Fakes of reality. Do we really need the paradigm of the documentary? From the ontology to the epistemology of movie images, i.e. there and back again


The starting point for this paper is the statement that we are witnessing a “mock-documentary boom” in contemporary cinema. Viewers today can be surprised and confused by the variety of “intercrossings” that are used in documentary and fictional strategies. The fact that there has been a growing number of films that do not respect the traditional division between fictional and non-functional cinema deserves deeper consideration. The introduction of the paper is focused on historical sources and classifications of this complex phenomenon (for example: the brothers Lumière tradition contrasts with that of Méliès). The main body of the paper is concentrated on the question of what cinema can offer in lieu of a documentary paradigm. It also tries to explore ontological and epistemological perspectives which can clarify some of the reasons for the popularity of mock-documentary and docufiction productions. It ends with a suggestion that the cinema is a domain of fakes of reality regardless of whether fictional or non-fictional narration is used to tell their stories.

**Keywords:** mock-dokumentary, docufiction, contemporary cinema, ontology of cinema, epistemology of cinema

The modern fact is that we no longer believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film.[1]

Gilles Deleuze

Present artistic practices question the classical division between non-fiction and fiction cinema so strongly and broadly that we cannot ignore the position and the scale of this phenomenon. We have been observing a generative boom in the mock-documentary and docufiction[2] productions, though the practice itself is not a new one.

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As I will try to prove, it has existed in cinema for ages, though, in reality, it did not get its name till the 1980s.[3] The modern viewer is surprised and confused about the variety of “intercrossings” which are used in documentary and fictional strategies. The first mode features a blending of historical, documentary and comedy elements, such as in Żelig (1983) and Jara Cimrman lying, sleeping (1983, original title: Jára Cimrman leží, spící). One of the most interesting tendencies here is the mock-documentary, which tells the audience alternative versions of history, including Opération lune (2002) and C.S.A.: The Confederate States of America (2004). Within this group, I would like to emphasise Death of President (2006) and Interview with the makers of The Death of President (2006). The second mode of mock-documentary narration combines biographical elements and documentary techniques with a comedy impact. Both the status of biographical connections to real persons and the dominance of parody can be distinguished in such films as Take the Money and Run (1969), All You Need Is Cash (1978, also known as The Rules), This is Spinal Tap (1984), Fear of the Black Hat (1993), A Mighty Wind (2003) or Year of the Devil (Rok dábla, 2002), and Exit Through the Gift Shop (2010). The third strategy is based on showing and uncovering the “cinematographic apparatus”. I would particularly like to distinguish this tendency in the documentary. Such a self-centred formula is present in an exceptional precursor film: Man with Camera (Chelovek s kino-apparatom, 1929) by Dziga Vertov. The comedy factor in this film is not as important as questions about the ‘montage eye’ and the new cinematographic way of seeing the world, but we cannot forget about Vertov’s play with the camera. There are a few modern productions worth mentioning which can move the viewer and change their perceiving habits. These include Incident at Loch Ness (2004), Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (2006) and The Reunion (2011). In films of this kind, we also find realisations with different artistic qualities. Apart from the document-stylized parody Jesus F Trotsky Presents (2012), there are also films which ask important questions about the role of the film as a medium. Petr Zelenka’s The Brothers Karamazov (original title: Karamazovi, 2008), de facto poses questions about the relation between life and the art. Although I have listed three currents as the dominant ones, we can potentially mix all of these strategies and techniques in docufiction cinema. In each of these tendencies, we can consider film as a parody, criticism and deconstruction.[4]

The variety of moods and the subject area of the mock-documentary can be found in some Polish titles,[5] but in my paper I would like some techniques are “friendly” but for other are not. See J. Roscoe, C. Hight, Faking it: Mock-documentary and the Subversion of Factuality, Manchester 1998. See B. Kosińska-Krippner, op. cit.

[4] I agree that we can research a construction of audiovisual text using for example neoformal methodology, but intentions of director and models of viewers are not so “obvious fact” and there are depended more on our interpretation. For one audience Kieślowski’s works: Pierwsza miłość, 1974, Życio-
to mention only two such films which appeared recently, because they represent two opposite poles: *Nawet nie wiesz, jak bardzo Cię kocham*, 2016 and *Szkoła uwodzenia Czesława M.*, 2016. Paweł Łoziński’s film guides viewers towards the psychodrama, the starting point for which is a documentary style. We witness the therapeutic sessions of mother and her daughter, tied up in a toxic relationship. The final revelation that the woman is not the girl’s real mother, and that the daughter has no relation to this mother, causes the audience to feel deceived. Aleksander Dembski in his *Szkoła uwodzenia Czesława M.*, on the other hand, works in the opposite way, as it uses fiction as a starting point, and offers us comedy which teases us with supposititious references to an authentic singer Czesław Mozil, who plays himself.

This inventory is not exhaustive, but even from this draft set we can notice a striking variety of shades of mock-documentary and possible flirts with this strategy. It is this characteristic that makes feature films, short films and series mixing fiction and reality so popular now, no longer limited to specific generic and stylistic hybrid titbits.

Documentary and quasi-documentary practices are also being introduced to fictional cinema, while fictional production techniques being applied in documentary cinema encourage a twofold reflection. On the one hand, we can pose questions concerning genealogy, and try to define the mock-documentary and establish the boundaries within this sub-genre. What are the sources and potential results of the docufiction avalanche in cinematic and audiovisual culture? If documentary filmmakers blur these boundaries themselves, maybe it is necessary to reject the documentary paradigm. Is cinema just a fake version of the domain of reality, no matter if narrated by means of fictional or non-fictional cinematic conventions? On the other hand, we also face philosophical issues. Is there any sense in asserting the meaning and the role of the documentary in a world of ‘post-truth’? How to defend against fake journalists who make up images from wars or recording-mystifications of death sentences? Finally, coming back to the epigraph of the article and the Deleuze’s words: what can we do if the world merely resembles a mediocre film? How should we live if the events we experience, ones as fundamental as love and death, seem only to imitate film plates, clichés and stereotypes? Are we indifferent to the distinction between fiction and reality?

As far as the approaches of various cinema theoreticians are concerned, films which do not respect the traditional division between fiction and non-fiction are a kind of unwanted child. It is obvious that at the beginning of cinematography such interusions took place; classical typologies, however, take great pains to draw a line between the Lumière brothers and Méliès. They also try to contrast films based on facts from

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*There and back again: documentary tendencies and the mock-documentary as the unwanted child of cinematography*

feature films that create a fictional world. Was it consistent enough? Was it effective? According to Siegfried Kracauer in his *Theory of Film*, Lumière is presented as a “strict realist”, while Méliès “gave free rein to his artistic imagination” and, as Kracauer adds: “The films they made embody, so to speak, the thesis and antithesis in Hegelian sense.”[6] Frankly speaking, attempts at establishing a photographic pedigree for realistic and creative tendencies did not explain much; moreover, they signalled the problem of overlaps between documentary and fictional perspectives (as Hegel teaches: The thesis and antithesis always produce a synthesis). An analysis of *Teasing The Gardener* (L’Arroseur Arrosé, 1895), which is evidently shaped to highlight conclusions about realistic and formative tendencies, can be seen in this context:

This film, the germ cell and archetype of all film comedies to come, represented an imaginative attempt on the part of Lumière to develop photography into a means of story telling. Yet the story was just real-life incident. And it was precisely its photographic veracity which made Maxim Gorki undergo a shock-like experience. “You think”, he wrote about *Teasing The Gardener*, “the spray is going to hit you too, and instinctively shrink back”[7].

The “photographic veracity” of this work – which is so emphasised by Kracauer – could be quite easily questioned when we observe the staging and actors playing in this scene. The prankster who sprayed water on the gardener ‘must’ be punished, but only when the man takes him to the front of a heavy camera. The boy’s final bow, with his eyes fixed on the lens, demystifies the realistic tendency as a prepared show; although this movie was supposed to present itself to the audience as a quasi-documentary. Having been mixed with creation, the standard realistic line falls to pieces right at the dawn of cinematography. If theoreticians want to search for the first production of the mock-documentary style, I would suggest considering this very film as a prototype.

Grierson’s text devoted to the *Moana* (1926) by Flaherty published in the *New York Sun*[8] is considered to be the *locus classicus* of the term: ‘documentary film’. The intention of this definition is apparently to separate documentary movies from other filmic registrations that were based on realistic materials. Against this background, we should single out *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929) by Dziga Vertov. This movie, which could be a perfect answer to Grierson’s definition, includes a strong intention: an interpretation which explicitly makes use of editing. The dynamic montage combines the beat of mechanical and organic elements and a visual rhythm of light and darkness. The variable cadence of the flowing and cutting of images looks like a pure pulse of matter. This esthetical mastery of images is strictly linked with

a basic aim: “avoiding getting lost in the chaos of life and realising the situation the camera was put into”.[9] Paradoxically, Vertov is accused of subjectivity although his movie is far more objective than each film which imitates human perception and is based on a long take from one point of view. Vertov collapses a maximum number of points of views and diverse perspectives. Although he proposes here a very original and extremely cutting-edge notion of objectivity, which was complementary with Bergsonian materialism,[10] Man with a Movie Camera was not proclaimed the prototype of documentaries.

A common-sense feeling of objectivism took over. L’Arrivée d’un train a la Ciotat (1895), a mystified legend about people running away from the screen, passed into history as the starting point for the documentary and the cinema in general.[11] Vertov’s masterpiece was placed aside in the area of artistic experiment, though this was not the author’s intention. For the ‘montage seeing’, the supreme value is the authenticity of life experienced here and now. Today, this film strikes the viewer with the abundance of documentary recordings, which portray that age in an excellent way. It is hard to deny Lev Manovich’s opinion: the short takes which build Vertov’s movie become a collection of data about a world which has passed away.[12] Vertov discovered that our world is neither coherent nor based on continuity – we live in many worlds simultaneously. If we want to make visible this plurality, conflicting perspectives and multiple points of view, it is not necessary to remove the boundaries between these different worlds. In one screen, the director allows various spaces and layers to overlap, proving that they do not have to match as far as their scale and lighting are concerned. He does not want to hide these levels; he wants to expose them. It is only by virtue of the convention that we regard simultaneous montage to be more credible than montage in the image.

Any attempt to define the documentary movie posed problems right from the very beginning of cinematography, let alone defining it in later periods. Mirosław Przylipiak in his Poetica of Documentary Cinema shows clearly how the subsequent strands and artistic practices called for continual rethinking of the documentary paradigm. Nowadays, the idea of making a list of different definitions, and attempting to build one’s own definition of the subject matter,[13] appears to be more of a ready tool for deconstruction. Even with the best intentions, documentary cinema seems to have spread into hybrid and border forms. Against this background, appeals for ethical behaviour from


filmmakers, and not offending viewers’ beliefs, seem, not only ineffective, but also clearly show traditional film theoreticians’ powerlessness. In this context, we should consider rejecting the division into fictional and non-fictional movies. Perhaps we should agree to the fact that we are currently in an era of cinema of attractions, in which neither ethical nor genealogic rules are obeyed. ‘Anything goes’ used to be an attraction used only to shock audiences and bring commercial success.

Tom Gunning in “The Cinema of Attraction[s]: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde”, in referring to his own research about early cinema while cooperating with André Gaudreault, questions the split between the “Lumière tradition” and the “Méliès tradition”:

Whatever differences one might find between Lumière and Méliès, they should not represent the opposition between narrative and non-narrative filmmaking, at least as it is understood today. Rather, one can unite them in a conception that the cinema is seen less as a way of telling stories than as a way of presenting a series of views to the audience fascinated because of their illusory power (the realistic illusion of motion offered to the first audience by Lumière or the magical illusion concocted by Méliès), and exoticism.[14]

In other words, this conceptual and historical twist, made during the FIAF congress in Brighton 1978, is based on the conviction that the act of showing and exhibiting links the films to the year 1906. In this context, both actuality and non-actuality filming can be described by one term: the cinema of attractions – as opposed to the later developed voyeuristic narration based on the story. Thus, Gunning offers modes of narration which could include, and, initially seem to do so, both documentary and non-documentary film. In practice, however, they focused only on the fictional movie. The film historian highlights that this decision resulted from organisational issues and an overload of productions which were not archived. The possibility of combining the documentary and non-documentary movie into one common historiographical theory is somehow left to be discussed later. However, another article by Gunning, where he analyses early non-fiction films and the aesthetics of the ‘view’,[15] is symptomatic. He asserts:

I separate the view, which is descriptive and based on the act of looking at something, from a documentary film as a rhetorical and discursive form, which anchors the images in some argumentative and dramatic structure.[16]

The author quotes Charles Musser’s thesis concerning a discursive order of early film-views from the time of the First World War[17], as well as Nicholas Hiley’s results of research presented during a workshop in Amsterdam, when he argued that the aerial photos in

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[15] T. Gunning, Przed filmem dokumentalnym...
the film *Zeppelin Attack on England*, 1914–15 were taken before the war, and the damage, allegedly caused by the attacks of jet fighters, were brought on by the gunfire from ships[18]. Of course, that practice is not as surprising for me as Gunning’s conclusions. In his paper, we can find that: “a documentary movie emphasises its accuracy and plausibility, since the authenticity of the imagery becomes the part of its reasoning.”[19] The definition constructed in this way clouds more than it clarifies. The author almost casually finds: “Perceiving it in this way, the problem of falsification of evidence, as in *Zeppelin Attack on England* does not appear in the ‘view’, because all manipulations exist here only to make the film more spectacular.”[20] But what should we do if the pretended authenticity becomes part of the argument of the film? Is it enough to change the category of the film from ‘views’ to the ‘cinema of attractions’? Gunning’s definition is hardly satisfying. What instantiation should check the authenticity of images? As viewers, we are defenceless against the suggested truthfulness of the images, the origin and recording time of which we cannot check and confirm. The relationship between a documentary cinema of attractions and the documentary of peeping gives us no chance to dispel existing doubts, especially when it refers to the traditional ontology, as in Gunning’s case. Is the modern filmic *fakenews* just a view of the world in which deception serves to make the news more attractive?

Gunning’s concept has become widely adopted, also outside the field of the early cinema, ranging from the films of the Lumière brothers to *Matrix, 1999* by Andy and Larry Wachowsky.[21] Many researchers have claimed that fictional cinema, after this first attractions boom, went through a classical voyeuristic period with strong narrative power, but today, in the post-classical era, it looks as if mainstream cinema is going to return to “attractions” as a dominant strategy.[22] Virtual reality spaces in *Matrix, Gaurdians of the Galaxy* (2014) or *Spider-Man* (in many filmic variants) represent the same tendency: a post-narrative episode structure, which is not based on storytelling or the psychological construction of characters, but on tricks, effects, a parade of new technology and a variety of audio and optical impetuses, the aim of which is to produce a spectacular show. Therefore, analogously, non-fiction film, after a phase of showing ‘views’ based on a purely visual side, may have gone through a phase of peeping into reality, only to pursue the cinema of attractions again today.

The mock-documentary cinema of attractions emphasises the magnetism (between fiction and non-fiction) of the shown spectacle. In commercial productions, attractiveness is built by monstruation and visual shock, aesthetic astonishment, but also pulling back the curtains, even if there are other layers of mystification behind them. In non-commercial trends, a visual pleasure and existential satisfaction is taken from recording views of everything that is visible while eating, walking, driving, etc., paying special attention to capture images of yourself everywhere (at work, at the party, on vacation or even in the bed during a sexual act). Everybody has a camera in their phone; everybody has the possibility to make their own film almost whenever they choose.

At first glance, the answer could look like a banality. We just need proof that the world exists. André Bazin speaks of a reflection on humanity’s psychological, and indeed ethical, obsession in the arts with depicting reality. As time evolved, so did the means of artistically (or not artistically) replicating reality. There is the same desire at the base of this phenomenon: from cave drawings, to mummification, engraving, painting, photography, and to its (thus far) most convincing form, cinema. In the task of duplicating reality, cinema has surpassed all other forms of representation (mimesis). This thesis is rooted in a traditional ontology, and it could be discussed from different theoretical perspectives. Donato Totato writes:

Much of the confusion concerning Bazin’s writings – and indeed a major concern in the canon of film theory – is traceable to the relationship between the filmed image and its life counterpart. How does Bazin explain this relationship? He describes it in the following terms: 1) “The photographic image is “a kind of decal or transfer”; 2) “The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it”; 3) Photography embalms time; 4) “The photograph as such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint”; 5) “In no sense is it the image of an object or persons, more correctly it is its tracing”; 6) “The photograph proceeds … to the taking of a veritable luminous impression in light – to a mold. As such it carries with it more than mere resemblance, namely a kind of identity …”; 7) “The cinema … makes an imprint of the duration of the object.” The words Bazin uses are essentially synonyms: decal, transfer, fingerprint, tracing, mold, imprint. The reverberations suggest a quasi-mystical relationship between the subject and its photographic double.[23]

These imprinted light-sensitive tapes were, in Bazin’s essays, the proof. Although the aim of contemporary audiovisual culture is the same, images among us are quite different. Archiving digital data like images and films lost their materiality – they are not material objects any

more, but rather, virtual events. Images appear for a moment. It is just like with our world, in which images appear in front of our eyes only for an instance; and though we would like to stop this permanent movement and somehow capture it; it is impossible to keep it forever. Employing and developing the artistic form in the cinematographic history, Bazin divides all directors (between the years 1920 to 1940) into two groups: those who base their integrity in the image (the imagists) and those who base their integrity in reality (the realists). The directors who believe in the power of images belong to two different camps, the ones setting scenes with the plastics (lighting, decor, composition, acting) and others working with editing (the montagists). According to the French film critic, a realist filmmaker does not distort time or space, but attempts to depict true reality without his expressions, because:

Expressive editing invents meaning through juxtaposition of the images and not through the images themselves. This is trickery; it removes the freedom on the part of the spectator to select and remove, by themselves, any existential ambiguity which might be present in the scene. Therefore, it is not true to reality, either spatial, temporal, or moral.\[24\]

We should not forget that this division between two camps descends from the same platonic tradition, which splits the original and the copy, the object and the images of the object. In this section, I will not lay out Bazin’s fruitful discussion of the historical evolution of film style. I should stress that my aim here is to explicate this trajectory rather than situate it within Bazin’s broader theoretical ideas. The “pure” realism he postulates needs spatial integrity, depth of field, and the long take mise-en-scène. But who knows if this space is really built as a continuity or if it is a category constructed by our perception. Can we feel and consider our life in time only in a chronological way? Or does time exist even deeper? On the contrary, I think that not only can the cinema never totally duplicate the viewing process – physiologically and psychologically – but we should also notice how crucial our presuppositions about special and temporal category are as well. We can also consider Vertov’s assumption that the world is a chaos of images. He does not offer ready schemes and the same pattern that could be seen in his films. Editing is not only linking or building a narrative totality, but also cutting, which can be used as an invitation to constructing the senses by spectators who can make an effort to find explications, which are not instantly obvious. In my opinion, Man with a Move Camera by Vertov destroys Bazin’s concept from the inside. The former being caught in the trappings of his ontology or meaningless formal articulations. “True realism” by Vertov shows that there are different ways of countering this problem, or more precisely, both problems: reality and freedom.

In contrast with Bazin’s “myth” of reality there is Gilles Deleuze’s cinema philosophy. He questions a commonplace representation of the world and a traditional commonsense metaphysics. His ontology postulates that each object consists of an uncountable number of images. It does not imply an all-out attack of simulacrum. His clear understanding: the world comes to us as light, as energy, as images. We are images among images. When he makes a commentary on Bergson, he emphasis the identity of the image and movement: “The movement-image and flowing-matter are strictly the same thing.”[25] He explains: “There is no moving body [mobile] which is distinct from executed movement. There is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is universal variation.”[26] Our reality, in this context, can be expressed in an almost mathematical simple formula: movement+time=images. Deleuze, contrary to Bazin, claims:

It is not the same as the other arts, which aim rather at something unreal through the Word, but makes the Word itself something unreal or a tale [récit]. With the cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image, and not the image which becomes world.[27]

Images in the cinema and images in the world have not got a different “nature”. The main variation between the cinema and the area outside an auditorium is the reactions evoked. When we are in front of the screen, we only contemplate a stream of images, but when we are in our own life we have to act and react, respond to images. We should notice, however, that the cinematic situation has a great advantage. In our world, we are always limited by our central position. In our perception, our position is strictly established: we can see only from one point of view, from our time and place. In the cinema, just because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which are made will not prevent it from leaving the path of natural perception. Broadly speaking, this would be the opposite of what phenomenology puts forward. It is freedom which gives the possibility of observing various corners of the world: experiences that are not available for us, men and women who have dissimilar opinions: The cinema can open up for us a plurality of sundry points of view. Even if somebody does not feel persuaded to Deleuze’s metaphysics based on a chaos of images, I would suggest analysing what it offers to us. The more we do not believe in what happened to us all, the more we want to shoot photos which could call to mind: it really happened; but this is not the proper way. How can we believe in love, death, the world, which appears to be a bad film? Deleuze’s answer is: let’s go to the cinema to watch a good film. Is this an irony? His answer sounds paradoxical. However, Deleuze unites the philosopher and film-fan passion. What does a good film mean? His definition is simple:

[27] Ibidem.
the good audiovisual text moves us and pushes to think: from percept to concept. Deleuze agrees absolutely with Heidegger, saying, that man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. The possibility itself, however, is no guarantee that we are capable of thinking.

The cinema can steal thoughts, but it can also stimulate them. Both tendencies, fiction cinema which looks like a documentary, and non-fiction cinema which is supposed to present real events but uses fictional strategies, can provoke us into mental activity, provoke us to think about the crux of the matter: the relationship between ourselves and reality. Against this philosophical background, the mock-documentary is not an unwanted child who was born together with cinematographic birth. It is not a dirty mark on the surface of a pure documentary cinema. Filmic fakes of reality uncover that images are comparable. In real life (and in the cinema) we (and images) have a fictional and a non-functional side. In this perspective, docu-fictional hybrids acquire significance. This is a constantly growing phenomenon, and is major for two reasons. Firstly, they directly uncover how problematic reality and truth are. They provoke us to consider and reconsider reality. Instead of automatically taking the commonsense opinion, we can find what is important for ourselves: in life and in the cinema. Secondly, at the beginning the historical construction/re-construction or even deconstruction of the documentary paradigm, it was shown that the theory is merely a utopian dream about an accurate network of notions which describes all varieties of reality. Although we are casting the net, using Deleuze's metaphor, into the ocean, it shows that whales are also swimming through its huge mesh. Finally, we should agree that artistic practices and life itself have precedence over theory.

Deleuze indicates, and once again let's follow the tracks of his concept, that the weakness of the theory and the powerlessness of our thinking could be turned into an asset. He reasons that we need a restoring belief more than knowledge: "Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link."[28] In this context, we should be rather afraid of people who know for sure, especially if they want to impose their one and only truth. He emphasises:

Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reason to believe in this world. It is the whole transformation of belief. It was already a great turning-point in philosophy, from Pascal to Nietzsche: to replace the model of knowledge with belief.[29]

But, importantly, he separates from this desiderata believing in another world, or in a transformed world. The philosopher writes: "If cinema shows to us the powerlessness of our thought we should believe. Believe, not in a different world, but in a link between the man and the world, in love or life, believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable."

In this context, the thought is not a theory region, but a problem of life. Our thinking should not be concentrated on the essence, but on choices and making decisions. We have to draw a line between what is important and what is not. According this point of view, we do not really need the paradigm of the documentary but rather a new paradigm of fiction. The condition of cinema has only one equivalent, not imaginary participation in a fictional or non-functional world, but the rain when we leave the auditorium. The moment when we are leaving the cinema is the most important. According to Deleuze, it is a totally metaphysical switch. We should celebrate it when we come back to our everyday world. Having finished watching the film Nawet nie wiesz jak bardzo Cię kocham by Łoziński, I still have women’s portraits in front of my eyes. The camera was going into their relationship so closely: love-hate bound in one strong knot of suffering and pain. The lens investigates each wiggle, each tear, each wince on their faces. I thought that it was so good that the director was looking for the truth of all of these kinds of toxic relationships, but he protected real people. I agree with Deleuze that we are fakes of reality in the everyday world and in the cinema also, but that we need belief in this world, where an ethical perspective is still important.

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