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The importance of the state military policy of the Central Council in the modern development of the Ukrainian army

1. Formulation of the problem

The question of the existence of the Ukrainian army arose immediately with the creation of the Central Council and the beginning of its struggle for power. The army and its power allow us to speak about the strength of the state, its authority in the world. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the liberation struggle took place in Ukraine, the importance of the army in general is difficult to overestimate. It is important to study doctrinal research and legal support for the formation and creation of the Armed Forces of the Central Council, in order to improve national legislation governing guarantees of rights and freedoms of servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the context of the development of the national armed forces at the present stage, the military legislation of the Central Council needs a separate analysis with a detailed study of the origins and formation of the Armed Forces in 1918–1919 of Ukraine.

2. Analysis of recent research and publications

To date, there is a wide array of historiographical material on this issue. However, much research concerns the general functioning of the Central Council. In the

context of our study, the works of Mykola Kravchuk,¹ Valery Soldatenko,² Vladyslav Verstyuk,³ Ivan Krypyakevych,⁴ Vitaly Lazorkin⁵ should be singled out. Comments on the articles of contemporary historians are of great importance, among them: Oleksandr Petrash,⁶ Oleksandr Serdyuk,⁷ Vitaly Lazorkin.

Parts of the general problem have not been solved before. The introduction of a special period, conscription of Ukrainians for military service in mobilization, expansion of staffs, positions in the army, invasion of Ukraine by foreign troops, which caused changes in geopolitical, social, military life, are the root causes of reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their further improvement. For an effective and solid basis for the creation of the Army of Ukraine, regulatory and legal support, theoretical and practical construction of the Armed Forces of the Central Council is becoming a topical issue of research for today. The experience of creating military administration bodies, receiving military education by servicemen, introducing military schools, and developing the legal side of creating an army of the Central Council are the main categories of study for scientists.

The issue of studying the Ukrainian command's attitude to the action plan, introducing tactical decisions, and preparing a combat arsenal for the liberation of Ukrainian lands deserves special attention. Analysis of statistical information on the number of mobilized to the army of the Central Council and soldiers who were held captive by foreign troops, will allow you to build a quantitative picture of the army during the reign of the Central Council.

Of particular importance for Ukraine is the national liberation movement for the restoration of national statehood, which is the dominant factor in socio-political life. Many critics in the history of military construction of the Central Council are reflected in the figures, leaders, participants in the creation of the Armed Forces. Their accusations of not understanding the place and importance of the Central

¹ M. Kravchuk, *Army of the UCR and its experience for the present: historical and legal research*, Ternopil 2016.

² V. Soldatenko, *Ukrainian revolution. Historical essay*, Kyiv 1999; idem, *Military factor in the struggle for political power in Ukraine in 1917–1918*, Kyiv 2002.

³ V. Verstyuk, *Ukrainian Central Council: the period of formation*, „Ukrainian Historical Journal” 2007, no 2.

⁴ I. Krypyakevych, *History of the Ukrainian army (from princely times to the 20s of the XX century)*, Lviv 1992.

⁵ V. Lazorkin, *Armed Forces of Ukraine: 1991–2011*, „Universum” 2011, no 11–12 (217–218), <http://svitlytsia.crimea.ua/index.php?section=article&artID=16657>.

⁶ O. Petrash, *Commentary on the article „Countlessness as a way to defeat,”* <http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/blog/istoriya/bezbroynist-yak-shlyah-do-porazky>.

⁷ O. Serdyuk, *Evil genius – the leader of terrorism*, <https://www.yakaboo.ua/ua/stebeljak-serdjuk-o-zlij-genij-vozhd-terorizmu.html>.

Soviet army in the revolution and nation-building have not been thoroughly studied to this day and require thorough research.

The agitation policy, which is directed not only against the army of the Central Council, needs a separate study. Her goal was quite successful in the work environment. And part of the workers joined the Bolshevik troops, who then occupied the rest of Ukraine. The study of informational impact on people, analysis of documentation, archives, will allow us to understand how not only military influence, but psychological.

3. Formulation of the goals of the article

The aim of the article is to find out the importance and practical significance of military construction during the Central Council for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Compare the mobility and power of today's army with the army of the Central Council. Highlight the main normative directions of development of the Armed Forces of the Central Council and reveal their significance for the current legislation.

4. Presentation of the main material of the study

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the past six years has become deep and long-lasting and has led to tectonic changes in relations between Kyiv and Moscow. Russian aggression has inflicted unprecedented human, territorial and economic losses on Ukraine. Of the entire model range of interstate relations in Ukraine, only the format of confrontational coexistence with Russia has been established for a long time. Military action of the Russian Federation is carried out on the territory of Ukraine with the use of the history of the past. The fierce struggle of the UPR troops for their territories seemed to be repeated again. The experience of the UCR serves as the foundation of the nation-state, the basis, the basis for the development of other types of state entities, including the Ukrainian State P. Skoropadsky, the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, and became the basis for the Armed Forces.

By learning about the methods of martial arts, the type of military organizations, the size of the army, the armament of troops, the organization of military authorities and the most decisive battles of the Central Council, we can rethink the development of military construction in Ukraine and improve the situation (including social and material security) Armed Forces of Ukraine. To better understand why the army of the Central Council is an example and is important for today's army building, it is necessary to refer to the experience of those times and clarify the ideological concepts of the leaders of the Central Council and outline the power of the army.

Since the establishment of the Central Council, and later the formation of the UPR, the issue of army development has become a priority. A large number of people later began to gather in circles, volunteer battalions were formed, and Ukrainians were separated into separate military formations, which pushed the authorities to create separate battalions and regimental units. The main task was to “unite all Ukrainian soldiers in the immediate organization of the national army, as a powerful military force, without which it is impossible to think about gaining full freedom of Ukraine.”⁸ However, not everyone supported the initiative to build the army, because the idea of their own armed forces, apparently, at that time the leaders of the UCR had not yet formed. The first documents of the Central Council did not raise the issue of the armed forces. The demonstration on March 12, 1917, in Petrograd on the occasion of the victory of the revolution, caused a spontaneous movement among Ukrainian servicemen and conscious national minorities.⁹ It was she who became the “core” to the awakening of national consciousness of the importance of the army – as a result of the formation of military units, clubs and more.

On March 16, 1917, a meeting of Ukrainian soldiers of the Kyiv garrison took place, the decision of which was the establishment of the Ukrainian military club and the beginning of the organization of the Ukrainian army. For this purpose, the Ukrainian Military Committee was formed. This committee became, in fact, the first central organization for Ukrainization in the army: the allocation of Ukrainian servicemen outside Ukraine (in garrisons) in separate Ukrainian military units and their gradual redeployment to Ukraine, as well as the allocation of Ukrainian servicemen on the fronts in separate units with their transfer to the Ukrainian front. This meant that, in fact, Ukrainized corps and divisions remained part of the Russian army, receiving only a relatively large share of Ukrainian reinforcements. But even in this form, Ukrainization was extremely inconsistent, as most divisions assigned to Ukrainization continued to receive Russian recruits. The value of such an army as a national armed force was mostly zero.¹⁰

M. Kravchuk in his article *UCR Army and its experience for the present: a historical and legal study*, focuses on the formation of the Ukrainian army in 1917–1921, on the basis of the armies of former states. The Russian Tsarist Army is the first stage from which Ukrainian soldiers “learned” and at least four million Ukrainians served.¹¹ This explains the individual approach of the serviceman to the strategy of struggle, the experience of personnel, the formation of “their” vision of the creation of the Armed Forces of the Central Council.

⁸ O. Petrash, *Commentary on the article...*

⁹ V. Soldatenko, *Ukrainian revolution...*, pp. 138–139.

¹⁰ I. Krypyakevych, *History of the Ukrainian army...*, pp. 363–370.

¹¹ M. Kravchuk, *Army of the UCR...*, p. 25.

Thus, the guarantor of political, economic and cultural independence of the state must be a capable, well-organized, properly armed army that relies on the support of the people and protects the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This stage in the creation of the Central Council troops shows us that the Armed Forces need to pay attention not only when the “enemy is advancing,” but also to training military personnel, especially combat units on a regular basis. The realities of today put forward increased demands on the consciousness of personnel, on the motivation and awareness of which depends on the performance of tasks in combat. For some reason, more attention has been paid to the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 2014, after the invasion of Russian troops in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since then, the mobilization process has begun, the process of encouraging everyone to serve under contract, etc., but the experience of the Central Council clearly indicates that the development of the Armed Forces must be continuously maintained and maintained in full combat readiness. It should be noted that since the establishment of the UCR, the Ukrainian development of the Armed Forces has taken various forms: it includes multiple government meetings, which made important decisions on organizational and personnel issues, appeals to the Ukrainian people, status and composition of its commissions, plans, etc.; creation of separate regiments (March 16, 1917 Ukrainian Military Club named after Hetman Polubotko, later the Ukrainian Military Organizing Committee was established – where the focus was on intensifying the Ukrainian military movement by creating similar branches throughout Ukraine); its legal reflection and consolidation of the creation of its own Armed Forces was reflected in the All-Ukrainian National Congress and three Military Congresses (The main issues were the introduction of the Ukrainianization of existing troops as a way to form the Ukrainian Army, the election of the Ukrainian General Military Committee to lead military affairs and the adoption of four universals).¹² Traditionally, Ukraine has adopted some of the forms of building the army of the Central Council, for example, government meetings to address defense issues, other forms have undergone modernization, and are manifested in: evening convocations of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, conferences, legal consolidation in regulations recommendations, drawing up a plan of measures, development of the Military Security Strategy, adoption of the Laws of Ukraine in the field of defense, etc.

However, the non-recognition by some public authorities and some politicians of the importance of the Armed Forces of the Central Council, led to the decline of the army and caused a flurry of public distrust of the government, which led to the disarmament of the Ukrainian regiment. P. Polubotko and February 9, 1918 appeal to the military-political bloc of the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Bulgarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, for military assistance.

¹² V. Verstyuk, *Ukrainian Central Council...*, pp. 23–46.

The 1st Ukrainian Corps (which included 40,000 well-armed soldiers), led by Pavel Skoropadsky, was disbanded. Under these conditions, reliance on Ukrainianized units became impossible and there was a need to create a new army.

After the proclamation of the Fourth Universal of the Central Soviet, it turned out that to protect Kyiv from the Bolshevik “Muravyov hordes” (numbering 5,600 soldiers and sailors), which was repulsed at the Kruty station 420 soldiers and students, almost no one.¹³ Many Ukrainianized units either took a neutral position or even sided with the Bolsheviks. On February 8, after several days of heavy fighting and artillery shelling, Ukrainian units were disarmed by the Bolsheviks or self-demobilized.¹⁴

Thus, following the process of creating national military formations during the activities of the Central Council, it is necessary to emphasize their importance for the modern construction of the army. Patriotic education of servicemen, formation of central governing bodies of the UPR armed forces, their functional responsibilities, social and material security of the army, setting specific combat tasks, maintaining military discipline, ideological national consciousness of creating their own Armed Forces, rule-making activities and legal consolidation of the army factors that gave rise to their own army. The military activity of the Central Council with its important experience has largely become a guide on the way to the formation of military units of Ukraine in 2021. Drawing a parallel with Independent Ukraine, it is clear that the Ukrainian development of the army in 1917–1921, laid the foundation for the creation of the Armed Forces, and it began with the legal formation. Thus, on August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a resolution “On military formations in Ukraine,” which determined: “to subordinate all military formations stationed on the territory of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; to establish the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; The Government of Ukraine to start creating the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”¹⁵ In fact, this resolution marked the beginning of the construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an important institution of the state and an integral element of its military organization. Later, on December 6, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed extremely important laws for military construction – “On Defense of Ukraine” and “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”¹⁶ On the same day, the text of the Military Oath was approved, which was first taken in the Verkhovna Rada Hall by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General KP Morozov. Legal regulation of relations between the state and the citizens of

¹³ V. Soldatenko, *Military factor in the struggle...*, pp. 90–91.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Resolution “On military formations in Ukraine,” Verkhovna Rada Document, 1991, <https://www.zsu.gov.ua/menu/5fe440852f429b1f88ce9cbc>.

¹⁶ Law of Ukraine “On Defense of Ukraine,” Verkhovna Rada Document, 1991, <http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/node/4344>.

Ukraine in connection with the fulfillment of their constitutional duty to protect the Motherland is regulated by the adopted Law of Ukraine “On Military Duty and Military Service” of March 25, 1992.¹⁷ Gradually, the number of troops in Ukraine at that time reached about 980 thousand people. However, changes in the political leadership led to the gradual decline of the Ukrainian army. The number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has significantly decreased, and the military profession has lost its popularity. The equipment on the balance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine became obsolete, and the supply of new ones from the international arena or the development of new ones was practically non-existent. The turning point for the Ukrainian army was February 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched a military aggression in the Donbas in the spring. Large-scale reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine begins, which took place with the support and active participation of the country’s civil society. Significantly increased the number, budget funding and revised staffing. The main documents of strategic planning in the field of national security and defense are: National Security Strategy of Ukraine (May 2015),¹⁸ Military Doctrine of Ukraine (September 2015),¹⁹ Concept of Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine (March 2016),²⁰ State Targeted Defense Program for the Development of Arms and Military Equipment until 2020 (March 2016),²¹ Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine (June 2016),²² State Program for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period up to 2020 (March 2017).²³

In these documents, Ukraine clearly defined its European integration and desire to join NATO, as well as the threats and enemies identified by the Russian Federation. Today, in 2022, despite active hostilities throughout Ukraine, Ukraine continues to build a strong army, equating it to NATO standards. During the existence of Independent Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine regained combat capability, gained combat experience, increased operational capabilities, improved technical equipment and security for the successful defense of the state.

¹⁷ Law of Ukraine “On Military Duty and Military Service,” Verkhovna Rada Document, 1992, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2232-12#Text>.

¹⁸ National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada Document, 2015, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0008525-15#Text>.

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5. Conclusions

Thus, the comprehensive development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is impossible without a military state policy. Only by analyzing the experience of the past will we be able to provide the military with the most modern weapons and make the right reforms in all areas of defense. The military policy of the Central Council is the best example of “taking” the best conditions for building Ukraine’s army, as the Central Council was the first to form a military government. Analysis of its activities to create separate tactical groups, battalions, regiments, military support, development of regulations – further indicates its achievements in the field of military construction. Today, the military policy of the Central Council is the successor to the formation of the Armed Forces. By analyzing its activities, it is possible to avoid contradictions and disputes not only in the legal aspect of the development of the Armed Forces, but also political disagreements in the international arena. The activity of the Central Council in the military sphere reveals the military – political relations between the government and the military, thus «showing» us the tension in relations. This means that those who fought for Ukraine’s independence and those who fought against its independence cannot be honored at the same time. This is political schizophrenia that will destroy any state.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL IN THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMY

Abstract

The article examines the scientific significance of the state military policy of the Central Council. It outlines the deployment of the military movement and the activities of the military bodies of the People's Republic of Ukraine. The significance and influence of the experience of the military policy of the Central Council for the present-day development of the state is delineated. Normative activity in the military sphere during the period of the Central Council and Independent Ukraine is analyzed. The issue of the legal, financial, and social situation of the military personnel of the Armed Forces between 1917 and 1919 is highlighted. The military legal norms of the period together with the military norms from the Independence of Ukraine are analyzed. The need to supplement these documents is proven, in particular by a detailed description of the role and function of the military personnel in the military formations as a component of military security policy. It is emphasized that the main priority in the national security system is the development, preservation, provision, and improvement of the regulatory and legal acts. The basic documents that defined the state policy of national

security during the Central Council period as well as their significance for the present-day development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are analyzed.

Keywords: army, military policy, organs of UCC, armed forces, Central Council of Ukraine, national liberation struggle