ABSTRACT. The aim of the article is to present the concept and actions taken by the Soviet diplomacy and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church to subjugate the Orthodox communities in the communist Balkan countries. The mechanism of the subjugation of the Balkan churches has been included into a comparative perspective and integrated into the broader concept of the Moscow Patriarchate towards gaining a leading role in the Orthodox world in the first years after the end of the Second World War. The process of dependency and its effects are reflected in diplomatic documents, but also in those produced by the Orthodox Churches themselves. The key element for gaining central position in the Orthodox world by Moscow was the organisation of anniversary celebrations and conferences to integrate the community and to involve it in the implementation of plans towards Soviet political domination. The results of these efforts were very limited in relation to ambitions outlined by the leadership of the Soviet state, revealing differing positions of the major patriarchates, as well as a real strength of authority and prestige that the Ecumenical Patriarchate invariably enjoyed.

Author: Tadeusz Czekalski, Jagiellonian University, Institute of History, 13 Gołębia st., 31-007 Cracow, Poland, e-mail: tadeusz.czekalski@uj.edu.pl, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8494-1769

Keywords: Balkan history, Soviet Union, communism, Orthodox Church, religious policy

The Second World War victory played a pivotal role in the process of building a Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Southeastern Europe. The process of subjugating the Balkan countries that fell within the orbit of Soviet influence (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and, with time, Albania) referred to the common past linking the countries of Southeast Europe with the Russian Empire, but also alluded to elements of cultural and religious unity. In this case, the exposure of Slavicity as a unifying factor prompted the construction of a common ideological space, the foundation of which could be the Orthodox faith, as a confession with which the majority of the population of the
Balkan Peninsula identified, together with the majority of the population of Russia — that is, this part which did not undergo atheization processes. It is also difficult to overestimate the role that clergymen educated in Russian clerical academies played in the history of Balkan Orthodoxy.

It may seem to be a peculiar paradox of the Soviet foreign policy of the late 1940s that the state, built since 1917 on the foundations of irreligiousness and an atheistic worldview, began to use the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in an instrumental way to achieve immediate political gains. Beginning in 1943, the Communist authorities’ policy toward the ROC visibly softened, and the clergy, against whom persecution had ceased, were expected to engage in the mobilization of society to fight against the Germans.\(^1\) Another expression of the new religious policy was the establishment in 1943 of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church, operating under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR. Georgi Karpov, who headed the Council, together with Ivan Polyansky (chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs) from 1944, was in charge of coordinating the “religious policy” of the state, which in practice meant designing the activities aimed at the most effective use of the Orthodox Church’s authority by the communist state and including the Orthodox hierarchy in tasks carried out internationally, in line with the Kremlin’s imperial plans.\(^2\) Urging the hierarchs to act in the interests of the state was also to be served by the declarations that the grim experience of religious persecution of the interwar period was a closed chapter, and that the future of State-Church relations was to be defined by the concept of a “new course”. In November 1944, at a meeting with the Orthodox hierarchy, Georgi Karpov declared that the policy of the authorities toward the ROC would change permanently, a consequence of the active attitude of the clergy during the Great Patriotic War.\(^3\) The announcements of the return of devotional items kept in state museums were accompanied by the declarations of organizational assistance and readiness of state representatives to participate in receiving foreign guests coming to Moscow at the invitation of the ROC.

**THE IDEA OF A MOSCOW VATICAN**

From Kremlin’s perspective, the creation and expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence was to take place under the banner of the unity of Orthodox believers from all over the world and the assumption by the heads of the ROC of a leadership role in

---


3 С.В. Болотов, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
the new united Orthodox world. Despite the atheistic nature of the communist state, in this case its interests and those of the ROC seemed to coincide. The idea of creating a federation of autonomous Orthodox churches, under the authority of Moscow, was attributed to Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky), who died in 1944, and was said to have perceived the future of world Orthodoxy in this way in discussions with his associates. In the Communist Party leadership, it was no coincidence that the idea of unifying the Orthodox churches under the direction of the ROC was seen as the idea of the Moscow Vatican. The prelude to its implementation was to be the creation of adequate institutional facilities and the necessary infrastructure in Moscow, but also the organization of conferences that were to demonstrate the potential of the Russian Orthodox Church and define the methods to combat the factors that threatened the unity of world Orthodoxy. In the new political reality that emerged after World War II, which was victorious for the USSR, it was the Russian Church, as the largest and representing the largest number of adherents, that was to take the precedence over Ecumenical Patriarchate, weakening and “closed in Phanar”. The Russian Orthodox Church was also faced with the task of effectively limiting the influence of the Holy See in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, as well as eliminating the most dangerous element of Vatican influence, which was considered to be the Uniate churches still operating in the region. The final element of the plan was to convene the General Council in Moscow, which was to confirm the Russian Church’s due prestige in the Orthodox world.

Recognizing the degree of acceptance of the Orthodox churches for the idea of unity, but also examining pro-Russian attitudes in the Orthodox world, was served by an invitation to all heads of autocephalous churches to the Pomiesiny Sobor [All-Russian Church Council], which was held in Moscow from January 31 to February 2, 1945. The reason for its convening was the need to elect a new patriarch of the ROC, following the death of Sergius (Stragorodsky), and to determine the rules for the functioning of the Church after the end of the war. The Council was presided over by the subsequent Patriarch Alexy I (Simiansky). The patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch came to Moscow, the other patriarchates sent their delegates. Considering the extent of the measures taken before the Council by Soviet diplomats to raise the profile of the guests to the ceremonies, the results were moderate at best. The Balkan countries were represented by Metropolitan Josif (Cvijovic) of Skopje, who arrived in place of Serbian Patriarch Gavril (Dozić), who was incarcerated in a German camp. After the conclusion of the Council’s work, the hierarchs of the ROC were received by J. Stalin, who appreciated the Church’s efforts to strengthen the international position of the Soviet state and in establishing foreign contacts.

4 T. Волокитина, Г. Мурашко, А. Носкова, Москва и Восточная Европа. Власть и церковь в период общественных трансформаций 40–50-х годов XX века, Москва 2008, p. 94.
5 М. Шкаровский, Сталинская религиозная политика, op. cit., p. 11–12.
6 С.В. Болотов, op. cit., p. 159.
The plan developed by the Council of People’s Commissars in March 1945 and presented to Stalin for the use of the ROC for the purposes of Soviet policy included a postulate for the active involvement of the Orthodox Church in the Balkan direction, which was to be initiated with a series of official visits by ROC delegations, preparing the basis for the cooperation and, in the long run, subordination of the autocephalous churches in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The cooperation with the Balkan churches was to become a part of the grand plan to organize a worldwide conference of Christian (non-Catholic) churches in Moscow. The main task of the conference was to stigmatize the actions of the Vatican, aspiring to play a leading role in the world. The program of the conference planned to discuss the attitude of the Orthodox Church towards the ecumenical movement, but above all to discuss the role of the papacy as an anti-democratic and even pro-fascist institution, collaborating with forces threatening world peace.

In Grigory Karpov’s letter to Stalin (March 15, 1945), there was a belief that the unequivocal protest expressed at the conference against the Vatican’s activities would lead to its isolation and undermine the authority of the Pope. In order to give the conference an all-Christian status, it was intended to invite the heads of the Orthodox churches of Serbia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Finland and the Eastern Orthodox churches, but also the representatives of the Anglican and Old Catholic churches and the American Methodists. The ROC was to appear at the conference as the initiator of an international movement of Christians united by the idea of liberation from papism. The conference was scheduled to begin in September 1947 in Moscow, and its institutional aftermath was to be the creation of an executive body for a new movement of Christian unity, rejecting the dominance of the Vatican, but also opposing the integration around the increasingly active ecumenical movement in Western Europe.

The success of the planned conference depended on both the actions taken by the hierarchy of the ROC and the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy in trying to counter the increasingly active American activities in the Middle East. Material and financial assistance from the ROC to churches affected by the war was to play a significant role. In May 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers instructed Finance Minister Arseniy Zverev to transfer the amount of $195,000 for the purpose of the ROC’s for-

---

7 М. Каиль, „Православный фактор” в советской дипломатии: международные коммуникации Московского патриархата середины 1940-х гг., “Государство, религия, церковь в России и за рубежом” 2017, no. 1, p. 23.
9 М. Шкаровский, Сталинская религиозная политика, op. cit., p. 16.
10 Ibidem, p. 18.
11 Н.Г. Псомиадес, Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East, “Middle East Journal” 1957, vol. 11, no. 4 (Autumn 1957), p. 371–381.
12 Т. Волокитина, Г. Мурашко, А. Носкова, Москва и Восточная Европа, op. cit., p. 102.
eign activity. In the same year, a significant portion of this sum went to the Jerusalem and Antioch Patriarchates. The Moscow Patriarchate expected the beneficiaries to actively support the struggle against the Vatican, but the Middle Eastern patriarchs expressed no interest in coming to the Moscow conference, for fear that their arrival might be seen as a gesture of submission to the authority of the ROC. Upon receiving the invitation from Moscow, the Ecumenical Patriarchate sent a kind but firm reply to the Moscow Patriarch reminding him that according to the tradition and canonical order, the initiative for convening pan-Orthodox conferences and synods belongs to Constantinople.  

In view of the information coming to Moscow that the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, as well as Ecumenical Patriarch Maksimos V, would be absent at the planned conference, a decision was made to postpone the meeting until 1948, and then to adopt a new formula for the meeting that would allow the Moscow Patriarch to “save face”. Patriarch Alexy extended an invitation to all autocephalous churches to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the ROC, scheduled for July 1948 at the Church of the Resurrection in Moscow’s Sokolniki. The planned anniversary celebrations were to be accompanied by substantive meetings addressing the topics of Orthodox unity and the hostile activities of the Vatican. In order to bypass the canonical restrictions that the Ecumenical Patriarchate was reminded of, the Moscow Patriarchate sought to gain a dominant role in the Orthodox world by organizing a succession of impressive religious anniversary celebrations that were intended to convince the hesitant Orthodox churches to recognize Moscow as the most active and cooperative center of the Orthodox world.  

The July celebration of the anniversary of Russian autocephaly brought together the representatives of eleven of the thirteen autocephalous churches, but most of them were delegates without mandates to represent their churches in substantive discussions. None of the patriarchs of the East (Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem) appeared in Moscow. Both Metropolitan Germanos, representing the Ecumenical Patriarch, and the representative of the Greek Church Chrysostomos limited their participation to official ceremonies. Constantinople consistently maintained the view that synods and all-Orthodox conferences could be convened only by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The truncated plenary sessions did not lead to the realization of the project of bringing world Orthodoxy under Russian control, but they did confirm the existence of the bloc of Central and Eastern European Orthodox churches, the heads of which appeared in Moscow in unison and expressed a full support for the unanimously adopted

---


14 P. Kitromilides, op. cit., p. 85–86.

“Message to the Christians of the Whole World”, directed against the Roman Supreme pontiff and the hostile activities of Protestant America.16

One of the biggest disappointments for the ROC hierarchy turned out to be the attitude of the Greek Orthodox Church (GOC), which in the first post-war years leaned quite unequivocally towards the pro-Western option, while distancing itself from the idea of Orthodox unity under Russian sovereignty. A symbolic manifestation of Athens’ independence was the participation of representatives of the GOC in the assembly of the ecumenical movement in Amsterdam (August–September of 1948), which led to the establishment of the World Council of Churches. The representatives of the three autocephalous churches took part in the Amsterdam deliberations, and this significantly undermined the thesis from the Moscow deliberations about the ecumenical movement as a form of a struggle against Marxism and communism, harming the unity of the Orthodox world.17 From 1941, the Greek Church was headed by Archbishop Damaskinos (Papandreu). Appointed as the regent of Greece in December 1944 by the authorities in exile, he was given a political position that none of his predecessors in the archbishop’s chair had enjoyed, and at the same time the ability to determine the GOC’s relations with the outside world without significant interference from civil and military authorities.18 Although Damaskinos did not unequivocally condemn Orthodox priests sympathetic to the communist resistance movement, he sided with the legitimate authorities during the civil war (1946–1949), and in June 1946, on his initiative, the synod of bishops condemned the “communist rebellion.”19 The support that the Kremlin and other Balkan states gave to the communist Greek partisans fueled the antagonism between the GOC and other Orthodox churches in the Balkans. This antagonism was also confirmed by the GOC’s position, consistent with the Greek authorities, in the dispute with Albania over the statehood of Northern Epirus. The opinions of Soviet diplomats unequivocally portrayed Damaskinos as the cleric who had previously collaborated with Germany and currently represented the interests of reactionary circles and was oriented towards Britain.20 Damaskinos’ successor Spiridon (Vlachos), who ascended the throne of the Archbishop of Athens in May 1949, presented an unequivocal criticism of Moscow’s

16 At the Moscow conference, the Balkan countries were represented by Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo V (Dožić), Bulgarian Exarch Stefan (Shokov), Metropolitan of Korča Bishop Paisi (Vodica) and Metropolitan of Philippi Bishop Chrysostomos (Chatsistavrou).
20 Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 368, 401. Accusation against Damaskinos of him collaborating with the Germans alluded to the circumstances of his assumption of the archbishop’s dignity. In 1941, Archbishop Chrisanthos (Filippidis), who was in charge of the Greek Church, refused to administer an oath for a collaborationist government, for which he was removed from his office, and
idea of the “unity of the Orthodox world” and the willingness to work closely with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1948, Athenagoras I, the former Metropolitan of New York, ascended to the Patriarchal throne in Constantinople, becoming the spokesman for a close cooperation between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Church and the number one enemy of the Moscow-subordinated Orthodox churches.

**ALBANIAN AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH**

Of the Balkan Orthodox churches, the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (AAOC) held a special place in Russian politics. Its importance, however, was not due to the potential it represented (it consisted only of 20% of Albania’s population, most of which declared themselves to be of the Muslim faith) or even less to the authority it enjoyed at home and abroad. The authorities in the Kremlin, assessing in 1948 the effectiveness of political control over the Orthodox churches in the Balkans, considered the situation in Albania exemplary, describing the country as a “leading outpost in the fight against Catholicism.”

21 As late as in 1947, Moscow’s interest in the fate of the Albanian Orthodox Church could be considered negligible. The news of the Moscow Patriarchate’s initiatives from 1945–1946 hardly reached the Albanian Orthodox clergy, which was struggling to cope with the effects of the crisis caused by the war effort. Between 1939 and 1943, the Italians occupying Albania financially supported mainly the Catholic Church, which led to the marginalization of a community considered by the occupiers to be a Greek outpost in Albania. The Uniate Church, which, until then had remained a marginal phenomenon in Albania, was also a beneficiary of Italian aid.

22 The guerrilla war, which culminated in 1943–1944, caused considerable destruction in the southern part of the country, where most of the Orthodox churches and monasteries were located. The autocephaly of the Albanian Church was seriously threatened by the lack of bishops who, according to the canon law, could form the Holy Synod.

23 The factor that worked in the Orthodox community was the fact that quite a large group of clergy during the war actively supported the communist-led resistance movement, which in the new political reality put it in a position of privilege over the Albanian Catholic Church. The AAOC’s loyalty to the communist authori-
ties was recognized after the suppression of the Postriba uprising in September 1946, which was condemned by the Orthodox clergy.24

Until 1948, Albania remained closely dependent on Yugoslavia, based on political and economic support from Belgrade. However, while in the interwar period the Serbian Orthodox Church’s assistance to the Albanian Orthodox Church allowed the latter to gain independence, after 1944, neither the Serbian hierarchy nor, even less, the authorities in Belgrade showed any interest in the fate of the Albanian Orthodox. This problem was brought to the attention of the Soviet deputy in Tirana, Dimitri Chuvakhin, who, like other Soviet diplomats, was engaged in promoting the idea of unifying the Orthodox churches under Moscow’s control. As the head of the AAOC, Archbishop Kristofor (Kisi) recognized as early as 1946 that the assistance from the Russian Church was the only way to save the independence of the Albanian Orthodox Church and to obtain material assistance so that it could continue to function.25 From the spring of 1947, D. Chuvakhin oversaw the preparations for the first visit of an Albanian Church delegation to Moscow. At the prompt request of the Soviet side, people suspected of the collaboration with the German and Italian occupiers were removed from the composition of the delegation proposed by Kisi. The delegation that went to Moscow was headed by Archimandrite Paisij (Vodica), who enjoyed the full support of the Albanian communist authorities, not least because of his active participation in the communist resistance. The Albanian delegation was in Moscow from January 10 to 28, 1948, meeting with the hierarchy of the ROC and soliciting moral and material assistance for the Albanian Church. Paisi’s statements during the Moscow visit focused on exposing the hostile, anti-popular activities of the Catholic clergy in Albania, as well as the need for sweeping changes in the leadership of the AAOC, historically embroiled in collaboration with the occupation.26

Four months later, a three-member delegation of the ROC headed by Metropolitan of Kursk Bishop Nestor (Sidoruk) visited Tirana. The most important purpose of the Russian clergy’s visit was the chirotony of the new bishop in Albania and the reconstitution of the structures of the Holy Synod.27 The decision of the chirotony was made by Bishop Nestor after a meeting with a member of parliament D. Chuvakhin, who recommended Paisij Vodica as a candidate loyal to Moscow and the future head

24 The attack on Shkodra by anti-communist troops, on Sept. 9th, 1946, referred to in Albanian historiography as the Postriba uprising, initiated a wave of persecution of the Catholic clergy, who were suspected of the involvement in the preparation of the uprising.
25 Information on the activities of the AAOC Holy Synod, AQSh, f. 536, KOA, 1946, d.103.
of the Albanian Church. The ordination of two more bishops allowed the elimination of “insecure elements”, and hierarchs charged with cooperation with the occupation authorities during the war were considered as such. The culmination of the personnel changes which were in line with Moscow’s expectations, was the removal of Archbishop Kristofor, who lost his position to Paisij (Vodica) in 1949. Paisij’s assumption of sovereignty over the Albanian Church guaranteed close cooperation between the Albanian Orthodox hierarchy and Moscow. The new legal status of the Orthodox Church was determined by the Law on Religious Communities of November 1949 and the new statute of the AAOC, adopted by the government in May 1950. Under these provisions, the Church was placed under strict control of state bodies, and could only carry out foreign contacts through state.

The proceedings of the congress of clergy and laity held in February 1950 in Tirana began with a lengthy speech by Paisij, dominated by the expressions of gratitude to the ROC for the restoration of the community he led. The hierarch also enumerated a long list of enemies threatening the unity of the Orthodoxy and the church in Albania. In addition to Athens, Constantinople and Belgrade, the list of enemies included Kristofor (Kisi), whom the successor accused of introducing dictatorial rule and “anti-patriotic activities.”

A manifestation of Paisij’s Russophile attitude was the support he gave to the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Society, which was active within the Orthodox Church, promoting the reading of Russian literature among the clergy. Albanian historian Artan Hoxha, however, sees symptoms of a subsequent crisis in Albanian-Soviet relations from as early as 1949. At the time of Enver Hoxha’s Moscow meeting with Stalin, the latter was said to have pressed for an alignment of Albanian religious policy with patterns practiced in the Soviet state. Hoxha avoided unequivocal declarations on this issue, in the belief that Stalin did not understand the peculiarities of Albanian multi-religiousness, and that privileging the Orthodox community over the much more numerous Muslim one could lead to unnecessary tensions and conflicts.

The reorganization of the principles of religious law and the reconstruction of the structures of the Holy Synod in Albania in 1949–1951 took place in accordance with Moscow’s expectations and according to models tested in other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless, as early as after Stalin’s death in 1953, the Politburo of the Albanian Labor Party began to ignore most of the recommendations for changes in policy toward religious communities coming through Soviet dip-

---

29 AAKP Statute, AQSh, KOA, f. 536, 1950, doc. 292.
30 AQSh, KOA, f. 536, 1951, doc. 463.
lomats residing in Tirana, seeking to strip the Orthodox Church of its status as a privileged community.\(^{33}\)

**BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH**

As in the case of Albania, the end of the war found the Bulgarian Church in a state of deep structural and moral crisis. The autocephaly of the Bulgarian Exarchate, announced in 1872, was condemned by Constantinople, which until 1945 recognized that the Bulgarian Church was still under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. After the death of Exarch Josif (Yovchev) in 1915, his successor was not elected, and the Church was managed collectively by the Holy Synod, remaining under the supervision of the state authorities. Long-term cooperation with the authoritarian regime in power in Bulgaria and the ambiguous attitude towards the cooperation of the Bulgarian authorities with Nazi Germany significantly reduced the prestige of the Church in society and put it in a difficult situation in the face of the communist party seizing power in Bulgaria. The demand to reform the Church and distance itself from state policy was put forward by a group of hierarchs led by Metropolitan Stefan (Shokov) of Sofia. The Synod of Sofia convened by him and launched in November 1939, did not lead to a breakthrough, but initiated the implementation of a program that was to strengthen the prestige of the Church in society and, in the future, to restore the patriarchate.

During the war, the Church took steps to achieve an autonomous position, not always in accordance with the government’s policy. This was evidenced by Metropolitan Stefan’s appeals for peace, as well as the actions taken in defense of Bulgarian Jews. Stefan’s pro-Russian declarations were also quite clear. Even before the Patriotic Front took power, he declared himself a supporter of Bulgaria’s neutrality and cooperation with Russia, to which “Bulgarians should be grateful for their liberation from the Ottoman yoke.”\(^{34}\) Shortly after the September 1944 coup, which led to the takeover of power by the Fatherland Front, Stefan appeared on Sofia Radio, conveying the greetings of the Holy Synod to the new authorities in the belief that the common goal of the new authorities and the Church is the happy future of the Bulgarian nation.\(^{35}\)

From the formal side, until October 1944, the position of a chairman of the Holy Synod was held by Metropolitan Neofit (Karaabov) of Vidin. A letter sent on October 5 by Moscow Patriarch Alexei to Stefan, in which he titled him *pervostoyatiel* [a chief

---

33 This meant, in practice, limiting the amount of state subsidies to the Orthodox Church and putting it on a par with other religious communities, which until 1953 received much less funding from the state budget. Despite the pressure from the Soviet side, E. Hoxha personally opposed sending Orthodox clergy to theological academies in the USSR; A.R. Hoxha, op. cit., p. 209–210, 216.

34 Т. Волокитина, Г. Мурашко, А. Носкова, *Москва и Восточная Европа*, op. cit., p. 165.

clearly suggested who among the Bulgarian hierarchs enjoyed the greatest trust of Moscow. After Neofit’s resignation, the Metropolitan of Sofia became the new head of the Holy Synod on October 16. Information coming from Soviet diplomats in Sofia confirmed the hopes that had been pinned on Stefan for the full subordination of the Bulgarian Church to Moscow. Soviet representatives in the Allied Control Commission, Alexander Cherepanov and Dimitry Yakovlev, met regularly with Stefan, describing him as a supporter of Soviet domination of the Balkans and curbing British influence in the area. The metropolitan expressed his conviction that the newly elected patriarch of the ROC should come to Bulgaria and place the patriarchal khlobuk on his head, which could cement the ROC’s dominant position not only in Bulgaria, but in the entire Balkans. Moscow’s assistance proved crucial for the confirmation of Bulgarian autocephaly by Constantinople on February 22, 1945, and for the end of the schism that lasted more than 70 years. The Russian patriarch arrived in Sofia in the summer of 1946. The visit did not lead to the Bulgarian exarch being granted the dignity of patriarch, but it cemented his image as an “ally of Moscow” and strengthened the opposition of clergymen in the Holy Synod, who did not accept the growing arrogance of Stefan. One of the exarch’s last successes in dealing with Moscow was obtaining a loan for the reconstruction of the Sofia Cathedral in May 1947. The amount of 555,000 rubles was intended, in Georgi Dimitrov’s belief, to strengthen pro-Russian sentiment in the leadership of the Bulgarian Church.

Convinced of his privileged position in his dealings with Moscow and his imminent elevation to the patriarchal capital, Stefan began to assume the role of an advisor in his correspondence with Patriarch Alexy from mid-1947. The exarch criticized the domination of the Greeks in the Orthodox world and the prevailing belief that Constantinople should be the “mother of all Orthodox churches”, since “we are strong enough to repair and renew our Orthodox life without the help of the Greeks.” Skepticism in Moscow may have been aroused by Stefan’s suggestions to join the

36 In January 1945, the exarchate was renewed with the approval of the Communist authorities. The Council of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church elected Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia to the post; M. Методиев, Между вярата и компромиса. Българската православна църква и комунистическата държава, 1944–1989, Sofia 2010, p. 109.
37 After the signing of the armistice between the Allied states and Bulgaria, the highest authority in the country was exercised by the Allied Control Commission, headed by Soviet Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin. Key decisions about Bulgaria’s future were made by Soviet representatives, while Western states generally did not object to Moscow’s growing influence.
38 Note by G. Karpov on the meeting between A. Cherepanov and D. Yakovlev with Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia, 19.11.1944; Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 57–58.
39 G. Кarpov to J. Stalin, 16.05.1947, Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 481.
40 С.В. Болотов, op. cit., p. 165.
Western European ecumenical movement — as this would allow the Orthodox to emerge from isolation. In June 1947, Stefan tried to negotiate with Patriarch Alexy the subject of an all-Orthodox conference in Moscow, while stipulating that he might not come to the conference due to his ill health. The attitude of the Bulgarian hierarch caused such a big concern in Moscow that the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov, was directed to negotiate with him. The favorable changes in the state’s denominational policy that Dimitrov announced in his conversation with Stefan (including leaving the Faculty of Theology at Sofia University) allayed the doubts of the cleric, who was to travel from there directly to Moscow after his treatment in Karlovy Vary at the expense of the Bulgarian state.43

The political influence the exarch enjoyed in Moscow aroused the envy of the Bulgarian Church hierarchy, which tried to discredit Stefan by informing the Communist Party leadership of his pro-Western orientation. The facts from his past were used against the exarch, including his visits to London in 1910, where he was in contact with Masonic circles.44 Equally dangerous from Moscow’s perspective were Stefan’s former contacts with the Western European ecumenical movement and John Mott, one of the leaders of the YMCA.45 These fears were confirmed by the exarch himself when he was soliciting unsuccessfully in 1948 for the opportunity to join an ecumenical assembly in Amsterdam. In September 1948, by the decision of the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Stefan was removed from his position on the pretense of his ill health and interned in the village of Banja in the Plovdiv district.46 After his removal, the exarchate was abolished, and Stefan’s main opponent, Metropolitan Paisyus (Ankov) of Vratsa, took over the post of a chairman of the Holy Synod. The scope of permissible Church activity was defined by the Law on Religious Associations, modeled on Soviet solutions. Clergymen were prohibited from maintaining foreign contacts and criticizing political authorities. Religious activity was restricted to the interior of temples, with minimal opportunities for clergy training and the publication of church prints. In December 1952, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was represented by the Metropolitan of Plovdiv Cyril (Konstantinov) at the Congress of the World Peace Council in Vienna (controlled by the Kremlin). The trust he enjoyed in the Communist Party leadership was linked to his activities in the Communist movement in his early youth, and Cyril’s enthronement as a Patriarch (May 10, 1953) crowned the process of bringing the Orthodox Church under full state control.47

---

44 Stefan’s close associate, protopresbyter Georgi Shavelsky, was also suspected of having contacts with Freemasonry, C.B. Болотов, op. cit., p. 164.
45 An extensive report on Stefan’s past was compiled in December 1947 at the request of G. Карпов by an employee of the Soviet consulate in Sofia, Georgiy Shnikov; Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 621–628.
46 М. Методиев, op. cit. p. 120–121.
47 Chairman of the Bulgarian Religious Affairs Office Dimitar Ilyev described Kirill as early as 1948 as “our man in whom one can have full confidence”, an opinion shared by Soviet diplomats in Sofia;
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Unlike the Albanian and Bulgarian churches, the Serbian Orthodox Church, facing a possible confrontation with the communist-created Yugoslav state, had an important bargaining chip. Its social authority grew significantly in the 1930s, when it opposed the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the issue of signing a concordat with the Holy See that would discriminate against Serbian Orthodox believers. The Church’s significant asset in confronting the Communist state was also the numerous participation of the clergy in the resistance movement and the repression they suffered. More than two hundred Serbian clergymen fell victims to persecution in the areas controlled by the Independent State of Croatia, and one in four Orthodox church buildings was completely destroyed. Patriarch Gavrilo V (Dožić) and Metropolitan Nikolai (Velimirović) of Žica, who were arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in the Dachau concentration camp in 1944, became symbols of the persecuted Church.

Leading the work of the Orthodox Church (in the absence of the Patriarch), Metropolitan Josif (Ivovic) of Skopje had to contend with growing anti-communist as well as anti-Soviet sentiment among the hierarchy. Faced with the creation of a multi-ethnic state by the Yugoslav communists, a conflict with the Church, which identified itself with the Serbian people and with the Serbian raison d’etat, seemed natural. At a time when the Yugoslav party leadership was tightening its grip on the Kremlin, the Serbian Orthodox clergy continued to be visibly influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, centered since 1922 around the synod in Sremski Karlovci. The pro-Russian sentiments of the Serbian bishops were largely shaped by the anti-communist and anti-Soviet Zarubezhniki [expatriates] of Karlovci. Georgi Karpov, in a conversation with Stalin, warned what a difficult task it would be to neutralize the influence of Russian émigré clergy on the Serbian Church.

A new subject of contention in relations with the ROC was Moscow’s efforts to take the jurisdiction over the Czechoslovak Orthodox Church out of Serbian hands. While this change was discreetly supported by the Metropolitan Josif (Ivovic), much of the Holy Synod opposed it. The issue of changing the status of the Czechoslovak Church was handled by the Russian Patriarch’s envoy, Metropolitan Sergius (Larin) of Kirovohrad, who came to Belgrade several times on this issue. The failure of talks with Metropolitan

conversation between D. Ilyev and B. Spiller, 10.12.1948; Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 826–831.

48 Т. Белякова, Конструирование национальной идентичности в социалистической Югославии и македонский церковный вопрос, “Государство, религия, церковь” 2014, no. 4, p. 65.


50 After 1948, maintaining contacts between the Orthodox Church of Czechoslovakia and the Serbian Orthodox Church became impossible due to the Soviet-Yugoslav split. The Czechoslovak Church remained under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church until 1951, when it obtained autocephaly (unrecognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople until 1988).
Josif in February 1946 prompted the Communist authorities of both countries, whose pressure led to the settlement of the dispute in accordance with the Kremlin’s expectations.

Patriarch Gavril’s planned return to the country was intended to strengthen the position of the Orthodox Church in negotiations with the communist authorities, and at the same time, in the belief of some bishops, to prevent the imposition of the Bolshevik order in Church-State relations. Gavril, who restored his freedom on May 8, 1945, did not shy away from a quick return to the country, probably hoping that King Peter II Karadjordjevich would appear in Yugoslavia before him. In a letter to the American-Canadian Patriarch Dionysius sent in the spring of 1946, he expressed his conviction that his return to the country would not result in a change in the political situation; he also feared that those in power in the country would seek to exploit his authority, which he would not be able to effectively oppose.\(^{51}\) The decision to return to the country was determined by a meeting between Gavril, who was staying for treatment in Karlovy Vary, and the exarch of the ROC in Czechoslovakia, Bishop Elefteri (Vorontsov).\(^{52}\) Gavril praised Russian Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky), who decided to cooperate with the communist authorities during the occupation, while stressing that the situation in Serbia was extremely different from that in Russia. However, Elefteri managed to convince the patriarch that it was inevitable for the Church to take up the cooperation with the communist authorities. Upon his return to the country in November 1946, Gavril declared that the mission of the Serbian Church remained unchanged and that he would continue to serve God, the nation and the state. Convinced of the need for a close cooperation with the ROC, the Serbian patriarch saw it as a necessity in the face of the threat from the Vatican, and saw Moscow as the best place where the heads of the Orthodox Churches should gather.

The patriarch’s talks with Josip Broz Tito, which took place in December 1946 and January 1947, were to play a key role in defining State-Church relations. According to the account of the Soviet deputy in Belgrade, Anatoly Lavrientev, Gavril was impressed by the concept presented by the Yugoslav leader of the unity of the Slavs within a single state.\(^ {53}\) The patriarch complained about the poverty of the Serbian Church after the end of the war, as well as the hostile activities of the Vatican, which sought to establish a separate Yugoslav Catholic Church. The issue of Gavril’s planned trip to Moscow, at the invitation of Patriarch Alexy, was also a topic of discussion. Tito felt that such a trip would be politically useful, and that Gavril should accept the invitation from the Patriarch of Moscow.\(^ {54}\)

\(^{51}\) Т. Волокитина, Г. Мурашко, А. Носкова, Москва и Восточная Европа, op. cit., p. 256.

\(^{52}\) Ibidem, p. 258.

\(^{53}\) Г. Карпов к К. Ворошилову, 17 Х 1947, Власть и церковь в Восточной Европе, op. cit., p. 596–597.

\(^{54}\) Т. Волокитина, Г. Мурашко, А. Носкова, Москва и Восточная Европа, op. cit., p. 100.
Demonstrations of the patriarch’s pro-Russian stance came with the deliberations of the Slavic Congress in Belgrade (December 11, 1946). The head of the Russian delegation, Bishop Nikolai, repeatedly met with Gavrilo during the deliberations, hearing from him the declarations of support for the idea of Moscow solving the most important problems of the world Orthodoxy. In April 1947, Belgrade was visited by Bishop Nestor (Sidorchuk), who was returning from Albania. He saw the visible process of normalization in Church-State relations, related to the establishment of the Commission for Religious Denominations, headed by Gen. Ljubodrag Đurić, which not only enabled the resolution of current problems, but also gathered the information on the current situation in the Church. According to Sergei Trotsky, who met with the Serbian patriarch in January 1948, State-Church relations remained correct although the cases of the arrests of the clergymen who publicly criticized the communist authorities the blemish on this picture.

The removal of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 put the Serbian patriarch in an extremely difficult position. His long-planned visit to Moscow was scheduled for July and combined with his participation in the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Russian autocephaly. On July 3, 1948, there was a meeting between the patriarch and Gen. Lj. Đurić, who declared on behalf of the Yugoslav government that Gavrilo’s trip to Moscow would be considered an act hostile to the government and the people. In a situation where the Kremlin has adopted an attitude hostile to the Yugoslav authorities and subjected them to criticism, the patriarch’s presence at the Moscow celebrations could be interpreted as an act of solidarity with Moscow. In the current political situation, Gavrilo’s presence at the Moscow celebrations can be read as an act of courage and political self-reliance on the part of the Serbian hierarch. The patriarch’s statements presented in Moscow indicated his disillusionment with Tito, who headed the Yugoslav state “even though he was a Croat and not a Serb”, and that the policy of the authorities in Belgrade meant that “the Orthodox Church cannot find a place for itself in the state.”

The patriarch’s trip to Moscow did not result in the repression by the communist authorities against either Gavrilo or the Orthodox Church. The Union of Orthodox Clergy of Yugoslavia, which was established in March 1949 and declared full support for the policies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and active participation in the work of the Popular Front, was to become a counterweight to the patriarch,
who did not stop contacting Soviet diplomats in Belgrade. Gavrilo’s death in May 1950 and the assumption of the patriarchal throne by Vicentije II (Prodanov) brought a change in the Orthodox Church’s policy to one that was more conciliatory towards the Communist authorities. At the same time, it meant breaking off contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church for several years. They were formally restored in 1956, when the Serbian Patriarch came to Moscow, and as part of a visit in October 1957, the head of the ROC Alexy I visited Yugoslavia, where he was welcomed with the honors due to the head of state.60

The program to subordinate the Orthodox Churches in the Balkans to the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, carried out at the behest of the Kremlin, was one element of the plan to make Moscow the “ideological center” of the Orthodox world. Closely correlated with the efforts to politically Sovietize the Balkans, it produced limited results, far from the expectations expressed in 1945. The plan to convene a worldwide conference of Orthodox Churches in Moscow similarly to the plan to make the capital of the USSR an ideological homeland for Christians of the whole world in July 1948 ended in failure for the Kremlin, while confirming the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox world. In the practical operation of the Soviet state, this led to a decline in the importance of the Orthodox Church as an effective instrument of foreign policy, and at the same time to the strengthening of the system of control of religious communities, which was soon experienced by countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. The attempt to fully subordinate and impose the pattern of Soviet religious policy in Bulgaria and Albania was successful. This was facilitated by the close cooperation of the political authorities of these two countries in the process of subjugating the churches, as well as by internal divisions among the Orthodox hierarchy and the decline in public support for church institutions in the first postwar years. The confirmation of the close connection linking the Bulgarian and Albanian Churches with Moscow was the act of rejecting, at Moscow’s suggestion, of these communities’ participation in the World Council of Churches.61 The Serbian Orthodox Church, strengthened by the authority of the Patriarch and the heroism of a church suffering and persecuted during the war, had a different bargaining chip in its efforts to preserve its independence. The fate of the Serbian Church, and its independence from Moscow, was determined by the Soviet-Yugoslav political dispute. The attitude of skepticism toward Soviet domination paradoxically became a unifying factor between communist Yugoslav politicians and Orthodox hierarchs. The unity of the adherents of the Orthodox Church of Southeastern Europe under Moscow’s rule had already been presented in the rhetoric of Pan-Slavic rather than Pan-Balkan slogans since 1946. For the Greek Church, the offer of leadership of a community subservient

61 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Church joined the World Council of Churches in 1961; the Serbian Church did so four years later.
to the atheist authorities in Moscow in the Orthodox world was incompatible with Orthodox tradition and the community’s evangelistic mission.

REFERENCES

Sources
Arkivi i Shtetit, Tirana, Fond 536 — Kisha Ortodokske Autoqefale.

Publications
Hoxha Artan, Kisha ortodokse nën komunizëm. KOASH-i dhe regjimi diktatorial, Tirana 2017.
Андрей, Экзарх болгарской Церкви митрополит Стефан и Московская Патриархия, “Вестник ПСТГУ II: История. История Русской Православной Церкви” 2013].


Psmiades Henry, Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East, “Middle East Journal” 1957, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 371–381.


Volokitina Tat’ijana, Murashko Galina, Noskova Al'bina, Moskva i Vostochnaja Evropa. Vlast i cerkov v period obshestvennykh transformacij 40–50-kh godov XX veka, Moskva 2008 [Волокитина Татьяна, Мурашко Галина, Носкова Альбина, Москва и Восточная Европа. Власть и церковь в период общественных трансформаций 40–50-х годов XX века, Москва 2008].