




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TURKISH BALKAN POLICY DURING THE GOLDEN TIMES OF THE COLD WAR

SIBEL TURAN

ABSTRACT. Sibel Turan, *Turkish Balkan policy during the golden times of the Cold War*.

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As it is known, two super powers emerged after the Second World War. Those two super powers faced each other in a conflict called 'Cold War.'¹ Second World War prepared the ground for Russia to achieve a goal that she had been struggling to do so for the last two centuries. The Soviet Union that moved into the lands occupied by Germany as a savior soon aftermath of the war took control and influenced all the central and Eastern European countries apart from Austria, Finland, Greece and Yugoslavia. However, the Balkans, as usually observed in every period, displays a significant difference in the conflicting areas during the golden years of the Cold War. The golden years of the Cold War features a period between 1950 and 1960. The major factor in this is largely due to the fact that a large part of the Balkans was within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. In addition to all, Yugoslavia's prominence in the Balkans by following a policy that is different from the Soviet Union is regarded an essential parameter. From Turkey's point of view, our relations with our allies, Greek and Bulgaria, a royal neighbor of the Eastern bloc, and Yugoslavia were of particular importance.

Three months after the Marshall Plan was put forward, Cominform was founded in place of Comintern that was abolished during the war through the participation of the communist parties in Europe on 5 October 1947.² Jdanov, in his speech at founding Cominform, stated that the world was divided into two blocs. In his letter to Truman, dated May 12, 1945, Churchill wrote: "an iron curtain fell on the Russian

¹ E. Hobsbawm, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl 1914-1991 – Aşırıliklar Çağı*, İstanbul, Sarmal, 1996, p. 263.

² A. Ribard, *İnsanlığın Tarihi*, İstanbul, Say, June 1983, p. 618 ve K. Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikaları (1939'dan Günümüze Kadar)*, Ankara, AÜSBF, 1983, p. 247.

front. We don't know what is lying behind it."³ On the other hand, Stalin, Churchill, Molotov and Eden had already shared the Balkans and Central Europe among themselves in Moscow in October 1944 and they called that the Percentages Agreement.⁴ The destiny of post-war Central Europe and the Balkans was to be shaped accordingly.⁵

The percentages agreement was to divide the Balkans in spheres of influence between the two countries and provide a free ground for the super powers to play in the region.⁶ According to this secret agreement, here is how the two states negotiated about spheres of influence in the Balkans: the Soviet Union should have 90 percent influence in Romania; other states should have 10 percent; the United Kingdom should have 90 percent influence in Greece; other states should have 10 percent; in Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should have 50 percent; the Soviet Union should have 75 percent and the United Kingdom should have 25 percent influence in Bulgaria. This agreement showed that Churchill gave up on Bulgaria and Romania against Greece.⁷ When people learned about that agreement which was written in Churchill's diaries, Tito overreacted to it.⁸

As such developments took place in Europe, as a result of the tension between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavian Communist party was expelled from Cominform in June 1948.⁹ Meanwhile, People's Republic of China in Asia won her independence in October 1949, which was a great benefit to the Eastern bloc. Turkey, with her unique geostrategic position and situated on the south-eastern part of the Western bloc was to be inevitably affected by the developments facing the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Turkey and Greece being in the Western bloc again brought up the idea that good relations established in the 1930s between Turkey and Greece could promote the initiation of cooperation among the Balkan countries. Turkey, as it was in the Middle East, wanted to play an effective role in this initiation. This also made a part of the containment policy followed by USA, a major leading state of the Western bloc.

Tito's leaving the Cominform in 1948, in other words, following a policy that is different from the Eastern bloc put forward the idea of building a pact on the Ankara

³ K. Gürün, op. cit., p. 210.

⁴ Cited by Churchill's memory M. Aydın, *Kutu-Yüzdeler Anlaşması*, ed. B. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 471.

⁵ M. Aydın, op. cit., p. 471.

⁶ O. Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye*, Ankara, AUSBİF, 1969, p. 18. "I say let's put our business in the Balkans in order. Your armies are in Bulgarian and Romania ... Let us not deal with small things before set off. From England and Russia's point of view, you would have 90 percent sovereignty over Romania; We would get 90% of Greece, and share Yugoslavia fifty-fifty, what do you say?". From Churchill to Stalin, Moscow, October 1944, The Percentages Agreement, R. Cloog, *Modern Yunaitan Tarihi*, İstanbul, İletişim 1997, p. 163.

⁷ O. Sander, op. cit., p. 18.

⁸ After the disclosure of secret agreements, answering the questions by a Parisian reporter, Tito stated that Yugoslavia was divided fifty-fifty by Moscow and Yalta agreements but also added that he spoiled Stalin's game (Cumhuriyet, 26 November 1968).

⁹ F. Keskin, *Komintern ve Kominform*, ed. B. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2001, p. 500.

– Belgrade – Athens axis. There were two main reasons for building this pact. One of them was anxiety over security; the other was the increasing need for economic aid.¹⁰ On the regional platform, Turkey again set the agenda for an international organizations option, which was a traditional method of Turkish foreign policy. But starting from 1945, Turkey opted for the west for security reasons as one of the major factors shaping Turkish foreign and she became the advance post of the Western bloc.¹¹ According to Ulman and Sander, it was impossible for Turkey to maintain her security on her own and she followed a policy based on the idea that it was only possible within the Western bloc.¹² The Balkan pact made a different version of that policy.

The foundations and infrastructure of Yugoslavia's dismissal from the Soviet bloc were laid in 1948 as far as the disagreement between Stalin and Tito was concerned. Tito, at the beginning of 1930s, had already cleansed the party of Stalinists and wanted to keep the national struggle for independence and solution of national issues out of Stalin's reach and control, which had made the roots of dispute between two countries in the following years.¹³ For that reason, at a meeting among Eastern bloc countries in February of 1948, Stalin showed his distress over the two military divisions sent by Yugoslavia to Albania as an excuse and pointed out that the Soviet Union was to be counseled about issues concerning mutual interests in foreign policy.

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania, the states being under the Soviet Union influence, had no free will and consequently they were against the pact.¹⁴ However, the Soviet Union was against a possible Balkan Federation made of Bulgaria and Greece.¹⁵ *Pravda* apparently stood against that idea on 29 January 1948. Meanwhile the rumour that Dimitrov and Tito were going to build a Balkan Federation caused turmoil.¹⁶ The tension starting at that point reached its peak when Yugoslavia was dismissed from Cominform in the summer of 1948. That separation left Yugoslavia in loneliness within the Soviet bloc and also caused her to face many military and economic risks. At that time, Yugoslavia's initiatives to join COMECON, a counterpart of the Marshall Plan of the Eastern bloc, were turned down.¹⁷ All those developments made Yugoslavia meet Turkey, the advance (west) front of the west, at the Balkan Pact. Especially through the efforts made by Turkey, the Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration signed among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia on

¹⁰ M. Fırat, *Yunanistanla İlişkiler*, ed. B. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası I*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2002, p. 576.

¹¹ E. Yurdusev, *1945-1989 Döneminde Türkiye ve Balkanlar, Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi 200 Yıllık Süreç Sempozyumuna Sunulan Tehliğler*, 15-17 Ekim 1997, ed. I. Soysal, Ankara, TTK, 1999, p. 376.

¹² H. Ülman ve O. Sander, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) II*, Ankara, Journal of AUFPS, vol. XXVII, No. 1, March 1972, p. 7.

¹³ İ. Uzgel, *Sosyalizmden Ulusçuluğa: Yugoslavya'da Ulusçuluğun Yeniden Canlanması*, Prof. Dr. G. Ökçün'e Armağan (anniversary volume) Ankara, „Journal of AUPSP“, VLVII, Ocak-Haziran 1992, No: 1-2, p. 221.

¹⁴ E. Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, Bilgi, Ankara, 1996, p. 81.

¹⁵ B. Jelavich, *Balkan Tarihi II*, İstanbul, Küre, 2006, p. 346.

¹⁶ T. Ataöv, *Marshall Planından NATO'nun Kuruluşuna Kadar Soğuk Harp*, Ankara, *Journal of AUPSP*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, September 1968, p. 290.

¹⁷ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 349.

February 28, 1953. At the NATO council, Prime Minister Menderes even proposed Yugoslavia's entry to NATO. But that initiative was rejected due to the Trieste issue between Yugoslavia and Italy.¹⁸ The treaty executed on May 29, 1953 finally made the first stage of the Triple Alliance.¹⁹

Necessity for coordination and collaboration on defense was underlined in the introductory part of the treaty and that issue was arranged in articles 1-3 in detail. It was also stated that foreign ministers were supposed to meet once in a year and collaboration between commanders of armed forces was also emphasized. Through this agreement, in which no timeline was stated, it was decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Ankara.²⁰

In the following August, 'the Treaty of Political Collaboration and Solidarity' in the Yugoslavian city of Bled signed by the alliance could be regarded as a regional defence alliance and it was to last for 20 years. The second article of the mentioned treaty was quite similar to article 5 of NATO.²¹ The Bled treaty had not abolished the Ankara treaty. Press releases about the Bled treaty, that is, the Triple Alliance mainly focused on the matter of attachment of a communist state to the western security system and attracting other Soviet Union countries to join free nations community.²² According to Köprülü, European security was to benefit from the Balkan Pact.²³ In these agreements, it is possible to observe the prevention of Yugoslavia's return to the Eastern bloc rather than the initiatives by the countries in the region and the leading power of USA which was following a containment policy against the Soviet Union.²⁴ Actually, Turkey was in a delicate keystone position concerning the attempts of besieging the Soviet bloc of USA foreign minister Dulles through regional alliances.

However, a Yugoslav-Soviet intimacy had begun through the efforts by Khrushchev and Bulganin in the months following the Bled agreement.²⁵ Yugoslavia, taking a different stand from that of other socialist states in the Balkans, followed a non-aligned and independent policy.²⁶ Especially Khrushchev's making peace with Tito in 1955 simply signified an implicit acceptance of Yugoslavia's independent and nationalist communism that was admired by the Eastern bloc.²⁷ On the other hand, when adopted a system consisting of autonomous cooperative initiatives instead of an organized central economy, Yugoslavia, which was a peculiar member of the socialist system, could perform not a remarkable achievement compared to others.²⁸

¹⁸ H. Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, Ankara, ODTÜ (METU) ve, 2001, p. 52.

¹⁹ İ. Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Bağlıları (1945-1990)*, Cilt II, Ankara, TTK, 1991, p. 471.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 472.

²¹ M. Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara, AÜ SBF Yayınları, 1987, p. 243.

²² F. C. Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, Cilt II, 2. Kısım, Ankara, TTK (THS), 1987, p. 510.

²³ H. Bağcı, a.g.e, p. 54.

²⁴ O. Sander, op. cit., pp. 89-90 and p. 101.

²⁵ E. Yurdusev, op. cit., p. 378.

²⁶ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 434.

²⁷ D. Sezer, *Khrushchev Devrinin Blok İçi Meseleleri*, Ankara, AÜ SBF Yayınları, 1967, p. 25.

²⁸ E. Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 461.

The Soviet Union at this point caused a dangerous movement within her own bloc. The only benefit of that policy for the Soviet Union is Yugoslavia's becoming a leader of the non-alignment policy instead of becoming a western ally.²⁹

This case indeed caused Turkey and Yugoslavia to take different roads. During that period, Turkey, following a policy that is fully dependent on the Western bloc, did never accept a foreign policy that was based on non-alignment and neutrality.

Yugoslavia could little benefit from the alliance between Turkey and Greece; Yugoslavia did not thoroughly end her alliance but made it inapplicable. As a result, the pact went into the dusty shelves of history in the middle of 1955.³⁰ Another country benefiting from this alliance is Greece. During his visit to Yugoslavia, Karamanlis, the then Greek prime minister of Greece, pointed out that the cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia would continue on the same frequency whatever happened in the Triple Alliance.³¹ In fact, talks over solving the obscure issues between Greece and Bulgaria had been continuing since the beginning of 1950. Political relations had been established between the two countries but Bulgaria had not kept her promise. Problems were solved at last and a protocol bringing a solution to the borders problem was signed in 1958.

When we look at Turkish-Greek relations, we see that 1950s were recorded in history as a period with a loaded agenda. From the beginning of the 1950s, Greece solving her interior problems by the help of USA³² began to show interest in Cyprus and regarded it as a national matter of concern.³³ Turkey and Greece were members of NATO in the beginning of 1950s and in this respect Greek Prime Minister Sofokles Venizelos visited Turkey. Two sides at these talks in Ankara decided to build a permanent mixed Turkish-Greek commission.³⁴ Additionally, the commission decided to establish good relations with Yugoslavia concerning the regional security. Also in addition to all of these, Menderes saying that the Cyprus issue would reach a solution within Turkish-Greek friendship, he encouraged Greece to take steps about Cyprus.³⁵

Disregarding these policies, relations were developing at a desired level.³⁶ Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Affairs Minister Fuat Köprülü visited Athens on April 26 and May 2. On the last day of the visit, Menderes stated that the idea of a Turkish-Greek Union suggested by his Greek counterpart Plastiras would serve the

²⁹ K. Gürün, op. cit., p. 223.

³⁰ İ. Soysal, op. cit., p. 474.

³¹ O. Sander, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

³² After the Korean War broke out, as a result of the change in policy, USA began to support Greece and conservative governments more. An agreement based on military cooperation was signed between Greece and USA in 1953. Financial support to USA and concessions made to USA reached its peak. B. Jelavich, op. cit., pp. 441-443.

³³ E. Yurdusev, op. cit., p. 379.

³⁴ M. Hatipoğlu, *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, Ankara, Siyasal, 1997.

³⁵ Ş. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)*, Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, p. 55.

³⁶ M. Hatipoğlu, op. cit., p. 291.

interests of the west as well.³⁷ Between June 8 and 15 of 1952, the Greek King Paulos visited Turkey. During that visit fishing issues in the Aegean Sea were laid on the table and the agreement could only be paraphrased on June 21, 1952.³⁸ In the autumn of the same year, President of the Republic Celal Bayar visited Greece. Meanwhile, the Greek press was trying to make Cyprus a problem. Additionally, on returning his call in November of 1952, Celal Bayar made observations in Athens and Western Thrace. During Bayar's visit to Western Thrace, he opened a Turkish High school.³⁹

While Turkish-Greek relations were developing within the framework of good relations, both countries focusing on the Cyprus issue started a new turning point in the relations. In other words, taking the Cyprus issue to international platform and EOKA, as an organization behind the scene, starting an armed struggle with the support of the majority of Greek Cypriots against the English occupation to realise ENOSIS put the future of the island on the agenda and revitalised the Turkish-Greek conflict.⁴⁰

At this point, the first disagreement arose related to the Cyprus issue. While there were attacks on Cypriot Turks during this period, the spread of the news⁴¹ that a bomb was planted in the house in Salonika where Atatürk was born on September 6-7, 1955 agitated people and they attacked the Greek community living in Izmir and Istanbul.⁴² When September 6-7 events took place, the London conference was still continuing, but those events caused⁴³ the conference to end.⁴⁴

The Cyprus problem was still the primary focus of Turkey and Greece in the years following 1955. At this point, England, the third side of the problem was very good at maintaining an international balance. The most important reason for this was due to England's Middle East policy and the increasing strategic importance of the island.⁴⁵ Actually, the Cyprus problem arose in relation to the ongoing abolition of British Empire.⁴⁶ England's departure from the Near East could lead to USA's intervention.⁴⁷ Again during this period, the Greek set up many organizations to throw

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 292.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 289.

³⁹ B. Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Batı Trakya Sorunu*, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991, p. 120.

⁴⁰ A.D. Mavroyannis, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Türk Yunan İlişkilerine Etkisi", *Türk Yunan Uyuşmazlığı*, ed. S. Vaner, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 1989, p. 129.

⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁴² M. Fırat, *6-7 Eylül Olayları*, ed. B. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, Vol. I, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 602.

⁴³ E. Mütercimler ve M.K. Öke, *Düşler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2004, s. 350 ve F. Sönmezoglu, *Kıbrıs Sorununda Tarafların Tutumu ve Tezleri*, ed. E. Çam, *Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar*, İstanbul, Der, 1989, pp. 83-84.

⁴⁴ When those events occurred, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who was then in London, asked for a voice that was off the agenda and said "I should say in deep grief and sorrow that while we had been looking for a peaceful solution for the Cyprus problem, the house where Atatürk was born was attacked with a bomb; this is a severe provocation and there is no point in continuing with the conference." M. Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları*, İstanbul, Cem, 1990, p. 133.

⁴⁵ F. Sönmezoglu, *Kıbrıs Sorununda Tarafların Tutumu ve Tezleri*, p. 83.

⁴⁶ T.R. Aras, *Görüşlerim. II*, İstanbul, Yörük, 1968, p. 4.

⁴⁷ M. Dikerdem, op. cit., p. 128.

the English out of the island and unite it with Greece.⁴⁸ But England could not be influential because of her failure in the Middle East and USA's increasing power and began to develop a positive attitude towards proposals of pulling out of the island. Starting from that point, England brought up the proposal of division about the disagreement between Turkey and Greece. That proposal was also welcomed by Turkish public opinion. Meetings of "either division or death" were organized in Istanbul. Greece, which did not welcome the proposal of "Division" mainly aimed at annexing the island to Greece.

However, England introduced a different set of proposals towards the solution of the Cyprus problem since 1957.⁴⁹ At that time, clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots could have worsened the case but for USA's intervention. Sides came together in London to discuss the primary agreement that was contracted in Zurich.⁵⁰ After the London talks held in February of 1959, Cyprus became an independent state through the agreements signed on February 19 in London and the Nicosia Agreement on August 16, 1960. But related to Cyprus problem, the desire to annex the island to Greece in 1960s gradually increased the dosage of the events and the problem reached an explosive point in 1960s. Greece's main policy about Cyprus in this respect was to prevent Turkey from being a part of the problem.⁵¹

Our relations with Bulgaria developed on the Soviet Union and American axis. In years 1944-1945, Turkey and Soviet Union were on very bad terms. The Soviet Union declared that she had abolished the Friendship and Non-aggression Pact made with Turkey in 1945 and she also asked for land and base for the renewal of the treaty. Turkey, in this atmosphere of insecurity, chose USA as an ally. That choice resulted in Turkey's NATO membership. Within the framework of this international conjecture, in those years issue of Turkish minority set the agenda of the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria which was following a policy in tandem with the Soviet Union. Bulgaria at that time lived in fear and isolation due to the border dispute between Greece and Yugoslavia.⁵² However, recapture of almost all the Balkans by communist regimes naturally filled Turkey with anxiety over her security. At that point, that Bulgaria forced 250.000 people to emigrate during Korean War increased Turkey's anxiety over security more. In fact, Bulgaria with no difficulty gave passports to the Turks who wanted to emigrate even in 1949.⁵³ Because of the incidents of espionage that started towards the end of the same, year, a crisis in relations between Turkey and Bulgaria arose after 1950s. As a result, Bulgarian embassy in Sofia delivering a diplomatic Note on August 14, 1950 asked for permission from Turkey for the ac-

⁴⁸ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 446.

⁴⁹ Turkey indeed changed her Cyprus policy starting from 1956. One of the reasons for this was England. F. Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul, 2006, p. 148.

⁵⁰ M. Sarıca, E. Teziç, Ö. Eskiurt, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, İÜHF 1975, p. 12.

⁵¹ F. Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 153.

⁵² S. Turan, *Türkiye'nin Balkan Politikası Bağlamında Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkilerine Bir Bakış*, BAL-TAM Türklük Bilgisi, Balkan Toplulukları Araştırma Merkezi, Prizren, Mart 2006, pp. 77-78.

⁵³ B. Şimşir, *Bulgaristan Türkleri (1878-1985)*, Ankara, Bilgi, 1986, p. 217.

ceptance of 250,000 Turks who wanted to emigrate to Turkey in three months. The Note stated that allowing and accepting Turks who wish to emigrate into the country (Turkey) was a requirement of the Turkish-Bulgarian Residency Agreement signed on October 18, 1925.⁵⁴

Turkey replying to the Note on August 28, 1950, made it clear that it was still insisted on the issue although it was known by the other side that Turkish economy could not afford 250,000 emigrants of the Turkish origin and political views of the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin were investigated for maintaining national security. Meanwhile, Turkish press and public opinion while criticizing Bulgarian policies were mainly targeted at the Soviet Union. Although the problems between Turkey and Bulgaria basically resulted from Bulgaria's interior problems, they were intensified by ideological and structural atmosphere of the Cold War.⁵⁵ Meanwhile Bulgaria sent another Note on September 22, 1950. The Note stated that Bulgaria treated the Turkish minority very well and allowed free allocation of goods and properties of those who wanted to leave and also put forward that Turkey in fact didn't treat the Christian minorities well and Greek emigrants were the solid poof of that. Turkey replied to the Bulgarian Note and defended that the October 18, 1925 agreement was perverted by Bulgaria and also claimed that the second article of the agreement was meant to apply to a common emigration situation not to the mass emigration. In the memo sent in addition to the Note, it was stated that Turkish-Greek Community Exchange was carried out in accordance with regulations stated in the Lausanne Treaty. Bulgaria's latest Note aroused big anger in Turkish press and accusations regarding status of minorities in Turkey were received as a hostile insult. On that, President of the Republic Celal Bayar closed the Turkish-Bulgarian border on November 6, 1950 and stated that he would take the issue to the international platform.⁵⁶ Those initiatives caused Bulgaria to soothe her harsh attitude. But after the agreement signed in December 1950, Turkey reopened the border. But on November 8, 1951 the border was closed again as Bulgarian authorities had let gypsies cross the border. Bulgaria again protested that through a Note. About 154,000 emigrants arrived in Turkey as a result of the emigration flow of Bulgarian Turks that started in 1950 and were located especially around Istanbul.⁵⁷ Turkey received a 30 million TL aid from USA for the settlement of the emigrants.⁵⁸

Another Note came from Bulgaria in 1952. That Note was related to Turkey's becoming a NATO member. The Note sent on February 22 claimed that Turkey's NATO membership posed a threat for Bulgaria, strategic roads were being built in Thrace, spies were trained in Turkey and it was also added that Turkish authorities would be kept responsible for possible incidents. Turkey sent her Note as a reply on April 16 and denied the allegations put forward.⁵⁹ By the way, it should be

⁵⁴ İ. Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye*, İstanbul, İSİS, 1997, p. 103.

⁵⁵ S. Turan, op. cit., p. 79.

⁵⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, November – Kasım 1950, Number 204, pp. 30-31.

⁵⁷ İ. Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye*, p. 135.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 136.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 143.

noted that the Soviet Union sent two Notes related to Turkey's accession to NATO in 1951.

After 1944, among Eastern European countries, it was Bulgaria it was Bulgaria which had the closest relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ Bulgaria, in a way, fully carried out the directives given by Moscow. But on March 5, 1953, Stalin died. In the same year, the Soviet Union reported that she withdrew her demands on Turkey. In 1954, the Soviet Union Communist party acknowledged a principle of living in peace at its XX. Congress. Through this event, winds of peace were blowing on the international platform. But it took some time for the spring atmosphere on the international platform to reflect on the Turkish- Bulgarian relations and the golden age of economic relations was to begin by mid-60s.⁶¹

Looking at our relations with Albania, Albania is not a Balkan state which is not a close border neighbour of Turkey but has deep historic ties with Turkey. Albania was in turn under Italian and German siege throughout 1940s. Turkey's Tiran embassy remained opened and continued working.⁶² During this period, a guerrilla struggle was started against the occupants in Albania. Albanian Communist party was founded by the Yugoslavian Communist party in 1941 and the party remained under Yugoslavia's control until 1948.⁶³ That control was secured by Kochi Džodze who was Enver Hodja. In 1948, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union being on strained terms and Albania's dismissal from Cominform were events that opened the path for Albania. Enver Hodja, the leader of the independence movement, seized power in Albania after the elimination of Yugoslavia's influence.⁶⁴ The strange thing is that Kochi Hodja, who was a more ardent communist and Russian fan not only lost that struggle but he was also hanged along with 13 people.⁶⁵ The new administration of Albania closed down the Consulate General of Turkey in Tiran. For that reason, Turkey did not recognize the new Albanian administration. Only after 10 years, Albania began to start relations with Turkey. In return for Albania's demand for establishing relations, Turkey was quite scrupulous and prudent. In spite of this, Turkey voted in favour of Albania at the General Assembly for Albania's accession as a member to the United Nations. Albania wishing to establish relations first signed an agreement for the protection of her interests by the Bulgarian Embassy. That agreement was not accepted by Turkey. For that reason, the Albanian Embassy in Paris verbally and orally demanded to establish relations with Turkey again. As a result, it was agreed to start relations through the embassies on June 24, 1958 and that marked a new era in the Turkish-Albanian relations.⁶⁶

Towards the end of 1950s, relations between Turkey and Albania started. As stated above, those relations were demanded by Albania regarding the regional and

⁶⁰ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 391.

⁶¹ S. Turan, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

⁶² B. Şimşir, *Türkiye-Arnavutluk İlişkileri*, Ankara, ASAM 2001, p. 32.

⁶³ D. Sezer, op. cit., p. 40.

⁶⁴ B. Şimşir, op. cit., p. 33.

⁶⁵ K. Gürün, op. cit., p. 224.

⁶⁶ B. Şimşir, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

international conjecture due to her dispute first with Yugoslavia and latter the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's program and the decisions made by the Soviet Union Communist Party's XX congress were received with dissatisfaction by Enver Hodja. In reality, Albania was not going to accept COMECON integration program like Romania.⁶⁷

Maintenance of collaboration among the Balkan states and disarmament proposals put forward by the Romanian Prime Minister Stoica were the most striking issues observed in our relations with Romania,⁶⁸ another Balkan state, between 1950 and 1960. The developments in the Balkans the years between 1950 and 1960 were important in terms of regional collaboration. The principle of "living in peace" agreed at the XX congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party naturally laid behind the proposals regarding collaboration among blocs.

On September 17, 1957, based on the Stoica Plan, the Romanian Prime Minister Stoica sent an invitation of cooperation to the prime ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Greece. The plan, including two basic features, emphasised on keeping the Balkan region as large as it could cover six countries. Another important feature of the Stoica Plan was that there was no mention of an atom free zone.⁶⁹

The main points of the Plan were as follows:⁷⁰

- Within the framework of cultural and economic developments, there is a great possibility of developing relations among countries in the Balkans.
- There are some unsolved problems and disagreements among some states of the Balkans but those should be stopped through collaboration.
- Development of economic collaboration is to the benefit of the Balkan states.
- A cultural cooperation should be achieved among the Balkan peoples.

Acting the above principles, Stoica asked six Balkan states to meet at a conference. The proposal made by the hosting country Romania was principally accepted by Bulgarian and Yugoslavia but turned down by Greece and Turkey.⁷¹ In her rejection, Greece stated that she regarded the plan as a sign of the efforts towards dividing the Balkan states and reported that to Romania. Turkey declined that proposal and reported her reasons to the Soviet Union. Greece's negative attitude about the plan after Turkey signaled that the conference could not convene.⁷² Thus, the Balkan Union dream couldn't be realized.

As a result, the nature of the Cold War atmosphere between 1950 and 1960 caused Turkish-USA relations to improve. Turkey, serving for the western interest in the Middle East through the Balkan Pact in the Balkans and the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East, was relatively opposed by both her close neighbors (Greece and Bulgaria) and far neighbours. That was caused not only by the golden years of the Cold War but also by Turkey's being a deliberate western follower actor. But that situation

⁶⁷ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 409.

⁶⁸ Like Bulgaria, Romania also protested Turkey's entry to NATO through a Note on March 3, 1952. See İ. Soysal, *Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye*, p. 143.

⁶⁹ O. Sander, op. cit., p. 145.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, pp. 145-150.

⁷¹ B. Jelavich, op. cit., p. 401.

⁷² O. Sander, op. cit., p. 151.

resulted in the isolation of Turkey on an international platform like Middle East, the Balkans or United Nations. On the other hand, Greece, another loyal (!) follower of USA, was not mistaken as Turkey. According to Sönmezoğlu, Greece pursued a more region oriented policy compared to Turkey. But as required by the system at that time, neither Turkey nor Greece had a probability of acting together with the Western bloc countries.⁷³

Turkey had to do with mutual relations during the golden years of the Cold War. In addition, Turkey on the long run lost the chance of acting in her own initiative in the Balkans. That was negatively reflected on the Turkish foreign policy in the following years.

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⁷³ F. Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 93-94.



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