

Apposition

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Abstract

The term Apposition has given rise to many disputes over its range of occurrence and its affinity with the Epithet. This article is an attempt to detect theoretical and logical ambiguities concerning the Apposition in the analyses of Armenian and French syntax. After a brief presentation of “contradictions”, the author tries to explore the internal logic which caused them. Then, the problem is reviewed again in the light of the cognitive grammar.

1. Introduction

The definition of the term Apposition generates already some confusion: the term derives from Latin *apponere* which means ‘to put at side.’ Unfortunately, the term Epithet, being of Greek etymology (*επιθετον*), is defined identically: ‘one which is put at side’. These two definitions concern a syntactic position and neglect lexical and semantic dimensions.

Obviously, on a semantic level, the Apposition and the Epithet are not found with identical sememes, and a clear distinction is possible. They are both the extensions of the noun, but in different ways. S. Abrahamian [1975:287], an Armenian contemporary linguist, tries to define them in the following way:

Apposition is a complement of the noun by which is expressed what the noun is.

Epithet supplements the name and expresses such or such feature of the referent.

What the noun is and a feature of the referent say a priori the same thing, and the attempt of a clear-cut distinction seems to fail. It is necessary to avoid making the Apposition simply a detached Epithet. A question arises here, whether an adjective can be used as the Apposition.

- (1) *Le feu dance sur la Seine, fou et violent.*
Fire dances in the Seine, insane and violent.

In this case, there are simply two detached Epithets. It can be seen below that Apposition cannot leave the limits of the noun (1). The extreme category form such constructions as *Le roi soleil* (*The King Sun*) where the Apposition is on the verge of decategorization (noun > adjective). Damourette and Pichon [1935] consider the second noun (*soleil*) to be not the Apposition, but the Epithet. Obviously, the problems dealt with here are rather hazy. A specialist on the Armenian syntax, R. Iskhanian, avoids defining the Apposition. His book [1986:167] devoted to the Armenian syntax does not give any such a definition at all. Even the definition by P.H. Matthews in *Concise dictionary of linguistics* [1997:22] appears somewhat vague: *Apposition: A syntactic relation in which an element is juxtaposed to another element of the same kind, especially between noun phrases that do not have distinct referents, e.g., ‘Lucienne’ is in Apposition to ‘my wife’ in ‘Do*

*you know my wife Lucienne?’ Elements are seen as parallels but do not have distinct roles in a larger construction, e.g. ‘Smith’ is seen as apposed to ‘Captain’ in ‘Do you know Captain Smith?’ and are distinguished from *modification (or attribution) in that there is no clear tendency for either element to qualify the other.*

How to decide whether a qualification is ‘clear’ or not? In both cases, we deal with the qualification, two cases of predication.

Purely positional analyses, i.e., the definition of the Apposition according to the occupied place, appear to be the most vague. At the beginning of the previous century, an Armenian linguist, M. Abeghian [1965:509], decided that the Apposition could only be placed after [the noun] (*sic!*). However, a criterion remains unknown. The Apposition is regularly put after the name that it supplements and takes the same case, the same number and the same person [M. Abeghian 1965]. That caused the following aberrations. R. Iskhanian [1987:167] gives initially the following example of the Apposition:

(2) *Kancum er torane ‘Astrikin.*

Verb [Past continues] + Noun [Accusative] + Proper Noun-Apposition

‘He called his small daughter ‘Astrik’.’

Astrikin is regarded here as the Apposition. Some pages afterwards, we find the following example, where *Vartane* is regarded as the Apposition. Unfortunately for the author *Vartane* is not postposed.

(3) *Ekav Vartane, erbayrs.*

Verb [Present Perfect] + Proper Noun [Nominative] + Noun-Apposition with Possessive article

‘Vartan came, my brother’.

But the confusion does not stop at Armenian. Even an established researcher, H. Béchade, leads himself in a trap because of the lack of the semantic and syntactic discriminatory definitions. In [Béchade 1993], one finds the following example, in which *soldat* is regarded as the Apposition:

(4) *Soldat, il a fait de nombreuse campagnes.*

‘As a soldier he has participated in many campaigns’.

(In fact, *soldat* is here only Manner Adjunct.)

Is it necessary to integrate dislocations (left and right) into Apposition? The debate [Forsgren 1991, 1993; Lago 1994; Picabia 1991; Neveu 1995; Raabe 1979] around the Apposition is far from being finished. Combettes [1998], in order to reconcile everyone proposes the term of detached construction. Combettes [1998: 17-28] and Forsgren [1988: 143], [1991: 605-606] distinguish the following types which can constitute a detached construction:

- Nouns and pronouns: *Auteur de «Mme Bovary», Zola aurait connu plus rapidement le succès...* (As the author of «Madam Bovary» Zola would have had a more rapid success...)
- Adjectives, past participles or corresponding prepositional syntagms: *Cet homme qu’on évacue, en chaussettes, inanimé, c’est un conseiller d’Etat...*
- Absolute constructions: *Ils s’en vont, hirsutes, les yeux ravagés par la peur...*
- Present participles: *Regardant à sa gauche, il vit le facteur qui sortait de sa maison...*

Combettes [1998] counts also Gerund among detached constructions. Forsgren takes into account other forms:

- Adverbial syntagms: *...un écrivain qui lève son verre pour répondre à un toast d’hommes en smoking, debout autour de la table...*
- Relative subordinate clauses (explanatory): *Sartre, qui réfléchissait déjà sur une perception, l’image, l’imaginaire, reprenait la thèse d’Alain...*
- Infinitives: *Il n’a qu’une idée: s’évader*

- Space or temporal constructions: *Ce premier ministre légendaire, de 1946 à 1969, personnalité d'abord froide et austère, [...], savait repérer les jeunes talents politiques...*

Lago [1994] goes until the title of his article: Is the Apposition a function or a mode of construction? However, calling the Apposition – the mode of construction we can not solve the issue.

2. The morpho-syntactic level

Generally two words W1 and W2, denoting respectively sets of entities *E1* and *E2*, are in one of the following relations:

1. Identity: $E1 = E2$
2. Inclusion: *E2* is included into *E1*.
3. Overlap: *E1* and *E2* have a non-empty intersection, but one is not included in other.
4. Disjunction: *E1* and *E2* have no element in common.

The Apposition should enter the third case. But where is the common element and what is it? Let us see the situation from a syntagmatic point of view. Syntagmatics is presented in general in the following way:




Fig.1. Types of prepositional construction

The juxtaposition, even if it really exists semantically, can be recognized by no overt morphological indications. The co-variation can be recognized by feature congruity, i.e., compatibility of values of identical grammatical categories of syntactically combined linguistic items. The government relation is present when there is the determination of one element by the inflectional form of the other. It can be said at the beginning of our analysis that the Apposition falls under the co-variation. In HPSG it will be presented as follows:

(3) *Ekav Vartane, erbayrs.*

Verb [Present Perfect] + Proper Noun [Nominative] + Noun-Apposition with Possessive article
Vartan came, my brother.




Fig. 2. Description of the Apposition in HPSG

But this is just a description and not an explanation. Let us return to the problem. It seems that if the true function (on the basis of its cognitive dimension) of the Apposition is found, one should also be able to seize its core property and to say what the Apposition is. There exists a semantic (conceptual) solution which would allow the clear distinction between the Apposition and the Epithet.

At this morphosyntactic level, it is impossible to say that the Apposition has a definitely fixed position. In fact, the semantic roles decide about the positions and consequently about the Appositions which could supplement them. The Apposition can be pro-posed as well as post-posed. Combettes [1998:67] recognizes that it can be placed after its support or occupy the initial position in the sentence. The criterion of the definition can be only semantic and pragmatic (2). And it must be restrictive. For this reason, it would be appropriate to give a particular status to the Apposition – Genitive syntagm (*La vile de Paris*). Contrary to the normal Genitive system, the Relational Apposition, as can be seen below, does not have a syntactic head, i.e., two elements have the same function – the Concordial Case. Noun 2 is also a nominal head and can receive the Apposition in its turn:

(5) *Arsenal, the champion of England, the inventor of football, gained a victory.*


3. Predication with the Apposition: Towards the first solution

Let us examine the semantic (conceptual) dimension. Davidson [1967] announced the presence of two or more predications, i.e., the existential quantification over an event which is not explicitly present in the surface structure. Given that we want to convey two units of information, there is often a choice between presenting them separately, one by one, or as one piece. For instance, we may say: This is a man and he is unmarried. It is not far from the position of Fauconnier [1996]. It is a Blending – a conceptual integration of related events into one complex event. The following sentence could be rewritten in the following Davidsonian way:

(6) *Paul a frappé Pierre.*
∃ frapper (e, Paul, Pierre).

It can be observed that the Apposition functions like a specific predication. Like the predication, any Apposition presupposes the verb to be. Some linguists do not hesitate to give it the status of a hidden Attribute. The Apposition, in spite of co-reference, could be regarded as a second entailed sentence. It does not form a part of the principal argumental system.

But as a predicative noun, it concerns the second predication (the second focal adjustment of selection) – the second operative time when the world is perceived analytically (metadiscursively). The first names an existential event (or what is posed like the existential event), the second supplements it. On a cognitive level, the Apposition should be registered apart from the existential event which indicates the static face of the trajectory [cf. Fig. 3]. Let us specify that static does not mean aperspectival as the 2nd predication Apposition enters the prospect of the sentence.



tr bis – trajectory of Apposition: Metadiscourse (the second focal adjustment of selection)
lm – landmark
tr – trajectory of Existential Event Entity: Discourse (the first focal adjustment of selection)

Fig. 3. Cognitive Approach to the Apposition

The second predication (the Apposition) is a predication of a particular type. It would be more judicious to regard it as a counterpart to the noun phrase which it supplements. The Apposition and the Attribute testify to the dialogue of an underlying structure. The Apposition is a relation built like a relation which does not have certain prototypical characteristics of the canonic syntactic relations. One of its components is a non-mediate relation by a context matrix, data ontologically autonomous, independent (but not separated) static identification compared to the event which is described in the context matrix. On the cognitive level, we could say that the first predication concerns what I see, whereas the second what I see of what I saw.

The problem is that the Epithet also predicates, as the generative grammar has already shown it. I saw a black dog is built on two levels:

- (7 a) *I saw a dog.*
- (7 b) *This dog was black.*

Where is the difference then between the Apposition and the Attribute? Contrary to the Apposition which is appellative the Epithet does not assign a new position, as a semantic role, the function reserved for the noun. It is the Epithet that is on standby of support, not the Apposition. The Epithet is dependent. However, there is also the problem of temporality to take into account.

If the attribute adjective is the expression of a temporal attribution (verbal intendment in time), the epithet adjective marks a timeless attribution (adjectival intendment in space). But the same applies to the Apposition when compared to the nominal Attribute: it marks timeless identification in space. The Attribute can associate only with the subject and direct object, whereas the Apposition can associate with all the arguments (even adjuncts). Unfortunately, this distinction cannot solve the problem entirely.

Without a clear distinction between characterization and identification (two phases of topicalization), the analysis risks to get bogged down in explanations. The characterization does not return to designation, but to the property which the referent of the noun has. Thus in a sentence like:

- (8) *Paul boit son café chaud.*
 (Paul drinks his coffee only hot.)

chaud should not be regarded as the Apposition [Scheppers 1999] but as the Attribute of the object. *Chaud* predicates intentionally that *chaud* is a general sememe, not identifying THE COFFEE of Paul (a feature is not stable) whereas small daughter [cf. Example (2)] was predicating extensionally that small daughter is a sememe concerning only *Astrik* (a feature was stabilized with

a real referent). The small daughter is the *+marked* Patient in the argumental system, i.e., the recognized Patient.

The Apposition thus refers to and informs simultaneously. The reason is that it does not repeat. The same one does not bring any information. Therefore, the function of the Apposition is to bring a new piece of information as identification (like autonomous information). It is not also a “photo” of the Noun 1 without clear contents (it would slip in this case towards the pronoun).

From a localist point of view, it may be said that the Apposition becomes necessary since each phrase predicates about the location of one entity only [Langacker 1987]. The Apposition carries a presupposed location. Uttering a sentence, the speaker intends a particular object to be salient to the hearer and this intention constitutes the internal, inseparable property of the constructed representation. In the appositive statements, noun phrase 1 is chosen by the Perceiver, whereas the noun phrase 2 which brings information is chosen by the Cognizer. The errors of localization of the Apposition come owing to the fact that it is systematically considered as a separate entity. But this is the relation between the Perceiver and the Cognizer – between two conceptual dimensions. The argumental selection is made so that the first discursive choice should be realized (Arsenal). The Apposition is a correction of this choice, a correction located on the analytical plan (the champion of England).

(9) *Arsenal, the champion of England, the inventor of football, gained a victory.*

Thinking always begins with suggestive but imperfect plans and images; they are progressively replaced by better, but usually still imperfect, ideas. Because of the schematical assumption and its implications for human memory – says Barsalou [1998:12] – we should be surprised if the cognitive system ever contains a complete representation of an individual.

Referential situations are organized in terms of successive, nested and collocated specifications and re-specifications of figured aspects against grounded aspects. In Elements of structural syntax, Tesnière [1969:165] gives the example of the Apposition on the way to become the Circumstantial of Concession (a comment): (...) In the sentence Remarkable Speaker, Atticus was a poor writer, if the quality of poor writer is allotted to Atticus by attribute, it is a different quality and in opposition with the first which is lent to him by Apposition, so the Apposition can develop in the direction of a concessive circumstantial: Though remarkable speaker, Atticus was a poor writer. Remarkable Speaker is obviously a subordinate clause of concession (metadiscourse) which semantically corrects (modifies) the principal one.

4. About semantic dependency

As it was mentioned above, the Apposition is the predication of a special type. Starting from the following definition of the predicate: One of the two main constituents of a sentence or clause, modifying the subject and including the verb, objects, or phrases governed by the verb, as opened the door in Jane opened the door or is very sleepy in The child is very sleepy. [*The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language*: 4th edition, 2000], it can be said that the Apposition predicates –because they share the same referent it is usually possible to insert who /which / is / are between them: my friend, who is John. [Hudson 2001]. As the Predicate, it enters a system of dependency (syntactic, semantic and morphological). The Predicate conceptually has not autonomous meaning which is used in combination with some other meaning (its argument) to convey the referent of that argument.

It is possible for two constituents to be co-referent, i.e., to be in a semantic relation of co-reference, without any syntactic binding relationship (syntactic dependency) between them. There is, for example, the definition of R. Hudson [2001]: One of the most general traditional types of construction, alongside with subordination and coordination. A typical example of the Apposition is my friend John. If two words are in Apposition, they:

- are next to each other (except for their own dependents) so that they can be considered as a simple phrase – My friend John is one phrase,

- have the same referent, i.e., John (Apposition involves co-reference),
- they may or may not be separated, according to meaning. In speech, they may or not may be separated by intonation), e.g. My friend John or My friend, John.

Because they share the same referent it is usually possible to insert who / which / is / are between them – My friend, who is John.

Although the Apposition is traditionally contrasted with subordination, i.e., dependency, it can easily be included in a dependency analysis, as a kind of dependency. It is clear that the second word depends on the first. But what does a kind of dependency mean? The given example (my friend John) can be considered in two ways:

1. I do not think that there is the Apposition in the construction my friend John. The system cannot be broken up. It is to be regarded as one word only. There would be the case which H. Frey [1929] called condensation and which Givon [1979] calls loose *parataxis*.
2. If there is dependency, friend is the Apposition and not John. Listeners attempt to build up a sentence's interpretation gradually. To do it, they need to have the starting point fully identified, since it is the basis for the rest of the interpretation. Gernsbacher [1990] has shown that the initial nominal phrase has the predicated advantage of first mention. This advantage makes the first noun more memorable and more accessible for further meaningful processing. The starting point must be referential. It is not intrinsic dependency, registered in the syntagm, but inferential dependency.

To configure something as +determined, it is often enough to represent a universally known concept.

- (10) *Travailler, chose nécessaire à tous...*
(To work, a useful thing for everybody...)

A new question emerges, i.e., what the difference is among the Apposition, the Epithet and the Attribute. Using which is we fall into the Attribute predication, which Hudson gives the following definition: Relationship between two concepts which identifies one as a property of the other.

The Apposition is the predication of a special type, if one starts from such a definition [of the predicate]: Predicate conceptually has no autonomous meaning which is used in combination with some other meaning (its argument) to convey the referent of that argument. Of course all linguistic expressions are considered here as the predicate in that they are distinguished from one another on basis of the location [Langacker 1991: 547]. But various kinds of predication have to exist.

One can say that the Apposition and the Attribute constitute anticipatory calculation on behalf of the speaker – the epistemic ground according to Langacker [1987:127]. They anticipate the reception of the message (the Principles of Grice are useless to point out here) and provide additional information. The Apposition and the Attribute testify to a dialogue of underlying structure. The Attribute does it by the focused recovery of such or such close feature of the noun. Apposition does it by a reference to a common knowledge, i.e., by reduplication of +new information. The speaker re-elects the referent by periphrasis which contains also some additional information. For this reason, do we have to consider dislocations (left and right) as Appositions – the cases of anaphora (the projection of semantic roles)? It is often heard in France today to be said by the politicians:

- (11) *Les Français, ils veulent la sécurité.*
(The Frenchmen, they want safety.)

They can be held very well as the Apposition (a reduplication) of the Frenchmen. It will then receive new semantics – a signification close to: my friends... these which love me... share my ideas and which you know, etc. But such information can not be directly observed, and all dislocations (left and right) are not Appositions; they does not bring any new information compared

to the Frenchmen. They presuppose pronominalization. The concept of dislocation takes place when the sentence is already given. The Apposition does not renew equivalent units (3).

It seems to be necessary, in the final analysis, to admit that the Apposition presupposes a cognitive movement going from the noun 1 towards the noun 2 – a kind of dependency. Langacker locates this mechanism in, what he calls, the active zone analysis. In active zone analysis the relational predication – a verb, adjective, adverb or preposition – adjusts its meaning to accommodate its semantic argument. The author of the present article claims that all items have the active zone. But the relational predication of the Apposition is made in the other way than the Attribute's relational predication. It is not a question of total dependency.

In the Hudson's example, the identification (the Apposition) can be done by John. However, is it real dependency – a predication like with the Attribute when John is a monosemous and self-sufficient word? The noun John is not an inherent (intrinsic property) of Friend and it has a relational nature (extrinsic property). John refers, but does not really describe. Names – Perry specifies [1997:6] – refer, i.e., they contribute to the official content of the individual they designate. Definite descriptions describe, i.e., they contribute to the official content of the mode of presentation their meaning associates with them.

If small daughter can characterize Astrik (bring information by naming a property of), the reverse is not possible, since Astrik by its status of a Proper noun (indicating what is single and being inherently definite) cannot characterize a small daughter. Astrik can be a small daughter, but a small daughter cannot be Astrik. Astrik is not an inherent sememe of a small daughter. We had the same phenomenon with my friend John where the alternative my friend who is John is unacceptable. If we take the principles of selective binding, a question emerges – Which feature does John select in the nominal head friend? Does there exist any John (an individual) in friend? As a Proper noun, John cannot predicate. John is a rigid designator. It is referring but not describing. Proper nouns are not associated with any description of the individuals they refer to, but are directly attached to their referents by the act of naming or “baptism”. Judgments that we make about the referent are essentially retrospective. The reference is affected by what we will do as much as by what we have done.

Someone – Kripke says [1980:70] – uses the name ‘Socrates’. How are we supposed to know to whom he refers? By using the description which gives the sense of it. According to Kneaded, the description is ‘the man called Socrates’. (...) We ask: To whom he refers by ‘Socrates’? And the answer is given: Well, he refers to the man to whom he refers. If this were all there was to meaning of a proper name, the no reference would get off the ground at all.

It remains to distinguish again between identification and attribution (characterization) and in a certain way, reference from description. In the syntagm *la vile de Paris*, it is perhaps *la vile* which is the Apposition (like friend in the syntagm *my friend John*). Sometimes the deictic has to be considered to function like Appositions (the inferential information provided by the context), but how to know if John and Paris are deictic here or not? It is true that the deictic can be added to the identification and informativeness must be measured with reference to the hearer of the message.

The Epithet (characterization) is in direct dependency (forms a block) on the noun which it accompanies; The Epithet realizes a sememe already contained in the noun. Thus, it does not add new external information. The Epithet, contrary to the Apposition which opens a new location, does not allot a new location. It widens what has existed already. The semantic vicinity does not mean membership in the same semantic universe.

5. The pragmatic level

The above-mentioned differences have their equivalent in the pragmatic plan. At first sight, the pragmatic base seems to be the same for the Apposition and Attribute. Speakers engaged in conversation are guided by Relevance Maxim [Grice 1975], whereby they will relate their contribution to what the other participants in conversation are saying. We find the problems of the double predication with different entailment. Let us return to the earlier example (8).

- (8) *Paul boit son café chaud.*
(Paul drinks his coffee hot.)

Thus, it is necessary to continue to consider two predications (two speech acts); the second supplementing the first:

(8 a) *Paul prend son café.*
(Paul drinks his coffee.)

(8 b) *Son café est chaud.*
(His coffee is hot.)

The utterance (8) implies a priori and covertly: Paul does not like cold coffee (a response to a proposal of the kind: Not as cold as you think). There are two speech acts. The adjective *chaud* opens on the context. Compare it with:

(12) *Paul prend un café chaud.*

It can be seen that we have some semantic (and syntactic) shortening and that *chaud* has integrated (internal characterization) the noun coffee which it characterizes. There are two clauses but one speech act. The utterance (11) does not imply. It presupposes (Paul drinks coffee). Examine now the following sentence:

(13) *Paul prend du Nescafé, un café soluble.*
(Paul drinks Nescafé, instant coffee.)

Here are two clauses and two speech acts. The Apposition exhausted the semantics of Nescafé in the sense that it defined extensionally (it is directed to the known world). Probably, it comes from the fact that Nescafé is universally known. The Apposition implies a posteriori and overtly. Langacker [1991:89] distinguishes two types of grounding predications: (1) those which identify an instance with reference to a more inclusive class (mass reference), and (2) those which focus on a degree of definiteness, i.e., it is the instance presented by the speaker as known to the hearer and takes the ground (the speaker and the hearer) as their reference point.

That explains the fact that the Apposition cannot accept modality – it would slip towards the detached Epithet:

(14) *Le remarquable chef de l'actuel gouvernement afghan, Hamid Karzaï,...*
(The remarkable chief of the actual Afghan government, Hamid Karzai...)

6. The other litigious example

Let us return now to the other example given by an Armenian linguist Rafael Ishkhanian. It relates to the predicated personal Pronoun (a tonic pronoun).

(15) *Es inks Tessa.*
Personal pronoun, first person + Adjective (?) (myself) + Verb [Present perfect]
(I have seen myself.)

The analysis begins with a question: why do the French put a hyphen between *me* (*moi*) and even (*même*): *moi-même*? If the restrictive definitions proposed here are applied, it leads to the following situation. On a cognitive level, *même* marks salience (the profile of *moi* which is the ground) and the salience is due to a separation: an entity X is duplicated by an entity X'. The French would consider that there is 'a clone' and not intentional renewal (characterization) of a sememe contained in X. A point of view has changed – it is now external. Second time, X is seen outside. In English there is only one word (myself) – considering that conceptual identity can not cause a lexical separation: a case of 'condensation'. But this word marks the membership: *my* + *self*. Nevertheless, the relation between an entity and the other one is obtained (designation with

predication) – I have a self or the self of me, i.e., a noun complement or a relational adjective (the Epithet).

Does it mean that *même* could be regarded as the Epithet of *moi*? It seems that it is not the case. The noun complement or the relational adjective does not characterize. For example, equine in a equine butchery says nothing on the essence of butchery. It could be a bovine butchery as well. The same problem exists in the cases of presidential in presidential reception. Then *même* will not take the constitutive feature selfness contained in the Qualia of *moi*. After all, what is it – I? To speak about an object, it is to select it, pose it as a single. But how to do it with EGO? MEME is more than a property, since a property cannot determine the reference as the object might not have that property in all worlds. For example, gold may not be yellow in all worlds.

This analysis is valid if *moi* and *même* are separated. But the problem is that *moi-même* is to be taken as only one phonological word. The APPPOSITION is not MEME but MOI-MÊME. In the clause, there is a true pronoun inseparable from the verb: *JE l'ai vu moil-même*. MOI is already a predicated word. [Moignet: 1980] calls it an ontic pronoun. ME-MEME thus echoed the agentivity contained in the qualia of I (JE). I refers, MOI-MEME marks a slip towards the description.

If the Armenian language is examined, the following phenomena are noticed:

1. Ink (1st person singular inks, 2nd person singular inked) is a reflexive pronoun which corresponds with Russian Sam (for the third persons of the singular), Latin ipse and Greek autos .
2. All these forms are declined like an ordinary noun. Apparently they have nothing in common with the Adjective. Indeed, it is the Apposition. But the problem is that Armenian resorts to the same lexeme to indicate the personal pronoun *JE* (inseparable from the verb) and the ontic pronoun *MEME*. The first is included in the verbal ending. A curious phenomenon is found: Noun 1 (here the Pronoun) is attached indirectly to the verb and its place is not canonical.

7. Towards the second solution

There is not any doubt that the answer should be sought in the types of predication. At this level parallelism can be released between the nominal Attribute (e.g. He is my neighbor) and the Apposition on one side and the Epithet and the adjectival Attribute on the other. The adjectival Attribute marks a decompression of the Epithet, an actualization of the characterization (attributive level), whereas the nominal Attribute marks a decompression of the Apposition, an actualization of the identification (referential level) (cf. Fig. 4).

COMPRESSED Epithet Apposition	DECOMPRESSED Adjectival Attribute Nominal Attribute
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Fig. 4.

It is in their compressed form that one sees the differences: the Epithet integrates the noun, takes again a sememe contained in the name, whereas the Apposition does not integrate the noun and remains juxtaposed. The Apposition is an addition, a function specific to the nonrelational things (according to the Langacker 's definition).

Between them is the Attribute. Bolinger [1967] thinks that the Attribute marks a slip towards the Verb (more temporary circumstances) when compared to the Epithet which would have greater stability of the features. In the two following clauses the second would mark greater stability.

(16 a) *This is straight whiskey.*

(16 b) *This whiskey is straight.*

We end at a semantic/syntactic definition which would go from a dependent element (the Epithet) and incident with the noun [No.1 on the Fig. 4. below] towards an semi-independent element (the Apposition) and not incident with the noun [No. 4 below] – from characterization to identification and inversely.

It is between two semantic poles (the Epithet and the Apposition) that would be the Genitive Apposition [No. 3], near to the relative Adjective [No. 2]. These two semantic poles can be both focused – the Epithet by the Adjectival Attribute, e.g. The fly is black; the Apposition by the Nominal Attribute, e.g. The president is my friend, i.e., from the – focused entity (compressed and closed version) towards the +focused entity (decompressed and opened version). Decompression is impossible with the relative adjective, e.g. *The reception is presidential.

The Apposition (nominal head 2) thus must mark the pole –determined compared to the nominal head 1, the noun +determined (presence of the determinative article if it is a common noun) with which it is associated. This approach involves a new possibility: if one regards Noun 1 as a determiner (= the), one is obliged to regard Noun 2 as a complement. But it is a secondary operation of the mind, which is established starting from the researcher and not from the speaker.

- (3) *Arsenal, the champion of England, the inventor of football, gained a victory.*
 determiner > noun

Thus it is proposed to consider only the case No. 4 as the Apposition, however, with a widening towards the Genitive Apposition which represents a point of meeting with the Epithet.




Fig. 4. From the Epithet to the Apposition

The Epithet marks maximum integration (characterization from the interior) contrary to the Apposition which marks minimal integration (external characterization = identification). If there is intrinsic transitivity in the case of the Epithet, one can say that an extrinsic transitivity exists in the case of the Genitive Apposition [cf. No. 3 in Fig. 4. above]. This semantic distinction is observed in the two following examples:

- (17) *A talented man.*
 (18) *A man of talent.*

At this point some other remarks need to be added.

1. The integration should relate only to the adjective without slipping towards the adverb, i.e., the manner complement, e.g. *Soldat, il a fait...*
2. The noun 2 in the Apposition starts a movement towards the decategorisation. But just a beginning of decategorisation because it only partially enters the function of the modification. At this level of the analysis, one could push the limits of the Apposition until cases like *sa famille à lui*. There would be, perhaps, a point of meeting between the Apposition and a left dislocation. *À lui* is not the exact equivalent of *sa*.
3. The Attribute marks the exit of the noun from the actinical system, if it is considered that only the noun (and a pronoun) can configure an Agent.

8. Conclusions

In this short investigation, the author has tried to bring some more clearness in the field of grammar and stylistics. It appears that there is lack of clear-cut distinction among the Epithet, the Attribute and the Apposition, which leads to certain approximations and contradictions. However, the current tools of investigation make it possible to establish relatively fixed borders between them. It seems to be possible to delimit, on the one hand, the Epithet and the Apposition and, on the other hand, to distinguish an attributive predication from an appositive predication. This delimitation and this distinction pass by the semantics (conceptual) of the respective categories of the Noun and Adjective. Moreover, the investigation has showed that without the intervention of semantics any speculative operation becomes impossible. However, a more thorough semantic analysis should be carried out to arrive at even clearer differentiation.

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Appendix

- (1) Apposition can be a clause:
Sachez une chose, que cet enfant travaille bien.
- (2) In this connection Lambrecht [1994:204] notes that high pragmatic salience of the referent is a general cross-linguistic condition for the right-detached occurrence.
- (3) But in the clause: They, the Frenchmen, want safety. (they would be a personal deictic), one could regard the Frenchmen as the Apposition.
- (4) There is no exhaustive description, and the speaker stops as soon as they estimate that the environment makes it possible to supplement description