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INSIGHTS FOR ARGUMENTATION THEORY FROM A COGNITIVE-MOTIVATIONAL APPROACH TO EMOTIONS¹

ABSTRACT. Cristián Santibáñez, *Insights for Argumentation Theory from a Cognitive-Motivational Approach to Emotions*, edited by Barbara Konat, Cristián Santibáñez, „Człowiek i Społeczeństwo” vol. LXI: *Emotion in Argumentation*, Poznań 2026, pp. 49–65, Adam Mickiewicz University. e-ISSN: 2956-5243, ISSN 0239-3271, <https://doi.org/10.14746/cis.2026.61.5>.

This paper examines Miceli and Castelfranchi's (2015; hereafter M&C) theory of emotion to explore how a cognitive-motivational analysis of emotional functioning can interact with established conceptual approaches in mainstream argumentation theory, with particular attention to argument reconstruction and interpretation. The discussion begins by outlining the principal ideas presented by M&C, focusing on how their cognitive-motivational framework provides insights into the mechanisms underlying emotions. These concepts are then applied specifically to argumentation theory, demonstrating the relevance of M&C's approach within this domain. The analysis culminates with a detailed example illustrating the integration of both perspectives, highlighting the practical implications of combining cognitive-motivational analysis with argumentation theory. From the discussion and the example provided, two key ideas emerge. First, employing a cognitive-motivational anatomy of emotion makes it easier to reconstruct and interpret the implicit elements within arguments. Second, incorporating the conceptual frameworks of persuasion through arousal of emotions and persuasion through appeal to anticipated emotions clarifies the role that specific emotions play in the structure of an argument.

Keywords: anticipation, argument, cognition, emotions, Miceli & Castelfranchi

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¹ **Acknowledgment:** This work is the result of the discussions held during the 2025 ECA PhD Summer School, which was organized by Dr Konat. I am deeply grateful to her. On this occasion, I presented, for the first time, the main ideas that are presented in this paper, which were improved through dialogue with colleagues and students.



Introduction

Almost at the very end of their wonderful book on emotions, Maria Miceli and Cristiano Castelfranchi (2015; hereafter referred to as M&C) entitled a section “Anticipating other’s emotions: A means for persuasion.” To me, as a scholar working on argumentation, the book provides a robust explanation of how we can adjust our emotional persuasive strategies to influence others’ goals, potentially their actions, and, more importantly, anticipate our own behaviour and consequently calibrate our beliefs with the contextual state of affairs. In other words, M&C’s theory on how emotions work cognitively can be considered a pragmatic theory of how beliefs and courses of action (theoretical and practical reasoning, respectively) function when motivated by emotions. In the aforementioned section (Chapter 7, Section 7.5), the authors point out that: “By persuasion, or more precisely a persuasive intention, we mean an intention to modify, through communication, another’s beliefs as a means for modifying (generating, activating, or just increasing the value of) the other’s goals (Miceli et al., 2006; 2011). By emotional persuasion we mean a persuasive intention that appeals to another’s emotions. Its specificity lies in the means used by a persuader P in trying to modify a recipient R’s beliefs and, consequently, R’s goals” (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 195).

From the outset, it is worth mentioning that in this section, the authors distinguish between two different emotional persuasion strategies, which exemplify how emotions can influence others’ emotions and beliefs. The first is *persuasion through arousal of emotions*, and the second is *persuasion through appealing to anticipated emotions*. In the first case, the speaker (or communicator) tries to modify the listener’s beliefs so that they produce an emotion, which results in them generating a new goal that can impact their decision-making and behaviour. The authors then introduce a caveat: for the communicator to succeed in influencing the listener, they must have an emotional repertoire that allows them to foresee the listener’s reactions and anticipate the consequences of their communication. M&C also add that this: “implies possessing an adequate (implicit) theory of the basic determinants and consequences of emotional reactions in general, as well as of R’s [listener] personality” (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 195).

The second strategy involves the speaker intending to modify the listener’s beliefs by anticipating the emotions the listener could experience as a result of their own choices. In other words, the speaker’s communication is intended to activate (or increase the value of) the listener’s goal

of experiencing a specific emotion, which, as with the first strategy, will impact the listener's decisions and actions. As with the first strategy, the authors introduce a caveat: they state that: "In order for this strategy to be effective, P should be able to anticipate both the emotions associated with R's choices and the value of R's goal (not) to feel those emotions" (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 195).

Interestingly, M&C point out that appealing to anticipated emotions is structurally indistinguishable from an argument from consequences (citing Walton, 1996), except for the *content* of expected (or unexpected) consequences. In the case of anticipated emotion, the content is precisely the experience of a certain emotion. Once again, it is worth quoting the authors on this: "In other words, persuasion through appeal to anticipated emotions is a form of rational and argumentative persuasion, in that it applies typical rules of reasoning about means-end relationships" (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 196).

It is important to emphasise that M&C's approach is not an argumentative theory of how emotions are used for the specific purpose of argumentation, but rather how a cognitive-motivated analysis can explain their persuasive function and power. Therefore, M&C does not analyze the crucial distinction between emotional and propositional arguments, which is central to the literature on argumentation theory (see, for example, Gilbert, 1997; Tindale, 2015; Walton, 1992; 1997).² Thus, in my interpretation, M&C do not consider these to be two different ontological categories, but rather two different types of linguistic and psychological representations. To be considered representations with emotional components, M&C's approach appears to refer to both the use of explicit psychological and linguistic content (emotions proper and emotional expressions, respectively) and implicit references or intentions to provoke emotional states. Emotional representations could therefore have the same pragmatic consequences as logical reasoning in terms of influencing others.

As this brief introduction to M&C's theory has shown, the cognitive processes involved in the functioning of emotions, as described in their approach, could provide insight into how argumentation theory evaluates the use and impact of emotions. To this end, this paper summarises and discusses M&C's approach, proposing a couple of lines of inquiry through which this improvement can be considered. The first line of inquiry is to establish

² I would like to express my gratitude to one of the blind reviewers for highlighting the importance of addressing the ontological problem, even if only briefly.

whether a cognitive-motivational approach could serve as a more effective background theory for reconstructing and interpreting implicit aspects of arguments. The argument reconstruction method adopted here is based on Douglas Walton's (2006) proposal, which is described in Section 4. The second line of inquiry explores whether a cognitive-motivational framework could assist in distinguishing the structural role of emotions within arguments, i.e. whether they function as reasons or conclusions. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general cognitive approach of the M&C theory, section 3 presents and discusses some of the main approaches to analysing emotions within contemporary argumentation theories in light of the M&C theory, and section 4 analyses an example of an emotional dialogue in which arguments are exchanged in terms of the two persuasive strategies identified by M&C. The conclusions revisit the main points of the paper to consider how these lines of enquiry could be further developed.

Emotions, cognition, and anticipation

One of the key aspects of M&C's theory is that the cognitive-motivational anatomy of emotions involves anticipatory representations, such as possibilities, predictions and/or expectations. For instance, an individual may progress from anxiety to fear, or from disappointment to discouragement or regret. As can be deduced from the cognitive-motivational anatomy of emotions mentioned above, anticipatory representations broaden the human emotional repertoire; for instance, anxiety can be considered the anticipation of a future feeling of fear. This conception of the cognitive and motivational functioning of emotions is consistent with the view that our cognitive capacities are part of a significant human cognitive trend: the cognitive human system is designed to produce the future (Bulley et al., 2020; Suddendorf et al., 2022; Santibáñez, 2024).

In M&C's theory, the belief-goal analysis drives emotional motivations. The cognitive system is organised in such a way that, to fully grasp the function of emotion, the analysis of emotions must be tied to the potential beliefs that the agent could acquire by feeling a certain way. The cognitive system works in this way because emotions play a powerful role in teaching agents how to behave in future scenarios in which similar emotional events could occur, helping them to avoid or prefer certain outcomes. In other words, as M&C clearly point out (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 15), emotions imply goals. However, it is not only emotions that imply goals; they also

generate them. This dynamic is known as the conative aspect of emotions. A paradigmatic example of this is fear, which signals risky or dangerous situations and consequently the goal of avoiding them.

In order to properly approach the dynamic by which the cognitive system processes the motivational anatomy of emotions, the authors introduce the fundamental distinction between anticipated and anticipatory emotions.³ Anticipated emotions are both the subject of anticipatory representations and the motivational effects of goal-directed behaviour. Anticipated emotions are [...] “the anticipation of emotional feedback” (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 191). In its most basic sense, an anticipated emotion is an expected emotional response to an event that the agent has foreseen. These emotions are a representation of a future event that produces an emotional response. The authors provide an example of this: “If I anticipate failure at an exam, I will feel fear, whereas if I anticipate success I will feel hope” (p. 26). In order to produce an appropriate emotional response, the anticipatory representation should comprise beliefs about the expected events and goals relating to that specific event. The authors call this compound as interested anticipatory representation (IAR), this is, “a belief-goal compound constituted by a belief about a future event p together with a goal that p or *not- p* obtains” (p. 26).

Within the context of anticipatory emotions, M&C attribute an important role to invalidation-elicited emotions processes. The author’s explanation clearly shows how this works: “Suppose that at time t_1 John has a particular (positive or negative) IAR, and that at time t_2 his IAR is invalidate by actual experience. The fact of having had an IAR and its being invalidated is likely to produce some emotion. If the IAR was a positive one (for instance, John had the goal and believe that Mary would visit him on Wednesday) and it is invalidated (Wednesday comes and Mary doesn’t show up), John will experience disappointment. Conversely, if his IAR was negative one (for instance, John believed that Mary would visit him on Wednesday whereas he had the opposite goal), he will experience relief” (p. 29). The anticipatory emotions involved in the example are hope and fear, respectively, in the positive and negative IAR. Furthermore, the example shows the general underlying cognitive design as a prospective, proactive and future-producing machine. Therefore, anticipatory representations can be used as goals and

³ The distinction is already part of the literature on emotions from a psychological point of view, particularly within the domain of clinical psychology, as is shown by recent publications (Clayton et al., 2024; Feil et al., 2022).

drive the agent's behaviour. According to M&C, a proper goal is based on, and regulated by, the system's internal representation of the anticipated results of such behaviour, rather than being triggered solely by perception. Goals can therefore be triggered by wishes, desires, motives or intentions. This is why M&C insist that the fundamental cognitive and motivational building blocks of emotions are beliefs and goals.

Having a goal involves introducing value (whether positive or negative), because there is an intrinsic evaluation (or appraisal) in the anatomy of goals (we have a goal because we consider achieving it to be a good thing). However, evaluations are not necessary for emotions. Beliefs and goals are components of emotions (some emotions, of course, have an evaluative component, such as envy, and evaluation obviously helps with the self-regulation of emotions, such as guilt). Manipulating beliefs and goals can induce an emotional shift: a given emotional experience (such as disappointment) can change into another (such as regret) due to a change in some of its cognitive or motivational components.

Returning to the fact that emotions generate goals, as mentioned earlier, once an emotion has indicated whether a goal has been achieved or failed, another goal is often activated (the aforementioned conative aspect and function of emotions). For example, fear signals danger and generates the goal of avoiding it. Complex emotions work in the same way: A's envy of B, besides signalling that A's goal g_1 of 'not being inferior to B' has been thwarted, is likely to generate A's goal g_2 that B suffers harm.

As can be deduced from the description of the anatomy of emotions, they share with other psychological mechanisms or processes the fact that they serve pragmatic purposes, in this case regulating the behaviour of individuals and groups. Therefore, emotions influence behaviour, and, as M&C emphasise, in a less direct way than is generally supposed. Fear, for instance, does not seem to consistently cause behaviour; not only can its implied action tendency (flight) be inhibited, but the flight response also appears to occur before a full-blown emotion of fear has developed. This core negative affect is alarming. For this reason, M&C point out that the immediate effect of a full-blown emotion is the establishment of certain goals. Based on the evidence, M&C suggest that emotions are not clearly differentiated in terms of behavioural orientations or actual responses, which are mostly dependent on particular situational demands rather than specific emotion categories.

Let's use sadness as an example to conclude this brief discussion of M&C's account of the motivational anatomy of emotions.



As the cartoon illustrates, this emotion does not appear to be linked to any particular behaviour. Rather, it is likely to foster cognitive processing, particularly counterfactual thinking. As mentioned earlier, emotions typically stimulate cognitive processing about the situation and one's own and others' mental attitudes and recent behaviour, in order to facilitate advantageous future behaviour. The cognitive function of fear, as a full-blown emotion, is learning. Fear teaches us to avoid risky or harmful situations, meaning that any time we encounter similar circumstances in the future, we will experience anticipatory emotions, which trigger avoidance in turn.

Once full-blown emotions have fostered cognitive processing of recent experiences, they are likely to leave an emotional residue associated with the memory of the situation and behaviour that produced the emotion. This is why they have the capacity to foresee and represent the future anticipatorily.

Argumentation theory and emotions

The affective residue of important emotional experiences teaches us not only how to deal with our own personal situation, but also how to use cognitive processes to influence others' beliefs and actions (Thagard, 2000; Tindale, 2015). As mentioned in the introduction, M&C distinguish two persuasive strategies in this realm: *persuasion through arousing emotions* and *persuasion through appealing to anticipated emotions*. As M&C point out, appealing to anticipated emotions could be seen as pragmatic argumentation (appealing to consequences), because the agent applies rules of reasoning about means-end relationships. However, the authors also emphasise that it is the content of the anticipated emotions themselves that makes

a significant difference to the general inferential structure of arguing by consequences. It seems that contemporary mainstream argumentation theory overemphasises this way of viewing emotional argumentation (Santibáñez, 2026). A notable exception is Michael Gilbert's theory (Gilbert, 1997; see Carozza, 2007; Tindale, 2022), which explicitly emphasises that the strength of emotional arguments primarily stems from their emotional content (Gilbert, 1997: 83). This is also highlighted by M&C as a key distinction when an agent employs anticipated emotions in emotional persuasive strategies. Some authors have also pointed out the cognitive aspects of emotional argumentation in the past, such as Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1995) and Christian Plantin (1999; 2004). However, the former overemphasises the rational and instrumental dimension of arguing by emotions, while the latter links the cognitive aspect of emotion mainly to its linguistic expression. The M&C approach adds to the discussion by considering the cognitive learning process underlying emotional argumentation and its relationship to the broader processes of building the future and predicting behaviour. It also considers the functional theoretical divide between persuasion through arousing emotions and persuasion through appealing to anticipated emotions. Let's take a closer look at the first strategy, which I believe contains a point of connection with Gilbert's perspective.

According to M&C (2015: 196 ss), *persuasion through arousal of emotions* contains an a-rational element "as long as the aroused emotion... generates a goal in an "automatic" and compelling way, regardless of any evaluation of its instrumental relationship (or its possible interference) with other goals" (p. 196). The authors' explanation of the second strategy gives us two important considerations. First, it differs from Ben-Ze'ev's view in that the agent produces an evaluation of the link between the emotion used and the reason. Second, and more importantly, it emphasises the proper motivational force of emotions. However, as M&C indicate, this strategy demands other requirements to be effective besides appealing to anticipated emotions. The agent trying to arouse a certain emotion in the target agent (audience) should be capable of avoiding backfiring on their own intentions. For example, trying to provoke envy can sometimes result in provoking shame for envying someone else instead of cultivating the quality being envied. At the same time, if the agents want to arouse a specific emotion in the audience, they should be aware of the situational conditions, motivational consequences and implications of that emotion, as well as the audience's dispositions. The burden on the agent who wants to arouse an emotion seems quite heavy, to say the least. Perhaps the visceral-intuitive mode of Gilbert's theory could

explain the use of this strategy, but this is beyond the scope of my work (see Tindale, 2015; 2022).⁴

The second M&C strategy, which involves appealing to anticipated emotions, is more complex than the standard argumentation theory approach of considering consequences. For M&C, it is not just about considering the outcome of one's decisions, but also "thinking about the emotion one would feel as a consequence of one's decision" (p. 197). The idea is that an agent has a cognition about the potential emotion she could experience, and then represents herself in the post-choice situation so that she 'pre-feels' what she will feel in the imagined, wished-for or expected future. As mentioned earlier, appealing to anticipated emotions, according to M&C, shares with argument by consequences the fact that both are paradigmatically based on reasoning about means-end relationships. However, pre-feeling in the M&C framework is what makes the difference, as the authors emphasise: "We also suggest that the impact of anticipated and pre-felt emotion on decision making is likely to be stronger than that of an anticipated but non pre-felt emotion, because the cognitive anticipated of the emotional reaction, when tinged with an affective element, is experienced as more compelling, thereby acquiring a stronger motivating power" (p. 198).

M&C offer three different cases in which anticipated emotion can occur: (1) *the anticipatory representation of an emotion produces a feeling*, in which the agent "foretastes" the emotion (and because she pre-felt it, the emotion can come in weaker intensity when actually occurs); (2) *a feeling induces the anticipatory representation of an emotion*, in which the anticipated event directly elicits an emotional reaction, which in turn tells to the agent what she is going to potentially feel when the events comes; M&C point out that in 1 and 2 there is pre-feeling which may impact on the agent decision, but in the feeling has a premonitory role; 3) in this case, according to M&C, something similar to 1 happens but with a crucial turn, for the emotion

⁴ In Gilbert's (1997) theory, the visceral mode of argumentation generally refers to the role of the body in the production and analysis of arguments. In order to provoke a specific emotion in others using the visceral mode, the agent requires tacit and explicit knowledge of the situation at hand, as well as of the other agents with whom they are interacting and trying to influence. Tindale (2015; 2022) emphasises this aspect in his work on the use and role of emotions in argumentation: the agent will use any emotional means (language, gestures, sounds, etc.) that she deems essential to resolving the controversy in her favour. Clearly, the way in which visceral arguments are expressed depends on the maturity, knowledge and experience of the agent, and people make use of them to varying degrees of awareness, ranging from automatic to highly controlled.

experienced beforehand is difference from the anticipated emotion, and the example is that agent may anticipated that she will feel envy in the near future, but she experiences shame actually when experiencing the bad feeling of envy (according to M&C, Elster refers to this case as ‘meta-emotion’, which is an emotion about an emotion. For example, feeling shame because you are anticipating envy).

Combining M&C theory and argument reconstruction

So, as far as I know, none of the previous discussions have been incorporated into argumentation theory, not even in recent elaborations on the matter (Gilbert, 2026; Tindale, 2026). However, some general connections can be made if we consider the following definition: “The definition I offer (Gilbert, 1994c: 8) is as follows: *«an emotional argument is one in which the words used are less important than the feelings being expressed»* (emphasis original). Linda Carozza amplifies this: [E]motional arguments are arguments where i) emotion is a reason, ii) emotion is a conclusion, and iii) arguers express themselves emotionally (Carozza, 2022: 560)” (Gilbert, 2026: 124).

As I understand it, the emphasis in Gilbert’s definition, incorporating Carozza’s insight, offers at least two points of encounter with the M&C analysis: (1) What is important is the feeling expressed, and in M&C terms, what the feeling motivates, cognitively and emotionally speaking; (2) Arguers’ emotional expression amounts to considering what they want to create as a future scenario. Point 2 is also in line with a more traditional account of the use of emotion in argumentative exchanges when viewed rhetorically, as Tindale considers it: “Pathos: Strictly speaking, *pathê* are emotions, and pathos is another rhetorical feature of argumentation, referring to the way a particular emotion is stimulated or suppressed in the audience. When it comes to matters of social argumentation, it is impossible to leave aspects of psychology out of the equation, in spite of the efforts of some logicians. We simply make different judgments when we are in specific emotional states. And knowing this, an arguer can strive to stimulate appropriate responses, to experience pity, for example. On some accounts of rhetoric, pathos refers to the audience itself (Meyer, 2000; 2017). Pathos emphasizes the audience-centeredness of the rhetorical perspective, as the arguer draws on devices that will modify the emotional reactions of the audience” (Tindale, 2026: 38).

Now, an argument can be represented by diagrams. Fortunately, there are different tools available for this task. In argumentation studies, the Toulminian model (Toulmin, 1958), the pragma-dialectical reconstruction (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) and the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco, 2019) are very familiar. However, I opt for a simpler (but not simplistic) approach to uncovering and visually representing arguments. For this reason, I will follow Walton's type of reconstruction (2006). This tool allows us to observe straightforwardly the relationship between the reason(s) and the point of view. Walton's approach distinguishes between the following types of diagram: a) Linked argument: two reasons support the claim in a mutually dependent way; b) Convergent argument: the reasons are independent of each other; c) Divergent argument: one reason can serve two or more standpoints (conclusions); d) Serial argument: the middle proposition has two functions: as the conclusion of the first reason and as the reason for the final conclusion. Usually, as Walton (2006) emphasises, the final conclusion is very controversial and, for this reason, requires a sequence to obtain support. This enables the audience to appreciate the entire line of reasoning; e) Arguments with undercutters: In an argument with undercutters, the speaker puts forward the pros and cons of the conclusion. In real argumentation, we unconsciously make use of these types of structure, usually in complex arguments in which we combine various types.

The following analysis of a dialogue offers some preliminary methodological steps for connecting M&C's theory with argument reconstruction. The analysis will comment on some of the protagonists' turns using both M&C theory and argumentation theory.

The analysed dialogue is part of an episode of the famous TV cartoon *The Simpsons*, in which Bart and Lisa interact emotionally (Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WR82RTVII9Y>; this dialogue has been analysed elsewhere: Santibáñez, 2026):

1. Lisa: [She is in her desk writing a letter, notably emotionally touched, the spectator can see her sad eyes in the mirror she has above the desk] Dear Log, my brother is still missing and maybe it is my fault because I failed to take his abuse with a good humor, I miss him so much already that I don't know... (she cries dearly).

Lisa begins her letter to her brother with a convergent emotional argument. Bart is missing because of me (Lisa), and it is my fault because I failed to take his abuse in good humour. The structure of the argument can be visualised as follows:




Figure 1. Convergent argument

In M&C's terms, it seems that Lisa is using an argument based on persuasion through the arousal of emotions to influence any potential reader of the letter (critically, any other member of the Simpson family) to adopt the belief that she is responsible for the event and eventually modify their behaviour towards her (perhaps by punishing Lisa). However, the letter can also be seen as an emotionally persuasive mirror; that is to say, she is explaining her supposed responsibility for Bart's disappearance. Her reasoning contains an anatomy of emotions that can be described as follows: she reacted badly to Bart's jokes; her own negative emotion (not feeling happy in response to Bart's jokes) generated another regrettable event (Bart disappeared), which in turn generated a new emotion in Lisa: blame. Note that the two emotions underlying Lisa's reasoning – unhappiness and blame – are reflected in her choice of words. I have visually represented these emotions in the form of clouds above the expressions.

The blame automatically and compellingly generated a new goal (to repair the situation and find Bart), regardless of any evaluation of its instrumental relationship with other goals or possible interference with other urgent activities or responsibilities that Lisa might have. When Lisa says, 'I miss him so much already that I don't know...', it seems that, from the feeling of missing him (longing, melancholy and a deep sense of absence), she anticipates such a painful emotion that she is incapable of expressing it.

The dialogue continues:

2. [Bart is seated on the roof of the house playing with a paper aircraft. Suddenly he heard her crying] Hey, Lis, Lisa, here is Bart...

3. Lisa: Bart, where are you?
4. Bart: Shhh [trying to keep the situation quiet], I am on the roof.
5. Lisa: [Lisa gets on the roof] What are you doing up here? Everybody is worried.

In 5, Lisa's use of the expression 'Everybody is worried' [about you, Bart'], is probably intended to influence Bart's behaviour by generating the anticipated emotion of regret.

6. Bart: Really, do they cry?
7. Lisa: Yes
8. [Bart happy because everybody is crying for him] Bullseye!!
9. Lisa: Bart, why did you burn my centerpieces?
10. Bart: oh come on...
11. Lisa: Was it because you hate me or because you are bad?
12. Bart: I don't know, I don't know why I did it, I don't know why I enjoyed it and I don't know why I'll do it again

The interactions in turns 11 and 12 demonstrate that Lisa presents Bart (in tin 11) with a manipulative false dichotomy (Santibáñez, 2017), offering him two emotions that he has to choose between. Although Bart acknowledges his enjoyment immediately, he deliberately refrains from choosing either emotion.

13. Lisa: Just tell me you are sorry.
14. Bart: Why should I?
15. Lisa: Bart, the only reason to apologize is if you look deep down inside yourself and you find the spot, something you wish was not there because you feel bad, you hurt your sister's feelings...
16. Bart: Leave me alone.
17. Lisa: Just look!!
18. Bart: Ok, ok [he concentrates, close his eyes, trying to look at inside of himself] ... looking for the spot... mmm... still checking, this is so stupid. I am not gonna find anything. Just because I wrecked something she works really hard on and I made her co... oh oh... (he realizes, goes to his sister, touch her shoulder, and says) I am sorry, Lisa.

From turns 15 to 18, Lisa convinced Bart to own up to his mistake, provoking the emotional response she had hoped for: a heartfelt apology. In my view, Lisa's persuasion is a combination of arousing emotions and appealing to anticipated emotions. She communicates a representation of the situation to modify Bart's beliefs, thereby eliciting emotion. At the same time, the way she describes things anticipates the emotions that Bart will feel as

a consequence of his choice, activating or increasing the value of R's goal of feeling that emotion (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2015: 195). Bart should feel ashamed of his behaviour and sincerely apologise. Lisa's reasoning in turn 15 is a very calculated emotional representation of the situation. The single argument can be reconstructed as follows:




Figure 2. Serial (implicit) argument

The dialogue concludes with the final two turns.

19. Lisa: Apology accepted [she gives Bart many big kisses. He is happy with it].
20. [From the window below, Homer was observing the scene. Homer smiles]

In turn 19, Lisa accepts the apology — apologies are considered pragmatically successful if they are accepted — and behaves accordingly, repairing her relationship with her brother through an emotional gesture (kisses). In 20, is Homer happily satisfied because the siblings are at peace, or because of Lisa's wonderful persuasive skills?

Conclusions

The M&C theory is a significant conceptual effort to unite the cognitive and affective dimensions of emotional functioning. One of the authors' central emphases is to demonstrate that emotions are based on cognitive motivation, making them part of a larger cognitive design of human functioning: constructing the future by anticipating emotions, scenarios, and goals. Emotions,

viewed pragmatically, foster a process of underlying learning. In this brief work, I have attempted to initiate a dialogue with the M&C theory that promotes the argumentative analysis of controversial exchanges. Two ideas I have tried to highlight, which obviously require further exploration and, above all, empirical support, are the following: M&C's theory offers significant support for reconstructing the implicit elements of an argument by detailing the cognitive-motivational anatomy in the generation of emotions that are necessarily linked (such as disappointment and regret) to achieving goals (for example, avoiding a scenario or problem that generates disappointment and regret). M&C's theory (2015; see also Miceli, 1992; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2005; Miceli et al., 2006; 2011) provides a detailed, fully exemplified description of the links between emotions that are cognitively and motivational interconnected, despite the fact that in specific communications, these connections are implicit. By understanding this anatomy, the argument analyst can more robustly reconstruct what has been left implicit. Similarly, and as a second idea to explore in future work, M&C's theory of the cognitive-motivational anatomy of emotions offers a heuristic for more accurately and reliably identifying the structural role that emotions play in arguments (whether as a reason, as a conclusion, and, if necessary, as a warrant or major premise).

Another dimension that could benefit the study of argumentation and controversial communication in general is the analysis of argumentative patterns and/or profiles according to the use of certain emotions by certain speakers (whether individuals or institutions, such as political parties). This is based on the idea that the tendency to use certain emotions, as we have learned from the M&C theory, is paired with other emotions (and their respective positive or negative values) according to cognitive, motivational and affective processes that aim to anticipate future scenarios.

One clear limitation of my work is its exploratory scope and its highly theoretical and speculative nature. Similarly, the example provided (Simpson's cartoons) is merely an initial illustration of a potential method for reconstructing the anatomy of emotions (and their role) within arguments. Clearly, more empirical and real-life cases of public communication need to be analysed in the future to corroborate or falsify these basic ideas. One way to improve the suggested lines of enquiry methodologically would be to design experimental scenarios to observe how different agents (culturally and linguistically speaking) reconstruct and evaluate the anatomy of emotions potentially interconnected in arguments. It would be interesting to find out whether people from Poland or Chile, for example, see the

same connection between shame and regret, or if they perceive different emotional links when trying to convince someone (or being convinced) to act in a certain way.

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