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CAN WE HAVE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY?

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This paper concerns synthetic philosophy, or philosophy created by a computer system. We discuss when a work created by a computer system can be called a work of philosophy and when it cannot. We question the kind of philosophy that synthetic philosophy could be, as well as what kind of philosophical vistas it could open to us. Furthermore, we also delve into who would be responsible for the ethical impact from computer-generated philosophical works. Finally, we speculate about the possible future of synthetic philosophy with AI technologies that have yet to be created.

Keywords: synthetic philosophy, AI systems, nature of philosophy, computer-generated philosophy

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Introduction

We have witnessed the emergence AI-generated art (e.g., Cetinic & She, 2021), music (e.g., Dhariwal et al., 2020), news (Landymore, 2023), legal documents (e.g., Bloomberg Law, 2023), sermons and theological texts (e.g., East, 2023; MissionMarketingTeam, 2024), computer fiction (e.g., Besinger, 2023), and poetry (e.g., Tang, 2020; Agnew et al. 2022; Ludwig, 2023).¹ We are also already seeing short philosophical-like essays being generated

¹ The provided references are merely an illustrative selection for each topic.

by computing systems (Krzanowski & Polak, 2022; 2023), and we could well expect to see philosophical papers, essays, book reviews, and such like being written by computers, albeit with the help of human agents, and submitted to conferences and journals.² Thus, the moment seems right to question whether computer systems could actually create a kind of work that we could regard as philosophy, as well as ask the sort of work that this may be.

We first question what we could refer to as synthetic philosophy, or in other words, under what conditions could we refer to a work created by a computer system as a work of philosophy? We then move onto pondering the kind of philosophy that synthetic philosophy could be and the sorts of philosophical perspectives that could it open to us, if any. Furthermore, we question who would be responsible for the ethical impact of computer-generated philosophical works on society, politics, and democracy. Finally, we address the question of the truth and relevance of synthetic philosophy: Would these works, imaginary or otherwise, be mere artifacts, or would they attain the status, impact and relevance of the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Descartes, Leibnitz, and so on. And last but not least would computer systems generate a new kind of philosophy that is different from what we have created?

Note 1: In our discussion, by “computer systems,” we are referring to computer-based AI systems, which are designed with the explicit aim of simulating human intellectual capacities or, in a more extended sense, human agency, because we assume that human agency (e.g. Mayr 2011)³ is at the root of philosophical thinking. Different computer systems may have different objectives that are related or unrelated to the original goals of AI (as in McCarthy et al. 1955), but in this discussion, we are referring exclusively to computer systems in the sense of computer AI systems.

Note 2: The possibility of computer systems generating philosophical work has only manifested recently with the rise of large language models (LLMs) and generative AI, so it is no surprise that we use the capacities of these systems as reference models for AI’s capacity to mimic human creative faculties. Nevertheless, while we refer to LLM systems, it is only as an exemplar of a certain model of natural language processing, the most

² Several journals have already banned AI authorship or are at least considering doing so (e.g., Acosta & Levin, 2022; Vincent, 2023; Quach, 2023; Schlagwein & Willcocks, 2023).

³ According to Mayr, “Our self-understanding as human agents includes commitment to three crucial claims about human agency: That agents must be active, that actions are part of the natural order, and that intentional actions can be explained by the agent’s reasons for acting” (Mayr, 2011).

successful one so far (as of 2024), rather than as a model of intelligence in general sense or AGI. We do not attribute anything more to LLMs than we would attribute to Turning Machines (TMs, see below). LLM systems have a grammatical structure based on statistical correlations among the source data and some semantic structure (statistical semantics as opposed to ontological semantics⁴) based on the same correlations, but they lack semantics and understanding in the sense that we understand them, as explained later in the text.

What could synthetic philosophy be?

We could posit that synthetic philosophy, or a philosophical work created by a computer system or more generally a computer artefact, is a work that resembles (i.e., in that it has a similar format, structure, content, and purpose) the philosophical work created by human philosophers in the past. For example, such work could come in the form of an essay, a review, a summary, a book, an analysis of some work, a philosophical question or questions, problems to be solved, philosophical insights, a philosophical research proposal, a conference abstract, a conference presentation, a book on a philosophical topic, a Ph.D. or Master's thesis on a philosophical topic, and so on.

The question of “What is philosophy?” is not going to be resolved here.⁵ There are varieties of philosophy, and varieties of various works. (For recent experiences in philosophy, see for example, the work of Yancy [2002], and for meta-philosophy, see the works of Overgaard et al. [2013] and Rescher [2023]). Some of these works clearly have a philosophical standing, some are ideological manifestos, some are borderline. In some cases, it can take decades or centuries or seismic changes in culture and politics before a work is recognized, or dismissed, as being philosophical (e.g., Kenny, 2012; Baggini, 2018).

⁴ Statistical semantics is semantics deduced from syntactic structures. Ontological semantics is semantics deduced from the relations with the external world.

⁵ See the many views about the nature of philosophy from both well-known and lesser-known philosophers, such as Russell (2001, 2005), Heidegger (1959), Nagel (1987), Deleuze and Guattari (1994), Craig (2002), Overgaard et al. (2013), Joll (2017), Maritain (2005), Hadot (2008), Kenny (2012), Pritchard (2016), Hampel (2018), Midgley (2018), Grisez (1963), Kekes (1980), and Williamson (2022). An essentialist definition of philosophy has been rather elusive, of course, but many have been proposed nevertheless.

We propose here various approaches for deciding whether a specific computer-generated work is a work of philosophy:

- (1) Synthetic philosophy can be regarded as a philosophical work if a panel of experts recognizes it as such. This definition is somewhat flawed, however, because with a certain panel of experts, any work could count as philosophy (Overgaard et al., 2013; Rescher, 2023).
- (2) We could ask a computer system to generate a paper on a specific topic for which there already exists substantial, recognized publications. By comparing the results with these publications in terms of content, argument, context, presentation, key terms, and so on, we could make a qualitative judgement about the computer's work.
- (3) We could select a panel of judges who are all recognized experts in the topic, because such a panel would certainly ensure a more stringent evaluation of the computer system's work than would be the case with the philosophical commons, as in approach (1).
- (4) We could ask a computer system whether it considers its output to be a philosophical work. In other words, we exclude human agents from deciding what is and is not philosophy.
- (5) We could conduct a poll and determine philosophical works through democratic votes (i.e., crowd voting). Nevertheless, democracy judgements are often misjudgments.
- (6) We could apply an arbitrary judgment through religious or political powers has often been the case in the past.

More proposals like these can be generated. So, with no clear solution in sight, to make the problem of the reference criterion (RC) (to decide what is and what is not a work of philosophy) manageable – whether it be (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) – without deciding which of these is right, we propose that a computer-generated work p is philosophical if it satisfies the definition (D):

Def. (D): We refer to p as a work of philosophy if it satisfies the criterion $RC(p)$. Otherwise, p is not a work of philosophy. The criterion RC is to be defined as appropriate.

None of the above proposed reference criteria addresses the problem of determining how “good” synthetic philosophy would be, but then “good” is a relative judgment made by a panel of experts or through some other procedure.⁶

⁶ For example, many experts in many places and university circles regarded Marxism and Leninism as the pinnacle of philosophy, and some still do (Kolakowski, 2005), but at

Indeed, works that were once revered now seems nonsensical, and once-dismissed writings are often seen now as gems of human thought. It also may be the case that to classify philosophical work, we will need to choose a qualifier other than “good,” such as “interesting,” “novel,” or “revealing.” Unfortunately, using such qualifiers would muddle the issue even more, so the development of a comparison methodology for synthetic philosophy will not be discussed further in this paper.

Not every work generated by a computer system will be regarded as synthetic philosophy in the sense of Def. (D), but which will and which will not? Works that are a reproduction, or a copy, of existing works will obviously not qualify under Def. (D), so existing human-generated work that has been rewritten, translated, and/or corrected by a computer system would not qualify either. In addition, work that has been generated by a computer system and then corrected, improved, reformatted, and rearranged by a human agent (i.e., the human-in-the-loop case) could not be regarded as synthetic philosophy. If such a work were to be presented as the human agent’s work, it would be a case of rather unprofessional practice. These works could be denoted as collaborative works between humans and machines, but they would require a more subtle interpretation to which we are not yet open, although others may disagree on this point.

To avoid any hybrid, human-in-the-loop creations, we claim here that a piece of work generated by a computer system may be considered synthetic philosophy if the computer system generated this work in response to a specific prompt from a human agent or at the request of a human agent. For example, specific questions could be “What is the nature of virtue?”, “Could I lie?”, “What is JTB?”, and so on. We do not envision computer systems initiating their own philosophical works, because fully autonomous thinking systems for now.

So we have an argument (A)

(A1) The work is generated by a computer system in response to a specific prompt from a human agent or at the request of a human agent.

(A2) The work satisfies (D).

Thus,

(C) The work can be considered as philosophical work generated by a computer system.

least as many would likely disagree. Further examples of good philosophy turning sour, or vice versa, can be easily found.

What sort of philosophy could we expect from computer systems?

We propose that The Three Principles (3P) of computers systems, including AI systems, are relevant to synthetic philosophy:

- (P1) Computers do not “know” (in the way humans do) what they do (i.e., they do what they are programmed to do and do not track the truth).
- (P2) Computers do not “understand” (in the way humans do) data (data here is an input to the system – text ,video, voice, in any form) but rather create statistical models of data based on synthetic structures in data that they are fed with.
- (P3) There is no learning (in the way humans do) in machine learning,⁷ and there is no intelligence (meaning human like intelligence) in machine intelligence.⁸

To understand points (1), (2), and (3), we need to understand what computer systems are in principle: By a computer system, we refer to an artificial information-processing system based on a formal mathematical model of computing, such as a Turing machine (e.g., Haugeland, 1985; Primiero, 2020; Russell, 2020; Sipser, 2020; Wolfram, 2023b). This formal model for reasoning or information processing allows effective or mechanical computation,⁹ and all our current computer systems are implementations of a Turing machine (TM) (e.g., Primiero, 2020; Russell, 2020). Furthermore, we do not attribute to computing systems any intellectual functions that would imply consciousness, self-awareness, emerging intelligence,

⁷ Machine Learning “is a branch of artificial intelligence (AI) and computer science that focuses on using data and algorithms to enable AI to imitate the way that humans learn, thus gradually improving its accuracy” (IBMML, 2024).

⁸ AI by definition should possess human learning, intelligence, thinking, and other faculties. AI currently does not have these, nor will it have them for the foreseeable future (e.g., Mitchell, 2019; Smith, 2019). Nevertheless, it sort of has them, but current learning in ML is not in the sense originally intended in AI, nor is the thinking or intelligence. Thus, predicates are often used, such as “almost like...,” “kind of...,” and “sort of...” to imply that such systems do not have these properties, contrary to the common understanding.

⁹ The word “effective” is synonymous with “mechanical” (Copeland, 2020). A method or procedure M for achieving some desired result is called “effective” (or “systematic” or “mechanical”) if, among other conditions, M needs no insight, intuition, or ingenuity from the human being applying the method (Copeland 2000, 2024, see also Haugelan, 1985; Smith, 2019).

or a human-level intellect, as would be the case with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).¹⁰

To understand (2) we need to acknowledge and recognize the following:
 A. AI, including the current LLM systems, operate on data type (f), which is a subset of the entire complex of the (a–e) data that is available to philosophers.

Note that data is the input to the computing process, which in our case is supplied for generating philosophical work. We are therefore talking about the data needed to create philosophy, because as the philosophical dictum goes, *ex nihilo nihil fit* (i.e., “nothing comes from nothing”). Thus, any philosophy – whether it be human, synthetic, or from some other source – needs data, and depending on the input data used, we would get different philosophies. Rescher (2023) regards philosophical data as:
 (a) common knowledge and beliefs;
 (b) scientific facts and expert knowledge;
 (c) facts from everyday experience;
 (d) received opinions, religious and cultural teachings, and social opinions; and
 (e) traditions and inherited lore.

For the case of synthetic philosophy, we may add some more specific items to this list, namely:

(f) existing information in digital form on the Internet and digital archives or depositories (i.e., libraries), such as textual, pictorial, and video data.¹¹

We can surmise that (f) is a reflection of (a) to (e), but this is just almost correct, because not all of our knowledge and philosophical data in (a) to (e) is available in a digital form (e.g., Ward, 2021). Thus, (f) would be

¹⁰ What we understand as AGI varies depending on who is talking about it (e.g., Heikkilä & Heaven, 2022; Mitchell, 2019; Fjelland, 2020). We therefore get different conceptualizations, such as general-purpose, human-level intelligence (Marcus, 2022); the generic ability of a machine to consciously perform any task that a human could (Kumpulainen & Terziyan 2022); a machine having the intelligence to understand the world (Arek, 2020); a representation of generalized human cognitive abilities (Jabrzyk, 2024); a general-purpose capability (Cassimatis, Bello & Langley, 2008); and the capacity of an engineered system to display a vague sort of general intelligence that resembles that of humans (Goertzel, 2015).

¹¹ The categories of data suggested by Rescher do not align with phenomenology, continental philosophy, analytic philosophy, ordinary language philosophy, or any other philosophical school or methodology. They instead represent the “raw material” that any of these schools could access and choose to utilize, albeit to varying degrees and with different perspectives.

a subset of the entire philosophical data, at least according to Rescher's list.

- B. We cannot attribute to current systems any kind of intellectual prowess that would imply consciousness, self-awareness, or a human-level intellect.
- C. The currently developed AI natural language processing (NLP) LLM algorithms are based on the statistical pattern-matching of tokens (words or fragments of words) rather than a search for truth, hidden meaning, and so on, so we cannot expect from such systems original philosophical works but rather just a recombination of extant sources (e.g., Chomsky, 2021; Bender et al.; CBS, 2023; Mitchell, 2023; Paaß & Giesselbach, 2023).¹²

So, what can we expect from computers in terms of philosophy? Well, while some philosophical insights may be hidden in the extant input data that is used to train computer models, insights that we have not discovered or missed, the answers to the perennial problems of philosophy will not be found there, certainly not through statistical pattern matching (LLM systems are generally pattern matching systems).¹³ But why not? The following arguments may support this claim (A1.0):

¹² To apprehend the methodical differences between philosophy generated by AI based on statistical correlations among tokens (i.e., words and parts of words) and the philosophy of human agents, albeit with many exceptions, we need to look at the philosophical travails of some of the most prominent personalities. For example, Descartes came to his conclusions mostly by thinking deeply about his, although this can be generalized to all human kind, epistemic and ontological position. (For more on Descartes, see the works of Clarke [2007] and Nadler [2013].) Computers, in contrast, do not have an epistemic or ontological position to begin with, and it is hardly conceivable that they would generalize their ideas to the whole of the computer species, so to say. Thus, in all probability, they will not perform synthetic meditations and output something like *computo, ergo sum*. Descartes did of course perform detailed studies of extant writings on a variety of topics, and some of his ideas were not entirely his, but these were food for thought rather than a jigsaw puzzle from which he built the text of his thoughts, which is what LLM systems currently do. When we trace Martin Luther's arduous road (1512–1517) to his bliss, we can see a man who was deeply immersed in a variety of texts, but the bliss came from within him (for more on Luther, see the work of Wilson [2017]). Computers do not experience such bliss, except through maybe a short circuit. One could easily give examples of philosophies that were created in a similar way to how current LLM systems work, but we are not talking here about this way of doing philosophy, because this seems to be a fool's errand.

¹³ A selection of perennial philosophical questions was provided by John Lennox in his response to Stephen Hawking's dismissive perspective on philosophy (Lennox, 2011). Nevertheless, quoting Lennox is about more than just giving examples of perennial philosophy:

(A1.1) Only part of our philosophical experience and data is, or ever will be, available to computers in a digital format.

(A1.2) Computer systems can only use data in digital format.

Thus,

(C1.1) Computer systems can only access a fraction of the data used by philosophers.

Thus, the 3P principles and its consequences imply that we should not expect synthetic philosophy to resolve any of our deep, primary philosophical questions that we humans are asking, at least if we agree that philosophy is about such questions (some philosophers and philosophical schools do indeed deny this), rather than reinterpreting extant texts. Why? Here is a follow up argument to support this (A2.0):

(A2.1) Philosophy has been unable to resolve its fundamental questions.

(A2.2) The *aporia* of philosophy is reflected in the extant data.

(A2.3) Computer systems (like the current ML models) use digitized extant sources to create combinations (interpolations)¹⁴ of existing information (data type f) based on data-derived statistical rules for syntax and semantics.

Thus,

(C2.1) Computer systems will not resolve the fundamental questions of philosophy, because the answers are not in the input data provided to them.

What about synthetic philosophy and ethical responsibility?

Why should we ask this question? There are several reasons, so we ask who would be responsible for the ethical impact of computer-generated philosophical works on society, politics, and democracy, at least if such works are ultimately created. Here is an extended argument to address this question (A3.0):

Lennox used these questions to juxtapose scientific thinking and philosophical reflection. “Science, (implied) including computer sciences and its ware, is not designed to answer certain types of questions” was Lennox’s message.

¹⁴ Interpolation is “the process of obtaining intermediate terms of a series of which particular terms only are given” from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Interpolation.

- (A3.1) Philosophy is an activity engaged with reality (Socratic school), although not every philosophy has such objectives and ambitions. Note that if philosophy is practiced as juggling barren concepts (some schools in early analytic philosophy), its ethical implications will of course be rather slim.
- (A3.2) Philosophy impacts society and our collective psyche, especially if we are to receive guidance and perspectives on matters of life from machines (Lindgren, 2024). Note that philosophy is not just an abstract academic discussion, just as the history of philosophy and its impact on societies has demonstrated (e.g., Wilson, 2017). Such questions should certainly not be addressed by researching human-compatible AI or responsible AI, because these are just proposing technical solutions to non-technical problems.
- (A3.3) We also cannot dismiss the possible impact of synthetic philosophy on excluded minorities or disadvantaged groups, because computer systems are, and always will be, oblivious to such contexts.
- (A3.4) On a smaller scale, the ethical implications of synthetic philosophy include aspects like plagiarism, authorship, and ownership, and these problems are becoming relevant already, albeit in a different context. Thus,
- (C) It is conceivable that synthetic philosophical works may ethical impact on our society and collective psyche.

Now, what should we do about this state of affairs? Generally, with an artefact, responsibility for its performance should lay clearly with its maker. But should we apply this rule to AI in general and synthetic philosophy in particular? Industry has always tried to avoid any responsibility for the consequences of what they produce. For example, think about the stories from the pharmaceutical, oil, and chemical industries, as well as autonomous cars, weapons, and so on (e.g., Oreskes & Conway, 2011). There is, and will likely continue to be, resistance from the computer industry to accept or even admit any ethical impact of their products and to take responsibility for their actions.

What about the truth and relevance of synthetic philosophy?

With synthetic philosophy, or philosophy created by AI systems, there is the question of ontology. In other words, what exists (in the ontological sense)

for computers and humans? The AI systems that we currently possess, or may have in a foreseeable technological future, do not have their own worldview or ontology of the world (e.g., Brown et al., 2020). Any meaning in their work needs to be derived from syntactic and semantic rules that are gleaned from the extant data, which is provided as input data rather than through reference to the external world (see Smith, 2019). Furthermore, these rules are of a statistical, Bayesian nature (e.g., Wolfram, 2013a). They can only reflect what has been done, so they reflect the limited, selective sampling space through which these AI systems were trained.

This may not be of consequence when computer-generated works are based on abstractions and are about abstract problems. But it certainly matters when such works are concerned with real-world problems. For example, the core philosophical questions of life, existence, values, meaning, consciousness, suffering, beauty, ethics, the human condition, and so on take on different meanings when they are addressed by a human being rather than AI software, even though their pronouncements may be expressed in the same words. Why is this? Put simply, computers do not “live, exist” the lives that we humans do, so how can they tell us anything about it? How can they tell us “how to be human,” to paraphrase Nagel’s bat. They cannot. (For everyday life and perception, see the work of Dreyfus [2016]).

Indeed, due to the absence of a real-world ontology, AI responses cannot refer to concepts in the real world the same way as we humans do. Human responses do mean something to us as they are usually a synthesis of our experience (collective or individual), or at least we believe they are this way. We could therefore conclude that any philosophy produced by an AI system will be devoid of meaning to us, so any meaning imparted into AI works of philosophy would be an over-interpretation on our part. Building on this idea, we can posit that a philosophy that about the core philosophical questions of life, existence, values, sense, consciousness, suffering, beauty, ethics, the human condition produced by AI systems is meaningless, to us even if it sounds meaningful.

Going back to the 3P principles, we should not expect computer systems to make claims of truth of any sort, because they do not “know” (in the sense of JTB) what truth is. This is simply because while they may find logical justification for their claims (J), they cannot recognize what is true and what is not (see the 3P) because they do not have beliefs. To have JTB, you need human-like agency, and machines currently do not have it, period. Moreover, Gettier’s argument (Gettier, 1963) does not invalidate the validity of the JBT for most of the real, rather than academic, problems.

What about possible future technologies?

As advanced as they are, the current LLM models are not the future of AI (e.g., Floridi & Massimo, 2020; CBS, 2023; ExpovistaTV, 2024). What is then? Speculation about what may happen in future with synthetic philosophy again belongs in the realm of techno-fantasy. For example, we may have computing systems that exhibit intelligent properties in the sense of what was originally envisioned for AI technology rather than something based on the Turing paradigm. (For more on non-Turing computations, see, for example, the works of Wegner and Goldin [2003]; Stacewicz [2019]; Dodic-Crnovic [n.d.], and Gasarch et al. [2021]; Skowron and Stacewicz [2023]). We may have neuromorphic AI (e.g., Piccinini, 2014; Thagard, 2024), fully or partially synthetic conscious systems,¹⁵ or something else. All these new inventions or information-processing methods will, in all probability, be able to create a sort of philosophy, at least according to some criteria. This is supported by the argument that if one sort of computing system (TM) can create philosophy, another (non-TM) computing system can do it as well at a sufficient level of advancement, because they differ only in kind rather than in principle (i.e., they all compute or process information). As for quantum computing, we should not count on quantum computers to open up new gates of philosophy, because they are just TM machines with quantum mechanics foundations (e.g., Mitchell, 2023) (the carrier of information is quantum system, not electromagnetic wave or photons).

It is possible that these future systems with their yet-unknown structures will create a kind of intelligence that would be different from ours, with different objectives, values, worldviews, and consequently different philosophies.

Thus, for the sake of completeness, we accept that we cannot exclude any such developments on a logical basis, but on a practical level, they potentially exist on a rather distant horizon that we do not know much about. Thus, we leave the details of this to the futurists like the Bostroms (superintelligence and the singularity [Bostrom, 2016]), Kurzweils (techno

¹⁵ Synthetic consciousness: (I) a research program in AI and robotics (Gamez, 2008; Chrisley & Parthemore, 2007; Aleksander, 2020; Cali, 2022) or (II) an abstract concept that describes the phenomenal properties of any conscious system, whatever it may be, such as biological, mechanical, or something else (e.g., post-biotic) (Dennett, 1991; Aleksander & Morton, 2007; Christley, 2009; Chalmers, 2017; Metzinger, 2021; Smith & Schillaci, 2021).

fantasies [Kurzweil, 1990; 2005, as well as comments by Rennie, 2010), Assimovs (the notorious three laws of robotics [Assimov, 1950/2018]), Lems (the future of technologies [Lem, 2013]).¹⁶

Conclusions

In conclusion, computer systems may generate a variety of works that may be seen as works of philosophy, because philosophy is a rather elusive thing to define precisely. These computer-generated works, which operate under the humans-in-the-loop approach (e.g., Germain, 2024), may somewhat resemble the works of humans, certainly in form, or maybe in some content.

The most advanced current NLP systems, such as LLMs, are proficient at generating text or multimodal works, in response to prompts, but these systems can only reflect what has been written or created (video, images, sounds) before, because this is what they are trained on (e.g., Bender et al., 2021; Benaich, 2023; Ludwig, 2023; Hilton, 2023; Meyer, 2023 et al.; Bello, 2024; ExpovistaTV, 2024).

Graduate and undergraduate students could certainly benefit from using LLMs' functionality (e.g., Jones, 2023). For example, for a question what is truth, GTP4o responds that:

Truth is the property of a statement or belief that accurately reflects reality or corresponds to facts. In philosophy, it is often defined as the agreement between a proposition and the way things actually are. Different theories, like the correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatism, offer varying explanations of how truth is understood and verified. (GPT4o, 10.24.2024).

The response that is quite close to what Britannica would give:

Truth, in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, the property of sentences, assertions, beliefs, thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the facts or to state what is the case. (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/truth-philosophy-and-logic>).

GTP 4o responded even with more details than Britannica Entry. The current LLMs (2024) can do much more than just generate the definition of the truth. They can generate a coherent essays on philosophical topics, answer philosophical examination questions, summarize research articles

¹⁶ Still, Stanislaw Lem seems to have better predicted the technological future than most of the celebrated sci-fi writers (Krzanowski & Polak, 2021).

or books¹⁷, create a review or an abstract of philosophical paper¹⁸, or formulate research topics¹⁹. And probably AI systems will be able to do much

¹⁷ The Prompt “What Theologica is about?”: What *Summa Theologica* (also known as *Summa Theologiae*) is a comprehensive theological work by Saint Thomas Aquinas, written between 1265 and 1274. It is one of the most influential works in Western Christian theology and philosophy. The Summa is intended as a guide for theology students and systematically covers the central doctrines of the Catholic faith. The work is divided into three main parts: Part I (Prima Pars): Discusses the nature of God, creation, angels, and humanity. Aquinas explores the existence and attributes of God, the relationship between God and creation, and the nature of human beings as creatures with both body and soul. Part II (Secunda Pars): This part is divided into two sections: First Section (Prima Secundae): Focuses on human morality, the nature of human happiness, virtues, vices, and the moral law. Aquinas provides a deep analysis of human actions, free will, and how individuals can achieve ultimate happiness through their relationship with God. Second Section (Secunda Secundae): Details the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance), the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity), and specific ethical topics, such as justice, war, and the roles of individuals in society. Part III (Tertia Pars): Discusses Christ, the sacraments, and salvation. It includes an extensive analysis of Christ’s nature, the Incarnation, and the purpose of the sacraments in the Church, particularly focusing on the Eucharist, baptism, and penance. Although Aquinas died before finishing the *Summa Theologica*, his work is revered for its philosophical rigor and clarity in explaining Catholic doctrine. It blends Christian theology with Aristotelian philosophy and has had a lasting influence on Christian thought, especially in the areas of metaphysics, ethics, and natural law.” GPT4o, 24.10.2024.

¹⁸ This is an abstract of this paper created by GPT4o (24.10.2024): This paper explores the concept of synthetic philosophy, defined as philosophical works generated by AI systems. It investigates the conditions under which such AI-created outputs could be considered legitimate philosophical contributions, as well as the types of philosophical insights these systems might provide. The paper also addresses the ethical implications of AI-generated philosophy, questioning the responsibility for any societal impacts it may have. Finally, it considers the future of synthetic philosophy in light of potential advances in AI technology, while recognizing the limitations of current systems in replicating human philosophical inquiry.

¹⁹ The prompt: “Formulate four research topics in philosophy of mind: (1) Consciousness and the Hard Problem: Can Physicalism Adequately Explain Qualia? This topic would explore the limitations of physicalist theories in addressing subjective experiences (qualia) and whether a non-reductive explanation of consciousness is necessary. (2) The Nature of Intentionality: How Do Mental States Represent the World? This research would focus on intentionality, or the „aboutness” of mental states, analyzing how thoughts and perceptions represent objects or states of affairs in the external world, and evaluating different theories such as representationalism and direct realism. (3) Artificial Intelligence and the Possibility of Machine Consciousness: A Philosophical Investigation. This topic would investigate whether artificial systems, such as advanced AI, can achieve consciousness, examining theories of mind (functionalism, computationalism) and addressing challenges like the Chinese Room argument and the problem of understanding subjective experience. (4) The Mind-Body Problem: Can Dualism and Physicalism Be Reconciled? This research would explore attempts

more complex works and better in the future releases or future architectures. But these are relatively repetitive (albeit time consuming) tasks.

What about resolving deep philosophical problems (meaning of life, existence, values, sense, consciousness, suffering, beauty, ethics, the human condition, etc.). We may get meaningful and coherent responses with current versions of LLMs or future releases. However, it would seem that until AI systems have access to the full range of data (i.e., data (a) to (f)) that philosophers have and we develop a proper methodology for them to comprehend these data, we should not expect to get anything substantially different (in a form of philosophical content) from AI systems to what we currently get from LLMs (e.g., Weinberg, 2020).

It may be possible (such possibility cannot be excluded) to develop artificial consciousness, highly intelligent machines with their own concept of self and their own worldview and what goes with this their own philosophy. But this is the stuff of uncertain technological future. Nevertheless, it seems that AGI systems (conscious, autonomous, self-reflecting, etc.) still would not be like us, so they would not be able to tell us anything about us (simply because they will not be us). Would you accept a swimming lesson from someone who never swam? There is an argument along the lines by Nagel's bat that needs to be answered. We may gain from these systems some third person perspective on us. But still this will be their perspective on us, not God's eye view or a view from nowhere.

What will we ultimately gain from synthetic philosophy? If our philosophy is a search for answers to the perennial questions of humanity, in all probability computer systems cannot help us. If synthetic philosophy is simply an analysis of existing knowledge, even with access to more data, computing systems can only simply recombine existing ideas from a limited data set. We may learn from these synesthetic systems some truth about the universe, cosmos, nature. But, again, this will be their perspective on the universe, cosmos, nature, not ours.

We may venture to state that in the fundamental sense often put forward by various schools of philosophy, both now and in the past, philosophy reflects the human experience, the immediacy of death, the human mind and condition (again see Lennox, 2011), and the complex multi-dimensional reality, the unity of which philosophy is trying to preserve. (See the comments on

to bridge the gap between mind and body, evaluating modern theories like property dualism, non-reductive physicalism, and emergentism to assess whether a coherent solution to the mind-body problem is possible. GPT4o. 24.10.2024.

the nature of philosophy by Wilfrid Sellars [1963]). If synthetic philosophy is expected to address these issues, the result may not be so positive.

While computer systems, as they are conceived now, may outperform us with their sophisticated manipulations of abstract concepts and their processing of vast amounts of information, they will not understand the human experience, because they are simply not like us (again Nagel's question). Even if computers did create philosophy independently, it would be an alien philosophy to us, because human philosophy needs data that lies beyond the reach of machines.

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