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On Three Paradigms of Emotional Communication in Music

The history of thinking related to the musical expression of emotions is probably as old as music itself. It occurs already in antiquity, in the Greek theory of *ethos*. Yet the conviction as to the possibility of arousing particular emotions through music was treated at that time in a quite specific way. Affect was identified with the Greek *pathos*, the most important designation of which was suffering (at least in the Aristotelian sense), opposed to *ethos*, or virtue, and to positive value in general. Also among the Stoics, *motus animi contra rationem* was perceived negatively, although with Peripathos, and later Aristotle, it was *eupatia* (*mediocritas*), that is, a balance between *ethos* and *pathos*, that became the ideal. Music could, and was supposed to, participate mainly in categories of value, and the conviction as to the possibility of connoting certain values and emotions through particular musical figures (above all the *modi*) led in effect to the postulate of the restricted use of these structures, which were in some way responsible for stirring emotions.

In mediaeval theory, thinking in terms of the ancient categories and the avoidance of deeper emotionality in art clashed with a different perception of the affects – especially of suffering. According to Rolf Dammann,[1] the chief watchword of the mediaeval martyrs – 'Deo gratias, qui nos pro suo nomine ad gloriosam passionem perducere dignatus est' – opened the gates to affects as positively understood, since the profound sense of Christ's suffering is transferred to man, whose suffering also gains a positive sense. Thus mediaeval affect became man's aspiration to God, the epitome of the idea of *agape* – redemption through love and suffering. However, in its aspiration to reflect the divine ideal, music employs chiefly the category of number and proportion, and so justifies divine and human suffering in a rational way. This opposition doubtless

[1] Rolf Dammann, *Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock* (Cologne, 1968), 230.

results from the fact that mediaeval music theory was very strongly rooted in ancient thought. Johannes Ockeghem, in his musical concept of *imitatio Christi*, is still employing exclusively representative figures and symbols, avoiding the expression of actual emotions. *Numerus* and *proportio*, which music reflected, were still being opposed at this time to the literary text, at times carrying concretised emotions, although *tristitia* and *duritia cordis* were already giving rise to 'errors' in the musical art. However, negative affects were perceived as undesirable and – still according to ancient tenets – soon gave way to positive qualities.

The breakthrough of the Renaissance, signifying a new, referential link between text and music,[2] founded on the laws of *imitazione della natura e delle parole*, brought with it the need – so characteristic of all music of the modern era – to enhance the emotion contained in the text, and at the same time the musical imitation of human emotions. The first coherent modern-era theory of musical expression, considerably nearer our times than Greek theory and probably constituting a watershed in how people thought about musical emotionality, was formulated by Gioseffo Zarlino (*Le istitutioni harmoniche*),[3] who forcefully emphasised the need for selecting adequate musical to literary means: 'and so it would not be appropriate were we to use sorrowful harmonies and a serious measure with a cheerful subject, nor should we use cheerful harmonies and light – or quick, as we have come to call them – measures where the words speak of things mournful and tearful'.[4] The use of chromatics with the texts of madrigals and the emergence of madrigalisms results in a sort of obsession with mirroring a text by means of music, although it does not yet give rise to a coherent system of affects. That *affectus exprimere* which appears in Zarlino essentially constitutes a postulate of the static reflection of words by music.

Only the emergence in the Baroque of a new purpose for the musical work, namely to move the listener, prompted the elaboration of a formalised theory of the affects. It seems impossible to overestimate the role of the receiving subject in the development of a modern way of thinking

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[2] In its broadest understanding, the notion of affect embraces all of music's referential allusions to the emotions it arouses in the receiver. Through music, 'the listener's heart should be moved, and so affects should be aroused (in him)'. (Michael Praetorius, *Syntagma musicum* (Wolfenbüttel, 1619), 229). Only Hanslick's definition of music as 'forms driven by the motion of sounds' (Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (Leipzig, 1854), and especially its reception, relativised the pan-referential understanding of music that had accompanied it since the birth of reflection on its subject.

[3] Gioseffo Zarlino, *Le istitutioni harmoniche* (Venice, 1558), ch. IV.

[4] Cit. on the basis of the translation by Anna Szweykowska in Zygmunt M. Szweykowski, *Między kunsztem a ekspresją* [Between art and expression] (Kraków, 1992), 85–86.

about musical emotion. Thus was born the **first** of the three paradigms suggested in the title. Whereas music of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance seemed to be addressed directly to the Absolute, whilst man could only attempt to penetrate the sense of that mission, only music of the Baroque seems to fully realise the postulates of humanism, coming closer to man. The analogy of the musical system and the system of affects is – in Andreas Hartmann's opinion[5] – twofold. It is linked on the one hand to the kinship between the nature of sounds and the nature of affects and their mutual proportions, and on the other to the systematisation of sounds and affects, thanks to which every sound, figure or affect gains its particular place in the hierarchy of the natural *logos*. This leads to the assertion of the metaphysical aspect of the theory of affects. Their defining and systematisation free man from the fear of chaos. As we become acquainted with our emotions and their nature, we go some way to gaining control over them. In this sense, the idea of harnessing the affects results from the spirit of rationalism. The conviction of the possibility of differentiating the affects, which constitute a sort of continuum, the possibility of dividing them into groups and classes, the possibility of describing them precisely and also – in particular – of linking them to the physiology of the human body, which may be formed and transformed through the adroit use of the affects, constitutes one of the most important myths of seventeenth-century learning and philosophy. In this sense, therefore, it is a method for ordering human emotions. The extraction of the affects from the human body enables them to be scientifically ordered. The return (perception) of the ordered affects to man constitutes at the same time a method for restoring to him natural order.

Yet at the same time the Baroque strips man of his inner harmony, endorsed by humanistic ideals since ancient times. Not only does it cast him full pelt into the world of emotions, but it also employs strong, extreme contrasts and contradictions in their expression. However, this does not mean that the concept of Baroque affects becomes subjective. One would search in vain among treatises from that era for passages speaking of a composer being moved or of the subjective feelings of the individual. Quite the opposite: we consistently encounter here an emotional type that remains within the framework of the natural sciences and anthropology. It would appear, then, that the rational thinking of the Renaissance has changed here only its focus, remaining the same method or mode of seeing reality. In the Baroque, the musical *motus harmonicus* retains its functional relationship with the *motus animae* –

[5] Andreas Hartmann, 'Affektendarstellung und Naturbeherrschung in der Musik des Barocks', *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 1/11 (1980), 25–44.

the moving of souls. Number and proportion, still central in the Baroque, are now at the service of the receiver, whose emotional reactions are calculated, as it were, by the composer. The *relationes harmonicae* and *non harmonicae* now go further than simply describing the text, becoming strategically calculated relations tailored to the expectations of the listener, seasoned with astrology, magic and the science of the temperaments. Interestingly, that 'calculation of emotions' on the part of the composer is aimed at provoking spontaneous and sensual reactions from the receiver. Thus the composer becomes the alchemist of the Baroque listener's soul. As for the affects, during the Baroque they become precisely defined, measurable quantities, which the composer must come to know, whilst preserving the most objective, rational, scientific attitude possible. Perhaps the first concise typology of the affects was proposed by René Descartes himself, in whose footsteps music theorists followed. Most typologies of the affects employ a primary division into joyful and sad affects. There is no need here to cite and present in detail even some of the popular typologies of the affects; for the most part, they give a similar set, differing from one another only insignificantly.

The postulates of expressing affects through music gave rise to more detailed considerations as to the methods of triggering them in the receiver, which is linked to the rhetorical discourse as part of the theory of the affects. Whilst philosophical, and especially psychological and physiological, knowledge was a sort of a priori method for bringing order to the human soul, rhetoric always constituted operative knowledge and determined the possibility of employing the theory of affects in practice, thus verifying their action. The speech of the orator has a distinct sign structure. Musical oration involves distinguishing the sign of an affect by furnishing the *loci topici* contained in the text of a composition with specific musical properties (or abstracting musical signs in instrumental compositions), then inducing the affect in the speaker and transferring it to the receiver, who experiences the same affect which the speaker aroused in himself. So this emotional communication is analogical, in a way, to the physiological function of the affect. But rhetoric does not seek the causes of such a state of affairs (like physiology or psychology) and concentrates solely on the action itself, and so on the practical verification of this interactive mechanism. Thus it is crucial who arouses the affect, in respect to whom the affect is aroused and also for what reason it came to exist. Rhetoric defines the principles according to which the speech (*oratio*) is prepared; musical rhetoric, meanwhile, defines the principles governing the creation of the musical oration, and so the musical work.[6]

[6] From the beginnings of its creation, *inventio*, that is, seeking ideas and topoi, through *dispositio*, that is, the defining of its adequate form (both horizontally, in

It is thanks to musical rhetoric that the principles of the *Wort-Ton* relationship in vocal-instrumental music are codified. An understanding of affectiveness in a vocal-instrumental composition seems strengthened by an understanding of the text, which confirms and names specific meanings and emotions in a literal way. The verbal text certainly enhances the clarity of the intersubjective communication and helps to make the composition's emotive code more unambiguously legible, although it is not an essential condition for its coming into being. The model situation involves the reading of the affective *loci topici* in the text and their furnishing with adequate musical figures, which further enhance the action of these *mots clef*. Thus the existence of the verbal text on one hand helps to simplify the process of decodifying the affect, but on the other can also mean its further complication. Simplification occurs under the – seemingly obvious – premise that music follows the lead of the text, in accordance with the principle of *imitazione della natura e delle parole* which held sway in music from at least the sixteenth century onwards. However, it is often the case, particularly in later music, that the verbal text and the music carry different emotional codes. Such a situation may arise naturally from a composer's lack of intention to portray with his music the emotions contained in the text. This would appear to have a number of possible causes. Sometimes the composer deems the emotive content of the verbal text sufficiently suggestive to preclude the need for a typical confirmation of these emotions through adequate musical structures. Other times, he fails to reproduce the *loci topici* through negligence, often resulting from *contrafactum*, haste or – in extreme cases – incompetence. Yet he may also intentionally match inadequate musical figures to given *loci topici*. This procedure, particularly frequent in the nineteenth century, expressing irony[7] or artistic distance, demands

time, and vertically, in space) and the disposition of specified parameters of the musical work, then *decoratio* (*ornatio*) – the process of embellishing the utterance by means of musical-rhetorical figures – and finally *memoria* and *pronuntiatio*; such are the stages of memorising and performing the musical oration. See Wiesław Lisecki, 'Vademecum muzycznej *ars oratoria*' [Vade-mecum of the musical *ars oratoria*], *Canor* 2 (1993), 13–26.

[7] One example of the intentional opposition between the affect designated by the verbal text, on the one hand, and the music, on the other, is Robert Schumann's song 'Ein Jüngling liebt ein Mädchen'. The verbal text, full of negative emotional expression, speaking of romantic misunderstandings leading to mortal tragedy, contrasts with the extremely bright and 'unproblematic' disposition of the music – a lively rhythm, simple and ostentatiously trite cadences in C major. The opposition produced between the two media helps create a new ironic quality. Schumann's acute sensitivity to the text leads to the creation of a very interesting new emotive quality between the music and the text. Referring to the eighteenth-century terminology of the affects,

a twofold competence on the part of the receiver, who theoretically should perceive both the emotional message carried by the verbal text and also the differing or contrasting emotional communication carried by the music, as well as the clash of these two messages, which produces a new emotive quality.

For Johannes Mattheson, the expression of affects is a key category in music. His theory may be regarded on the one hand as the sum of the seventeenth century's experience in considering affect and on the other as a pragmatically exact prescription for a way of seeing affects in the eighteenth century – a sort of *communis opinio* of that period. Yet another systematic exposition of the Baroque theory of affects – one which thrived throughout the eighteenth century – is Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg's treatise *Kritische Briefe zur Tonkunst* (1762), in which the individual affects from the joyful (*Lust*) and sad (*Unlust*) groups are enumerated and catalogued.[8] Marpurg's rather derivative concept attests Mattheson's enduring influence in this area and contains exact, detailed descriptions of several dozen affects, with specific musical properties ascribed to each. It is worth taking a closer look at one of Marpurg's descriptions to see the exactness, but also the kind of dogmatism, with which they were prepared. In respect to the affect of *Traurigkeit* ('sadness'), he writes that 'containing a high degree of sensual discontent, it is expressed through a slow tempo and a sombre, mournful melody, which is interspersed with manifold sighing motifs [...] in the area of which are most commonly used small intervals and which builds up an all-engulfing dissonant harmony'.[9] This description, like those of Mattheson, constitutes a sort of recipe for arousing the affect of sadness. A ready-made idea for the composer.

The concept of Mattheson and Marpurg clearly derives from Baroque aesthetics, inscribing itself in the first of the paradigms of the communication of emotions in music. Later statements by music aestheticians are linked to the emergence of the Classical aesthetic, presaging the next, **second** paradigm. Already in the work of Christian

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the text portrays *desperatio*, the music *hilaritas*, whilst the new affect that arises from the clash between the words and the music is *irrisio*.

[8] Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg enumerates a total of twenty-seven affects, giving for some hints regarding music.

[9] '[...] dass die *Traurigkeit* ein sehr hoher Grad des sinnlichen Missvergnügens oder Verdrusses, in langsamer Bewegung mit einer matten und schläfrigen Melodie, die mit vielen Seufzern unterbrochen ist [...] in welcher die engeren Klangstufen vorzüglich gebraucht werden und welche auf eine herrschende dissonierende harmonie erbaut wird, auszudrücken ist'; cit. after Ulrich Thieme, *Die Affektenlehre im philosphischen und musikalischen Denken des Barock* (Celle, 1984), 243.

Gottfried Krause,[10] we see a clear watershed, manifest in the very title of his treatise, Krause's 'musical poetry' being but a step away from the Romantic conception of the German *Tondichter*. The composer is no longer merely a musical artisan, who with a mathematical precision renders in music the rules set out in treatises, and becomes a 'tone poet', who has at his disposal a wide range of means for arousing in the receiver all sorts of emotions. The receiver of music in the second half of the eighteenth century ought to be – similarly to his Baroque protoplast – moved. However, the ways in which this is achieved are somewhat different. Inspired partly by French sentimentalism (Charles Batteux, Jean Jacques Rousseau), partly by German *Sturm und Drang*, subjectivism comes to play an increasingly important role in the perception of affects and of musical emotions in general. In Johann G. Sulzer's *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*,[11] we read no more of dogmatically categorised affects but of the 'expression of the individual "I" ', and of 'moving the composer's soul' instead of 'portraying affects'.[12] In this sense Sulzer opposes not only Baroque theories but also the aesthetic of *imitatio*, once more being trumpeted by the sentimentalists.

Whilst for Batteux, emotional musical language was still objectivised, Sulzer postulated its wholesale de-objectivisation. Other new postulates were the passivity of the receiver, who was to 'yield to all the emotions',[13] and the utmost fantasy of the creative artist[14] in forging emotions. This does not mean, however, that the affects of old were consigned by Sulzer to oblivion. Quite the contrary: although their semantic scope had changed, they were still the determining factor in the musical work. In Sulzer, the definition of music is based on its emotionality: 'music is a succession of sounds which arise from emotions'.[15] His definition does not contradict Baroque definitions. The interchangeable use of the terms *Affekt*, *Empfindung* and *Leidenschaft* occurred in German lexis from the seventeenth century onwards. Sulzer divides *Empfindungen* into two classes, namely psychological and moral emotions, ascribing to the former *Leidenschaften*, which should be seen as no more than the former

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[10] Christian Gottfried Krause, *Von der musikalischen Poesie* (Berlin, 1753). Krause distinguishes and discusses thirty-three different affects.

[11] Johann G. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste* (Leipzig, 1778–1779).

[12] See Carl Dahlhaus, 'Zum Affektbegriff der frühdeutschen Oper', *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Musikwissenschaft* 5 (1981), 107–111.

[13] '[...] sich allen Empfindungen überlassen'; see Johann G. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, 148.

[14] Ibid., 9–14.

[15] 'Musik ist Folge von Tönen, die aus leidenschaftlicher Empfindung entstehen'; ibid., 142.

'affects'. In characterising the various elements of the musical work, Sulzer, in a similar, referential, way to his predecessors, links specific emotional qualities with musical means. These links are naturally traditional and familiar from Baroque treatises. Despite a drastic change in language and discourse, the staffage of means remains essentially the same.

Yet while the 'psychological characters' are essentially convergent with the former affects, Sulzer's categories of 'moral characters' influenced the important change in music aesthetics that occurred around the turn of the Baroque and Classical eras. The emergence of the idea of absolute music, expressed by Wilhelm Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck and other aestheticians of the beginning of the nineteenth century, and also by theorists of sonata form (in particular Heinrich Christoph Koch), is linked chiefly to the domination of those 'moral characters'. Georg August Griesinger quotes a statement allegedly formulated by Joseph Haydn, whereby the symphony contained mostly 'moral characters' (thus we can assume that a lesser role is ascribed in this context to 'psychological characters').[16] Even if this statement is only attributed to Haydn, it is worth expanding on the idea. The instrumental and vocal music of the Classical era and early Romanticism do indeed seem to head down different paths, and they are lacking the unity which was characteristic in this respect of the music of the Baroque. Instrumental music appears to have been obliged to forge for itself what in modern parlance we would call new channels of transmission, or of access to the receiver. The method postulated by Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach in his *Versuch*, and also by other representatives of the Berlin school, linked to the incorporation into instrumental music of a stream of affects taken from vocal music, failed to work because of the lack of formal integration in these compositions. Thus the concept of 'moral characters' perhaps became a hallmark of the vigorous development of instrumental music. Vocal music, meanwhile, seeking new means of expression, did not have to relinquish entirely the previously elaborated models; it sufficed to adapt them. For this reason it would appear that while in Classical (at least in the sphere of the Viennese Classics) and early Romantic instrumental music 'moral characters' do indeed prevail over 'psychological characters', the presence in vocal music of the text (often of Baroque provenance) determines the favouring of 'psychological characters'.

It is also worth bearing in mind that Sulzer's modern concept was not the only one with widespread currency in the music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the famous eighteenth-century textbooks of in-

[16] Georg August Griesinger, *Biographische Notizen über Joseph Haydn* (Leipzig, 1810), 117.

strumental playing (Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Leopold Mozart, Johann J. Quantz), constituting in equal measure theoretical treatises and textbooks on the aesthetics of music, the notion of affect is used very extensively. To take one example, Quantz, in his search for an ideal analogy between music (and performance) and speech (*Musik und Rede*), in the chapter 'Vom guten Vortrage im Singen und Spielen überhaupt', writes that 'the performer himself should enter into the principal and secondary affects that he is seeking to express'.[17] The aspect of the performer's personal identification with an affect demanded by Quantz is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the second of the suggested paradigms of emotional communication.

Changes in the perception of affects were strongly dependent on the degree of awareness among those receiving them. It is worth pointing out that eighteenth-century audiences – with the exception of the opera-going public in Italy – were recruited exclusively from among the aristocracy and were generally very well educated. The increasingly numerous *Liebhabern* – aficionados and amateurs – were demanding a different exposition of the doctrine of the affects – one that would be more concrete and practical. At the same time, the fashion for external emotionality that took hold particularly in Germany during the mid eighteenth century even led to a heightened interest in the affects. Yet the Berlin school theorists essentially wrote of the same affects about which the rationalists had discoursed during the seventeenth century. All that had changed was the language of this discourse and, as already mentioned, the points of gravity. As the aesthetics of feelings took shape and developed, music began to represent more subjective emotional states. However, objective tendencies towards expressing through music more strictly categorised emotional qualities – affects – were not wholly lost. Essentially, then, the emotional expression of music functioned in the situation in which music found itself during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on several levels: as a tendency towards expressing through music subjective feelings in the receiver, as a tendency towards the objective representation by music of affects, by means of a fixed set of musical means and figures, and finally as affective reactions to music by the listener. Thus the affectiveness of music is both an immanent property of the musical language, on the one hand, and the reactiveness of the receiver to that language, conceived in an intentional way, on the other. And between the 'activeness' of the music itself and the 'reactiveness' of the listener to its language there exists a naturally organic link.

[17] 'Der Ausführer eines Stückes muss sich selbst in die Haupt- und Nebenleidenschaften, die er ausdrücken soll, zu versetzen suchen'; see ibid., 51.

Knowledge of the affects is also not forgotten in the nineteenth century,[18] although discourses about them are different from those of both the Baroque and Classical eras.[19] It is hard to disagree with Hartmut Grimm's thesis that the end of the Baroque theory of the affects is at once the beginning of the path for the theory of extramusical expression. The author sees the beginning of a new treatment of the affects – one which influences their understanding throughout the nineteenth century – in statements made by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn of 1757,[20] in which he claims that negative affects are just as 'pleasing' as positive affects, since they remain affects, and every affect is in essence pleasurable. Lessing's statements betray a different way of seeing the affects to that of the representatives of the Berlin school, of Koch or Sulzer. He treats affect *in abstracto*, and so sees its action as undefined, abstracted, in a way, from reality. Of course, this conception is not entirely new, and it is worth adding that in some sense it was shared by theorists of the Baroque, who saw no need for an affect to be aroused in the composer or performer for it to be aroused in the receiver. Yet Lessing's statements are informed by a more radical idea as well. In his opinion, a sad, unpleasant affect need not be unpleasant even for the receiver, whose perception Lessing enhances with that same artistic distance which Baroque composers reserved for themselves. It seems that we may speak here of the beginning of a new, **third** paradigm in musical emotional communication, which comes to be characterised by a distance towards the emotional content of a composition, manifest both in the composer (and the performer) and in the receiver of a musical work. Where Lessing's idea is innovative is in its complete opposition to the German conceptions of *reine Gefühle*, in which both the emitter and the receiver of the musical message had to be moved for the affect to act properly.

Thus the central problem shaping the peculiarity of the third paradigm of musical emotional communication appears to be artistic distance, in other words, the distance of the receiver (the subject) towards the 'emotional content' of the musical work (the object). The subject need not

[18] See Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Musikalisches Lexikon* (Frankfurt, 1802).

[19] Dahlhaus considers that the fundamental change that occurred in aesthetics between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is linked to a change in the way art theory was perceived – more specifically, with the exchange of the linguistic (sign) orientation, with musical language understood simply as an extraconventional gift of nature, for a dialectic orientation, which would lead to subjectivisation and the differentiation of expression. See Carl Dahlhaus and Norbert Miller, *Europäische Romantik in der Musik*. vol. 1 *Oper und symphonischer Stil 1770–1820* (Stuttgart, 1999), 236.

[20] Ibid., 106.

be moved itself in order to perceive the power of the given affect. The emotion triggered by the affect is not the same as a real emotion experienced under the effect of real stimuli. So music uses signs for affects, without personifying them, since the listener, recognising a sad affect, does not have to become sad. These signs would appear to be chiefly a consequence of cultural norms and conventions, which allow the competent receiver to recognise particular affects in a musical work. Yet this modern, and seemingly obvious and unquestionable, property of each musical work, which bids us see artistic emotionality through the filter of specific conventions, was not always so unequivocal. More than that – in the postulates of most theories of emotions from the eighteenth or nineteenth century we even find an outright proclamation of the lack of such artistic distance. In his famous treatise on piano playing, constituting an aesthetic *communis opinio* on such subjects as musical expression in the eighteenth century, C. P. E. Bach wrote, among other things, that '[...] the musician cannot move (the listener) unless he himself is moved. He must partake of all the affects which he wishes to arouse in the listener'.[21] It is of no consequence that Bach's treatise concerned musical performance, as the process of composing was understood in an analogical way.

In the early reception of the Berliners' ideas in the nineteenth century, evident, for example, in Koch's treatise, we can observe a retreat from a somewhat naive, direct way of seeing musical affects. The beginning of the nineteenth century already brought attempts at rejecting any sort of objectivism of musical emotionality. The physician Charles Bell stated in his *Essay on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression*[22] that emotions connected with music were completely resistant to rationalisation. Of a similar opinion was the evolutionist Herbert Spencer, who considered that the whole history of music constituted a continuum of the 'idealisation of the natural language of emotions',[23] although at the end of the nineteenth century another scholar, Friedrich von Hausegger, was still seeking to discuss musical emotions in terms of physiology.[24] One of the key arguments in favour of the indirect interpretation of affective qualities contained in music is their restriction to European culture. In

[21] 'Ein Musickus nicht anders rühren kann, er sie dann selbst gerührt, so muss er notwendig sich selbst in alle Affekten setzen können, welche er bei seinem Zuhörer erregen will'. Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1753–1762), 85.

[22] Charles Bell, *Essay on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression* (London, 1806).

[23] Hartmut Grimm, *Musik und Natur. Musikalische Ausdrucksaesthetik im 19. Jahrhundert*, in *Zwischen Aufklaerung und Kulturindustrie*, ed. Hanns-Werner Heister, Karin Heister-Grech and Gerhard Scheit (Hamburg, 1993), 110.

[24] Ibid., 111.

the eighteenth-century world, in which awareness of the existence of foreign cultures had only a slight influence on Europeans' understanding of their own culture and the artistic world seemed confined to Europe, the emotionality of music, functioning within the framework of particular figures, structures and topoi, could appear undeniable. As foreign musical cultures became better known, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the emotional language of music was re-evaluated and relativised, as it was found that music could express the same affects in different cultures by means of different means, most often completely incompatible with those which were prominent in European music. Wilfried Gruhn, however, points to the universality of some affective musical structures, which he links with some of the most common affects.[25] Certain gestures associated with the main affects, such as joy, anger, surprise or fear, are perhaps rooted in deep archetypical structures and so are not only intersubjective, but also intercultural.[26] Admittedly, these gestures can only be read on the lowest level of musical understanding, which Gruhn calls the 'external layer of sound', but that does not alter the fact that affects may be perceived across different cultures.[27]

In the opinion of Arthur Schopenhauer, it was not so much that the affects were expressive of human emotions, as human emotions were expressive of music and helped to shift the theory of the affects – and more broadly of musical emotionality – to the sole domain of the perception (and possibly the reception) of music. In this sense, therefore, the typologisation of emotions would be a categorisation, not so much of the music itself, as of the receiver's (utterly individual) feelings. It is worth noting that this way of perceiving emotions in music influenced most heteronomic conceptions of music during the twentieth century. It was perhaps only resisted by the naive hermeneutics of Hermann Kretzschmar or Arnold Schering. However, for a change, these scholars deemed it inappropriate to turn to sources and tried to reconstruct the world of former emotions first-hand, imposing contemporary ways of understanding on old compositions. Yet Schopenhauer by no means rubber-stamped the

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[25] Wilfried Gruhn, *Wahrnehmen und Verstehen* (Wilhelmshaven, 1989), 159, 190.

[26] See Manfred Clynes, *The Touch of Emotions* (New York, 1977).

[27] In Gruhn's opinion, the comprehension of emotive qualities carried by music takes place on the level of the original gestic perception (*gestisches Verstehen*), then on the level of the recognition of the model (*Mustererkennung*) and finally on the level of aesthetic identification (*ästhetisches Verstehen*). It is worth noting that the perception of the affect occurs on each of these levels – original and notionless perception (affect as an expression of gesture), structural perception (affect as an element of a work's structure) and also aesthetic, fully conscious, perception (affect as a part of the musical message).

death of the theory of affects. The centuries-old way of seeing music in these categories was even resistant to Eduard Hanslick's shattering, malicious critique: 'the layman "feels" the most in music, the trained artist feels the least'.[28] It is not surprising, therefore, that in the wake of Hanslick's 'formalistic' breakthrough the old holistic take on music, its communicative function and anthropological – to use a contemporary notion – dimension gives way to a one-sided focus on history, the work, structure, analysis and the discussion of genres and readings, seemingly detached from the addressee of music – from man.[29] Yet the current fashion for musical anthropology and cognitivism is strongly opposed to these conceptions and is reviving discourses that were present in former music theory, even if they are not normally referred to. So perhaps a combination of the chiefly Anglo-Saxon modern adaptive ways of seeing music and the Germanic *Quellenarbeit*, reconstructing the knowledge of past eras, marks the way forward for contemporary musicology.

Translated by John Comber

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[28] 'Der Laie "fühlt" bei Musik am meisten, der gebildete Künstler am wenigsten'; see Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (repr. Wiesbaden, 1975), 135.

[29] This thread is broadly and beautifully developed by Wolfgang Suppan, who considers that the anthropological dimension of music, which today is beginning to constitute an important aspect of research, originates from the musical Renaissance and Baroque. Suppan's assertion that there are today (in musicology) many Hanslicks, but what's missing is a Friedrich von Hausegger, sounds like a rhetorical metaphor ('Es gäbe heutzutage viele Hanslicks – aber leider keinen Hausegger'); see Wolfgang Suppan, *Musica Humana. Die antropologische und kulturethologische Dimensionen der Musikwissenschaft* (Vienna, 1986), 80.