Play it again – redundancy, literature and language games


The problem under consideration has its origin in the phenomenon of gameplay, which intersperses the rules and possible freedom of execution. The tensions between habit and surprise, regularity and irregularity created in this way expose the potential that lies in the grammatical conditions of the language use. The phenomenon of redundancy, considered in the context of a language game, can be presented in at least three ways: 1. redundancy as a non-game, 2. redundancy as a game – a struggle, 3. redundancy as a game – cooperation. In the latter approach, the recipient is invited to search for ambiguity, to take pleasure in activating non-obvious orders of literary expression. The article presents two very different examples of how redundancy functions in literary texts - a poem by Krystyna Miłobędzka and a short story by Janusz Rudnicki.

KEYWORDS: game, language game, redundancy, grammar

In racing games one voluntarily goes all round the track in an effort to arrive at the finish line instead of ‘sensibly’ cutting straight across the infield[1]

The tension between the convention and the creation is almost immediately apparent when we take a look at games. On the one hand, there is a set of pre-determined rules, while on the other, there is this idea that participation in the game results from the need to have fun, relax and feel free. On the other, we know how to achieve the objective set in the game faster, easier and in a more effective way. When the two worlds overlap, the real world and the game world, the temptation of functionalisation or optimisation is becoming quite huge.

Nevertheless, let us assume that we choose to play, voluntarily accepting the fact that the game is accompanied by a certain set of rules that is its immanent component. This acceptance allows for participation (each participant knows the same rules), a specific temporal and spatial distinction (the rules impose the boundaries), and comparison of initiation and proficiency levels. Watching the game makes it possible for the uninitiated ones to reconstruct the set, whereas the repetitive nature of the game will make it possible to distinguish an intentional violation from a mistake or error. Therefore, the essence

of the matter seems not to be the non-violation of the set of rules, but rather being aware of how the mechanism works. Proficiency, a good knowledge of rules and patterns open the door to exploration and crossing boundaries, while not destroying the fun for the player or for others. Hence, fun is derived not only from the participation itself but from some sort of uncertainty, as described by R. Caillios: “An outcome known in advance, with no possibility of error or surprise, clearly leading to an inescapable result, is incompatible with the nature of play. Constant and unpredictable definitions of the situation are necessary.”[2]

Games and rules

Let us look at this situation from a slightly different perspective – perhaps a surprising one. Describing the game mechanism and the essence of the term “game” is a specific linguistic task. First of all, the translation process is naturally present in the practice of describing, yet we do not deal here with translation into another, by default limited, inventory of items and the way the items are linked (simply – another language). The design of the description consists of a negotiated (with respect to the recipient and their perceptual potential) test of an alternative articulation which is being built in view of omitting terms that are inaccessible to the recipient (or, by definition, too outright for them). At the same time, this is still a linguistic practice that is pursued in tension towards the original text, whether expressed or not, whose information value is reduced to certain relevant assumptions.

The above situation is typical of everyday conversations, in each case of relativising messages by the sender depending on the presumed communication effects. With such a way of thinking we could come back to playing, since if we assume (anticipating the reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea) that language use is also some kind of a game, we are faced with the need to clarify this (non-new) analogy, and later (and this will be something new) refer to language games in the context of an unapparent, literary redundancy.

However, before this is done, we will need to consider one of the basic linguistic phenomena, that is, grammar. The idealist assumption that a language user would carry out further creative tasks on the basis of certain components of the lexicon and the rules for linking them (and, in doing so, they would bear all the responsibility for the texts produced as predictable in use – which would, to a certain extent, bring the idea of Laplace’s demon)[3] could bring about a reflection that grammatical rules guarantee the reproducibility of texts under comparable

[3] In view of such an idealisation, we would have a model that is in line with the concept developed by P.S. de Laplace, according to which the essence that knows all the initial values and the possible forces affecting all the elementary particles could precisely define the future, i.e. anticipate all the consequences of any subsequent action in such a system. “We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situa-
communication conditions, which at the same time leads to the idea of treating grammar itself as external to the objectified situation of the mechanism that is triggered to reflect the intentions of the participants in the communication.

The reflection on the autonomy of grammar already provides us with a fair basis to firmly refer to people who intensively analysed both the problem of a (language) game and the rules that apply to such game. Almost all of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* focuses on a discussion of observations and hypotheses related to the use of language. These, in turn, relate to a game, because, according to the assumptions put forward by the philosopher, “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”[4]

Naturally, the question about the rules is immediately prompted (in a surprisingly simple view) of a game understood in such a way. In fact, if we are dealing with a way of life, then activity in the course of life will intuitively lead us toward (social) rules, and these in turn allow us to think in a normative perspective. Therefore, we mean the rules that completely and without exception ‘sort out’ language practice, which often grammar is suspected of. This is also the case with the semantic value of language components (in particular, with words). Wittgenstein draws attention in this context to ideal understanding, which also applies to the term “game” – the idea of the perfect category limits our inclination to negotiate the use, so we are prepared (according to the philosopher) to undermine the fact that we are dealing with a game. In fact, the presumption is that a game should have rules without exceptions, and, in addition, cover all possible variants of the game.

Hence, can we still have grammar in mind at this point? We believe that we can, because it is the autonomy of grammar that distinguishes Wittgenstein’s way of thinking about language and its uses. When analysing the grammatical aspects of *Philosophical Investigations*, Maciej Soin says: “The belief that grammar is autonomous, expressed in the form of a statement could read as follows: language and its rules are part of the contingency sphere meaning that “grammatical structures” are not defined by the structure of the “world.”[5]

In the subsequent stage of the discussion, the author points out that

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in rejecting the restrictive imposition of the definition on what a person experiences and describes, “the harmony between a thought and reality is a work of grammar.”[6] The conclusion is that we are dealing with a complex process which, to some extent, involves negotiating a description on the basis of grammar, which in turn is not a closed and absolute set of rules but rather a method of including in a language what is subject to a description of a given situation. The most important thing in this context is that a language game (to which we will return in a moment) engages the participants on the basis of rules that do not define the values of the messages transmitted, which do not verify their adherence to the essentially conceived meaning, and that do not block their potential in the context of reproducible communication patterns. The dynamics of linguistic creativity (also in typical situations) remain in a multi-factor relationship with grammatical rules, but these define the terms of the negotiation (language game parameters) rather than the design models of texts together with their reception strategies.

Let us take a moment to focus on the meaning of a “language game”. If we assume that the act of defining entails a temptation to exhaust the meaning of the term, it would be better to settle for an ostensive exemplification, out of which various aspects of the game understood by the author of the Investigations…[7] would emerge. A similar aspect of how a “language game” is understood is highlighted by Günter Abel, a scholar of interpretativeness. He says: “Someone who asks: ’How do you define a language game?’ or asks me: ’Please define a language game’, shows that they have not yet understood the philosophically and linguistically relevant punchline. You could reply: ’Please define «defining of a language game» first’. Or: ’How do you define «defining of a language game»?’ And ad infinitum. It will quickly become clear that we will not move forward in this way. At a certain point, the meaning of a sign (not: yet “to be defined”) must be accepted […]”[8] At this point, it would be best to accept that the socially negotiated periphrases to a greater extent determine the ways of thinking about basic phenomena (understood rather as informality in the broad sense) than definitions understood as a deliberate clarification of the meaning of categories. In the case of a language game, this also has an important metaphysical aspect. It is not the case that such a game can be explained without conceptual consequences by semantically simpler (or more precise) terms. In this way, we would prove that the concept of a language game is restricted by a conventional and reduced gesture of simplified categorisation. It should be enough for us here to see the

[7] M. Soin says: “The term «language game» has […] at least three meanings: as a form of language learning by a child, as a fictional situation the presentation of which casts light on the uses of language, and finally as part of the actual language practice […]”. Ibidem, p. 78.
similarities; that is Wittgenstein’s way of observing phenomena which have something common with each other.[9]

On this basis, we will now try to consider the relationship between a game and redundancy, with the conviction that this will allow us to look at redundancy in literature. Consequently, we adopt the hypothesis that, thanks to literary texts, we can capture the unapparent activity of grammar and its peculiar mechanics, which provides the basis for language games, including those that are shared in the daily communication space. Thus, perhaps literature (through its properties) has a greater potential in this view than texts present in daily communication events.

I

Redundancy as a term in the humanities is not defined too often. This results in either avoiding and replacing this concept with another one, with various reference ranges, or using such terms as “redundancy”, “redundant” in the meaning disseminated in everyday communication: unnecessary, unneeded, unwanted. With a little more accurate exploration, it can be seen that in the humanities two main trends set the places with which redundancy is associated. The first one is the theory and information trend, the second one is the normative, cultural and linguistic trend.

The concept of redundancy, which has developed on the basis of the technical sciences, involved treating it as a means of eliminating noise and interference. In the signal transmission model, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver included the essence of its influence; the mathematical theory of information, described by Shannon, leaves redundancy apart from references to human communication or to meaning, which is quite significant.[10] When language and communication researchers later used the concept often[11] to describe the process of eliminating noise or protecting against factors that could distort the message, redundancy was just a synonym for inventory or reserve. In this respect, positive values of redundancy are revealed, both mandatory redundancy (so-called code or system redundancy) and non-mandatory redundancy (e.g. various metatext operators) are described in this way. System redundancy occurs on phonetic, flectional, word formation or syntax levels (for example, eliminate vowels from any part of the text to see that the message is still clear, although

[10] Cf. “The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; […] These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem”. C. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, “The Bell System Technical Journal” 1948, no. 27, p. 379.
slightly more difficult to receive), non-mandatory redundancy is in turn a tool for adjusting the level of consistency, and thus the clarity of the text. Also, Walter J. Ong placed redundancy in this context.[12] He noticed that “oral cultures encourage fluency,”[13] thus “eliminating redundancy on a significant scale demands a time-obviating technology, writing, which imposes some kind of strain on the psyche in preventing expression from falling into its more natural patterns.”[14] Therefore, redundancy and orality remain in an indissoluble relationship, and one of the more important concepts that must appear in this context is facticity.[15] Once again, redundancy serves as “security” to establish or maintain contact.

The second trend, which is strongly influenced by the way in which redundancy is understood, can be defined as lapsological. It refers to the source of the word (redundantia – as derived from redundaree – come out from the banks, spill) and originates from the circle of Roman rhetoricians. Here, the value of redundancy is clearly negative: redundancy means excess, while pleonasms and tautologies (i.e. concepts that are subordinate to redundancy) are elements that we should discard from messages in order to make the message more correct. On a side note, it should be added that, for example, Quintilian, who wrote about the category of verba redundancy, presents an ambivalent approach to this category: “Style may, however, be corrupted in precisely the same number of ways that it may be adorned,”[16] writes Quintilian, and includes the functional criterion in his considerations about style. The question of purposefulness is the beginning of the idea of intentionality that makes it possible to go beyond strictly normative categories.

One of the most common synonyms of redundancy (in and outside the scientific circulation) is repetition, but also recursion, recurrence or iteration. It more common refers to the issue of form than content and, paradoxically, with the abundance of terms used to refer to the repetition is presented by J. Aitchison in a paragraph of a text devoted to linguistic repetition, which is based on the principle of parallelism:

[...] repetition skulks under numerous different names, one might almost say aliases, depending on who is repeating what where:

[12] This approach seems to be important also because it becomes useful in research into literature (stylisation, dialogue).
When parrots do it, it's parroting.
When advertisers do it, it's reinforcement.
When children do it, it's imitation.
When brain-damaged people do it, it's perseveration or echolalia.
When dis-fluent people do it, it's stuttering or stammering.
When orators do it, it's epizeuxis, ploce, anadiplosis, polyptoton or antimetabole.
When novelists do it, it's cohesion.
When poets do it, it's alliteration, chiming, rhyme, or parallelism.
When priests do it, it's ritual.
When sounds do it, it's gemination.
When morphemes do it, it's reduplication.
When phrases do it, it's copying.
When conversations do it, it's reiteration.
In sum, the following alphabetical list of 27 terms covers repetition's commonest guises, though there are undoubtedly more to be found in specialized areas such as classical rhetoric:

Alliteration, anadiplosis, antimetabole, assonance, battology, chiming, cohesion, copying, doubling, echolalia, epizeuxis, gemination, imitation, iteration, parallelism, parroting, perseveration, ploce, polyptoton, reduplication, reinforcement, reiteration, rhyme, ritual, shadowing, stammering, stuttering.[17]

Obviously, the author uses this phenomenon to trigger a game, while simultaneously raising a few important issues related to such categories as speech function or intentionality that are fundamental to communication (including the level of awareness of the sender who triggers the repetition mechanism). What also draws attention is the fairly close link of the repetition category to the references at the level from the phoneme to the sentence; perhaps the issue of going beyond the system, shifting towards the text and discourse, will be the reason why the use of the term “redundancy” will become more operative. It also seems (which we will not be able to fully prove in this paper yet) that the category of redundancy has more potential to describe phenomena outside the area of elocution, so it may refer, for example, to the stage of rhetoric invention or disposition. Concluding this section about the terminology and scopes of the concept, it may be pointed out that “redundancy”, like “repetition” or “reduplication”, includes the meaning of “oversupply”, “surplus” or “excursus”, i.e. phenomena that assume the existence and crossing of some baseline (but which do not hold a clear valuation, e.g. “excess”).

II

Being aware of the complexity of both a language game and redundancy creates a temptation to use a model view – one that is simplified without numerous nuances on the one hand, and one that contains the essence of communication, the various types of redundancy and

pronounced trends on the other. Hence, any attempts to categorise the presentation of redundancy in the context of a language game resulted in our proposal for the following triad: 1. redundancy as a non-game, 2. redundancy as a game – a struggle, 3. redundancy as a game – cooperation. We will then describe them briefly to show what the relationship among the following is: game – redundancy – literature.

Redundancy as a non-game

The potential for creating a reserve observed in redundancy, which is described first with reference to technical systems, and only later with reference to language and communication, assumes that this inventory does contribute to greater clarity, to a reduced reception effort. Hence, when the text repeatedly indicates that the sender speaks in the first person singular, then this is evidenced by the pronouns (personal and reflexive pronouns) or verb forms, although a single piece of information on this subject could be sufficient. When we make a spelling mistake or use a wrong automatic prompt from a phone, the recipient will generally recognize the meaning of the message – just due to the system redundancy.

An example of redundancy from a text level includes metatext operators, which create threads about the text itself, we could skip – and thus abandon – phrases such as: firstly, secondly, thirdly (as the following paragraphs indicate so), the following phrase: at the beginning of the text, we will look at… from the introduction, or the final phrase to sum up. However, the essence of things is that thus occurring redundancy serves a different kind of reading pleasure: not that of uncertainty or the search for meanings. The opposite is true: the aim is to eliminate uncertainty, reduce the number of interpretation paths and minimise the reading effort. In the case of redundancy as a non-game, the reception pleasure is to be derived from the transparency of the message, which is to be formally neutralised. Obviously, the key issue here will also be intentionality, the attitude of the sender, who assumes achieving certain objectives.

Redundancy as a game – a struggle

When a sender “uses” redundancy deliberately and intentionally to serve as a tool against someone, we can talk about an agonistic game. Such a game is based on a struggle, competition, the desire to defeat the other party, known as an “opponent” or “enemy”. Naturally, redundancy is one of the many methods used in such a gameplay, with politics or advertising being the natural discourse environment of the game in this case. Although the participants will not always have equal odds, it seems that the conditions for participation can be considered fulfilled: we know that in the pre-election debate politicians will attack opponents and hide their own weaknesses, we know that an advertisement is a producer-paid message aimed at underlining the benefits of a product or service, etc. By knowing the rules of the game, we take
part in it while being aware what tools can be used to gain an advantage, win a dispute, convince someone or be convinced.

Arthur Schopenhauer describes an agonic redundancy game by proposing to use the method defined as *mutatio controversiae*, which is a change in the subject of the dispute. This type of “influence” is not a supplement to the thread, it is not a learning base for the recipient, but, on the contrary, it is intended to distract attention, to allow for an escape from an inconvenient issue as to save communication in the event of conflict: “you can suddenly begin to talk of something else, as though it had a bearing on the matter in dispute, and afforded an argument against your opponent.”[18] Another method, based no longer on surplus or excursiveness, but on the overproductivity of the form, first multiplies the words used, and then applies an official and more specialised style than the one used in the conversation. As Schopenhauer notes,

if he [your opponent – A.K., K.S.] is secretly conscious of his own weakness, and accustomed to hear much that he does not understand, and to make as though he did, you can easily impose upon him by some serious fooling that sounds very deep or learned, and deprives him of hearing, sight, and thought; and by giving out that it is the most indisputable proof of what you assert.[19]

The effectiveness of this camouflage mechanism is provided by the belief of the participants in the communication that their action is rational and the rules of cooperation are respected.[20]

**Redundancy as a game – cooperation**

Finally, there is the third most important view to understand the complexity of the following relationship: game – redundancy – literature. Joint participation in this game will mean what B. Suits describes as a choice of a “longer way home”, while deriving pleasure from engagement and participation, may depend on a number of factors. The “hiccups” imposed by the game’s rules are accepted voluntarily, precisely in the name of the game itself, so that it can come into being and give satisfaction. The autotelic feature of literary expression, which all other functions of the message are subordinated to, highlights the self-maneouvrbility of literature, the potential to trigger new, unexpected orders, and indicates the recipients that the unexpected may occur. Therefore, pleasure may be derived, on the one hand, by knowing the conventions, genre, style of the text (i.e. rules of the game), and on the other, the “common world” of the potential players (i.e. those who know and accept the rules) helps to read or not, the topos, figures or

[20] At this point both P. Grice’s conversation maxima and the quotation from *Faust* cited by Schopenhauer: “Commonly man believes that if he only hears some words, there must be something in them to ponder over” (Faust I, 2565–2566) should be mentioned.
leads, explore the attempts to push boundaries, ambiguities, and thus uncertainty about the “result” (because many paths and many readings open up).

It must be pointed out immediately that it is not our aim in this paper the phenomena, categories and mechanisms that involve redundancy in literature, all the more as it would be probably necessary to start with the broadest meaning of redundancy, which in the metareflection over literature occupies an important place. It would be enough to refer to discussions[21] on the boundaries of popular, mass, high and low-culture literature. The emerging references to uniqueness and repetitiveness occurring there would require insight into the understanding of repetition and novelty, redundancy and innovation. Here, using the catch-all and conveniently reflexive category of the game, we would rather like to identify the potential of redundancy, and we hope to create a study on this subject in the near future.

Thus, we chose two different examples. In the first, Krystyna Miłobędzka’s poem, we want to highlight the potential of a verse form which the poet exploits in her texts by the apparent saving of language resources. This makes it possible (in our opinion) to consider redundancy that is strongly dependent on the grammar applied in the poem. The second example, Janusz Rudnicki’s short story, draws our attention to a few rhetoric levels of redundancy.

Redundancy for lack

The form of a free verse makes it clear to the reader (not necessarily during the first reading of the text) that grammaticity significantly affects the building of interpretation schemes. This is certainly supported by the specific saving of the language material, which may be identified simply with unextensive poetic text as well as the line as a graphic unit of the poem, which requires special attention. Therefore, grammaticity is a potential for a combination of designed statements, and these in turn serve as an indicative (and at the same time hypostatised) background for attempts to determine the formula of individual phrases. In this case, the aim of the line phrases to be independent seems to result in implied linearity, which is peculiarly stirred by the structure of the poem.

In her idiopoetics, Miłobędzka introduces something else. She triggers the distance between language categorisation and experiencing the surrounding world – she questions language axioms (or automatisms) in semantics, grammatical collocability and syntax rules of the story. From this perspective poems have the potential of a story not being a one-off. However, this is not because the first one is imperfect and should be improved, but rather, because each poem-based story (as a risk-bearing experience) becomes a full-fledged non-alternative event. Just as in nature, there are various qualities in the obvious con-

[21] Discussions on the subject were held by many thinkers, such as T.W. Adorno, R. Barthes, J. Baudrillard, P. Bourdieu, U. Eco, J.O. Gasset, M. Horkheimer, D. McDonald, M. McLuhan and others.
course with an unobvious justification, a poem also contains the trace of a multiplicity that can be (only) written into different partial situations through grammar. However, this will never exhaust the subjective potential of experience.

From this perspective, redundancy could be regarded as redundancy for lack. Let us look at an example of a poem:

co ja robię, patrzę w jest
w to samo jest mnie i to samo jest wody
w to ośnienie
to jestnienie
jest nie nie
które scalam
które skracam do istnienia[22]

[what I do, I look at is
at the same is of me, and the same is of water
at this dazzling
that yestence
is not not

which I merge
which I condense to life]

Let us try to think about a particular scene based on this poem. Looking at a mirror reflection in a sheet of water is certainly nothing unique. If we settle for the phenomenon of an image captured on an impermanent plane, consider the variations in the reflected image (different stages of deformation depending on the degree of surface vibration) or reflect on the similarity of colours in this case, the description would be an attempt to explain what is perceived. However, the reader of this poem receives strong grammatical signals that the view is completely different: “co ja robię, patrzę w jest” (what I do, I look at is). This verbal statement already highlights the need for a distance from the language. In fact, the apparently obvious reasoning: looking is an activity which can be asked about with the verb to do turns out to be questionable. The dynamics of looking is defined by the preposition expression, I look at is. This immediately results in an important duality, because looking (as doing something) refers both to reflection in water expressed by metonymy and to the word determining existence (is). Both references are conventional, which to some extent is indicated by the internal discourse in the line: what I do, I look at is. The reflection in water is conventional, as well as the linguistic pronouncement of presence (significance) by means of a word. The latter situation is described by the next line, because “the same is” refers to the reflection (of me) and to water (no longer as a medium). The right of the language to

the individuality of phenomena or objects contains here a condensed illustration, but at the same time, criticism. Even a conjunction (and) that equalises both parts of the line gain an additional function of an arbitrary connector in this order, which has the potential to single out relationships, perhaps completely irrelevant in a broader experience context.

Further text lines allow for consistent thinking about the language-based mechanism of naming and identifying, about the simultaneous description of activities and experiencing, and about the interpretation strategies resulting from the language-specific relevance.[23] The first point has already been briefly clarified. It is only possible to additionally indicate the phenomenon expressed by a pair of words: jestnienie – istnienie (yesistence – existence). It is where the fundamental critical idea in relation to language equivalence is contained, which directs the user toward abbreviating and categorical monotony (sort of grammatical one, too). In the poem, the narrator draws attention consistently (again with metonymy, but this time also expressed by metalinguistics) to the fact that in the categorical constatations there are simplifications both at the level of the world description and, which is probably more severe, subjective perspective characteristics. From here, it is close to the second point, which is a simultaneous description of the activity and experience. The reflection in the water shimmers (“w to olśnienie”; at this dazzling), which, on the one hand, causes tension in the process of comparing the “proper” face with the imitated one, but on the other, it leads to delving and thinking, combined with questioning the downrightness of the idea of existence (with the characteristic extraction of double negation: “jest nie nie;”[24] is not not).

The third point – relevance defined by language categories – in some way applies to the very activity of looking (gazing), but this time on the basis of assumptions made by categorisation. Merging is abbreviating, because passing judgements about a whole or calling in a simple way is already filtering through a language, with the assignment of roles resulting from the grammar used in the statement. The poem retained as unmerged, in the poetics of apparent autocorrection and refinement, is actually a pretext for analysing the potential of any situation in which a person perceives anything through the prism of themselves (again by metonymy – reflection in the water), and thus they call, describe and “do” things using a language.[25]

In this case, redundancy refers to a lack in several aspects, above all, the lack of a sufficient story: after all, the scene we are considering is an option of a text rather than obviousness that emerges from the name, but on the other, it implies simplifications, which are carried out in the language and which are sometimes completely distant from the specific circumstances of the cause, the initial situation.

[24] It should be pointed out that this is also a miniature of apparent repetition in Polish – a notation that is almost identical to a one-word form: existence is, on the one hand, undermining of the obviousness of the name, but on the other, it implies simplifications, which are carried out in the language and which are sometimes completely distant from the specific circumstances of the cause, the initial situation.
description. In fact, we can “merge” the poem by Miłobędzka into one sentence with a more complete and paraenetic apposition: I look at is. Redundancy also applies to lack of grammar in the case of line phrases, which the reader performs depending on the interpretation design, but also because of the reading, which is not a one-off. Finally, redundancy is displayed as a consequence of the two previous aspects: after all, the text has a potential for ambiguity, if only at the level of the problem of the language and experience relationship under consideration.

Now let us look at the second example, where defining an activity takes a completely different form and text function.

A few-pages-long short story by Janusz Rudnicki begins with the following scene: *I can be seen from the back, not moving. I sit in an empty room on a carton box.*[26] It is a one-piece story: The protagonist chooses to go to the Baumarkt to buy a one-hundred-and-forty-centimetre-long kitchen countertop, and the salesperson does not want to cut it for him from two meters. Nevertheless, in the end, the protagonist comes up with a solution – and he returns on foot, with the countertop.

The composition idea of the story is based on parallelism: the text is constructed through repetition structures with emerging minor changes to indicate some movement (despite the protagonist’s not moving in three scenes following each other):

- *I can be seen from the back, not moving. I sit in an empty room on a carton box.* (38)[27]
- *I can be seen from the back, sitting and not moving.* (39)
- *I can be seen. I look like a new, abandoned, sitting bone of being, set aside.* (40)
- *I can be seen, I walk slowly like a horse from captivity, behind which a furious mechanical herd.* (43)

The differences indicate that each of the shots occupies a different position in the timeline, but the perspective is the same: the protagonist is being watched by someone outside. If redundancy is often combined with the principle of *periculum in mora* (danger in delay), then the opposite is true for Rudnicki. It seems that through a composition iteration, there follows a slow motion, giving the protagonist an elementary sense of meaning which fills time and occupies the mind.

Rudnicki draws the scenes frame by frame, and the slow-motion effect is achieved by presenting the accumulation of activities (those performed and those that the protagonist does not do), activities which are described precisely, using exact and inaccurate repetitions:

*Light rain, light rain starts to patter against the windowsill, I don’t have an umbrella, I have a thing to do, I have the reason to go out, I will buy an umbrella. I go out, it no longer rains, I don’t buy an umbrella.* (38)


[27] The quotes are followed by the page numbers in the volume of Rudnicki’s short stories mentioned above which we put in brackets.
I do nothing. I don't scratch myself, I don't hum, I don't move any of my limbs. I get up, pack a microscope, go out, enter a shop, I want to return the microscope, the shop assistant wants to know if I have found any defect, I did not find any defect, I found that I had nothing to magnify, the shop assistant thinks it is a joke, he looks at me, he realises it is not a joke, takes the microscope and refunds the money. (39)

The multiplicity of verbs in a personal form (including those in the *verba dicendi* category, which introduces quotes, the metatext ones), usually dynamising the text, is used by Rudnicki to achieve the slow-motion effect. Meticulous description, omitted quotes in the indirect speech, and also the precise cause and effect motivations are ways to show the multiplicity and variety, and thus make the existence more meaningful.

Another retardation mechanism in Rudnicki's short story are collections – complete sets, containing complementary items, which appear in the adjacent text, and whose presence exposes complete repetitions and repetitions with dislocations (e.g. [...] I walk. With the countertop on my head. Once weirdly leaning forward, because it is heavy, once weirdly leaning backwards, because it is heavy. Once, seeing the ground because of it, and once seeing the sky). There is a contradiction between items in the collection, and complementary subsets are created (*from top – to bottom, forward – backwards, close – far, enter – go out, I buy – I don't buy, I found – I didn't find*). Switching the perspectives is one way to tell the “whole scene” and present a complete picture, multiplied by this completeness.

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The problem we are considering has its origin in the phenomenon of gameplay which intersperses the rules and possible freedom of execution (creation). The tensions between habit and surprise, regularity and irregularity, convention and innovation, created in this way expose the potential that lies in the grammatical conditions of the language use. They also reveal the existence of conditions for negotiating this use, depending, for example, on the recipient's competence, the model of participation in communication, and the assumed effects. Therefore, the language game will be perceived as the observance of communication rules, assuming that the various roles are moderately stable and the potential of a social contract relating to the language creates basic rules of linguistic activity.[28] The phenomenon of redundancy, considered in the context of a language game, can be presented in at least several versions: agonically – when the multiplication, excursiveness, broadcasting of the message is aimed at achieving an advantage over the recipient, defeating him; cooperatively – when the recipient is invited to recognize conventions,

registers, genres, search for ambiguity and multiplicity of readings. Finally, redundancy can function outside the category of a game: when it is related to the issue of communication optimization, it is to ensure the formal transparency of the message, eliminate noise and – thus – reception uncertainty.

The consideration of language game in relation to redundancy (especially as cooperation) literature seems to favour. Lack of shape, iterativeness and multi-value as attributes motivated by grammar, but also by the communication potential of literary texts, we see as a reason for thinking about the latter in relation to Wittgenstein’s language games. What redundancy, the understanding of which goes beyond the evaluative excess, means in this context is a multifunctional and at the same time capacious phenomenon, also describing textual mechanisms (also operating outside the language system) or rhetorical mechanisms outside the area of elocution. In Miłobędzka’s poetry, which questions language habits and automatic reproductions of typical patterns, redundancy refers to a lack noticeable from the perspective of describing, naming and subjective experience. Rudnicki’s stories, in turn, make it possible to look at redundancy as a retardation mechanism, perceptible at the level of composition, syntax or expression.

The ranges of redundancy functioning in the literary texts indicated in our research so far allow us to believe that the phenomenon is revealed, firstly, to have great sense-creating potential, and secondly, is unlimited in terms of type, genre and convention.

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