Spatial Situations of Literature

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Over forty years ago Janusz Sławiński wrote that the umbrella term "space" signifies such varied phenomena that the language of their description cannot be hermetic. Today, after a few decades of attempts at formulating new terms and in spite of intense theoretical and analytical work, the collection of formulae seems to remain incomplete. Literature studies require a few new terms from spatial studies. In this paper I am proposing the term "spatial situations" as a convenient way of capturing literary records of experiencing space. First I will present a concise definition of that concept followed by its methodological justification, and its possible application in literary studies.

A spatial situation is grounded in the attentiveness category, a specific experience of the human subject who is in a concrete geographical location, who shares that location with a place cumulating heterochrony, and who is exposed to the effects of matter.

This concise definition consists of concepts which mutually enlighten each other: the heterotopic nature of space, interpreting the subject in the context of the surrounding materiality, the presence and agency of places in terms of possessing qualities which appear in reality, the interplaying and clashing concepts of significance and presence (both in the case of direct contact with space and mediated by the media materiality of print), and attentiveness as the fundamental quality of human life.
Heterotopia of space

Heterotopia is the central concept of Foucault’s *Of Other Spaces*. The French philosopher connects it with changes in the perception of space in the 20th century, when “the site has been substituted for extension which itself had replaced emplacement. The site is defined by relations of proximity between points or elements”¹. The interest in space-related issues makes the 20th century the time of space, which juxtaposes close and distant things, co-existing in dispersion and formulating reality as a combination of points and crossing of tangled branches.

Despite the fact that Foucault did not use that context, it is easy to observe that heterotopia functions also as a medical term: the presence of a particular tissue type at a non-physiological site². The chiasmatic character of heterotopia is hence visible in two dimensions. On the one hand it shows its multidimensionality as a term shared by biology, medicine, architecture, and humanities, and on the other, it lacks integrity, as it refers to both imagined and real, as well as internal and external, spaces. The connective character of heterotopia is based on its “curious property of being connected to all other emplacements, but in such a way that they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of relations that are designated, reflected or represented by them”³. For Foucault heterotopias are places like no other, places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society, which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias⁴.

In the introduction to *Inne przestrzenie, inne miejsca. Map i terytoriów* [Other spaces, other places. Of maps and territories] Dariusz Czaja attempts to explain the specificity of heterotopia, which is constructed from juxtaposed concreteness and imagination, as well as reality and representation, where he considers the social expectations of heterotopias. For example, they were supposed to create the space of illusion which unmasked the real space as a delusion (for example, this is the role of a brothel) or – the casus of colony – create a compensation for our reality. Czaja notes that heterotopias are places which are:

in a way beyond all the other places, although it is possible to locate them. They are significantly different (*heteros*), peculiar. Heterotopias can have various forms and probably it would be difficult to find their universal variant. Heterotopia lies in-between a domesticated and familiar real place

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³ Foucault, “Inne przestrzenie”, 120. English translation by Jay Miskowiec [PZ].

⁴ Foucault, 120.
(topos), and a place deprived of real space, existing as an imagined entity (ou-topos). Heterotopia exists, but it exists differently than places which are commonly available, visited and experienced. It remains in a relationship of disparity with the rest of the surrounding space. It functions within it as a different, separate, distinguished entity. It is a crater in the arranged spatial space. Heterotopia is actually “here”, perceptible, tangible, and may become a part of possible experience, although in reality it always remains “elsewhere”. It is an exception to the rule, licensed by culture 5.

Hence heterotopia is a material place that exists in reality, which apart from its absolute reality is also absolutely unreal, because it can be perceived as different from itself. Thus heterotopia would initially be a place that can be reached, its location easily found on a map, and then visited, but in its second reveal it would become the presence of the absent, non-tangible content of a formally concretized place. Foucault explains this duality effectively on the example of a mirror. Apart from its materiality, it is also a reflection of the surrounding space, thanks to which it becomes its own absence, making another space present 6. A similar mechanism is created on the theater stage. A separated and tangible surface easily becomes a different place within the space of the theater, materializing artistic contents in a short-lived act of illusion 7.

The encounter of that spatial indefiniteness with concrete human experience is truly interesting, for it is the external surrounding that “carves and flutes us”, and this is where “the erosion of our lives takes place”. Hence Czaja’s observation regarding the over-static character of heterotopia, understood as unchangeability in terms of time and space, is worth highlighting. The need to shift towards imaginative spaces is explained by logical, inevitable transformations of what is material in Foucault. This idea seems to restore the balance between material and non-material aspects of heterotopia. Czaja brings Foucault’s reflection closer to the Augé 8 definition dictionary, demanding the presence of the concept of the “transformations of sites”, which make the life of space dynamic, most often by degradation, dysfunctionsality, and their destruction 9.

Out of all the rules explaining heterotopia, meticulously listed by Foucault – 1) there is no culture that does not create heterotopia; 2) society can change heterotopia’s way of functioning; 3) heterotopia can juxtapose many spaces in the same real place; 4) heterotopias are connected with layers of time; 5) heterotopias always assume a system of opening and closure, which simultaneously isolate them and make them penetrable; 6) heterotopias play defined roles in relation to the rest of the surrounding space – there is a temptation for academics to combine the third and fourth rules.

6 See Foucault, “Inne przestrzenie”, 120.
7 See Foucault, 122.
8 See Marc Augé, “Nie-Miejsca. Wprowadzenie do antropologii nadnowoczesności (fragmenty)” [Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity], translated into Polish by Agnieszka Dziadek, Teksty Drugie : teoria literatury, krytyka, interpretacja, nr 4 (2008): 127–40; in her text Czaja goes one step further. By juxtaposing heterotopias and non-places she indicates that they are “related to each other in terms of the most important things: recognizing more clearly (…) the distinctness of some fragments of a space that we experience. Distinctness in terms of areas surrounding it. If we deprive non-places of negative values, and provide heterotopias with a chronological parameter, we can bring them closer to each other and use as a useful operational category”: Czaja, “Nie-miejsca. Przybliżenia, rewizje”, 22.
I would like to base the fundamental principle of every space (heterotopics) on those two rules. Contrary to Foucault I do not treat heterotopia as a type of space. Instead, I extract the constitutive characteristic from it and assume it to be a component of every space, which thus becomes a warehouse of layers of time. Instead of thinking in terms of models, I would rather think of features, qualities, intentions, characteristics, as well as a way of making present, permeation, exceeding, and appearing. The perspective of radical opening and the attempt at capturing similarities present in the string of different practices are thus founded. Heterotopicity as a constitutive characteristic of Foucault’s heterotopia becomes present in every space. Every site – apart from its materiality – thus has the potential to become a different site, such as its own historical version. It collects the material traces of history, which can contribute to numerous virtual spaces, in its realness. I extend the heterotopicity phenomenon to all spaces, assuming that category to be a universal spatial characteristic.

The materiality of reality

If places are connected with passing time, different temporalities can be found in every one. Foucault claims that “we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space”\(^\text{10}\), thus directing our attention to both the material aspect of the existence of places and the material dimension of human existence. He forms a similar thought once more: “We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another”\(^\text{11}\). Space is thus both a collection of meanings and a real element of reality, collecting its previous versions or conceptualizations. The experience of heterotopicity can be achieved only when one detaches themselves from traditionally understood time. Only the weakening of presence can permit the palimpsest-like character of space where time accumulates to be revealed,\(^\text{12}\) and propose the perspective of being-in-space.

Both Foucault’s materiality of space and the material dimension of existence within it brings that position closer to the realist mindset, which assumes that there is a so-called “material culture” next to man, plants, and animals. Hence all existing entities share some purely physical characteristics, and their presence in the world creates a defined difference, also for other entities. These entities, as claimed by Bjørnar Olsen in *In Defense of Things: Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects* “are, of course, different – between and among themselves – extremely varied forms of beings that actually constitute the very basis of collective action”\(^\text{13}\). The realist mindset hence means acceptance of the existence of the material world, whose particular elements constitute the basic and stable foundation of human existence. Objects and places have specific properties which impact and shape not so much the human perception, but rather

\(^\text{10}\) Foucault, “Inne przestrzenie”, 119.
\(^\text{11}\) Foucault, 119.
\(^\text{12}\) Heterotopicity sometimes approaches Bachtin’s chronotype, i.e. the inseparability of space and time, and in the literary artistic space-time allowing to bind spatial and temporal features in a meaningful and complete whole. See „Czas i przestrzeń w powieści”, [Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel] translated into Polish by Jerzy Faryno, Pamiętnik Literacki : czasopismo kwartalne poświęcone historii i krytyce literatury polskiej 65, nr 4 (1974): 273.
people with objects, materials, landscapes and cohabitated spaces\textsuperscript{14}. To put it simply: objects, places, landscapes and spaces exist independently of man, they are-already-there.

This clearly anti-Cartesian position leads to a shift on two surfaces. The first one shows that the subject is a part of a broader arrangement rather than an observer watching it from a distance. Absorption into the system leads to the second change – the former distance founded on intellectual capabilities is replaced with a heterogeneous network, which includes not only intellectual, but also sensual and material factors. The competences of human corporeality thus grow, and situating it in specific locations is connected to something that we could call subject objectification. The impression that assumes that the human body is the only body in the world, and additionally that a living body moves from one place to another in a way unlimited by other types of beings, is misleading\textsuperscript{15}. Olsen warns against the anthropocentric perception of materiality. The reflection about the body must include what this body signifies: things to which the body refers and with which it connects, the material components of the world in which it exists\textsuperscript{16}. The material potential of corporeality should be referred not just to things to which the body is concerned and to which it connects, or to put it simply: among which it exists, but also to places colonized, inhabited, and experienced.

The experience of space must be connected to the phenomenological perception, which assumes two crucial observations: we depend on the world through incorporation into a network of human and non-human entities, and we enter relations with the world both as thinking subjects and corporal objects\textsuperscript{17}: the Cartesian opposition of passive and inert matter and active and creationism-affected human mind. Our existence is engaged, "we-are-in".

Space encountered by a physical object exists without it and is prior towards the experience\textsuperscript{18} which results from their encounter. Place escapes constant attempts at mediating materiality within human reasoning, hence it is neither a Kantian phenomenon (cognizable "subject of senses"), nor "a thing within itself", i.e. a transcendent subject about which we can know nothing, nor even Hussler’s intentional object, a result of a phenomenological reduction.

A place as a palimpsest-like structure of accumulating time can be considered a material record of the past. Laurent Oliver, using Bergson’s duration theory, notes that “the present here is made up of a series of past durations that makes the present multi-temporal”\textsuperscript{19}. The components of space are not just a trace or sediment of distant past, as they are also effectively included in creating and diversifying periods. Olsen observes that objects (and hence places)

\textsuperscript{14}Olsen, 11.
\textsuperscript{15}See Olsen, 18.
\textsuperscript{16}Olsen, 18; it is good to view this issue in the context of Bergson’s “habitual memory”: Henri Bergson, \textit{Materia i pamięć: esejo o stosunku ciała do ducha} [Matter and Memory], translated into Polish by Romuald Jakub Weksler-Waszkinel i Marek Drwięga (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Zielona Sowa, 2006), 67 i nast.
\textsuperscript{17}See Bergson, \textit{Materia i pamięć}, 109.
\textsuperscript{19}Oliveir, Laurent, "Duration, Memory and the Nature of the Archaeological Record”, in \textit{It’s about Time. The Concept of Time in Archaeology}, ed. H. Harlsson (Goteborg: Bricoleur Press, 2001), 61.
“make the past present and tangible; they constantly resist the regime that has subjugated time to the prevailing image of it as instantaneous and irreversible”

Self-agency of places

Self-agency of matter is not about copying the activity of a subject, but about the unique quality based on indicating own distinctiveness. What is the specificity of the influence of things? In “Zwrot performatywny” we współczesnej humanistyce (“Performative turn” in contemporary humanities) Ewa Domanińska notes that due to anthropocentric and post-humanist criticism many scholars extend self-agency to non-human entities, but none of the projects is about attributing non-human entities intentionality or replacing human agents with non-human ones, but rather about highlighting a situation in which “changes in reality are an effect of processes and cooperation of various agents”. By commenting on the actor-network theory by Bruno Latour, Domanińska indicates that intentionality is an element which differentiates the human agency from the self-agency of things. Non-intentional agency of non-human objects would thus rely on intensely observable presence which through its very existence forces human subjects to take a stance. Consequently, a place has no intention of having an impact on man, space does not “assume”, “resolve”, and finally “does not want to influence” the human subject, but through its own material presence it involuntarily becomes an element of a network of co-dependencies and requires establishing relations towards it.

In Art and Agency Alfred Gell indicates the mediation of interpersonal relations in matter by taking a closer look at the influence of things and how they refer to people. By defining agency as “relative and context-dependent”, he is only one step away from including non-human entities in that network. Thanks to that premise agency becomes an involuntary interaction between entities, an invitation to cooperation, a very delicate but observable requirement to “relate-to-me”. The functioning matter, which plays the mediator, is an element of the affordances theory by James Gibson, defined as what the environment offers the individual. Hence the agency of matter would rely on providing characteristics and willingness-to-act in an unmediated way. A place’s affordance would thus be responsible for a variety of possibilities which are available in a specific constellation of things. Exploring ruins of a basement is a completely different experience than admiring a city from the highest viewpoint. Both places provide a limited number of perspectives, update different scenarios, expose the subject to different stimuli, and possess different heterotopicities.

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21 See Olsen, 60.
24 See Bruno Latour, Splatąając na nowo to, co społeczne: wprowadzenie do teorii aktora-sieci [Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory], translated by Aleksandra Derra (Kraków: Universitas, 2010).
If the abilities of the human subject are limited, and their activity is mediated also through matter which takes a specific location in reality, then – according to Maurice Merleau-Ponty – to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation. That responsive character can surely be found in the basic characteristic of an object, which according to Martin Heidegger is “readiness-to-hand”, i.e. an intuitive ability to use it:

[The] less we stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become (...) ‘theoretically’, we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand.

Exploiting things and places thoughtlessly, taking advantage of manufactured tools and using them as intended, using places as containers for our everyday activities, all make them invisible. Presence is a different way of existing for them – it embodies itself through the loss of “readiness-to-hand”. As Hubert Dreyfus writes, presence is related to some unrest and disruption. When we use things and they function according to our wishes, they are invisible to us, but when they do not and thus cannot serve their purpose, we begin to notice them. A damaged hammer, a flat tire or a rediscovered, long forgotten room attract far more attention than objects and places characterized by “readiness-to-hand”. The loss of that quality for objects and making them present are related to the disruption of their present role and activation of heterotopicity as a constitutive quality of space. A place ceases to be the arena of everyday activities, becoming an actuation of what is absent, starts to be noticeable, and grows to become non-obvious, which is just a step away from using the invitation to explore its stratification.

Attentiveness and space

The loss of readiness-to-hand of places is like an invitation. In order to answer it, one has to be attentive. Zofia Król, author of Powrót do świata. Dziejów uwagi w filozofii i literaturze [Return to the world. History of attention in philosophy and literature] defines attentiveness as the relationship between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, in which the subject is first of all aware and convinced of the significance of the process of perception, as well as believes that what they experience is the same as what they perceive. Commenting on that book, Joanna Krajewska observes that “the stakes are much higher than a novel conceptualization, systematic elaboration, attractive interpretations. Attentiveness towards objects constitutes (...) an inalienable quality”. Powrót do świata directly discusses an elabo-

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39See Martin Heidegger, Bycie i czas [Being and Time], translated by Bogdan Baran (Warszawa, 2008), 88.
39Heidegger, 88–89.
rate version of the act of attentiveness, in which the touch with the lost world (also because of temporal distance) is regained, and the object itself can be saved from the effects of time³⁴.

Being attentive means having a surplus of awareness, which assumes being called by the Other. Hence for Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht attentiveness means “openness of the mind to the world (»mind« and »awareness« are more capacious terms than » attentiveness«, defined as a specific function of awareness)”³⁵. Openness to concepts evoked in our mind, as well as to the effects and products of imagination in entanglement with the body and the senses, is an integral part of attentiveness. Similarly to concepts evoked by words under the influence of prosody, i.e. forms of contents, become imagination, i.e. the substance of contents, every situation of attentiveness which allows the capture of certain forms (such as architecture, artifacts of the past) also permits their absorption and transformation into substance. Although it does not mean that the internal time of awareness is stopped or that it is dominated by the indicated contents, it allows the past in our mind to be present in our imagination thanks to the object of attention, not as a meaning, but as a substance³⁶.

There is already something in a space and it should be learned through discovering it meticulously. “Ever since I bought that postcard I have suspected that there is a dormant story in it, a story which none would be able to conceive. A genuine drama, complex and likely painful – a story of mutilation or betrayal, a crime even; we will never know it, even if we suspect its presence”³⁷. Although listening to the material space attentively does not guarantee that we will learn about it, creating it by us and the surrounding senses – even if they do not form our reality – fuse the concrete materiality and actuation of the subject in the world in an act of world-creation. That Bergsonian trait proves that meaning-creation based on the culture of sense and logos will have different sources than world-creation in terms of the creation of some real event, based on encounter, tangibility, but first and foremost on the simultaneous and topographically identical presence of the subject and place.

The above proposals allow to see the kind of attentiveness in the spatial experience which allows to use the heterotopicity of places, thus restoring what is hidden and absent. Of course being sensitive to the agency of matter does not mean a restoration of old forms of places, and neither will it substitute the presence for the past, but it will allow for feeling the presence of what has passed, been lost or is foreign. It happens thanks to the similarity of attentiveness to spells and magical practices³⁸. Hence magic is the predominant function of attentiveness – it actuates things, people, as well as spaces which initially were absent. Gumbrecht searches for an explanation of what actuation is in the traditional theology of Eucharist, “in which Eucharist is a rhythm, magic thanks to which the real presence of God happens”³⁹. For what is Eucharist

³⁴See Król, Powrót do świata, 10.
³⁶See Gumbrecht, 49.
³⁸Gumbrecht, “Jak podchodzić do «poezji jako rodzaju uwagi»?”, 44.
if not a ritual for creating the genuine presence of God, His real actuation? It is clearly stated that the flesh and blood of Christ transform into substances in the “form” of wine and bread\(^{40}\). It is when the words “this is my body” are said when the real presence of God becomes a fact\(^{41}\).

A play of nuances between producing the “substance of contents”, i.e. imagination connected with a somatic reaction, and “form of contents”, which transforms imagination into knowledge and significance takes place here\(^{42}\). It is a reaction which allows the combination of psychosomatic experience with using consolidated meanings and conglomerating what happens before we think with the results of thinking. I think that the intensive experience of spatial attentiveness is powered by both these strategies. Perhaps this is what Król meant when she wrote that “the work of radical attentiveness is thus based also on the return to the lost simplicity of thought, and thus to the closeness of being”\(^{43}\).

Only a attentive subject, substantially co-present with heterotopic space which accentuates both its material aspect and “memories” of past times collected inside, can stand in the face of “the more substantial moments of imagination and past moments which appear as if conjured”\(^{44}\). What the reader and observer of space can contribute to its richness is not just “attentive openness to »Being« and imagination before they appeared”\(^{45}\), but also creative co-creation of space through various strategies: attentiveness practice, post-memory, memories, premonitions or fantasies.

Spatial attentiveness is about not detaching oneself from the world and striving not towards salvation, but towards fragmentary actuation of a place which reflects the materialized heterotopia in terms of its specificity and shape. Spatial experience means conscious detachment from the readiness-to-hand of the material surroundings, as well as an attempt at capturing the chance to allow a place to present any elements of the accumulated heterochronies. Attentiveness is a sort of sensitivity and focus on details, as well as the will to actively search for something hidden beneath traces left behind by a place; it is following a trail without belittling what actuates itself in that place.

The significance and meaning of space

Olsen writes that material things “do not just sit in silence waiting to be embodied with socially constituted meanings”\(^{46}\). Hence he is against the concept that objects and the world without man’s intervention – entities beyond our cognition – are in themselves deprived of meaning, and that they become meaningful only when they are incorporated into our society and intentions\(^{47}\). Baudrillard’s conviction that objects become signs, they are consumed as such, and

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\(^{41}\)Gumbrecht, “Użyteczność historii (ubezczanie i odkupienie)”, 123.

\(^{42}\)See Gumbrecht, “Jak podchodzić do «poezji jako rodzaju uwagi»?”, 48.

\(^{43}\)Król, *Powrót do świata*, 63.

\(^{44}\)Gumbrecht, “Jak podchodzić do «poezji jako rodzaju uwagi»?”, 50.

\(^{45}\)Gumbrecht, 50.

\(^{46}\)Olsen, *W obronie rzeczy*, 21. [page 10 of the English version]

\(^{47}\)Olsen, 61.
their essence is the sign’s value is an example of such a way of thinking. For spatial situations this would mean that any created senses would not be in the network of mutual relationship of intentionality of human subjects and the agency of non-human entities, but within a spatialized object. Fear accompanying one’s entrance to a ruined, dark basement would not be related to the smell of rotting, dead animals, tangibly damp walls, discomfort connected to its low ceiling, but to the game of associations with cultural texts and own experiences.

The conviction that materiality and reality are deprived of meaning without man’s intervention is the basis for this idea. They become meaningful only upon incorporation into some social context. This is why Olsen can write that “when we come across interior decorations, an outfit, a megalith or a landscape, we are confronted with the material mirroring of ourselves, and our social relationships. Olsen illustrates this idea with a very suggestive example borrowed from Glassi:

A German couple buy a carpet in the covered Bazaar in Istanbul. It becomes a souvenir of their trip to Turkey, a reminder of sun on the beach, and it becomes one element in the décor of their home, a part of the assembly that signals their taste. Their son saves it as a family heirloom. To him it means childhood. Germany replaces Turkey. The weaver’s memories of village life give way to memories of an aging psychiatrist in Munich for whom the carpet recalls a quiet moment when he lay upon it and marshaled his bright tin troops on a rainy afternoon. Then his son, finding the carpet worn, wads it into a bed for a dog, and his son, finding it tattered in his father’s estate, throws it out.

A trace of the country life, a souvenir from a trip or a childhood memory are ways of “reading” materiality, which on the one hand result from the conviction that reality can be treated as a text, and on the other – that reading depends on the reader and is created in the act of perception. Such an existence of an object and space has its origins in structuralism and poststructuralism, and is related to a conviction that “there is nothing beyond text”. It also encourages to combine the world with its textual representation. Thanks to that each element of a space is given formerly assigned signifiers which need to be decoded. Viewing places in such a way is based on de Saussure’s concept of the elements of significiant, whereas the material signifier can be characterized by stability, the signified is constantly created by subsequent acts of reading. If significiant’s role is to make it possible for the signifié as the only proper sense, then as a result we have the unusual disproportion between the material and the conceptual which leads to the reconstruction of the significiant; for while the signifié is constituted, its significiant disappears as an insignificant element. Despite the whole cognitive process which transforms the significiant into the signifié, the material remains present exactly as material – creating meanings does mean neutralizing elements of reality.

The concept described above does not take into consideration the distinctness of materiality or the fact that they possess some independence from the social life of people, “as anyone who has tried to walk a city, sail a boat, or assemble an IKEA bookshelf has experienced, things are

50Henry H. Glassie, Material Culture (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1999), 58. [page 49 of the English version of Olsen]
51See Olsen, W obronie rzeczy, 81.
not just submissive and plastic beings ready to embody our mental templates or the imperatives of our social wish images. Obviously we do not experience a city, home or landscape in the same way as we read a text. However, this does not mean that intellectual engagement in reading a text cannot be an element of the somatic experience of a space.

Treating the relationship between man and material cultural as an intellectual task close to a conscious reading of signs and texts reduces them to their non-material dimension and deprives them of their distinctiveness. Studying objects and places cannot lead only to uncovering “something more” and treating it as an incomplete representation of the past. Reality, physicality, corporeality, objectivity, and factuality are thus crucial here, which brings us closer to de Saussure’s concept of sign, which we can find in Aristotle’s idea. In Aristotle the concept of sign is based on the difference between the material signifier, which connotes the surface, and the non-material meaning conceptualized as depth. Aristotle combines substance understood as “that what is present, for it requires space” with form, which is “that through which the substance becomes observable”. There is no non-material meaning which releases itself from genesis materialized in the signifier, but giving it back its role allows us to get closer to the meaning. If only the combination of what needs place with what makes it possible to be visible offers the possibility to “bring our bodies closer”, then accepting the materiality of a place from which the form creates a somatic reaction to a real space cannot be ignored, as it would be in de Saussure’s theory of sign. A place marks through its substance and form.

In Produkcja obecności Gumbrecht takes advantage of the theory of sign which rehabilitates the material aspect of meaning, thus making the meaning present also in the material dimension. Presence does not first of all relate to temporal relationships with reality, but to spatial relations – “here” is more important than “now”. Being present means being touchable, and being touched (both physically and metaphorically). The word “production” which completes the title of the book refers to “releasing” an object into some space. However, the author does not mean producing, but rather various processes and events which lead to an increased influence on what is present on human bodies.

One of the tasks that Gumbrecht sets for himself is an attempt at introducing the effects of presence to humanities, dominated by interpretation and meaning, and enslaved by hermeneutics. Thus he decides to lead the reader through over a millennium of the Western culture, which traded presence for meaning. He sees the most vivid example of that cultural transformation of the perception of Eucharist between the catholic and protestant theology:

As a result of several dozen years of theological discussions, the protestant theology redefined the presence of the body and blood of Christ into references to their “meanings”. Gradually “is” in the sentence “this is my body” was supposed to be understood as “it means” or “it replaces” my body. The meaning of Christ’s body and blood referred to the last supper, but it was not supposed to reenact it.
For Gumbrecht that symbolic move from “it is” to “it means” becomes the demarcation line between two traditions, which is why he decides to inscribe the two discussed concepts into the dual typology of “the culture of meaning” and “the culture of presence”. However, it is impossible for just one type to appear, hence he advises to consider the ways in which those two models intertwine. Spatial situations are thus powered by both the effects of meaning and the effects of presence.

Gumbrecht claims that first of all, the mind is the original self-reference of man in the culture of meaning, whereas in the culture of presence it is the body. This means that, secondly, the external perception of self in reference to the world is juxtaposed with accepting one’s own body as an integral element of existence. Those observations allow consideration of a spatial situation in the arrangement of everyday life. However, that unequivocal reading problematizes the third point, in which Gumbrecht points out that in the culture of meaning knowledge is created in the act of interpreting the world, whereas in the culture of presence it is typically revealed – “it just happens”. What brings spatial situations closer to the presence-related conceptualization of knowledge is the fact that knowledge does not have an exclusively concept-like character, and that it appears as a ready substance which does not require interpretation understood as modifying the meaning. That discrepancy reminds the double-phased character of spatial experience, during which the initial exposure to the effects of a place which presents itself in its materiality by its own presence can be completed by an intellectual attempt at analyzing its elements and relating it to the existing cultural meanings. Hence the (very important) fourth point – a spatial relation can be constructed from two different concepts of a sign. In de Saussure’s culture of meaning we deal with the two-element sign which consists of the signifier and the signified. In the process of decoding a sign the material signifier is no longer of interest as soon as the signified is recognized. Presence operates on Aristotle’s definition of sign, according to which it connects substance and form. The combination of the thing that requires a place with what makes it visible makes it possible “for our bodies to be closer”. Accepting the materiality of a place which – even after the first, very somatic reaction to the real space – does not stop being interesting and is still present, allows to see substance and form in it. And that is the reason why – fifthly – spatial experience allows the writing of one’s own body into a wider order of instabilities of material things. The perception of the presence of what is foreign shows that continuity can be abruptly disrupted, that the sequence of events does not have to build a harmonious vision of the whole, an action, or – as Gumbrecht would like – “transformation” which assumes a collection of unchangeable qualities prone to improvement or beautification. The “action” of meaning is juxtaposed with the “magic” of presence understood as making the absent present (like two different spaces appearing in the same heterotopic place). And this is why – sixthly – for the culture of presence, space is the dimension where any relations are laid down in reality.

His seventh point is difficult to consider in the context of spatial situations, according to which in the culture of presence corporal relations can transform into the violence of bodies against other bodies. Violence is one of the terms that Gumbrecht redefines in *Produkcja obecności*, which is why it should be considered to be an irremovable element of any relation based on presence. In this sense violence understood as a direct physical impact of a corporal
form in a way approaches the conceptualization of interpersonal relations of existentialists who defined every attempt at a contact between two entities as an executioner-victim relation. On the other hand, the culture of meaning is characterized by permanent suspension of real violence and transforming it into power.

The topic of point eight is the term of situation or situationality, which in the culture of meaning is related to innovativeness and the effect of surprise – unpredictability of a sort. Gumbrecht seems to extend the category of situationality in such a way as to allow for the expected or even desired transformations. In other words, any lack of continuity related to the actuation of a situation “hits us” even when we do not expect it.

In the ninth point he discusses the official or everyday culture and its negation. In the culture of meaning games and fiction play that role, they introduce rules in lieu of the motivation of the participants of that process. In the culture of presence a carnival is the negative of everyday relations, as an exception which “proves to be full of chaos, contradicting and pointless elements”.

A spatial situation would thus be a quasi-magical ritual, which thanks to the physical presence of materiality in the form of a corporal subject and realist space allows the formalized substance of a place to become present only as a central part of a future situation. During a spatial situation a real, stratified presence is created, similar to a palimpsest. A spatial situation, although so strongly related to the culture of presence, is also powered by sign elements in the form of intellectual attentiveness and extra-material knowledge about places. What is only an experience of presence in its initial character can prove to contribute to further searches powered by the effects of meaning.

Presence is always marked by absence. Torn between existing and not existing, it is necessarily ephemeral, which means that in a culture which is mostly based on meaning, it can only exist in the form of “effects” of presence. It is thus impossible not to notice that presence and meaning appear together, and that there is always some tension between them. Again, this is Foucault’s “epoch of simultaneity, epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed”. Of course appearing together does not mean being complementary. We are immersed in the space of constant struggle and fighting over human activity by the two forces.

Similarly, to the case of the effects of presence which do not disappear under the pressure of meaning trying to annihilate material elements of reality, the physical presence is unable to extinguish the dimension of meaning. It is not about a stable structure of a pattern in which the meaning and presence appear next to and complement each other, but about the constant movement between the effects of presence and meaning which creates anxiety and – through its internal instability – provides the object of experience with a subversive quality. This means that spatial situa-

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60 Foucault, „Inne przestrzenie”, 117. English version by Jay Miskowiec.
61 Gumbrecht, *Produkcja obecności*, 123.
tions would not just be an example of “intensity moments”\textsuperscript{62}, in which Gumbrecht combines the quantitative surplus with temporal fragmentation and explains that these are moments which offer “a sense of a high level of functioning (…) of cognitive, emotional, and maybe even physical powers” instead of a message and knowledge, but they would also exist as their negative. Spatial situations which are “processes of extensiveness” are an attempt at fighting the effects of presence by the effects of meaning, a fleeting victory of cognitive functions, reasoning, associations, knowledge and intellect, as well as an occasion to build a message and learn something new through conceptual work. It is only the simultaneous duality of meaning and presence that reveals our true relationships with space. This sensible and inclusive position of Gumbrecht encourages the rethinking of the consequence created by the exclusive dominance of the Cartesian worldview.

And what about literature?

It is impossible to imagine humanities practices without interpretation. As an elementary and possibly inevitable intellectual practice it is crucial. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to propose such a network of concepts which would allow humanities to refer to reality in a more complex way than only through assigning meaning to the world\textsuperscript{63}. Hence it is no coincidence that in the subtitle to his book Gumbrecht indicates those humanities phenomena which are in no way “transferable” via meaning. The difficulties resulting from that revolutionary change in the way of thinking against which Gumbrecht warns us are related to accusations of philosophical naivety and non-scientificity of terms such as “substantialism”, “reality” or “Being”\textsuperscript{64}. How shall we then refer to the world differently?

Opening a new line in contemporary humanities in reference to literary studies would mean an attempt at answering questions concerning the existence of literature taking place without the issue of interpretation, but with its temporal suspension; about the possibility of knowledge that came to be not via an act of interpretation, but through the possible agreement between learning about the world through concepts and observing it with senses\textsuperscript{65}, or maybe even based on presence; about the materiality of communication and connecting the semantic complex with how it appears on a printed page; about using presence as an opportunity to form new terms and go beyond the tautological “something that is, is”\textsuperscript{66}.

In a way Gumbrecht encourages to view literature as – nomen omen – a space which, instead of abandoning and forgetting, tries to propose a relation with the world based on presence. Viewed in

\textsuperscript{62}In the concept of “intensity moments” we can see a clear influence of Merlay-Pinty. In experiencing things he saw a “full” corporal experience, which cannot be achieved via contemplation or “putting our everyday and complicated co-habitation with objects in brackets”, Olsen W obronie rzeczy, 204; Due to the physical similarity the human body involuntarily initiates direct relations with objects. Only body “can lead us to things, which themselves are not flat entities, but rather deep, inaccessible for the subject high above the world, open only to such a subject (…) which coexists with them in that world”, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Widzialne i niewidzialne, translated by Małgorzata Kowalska (Warszawa: Fundacja Aleitheia, 1996), 140, translated into English by PZ.

\textsuperscript{63}See Gumbrecht, 73.

\textsuperscript{64}See Gumbrecht, 73–74.

\textsuperscript{65}See Gumbrecht, 62–63.

\textsuperscript{66}See Gumbrecht, 12–13, 37.
this way, literature will be treated as a place where the effects of presence and the effects of meaning clash with each other. However, this is not everything, for the reception of literature (I do not use the term “reading” here on purpose) has to obey the same rules. Writing about literature is then naturally obliged to accept the aspect of presence, realizing itself through repetitions dictating the rhythm of writing and reading, intrusive (like the material presence) return to the same motifs, intertwining arranged argumentation with articulated intuition. A conventional story, the presence of analysis and interpretation and following narrative rules will sometimes have to give way to networks and constellations, a sense of being close or far away, simultaneity (even in the form of numerous attempts at reading the same text or multiple application of similar tools or concepts), and literature translations, contexts, references and motifs will bond repetitions and returns.

An attempt at a different reception of literature would be related to a temporary suspension of interpretation in favor of presence – difficult to capture and define, present only in “moments of intensity”. This would thus lead to an attempt at rooting art in substance whose form appears and disappears. In such a conceptualization literature would be close to fireworks exploding in the sky, which appear only to disappear a moment later. Literature understood as Adorno’s apparition is a phenomenon: if apparition means a flash, a fleeting touch, then the picture is a paradoxical attempt at capturing what is the least durable. Transcendence of a moment takes place in works of art⁶⁷. Commenting on Adorno’s aesthetics, Karol Sauerland stresses that the distinctness related to phenomenality rather than an image of art, every so often reaching the world of our imagination⁶⁸, still remains elusive, since it is only a premonition of the Non-existing.

The presence of spatial issues in literary studies, which are interdisciplinary by definition, has to be related to a view allowing a transfer of knowledge from the analysis of fictional or biographical places to the real space and experiencing it, as well as using spatial relations which take place both within and beyond literature⁶⁹. The dependence is thus mutual, although its complexity is not realized in a simple mutual exchange. A relation can take the form of refraction and treat literature as a prism⁷⁰, which transforms authentic places into a literary one, or assumes that specific places become a creative space which allows literary activity, or assume the complementary character of literature and space, and literature and place. Opening literature studies to such a perspective allows for a new and constructive reading of literature.

The spatial reflection of spatial situations is an attempt at creating concepts which give humanities a chance to refer to the world in a more complex way than by assigning meaning to it⁷¹. Hence we are talking about mechanisms that go beyond thinking of literature as “the other reality”, an autonomous form of life. It is about accepting the entity dependency of literature on materiality, not about reflecting an epoch and society in signs or the indissolubility

⁶⁷Theodor W. Adorno, “Ästetische Teorie”, in Gesammelte Schriften, t. 7 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 130; See also Karol Sauerland, “Kilka pojęć z estetyki Theodora W. Adorno” [a few concepts from Adorno’s aesthetics], translated into Polish by Wólkowicz, A., Miesięcznik Literacki, No 7 (1981): 52.
⁶⁸Sauerland, “Kilka pojęć z estetyki Theodora W. Adorno”, 53.
⁶⁹See postulates of spatial studies with the use of literary studies: Wójtowicz, Metamorfozy Pałacu Staszica, 186 i nast.
⁷⁰It is Robert Packard’s idea, see Elżbieta Rybicka, Geo poetyka: przestrzeń i miejsce we współczesnych teoriach i praktykach literackich [geopoetics: space and place in contemporary theories and literary practices] (Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych „Universitas”, 2014), 36.
⁷¹See Olsen, W obronie rzeczy, 73.
of aesthetics and social reality. Hence instead of the independence of an aesthetic experience, which is becoming the rule of the new form of collective life\textsuperscript{72}, we should look for a linkage of an aesthetic experience and its spatial and material basis.

Using the category of presence means not just abandoning the Cartesian division into the subject of cognition and the cognizable reality, but also resigning from being closed by the problems of language, narration and the autonomy of the represented world. Accepting the material and spatial reality which is present before a work of literature, accompanying its creation and reception, permits the formation of fresh and inspiring theses. Such suggestions can be found in Paweł Tomczok’s excellent paper, \textit{Realność pośrednika}\textsuperscript{73} [The reality of a mediator], whose main goal is to present alternative proposals to current narrative studies. Tomczok aims at changing the mentalistic paradigm to a realist model which offers a new theory of storytelling, taking into account the important role of objects co-creating narration. Alienating materiality during reading makes literature detached from reality and closed in a system governed by its own rules\textsuperscript{74}.

Tomczok wants literary studies to consider the “dummy-like” character of the represented world of every work of literature, as well as the hidden materiality or corporeality of the narrator, making itself present on the basis of Heidegger’s secrecy. His proposal thus supports reading literature to be understood as participating in situations of spatial attentiveness proposed by it, as for a scholar such a space and its potential for situational openings are real, and so is the narrator and shaping attentiveness of someone who deals with a model of the real world.

Allowing for literature’s ways to refer to the world in another way than via meaning – and hence introducing on the stage of literary studies concepts unequivocally implying materiality and presence to appear in philological reflection – does not have to mean philosophical naivety. An attempt at introducing being, presence, agency of non-human entities, or finally spatial situations combining those categories to literature studies, implying the possibility of returning to Aristotle’s substance\textsuperscript{75}, has a chance to lead to a theoretical breakthrough, which will allow better understanding and experience of the network of dependencies between literature and everything that surrounds it.

translated by Paulina Zagórska

\textsuperscript{72}On the subject of the relationship between aesthetics and social reality and literature as “symptomatology of society, opposing the noise and illusion of the public sphere”, see Jacques Rancière, \textit{Dzielenie postrzegalnego: estetyka i polityka} [The Politics of Aesthetics], edited by Magda Pustoła i Kuba Mikurda, translated by Maciej Krońiwnicki and Jan Sowa (Kraków: Korporacja Ha!art, 2007), 50–98.


\textsuperscript{74}See Tomczok, 21.

\textsuperscript{75}See Gumbrecht, \textit{Produkcja obecności}, 73–74, 96.
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KEYWORDS

heterotopicity of space

spatial situations of literature

ABSTRACT:
The paper discusses the category of spatial situation – a specific experience of the human subject based on the concept of attentiveness, which is located in a specific geographic location, shares that location with a place accumulating heterochrony and is subject to the agency of matter. The term is considered in the light of Michel Foucault’s heterotopia, the return to materiality of Bjørnar Olsen and the culture of meaning and culture of presence of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht.
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