

STRUCTURE OF THE CAVALRY GROUP OF THE CROWN
STANDARD-BEARER MIKOŁAJ HIERONIM SIENIAWSKI,
STATIONED IN MOLDAVIA AFTER THE BATTLE OF KHOTYN
(CHOCIM) IN 1673*

ZBIGNIEW HUNDERT

ABSTRACT. On 10 and 11 November 1673 Commonwealth's armies crushed Ottoman forces at the battle of Khotyn. Victory open new theatre of the operations against High Porte: towards river Danube and on the Polish territories lost in 1672 (Podolia with Kamianets-Podilskiyi and Right-bank Ukraine). Polish and Lithuanian troops were very weary after the campaign, what's more death of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki led to interregnum. Polish command decided to set up the system of border defence, to protect country until the election of new monarch, which should later lead to the new offensive. As such cavalry detachments were spread out in Podolia and Moldavia, while corps under command of Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, Crown Standard-bearer was sent to occupy the latter country. Previous research mentioned that this group had between 6000 and 8000 soldiers. Thanks to document from National Library in Warsaw, we can now identify much more detailed organisation of Sieniawski's force. He had 48 *pancerni* banners and two light horse banners, in total 5206 horses. Despite capturing Iași, capitol of Moldavia, Sieniawski's troops were forced on 17 January 1674 to retreat to Poland, under pressure from the fresh Tatar attack. Despite of the withdrawal from Moldavia, border defence system was still functional and Commonwealth managed fairly quickly to elect new king.

Author: Zbigniew Hundert, The Royal Castle in Warsaw — Museum; University of Warsaw, Faculty of History, 26/28 Krakowskie Przedmieście st., Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: zhundert@zamek-krolewski.pl, z.hundert@uw.edu.pl, **ORCID:** <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5088-2465>

Keywords: Interregnum 1673–1674, Cossack style cavalry/*pancerni*, Jan III Sobieski, Polish-Ottoman War 1672–1676

Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia, XXX, Poznań 2023, Wydawnictwo Wydziału Historii UAM, pp. 109–119, ISBN 978-83-67284-33-2, ISSN 0239-4278. English text with the summary in English.

<https://doi.org/10.14746/bp.2023.30.7>

* The article was written within the grant project, *Edycja diariusza wojewody witebskiego Jana Antoniego Chrapowickiego (1612–1685), cz. IV–VII*, financed by the National Programme for the Development of Humanities under the decision no. 11H 20 0211 88 from 2022 to 2027.

In summer 1672 army of the Ottomans invaded completely unprepared Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the successful offensive Sultan Mehmed IV captured Podolia with important fortress of Kamianets-Podilskyi and Right-bank Ukraine, then forced upon Commonwealth heavy conditions of the peace treaty in Buchach (18 X 1672). Commonwealth had to cease to Ottomans all captured territories, where Turks created new province.¹ In 1673 Poles attempted to go into offensive. Treaty of Buchach wasn't ratified, and both Commonwealth's armies — Polish and Lithuanian — prepared well to take the fight to the enemy. Ottomans decided to focus on the defence, attempting to keep previous year's booty with three corps — two deployed in Moldavia (one at Khotyn and one at Iași) and one in Podolia near Kamianets-Podilskyi. The largest of those, with approx. 30,000 men, was stationed near Khotyn. It became main target of the Commonwealth's attack and during the battle that took place on 10 and 11 November 1673, Polish-Lithuanian army under overall command of Crown Grand Hetman Jan Sobieski defeated Hussein Pasha's force. It was the worse Ottoman land defeat up to date.²

Commonwealth wasn't able to follow up the victory in autumn 1673 due to both late season and beginning of the interregnum. On 10 November died King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, which lead to the start of the election process, in order to choose new monarch. To secure the border with Ottomans and their allies, Sobieski decided to use part of his force to garrison few strategic locations captured in 1673 in Moldavia and Podolia. He attempted to create new base of operations for the future offensive, planned for the period after the election of new king. Hetman wanted also to control the whole of Moldavia, by deploying their detachment of Polish cavalry. It was move aimed at cutting off logistics lines to Kamianets-Podilskyi, which could lead to its quick surrender and return to Poland.³ Cavalry group that was to fulfil this mission was under the command of Crown Standard-Bearer Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, one of the closest political and military collaborators of Jan Sobieski. In this article I would like to focus on analysing the organisation and structure of this corps.

System of Kamianets-Podilskyi's blockade, created at the end of November 1673, is well researched in Polish historical-military literature. Thanks to work of Janusz Woliński and Marek Wagner, we know well the activities of Sieniawski's group in Moldavia, from its creating to retreat into Commonwealth on 17 January

¹ See: G. Ágoston, *The Last Muslim Conquest. The Ottoman Empire and its wars in Europe*, Princeton–Oxford, 2021, p. 486–490.

² Most current research of the campaign of 1673 and battle of Khotyn, see: Z. Hundert, *Bitwa pod Chocimiem 10–11 listopada 1673 roku w historiografii*, "Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny" 2021, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 161–176.

³ About plans of the Polish command after the battle of Khotyn: Z. Hundert, *Wojsko koronne a elekcja 1674 roku [in:] Wokół wolnych elekcji w państwie polsko-litewskim XVI–XVIII wieku. O znaczeniu idei wyboru — między prawami a obowiązkami*, eds. M. Markiewicz, D. Rolnik, F. Wolański, Katowice 2016, p. 310–313.

1674.⁴ Both researchers didn't know the register of the cavalry banners from the manuscript kept in National Library in Warsaw though. Document, written in camp near river Dzicza Racka on 29 November 1673, not only provides exact list of the units that were part of Sieniawski's corps but also other cavalry forces, created during the army gathering at the camp in Kakaczary (or Kakaczany) on 27 November 1673. It provides details of units under command of Deputy Cup-bearer of Sieradz Andrzej Modrzewski, that was located in Międzyboż at Podolia and those led by Knight of Malta Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski at Łabuń, protecting border between Volhynia and Right-bank Ukraine. Unfortunately there is no information about second strongest, after Sieniawski's corps, group of Polish cavalry — force that under Voivode of Braclaw Jan Potocki was directly blockading Kamianets-Podilsky. It does include small detachment of Potocki's forces though, that under Lieutenant Jan Golejowski was stationed near Studzienica between Halicz Land and Podolia.⁵ In this article we will focus on Sieniawski's force, having in mind researching other cavalry detachments in the future.

On 21 November Sobieski informed about his military plan interrex, Archbishop of Gniezno Kazimierz Florian Czaratoryski, writing to him that operations was to start after the general gathering of the Polish army,⁶ in the camp at Kakaczary.⁷ After the gathering, those army units that were not assigned to any of the battle groups travelled to Poland, to be stationed on the winter quarters. Amongst them were all banners of winged hussars (that played important role in the battle of Khotyn), part of *pancerni* units, all *arkabuzeria*⁸ and majority of infantry and dragoons regiments — except those that were part of garrisons in Podolia (Międzyboż, Żwaniec, Jazłów, Satanów) and Moldavia (Khotyn, Suceava, Târgu Neamț). Cavalry was to be sta-

⁴ J. Woliński, *Po Chocimie 1673–1674* [in:] idem, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, Warszawa 1983, p. 60–89; M. Wagner, *Działania wojenne na obszarach moldawskich, podolskich i ukraińskich wiosną 1674 roku* [in:] *Studia Historyczno-Wojskowe*, vol. 2, ed. M. Nagielski, K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, Zabrze 2008, p. 163–173; idem, *Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676*, vol. 1, Zabrze 2009, p. 394–407.

⁵ *Komput wojska pod komendą jmp. chorążego koronnego w Wołoszech zostającego, spisany nad Dziczą Racką, die 29 novembris 1673*, The National Library in Warsaw, ms 6659, p. 143–146. This document was previously used in the description of the deployment of the army after the battle of Khotyn. See: Z. Hundert, *Wojsko koronne a elekcja 1674...*, p. 312–313.

⁶ Majority of the Lithuanian army, under command of Grand Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac, left Moldavia already at 17 November 1673. See: K. Bobiatyński, *Wojsko i polityka — kilka uwag o udziale armii litewskiej w kampaniach przeciwko Turkom i Tatarom w latach 70. XVII w.* [in:] *Rzeczpospolita państwem wielu narodowości i wyznań. XVI–XVIII wiek*, eds T. Ciesielski, A. Filipczak-Kocur, Warszawa–Opole 2008, p. 508–509, 511–512. Some information about Lithuanian army in this period see: K. Bobiatyński, Z. Hundert, *The Composition of the Army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the War with Turkey (1675–1676) in the Light of Financial and Military files*, “Zapiski Historyczne” 2018, vol. 83, no. 1, p. 158.

⁷ Jan Sobieski to Kazimierz Florian Czaratoryski, Army Camp at Dawidów on the Pruth, 21 XI 1673 [in:] *Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego*, ed. F. Kluczycki, vol. 1/2, Kraków 1881, p. 1343–1344; J. Woliński, *Po Chocimie...*, p. 62–67; M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka...*, p. 397–398.

⁸ Medium cavalry, equipped and fighting in style of Western-type reiters.

tioned on quarters between rivers Vistula and San, while infantry and dragoons between rivers Dniester and Buh (Boh).⁹ We can find confirmation of their march towards assigned places, as there are surviving documents explaining all the damages they caused en route in Ruthenian and Bełz Voivodeships.¹⁰

Units assigned to the winter campaign of 1673/1674 were severely depleted by the previous fights with the Ottomans, also suffered due to late-year weather, hunger and sickness.¹¹ Up to 30 banners of cavalry and few units of dragoons (in total no more than 4000 soldiers) were under command of Jan Potocki. According to the muster from 29 November 1673 at Dzicza Racka, Andrzej Modrzewski had 10 banners of cavalry (935 horses), two units of dragoons (269 horses) and one infantry regiment (275 portions) — total 1479 horses and portions. Hieronim A. Lubomirski was in charge of six banners of *pancerni* cavalry (941 horses).¹² As mentioned before, Mikołaj H. Sieniawski's corps was the strongest, as according to previous research it was estimated as 6000–8000 *pancerni* cavalry, light horse cavalry and dragoons. What's more, under his command were 3000–4000 men from garrisons in Moldavia. Those contingents were composed of infantry regiments and artillery from Polish army, supported by few Lithuanian units that didn't returned to the country.¹³

Polish public opinion had high hopes about Sieniawski and troops, their activities were observed and commented during Convocation *Sejm* in Warsaw, that started on 15 January 1674.¹⁴ For example Voivode of Witebsk, Jan Antoni Chrapowicki, author of detailed day-to-day diary, wrote few notes about the operations of Sieniawski's corps. Under 16 and 18 January he mentioned that Poles captured capitol of Moldavia, Iași,¹⁵ dethroned pro-Ottoman prince (*hospodar*) Dumitrașcu Cantacuzino and chose his predecessor Ștefan Petriceicu but soon, due to problems with lack of provisions, had to retreat. On 31 January he wrote that under pressure from Tatars Poles aban-

⁹ From Śniatyń 3 XII 1673, The National Archive in Cracow, Archive of Pinocci Family, ms 16, p. 456; From Lviv, 29 XII 1673 [in] *Materiały do dziejów wojny polsko-tureckiej 1672–1676*, ed. J. Woliński, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1965, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 300.

¹⁰ There is evidence of damages caused in those voivodeships by many units, including hussar banners of Andrzej Potocki and Stefan Grudziński, also infantry regiments of Jan Sobieski, Aleksander Ludwik Niezabitowski and Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski. See: Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv [hereinafter: CDIAUL], fond 1, opis 1, ms 264, p. 78–85, 102–103, 132–135, 747–749 and fond 9, opis 1, ms 430, p. 34–36, 312–316, 326–328.

¹¹ See: From Lviv, 29 XII 1673 [in] *Materiały do dziejów...*, p. 299.

¹² See: Z. Hundert, *Wojsko koronne a elekcja 1674...*, p. 312–313; M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka...*, p. 399–400.

¹³ J. Woliński, *Po Chocimie...*, p. 68; M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka...*, p. 397–400. Also in Romanian historiography Sieniawski's force is estimated as 8000 cavalry and dragoons. See: I. Moga, *Rivalitatea polono-austriacă și orientarea politică a țărilor române la sfârșitul secolului XVII* [in:] *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională*, vol. 6, eds. A. Lapedatu, I. Lupaș, Cluj 1936, p. 219.

¹⁴ See: J. Woliński, *Konwokacja 1674 roku a wojna polsko-turecka* [in:] idem, *Z dziejów wojen...*, p. 99–127.

¹⁵ In Autumn 1673 one of the Ottoman corps was stationed there but after battle of Khotyn it retreated towards Danube. See: Francis Sanderson to Joseph Williamson, Danzig, 10 XII 1673, The National Archives in London (hereinafter: NAL), ms 88/13, p. 117.

doned Moldavia and are not in border town of Śniatyń.¹⁶ In reality Sieniawski managed to defeat Tatars at Husza on 14 January but due to huge problems with provisions and increasing pressure from Tatars, he had to on 17 January retreat to Poland.¹⁷ His withdrawal caused lots of concern, as some were worrying that it will lead to be collapse of the system of border protection in such vulnerable time of election of the new king. Luckily for Poles, Ottomans and Tatars didn't have sufficient forces for the offensive moves against the Commonwealth and Sieniawski's corps was able to march to Busk in Bełz Voivodeship.¹⁸ As such situation on the border was fairly stable until the new monarch, Crown Grand Hetman Jan Sobieski, elected on 21 May 1674 as Jan III, started new campaign in the autumn of 1674. Of course there were also negative sides of Sieniawski's retreat. Most important of them were losing chance for the complete blockade of Kamianets-Podilsky,¹⁹ abandonment of the possible starting points for new offensive in Moldavia and fact that after Poles left, pro-Polish Voivode of Moldavia, Ștefan Petriceicu, was dethroned again. So let's try to see what was the force that Sieniawski had under his command during this ill-fated expedition.

When setting up forces to protect Polish border at the end of 1673, all available army units were mustered in order to prepare lists for paying them special winter pay, known as *hiberna*. Crown Field Clerk Stefan Stanisław Czarniecki prepared list, presenting how each banner of hussars and *pancerni* were attached to the national cavalry regiments. Comparing it with the list of Sieniawski's units we will be discuss the process of organisation of his corps, also add the strength of the banners, lacking in the muster document from National Library. Sieniawski's corps was formed during fourth quarter of 1673. For the purposes of the soldiers' pay it was counted between 1 November 1673 and 31 January 1674. During that time whole national cavalry of the Polish army, excluding light horses, was composed of 123 banners: — 12 of hussars (1697 horses) and 111 *pancerni* (11,166 horses) divided into 22 regiments (total: 12,863 horses).²⁰ Sieniawski's corps was composed of the following regiments and banners:²¹

¹⁶ J.A. Chrapowicki, *Dariusz*, The National Museum in Cracow, ms 169, vol. 4: 1674–1676, p. 11, 12, 23.

¹⁷ More about the operations of Sieniawski's group, see: J. Woliński, *Po Chocimie...*, p. 75–86; M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka...*, p. 402–406.

¹⁸ Z. Hundert, *Wojsko koronne a elekcja 1674...*, p. 314–315.

¹⁹ Brian Davies explained the lack of success of the blockade operation by difficult winter weather and political consequences of the interregnum, which seems to be the correct opinion. See: B. Davies, *Warfare, State and Society, on the Black Sea Steppe 1500–1700*, London–New York 2007, p. 157.

²⁰ *Komput wojsk koronnych z podziałem chorągwi jazdy zaciągu polskiego na pulki 1673*, ed. Z. Hundert, "Studia z Dziejów Wojskowości" 2013, vol. 2, p. 311–323. Information from the fourth quarter can be supported by numbers provide in documents from the treasury commission of Lublin (Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Archive of Polish Crown Treasure, 86, ms 59–60) and Jan Wimmer, *Materiały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1673–1679*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1961, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 394–437. More see: M. Paradowski, *We came, We saw, God conquered. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's military effort in the relief of Vienna in 1683*, Warwick 2021, p. 31–32.

²¹ *Komput wojska pod komendą jmp. chorążego koronnego w Wołoszech...*, p. 143–145.

Regiment of deceased king Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki

Pancerni banners:

1. Royal banner under Michał Kozubski, <i>Starosta</i> ²² of Horodło ²³	134 horses
2. Prince Michał Czartoryski, Voivode of Volhynia	100 horses
3. Samuel Jerzy Prażmowski, Voivode of Płock	94 horses
4. Konstanty Piaseczyński, Castellan of Brześć Litewski	94 horses
5. Aleksander Cetner, Castellan of Halicz	100 horses
6. Wojciech Prażmowski, Crown Court Standard-bearer	98 horses
7. Mikołaj Tarło, son of the Catellan of Przemyśl ²⁴	98 horses
8. Mikołaj Koryciński, <i>Starosta</i> of Ojców	99 horses
9. Stefan Branicki, <i>Starosta</i> of Krosno	99 horses
Total: nine banners	916 horses

Comparing with its full strength, regiment is only missing hussar banner of the deceased king.

Regiment of Crown Marshall and Crown Grand Hetman Jan Sobieski

Pancerni banners:

1. Jan Sobieski, Crown Marshall and Crown Grand Hetman	200 horses
2. Aleksander Michał Lubomirski, Voivode of Cracow	148 horses
3. Jan Andrzej Morsztyn, Crown Deputy Treasurer	111 horses
4. Jan Wielopolski, Crown Pantler	122 horses
5. Jan Aleksander Myszkowski, Chamberlain of Bełż	98 horses
6. Mikołaj Sapieha, <i>Starosta</i> of Owruż	95 horses
7. Jan Karol Romanowski, Standard-bearer of Chełm	101 horses
8. Jan Lipski, <i>Starosta</i> of Czchów	107 horses
9. Jan Oleśnicki, son of the Chamberlain of Sandomierz	120 horses
10. Marcin Cieński	100 horses
11. Jan Rzeczycki (deceased)	92 horses
Total: eleven banners	1294 horses

When comparing with the original strength, regiment is missing four banners of hussars and one *pancerni* banner.

²² In Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth *starosta* was the office of the territorial administration. He was either overseer of crown land known as *starostwo* (and then called *starosta niegrodowy*) or official that had judicial and constabulary supervision about *starostwo* (where he was called *starosta sądowy*).

²³ In both Poland and Lithuanian it was custom in the army to call officers by their civil office title. That's why muster rolls and other documents often will include just such title, without even name of the officer.

²⁴ In Commonwealth sons of high ranking officials received honorific based on their father's title. So for example son of voivode was *wojewodziec*, son of the local chamberlain (*podkomorzy*) was *podkomorzyc*, son of castellan was *kasztelaniec* etc.

**Regiment of the Voivode of Belz and Crown Field Hetman,
Prince Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki**

Pancerni banners:

1. Dymitr Jerzy Wiśniowiecki, Voivode of Belz and Crown Field Hetman	196 horses
2. Mariusz Jaskólski, Castellan of Sanok	102 horses
3. Samuel Leszczyński, Crown Camp-master	117 horses
4. Prince Konstanty Wiśniowiecki	98 horses
5. Prince Jan Karol Czartoryski, Deputy Chamberlain of Cracow	100 horses
6. Marcin Zamoyski, Deputy Pantler of Lwów	100 horses
Total: six banners	713 horses

When comparing with the original strength, regiment is missing one banner of husars and four *pancerni* banners

Regiment of the Voivode of Kalisz Jan Opaliński

Pancerni banners:

1. Jan Opaliński, Voivode of Kalisz	97 horses
2. Melchior Grudziński, Castellan of Brześć Kujawski	100 horses
3. Piotr Adam Opaliński, Deputy Chamberlain of Poznań	82 horses
4. Kazimierz Grudziński, son of the Voivode of Rawa Mazowiecka	94 horses
5. Michał Rylski	77 horses
Total: five banners	450 horses

Comparing with its full strength, regiment is only missing one *pancerni* banner

Regiment of the Voivode of Sieradz Szczęsny Kazimierz Potocki

Pancerni banners:

1. Szczęsny K. Potocki, Voivode of Sieradz	120 horses
2. Jan Aleksander Woronicz, Deputy Chamberlain of Kiev	104 horses
3. Stanisław Wężyk, <i>Starosta</i> of Sieradz	74 horses
4. Aleksander Gomoliński	75 horses
5. Jan Malski	73 horses
6. Samuel Lipski	98 horses
7. Wallachian light horse banner of Szczęsny K. Potocki	80 horses
Total: seven banners	624 horses

Regiment is missing one hussar banner but was reinforced by Wallachian light horse banner.

Regiment of the Castellan of Poznań Krzysztof Grzymułtowski

Pancerni banners:

1. Krzysztof Grzymułtowski, Castellan of Poznań	119 horses
2. Stanisław Tuczyński	94 horses
3. Franciszek Żychliński, <i>Starosta</i> of Wałcz	87 horses
4. Constantin Șerban, former Prince of Wallachia	89 horses
Total: four banners	389 horses

Regiment in full strength, additionally reinforced by *pancerni* banner (former Wallachian light horse) of Constantin Șerban, from the regiment of Military Camp-master, Tomasz Karczewski.

Regiment of the Crown Standard-Bearer Mikołaj H. Sieniawski

Pancerni banners:

1. Mikołaj H. Sieniawski, Crown Standard-Bearer	149 horses
2. Jan Piaseczyński, <i>Starosta</i> of Nowogród Siewierski	98 horses
3. Jan Wojakowski, Standard-Bearer of Nowogród Siewierski	91 horses
4. Remigian Strzałkowski, Master of the hunt of Lwów	102 horses
5. Kazimierz Lipczyński, Master of the hunt of Przemyśl	100 horses
6. Tatar light horse banner of Mikołaj H. Sieniawski under <i>rotmistrz</i> Ułan	77 horses
Total: six banners	617 horses

Regiment is missing one hussar banner and two *pancerni* banner but was reinforced by Tatar light horse banner.

Regiment of the Crown Guard Stefan Bidziński

Pancerni banners:

1. Stefan Bidziński, Crown Guard	125 horses
2. Franciszek Sapięha, Lithuanian Master of the Horse	78 horses
Total: two banners	203 horses

When comparing to its full strength, this regiment is missing six *pancerni* banners.

According to the muster completed at Dzicza Racka Sieniawski's corps was composed of eight national cavalry regiments, although they were sub-strength: without banners of hussar and part of *pancerni* units. Instead two regiments were reinforced by light horse — one Wallachian and one Tatar banner. In total force was had 48 *pancerni* banners (5049 horses) and two light horse banners (157 horses), so together 50 cavalry units with 5206 horses. As we can see it is much lower number that 6000–8000 assumed in previous research. Additionally, contrary to old-

er works, there is no indication of the presence of dragoon units.²⁵ It is possible that Sieniawski's force was supported by some pro-Polish Moldavian troops but there number had to be very low.²⁶

Sieniawski's corps was almost exclusively made of *pancerni* cavalry — the most numerous type of cavalry in the Polish army.²⁷ It was universal formation, able to be used as shock cavalry utilising spears and sabre, supporting hussars with its firepower but also able to take part in reconnaissance mission or cavalry raids. Its wide range of the military capabilities can be easily seen in vast arsenal used by its soldiers: spears, sabres, pistols, carbines and bows.²⁸ Sieniawski had under his command 48 of 111 Polish *pancerni* banners, so 43% of its units. When looking at the strength alone, percentage will be even higher, as 5049 horses were 45% of all *pancerni* serving in the Polish army in the last quarter of 1673. Amongst the units that marched to Moldavia were all banners that belongs to colonels of the regiments, including elite royal banner (after deceased King Michał) and banners of Grand Hetman Jan Sobieski and Field Hetman Dymitr Wiśniowiecki. No doubt their involvement in the campaign had to have psychological effect, in order to show soldiers from other units (lower in the army hierarchy) that elites are their with them during the difficult operation.

Cavalry from Sieniawski's command were previously very active in campaign and battle of Khotyn in 1673, so it's certain that soldiers from those units were weary and overworked with almost constant warfare. As such they were burdened with what seems to be far too difficult task and it's hard to blame Sieniawski that, when facing offensive of the fresh Tatar troops, he decided to retreat. It's worth to point out though, that he managed to withdraw without losses. Approach of Tatar Horde was the official excuse of the retreat from the theatre of war, which — once announce pub-

²⁵ Although Hetman Sobieski wrote that he gave Sieniawski command over dragoon regiments but it seems that due to the lack of horses they didn't took part in the expedition and returned to Poland. See: J. Sobieski to K.F. Czartoryski, *Armij Camp on the Pruth, 1 XII 1673* [in:] *Ojczyście spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski*, ed. A. Grabowski, vol. 2, Kraków 1845, p. 357.

²⁶ Petriceicu brought with him just 1500 at the battle at Khotyn, so it's possible that they still accompanied him when Sieniawski escorted him to take over throne in Iași. The only unit from the Polish regular army, that was led by Moldavian or Wallachian and took part in Sieniawski's operation in 1673–1674 was banner of former Wallachian voivode Constantin Serban. For that purpose it was specially attached to the different cavalry regiment from the one that it served with before. See more: I. Czamańska, *Oswobodziciel czy najeźdźca? Polityka Jana III Sobieskiego wobec gospodarstw Moldawii i Wołoszczyzny*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 1989–1990, vol. 55–56, p. 157; eadem, *Jan III Sobieski wobec księstw rumuńskich i powstania węgierskiego*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Prace Historyczne" 2019, vol. 146, no. 2, p. 351.

²⁷ In Lithuanian army in this period *pancerni* banners equipped with lances were classified as *petyhorcy* cavalry. Those banners that didn't manager to receive hussar-like lances were still treated as *pancerni* units. See: Z. Hundert, *Kilka uwag na temat chorągwi petyhorskich w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1673–1683* [in:] *W panczeru przez wieki. Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, eds. M. Baranowski, A. Gładysz, A. Niewiński, Oświęcim 2014, p. 136–149.

²⁸ Overall description of *pancerni* cavalry during Sobieski's reign, see: M. Paradowski, *We came, We saw, God conquered...*, p. 64–74.

licy — was met with rather wide disappointment.²⁹ Francis Sanderson, who was at that time in Poland, informed Joseph Williamson that Sultan Kalga “with 10*m* Turcs et 50*m* Tartars was fallen into Walachia, from whence the Crown Standard Bearer was forced to retreat”.³⁰ Numbers of the approaching army was of course exaggerated. It was widely used in Commonwealth as a good excuse to explain the reason of retreat. At the same time it helped to show the public that, despite great victory at Khotyn, Turkey was still dangerous enemy. In perspective, Sieniawski’s group, composed solely of the cavalry, could not hope to fight for the long time so far from its logistic lines: on the enemy territory, without proper provisions and larger firepower. It couldn’t be even properly used to garrison Iași, unless hew Voivode of Moldavia could rule for the longer period of time. Alas, that didn’t happened.

Despite the fact that Polish corps was composed of elite units, and that its commander was an experienced soldier,³¹ it wasn’t able to fulfil its task. Still, despite all unfavourable elements, it seems that all that possible was done in order to protect Polish border in the winter of 1673/1674 and allow for proper election of the new monarch. It seems though, that when comparing it with the other detachments of the Polish cavalry active at that time, Sieniawski’s group did underperformed during its assigned operation.

REFERENCES

Archival sources

Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw:

Archive of Polish Crown Treasure, 86, ms 59, 60.

Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv:

fond 1, opis 1, ms 264 ;

fond 9, opis 1, ms 430.

The National Archive in Cracow:

Archive of Pinocci Family, ms 16.

The National Archives in London:

ms 88/13.

The National Library in Warsaw:

ms 6659.

²⁹ Proclamation of Convocation *Sejm*, Warsaw, 1 II 1674, CDIAUL, fond 9, opis 1, ms 430, p. 286–287, Warszawa, 1 II 1674. Document included information that: “że wojska świeże gromadne tureckie i tatarskie w ziemię wołoską weszły, dlaczego część wojska naszego w Wołoszech pod komendą wielmożnego jmp. chorążego koronnego natenczas zostająca, ku granicy polskiej pod Śniatyń zemknąć się musiała” (new and strong Turkish and Tatars forces entered the land of Wallachia [as Moldavia was called in Poland], therefore part of our troops, that were at that time stationed on Wallachia under the command of Noble Crown Standard-bearer had to retreat toward Polish border near Śniatyń).

³⁰ F. Sanderson to J. Williamson, Danzig, 7 II 1674, NAL, ms 88/13, p. 130. In this case “*m.*” comes from Latin and means thousand.

³¹ Sieniawski was very active prior to the battle of Khotyn, where he captured few fortresses in Podolia. See: M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka...*, p. 366.

The National Museum in Cracow:
ms 169, vol. 4

Printed primary sources

- Komput wojsk koronnych z podziałem chorągwi jazdy zaciągu polskiego na pułki 1673*, ed. Z. Hundert, "Studia z Dziejów Wojskowości" 2013, vol. 2, p. 311–323.
- Materiały do dziejów wojny polsko-tureckiej 1672–1676*, ed. J. Woliński, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1965, vol. 11, no. 2.
- Oczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski*, ed. A. Grabowski, vol. 2, Kraków 1845.
- Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego*, ed. F. Kluczycki, vol. 1/2, Kraków 1881.

Publications

- Ągoston G., *The Last Muslim Conquest: The Ottoman Empire and its wars in Europe*, Princeton–Oxford, 2021.
- Bobiatyński K., *Wojsko i polityka — kilka uwag o udziale armii litewskiej w kampaniach przeciwko Turkom i Tatarom w latach 70. XVII w.* [in:] *Rzeczpospolita państwem wielu narodowości i wyznań. XVI–XVIII wiek*, eds T. Ciesielski, A. Filipczak-Kocur, Warszawa–Opole 2008, p. 503–519.
- Bobiatyński K., Hundert Z., *The Composition of the Army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the War with Turkey (1675–1676) in the Light of Financial and Military files*, "Zapiski Historyczne", vol. 83/1, p. 155–175.
- Czamańska I., *Jan III Sobieski wobec księstw rumuńskich i powstania węgierskiego*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: Prace Historyczne" 2019, vol. 146, no. 2, p. 347–362.
- Czamańska I., *Oswobodziciel czy najeźdźca? Polityka Jana III Sobieskiego wobec gospodarstw Moldawii i Wołoszczyzny*, "Roczniki Historyczne" 1989–1990, vol. 55–56, p. 151–177.
- Davies B., *Warfare, State and Society, on the Black Sea Steppe 1500–1700*, London–New York 2007.
- Hundert Z., *Bitwa pod Chocimiem 10–11 listopada 1673 roku w historiografii*, "Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny" 2021, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 161–176.
- Hundert Z., *Kilka uwag na temat chorągwi petyhorskich w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1673–1683* [in:] *W panczeru przez wieki. Z dziejów wojskowości polskiej i powszechnej*, eds M. Baranowski, A. Gładysz, A. Niewiński, Oświęcim 2014, p. 136–149.
- Hundert Z., *Wojsko koronne a elekcja 1674 roku* [in:] *Wokół wolnych elekcji w państwie polsko-litewskim XVI–XVIII wieku. O znaczeniu idei wyboru — między prawami a obowiązkami*, eds M. Markiewicz, D. Rolnik, F. Wolański, Katowice 2016, p. 308–332.
- Moga I., *Rivalitatea polono-austriacă și orientarea politică a țărilor române la sfârșitul secolului XVII* [in:] *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională*, vol. 6, eds A. Lapedatu, I. Lupaș, Cluj 1936, p. 175–400.
- Paradowski M., *We came, We saw, God conquered. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's military effort in the relief of Vienna in 1683*, Warwick 2021.
- Wagner M., *Działania wojenne na obszarach moldawskich, podolskich i ukraińskich wiosną 1674 roku* [in:] *Studia Historyczno-Wojskowe*, vol. 2, eds M. Nagielski, K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, Zabrze 2008, p. 163–173.
- Wagner M., *Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676*, vol. 1, Zabrze 2009.
- Wimmer J., *Materiały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1673–1679*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 1961, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 394–437.
- Woliński J., *Konwokacja 1674 roku a wojna polsko-turecka* [in:] idem, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, Warszawa 1983, p. 99–127.
- Woliński J., *Po Chocimie 1673–1674* [in:] idem, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-tureckich*, Warszawa 1983, p. 60–89.