

## ***Tending and Logic between Bardili and Hegel: The Operativity of Reason beyond the Philosophy of the Subject***



Federico Ferraguto

(Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná – PUCPR, Curitiba, Brazil; federico.ferraguto@pucpr.br)  
ORCID: 0000-0002-3874-8300

**Abstract:** The paper traces some stages in the process of the speculative emancipation of the *Trieb* in Post-Kantian philosophy with the aim of reconstructing the context that allows explaining the outcomes of the treatment given to it by Hegel in the *Science of Logic*. Initially, some elements that underlie the speculative assimilation of the concept of *Trieb* in the course of the development of post-Kantian philosophy are presented, and in a second step, the position of an author central to the development of Hegel's *Logic*, namely Christoph Gottfried Bardili, is discussed. The theory of the drive developed by Bardili in *Grundriss der ersten Logik* makes possible a clearer understanding of the different levels at which Hegel makes use of the notion of *Trieb* in the doctrine of the concept and particularly in the understanding of teleology developed in *Wissenschaft der Logik*. The overall purpose is to show how the debate on *Trieb* does not take the form of the evolution of a purely anthropological interpretation, oriented toward a supposed critique of 'subjectivity', but rather is the result of its integration in a speculative sense.

**Keywords:** Hegel; Bardili; tending; the concept of *Trieb*; teleology; realism.

### **I. Tending, Life and Reason**

The post-Kantian debate and the rise of so-called German Idealism have opened new perspectives on the philosophical understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and reality. Traditionally, idealism has been interpreted as a phenomenalism that reduces the real to a result of subjective performance. This is a position that some thinkers, such as Jacobi, have labelled as nihilism or a form of self-enclosed subjectivism. However, recent literature has challenged this view. Through extensive and detailed historical and textual reconstruction, also linked to the acquisition of new materials, a different trend has emerged. According to this tendency the core of so-called 'German Idealism' could be seen not as a denial of the real in its autonomy, but as a reaffirmation of it in non-empirical terms.

This alternative view proposes that the real is not simply a projection of the mind, but a manifestation or concretisation of an absolute, understood as an extra-subjective operativity rather than a static entity. Idealism is thus transformed into a new kind of realism. The absolute is accepted as the living and operative ground of reality itself, in light of a richer and more complex view of the interaction between mind and world and of a holistic solution that conceives of seemingly opposite polarities as manifestations or articulations of an underlying unity (for this thesis see the extensive and recent treatments by Lorini 2015 and Theilke 2013).

The holism that develops in the process of discussing Kant's philosophy is particularly relevant to the contemporary problematisation of the structure and nature of life. It overcomes the alternative between mechanism and vitalism and renews teleological thinking beyond the complications of its association with creationism. Philosophers such as Fichte, Reinhold, Schelling and Hegel were protagonists of this development, which transforms the anthropological or philosophical-natural lexicon into a speculative sense and conceives of reason as a hyper- or supra-intentional propositionality that cannot be identified with the performance of an individual subject.

A significant example of this movement within post-Kantian philosophy is the reflection on instinctive life, which emerges as a dimension that is identified neither with the anthropological aspect derived from the analysis of the subject nor with the biological aspect derived from that of the organism. Tending, in its different meanings of effort, impulse, drive and tendency, no longer expresses, or not only, the unconscious dimension of the subject's conscious performance. It reflects, rather, an implicit operation of reason, which manifests itself through these subjective performances, as well as in the historical, ethical, biological structuring of the real as such<sup>1</sup>.

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1 The flexibility that characterizes the semantic field of the tendency is due to the structural hypertrophy that the word *Trieb* assumes throughout German philosophy between the 18th and 20th centuries, which has to be traced back to a work of condensation that the German language carried out in the Enlightenment era with regard to words, whose origin was predominantly anthropological, such as *nisus*, *appetitus*, *impetus*, *conatus*, *instinctus*, or expressions frequent in the philosophy of nature at the end of the 19th century, such as *Bewegung*, *Neigung*, *Anstoss*, *Streben* etc. A 'conceptual history' of this phenomenon, which accounts for and justifies this flexibility, has already been carried out (see Cesa 1993; Fabbri Bertolotti 1990; Buchenau 2002). What stands out as the historiographical presupposition of the research on this topic is the valid observation that the origin of the philosophical understanding of the concept of drive should not only be found in the development of the philosophy of nature (as Drouet 1972 claims), but also in a specifically ethical-anthropological context. By 'anthropology' is to be understood that philosophical perspective – which matures in the middle and late Enlightenment – referring to the investigation of human nature, which does not yet arrive at a separation between body and soul, aiming to keep together the scope of psychological research, concerning the faculties of the human spirit, which touches on the moral implications of this investigation. This perspective was developed by important authors of pre-Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, such as Tomasius, Wolff, Heydenreich, Abicht, Reinhold etc. In this historical context, the focus on the concept of impulse makes it possible to explain the human being as a "finite rational being", that is, as an entity who acts in a world, who has a specific rational and emotional constitution that motivates his action, which, moreover, develops concretely in the relationship with other human beings, who form the community of which he is a part. The aim of this paper is to show how this anthropological dimension of the *Trieb* shifts towards a speculative horizon that does not only identify the performances of the concrete subject, but rather the extrasubjective structure of reason that is articulated through subjective performances.

It is well known how Hegel's thought is characterized by a deepening of this concept and how tending should not be seen, for Hegel, only as an epiphenomenon of life. It represents the very core of pure thought in its internal dialectical movement, or the pure energy of thought itself, independent of any specific subject or mental capacity. This position of Hegel can be seen to emerge from a complex path in which two dimensions appear to intertwine. The first is that of a critique of subjectivity understood as self-empowerment, of which tending, in its articulations, is a fundamental expression (Franks 2006, 298). The second is an assimilation of tending from the anthropological dimension of the investigation of subjectivity into a speculative dimension (Zöller 2000, 201–202; also, see Buchenau 2002, 12; for the comprehensive treatment see Gambarotto 2018). Research on these topics has greatly enhanced historical-scientific inquiry, highlighting how a certain de-subjectification of tending has a consistent impact on an understanding of nature as a process that cannot be traced to an abstract causalism<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, the need for a historical and conceptual deepening of the process of speculative emancipation of tending, through which the anthropological (or anthropological-transcendental) dimension is assimilated to a more significantly metaphysical dimension, still seems to be alive.

In this paper I will try to show some stages of this emancipation process and I will try to reconstruct a context to explain Hegel's outcomes. I will begin by presenting some elements that underlie the speculative assimilation of the concept of *Trieb* in the course of the development of post-Kantian philosophy and will focus, in a second step, on the position of an author central to the development of Hegelian logic, namely Gottfried Bardili (a bio-bibliographical profile of Bardili can be found in Klemme 2016, 37–40). The theory of the impulse [*Impuls*] developed by Bardili in the *Grundriss der ersten Logik*, a work that Hegel certainly knew, makes possible a clearer understanding of the different levels at which Hegel makes use of the notion of *Trieb* in the doctrine of the concept and in particular in the understanding of teleology developed in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Beyond a resumption of the philosophical-historical discussion of the topic, my general purpose is to show how the debate on *Trieb* does not take the form of the evolution of a purely anthropological interpretation, oriented toward a supposed critique

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2 Notable in this regard is the research inspired as early as Lenoir 1980 and developed in more recent years (significant research in this regard is worth mentioning: Gambarotto 2018 and Kisner-Noller 2022). The former aims to one-side German life sciences of the period as arising from a unified Kant-Blumenbach research program, showing exactly the limits of the Kantian appropriation of the *Bildungstrieb* debate, and the latter aims to show how this debate is received in the post-Kantian discussion. Gambarotto's book has the merit of showing how historically the debate on *Trieb* emancipates itself from the discussion of the subject in favor of a general problematisation of nature as organism and a conception of mechanism that is not exclusively reducible to external causal connections (Gambarotto 2018, 18). The collective volume published by Kisner and Noller has the merit of showing how the terms of this debate are developed in a specifically philosophical context on the basis of the assumption that a purely mechanical view of nature cannot account for the complexity of the living (Kisner-Noller 2022, 4–5). In both cases, and especially in the case of Kisner and Noller, there is a lack of justification for the forms in which the philosophical assimilation of the impulse takes place and the way in which this concept, in philosophy, no longer identifies a specific living being, but the general structure of reason.

of ‘subjectivity’, but rather is the result of its integration in a speculative sense. This also suggests that the current valorisation of the hyper-subjective side of consciousness does not stand in a critical perspective to the alleged modern subjectivism, culminating in so-called German Idealism, but rather deepens and radicalizes some of its genuine implications (Beiser 2008, 2–3).

## II. From the Formative Force to Reason

Hegel’s position, an expression of a ‘realist’ reaction to the alleged idealism of the Jena-period Reinhold and Fichte (Onnasch 2006), can also be seen as a synthesis between the developments of the new biological science and those of the specifically philosophical discussion, with Kant, beyond Kant (an exhaustive reconstruction of Bardili’s influences on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel can be found in Zahn 1965; Onnasch 2006; Valenza 1994; on the speculative assimilation of the impulse in Hegel see Nuzzo 2022, 283 ff., and Wittmann 2006, who follows the same line; and Kunio 1988, who dwells only on the anthropological horizon, neglecting its speculative dimension). The synthesis of these factors unfolds in a path through which tending becomes, from a tool for the subjective interpretation of natural phenomena, a general determination of the representational connection between subject and object and, finally, a dynamic all internal to the concretisation of reason, understood as extra-subjective operativity. Underlying this path, we can identify at least three relevant factors.

The first Involves a rethinking of the results of Kantian reflection in the Third Critique. Here Kant argues that organized beings are not mere machines, since they possess in themselves a formative force [*Bildungskraft*] that is an expression of a self-propagating formative power inexplicable through mere capacity for movement (i.e., mechanism, AK, V, 374), which is communicated to matter that does not need to organize itself. But insofar, organisation as such is not traceable to a physical force, the concept of a thing as a natural end cannot be constitutive of reason or intellect, but only as a regulative concept for the force of reflective judgment, the teleological characteristics of organized beings should not be considered as ontologically definitive properties, but rather attributed to the way we understand them (AK, V, 376). This principle should guide our research on objects of this kind, considering their teleological characteristics only heuristically. However, Kant fails to consistently separate the concept of finalism from that of intention. He argues that teleology cannot find a complete answer to its inquiries except in a theology, highlighting an unstable position between mechanical and technical explanations of teleology, leading to the antinomy between mechanical inexplicability and illegitimacy of the technical-theological argument. On the other hand, Kant paves the way to overcome a technical understanding of teleology, but ends up blurring the conceptual distinction between internal and external finality, interpreting the former as the latter, that is, understanding teleology exclusively as the result of a subjective

intention. This represents a significant limitation in his philosophy, as he fails to conceive of finality outside the model of practical-technical action, thus denying the possibility of scientifically explaining the teleological characteristics exhibited by organized beings (a reconstruction of the assumptions and historical-philosophical implications of this passage have been summarized by Zamitto 2022).

The second factor consists in an emancipation of the tending from the context of biological science and its return to the set of theoretical and practical components that define the subject's forms of access to the world. In § 86 of the third book of the *Essay on a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation*, where he lays out the basic outlines of the theory of the faculty of desire, Reinhold understands drive not as a force of the subject or a property of the object of nature, but as a function for understanding the relationship between the formal or material element that motivates representation and the limits imposed by the representational form<sup>3</sup>. In this way, the drive reflects the result of the tension between the totality of the determinations of an object and the fact that the latter can only be partially understood through the representational filter (more on this in Selling 1938, esp. 58 ff., and Fabbianelli 2011). It is from this correlation that the object acquires meaning and it is through this correlation that the object can not be reduced to a mere thing, but understood as a represented object. In this way, the drive is released from a purely philosophical-natural context and rather indicates a form of relationship, or a function of consciousness, rather than a psycho-physically active force.

The third element is related to this conclusion and offers a deeper insight into the functional interpretation of tending. It can be found in Bardili's *Grundriss* and shares similarities with elementary philosophy. In the *Grundriss*, in fact, Bardili understands thought and matter as parts of a single fundamental principle common to mind and world, thinking (GEL, 1–2). By this term he does not mean the property of a subject, but a general meaningfulness common to subject and nature (GEL, 4) or, as Frege would say, the sense that is repeated and remains constant in every concrete act of thought (see Frege 1918–1919, 19; for further insights in this regard, see Bondeli 2018). Thinking, in its purest form, is therefore similar to the act of counting, as distinct from calculating, since it is based on the infinite repeatability of a unity constantly identical to itself, unconditioned by external elements. Unlike calculus, which involves externality, counting is a self-determined and self-referential process, operating within the confines of its structure and a priori (GEL, 2). At the same time, the identity of thinking is not static, nor is it closed upon itself. It is also determinative of the meaning of a specific cognitive or conative act. In its infinite repeatability it implies the possibility that each repetition is distinct from the others and, therefore, that thought binds itself to another than itself, or to matter (GEL, 4, 15–17). Thought and matter would, thus, be parts of an original disjunction through which this

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<sup>3</sup> "I call the *impulse* of the representative subject the relation of representational force to the possibility of representation, determined *a priori* in its faculty, the relation of force to its faculty, of the foundation of actual reality to the foundation of the possibility of representation, that is, to representability" (Reinhold 1789, 560).

meaningfulness is extrinsic in representative knowledge and in the very constitution of an object for individual consciousness.

Tending in this context does not represent a subjective element or a force of organized matter, but the very act of thinking not yet fully brought to consciousness. In this sense it represents a pure passivity, or even a mere 'being' of reason, insofar as it reflects the mere being of thinking. Bardili thus assimilates an aspect of Reinholdian elementary philosophy, tracing tending back to the internal structure of rationality<sup>4</sup>. This, however, in line with what Hegel would later argue, is not a subjective function that emerges from a purification from the empirical<sup>5</sup>, but rather the very movement of reason, which common consciousness perceives, and philosophy disclosed in its logic.

### III. Impulse through Matter in Bardili's Logical Realism

Resuming the results of a development already defined in his early writings (see on this the interpretation of Tognini 1976, 794–796), with the *Grundriss* Bardili provides a unified interpretation of the conative dimension of rationality in which the nature of the human being is presented through a kind of rational psychology that prompts him to understand the subject's practical performance as a development that leads gradually from sensibility to reason<sup>6</sup>. In his 1800 work, as well as in *Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Philosophie* with Reinhold, published in 1804, Bardili develops these conclusions more radically, but not with the aim of describing the structures of the human spirit. Indeed, he is convinced that this description must be the correlate of a doctrine of the general structure of reason understood as a 'rhythm' shared by subject and nature, thought and being, consciousness and world (BW, 105, Karsch 1925, 439). As Tarli rightly argues, "Bardili's ambition is not to deduce the conditions of possibility of the conceptualisation of reality (...) but to grasp the logicity of the real" (Tarli 2022, 54; GEL, 13–14)<sup>7</sup>. Bardili's

4 It was already Fichte who noted this closeness of Bardili's pre-Bardili logic to Reinhold's elementary philosophy in his 1800 review of the *Grundriss* (cf. GA, I, 6, 436–438).

5 This is a critique closely resembling the one Hegel addressed to Fichte in the *Differenzschrift* (see Hegel 1971, 49). However, the same criticism could be levelled at Bardili's philosophy, since rational realism consists either of pure formalism that achieves no materiality, or of completely material knowledge that loses its formal purity and can be reduced to mere individual and empirical knowledge (Hegel 1971, 101). According to Hegel, the only possibility to trigger this alternative would be to forget oneself in love, faith and the effort to fix knowledge according to analysis, method and discussion (Hegel 1971, 102).

6 The psycho-physical dimension of volition as a starting point and central element for the construction of a practical philosophy appears from the very beginning of the 1795 writing (see Bardili 1795, 1–3 and 18, where the will does not appear as an externally-experienced property of the individual but as a dynamic center evident in its practical [desires, volitions] and epistemic [intellectual performances] manifestations; on this see also Paimann 2009, 33).

7 In a word, and against Kant, the *erste Logik* denies the possibility of a transcendental logic and reduces critical philosophy to psychologism (GEL, 358–359). This means that the more a philosophy is based on subjectivity, defined essentially by the relationship with what is other than thought, the more it is empirical. Particularly insightful in this sense is Barone's observation (Barone 1999, 202) that the formation of Bardili's philosophy marks "with full evidence" the "subordination of the same transcendental logic to metaphysical logic" with the consequent process of "removing

‘first logic’, in other words, provides for the formalisation of the laws that allow for the direct understanding of the objectivity of the real, freeing it from any epistemological agent. For Bardili, the only certain being is not that of the subject, but that of the object-thought, which, at the logico-noematic and ontological level, is independent of both judgments and representations (GEL, 17–19; Tarli 2022, 55).

Beginning with the original and extraphenomenal objectivity of thinking, the understanding of phenomena, and of their objective reality, would only be the result of a ‘subjectification’ of thinking itself, which, applying to itself, enters into a relation with a matter, which is not given, but postulated as a function of the internal structure of thinking. Phenomenal objectivity can thus be produced only as a correlate of this repetition, at the moment when matter is, even if only partially, assimilated by thinking and configured as an ‘object’ for knowledge (GEL, 69). At the level of the application of thinking, an *Ur-Teilung* (GEL, 67), that is, an original division, is produced between thought and matter, according to which matter offers itself to thought and is annulled in it. But this annulment concerns only what of matter can be made the object of a specific predication. The object, in fact, is seen as the synthesis of possibility (i.e., possible predication) and actual reality (realized predication), and only realized predication is assimilated into thinking (GEL, 68 ff.). However, this general structure needs to be further specified. The synthesis of possibility and reality defines an object in general. But there must be a *plus* that distinguishes a certain object from all others constituted in the same way. This “plus” is the very act of concrete thinking (or preaching) that reflects a specific and unrepeatable direction of thinking which, in turn, exhibits the ineradicable residue of matter in its process of assimilation to thought. Bardili identifies this ‘plus’ with an impulse [*Impuls*] (GEL, 104), which thought, unable to bring back to itself, ‘transfers’ to the matter to which it is applied. Again, the impulse, like all the other elements that appear in the Bardilian description, is not something given by matter or present in matter. Rather, it is thought in matter from thought. The impulse is for [*für*] thought, insofar as it relates to the genesis of concrete thinking. But it is through [*durch*] matter, because it defines the residual element of matter that can no longer be cancelled and constitutes its intrinsic form. The specifically realist feature of Bardilian logic thus lies in the fact that matter as matter cannot be known in an absolute sense. Only the form, that is, that dimension which is assimilated into thought, can be known of it. Matter ‘in itself’ thus remains an inconceivable X, corresponding to that which resists its process of dissolution in thought and also to that which, irreducible to it, binds it in a specific direction. The impulse through matter is thus the vital act of thought, uncategorized and uncategorisable, but the presupposition of all conceptual construction. It shows how thought is not simply an in-itself, but also a for-itself and through-itself: immanent movement that is externalized in the phenomenality of limited and contradictory, individual and finite thinking. Bardili rightly speaks of an *Impuls*,

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Kantism, which was initiated with the declared purpose of faithfully developing the necessary implications of it”.

insofar as the dynamism of thinking is not resolved in an actual causality or creation of matter, but is reflected in the forms through which matter itself can be assimilated, and represented, in individual thinking. Bardilian impulse thus embodies the general conceptual characteristics of the *Trieb*: it reflects an immanent limitation of thinking, it impels thinking to materialize in a certain direction, it is unconceptualisable, because it makes conceptual forms possible, and it is immediate, being the presupposition of all further mediation. Finally, while being “*durch die Materie*,” the impulse does not belong to matter as such, but to matter as related to the process of repetition, or application, of thinking, that is, related to the formal side of matter. In its immanent, simple, immediate and unconceptual nature, impulse is therefore the still obscure consciousness of the living of reason. It is awareness of the fact [*dass*] that thought lives, but not yet of ‘how’ such life unfolds (GEL, 108). The unfolding of life, in turn, is articulated, for Bardili, in theoretical and practical terms: the mere vital act has as its correlate a feeling, which is linked to the apprehension of an object. The consciousness of the impulse has as its correlate an apperception. Here, the impulse to think is an expression of a definite moment in which thinking repeats itself and turns to itself. Finally, impulse consciousness as such has as its correlate a clear representation or desire. At this level, the impulse reflects an articulation of thinking in the concrete forms of succession, proximity and externality and makes matter a represented object. The set of these practical and theoretical determinations defines, according to Bardili, individuality, i.e., the set of determinations that can be interpreted as punctual and irreducible self-limitation through which thinking is particularised.

Bardili thus offers a first demonstration of the way in which the fundamental identity of thinking translates a concrete thinking and representing without admitting an external limiting factor or datum for thinking itself. Obviously, Bardili does not produce a cosmogony, that is, a description of how the real is materially created by thinking. As Reinhold will show in volume IV of the *Beitraege* of 1803, the Bardilian conception leads rather to a phenomenology, that is, a description of the concrete forms of manifestation of thinking. Impulse, too, is therefore freed from a purely anthropological and biological context and made a fundamental term in this articulation. It does not exhibit a force somehow traceable in nature, nor, as Kant would have it, a conceptual tool to make up for the inadequacies of our understanding of natural phenomena. Rather, the impulse through matter reflects the general dynamism of reason, which identifies as much the forms of the structuring of being as those of our understanding of it.

In Bardili, therefore, we observe a development of what Claudio Cesa called the categorical function of the impulse, showing how, in the post-Kantian discussion, the deduction of the conceptual forms through which an object is understood is replaced by a deduction of the dynamic functions of reason presupposed in these forms themselves (Cesa 2002). However, while in Cesa’s interpretation this function is found in the investigation of the modes of action of the human spirit, Bardili understands it as an expression of an extra-subjective operability that the human spirit shares with the other.



#### IV. *Trieb*'s Role in the Development of the Concept

Despite the decisive and vehement critique presented in the *Differenzschrift*, in his *Logic*, Hegel seems to take up a crucial element of the Bardilian logic and, beyond its anthropological or philosophical-natural articulations, enhances the potentialities of the concept of *Trieb* within the framework of a first philosophy<sup>8</sup>. For Hegel, too, tending reflects not the relation of thinking to a given otherness, but a specific and immediate self-relation of reason, which, in relating to the other from itself, is articulated and concretised in an individual manifestation. In the *Science of Logic*, in fact, tending is seen as a fundamental element in explaining the infinite making itself content of the form of thought as pure form (WL, 548–550), and referred to a process in which the fixed substantiality of a supposed “substratum” is completely resolved in the tense of its realisation, without being reduced to mere mechanism.

*Trieb*, in particular, is thematised in the context of the treatment of teleology and its relation to life. Teleology, in fact, is the concept in its existence (WL, 466), and that is the moment when the concept, infinite and free, is no longer characterised by an external determination. The finalistic relation overcomes the distinction of subjective and objective, and in it the concept does not merely assume a specific existence, but reflects a movement of reconnection or return to itself enriched by its relation to the object. In other words, finality defines an ‘order of things’ and does not merely represent a perspective on things. In its general structure, therefore, in finalism the concept is self-determining and, at the same time, lost in the other than itself. Externality is not nihilistically annulled, or brought back to a process of concept enhancement, but integrated and assimilated into the concept itself. In the subjective aim this assimilation is still only virtual and takes the form of an “essential effort and drive to place oneself externally” (WL, 445). Aim is here the subjective concept that urges itself to externality, or a universal that assimilates into itself its own negation. The movement of the aim can therefore be expressed as a dynamic that removes “the presupposition of the aim itself, that is, the immediacy of the object” (WL, 447) and posits it as determined by the concept. The relation of negation to the object, is not direct, but is an expression of “a negative demeanor” of the concept toward itself. In positing the object as determined by itself, in fact, the concept denies itself as such and opens itself to the other than itself. Thus, finality exhibits the object itself as an expression of an order

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<sup>8</sup> A problematisation of Hegelian reflection on *Trieb* in these dimensions has been conducted by, among others, Bonito Oliva (Bonito Oliva 2002) with regard to the philosophical-natural horizon, and by Maurer (Maurer 2018), who thematized the anthropological dimension. Both works have the merit of mapping in detail the recurrence of this notion in the development of Hegelian thought, reconstructing the broad spectrum of relations between impulse, feeling and desire, and showing the crucial function of tending in the translation of subjective spirit into objective spirit, going so far as to highlight how, in Hegel, “the power of spirit is its capacity to endure, by overcoming it, infinite pain” (Bonito Oliva 2002, 29). Schäfer (Schäfer 2020) develops an interpretation of the ethical-practical dimension of the relationship between *Trieb* and desire, supporting Angehrn's (Angehrn 1977, 158) thesis that in Hegel “the object of the theory of freedom is no longer the I in its abstract freedom and decision, but the spirit in its real existence: the objective spirit”. Through the thematisation of the function of the *Trieb* in the *Logic*, the general structure that forms the background to these conclusions is shown.

of nature, independent of the subject that understands it (WL, 447–448). At this level, the drive that characterizes the aim still remains only subjective and is characterised by a tendency to enslave the object that satisfies it, which, precisely because of this, becomes a ‘means’ for the achievement of a certain purpose. “The negative demeanor of teleological activity in the face of the object is therefore not an extrinsic demeanor, but is the change and passing that objectivity in itself makes into that” (WL, 452). If the aim immediately assimilated the object, finalism would fail, since this relation presupposes its exteriority. As a ‘means’ for the aim, the object takes on, instead, a double valence. On the one hand, it remains object, consumed by the extrinsic mechanical relations that characterize it as such. On the other, insofar as it assumes its meaning with respect to aim, it reflects it as something that ‘survives’ its specific realisation: “the plow is nobler than the immediate enjoyments it procures” (WL, 453). Through the understanding of the object as a means, the “drive” that characterizes the subjective aim is understood as an actual activity of the aim itself in which “determining oneself is also determining an object as not determined by the concept, that is, as external” (WL, 460). And, at the same time, externality, in this self-determination, is posited as internal to the determining of the concept itself. In asserting that “by his instruments man dominates external nature, even though for his aim she remains subject to it” (WL, 453), Hegel is not placing himself at the apex of modernity’s nihilism, but is urging us to understand the objective dimension of our existence as an expression of a rationality that transcends the specific interests of an individual and is, in itself, an expression of an order that the subject interprets, but does not produce or manipulate.

In the realisation of the aim, through the means, the moment of exteriority is not only placed in the concept. This does not remain only a tendency, but appears as a concrete totality and is identical with immediate objectivity (WL, 461). The realised aim thus becomes idea, concrete totality, the identity of concept and object. In the problematisation of the idea, Hegel presents the different forms of this identity by showing how it is, on the one hand, immediate (i.e., the concept must immediately be the object) and, on the other hand, is actually the result of a process, a mediation (the concept identifies with the object as a means). In this process, three moments emerge: the liberation from immediacy, the passing of the concept into the other, and the consequent interpenetration of the object by the subject, which “as a negative unit referring to itself is distinguished from its objectivity and is its being in and of itself, but essentially refers to it and thus has itself as its aim or drive” (WL, 466). Impulse therefore appears as mobilizing universal identity and reconfiguring it, not as something given once and for all, but as process and becoming (WL, 467). Thus, while in the realm of the philosophy of nature or the understanding of the organism the impulse can be understood as a specific epiphenomenon of the living being (Nuzzo 2022, 283 ff.), at this level of logic it is a conceptual operator that enables the internal development of the different moments of the idea. With respect to the phenomenon of life, it is the soul that infuses itself into every organism and leads it

back to a universal process. With respect to the moment of knowing, it is the drive that leads to contemplating in the object the subject's identity with itself and thus removing the subjectivity of the concept. With respect to the idea of the good, the drive no longer consists in the elimination of a given difference, but in the production of the difference itself (WL, 545). In this form the foundation has been established for the revitalisation of the logical movement as a "return to life," which is no longer the immediate coincidence of subject and object, but an expression of the convergence of theoretical and practical, of self-understanding and self-production of the idea, of self-consciousness and substantiality of things, or, again, of representation and reflection, which Hegel calls "method" and which is defined as the "supreme and only instinct of finding that is, and knowing for itself, every thing" (WL, 552).

## V. First Logic and Panlogism

In light of this *excursus* on the Hegelian theory of drive in the *Science of Logic*, it is possible to further specify the correspondences between Hegel's and Bardili's approach. In both authors the understanding of the drive is posited as the basis for a teleology grounded in an understanding of rationality as an operativity common to mind and world, both as a moment in which this operativity simply happens (For further details on this aspect, see Ferraguto 2018). In Bardili it is the *dass* of thinking as a tendency to develop in a direction defined by thinking's contact with the other than itself, while Hegel speaks of thinking's drive to preserve itself in the determination of the other or object. In both authors, the drive reflects a not fully conscious dimension of the development of reason, which, in turn, constitutes its fundamental opening to the other from itself and thus the initial moment for its concretisation.

This general structure makes it possible to justify the understanding of life as an expression of a dynamic endowed with an extra-subjective propositionality independent of the intentions of a subject, creator, or *mens*. Hegel in this sense stands as the cornerstone of a process that, while distancing himself from it, moves from Kant and in particular from his understanding of tending as an element found in nature and not in a subject producing it (for historical-philosophical insights in this regard see Zamitto 2022 and Lenoir 1980). Both Bardili's and Hegel's approaches also show how it is impossible to thematize the phenomenon of life for its own sake, without reference to a conceptuality, or a prior and prior logic, capable of legitimizing it. The question remains open as to how it is possible, and justifiable, so much to move from the natural, anthropological or psychological dimensions of understanding the impulse to the speculative dimension. For Hegel, as is well known, these dimensions bring out specific configurations of the idea's being (WL, 549), and philosophy would have the task of finding it in these configurations.

In the development of Bardilian realism, and more considerably in Reinhold's developments of it between 1801 and 1804, the conceptual framework of the impulse is

placed at the basis of the theory of antitypicality, which essentially describes a process by which thought and reality are brought into relation under the same laws, allowing the representation to act as a substitute, as an image, or as a phenomenon of the object in the consciousness that thematizes them (Reinhold 2020, 571–573)<sup>9</sup>. This legal correspondence between object and representation is fundamental to the reorganisation or reproduction of the object in the imagination, for example, in the laws governing the organisation of a plant that return to the imagination of the plant itself, becoming the indispensable conditions for its mental reorganisation or reproduction. The general structure of concrete thinking is specified according to the determinations of these reproductions giving rise to the set of schemas and categories through which both the real and our way of understanding it are organised. One can thus agree with Hartmann when he argues that the Hegel movement and Bardili's movement are different insofar as in Hegel we would have a 'panlogism', that is, the assimilation of the ontological structure of the real into the logical development of the concept, while in Bardili we will have only the presentation of a common legality to thought and reality through the antitype of matter by thought (Hartmann 1972, 37). Both, however, seem to be aware of the fact that the emancipation of life from the rationalistic mortgage passes through, and is made possible by, the emancipation and self-clarification of reason before itself.

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<sup>9</sup> Reinhold uses the term 'antitype', to indicate the appearance, image or mirroring of thought as a function of the realisation of an individual impulse. While in the Stoic and Leibnizian tradition the term 'antitype' was used to define the impenetrability of matter, and as a principle to define the individuality of bodies, Bardili (BW, 104, 166, 208) uses it to indicate an *Abbild* or *Gegenbild*, reproduction or mirroring of thought. For Bardili, in fact, antitype is an individual representation of thought or essence originating through human thought characterized by sensitivity and imagination. Based on this interpretation, Bardili also defines the Platonic concept of participation (BW, 207) and religion as well (for a general presentation of the concept of antitype in modern times, see Perl 1969).

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