STATE SECURITY OF SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
AND EVENTS IN POLAND 1980–1982*

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ABSTRACT. The Socialist Republic of Croatia, as one of republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, possessed its State Security Service (Služba državne sigurnosti, SDS), equivalent to similar political security services in other communist states. At the Yugoslav level there was also the Federal State Security Service. The State Security of Croatia dealt with both internal and external threats to the communist system and gathered intelligence information. In the early 1980s the State Security of Croatia gathered sizeable amount of information on the events connected with activities of “Solidarity” in the People’s Republic of Poland and the crisis that ultimately led to the imposition of state of war in Poland, as well as reaction to these events in Croatia. The main aim of this paper is to present State Security reports about Poland in the period between 1980 and 1982.

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Keywords: Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Republic of Croatia, Poland, “Solidarity”, State of War in Poland, State Security Service of Socialist Republic of Croatia

In the early 1980s, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia faced a new phase in its history, after the death of its leader, president Josip Broz Tito. The reforms during the 1970s brought decentralization and gave sizeable rights to Yugoslav republics, while the power was in the hands of League of Communists of Yugoslavia, consisting of leagues of communists of republics. Social and economic system was organized through socialist self-management, whose aim was to involve the working class into the management of economy and social affairs. In the early 1980s there was a growing economic crisis in Yugoslavia, but nevertheless the system seemed stable, the main

* This paper was written within the scientific project War, Victims, Violence and Borders of Freedom in the Croatian 20th Century (IP-2019-04-6673) of the Croatian Institute for History, financed by the Croatian Science Foundation.
exception being the riots of ethnic Albanians that broke up in the Serbian autonomous province Kosovo.\textsuperscript{1}

Socialist Republic of Croatia, as one of Yugoslav republic, had its own apparatus of internal affairs and security and one of its elements was State Security Service (\textit{Služba državne sigurnost}, SDS). Each Yugoslav republic had such a service and there was also a federal State Security. From 1980 to 1982 the State Security of Croatia gathered various information concerning the events in the People’s Republic of Poland. From late 1980 State Security reports dealing with those events were marked under the codename “Action Cracow”. The main aim of this paper is to present the information gathered by the State Security of Croatia concerning these Polish events.

The State Security used various methods to gather information. In Croatia it tapped telephone conversations and intercepted mail, and also used informants (“collaborators”, “social connections”). The State Security informants, mostly journalists or representatives of certain Croatian enterprises, also visited Poland and later submitted reports about the situation in that state.

The main outline of the events in Poland in early 1980s is well known. The strike in the Gdansk shipyard in August 1980, the foundation of the independent trade union “Solidarity” led by Lech Wałęsa and the ensuing negotiations between the “Solidarity” and the regime. During that period there were also various personal changes in the Polish government and leadership of the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (\textit{Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza}, PZPR), with general Wojciech Jaruzelski gaining all the main party and state positions. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states were worried about the “counterrevolutionary” developments in Poland and their military intervention in Poland seemed a possibility. Ultimately, the crisis of the Polish communist regime was resolved by the declaration of the martial law on December 13, 1981 and a crackdown on “Solidarity”, which was banned.\textsuperscript{2}

Yugoslav regime was eager to show its independence from the Eastern Block and to present its socialist self-management system as superior to the “state socialism” of WTO states. Yugoslav regime saw the events in Poland as a result of weaknesses of the Polish communist regime, while the perception of “Solidarity” was ambivalent, because it was seen as a movement including “moderate”, but also “radical” and therefore counterrevolutionary elements. Accordingly, Yugoslavia respected “Solidarity” in its demands for reforms, but it also condemned its anti-communist elements. Yugoslav regime saw the introduction of the martial law in Poland as its internal affair that should not be meddled in by other states.\textsuperscript{3}

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In late August 1980 Viktor Kinecki, Polish ambassador in Belgrade, ordered Kazimier Haladusz, Polish general consul in Zagreb, to stop issuing visas to journalists who wanted to visit Poland, in fact to postpone all visits to Poland with the exception of those that are necessary.4

Also in August Haladusz and his wife commented on strikes in Szczecin and Gdansk in a telephone conversation that was tapped by the State Security, concluding that the strike would have negative economic consequences and lead to “catastrophe” and further confrontations.5

During September 1980 Edward Rudnicki, consul for culture and information activities at the General Consulate in Zagreb, commented that personal changes in the Polish state and Party leadership were a positive step, because those who were replaced played a negative role and were responsible for a widespread corruption. Rudnicki also said that Poland will now use the Yugoslav experience, meaning the self-management. Also in September, consul for consular affairs Kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk commented that he does not believe that the new Polish leadership will be able to resolve the crisis, because Poland is in the state of “anarchy”. He also mentioned that there was concern that former prime minister Edward Babiuch would ask Moscow to intervene in Poland, and also mentioned that Piotr Jaroszewicz, who was prime minister before Babiuch, was a “Soviet man”.6

In late 1980 and early 1981 there were numerous changes in the Polish general consulate in Zagreb. Haladusz was prematurely withdrawn from the position of general consul along with some other staff.7 After Haladusz was withdrawn Kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk became the acting general consul. In late November 1980, Bartłomiejczyk commented that the previous Polish leadership indeed played a negative role, but what is currently going on in Poland is a “counterrevolution”. The Catholic church in Poland is at the helm of counterrevolution and “Solidarity” has recently been infiltrated by counterrevolutionary groups connected with Polish emigre circles.8

In mid-December 1980, the State Security, through tapping the telephone conversations, came to a conclusion that staff of the Polish general consulate in Zagreb is very nervous and worried about the situation in Poland, fearing violence and unrests. The staff of the General consulate also thought that Polish radio stations are not re-

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4 Hrvatska, Hrvatski državni arhiv u Zagrebu (hereafter: HR-HDA), Record group 1561, Služba državne sigurnosti Republickog sekretarijata unutrašnjih poslova Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske (hereafter: 1561), Centar Zagreb, 30.08.1980, Informacija broj 549.
5 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 02.09.1980, Informacija broj 557.
6 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 22.09.1980, Informacija broj 593.
porting the truth about the events, while Western radio stations were reporting about concentration on WTO troops on Polish borders.\(^9\)

In early February 1981 Kazimierz Janiak, formerly a high PZPR official in Płock, was appointed a new general consul in Zagreb. In conversation with an informant of the State Security Janiak said that the Polish government and Party are optimistic about the improvement of the difficult economic situation which is especially visible in providing food for the population. The Polish leadership planned to cut unnecessary investments and to involve the working class in running of their companies. Janiak also mentioned that there exist “powerful forces” in Poland whose aim is to destabilize situation and they enjoy the support of the reactionary circles in the West. Janiak hoped that military intervention can be averted and that the government and Party will take a strong stand toward those spreading antisocialist propaganda and destabilizing the situation. The informer who spoke with Janiak later reported that Janiak had not once mentioned “Solidarity”.\(^10\)

But Janiak did not stay in Zagreb for long. The Polish press published articles criticizing Janiak’s service while he held positions in Poland and he was ordered to return home. All this put a great strain on Janiak and he tried to postpone his return.\(^11\) In June 1981, Janiak contacted various consulates of the Western states and the State Security concluded that it is possible that he will defect to the West in order to avoid returning to Poland.\(^12\) Finally, in July 1981, Janiak returned to Poland and Kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk became a new acting general consul in Zagreb.\(^13\)

In fact, Polish General Consulate in Zagreb was officially closed on July 31, 1981. Nevertheless, Bartłomiejczyk and sparse Polish staff remained in Zagreb in order to finish the remaining jobs and to transport the Consulate’s documentation to the Polish Embassy in Belgrade. The Poles also planned to lease the building of their Consulate.\(^14\)

In early November 1981, an informant reported to the State Security that he talked with Bartłomiejczyk who said that former general counsel Kazimierz Janiak was taken to Poland “by force”, and also mentioned that Janiak was a close friend of the former Polish prime minister Jaroszewicz. Bartłomiejczyk also said that he had information that Polish government will soon introduce the “military regime” and the Polish army will take control over the economy and production which are currently in complete disarray. Bartłomiejczyk explained that the Polish government counts on the assistance of the internal security forces, while there are certain “ambivalences” with-

\(^12\) HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 10.07.1981, Informacija broj 788.
in the Polish army. If an attempt to reinstate order by Polish government fails, there is
an “agreement” to call for “brotherly assistance” of other socialist states.\textsuperscript{15}

In late November 1981, an informant of the State Security again talked with
Bartłomiejczyk who said that he was finishing the affairs of the General Consulate,
which is closed in accordance to the decision of the Polish Government to reduce
the expenses of its diplomatic network. Bartłomiejczyk, as well as the Polish am-
assador in Belgrade, thought that such decision was a mistake. There were 19 var-
ious Polish missions in Belgrade, which was irrational, while the General Consulate
in Zagreb was being closed despite the necessity for Poland to keep economic con-
tacts in Croatia and Slovenia and despite the fact that many Polish tourists were visit-
ing Croatian Adriatic seaside. Bartłomiejczyk also mentioned that the former general
consul, Janiak, was in the meantime retired and his previous service, while he held of-
fices in Poland, was evaluated in a negative light.\textsuperscript{16}

Concerning the current situation in Poland, Bartłomiejczyk commented that PZRP
is in constant “defensive” because many of its members compromised themselves
and lost the reputation. Bartłomiejczyk thought that the former PZRP first secretary
Edward Gierek should have been put before court for his malfeasance, which would
have improved the prestige of PZRP. Unlike the communist officials, Wałęsa routine-
ly kept a direct contact with the workers. Bartłomiejczyk did not believe in the possi-
bility of the Soviet intervention and concluded that it is up to PZRP and “Solidarity”
to find the way out of the crisis.\textsuperscript{17}

In early December 1981, as Bartłomiejczyk was planning to return to Poland, he
mentioned that “old communists” who support the Polish government are in grave
danger from “Solidarity” and other enemies. Therefore, the government decided to di-
vide weapons among its loyalists and Bartłomiejczyk was also planning to get himself
a pistol. Bartłomiejczyk also said that Wałęsa spoke about “Solidarity” taking over the
power by the year’s end with himself becoming the new Polish prime minister.\textsuperscript{18}

On December 11, 1981 an informant spoke with Bartłomiejczyk’s wife Anna,
who said that the dialogue between the Polish government and “Solidarity” was fin-
ished and Wałęsa would soon be arrested. She also said that during the negotiations
with the “Solidarity”, the government used media to show the destructive and nega-
tive background of “Solidarity” and this propaganda was partially successful. Anna
Bartłomiejczyk thought general Jaruzelski had “limited” political capabilities and will
rule with “iron hand”, but she spoke in the most positive terms about the Polish army,
noting that it is the only institution with educated cadre in contrast to incompetent ci-

\textsuperscript{15} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 03.11.1981, Informacija broj 1101.
\textsuperscript{17} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 07.12.1981, Informacija broj 1211.
vilian officials. Contrary to that, she concluded that the “Solidarity” gathers the best Polish intellectuals.19

After the martial law was declared, Kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk, in a telephone conversation with a consulate clerk, commented that general Jaruzelski “spoke well” in his public proclamation of the martial law. Bartłomiejczyk thought that the martial law was unavoidable and it was necessary to arrest “hooligans” from “Solidarity”, “Trotskyists” and “troublemakers”. But he also mentioned that Wałęsa was a “peaceful Catholic” who struggles for “Polish blood”.20

Polish General Consulate in Zagreb was officially closed, but after the proclamation of the martial law its staff became more active, as many Polish citizens contacted it. These Poles were mostly interested in how they could return back to Poland. Bartłomiejczyk was explaining to them that they could use train lines via Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but warned them that return trip by car could be a problem because gas stations in Poland were not selling fuel. LOT flight to Zagreb was also cancelled, so around 50 Poles were to return by train.21

Some Poles who contacted Bartłomiejczyk told him that Yugoslavs are “pitying” them, but Bartłomiejczyk warned them to be careful, while the most important thing for them is to return home. Bartłomiejczyk was also calming those Poles, explaining them that “anarchy” in Poland had to be ended, so everything is “good” because people returned to work and the situation would improve. Order in the state had to be restored and some people had to be arrested.22

The State Security also gained information that immediately before the proclamation of state of war in Poland and after it several hundred Polish citizens who found themselves in Yugoslavia applied to Austrian General Consulate in Zagreb for visas. These Poles then travelled from Yugoslavia to Austria where authorities accommodated them in a camp, from where they could leave for Australia and Canada.23

In early January 1982, Polish ambassador Kinecki contacted Bartłomiejczyk. The ambassador received information from Warsaw that Yugoslav authorities established a camp for Poles who refuse to return home, located near Varaždin in north-western Croatia. Bartłomiejczyk travelled to Varaždin where local police informed him that the camp for Poles did not exist. In fact, a group of Polish tourist were, without permission, camping for a month near the Hungarian border, but in the meantime they left in an unknown direction.24

It seems that Kazimierz Bartłomiejczyk finally returned to Poland in early June 1982. Just before the departure, his wife Anna told a State Security informant that situation in Poland was still “catastrophic” because Polish government was not able to resolve the problem of “counterrevolution”. Soviet intervention was “expected” because only the Soviet Union and troops of WTO could make the situation “bearable”.25

As previously mentioned, Polish General Consulate in Zagreb was officially closed in late July 1981. Already in April of that year the State Security tapped a telephone conversation between two Consulate officials who mentioned that the Consulate in Zagreb would be closed, in fact it would be reorganized into a commercial delegation with smaller staff. The two officials commented that they would prefer not to return to Poland and hoped they would be sent to some of the Polish consulates in USA.26

Nevertheless, in early July 1982 Zbigniew Gurzinsky, the first secretary of the Polish Embassy in Belgrade, visited the Diet of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. He explained that Poland had to close a number of its missions in various states because of its political and economic problems. Despite this, due to the exceptionally friendly attitude of the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Polish side decided to make an exception and to reopen its General Consulate in Zagreb.27 In October 1982 Stefan Kubiak arrived to Zagreb as newly appointed charge d’affaires of the Polish General Consulate. Concerning the current situation in Poland he commented that it was gradually improving, there were no more demonstrations, while new law on trade unions were much more democratic and the new law was written based on the experiences of Belgian, French and Yugoslav trade unions. Kubiak also mentioned that new harvest in Poland would be plentiful which would further help to improve the situation and increase productivity.28

INFORMATION GATHERED IN POLAND AND FROM POLISH CITIZENS

In early September 1980, the informants of the State Security visited Poland and spoke with Waldemar Boldaniuk, general director of the Polish oil industry. Boldaniuk stated that Polish foreign debt amounts to 20 billion USD, but the Poles managed to postpone the payments of foreign credits for the period of five years and they also received favourable loans from France, Italy, Sweden and USA. Boldaniuk also stated that the Polish army would oppose possible military intervention of the Soviet Union and other WTO countries, because “Poland is not Afghanistan”. Boldaniuk also talked about disagreements within PZPR’s leadership, because Gierek’s circle advocated the use of force against the strikers, while Stanisław Kania’s circle opposed this,

25 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 01.06.1982, Informacija broj 636.
and, ultimately, Gieriek was forced to resign although, publicly, he withdrew because of ill health.29

In late September 1980, a Polish delegation visited INA oil company in Zagreb. The delegation included Jacek Suszyński, general secretary of the Polish Organization of Engineers and Technicians, Wojciech Biedrzycki, professor at the University of Krakow and Josef Rasakovcki, director of the Institute for Oil and Gas Mining in Krakow. These Polish representatives talked about the situation in their state, claiming that it is even more difficult than it had been during the period of numerous strikes. Media from Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic were attacking the situation in Poland while simultaneously representatives of these two states were offering material assistance to Poland. Rasakovcki also mentioned that government insists that “Solidarity” should be registered with the charter that recognizes the principles of alliance with the Soviet Union and Polish membership within the WTO. The “Solidarity” leadership rejected such principles and this led to disagreement with the state. The Polish guests also mentioned that Soviet troops that took part in the maneuvers in German Democratic Republic are now stationed in northern Poland, while Czechoslovakia stationed its parachute units in its border area with Poland. Rasakovcki explained that Polish army was in a state of readiness during the strikes and was ready to oppose foreign intervention, but in the meantime became completely isolated from all the developments in Poland and, allegedly, even did not have access to live ammunition. The Polish visitors concluded that Polish people and its working class were under pressure to abandon any demands for political changes.30

In early November 1980, a journalist A. L., informant of State Security, visited Poland and conducted an interview with Polish foreign minister Józef Czyrek. After the official interview Czyrek told the journalist that he was worried about the Ronald Reagan’s victory at the American presidential elections. Czyrek thought that Reagan would revise the policy of previous Carter administration on supply of Poland with the agricultural products. Reagan administration would also make both political and economic pressure on Poland, but the economic pressure would be much more difficult to withstand. The departure of Carter administration also meant the departure of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was Carter’s National Security Advisor. Czyrek thought that Brzezinski, although an anti-communist, cared about the interests of Poland. But Czyrek mentioned that there were 10 million Poles living in the USA, and he hoped they would influence Reagan in order to prevent “famine” in Poland. According to Czyrek, situation with agriculture and food supplies in Poland was “tragic”. Czyrek blamed the PZPR for hiding the real situation from the workers. As a consequence, workers lost their faith in the Party. Czyrek was also worried about the elements within the “Solidarity” who were pushing it into “adventurism”.31

30 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 07.11.1980, Informacija broj 697.
A. L. talked with Tomasz Ritel from “Interpress” agency which said Lech Wałęsa was a “Christian socialist”, naïve and lacking experience and political knowledge. Nevertheless, Polish workers had a mystical faith in him and saw “Solidarity” as an answer to all problems. Ritel considered that in coalmining regions, around 75% members of “Solidarity” were also members of PZPR, while in the coastal region only around 50% “Solidarity” members were communists, which led to disagreements within the “Solidarity”. Ritel also explained that “Solidarity” was an indigenous and independent movement, despite the claims of the Polish state propaganda that it was under the influence from the West. In case of the Soviet military intervention, Ritel thought that Poles would be able to put up only passive resistance and added that Soviets were most worried about the current shifts within the PZPR aimed at the democratization within the Party.32

A. L. also made the official interview with Stefan Bratkowski, president of the Association of Polish Journalists, who told him that the Poles no longer believed the official media. Because of this, Polish journalists were preparing to hold an extraordinary congress whose aim would be the transformation of journalism from service of individuals and groups within the government into journalism that would serve the socialist system in general. Bratkowski explained that Stanisław Kania, the first secretary of PZPR, proposed measures which would lead to stability. A part of the PZRP leadership, “Solidarity”, Catholic intelligentsia and other groups were all interested in finding a solution which would lead to stability. Therefore, Bratkowski was optimistic and thought that Poland stood before the development of self-management, and cooperation between the authorities and the people would lead to economic recovery. Bratkowski also thought that “Solidarity” would play a great role in the normalization, because they were a strong group of people of “good will”. Anyway, two thirds of “Solidarity” members were also members of PZPR, so “Solidarity” could not be perceived as something aimed against the system.33

A State Security informant visited the Tobacco Institute in Cracow in December 1980, where he talked with its representatives, Vladislav Pelko and Leopold Kowalchuk. They told him that “Solidarity” was trying to replace certain officials in their institute. They also complained about shortages of food, explaining that Poland was exporting meat in order to pay its foreign debts, leading to shortages. They said that counterrevolutionary groups from Polish emigre circles infiltrated the “Solidarity” and also blamed Pope John Paul II for the current crisis in Poland, although he had in the meantime changed his attitude and was appealing for the “joint salvation” of Poland. Kowalchuk also mentioned the Polish army, saying that all younger officers supported the democratic reforms and the “Solidarity”, while older officers were mostly inclined toward the Soviet Union. Kowalchuk was also worried about the possible Soviet military intervention, but still thought this would not happen because the

33 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, [25.11.1980], Informacija broj 740.
Soviets had enough internal problems. He was also worried about possible intervention of other WTO states (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic) and mentioned that, allegedly, a large number of Polish army uniforms were sent to Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, so he did not rule out the possibility that troops of these states, dressed in Polish uniforms, could be deployed in Poland.\(^{34}\)

In June 1981 Leopold Kowalchuk, while on business trip to Trieste in Italy, again contacted the informant of State Security and mentioned that recently a Soviet consul in Poznań was killed, but this event was not made public. Kowalchuk suspected that the Soviets themselves were behind the killing in order to use it as a pretext for pressure on Poland.\(^{35}\)

During February 1981 journalist A. L. visited Poland again. He again contacted Tomasz Ritel from “Interpress” who told him that situation was constantly deteriorating. In the meantime, general Jaruzelski became the prime minister, and Ritel commented that previous prime minister Pinkovski did not enjoy any respect among the population. Ritel thought that Jaruzelski would have stronger influence on Poles who traditionally respect the army. Also, Jaruzelski was well known as a modest person which was of great importance in relation with the current campaign against the corruption of former officials.

Ritel also commented that the role of the Polish army was still unclear, but it was believed that the army would intervene in order to prevent the possible Soviet invasion. The position of the Catholic church was growing stronger but simultaneously the Church was calming the radical elements within “Solidarity” and, in certain cases, the Church cooperated with the regime. Within “Solidarity” itself, its local representatives were less and less ready to obey its central leadership and Wałęsa. Local branches of “Solidarity” were increasing the pressure on the regime, and were currently leading the campaign to abolish the privileges of the officials of the Party and Ministry of internal affairs. In Jelenia Góra local “Solidarity” demanded to take control over the resort used by members of Central Committee of PZRP and Ministry of internal affairs in order to turn the resort into the hospital. Wałęsa personally intervened, demanding from local “Solidarity” to give up on this demand, but they refused and the resort was temporarily turned into hospital. Some local branches of “Solidarity” were also questioning the position of Wałęsa. The national congress of “Solidarity” had not been held at that time, so its leadership, along with Wałęsa, were not officially elected. In fact, western governments and the Pope were pressuring “Solidarity” not to be radical, in order to avoid the possible Soviet intervention. The “Solidarity” leadership agreed to this, but because of the moderation it was losing the support of the masses. Concerning the PZRP Ritel concluded that it lost the authority not only among the masses, but also among its members who were demanding autonomy and the right to directly elect the Party’s leadership. The government and the PZRP were prepar-

\(^{34}\) HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 15.12.1980, Informacija broj 807.

\(^{35}\) HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 29.06.1981, Informacija broj 751.
ing large scale reforms in the management of the economy with the introduction of self-management on a scale “wider” than the Yugoslav. But “Solidarity” was sceptical about these plans and took them only as a starting point in negotiations.36

In April 1981 Polish delegation led by Waldemar Boldaniuk, general director of the Polish oil industry, visited INA oil company in Zagreb. Boldaniuk mentioned that Gustáv Husák, first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, stated that experiences of his state during 1968 should be applied to Poland. Boldaniuk concluded that Husák was a “son of a bitch”, trying to lecture the Poles. But the Poles were not the Czechoslovaks, and the Soviets could kill 200.000 Poles, but they would not subdue the Polish people who had it enough after 30 years of being “exploited”. Nevertheless, Boldaniuk concluded that all the changes in Poland were aimed at the development of the socialist system. He claimed that both Kania and Jaruzelski in fact supported “Solidarity” and were in agreement with its demand for an economic reform based on socialist principles. Yugoslavia with its socialist self-management system should serve as an example to Polish reforms. State Security noted that all members of the Polish delegation, and especially Boldaniuk, showed particular interests in the Yugoslav experience with self-management because they were also planning to adopt it. Jakub Siemek, head of the Oil and Gas Institute, who was also a member of the visiting delegation, stated that “Solidarity” has 11 million members which was a guarantee that Poland would withstand any Soviet pressure. Soviets would not dare to intervene militarily, while Wałęsa gathered around him a group of outstanding experts in economy, politics and science.37

In late April 1981 Wadim Mietkowski, head of the Polish pavilion at Zagreb Fair, visited Zagreb. Concerning the situation in Poland he said that Soviets did not understand the essence of “Solidarity” whose strength was impressive, because it could force the ministers and voivodes to resign. Mietkowski explained that “Solidarity” had importance to the Polish people equal to the importance of the October Revolution for Russians, because they saw “liberation and complete independence” in “Solidarity”.38

During late November 1981 a State Security social connection H. M. visited Poland. After returning to Zagreb he reported that Poles see the exit from the current crises in the “arranged” confrontation between the “Solidarity” and the government, which would prevent the Soviet intervention. H. M. also reported that the living standard in Poland is at the “lowest possible level”. The 95% of shelves in the biggest department store in Warsaw were completely empty, while remaining shelves were filled with various souvenirs. Foodstuffs could be bought at the black market for western currencies.39

36 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 02.03.1981, Informacija broj 193.
38 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 08.05.1981, Informacija broj 517.
Another State Security informant returned from a business trip to Poland in late December 1981, briefly after the proclamation of the martial law. He reported that Polish business partners he contacted commented that Poles themselves were to blame for a huge national crisis. Poles preferred easy life over hard work, while at the same time they had a strong anti-Soviet attitude. They preferred going on strike because they did not want to work and see their products being exported to the Soviet Union. The current crisis stared around 1970 when strikes were organized in larger industrial centres. In 1976 situation again deteriorated and at that time various, mostly “reactionary” organizations were organized, such as the Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR). The following step in the crisis was the foundation of “Solidarity”, whose advisors came from KOR, while its ideological patron was the Catholic church. The “Solidarity” wanted the crisis, because this would enable it to gain power. But the regime itself also preferred the crisis because it could blame the “Solidarity” for paralyzing the state and ultimately opening the possibility to crush the most exposed enemies of the regime.\footnote{HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 14.01.1982, Informacija broj 34.}

The same Polish sources also claimed that prior to the introduction of the martial law, “Solidarity” caused numerous incidents. One of them occurred in a factory near Warsaw where “Solidarity” demanded from all PZRP members to renounce their membership in the Party, or to quit their jobs. There were also rumours that there are foreigners within “Solidarity”, among them Americans, and after the proclamation of the martial law it was been publicly reported that police arrested one of those foreigners during the curbing of the strike in the Gdansk shipyard. The police also discovered secret “Solidarity” stashes of weapons and explosive. Both foreigners and weapons were smuggled by ships carrying aid for Poland and some of the ships were offloaded exclusively by selected members of “Solidarity”. They also told the State Security informant that general Jaruzelski was a patriot who in 1970, as a commander of Gdansk military district, refused to use his units against the workers’ demonstrations. During 1981 Jaruzelski again refused to use army to stop the strikes, claiming that army’s role was to defend the state and not to combat Polish workers.\footnote{HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 14.01.1982, Informacija broj 34.}

It seems that during 1982 informants of State Security rarely travelled to Poland, so reports on situation from that period are not available.

In September 1982 Andrzej Mietkowski arrived at Zagreb airport from Paris. He wanted to meet with his father Wadim, who was head of the Polish pavilion at Zagreb Fair. During the custom control several “Solidarity” bulletins were found in Mietkowski baggage and he was held for interrogation. During the interrogation he stated that he left Poland in March 1981, because of his opposition to the government, and was living in Paris at the time and worked as a journalist for a “Solidarity” paper. In Paris he could propagate the ideas of “Solidarity”, which was impossible in Poland. Nevertheless, he stated that he would return to Poland after the victory of
“Solidarity”. Questioned why he carried “Solidarity” bulletins to Yugoslavia, he answered that there was a „freedom of opinion” in Yugoslavia and that the representatives of Yugoslav trade unions attended the congress of “Solidarity”, so he did not see the reason why the bulletins should not be taken to Yugoslavia. He said that he arrived to Zagreb to meet with his father, because he could not meet him anywhere else. He indeed met with the father at the airport, and the State Security reported that the meeting was “very touching”, as both cried, hugged and kissed. Andrzej gave Wadim medicines and some presents. After the interrogation Andrzej Mietkowski was informed that he would have to immediately leave Yugoslavia. As the State Security reported, he did not take this lightly and he asked if he could stay for a few days. His father also asked for his son to stay and he wanted to intervene via his colleagues in the Chamber of commerce of Croatia and the Diet of Socialist Republic of Croatia. Despite all this, Andrzej Mietkowski flew away on that same day. He was also prohibited from entering Yugoslavia for the following two years. “Solidarity” bulletins and a book of a Russian author discovered during the custom control were seized and Mietkowski was issued a receipt that these materials would be returned to him after they had been translated and inspected.42

In early 1983 the State Security received a report from informant Z. N., who was a journalist working for Radio Zagreb and who visited Poland with the approval of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. According to Z. N., Jaruzelski should have withdrawn from the position of prime minister in January 1983 and possibly succeeded by general Czesław Kiszczak. Jaruzelski was successful in consolidating the situation in Poland and the Polish position within the Eastern Block. Nevertheless, PZPR was still “decimated” and would only gradually regain strength. Although the situation appeared calm, “clerical-fascist terror” of “Solidarity” was still felt, while the “extreme” part of “Solidarity” leadership transferred the struggle from the streets to the factory floors.43

INFORMATION GAINED FROM REPRESENTATIVE OF WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION STATES

State Security also gained information on situation in Poland by observing and contacting Soviet and other WTO states representative.

Arkady Markin, representative of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Belgrade, visited Zagreb in late August 1980 and commented that the Poles turned too much to the West and are indebted by loans taken from the western states. Markin was pessimistic about further developments in Poland. He also had a positive view of the recently

replaced Polish prime minister Edward Babiuch, while he was disappointed with his successor, Józef Pińkowski.44

In December 1980 Soviet warships visited Split at the Adriatic coast. During the visit Boris Sviridov, a Soviet naval attaché in Yugoslavia, stated that Moscow hoped that the Poles would resolve their problems on their own. He did not expect the regime change in Poland, because it was encircled by other socialist states. Nevertheless, he did not rule out the possibility of Soviet intervention if the situation in Poland had turned into “anarchy”, adding that Poles were “smugglers and lazy people”, who through history had been unable to recognize who their “true friends” were.45

In June 1981 Eduard Krasavin, Soviet general consul in Zagreb, commented that the Soviet military intervention in Poland was not an option. He also said he expected substantial changes in the Soviet foreign policy in the future, because its intervention in Afghanistan was unnecessary, while Moscow’s support for certain governments and progressive movements in Africa was costly and sometimes only brought problems to Moscow.46

Also in early June 1981 an informant of State Security of Croatia visited Belgrade, where he spoke with a Soviet representative, who said that the Soviets would intervene in Poland only in the case of civil war in that country, but otherwise there would be no intervention, because the Soviets made a mistake by intervening in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Therefore, the Poles should resolve problems on their own.47

In July 1981 an informant of State Security under codename “Franjo”, a journalist from Zagreb, visited Moscow where he talked with a certain Antonov, from “Novosti” Press Agency, who bitterly commented events in Poland. Antonov was pessimistic about the Polish ability to resolve the crisis, although he thought that Jaruzelski as prime minister was a person who could be trusted. Antonov mentioned that Poles were visiting Western European states where they claimed that they would like Poland to have the western standard of living. But in order to achieve such standard, commented Antonov, the Poles should work and not strike. One of Antonov’s assistants angrily commented that the Poles should be “shot”.48

In September 1981 Oleg Korunov, a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, visited Zagreb. He mentioned that he had the opportunity to talk with a Polish delegation visiting Moscow. These Poles told him that they would like their state to be similar to Yugoslavia, meaning that they would like to adopt a self-management system. Korunov allegedly ironically answered them that the difference was that the Yugoslavs “are working”, while Poles “are not working”.49

Also in September 1981 Stanislav Ostapishin, the first secretary of Soviet Embassy in

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44 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 28. 8.1980, Informacija broj 543.
Belgrade, during his visit to Zagreb, critically commented the Yugoslav anti-Soviet attitude. He was especially dissatisfied with the Yugoslav press covering of the situation in Poland. According to him, Yugoslav press had great sympathies for “Solidarity”, but he asked his hosts what would be the reaction if something similar to “Solidarity” appeared in Yugoslavia.  

During September 1981 the State Security also gained information from a lecturer of the Serbo-Croatian language who was at that time working at the Leningrad University. Among others, the lecturer noticed that all lecturers of foreign languages receive equal treatment, with the exception of the lecturer from Bulgaria who enjoyed a privileged position, while the lecturer of Polish language had the worst accommodations and the lowest salary. The same source later reported that in November 1981 four professors of Polish language at the Leningrad University were mobilized to the Soviet army, which was seen as a sign that the crisis in Poland was escalating and the Soviets were preparing to intervene.

In the meantime, in October 1981, a State Security informant spoke with Vitaliy Dudnichenko, Soviet consul in Zagreb, who said that there would be large scale changes in the Polish leadership, because American intelligence services, with the help of the Catholic clergy, played an important role in Poland. The Soviet consul added that the role of CIA in events in Poland is known and some of CIA’s agents have been arrested by Polish security services. Despite all this, Dudnichenko concluded that due to various reasons “force” cannot be applied in Poland.

On December 11, 1981, a State Security informant “Jan” spoke with Soviet consul Dudnichenko, who commented that break in the dialogue between the Polish Government and the “Solidarity” was unavoidable. Dudnichenko thought that Jaruzelski was “well organized” and would eventually be successful. Dudnichenko also pointed out that there would be no Soviet intervention, because the Poles would resolve the crisis themselves, while Moscow believed in a “firm agreement” it had with Poland.

On December 16, 1981 informant “Franjo” spoke with the Soviet general consul Krasavin. He told “Franjo” that Moscow was ready to accept the multiparty system in Poland under the condition that all parties had the socialist platform and that Poland maintained its commitments toward Moscow and WTO. Krasavin explained that Moscow understood that the system in Poland could not be organized along the lines of the socialist system in the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was better for Moscow to have Poland under the political platform of Jaruzelski rather than to have an unstable situation in that state. “Franjo” reported that from the tone of conversation with

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52 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 15.03.1982, Informacija broj 294.
53 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 05.11.1981, Informacija broj 1124.
Krasavin he had an impression that Jaruzelski’s political platform was in fact conceived in Moscow.\textsuperscript{55}

After returning from the Soviet Union in late March 1982, “Franjo” reported that it had been difficult for the Soviet authorities to explain to their people why there is no intervention in Poland, therefore after the proclamation of the martial law Soviet citizens were “relieved” and for that reasons there was no wider disapproval of the material aid the Soviets were currently sending to Poland. “Franjo” assumed that amount of this aid was substantial.\textsuperscript{56}

During the summer of 1982 “Franjo” again visited Soviet Union. Upon his return to Zagreb he reported to the State Security that the economic situation in the Soviet Union was difficult. Nevertheless, the opinion was that the “battle for Poland has been won” and the current Polish leadership would be able to resolve the crisis. Concerning the Polish debts to Western countries, their obligations were divided among the WTO states, in order to show “solidarity” with Poland, and this was done according to the “wise recommendation” of the Soviet leader Brezhnev.\textsuperscript{57}

Along with the information on the situation in Poland collected from various Soviet representatives, the State Security also gained information about the views of the representatives of other WTO states.

In early September 1980 Günther Berg, general consul of the German Democratic Republic in Zagreb, said to a State Security informant that although strikes in Poland stopped, the problems were not resolved. Such a situation made the German Democratic Republic “gravely concerned”.\textsuperscript{58} In July 1981 warships of German Democratic Republic visited the coastal town of Split. The east Germans were pessimistic about the situation in Poland, claiming that the Poles are “lazy and religious” people.\textsuperscript{59}

On March 12, 1981, an informant spoke with Jaromir Tichy, a Czechoslovak vice-consul in Zagreb. He concluded that the events in Poland were similar to the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and amounted to the actions of counterrevolutionary forces. Concerning the speech held by Kania at the 26th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Tichy concluded that the speech was created under the Soviet “dictate” in order to, if necessary, open the possibility of the Soviet military intervention in Poland. Tichy said that the Polish prime minister Jaruzelski talked with Wałęsa and told him that the Soviet intervention was possible and, allegedly, after this warning the announced strikes in Poland were called off.\textsuperscript{60}

In late October 1981 Tichy commented that riots in Poland started after the visit of Pope John Paul II, while the current situation in Poland was extremely difficult


\textsuperscript{56} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 30.03.1982, Informacija broj 371.

\textsuperscript{57} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 08.09.1982, Informacija broj 915.

\textsuperscript{58} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 22.09.1980, Informacija broj 593.


\textsuperscript{60} HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 19.03.1981, Informacija broj 269.
and only stern measures would allow the Poles to avoid a catastroph. The Poles were currently “starving”, which would not have been the case if they had had showed more loyalty toward the Soviet Union and WTO. In November 1981 Tichy said to an informant of the State Security that general Jaruzelski had taken over all the most informant positions of power in order to be able to act energetically. Tichy thought that the crisis in Poland reached the climax and because of this it was not surprising that the Soviet and Czechoslovak armies were ready to intervene. After the informant asked him whether this was not reminiscent of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tichy cynically responded: “Why would Poles have it any better than us!”.

Immediately after the proclamation of martial law in Poland, Miroslav Holub, the Czechoslovakian general consul in Zagreb, telephoned his wife on December 14, 1981. She was a journalist in the “Rudé pravo” newspaper in Prague. They commented on the situation in Poland and concluded that the introduction of martial law on Sunday was a good move, but it remained to be seen how would workers react to the martial law after they return to work. Holub’s wife feared the possibility of the civil war in Poland, but her husband thought that unlikely, because he believed in the authority the Polish army enjoyed among Poles. Holub also commented on the president Reagan’s statement on Poland, saying that the American president is a “cowboy” who acts as if Poland was an “American colony”.

In early March 1982 vice-consul Tichy commented that the imposition of the martial law in Poland was the only possible solution that prevented the general chaos. Despite the negative reactions from parts of international community, headed by the United States, martial law in Poland, despite its sternness, was the only possible solution. In late summer of 1982 Tichy stated that “Solidarity” has been connected with foreign states. Those who participated in “Solidarity” and their families received material assistance from abroad. He thought that it would take a long time to resolve the crisis, adding that similar events were also possible in Czechoslovakia, because of the lowering living standard of its working class.

Through its informants the State Security also gained certain information about the Bulgarian viewpoint on the situation in Poland. During November 1980 an informant visited Bulgaria, where one of its officials stated that Bulgarians were indeed scared about the antisocialist developments in Poland. Bulgarians also commented that the Soviets hoped that the Poles themselves would resolve the crisis, possibly with the intervention of the Polish army, because the Soviets were aware that their intervention would be a risky undertaking. Only if everything else failed, the Soviets would intervene directly. Later, in Spring of 1982, an informant of State Security visited

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64 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 10.03.1982, Informacija broj 275.
65 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 03.09.1982, Informacija broj 910.
Bulgaria, where officials of the Bulgarian Communist Party stated that the Catholic Church and Western states stood behind the upheaval in Poland. These Bulgarian communists thought that introduction of self-management system in Poland was unrealistic, while the introduction of the state of war was the only solution.67

Unlike the Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian representatives, their Romanian counterparts were more reserved. In December 1980 Nicolae Ficiu, the Romanian general consul in Zagreb, stated that the Soviet Union would not and cannot intervene militarily in Poland, because this would have huge political consequences for both Moscow and WTO. Therefore, the Romanian standpoint on Poland was identical to the Yugoslav one — the Poles themselves had to resolve their problems, but — as Ficiu remarked — the Poles should clear their state from “American agents”.68

REACTIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV OPPOSITION

Because of its multinational composition, Yugoslavia did not have a unified opposition to the ruling regime. Yugoslav federative system recognized national rights of all its national and ethnic groups, but at the same time the nationalism of any nation or ethnic groups was seen as dangerous and counterrevolutionary, aimed against the “brotherhood and unity” of Yugoslav nations and ethnic groups. But there was another type of opposition, consisting of Marxist intellectuals from various parts of Yugoslavia, gathered around the philosophical journal “Praxis”, published during the 1960s and 1970s. They criticized the Yugoslav communist leadership for abandoning “the original” communist idea for pragmatic purposes of holding the power. The Yugoslav regime labelled such a type of opposition as “anarchist-liberals”.69 The reports of the State Security of Croatia suggested that the “anarchist-liberal” circles showed the greatest activity concerning the proclamation of state of war in Poland.70

On December 14, 1981 the strike committee of the Szczecin shipyard issued a proclamation to the international community, asking them to demand from the Polish government to abolish the state of war, to release all arrested persons and to reinstate all workers’ and democratic rights achieved since August 1980. Upon receiving this proclamation, a group of around 300 intellectuals, students and other citizens from Belgrade sent a petition to general Jaruzelski, proclaiming their support for the “Solidarity”, demanding the abolishment of the martial law and the liberation of polit-

70 Yugoslav reactions to events in Poland during the early 1980s and to the “Solidarity” movement have recently been presented in: M. Sokulski, Reakcje społeczeństwa jugosłowiańskiego na powstanie i rozwój Solidarności 1980–1981, “Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, Pismo naukowe poświęcone historii najnowszej” 2020, no. 1, p. 226–251.
ical prisoners. In their petition they accused Jaruzelski of playing an “infamous role” by adding the military putsch to the arsenal of the “bureaucratic counterrevolution”, which shows that Polish “bureaucracy” is no worse than the “most militant bourgeois reaction”.

On December 24, 1981 a group of around 20 persons gathered in front of the Polish Embassy in Belgrade to protest the declaration of the state of war. The demonstrations were not authorized by the authorities and were immediately dispersed by the police. The police in Belgrade then arrested some persons and began investigating who organized the sending of the petition to Jaruzelski. The authorities made clear to those involved in the protest against the martial law in Poland that the Yugoslav government issued its official view concerning these events after which any manifestation of the Yugoslav citizens in connection to the Polish events would not be tolerated.

Already on December 30, 1981 the State Security in Zagreb had information that certain students of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, well known for their previous “anarchistic-liberal” activities, were also planning to sign the petition in support of the “Solidarity”. On January 15, 1982 the official Yugoslav news agency “Tanjug” in Belgrade received a letter of support to “Solidarity” signed by 206 Croatian citizens. “Tanjug” obviously did not make the letter public, but the State Security in Zagreb immediately began identifying citizens who signed it. It was established that the majority of those were students from Zagreb, mainly from the Faculty of Philosophy, as well as nine professors of that faculty (Danko Grlić, Miroslav Jilek, Milan Kangrga, Vjeran Katunarić, Mladen Labus, Žarko Puhovski, Goran Švob, Lino Veljak, Ozren Žunec). Many of those professors as well as certain students were already in evidence and under the measures of the State Security because of their “anarchistic-liberal” activities. But the letter was also signed by several persons who were known to the State Security as Croatian nationalists. The State Security planned to interrogate some of the signatories of the letter of support, while it decided to put two students, known as “anarchistic-liberal”, who initiated the signing of the letter, under its “preliminary operational analysis”.

In the meantime, on December 13, 1981, Stjepan Udović, a Yugoslav citizen working at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Uppsala in Sweden, telephoned a sociologist and philosopher Rudi Supek in Zagreb. Supek was member of the intellectual circle around “Praxis”. Udović informed Supek that he had contacted Adam Michnik, who was interested in establishing a journal that would gather people from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, who were researching self-management. Supek though it would be hardly possible to establish such a jour-

72 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 14.07.1982, Informacija broj 792.
nal, taking into consideration that the Yugoslav authorities were not inclined to give any publicity to oppositional circles in Poland. After the declaration of the martial law, Udović managed to visit Poland. As the opponents of the communist regime Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik had been arrested, Udović contacted their wives. In January 1982 Udović again telephoned Supek and informed him about his impressions from Poland. They again talked about Michnik’s initiative to found a journal that would deal with questions of democracy in socialism and self-management.\footnote{HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 16.12.1981, Informacija broj 1258, 14.01.1982, Informacija broj 32.}

On January 14, 1982, a lecture on events in Poland was held at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. The lecture was organized by the League of Socialist Youth chapter of the Faculty. The State Security carefully noted everything that was said at the lecture that was attended by around 250 persons, mostly students. The first lecturer was Žarko Puhovski, professor of philosophy. He stated that the Polish “Solidarity” was based on the right-wing bourgeois-liberal and nationalistic ideology, but even such an ideology could be “progressive” and “left-wing” in a modified Stalinist system existing in Poland. Other lecturers, Vladimir Lay and Zdravko Malić, based on their own knowledge of Poland, gave insight into the current events, but were, especially Malić, more reluctant to give any statements beyond the official view of the Yugoslav government.\footnote{HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 08.02.1982, Informacija broj 151.}

On February 13, 1982, a session of a study group “Man and System” was held at the Faculty of Philosophy. This study group gathered persons from around Yugoslavia known for their “anarchistic-liberal” tendencies. The topic of the mentioned session was the situation in Poland and it gathered around 35 persons from Belgrade, Slovenian capital of Ljubljana, and Zagreb. Andrzej Kutyłowski, an associate of the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, who left Poland in December 1981 and moved to Norway, also attended the session. According to the State Security, Kutyłowski held a brief presentation in favour of the “Solidarity”, but without any analysis or theoretical background. After that, presentations were held by Yugoslavs. Among them, an economist Branko Horvat described the situation in Poland as a “the first revolution in socialist states”, claiming that the “Solidarity” would make the democratization process possible, while self-management would play an important role. The State Security paid particular attention to the lecture of Mihajlo Marković, a professor from Belgrade. Marković thought that the events in Poland presented the most important attempt to counter the Stalinist model. He described the “Solidarity” as an autonomous and spontaneous mass movement. He also claimed that the Catholic church, despite its influence, did not play a crucial role within the “Solidarity”. Therefore, the experience of “Solidarity” showed that the working class could be the main subject of a revolutionary change and it could organize a truly democratic and pluralist movement. This movement was successful in achieving a legal right to have an independent trade union, which was simultaneously
an oppositional political movement, and the movement was also successful in achieving self-management in enterprises. But an attempt to take part in the Polish government was ultimately unsuccessful. Marković thought that the “Solidarity” could have been successful in taking part in the government, had it started a general strike in the spring of 1981, when the regime was weak. Ultimately the “Solidarity” was defeated because it underestimated the “counterrevolutionary potentials” of the Polish army and Marković drew parallels with situation in Chile, where army overthrew president Allende in 1973.

Marković concluded that the experience of the “Polish revolution” was invaluable, although the events showed that an independent democratic movement could not achieve more than to participate in the government along with the “political bureaucracy”. Marković also warned that the Catholic church’s advices in the critical moments must be ignored, because they were incompatible with “the democratic socialism”. Marković also concluded that the “Solidarity”, as it had existed before the martial law was “dead” but this was not caused primarily by the state terror, but because its 10 million members were not able to organize a general strike as an answer to the arrests of the “Solidarity” leaders. Nevertheless, Marković thought that the Polish people would probably continue its struggle and after several years a new and improved movement similar to the “Solidarity” would reappear.76

Day before, on February 12, 1982, Andrzej Kutylowski also held a lecture at the National and University Library in Zagreb. The title of the lecture was “Solidarity Trade Unions — A Demand for Self-Management” and it was organized by the Society of Sociologists of Croatia. Kutylowski presented the situation in Poland as it developed from August 1980, and mentioned a survey conducted in Poland whose results showed that the “Solidarity” was mostly motivated by economic and much less by political reasons. Rudi Supek attended the lecture and asked Kutylowski whether Wałęsa made a mistake when he moved from economic to political demands. Kutylowski answered that it was very difficult to draw a clear line between the economic and political demands of the “Solidarity”. In fact, the political demands were formulated only briefly before the imposition of the martial law, which was the only way to change the “structure of government”. He also said that the plans for the martial law were prepared much before the “Solidarity” formulated its political demands so they were not the cause for the introduction of the martial law.77

The State Security was also observing the reactions of the Catholic Church in Croatia to the events in Poland. The communist regime in Croatia always paid great attention to the Catholic Church, seeing it as a rival in control of the masses and also as a religious organization connected with Croatian nationalism.78 After the proclamation of the martial law in Poland, State Security agents attending masses in the

76 HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 17.02.1982, Informacija broj 198.
Zagreb Cathedral and in some other churches observed whether priests holding sermons would mention the events in Poland and make political comments, but nothing of particular interest was noted.\(^79\)

In early 1982 the State Security noted that the “Caritas” of the Zagreb Archdiocese was sending financial aid and parcels with food to Poland. In March 1982 the Archbishop Józef Glemp sent a letter to Zagreb “Caritas”, thanking it for sending aid to Poland. The Zagreb “Caritas” also received numerous letters from Poland, asking for aid in money and food, as well as numerous letters thanking for received aid.\(^80\)

From late May to mid-July of 1982 the Zagreb “Caritas” sent around 350 letters to Poland. All letters had the identical content, informing “Polish friends” that a parcel with food had been sent to them. Zagreb “Caritas” hoped that the parcels would be received intact and the “Polish friends” were asked to send a letter confirming its arrival and also to send the addresses of other Polish families who needed help, so that the parcels could also be send to them. These parcels contained noodles, rice, chocolate, candy, “Vegeta” spice, instant soups, puddings, vitamin C, powdered milk and detergent. The Zagreb “Caritas” also received 519 letters from Poland, many of them written in German, thanking for the received aid. In some of these letters there were the addresses of other families in need of help, as well as requests for medicines and second hand clothes. The State Security obviously wanted to stop the activities of the Zagreb “Caritas”, therefore all the mentioned letters, to and from Poland, were not delivered to the intended addresses.\(^81\)

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

As seen from the sources presented in this paper, the State Security of the Socialist Republic of Croatia gathered a sizeable amount of information concerning the events in Poland leading to the proclamation of the martial law in the late 1981. Obviously, the State Security was not the only and possibly not even the most important source of information for the Yugoslav authorities about these events, because the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Poland certainly sent even more detailed reports to Belgrade.

What is unknown is how the State Security used the gathered information, whether they were analysed or sent for further use to other institutions, such as the League of Communists of Croatia or other authorities. Undoubtedly certain information gathered by the State Security of Croatia about the events in Poland could nowadays, when compared with other more reliable historical sources, be seen as inaccurate,


\(^80\) HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 16.04.1982, Informacija broj 457.

\(^81\) HR-HDA-1561, Centar Zagreb, 04.08.1982, Informacija broj 837.
based on rumours and individual opinions. Nevertheless, I consider these pieces of information useful as a source for describing the atmosphere and the most important accents concerning the events in Poland in early 1980s.

Certainly, as the State Security was closely following all consulates in Zagreb, it also gained many information by observing the activities and views of the staff of the Polish General consulate. The State Security was also particularly interested in reactions of oppositional circles toward the events in Poland. According to its information, the most visible immediate response came from the so-called “anarchistic-liberal” circles, meaning the left-wing critical of the bureaucratic and non-democratic tendencies of the Yugoslav system. These circles were sympathetic toward “Solidarity”, seeing it as a genuine progressive movement of the Polish working class, or at least as a “right wing” movement that is nevertheless “positive” in the environment of the “modified Stalinist system” existing in Poland.

It is also interesting to note that the State Security reports sometimes mentioned various views and statements concerning the possibility of introducing a sort of self-management in Poland, as a solution to its problems. This detail was obviously interesting to the Yugoslavs, whose system was based on the socialist self-management.

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