Summary. The aim of the study is to evaluate the concept of culture in the face of social heterogeneity. Focusing on the distinction between homogeneity and heterogeneity on the example of musical culture the author focuses on four questions. Does the concept of culture in its theoretical formulation mean that it necessarily crosses the border of the formal set-theory ontology and leads to the multiplying of the entities? Are there acceptable criteria for differentiating the cultural aspect of human affairs from other aspects? Can the practice of distinguishing the less or more unified wholes called cultures be justified when confronted with the irreducible complexity and heterogeneity of social life? Is the concept of culture, though useful for the analysis of non-European and past European societies, still operative for the analysis of contemporary societies?

Keywords: heterogeneity, cultural theory, musical research.

The Experience of Musical Heterogeneity

In his very famous book Decentring Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research¹, Korsyn tells a story of ethnomusicological research concerning a traditional

Arab musical community. Korsyn's attention is awoken by the ethnomusicologist's brief comment on two women who were not taking part in the musical practices of their group. Asked for a reason, women answered: “This is not our music”. The ethnomusicologist, despite mentioning the situation, did not reflect much upon it, however. Korsyn, on the other hand, starts a discourse that puts in doubt all the practice of distinguishing and describing coherent musical cultures. The discourse itself is more questioning than negative; it does not aim to convince ethnomusicologists (and us) to abandon the description of musical cultures but to make us more sensitive to the heterogeneity of musical reality, to its conflicts, hierarchies of power and points of resistance. Not only is Korsyn’s main topic, contemporary musical research, ‘a Tower of Babel’, Korsyn’s figure of the “Tower of Babel” also describes every musical community before its cracks and chasms are obscured by a homogenizing description. It is then less a matter of a sudden discovery of cultural heterogeneity, than a matter of the new set of cognitive assumptions and presumptions that would not allow the omission of the two women’s “This is not our music”. Even more, it is a matter of a new theoretical, ethical and political sensitivity, which wouldn’t allow such an omission. These are the only two things necessary (and today more or less obvious) to show the problems behind both empirical research and the theoretical apparatus.

The problem of excessively homogenizing theoretical apparatus then arises. Some time ago, Robert Walser in his already classic *Eruptions: Heavy Metal Appropriations of Classical Virtuosity*, turned our attention to all the complexity and heterogeneity of the repertoire covered by a series of Western concepts like “classical music”, “serious music” or “musical canon”. Dance music and liturgical chants, autonomous and functional music, socially diverse music, coming from the university, the church, the court, and the burghers. And within these differences, further differences: music for public mass and for closed monastic liturgy, the songs of pilgrims and mendicant orders next to the learned music of *docti* etc. Historical analysis of the musical canon does not leave, according to Walser, much room for illusions: there is no identifiable rule of selection, no recognizable criteria of choice, no *ratio*. The canon ahistorically covers diverse and often conflicting practices, puts the phenomena of different origins into one sack, even though they lack a common history and common function. There is then supposedly no convincing way to defend constructs like “serious music” etc. They are a kind of terminological *Eintopf* without proper justification.

Undoubtedly, Walser’s considerations are difficult to counter, and his final conclusion is well-grounded: concepts like the “musical canon” form the invented tradition

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of socially privileged elites, a sharp sign of social distinction and reproduced hegemony, connected together in their own history and guarded by proper institutions. These are tools of symbolic violence, their unity is of an ideological nature; they rely not on a cognitive basis and the study of music but rather on power relations. Again, Walser’s conclusions are not unfounded and cannot be easily rejected. But still, Richard Taruskin, a scholar sensitive to the use of music as a sign of social distinction and generally to the interplay of power relations in the field of music, attempts to construct a counter-argument.³ He polemizes against Walser, but he shares his need and desire to rethink the status of former elite practices within democratic society. Taruskin does not simply reject all of Walser’s conclusions but asks how one could overlook the main unifying characteristic of the Western musical canon: namely that it contains wholly and exclusively those Western musical practices that rely – and historically relied – on writing, on musical notation as its main medium. The idea of the canon covers then written liturgical music and written music for entertainment, the written music of aristocrats and burghers. There actually exists a non-ideologial criterion for forming the canon and the concept itself is not cognitively empty. Even more: the idea of the canon is shaped by a very sharp differentia specifica and forms a coherent object of study, something undoubtedly strongly diversified but still not lacking a common history, grounded – at very least – in the history of musical notation. Neither does the canon stop being a tool of power relations, or a sign of social distinction; it does not even stop to be a reason for misunderstanding, as its unity apparently lies elsewhere than in “being art” or having a “higher value”. But heterogeneity no longer consumes the elements of homogeneity: slowly it becomes clear that we cannot simply choose “a proper side”, but we have to analyse the interplay of the two elements.

By the way, the funny thing is – funny in the context of Walser’s intentions – that the same reasoning can be largely repeated for the concept of “popular music”. Neither does the term “popular music” name any coherent historical reality or any recognizable social locus. It includes phenomena as diverse as the past urban transformations of traditional, rural African-American music (like urban blues, rhythm and blues, soul or funk) next to the contemporary production of the music industry, the past musical expressions of the English working class next to contemporary hipsters’ music. “Popular music” connects together music of conflicting racial and class genesis and even forms of music that, like rock and disco, wage open war upon one another. And again, even the smaller subdivisions still hide heterogeneous phenomena. The concept of “rock music” for example tries to name at the same time the music governed by the romantic ethics and aesthetic of authenticity, like the psychedelic rock of Jimi

Hendrix, Janis Joplin or The Doors, the transformations of white and black folk music within the so-called “southern rock” of the groups like Lynyrd Skynyrd or The Allman Brothers Band, and contemporary postmodernist rock and ironic post-rock. At the same time, industrial pop music contains “naive” commercial products and their ironic transformations, such as the projects of Lady Gaga. Indeed, one could malevolently reshape Walser’s ideas and say the concept of “popular music” names the ideologically motivated, invented tradition of English-speaking, leftist intellectuals, directed against something that these intellectuals – and not necessarily the actual socially unprivileged people – recognize as “the music of the establishment”… But still the term would – from social perspective – properly connect the musical practices that were at the time commonly rejected by different elites, refused analysis in terms of their own sets of values, and recognized as belonging to the “rebellion of the masses”. And even if the elites defiantly agree that there can be some important values in the music of European peasantry and of the peoples of former colonies, one could suspect – not without a justification – that this was a sentiment held by a former master for former subjects. Anyway, homogeneity and heterogeneity play together again, and the situation changes with every change of the researcher’s questionnaire.

We encounter then a similar problem on two different levels: on the level of the description of the musical practices of a given community, such as the ones provided by the anthropologists, and on the level of theoretical concepts used to conceptualize the sphere of music. Homogenizing generalizations encounter heterogeneous reality but homogenization can somehow find a proper justification. Even our few remarks and examples show that the crucial point is not to choose one side or the other, but to hold onto this tension. Giving oneself wholly either to the vision of homogeneity or to the experience of heterogeneity seems too risky. Ethical and cognitive reasons for a shift of balance in favour of heterogeneity, after a long domination of homogeneity as the scholar’s ideal, can be both understandable and tempting. But would that not be more revenge than justice and would we achieve anything more than a pure destruction of our ability to understand both music and society? One can divide a thing infinitely, but if one does not gain knowledge in the process, one only destroys that thing.

The Problem of Culture

One way or another, the problems of contemporary musical research show themselves to be more general in nature. The homogeneity and heterogeneity of musical
culture is just a case of the broader problems of cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity. We suddenly find ourselves in the middle of the ocean: in the field of a general theory of culture. The problem can be now formulated as a matter of the opposition between diversifying description of a given culture and the theoretical model of culture, or even more – as the opposition between the complexity of social life and the status of the very concept of “culture”. Sooner or later the problem of the heterogeneity of musical culture leads to the contemporary debate on the usefulness of the very concept of culture.

We cannot summarize this debate here. But we can point out a few repeatedly formulated reasons for which the experience of heterogeneity leads supposedly to the abandonment of the very concept of culture, trying to give some examples linking these reasons with the problems of musical research.

(1) The cultural dimension of social reality cannot be distilled from the wholeness of human acting. Any human act is simultaneously determined by the general, biological characteristics of Homo sapiens and the particular characteristics of the acting individual, by superindividual psychological regularities, and an individual’s biography; by the general structure of proper society and the specifics of the particular social milieu of an acting individual; and by the general system of culture and individual variations of cultural participation. Every human act happens in a network of other acts and many different agencies. In any given act all these dependencies are given as a unified whole and differentiating between them, just like the borders between used concepts, remains doubtful, unclear and questionable. A musical act is especially symptomatic for this situation. Let’s look at such an activity as listening to music. It connects the different dimensions of human existence in an obvious way. It is dependent on the characteristic of the species, on the anatomy and physiology of human sensual apparatus, and on neural conductivity and the activity of the brain – in a word, on biological characteristics shaped by evolution. But it is being experienced by an individual and basically it cannot be communicated: we will never know what another person hears when he or she listens to the Monteverdi’s Vespro, we can only – and must – assume that we hear roughly the same. Thanks to these factors, the act of listening to music can be, and is, researched by neurophysiologists and only a very specific – though a very important – form of musical research, based upon the concept of musical artwork as an ideal object barely presented in the medium of sound, can safely ignore these factors. Next we have the psychological dimension of the act of listening to music, dealing now not with neurophysiological

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processes but with consciously received impressions and mental representations, again connecting universal regularities and individual variations. Theoretically, we know should be able to reduce this description to a neurophysiological one, unluckily we have only a very vague idea of how such a reduction could be actually made. Last but not least, listening to music depends on the sets of values respected by the listeners, their knowledge, their expectations and the way in which they relate musical values to other axiological spheres. We can get irritated by statements like “Chopin sounds feminine”, “hard rock sounds masculine” etc., but we cannot simply reject them: they belong to the way some people hear music and we are here to research these ways, not to tell anybody what is “correct”. These values, this knowledge, these associations are of a social origin, but imprinting them in an individual happened in an always peculiar way. Still, listening to music is a simple and whole act. This complexity and unification makes the differentiation of various dimensions or aspect of such an act nothing more than a more or less doubtful hypothesis: there will probably be no end to the debate on the biological and social-cultural factors of musical experience, as the answers seem to depend largely on intellectual fashion and general Weltanschauung. This is exactly the situation that Émil Durkheim and Marcel Mauss tried to solve more than a century ago with the concept of unified social fact. Listening to music is such a unified social act. Differentiating the tools of its analysis is not operative enough. If then – the question arises – the role that culture plays in such acts is so difficult to estimate, maybe we would be better off without a concept of culture?

(2) The concept of culture seems to establish a new ontological realm, a new dimension of reality, that in no way stands up to the requirements of the set-theory ontology, which multiplies the entities and falls prey to Ockham’s razor. The way in which culture exists is either unidentified or requires the acceptation of the possibility that values and judgments can exist independently from their human bearers. Culture cannot be reduced to the beliefs of any particular individual; no individual can be properly named the bearer of culture. How then does culture exist? Only some form or more or less obscure Platonism could seemingly justify its status. We should ask then if this ontologically troublesome concept is at least absolutely necessary for the explanation of social phenomena. Such necessity could justify its usage. Unfortunately, Willard van Orman Quine⁵ and Donald Davidson⁶ managed to propose such explication of communicational processes – and what can be more cultural than communication processes? – that does fine without any recourse to

some superindividual knowledge. Both Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation deal only with the individuals involved and the pragmatics of verbal behaviour. If they are right, then the concept of culture may prove to be just an unnecessary heritage of already past ways of conceptualizing human affairs and of an ontology that we cannot accept today. Maybe only our trust in the status of anthropology as social science causes us to be more accepting for the term “culture” than we are for words like *Geist*. Maybe what we describe as musical culture is only a web of interacting individual acts, artefacts and personal beliefs. Maybe we should then give up such a way of describing the world?

(3) No matter how careful we are, how sensitive to the difference and heterogeneity we are, the differentiating could always go further. If we delimit such a whole as, for example, Polish culture in the year 2016, we have to immediately distinguish the official “national culture” from the everyday culture of Polish society and then go further. The participation in digital revolution emphasizes the importance of age stratification. Cities and villages require different models, but also small towns and big cities require separate consideration. And what kind of village: a suburban, gentrified one? A rich but strongly stratified village of capitalist agriculture? A post-collective village with its poverty and destroyed social bonds? A traditional village of small, independent farms? And aren’t these categories still homogenizing too much? Can we even hold onto the idea of the culture of “Polish post-collective villages”? Despite some similarities, such villages strongly differ in the various geographical regions of Poland. The unemployed and people who managed to change their economic status in such villages live in different ways, men and women live in different ways, youth and the elderly, married and unmarried, practicing Catholics and the religiously indifferent, voters and those who never vote … The same goes for musical cultures. Let’s take the example of rock music once again. Yes, rock, but connected with counterculture and its primacy of ideology, or concentrated on autonomous musical values? Independent, even “underground” or industrially produced and distributed? A product for mass consumption or the independent expression of underprivileged social classes? Governed – again – by the ethics and aesthetics of authenticity or directly opposing these values? Remaining closely tied to its African-American roots or rejecting or even forgetting these roots completely? Rock is all of this, it contains so many differences that we can ask if it actually exists… We can multiply such doubts up to the point where distinguishing any broader musical culture will seem pointless, because it will be nothing more than a starting point for disassembling, going always further and further,

(4) In this way, sooner or later we reach the level of individual differences. It’s safe to assume that we will not find two different human beings sharing exactly
the same beliefs and behaviour. Taking the simplest definition of culture as socially shared beliefs, we find that the more detailed the analysis, the narrower the culture appears. Individual variations affect even the sphere of languages, their grammar and syntax – not only in common speech but even in the much stricter medium of writing. Otherwise, there would be no such thing as a writer’s individual style. Such observations, strengthened by the particularity of any individual’s socialization process, gain special validity if we consider the Western modern world. It is not an accident that the contemporary attack on the concept of culture came mainly from anthropologists dealing with modern societies. These doubts concern, of course, the field of musical research, especially research on musical contemporaneity. Today, when thanks to the easy access to information we all live amongst many and various musical propositions, our musical worlds actually became private. The musical imaginary museum became individual and seems to no longer generate any group canons, or obliging patterns of musical education, or a community of taste.

Some Propositions of Solutions

None of these four accusations against the concept of culture is groundless. In trying to make some order within mixed things of different origins and categorical belonging, we can express these doubts as four solid and separate questions:

(a) Does the concept of culture in its theoretical formulation mean that it necessarily crosses the border of the formal set-theory ontology and leads to the multiplying of the entities?

(b) Are there acceptable criteria for differentiating the cultural aspect of human affairs from other aspects?

(c) Can the practice of distinguishing the less or more unified wholes called “cultures” be justified when confronted with the irreducible complexity and heterogeneity of social life?

(d) Is the concept of culture, though useful for the analysis of non-European and past European societies, still operative for the analysis of contemporary societies?

These questions belong to different discourses, from epistemology to detailed empirical problems, and cannot be answered together. They also belong to different intellectual traditions and were formulated at different moments in the history of the social sciences (especially the first question is venerably old). But I cannot resist

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the temptation to answer them separately, even if briefly and too hastily, even if just to show the other side of the problem.

(a) Certainly, “it’s not culture which paints the nails”. But there is something that takes it’s beginning from the difference between the act and the effect of the act, between the acting person and the result of his or her act. The results seem to become a separate reality which can be only partially controlled by individuals. It is a person who speaks, but no singular person can fully govern the grammar. It is the person who produces, sells, buys and consumes, but no singular person can fully control the economic processes. Moreover, we do study these processes as a quasi-autonomous reality – how else could the science of economy even be possible? It is a person who creates music, but no singular person can control the life and the transmission of musical work. The results of acts are still full of life when the actors are long dead. When we are given birth to, this world already exists and forms a part of outer reality that we have to learn. To describe many aspects of this process, different words could be, and were, used. Hegel used the word “alienation”, August Comte chose the word “society” (if it is not conceived of as a straight sum of the individuals), while Karl Raymond Popper used the term “third world”. This is the reality we also name with the word “culture”. Different words are preferred by scholars issuing different questions and assuming different perspectives, but Claude Lévi-Strauss rightly doubted if the words “society” and “civilisation” name distinct entities. The important point is that all these words name something new, which cannot be reduced to the set of individual acts and individual beliefs. This “something new”, culture, cannot be omitted. Quine’s brilliant description deals with a very particular situation of learning a new and unfamiliar culture, but Quine did not mention that in order to connect the sound “gavai” with a rabbit, his “radical translator” had to first recognize that sound as word, supposedly belonging to an unfamiliar language, in fact to assume that behind the sound “gavai” stands a whole unfamiliar culture… Without this assumption there is no reason to suspect any regular and repeatable relation between “gavai” and a rabbit, no reason to even think about a translation. Davidson’s fantastic “radical interpreters” are fantastic because they behave as if they did not know that they speak the same language (they do a lot of unnecessary work then) or even that they speak any language at all. As long as one is aware of the existence of at least one other community that speaks differently one is necessarily aware of speaking a language. Two people would have to communicate in Davidson’s manner only if they were the two first people in the world. Abandoning the idea of culture surprisingly seems to cause more trouble than it is worth. There is also no reason to worry about ontology too much. Culture does not have to be un-
derstood as a separate entity. It can be safely treated as just a word, naming the important state of affairs that important part of our knowledge is shared with other people, and is ready when we are born and is an object of learning. We cannot fully control it, because other people, both alive and dead, interfere. “Superindividual” is not necessarily a Platonic term. Culture is a simple term, and it denotes simple facts: Beethoven mastered major-minor tonality just like Bach mastered the tonal counterpoint, but they did not invent these systems – the systems were already there, developed by many people, shared with many individuals and ready to be learned.

(b) The problem of the criteria of culture is easier than it seems. The old, famous and usually misunderstood definition of culture proposed by Edward Burnett Tylor says, in its second component, that culture is something that we gain as members of society. It is a very clear criterion: culture does not contain characteristics that are idiosyncratic and not shared with other members of society and it does not contain the characteristics that are inherited in a way other than social (today we can say that they are inherited genetically). The difficulty lies not in the criteria, but in the details: is there, as Noam Chomsky claimed, a biologically inherited universal grammar behind languages or do the patterns of language have a cultural origin? Are basic musical structures biologically or socially determined? We still do not know the answers but we may yet come to know them, if we do not abandon such problems too early. Distinctions between social, cultural etc. on the other hand seem be borne of the specific needs, questionnaires and vocabularies of different scholarly disciplines. There is not a reason to cancel these differences as long as we gain knowledge thanks to different approaches. Such distinctions are not even always important. A historian of counterpoint does not have to worry if the rules of counterpoint are of social or biological origin. It is a cultural theoretician who has to worry.

(c) The heterogeneity of social life is indeed irreducible, but so is the common ground. A postmodern, post-bohemian, homosexual, pro-environmental, cosmopolitan Polish artist (a lover of American experimental music) and his hired Polish plumber (traditionalist, heterosexual, pro-industrial, xenophobic and tolerating only disco music) seem to have no common ground, and if properly asked, they would probably say that they do not belong to the same culture. But still they use such similar vocabulary, grammar and syntax that they understand each other without trouble and have no need of “radical translation” of the word “a pipe”; but still they belong to a common market and can agree on the proper payment for the work done; but still they both belong to the culture emphasising the validity of contracts (what a strong axiological community) and assume that they can expect each other to keep an agreement; but still they belong to the same system of law and
if either side breaks the contract, one side will sue the other. Without a common
semiotic sphere, which is guaranteed by a common culture, there could be no actual
meeting, no agreement and no other conflict than pure and brute violence. There
could be no recognizable difference, no market, no language, no class struggle, no
political struggle – only closed monads. As long as people interact, no heterogeneity
can destroy their common ground, just as no common ground can annihilate their
differences. Both points of view must be held together, at the same time, and there
is no scholarly problem in this. It is enough to differentiate the theory of culture and
the theory of participation in culture, to differentiate the theoretical concept of cul-
ture and an empirical or historic description of a particular culture of a given society.
Today’s new sensitivity to everything heterogenic is based upon ethics and politics
(and is justified), but also on a supposed and proclaimed theoretical crisis. We can
save this sensitivity without rejecting concepts that help us to understand the world.
A glam-rock guitarist of the 1970s could disregard romantic piano music and a lover
of romantic piano music could disregard glam-rock, or even all rock including Frank
Zappa, but both belonged to a common culture of diatonic sound organization and
of the chords built on thirds. They did not share this culture with the traditional mu-
sicians of Bali and composers of electronic music. Both their differences and their
common ground can be researched.

(d) Culture as a common ground seems to narrow today, we need to share less and
less to safeguard the existence of our societies. For two hundred years now scholars have
described this process in different terms and disagree on its valuation. Herbert Spencer
wrote about the transition from a military to an industrial society, Ferdinand Tönnies –
from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, Émil Durkheim – from mechanical to organic solidari-
ity, Anthony Giddens – from symbolic to functional integration, Zygmunt Bauman – from
modernity to postmodernity, Jerzy Kmita – about a project of culture without symbols.
Nobody can deny this process, and without its analysis one cannot explain contemporary reactive processes like the renaissance of nationalism. There is though a border for
the narrowing of culture and this border cannot be crossed without the annihilation of
society. The crucial point was precisely pointed out by Jerzy Kmita. According to this
Polish philosopher we can – although barely – imagine the destruction of the axiological
community, but not of the semiotic one. The social division of labour requires communi-
cation. Every transmission of knowledge requires communication. Every social activity is
filled with languages (as Yuri Lotman names every system organizing communication).
The axiological community narrows and diversifies, I would add, but the semiotic com-
munity broadens and unifies on a global scale. The interfaces of computers and tele-

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phones look almost the same in Poland, U.S.A. and China; we leave our country and our language but still easily read the road signs and easily cope at airports and rail stations. The differences are less and less obstacles for communication, and more of an attraction to the tourist. How surprised are we today if we suddenly find ourselves in a place where nobody speaks English. By the way, the destruction of a common axiological space is still a bit problematic. Firstly, it may yet prove to be a local European phenomenon, as it seems to not touch Islam or the Chinese “civilizational nationalism”. Secondly, it is not obvious if the supposed European end of common values will not prove to be simply the end of particular axiological systems (although important ones). It has to be remembered that capitalism is an axiological system too. Anyway, this is not a reason to abandon the concept of culture. It is simply a fascinating topic for cultural history.

There are generally no strong reasons to abandon the concept of culture (and the concept of musical cultures) in the face of social heterogeneity. Two things will suffice. First, to properly recognize the interplay between homogeneity and heterogeneity, its dynamics and complexity. Second, not to allow any theoretical assumptions to block the ethical sensitivity to differences – the sensitivity that is rightly so dear to us. The two Arab women, who told the ethnomusicologist “This is not our music” should have received proper attention. Their attitude reveals the internal processes of cultural differentiation and a possible change, and for a researcher it is priceless. Also, not giving proper attention to these women is unjust. At the same time, they cannot obscure the community of other people, who say in agreement: “This is our music”.

**Literature**


