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A Poststructural, Feminist Critique of Posthuman Genderlessness in Haraway's Cyborg

ABSTRACT. In this article, I want to begin to question the grammar, the understanding, the illocution, and the theoretical nature of genderlessness, in Haraway's posthuman turn. Furthermore, I want to bring to the surface a complication of the understandings of power within Haraway put into a more significant and more critical conversation with poststructural work that more fully grapples with productivity and comes to understand the discursive insinuations of gender and sexuality as simultaneously productive and violent—a mixture that should not be reduced to liberation or justness as a procession of/with the negation of gender. Even more so, within the same form of critique, I will also make the argument that specific posthumanisms such as Haraway's invocation not only disregard the productivity of gender as an essential critical space to grapple with but also that posthuman literature remands a reality yet topples the very concept that imbibes reality with substance. In particular, once we *name* gender, there is not only violence in imagining the nonexistence of gender (the absence of gender as a means of realizing/being), but also such imaginings and impossibilities descend further into a conundrum of attempting to realize a reality that no longer holds any substance of reality qua *reality*.

KEYWORDS: cyborg, posthumanism, Haraway, poststructural critique, discourse/power

Introduction

In this article, I want to begin to question the grammar, the understanding, the illocution, and the theoretical nature of genderlessness, being without gender (if we can even signify such a (im)possibility), or the absence of gender and/or the collapse of gender in Haraway's (2016) posthuman turn (Preciado, 2020; Chanda, 2016; Carrasco-Carrasco, 2022). In other words, within Haraway's *Cyborg Manifesto* and *Manifestly Haraway*, there is a repeated notion of a society/nonsociety (a reality) without gender, the negation or absence of gender as something to know, realize, identify with, coerce, etc. that challenges a poststructural intimation of

posthuman power/discourse in specific ways. In other words, Haraway's argument is a particular formation/performance of violence/violation/liberation/destruction without acknowledging such violence. Even more, there is also a contemplation of genderlessness that does not seriously consider the impossibility of genderlessness within the confines of reality qua *reality*, as Haraway intends to empty reality of its substantiating locus. To put this yet another way, moreover, I would like to challenge posthuman work—especially as it is coming from Haraway (2016)—to fundamentally come to terms with the productivity of gender within/of a poststructural critique and the means by which reality as utterable and being as signable come out of and from the boundaries and borders of regimentations of discourse (Butler, 1997; Foucault, 2003). In a critique of Haraway's genderlessness and pulling upon other posthuman works that mimic this intimate eschewal of the productivity and inundations of gender and discourse within our very "beingnesses," I want to caringly challenge and push Haraway's and posthuman work to more robustly think with/of the lack of gender in a posthuman space/reality or even to more imaginatively think transdisciplinarily with/alongside other theoretical frameworks such as postanarcha-feminism and/or decoloniality (Singh, 2018).

Furthermore, within/of this article, I will grapple with the post-ness of posthumanism and demand that posthuman work more intentionally think through/with the challenges to imaginative beings that they invoke, ignore, and eschew within their images of the cyborg and/or the genderless being. Using a mixture of a poststructuralist critique that informs posthumanism and work that attempts to understand the productivity of discursive power (work that locates the productive at the moment of continuous re-definition), I will argue that posthuman work, by invoking genderlessness, does a particularizing form of violence for which Haraway and other posthuman thinkers eschew or rather ignore. While Haraway and other posthuman scholars imagine and fetishize their conception of genderlessness within these spaces as "escapes" from restrictive accesses to being (Wright, 2011), they also refuse to wrestle with the ways in which gender produces such beings and imbibes our current realizations with sensicality, viscosity, and experientiality: gender thereby offering the very possibility of experiencing and/or reality. Even more so, within the same form of critique, I will also make the argument that specific posthumanisms such as Haraway's invocation not only disregard the productivity of gender as an essential critical space to grapple with but also that posthuman literature remands a reality yet topples the very concept that

imbibes reality with substance (speaking to the posthuman and yet draining such conversation of sensicality and/or what makes such discussions utterable in the first place). In other words, within this second argument, I will demonstrate that while Haraway and other posthuman scholars still imagine/theorize some reality in which posthumans/cyborgs exist or come into existence, they simultaneously and unwittingly abolish the very means of not only the normative conception of the human but conceptions of reality and existence themselves without contemplating this very denial of *reality* or contemplating more fully the language of the cyborg that necessarily retains its insidious connections to *reality* (as anthropomorphic and genealogical) and existence as a means of realizing the cyborg that no longer holds any substance or reality qua *reality*.

I want to fundamentally and foundationally question the violence and impossibility of genderlessness as seen through Haraway's (2016) posthumanism and the assumptions/arguments that a reality without gender could be "better," more "just," or more "equal" (Dvorsky, 2008; Chanda, 2016; Carrasco-Carrasco, 2022). Furthermore, I want to bring to the surface a complication of the understandings of power within Haraway (2016) put into a more significant and more critical conversation with poststructural work (Derrida, 1978; Foucault, 2003) that more fully grapples with productivity and comes to understand the discursive insinuations of gender and sexuality as simultaneously productive and violent—a mixture that should not be reduced to liberation or justness as a procession of/with the negation of gender. Even more so, within this very argument, I also intend to challenge the denunciation of dualisms that Haraway invokes—arguing instead that Haraway merely intends to reconstruct negationary being/nonbeing from and toward singularizing nonbeing. Throughout this piece, using a poststructural theoretical framework with a glance towards more radical and praxical theoretical frameworks, I want to construct an argument that takes note of the productivity of discursive regimentations such as gender and our responsibility as critical theorists to more fully grapple with these complications and flows of power. In particular, once we *name* gender, there is not only violence in imagining the nonexistence of gender (the absence of gender as a means of realizing/being), but also such imaginings and impossibilities descend further into a conundrum of attempting to realize a reality that no longer holds any substance of reality qua *reality*.

Within this article, I will construct my argument in four sections. First, I will build an analysis of Haraway's *Cyborg Manifesto* and their

Manifestly Haraway. Even more, while I will note that some posthuman works (Braidotti, 2022; Halberstam, 2013) seem to take up these post-structural complications with gender, race, sexuality, etc., I intend to focus on the cyborg within Haraway (2016) to push posthuman work toward more complex conversations of/around power (Butler, 1990; Hirst, 2019). Second, I will move towards our first constitutive critique, which intends to re-assess and critique the means by which we understand the flows/regimentations of power within such determinations/nondeterminations of gender and discourse more broadly. In other words, we must deal with the constructive/destructive violences, violations, and annihilations within the coordinations of cyborgian posthumanisms while noting how such violences liberate within/of such a violation. For instance, rather than uncomplicatedly identifying the image of the genderless cyborg as liberating or just, we also have to understand that such revolutions of reality are violent, destructive, limiting, and coercive. Thus, understanding such a movement of imaginative work as a re-definition of reality yet still intimately attached to limitations of discourse and the like. Our third section will discuss our second critique of cyborgified posthuman work (Haraway, 2016; Preciado, 2020; Chanda, 2016; Carrasco-Carrasco, 2022). I will argue that posthuman work relies too heavily on anthropomorphic considerations of reality qua *reality* to substantiate itself as something radically different or even as an extant ideal since it destroys its own foundations as it attempts to transcend such limitations of normative metaphysics and ontologies. In particular, even as posthuman work incites imaginative directions within/outside of human/non-human capacity, there is also a continued reliance on the linguistic/cognitive apparatuses of denoting reality within the confines of a/the reality and as an extension or as a constitution of existence qua being. In other words, as posthuman work instantiates/intimates toward some othered reality in which the cyborg or the posthuman *exists* (comes to exist), they also necessarily and recursively limit their radicality within/of their reliance on anthropomorphic attenuations and genealogically binding notions of *being*, *existence*, *reality*, and so forth (Hepburn, 1999; Derrida, 1978). Finally, within our last section, I will end with some conclusions and potential directions for transdisciplinary work that are already in process and should continue to be developed and explored to aid our imaginative directions in posthuman work towards greater radicality and more sound interrogations of power flows, discourse, regimentations of reality, existence, and the like (Spivak, 1993; Bey, 1991; Singh, 2018; Rigolot, 2020).

Exploration of Haraway's and the Cyborg's Genderlessness

In Haraway's *Cyborg Manifesto*, a particular form of subliminal, subversive, and power-ridden movement takes place in their discussion and interrogation of genderlessness regarding their invocation of the cyborg. Even more so, given their cybernetic and poststructuralist intentions, Haraway seems to continuously play with and play at genderlessness in reductive and non-complexifying ways. In other words, they are attempting to attain/imagine some sense of reality—that was/is still reality as meta-physically determining—that was/is genderless, or to think a way around or outside of gender that allowed in some sense more or greater non-human/human liberation,” “justice,” or “goodness” within a posthuman realm (Preciado, 2020; Haraway, 2016; and Chancer, 2017). For instance, an exemplification of this in Preciado (2020) argues,

It's no longer a question of demanding our membership in humanity by denying the primate. The new face of European racism invites us to go a step further, if we do not want to reproduce exclusions and let ourselves be divided. We must reject the classifications that form colonial epistemologies (pp. 58).

To put this in more explicitly, Preciado, in line with Haraway, is arguing that the un-consideration, the negation of humanizations, and the abandonment (the rebellion from) social categories is not only the “right” way to reimagine reality and existence but is the only way to move forward toward imagining posthuman futurities that are more “just” or “liberating” regarding more expansive means of “real”izing some reality that is still incipiently regarded and invoked as real. In other words, within much of posthuman literature as well as Haraway's work, there is this intimate and almost glaring logic that attempts to delineate some reality that could be without gender, calling towards genderlessness or speaking from a supposedly genderless critical frame as a means of liberating the being/non-being of the cyborg from restrictive accesses of humanizations.

I would suggest that cyborgs have more to do with regeneration and are suspicious of the reproductive matrix and of most birthing. For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure and restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd topographical productions at the site of former injury. The regrown limb can be monstrous, duplicated, potent. We have all been injured, profoundly.

We require regeneration, not rebirth, and the possibilities for our reconstitution include the utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous world without gender (Haraway, 2016, p. 67).

One of the primary and foundational (for there is some sense of refoundation in Haraway and posthumanism broadly) aspects of Haraway's cyborg is its always already multipliedness in which gender identity simultaneously becomes piecemeal and nothing, such that genders begin to mix and "lose" their significations within/of reality; the lines of gender moving and bending towards nonexistence and towards negating/ignoring/eschewing the regimes of truth that *move* through the constructions and regimentations of male, female, gender neutrality, third genders, etc. (Haraway, 2016; Firestone, 1970; Stross, 2006; and Dvorsky, 2008). With Haraway's work, moreover, their essay is an explication of reality and a portrayal of a potentialized future that they are arguing on behalf of and arguing toward, yet such futures, as intimated, incur/form/imbibe unquestioned violences and violations as well as a kind of illogical, incomprehensible realization that no longer seems to exist as such (Derrida, 1978; Hepburn, 1999). This cyborgified entity that Haraway defines, redefines, and constructs within the piece is a specific image of a here-to-nonexistent entity/nonentity—an imagining that necessarily confounds poststructuralism's conceptionings of power relationality, its productivity, and the very relations/constructions of reality and existence that confuses our comprehension within such framings of the cyborg/posthuman (Benson, 2014; Roberts and Joseph, 2005).

A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. [...] Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion (Haraway, 2016, pp. 1).

Here, Haraway begins their work with a form/kind of decryption and description of the cyborg as constituted by social, mechanistic, and bodily power. She draws this connection between her explorations and cybernet-

ic theory while still pulling her work toward Michel Foucault's biopolitics (Foucault, 2010). However, a question abounds within her work: does biopolitics speak to the cyborg if one must change the terms that we use to then speak to what may be considered "bio" or of life in regard to the cyborg (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 2003; and Weheliye, 2014)? Even more so, given Haraway's reinvocation of the social as an attenuation of the cyborg, there is a continual reliance on poststructuralism that remains internally confounding and a genealogical and anthropomorphic conception of metaphysical reality/realization that empties their cyborgian exploration of radical differentiation or actualization—that negates the possibilities of the cyborg as we bring such idealizations into "reality." Moreover, partially in line with Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, the cyborg is portrayed as "going beyond" the oedipal, as subverting the real, as becoming/unbecoming/being/nonbeing, as myth-reality-fiction, and as biological and machine. This is a complicated image and reality of the cyborg; however, this analysis demonstrates their mixture of poststructuralism and structuralism, cybernetics and genealogical inheritance, challenging their theoretical radicality and the cyborg's own realization (2016 and Lafontaine, 2007). As Haraway pictures them, cyborgs are contradictory images of reality/humanity/existence within a socializing realm that is always already defined in and by power-written discourses. Yet, cyborgs are not understandable within such discourses since they negate their realizations within their very inscriptions/productions of violence—negating the being of being or emptying reality of any substantial meaning that would inform embodiment, realization, consciousness, actuality, etc. Ultimately, this exploration will grapple with these complications and summarily challenge/push cyborgian and Haraway's thoughts.

First Critique

The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense — a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self-untied at last from all dependency, a man in space (Haraway, 2016, p. 8).

These lines that Haraway pulls together simultaneously disregard the forms of violence they call toward regarding genderlessness and purposefully re-imagine such violation/violence/dehumanization as liberating rather than confusedly indeterminate. In other words, within this first critique, I will argue that Haraway produces a particular formation of violence and violation given the productivity of discourse, power, and regimentation underlined and explicated by poststructural theory. Even more so, I will also argue that, as critical thinkers in a posthuman theoretical space, we must grapple with the violence/liberation that such genderlessness and cyborgification produce as a complicated nexus that is neither one nor the other (Haraway, 2016; Firestone, 1970; Stross, 2006; and Dvorsky, 2008). In turn, I will argue that Haraway's conflation of Marxist structural theologies and poststructural analyses results in a confusing parody of sensemaking and nonsensemaking that reduces such violent endeavors to liberating theologies (Hester, 2010; Deleuze, 1993).

In other words, Haraway's work speaks to liberating idealizations of the cyborg without substantively grappling with the violence inherent in such an indetermination or undefinitionalization. The concept of the cyborg, when viewed from a poststructural perspective, presents a dilemma regarding its relationship with power. On one hand, it is seen as a source of liberation according to Haraway, and on the other hand, the cyborg also perpetuates nonbeing and objectification (Martin & Mason, 2022). While ignoring the violence within such "liberations" and ignoring this form of groundless ground, Haraway implaces the cyborg as a genderless nonbeing and thereby empties the locus of the cyborg of its substantiating reality and summarily expects such conceptualizations/nonconceptualizations of the cyborg/posthuman to retain idealizations and conceptualizations of existence and liberation even as such cyborgs are emptied of meaning, signification, and substance. Furthermore, Haraway (2016) instantiates a reality that corresponds to practices and realizations of dehumanization and various forms/shapes of engendered violence and violation within/of the cyborg as nonbeing, as a being without gender, etc. (Foucault, 1995; Agamben, 1998; Martin & Mason, 2022). Thus, within a poststructural critique, Haraway's cyborg illustrates a particular formation of violence within genderlessness such that once we note the productivity/regimentation of gender, we also have to understand that Haraway simultaneously invokes violence in removing gender from our understandings of being/reality (Hale, 1996). Even more so, I would also and simultaneously contend that posthuman literature should more fully and robustly engage with this

kind of critique in ways that recognize the importance of such violence in imaginative, theoretical work and the potential affects/effects of such violence as recursive, limiting, liberating, and in particular ways made-redundant—understanding the complexities/complications of violence as such rather than idealizing the cyborg or posthuman as liberating idealizations without attendant violence.

As Haraway poses an ungendered mass of cyborgification/cyborgified humanity/non-humanity/beings/non-beings as some place of possibility within theoretical work and praxical imagination, they ignore or eschew whole swathes of poststructural interrogations of reality/discourse. For instance, poststructural analysis of social formations is understood as necessarily productive/violent—an intimate arrangement that is simultaneously mutual and should be grappled with as such in posthuman theoretical explorations. Thus, stripping the gender from the human is not only impossible given the bios of the human as interrelated to gender (thereby denouncing the existence of humans and the existence of existence) but is also a violent endeavor that remains under-explored in Haraway's work (Agamben, 1998 and Weheliye, 2014).

I take interpellation from the French poststructuralist and Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser's theory for how subjects are constituted from concrete individuals by being "hailed" through ideology into their subject positions in the modern state. Today, through our ideologically loaded narratives of their lives, animals "hail" us to account for the regimes in which they and we must live. We "hail" them into our constructs of nature and culture, with major consequences of life and death, health and illness, longevity and extinction. We also live with each other in the flesh in ways not exhausted by our ideologies. Stories are much bigger than ideologies. (Haraway, 2016, pp. 108-109).

To put this another way, within Haraway's cybernetic instantiations of Marxist theologies with poststructuralist analyses, Haraway (2016) consistently and continuously invokes genderlessness as liberating, yet they do not intend to view the destruction of such regimentations of reality as necessarily violent, violating, and destructive of the very means of realizing.

Haraway consistently invokes genderlessness as just, liberatory, and radical in response to gendered violence that is only ever limitedly seen as destructive/violent in their work. As Haraway combines their conception of structural cybernetics with poststructuralist discourse, I would like

to argue that in invoking a genderless cyborg as some idealization of human/nonhuman existence, Haraway also realizes particular forms/kinds of violence that are similar to the forms/kinds of violence that gender also makes possible within gendered understandings of realization, such that an ungendered mass would be just that—not constitutive of the/a social or the/a human in any substantiating way but mere mass or matter—non-beings: “beings” that were forced into non-being and subsumed into some othered being that lacked any coordination of being or reality as substantively understood or understandable (Stróżewski, 2008; Agamben, 1998). In other words, I would also continue to argue that Haraway mimics the kinds/forms of violence that they are directly opposed to within their explorations of gendered violence such that they inhere their image of the cyborg with nonbeing as a means of realizing posthuman possibility, idealizing the nonbeing/being of the cyborg as explicative of unreality (an emptied being/nonbeing that is perpetually within/of a state of liminality). To put this another way, even as Haraway gestures towards the post-structural or even the material (within her conversations of flesh), they also ignore discursive regimentations of power/reality while also instantiating their posthuman as a cyborg manifestation of continual violence and disturbance—a nonbeing without flesh—a being without being, thereby recreating forms of gendered violence while also expanding the realms of such violence towards all entities that are thereby relegated toward non-being (a fixation beyond dualisms yet also more violent in particular ways that eliminate being altogether in place of nonbeing—an indeterminacy of existence that negates itself within its own violation) (Foucault, 2003; Mbembe, 2019).

Second Critique

Continuing, I want us to move our critical engagement with Haraway’s (2016) work beyond these insidious and continuous forms of violence that flow from the un-signification of gender or the insubstantiation of gender from being/reality. I want our critical explorations to more intimately grapple with Haraway’s continual incoherent construction of cyborgian existence qua *being* and the made-inherent impossibilities/contradictions within such (non)constructions. As Haraway confers reality onto the coming into being of the cyborg, she also fixates the cyborg to a particular unreality or a nonsensicalizing instantiation of reality qua *reality* that

seems to only exist within the discourse of the human and thus of gendered conversations (Haraway, 2016; Strózewski, 2008). In other words, I would like to explore the ways in which dropping gender (by refusing to acknowledge gender/by denouncing the signification of gender in relation to the cyborg) not only commits particular forms of violence against the human form/ideal (and even such lived/unlivable instantiations) but also distinctly retains the language of existence and being which thereby limits our ability to speak towards radically, imaginative planes of existence such as the cyborg (such that the cyborg empties its reality as it instantiates its reality). To put this yet another way, I would like to focus on the contradiction at play when we theorize about some othered being yet still retain the linguistic and significatory play of being, reality, and existence as always already intimately attached to anthropomorphic and normativizing understandings of metaphysics, epistemologies, and ontologies (Derrida, 1978; Derrida, 1994).

In broad terms, for instance, Haraway's (2016) genderless cyborg/posthuman instantiates a nonbeing, or an invalidation of *being*, within the conceptualizations of specific understandings of *being* that are inherently made understandable in regard to our normative discourse of being/reality (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 1995; and Butler, 1990). Even as Haraway denounces the being of the cyborg as it is attached to normative conceptions of being/becoming, such as gender, race, class, sexuality, and ability, Haraway still seems to place the cyborg within relation to nonbeing/being as a means of explication and attenuation of their own reality/realization that is necessarily contradictory and limiting. Haraway (2016) states, "The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century" (p. 6); "The cyborg is a creature in a postgender world" (p. 8); "the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self-untied at last from all dependency, a man in space" (p. 8); "The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence" (p. 9); and "The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the self-feminists must code" (p. 33). In other words, even as Haraway plays at nonbeing/being and particular challenges of humanistic being—"The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics"—they are still necessarily and fundamentally emplaced within/of normative and anthropomorphic ontologies and metaphysics as such—cyborgs *are*, as Haraway (2016) con-

tinuously explicates. Haraway's cyborg comes into being as an interplay of being/nonbeing—a liminality that Haraway seems to be playing with, and yet there is also this recursive and repetitive interplay with nonbeing and being that reinstantiates entire histories of metaphysical, epistemological, and ontological development that constantly re-integrates the human form/ideal within the cyborg and does not allow the cyborg to escape or even challenge such indeterminability (Peterson, 2011).

Even more so, although Haraway does make this explicit play with a cyborg ontology and being/nonbeing as such, they also come to this theoretical impulse from a particular vantage of genderlessness, racelessness, classlessness, etc. In other words, what I would like to draw out from Haraway's work immediately is their focus on genderlessness as indicative of the cyborg; the cyborg, therefore, in becoming the cyborg, is detached from the discursive regimentations of gender as demonstrative/productive of the cyborg itself. As Haraway delineates, the cyborg exists within a postgender world; however, how does the cyborg come into existence, or rather how does the cyborg always already exist if our conceptions of existence are not only gendered but also necessarily inculcated within our termifications of the human? How do we ever speak to the cyborg without immediately destroying the possibilities of the cyborg as such? How do Haraway's explorations, thereby, immediately lose or put into precarity their radicality when we insinuate that the cyborg "is" or that it exists? In particular, Haraway's exculpation away from gender (although inherently violent/violating and uncritically engaged with as such) insinuates an incomprehensibility as we imagine the cyborg as an existing being/nonbeing. For even as Haraway (2016) attempts a particularizing dislocation with the cyborg as nonbeing (p. 24) (a potential access of cyborg ontology), our theoretical imaginings and our linguistic ideations are still lacking and ensnared within our always already normativizing accesses to metaphysical, epistemological, and ontological explorations that are inundated by such dialectics and productivities of conceptualizations—being/nonbeing (Derrida, 1978; Peterson, 2011; Stróżewski, 2008).

Ultimately, our theoretical language is still necessarily limited and limiting to our normative anthropomorphic and genealogical theoretical inheritance as can be seen with Haraway's issuance and focus toward gender and with our interplay within/of our first critique of this article, which thereby comes to requestion whether such significations of genderlessness as being/nonbeing are simply incoherent as well as violent—whether genderlessness as such is merely a play with words rather than a substantive

imagining of virtuality/actuality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Ultimately, Haraway's reliance on genderlessness as a means of explicating the cyborg as extant signifies our intellectual and imaginative reliance on normative metaphysics and ontologies that are entrapped within/of the human and the normative as indicative of being/nonbeing, and therefore, the cyborg as an extant nonbeing/being only instantiates its incoherence rather than its atemporal or othered existence. As Haraway continuously calls toward the cyborg's being/nonbeing, as they explicate its being/nonbeing in relation to genderlessness and otherwise, they also intimate its interpolation with normative metaphysics and ontologies that therein subvert the cyborg's very rebellion and radicality (Hepburn, 1999; Strózewski, 2008).

The cyborg is stillborn. Or rather, since it is genderless, it cannot be born or die. Therefore, it cannot exist within our normative attenuations of metaphysics and ontology. Thus, it challenges posthuman work and its own theorizations to instantiate newer linguistic and conceptual detachments from entire genealogical orders of theoretical work that inhere to be all-encompassing. The cyborg's existence never was or never will be so long as we remain within the linguistic determinations and delineations of being/nonbeing, existence/nonexistence, reality/unreality, etc. (Peterson, 2011). Furthermore, within the following section, I will make the continued argument that we must challenge such theoretical/imaginative limitations with other theoretical framings that do not necessarily rely on determinations of being/nonbeing as explicative and that challenge our reliance on normative metaphysics, ontologies, and epistemologies as such—creating a posthuman, or even cyborg, time-space without creation/conception/inception and without time, space, existence, being, etc. as explicative, constructive, sustaining, or sensicalizing.

Imaginative Directions in Conclusion

Within this article, I am challenging the theoretical concept of the cyborg and posthuman. However, I am hoping that this challenge opens up the possibility of creating a continuously transgressive space of the cyborg/posthuman that remains rebellious and challenging instead of becoming incomprehensible. Furthermore, in this final section, I would like to reconsider/reimagine the challenge that Haraway makes toward and away from gender in regard to decolonial and postanarcha-feminist analyses of realization and theoretical/praxical possibilities to challenge existence as such

(Bhabha, 1994; Cruz, 2002; and Herdt, 2020). For instance, in using decolonial or anarchy-feminist understandings of radical “being” or “existence,” we may more fully or rebelliously continue to question the possibilities outside of the binarized spectrum of being/nonbeing/gender/genderlessness (Godman, 2018; Bakošová & Odorčák, 2020; King, 2017; Newman, 2021). Moreover, in response to the problems that I have pulled out of/within Haraway’s cyborg and this posthuman turn, I am arguing for a stronger transdisciplinary and imaginative theoretical impetus put into conversations with the posthuman and the cyborg. Moreover, I would also position our critical movements towards reimagining and radically reunderstanding the limits/boundaries of being/nonbeing as crucial to posthumanism, cyborgification, and questionings of othered-humanisms. Thus, I want to make use of decolonial, posthumanist, and othered-humanist scholars such as Wynters (2003) and Newman (2021) to aid our transformation without inception toward posthuman (un)groundings and other-humanist discourses that may be more liberating, just, or expansive regarding radical metaphysics, ontologies, and epistemological foundations.

To put this yet another way, I am not arguing for myopic considerations of more radical gender identifications/nonidentifications, but instead I am pointing to potentially decolonizable/postanarchival understandings of gender and beingnesses (othered determinations of existence) that go beyond, between, and over understandings of reality and coming into being (and that of being/nonbeing)—imagining a posthuman entity that may exist yet eschews the language and metaphysical constructions of existence qua humanistic understandings (Billey & Drabinski, 2019; Peterson, 2011; Derrida, 1994; Derrida, 1998; Foucault, 2003; Butler, 1997). Even more, I want to suggest that decolonial and postanarchy-feminist work act and take up space as examples of such imaginative and radical directions in theoretical intentions. Further, these transgressive, theoretical directions may allow the theoretician to come towards regimentations of power yet simultaneously question the productivity of power and its relationality beyond some social that is taken as realizing/binding within poststructuralism. In other words, as one possibility using these theoretical frameworks, I want to pose the challenge of reconceptualizing *being/nonbeing* in more transgressive ways that do not entail the nonconsideration of gender as the primary means of identifying a posthuman existence, especially if such explorations are limited in transgressing such constructions of sociality, existence, being/nonbeing, etc. (Newman, 2010; Bey, 1991; and Walby, 2005; Deleuze, 1987).

Ultimately, I want to end within/of a critical stance against the non-complex use of genderlessness as some sense of being/nonbeing that attempts to “escape” the social conceptuality of being within posthuman understandings of power while also repositioning decolonial/postanarcha-feminist understandings of (non)gender(s) or the like in relation to the posthuman towards some potential radical theoretical movement away from normativizing humanistic and anthropomorphic considerations of metaphysics and ontologies that descend from being/nonbeing. In other words, this article argues against the ignorant forwarding a kind of negationary humanization or posthumanization that attempts to remove identity from a productively-oriented and theorized social space. In response to this form of eschewal, I am attempting to produce a critique of such critical attendance to the posthuman/cyborg that hopefully continues and builds on poststructural and posthuman work. On the one hand, given our post-ness of posthumanism, we have to foundationally and wholly come to terms with the violence of genderlessness as it speaks to/from our productive-relational understandings of power, and on the other hand, if we intend to imagine a posthuman posthumanism, we must grapple with and play with other boundaries of posthumanism such as postanarcha-feminist and decolonial frameworks to transgress normative, humanistic metaphysics and ontologies as we call toward the cyborg or the posthuman rather than merely reinculcating determinations of being/nonbeing onto the cyborg or the posthuman (Newman, 2021; Godman, 2018; Bakošová & Odorčák, 2020; King, 2017).

Moreover, while I want to position decolonial and postanarcha-feminist conceptualizations as potential challenges and transgressions from a more power-coercive institutionalization/regimentation/discourse of gendered identity, gendered being, and gendered non-being, such explorations are also limited without intentional, imaginative theory and radical intentions. Thus, the challenge I am presenting in this analysis of power and gender is to present the complexities (the violence within/of liberating movements) inherent within such conversations of the social, reality, gender, being/nonbeing, becoming/unbecoming, power, biopolitics, etc. while also constructing/maintaining means of challenging the limitations of being/nonbeing as understood through humanistic, anthropomorphic, and always already normativizing frameworks for/of metaphysics, epistemologies, and ontologies that may be realized through/with decolonial, postanarcha-feminist, or other radical, imaginative, theoretical work. (Alexander, 2018; Foucault, 1995; Butler, 1997; Newman, 2010; Wynters,

2003). In other words, in/of this article, I have demonstrated the violence and dehumanizing issuances of genderlessness as coming from Haraway's work, arguing for a critical re-understanding of such insidious violation/violence. Even more so, I have also come to argue/illustrate the impossibility of realizing the cyborg within/of *being/nonbeing* such that once the cyborg comes into/toward *being/nonbeing* as a means of explication and realization (intimately interconnected with our conversation of gender and genderlessness) the cyborg murders/negates/makes impossible its own intentionality towards radical exteriority since it continues to come into and towards reality as realizing. Finally, I also preliminarily pointed towards theoretical directions such as decoloniality and postanarcha-feminism within this concluding section to challenge the humanistic, anthropomorphic, and normativizing limitations of moving toward the post-human and/or cyborg from specific coordinations of dialogic discursive regimentations that are constituted from/by metaphysical attenuations of being/nonbeing and reality qua processes of *realization*.

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