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Husserl's phenomenological-communicative project

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This paper aims to present the phenomenological method in the perspective of the philosophy of communication, without depriving the latter of the great importance, in Husserl's works. The first part of this paper presents the ideas contained in *Idee II...*, including also the study of communication and agreement for the mutual exchange of experiences. The second part of this paper is the analysis of the arguments about the intersubjectivity, formulated by Husserl in *Medytacje kartezjańskie*. The last part presents the late period of Husserl's works, which did not weaken his communicative analyses. This paper shows the peculiar evolution the German thinker's views, which partially explains the doubts about the fundamentals of the phenomenological method.

Keywords: phenomenology, communication, intersubjectivity, constitution, primordial reduction

If a given psychological entity is to be,
possess an objective being, then the conditions allowing
for an intersubjective presentation must be met.
Husserl, *Idee II*

1. Introduction

Any compilation of phenomenology and communication seem to create, at least at first, some kind of dissonance. It is true, that Husserl himself did not consider either communication or the language as a means of it as the primary motif of his works. Additional difficulties created by him introducing terms such as pure consciousness or transcendental reduction fortify the seeming absurdity of the connection between philosophy of communication and the phenomenological method. This paper does not aim to assert phenomenology as a theory of communication. It aims rather to show a particular dichotomy of both branches of philosophy. Therefore, it is correct to state that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology project, pretending to be the fundamental theory of other sciences, is impossible to fulfill without the existence of intersubjective communication.

In the first part, Husserl's interpretation of communicative community is presented – beginning with the descriptions present in *Idee czystej fenomenologii i fenomenologicznej filozofii* ["Ideas II: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution"] and later in *Medytacje kartezjańskie* ["Cartesian Meditations"], in which the main role seems to be played by transcendental intersubjectivity; here, the key reflections of said work will be recalled, connecting intersubjective space with the idea of co-presenting, association, and pairing. The last part of this paper will create a kind of phenomenological circle – Husserl's analyses contained in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* will be presented there.

2. Communicative community – early analyses

In *Idee II* ["Ideas II"] (Husserl 1974) the phenomenologist starts to analyze more deeply the issues concerning intersubjectivity and the communication connected with it (similar analyses are also present in *Badania logiczne* ["Logical investigations"] (Husserl 2000), but there they have a different connotation pointing to the idea of the meaningfulness of expressions). He addresses issues there concerning the surrounding world – animal, physical, or the ideal mathematical beings' world. This world is the subject of interpersonal, intentional communication. As Husserl writes:

such surrounding world constitutioning itself in experiencing others, in understanding each other, and in agreement, we name as communicative [...] the idea of communication widens, understandably, from one personal subject also to social communities of subjects [...] (Husserl 1974: 277-278)

Observe that the sphere of other subjects and the possibility of sharing the epistemological experiences "carefully" takes an important role in Husserl's work. He was aware that eidetic-transcendental procedures cannot be correctly performed on the stage of intersubjective analysis. Furthermore, in the first part, titled *Konstytucja materialnej przyrody* ("The material constitution of nature"), in point F, Husserl shifts from the solipsistic understanding of experiencing the world to the intersubjective context, which is closely connected with him to noticing the necessity of the existence of other subjects, other living beings. He writes there: "If there is no such apperceptive branch, then it does not also define my understanding of things, if it still does define in my real experience, but the certain additions fall from my now modified vision of the world" (Husserl 1974: 112). Herein a certain reassurance may be found, which relates to the common experiencing the objects of experiences. After all, I experience the real, existing objects in the same way as others, called here the bodies of foreign subjects, and these objects are equipped with the same apperceived values. But why, without this part of the world, which consists of the sphere of living beings, to which includes the complex of the transcendental supposed beings, is my "solitary" apperception lesser? From Husserl's arguments, one can answer that that is so due to causal reactions, which come from the coexisting living bodies and are characteristic of them. These vast, determined relations are the verification of my apperception of the world. Furthermore, due to the sphere of

communication, used by Husserl as a function of understanding each other regarding the expressions about the perceived objects, I can verify the correctness of my “vision” of the world. The discrepancy between my experience and the intersubjective experience of others is for the creator of phenomenology the boundary experience. However, this does not mean that there is no division of the egoistic, as called by Husserl, world from the communicative world and from every relation based on the agreement between other people, which implies a multitude of apperceptions existing in communicative world. As Husserl's remarks, the world valid only for an individual is the basis of the world of interpersonal communication (Husserl 1974: 112-113, 273-274).

It is worth asking: “How does it happen that the relation to the multitude of communicating people influences the ideas of things and is constitutional to the idea of a particular object as ‘objectively real’?” (Husserl 1974: 113). Answering this question one should note above all the specific character of this relation, which introduces a difficult riddle – we perceive other people as bodies, thus by turning our focus toward such being, our objected focus perceived these beings as objects of experiences (as other real objects). Moreover, there is no rule that we must necessarily consider the existential thesis stating that other living beings exist during the performance of intentional acts on the intended objects of experience.. For this question the German phenomenologist puts forward a solution – phenomenology, which orients itself to the objected perception. After all, such a conceptualization of the supposed object in which it would seem “objectively real” is needed. This conceptualization will lead us to the identification of the ingredients that need to be fulfilled in the intentional view, namely, intentions. The theme of presentation is not without importance in the analyzed article. It, along with the issue of constitution, turns to ‘I’ as a doer of acts in the flowing stream of consciousness. As Husserl wrote: “everything that I experience belongs to my ‘surrounding’, and that means, above all, that my body is also present as a body” (Husserl 1974: 114). Worth noting here is the ascertainment that this bodily presence is not required during the phenomenological insight into the nature of the experienced objects. Therefore, what exactly is *solus-ipse* and can it really be defined? Husserl's arguments strengthen the theory questioning its existence. *Solus-ipse* is not a person alienated from their surroundings even if they have the phenomenon of having a body belonging to them at their disposal. The philosopher explains that, even if isolated from their community, a person is still in the circle of living beings. Thus they are an *Intersubjective object*. However, is this not a paradox considering his previous remarks? After all, the key ingredient for the phenomenological method, transcendental reduction, postulates a necessary *epoché* – a suspension of the existentialist thesis concerning the existence of the world and its psycho-physical subjects. W. Płotka correctly writes in *Studia z fenomenologii poznania* (“The studies of the phenomenology of discovering”) that

the phenomenology did not give any foundation to understanding the possibility of knowledge about other subjects [...] the cardinal sin of phenomenology is, in that context, the transcendental reduction, because of which the relation of subject towards other subjects become problematic, which locked [...] the subject into the borders of subjective immanency, that is – the sure and direct knowledge [...] (Płotka 2015: 219)

Is the admittance of the existence of the intersubjective community doubtful or does it perhaps lower the success rate of the method originated by Husserl? When faced with the transcendental method, do the community of communicating living bodies, as accepted in *Idee II...* (Husserl 1974), with whom I, as a living subject, obtain the confirmation of the existence of my experiences which happened in a particular moment, have the right to guarantee the truthfulness of my cognition? In the aforementioned work, the creator of the phenomenology seems not to care about these aspects. It is also questioned by Theunissen (1977) who said: “The subject of dialogical critique is mainly [...] the transcendental philosophy as knowledge about the constitution of the world from the subjectivity” (Theunissen 1977: 246).

Let us get back to what the creator of the method considered by this paper thinks about the constitution of a physical object in the intersubjective-communicative context. Husserl considers nature, our closest surrounding, as an intersubjective reality in which all collectivity exists and communicates. This kind of existence is based on the representative function of consciousness, continuing the phenomenon of the body and belonging to everyone who belongs to this reality. However, as we know, a physical object consists of a complex of conscious, equivocal expressions. This equivocality is the characteristic of intersubjectivity. Thus, it has a binding power, drawn from the elements of communication and further validated by the community by way of common agreement.

Husserl (1974: 123) explains:

The objective designation designates objects by that which belongs and must belong to it if it must appear to me or anyone else who is in community with me, and should appear the same for everyone belonging to the communicating community.

The various kinds of sensual aspects should not play any part in this designation. However, what, that is common and which, by subjectival presentation, decides on the possibility of agreement, gives it the right to exist? These are mainly terms related to space and time in which the object of a particular perception is located. Nevertheless, even this communicative community is bound by *concepts*, which create a particular *rule* functioning in said community. This rule constitutes a set of terms that relate to a physical object of experiences and allow for a common interchange of experiences. It pertains to all phenomena appearing to an intersubjective community. These appearances form the constitution of sense – they cause a particular physical object to be animated by sense. What is vital is that the placement of said object in reality is characterized by objectivity and appears to subjects by intercommunal identification; physical terms are thus the objective qualities of objects. As Husserl (1974) writes: “That which is objectively real is not in my, or anyone else’s, ‘space’ as in ‘phenomenon’, but in objective space which is a formal unity”. The German philosopher writes here about *communal consciousness* which, by means of objectivization, leads to the constitution of pure, spatial forms. This objectivization treats a particular spatial fragment as an *expression*. This spatial fragment is also equipped with sensual qualities. Communal consciousness, in contrast to the individual one, contains these various expressions. This consciousness is made up from the all possible to accept expressions.

Therefore, pure space does not constitute itself by an idealizing abstraction as a brief overview of *Badania logiczne* may have suggested, but by a community. Expressions are not particular to an individual. They pertain to the intersubjective community based on common agreement (Husserl 1974: 119-124).

3. Primordial reduction of the transcendental 'i' and 'pairing' in *Medytacje kartezyjańskie*

Considering the value of Husserl's transcendental reduction in relation to the suspension of the thesis of the existence of the world and its other subjects which are, as a result, apperceived as body-forms and oneself is considered as a living body (with a soul), we can enquire into the value of the connection of the primordial reduction with the intersubjective space. This dissonance is noted by S. Judycki, who relates this reduction to an issue of constitutional function of consciousness. In his book (1990: 45) he writes that this reduction "is similar to a paradox. It ignores the Other and all they constitute, to later achieve the Other in a constitutional consideration". Worth noting is that Husserl named this reduction variously: 'reduction to the sphere of solipsism' (a term rarely used by him), 'reduction to that which is mine', or primordial reduction. Let us concentrate on the origin of these remarks – the text of *Medytacje kartezyjańskie* in which Husserl starts *Fifth meditation* with the description of such reduction while also trying to refute the solipsistic objections.

In relation to the act of experiencing other subjects, Husserl (1982: 131) asks: "What then about other egos, which are not only my representation or something only in me represented, [...] but, following their own sense, exist as Others?" Accusing transcendental realism of lacking the phenomenological method in its fundamental assumptions, Husserl points to the consequential aspects of its purpose. Transcendental realism tries to find a link between the immanent sphere of the subject and transcendence, consisting of other egos, or as the philosopher calls them, Others. The ascertainment that there are transcendental boundaries of cognition which stretch no further than to the sphere of transcendental experience, which may seem so obvious, is not an exhaustive answer to this question. However, one cannot deny that this transcendental ego, which does not experience through nothing but by way of representations constituted in the immanent life of consciousness, is the indicator of the world itself, and so too the Other in their transcendence; the Other, who as *alter ego*, *other ego*, reveals itself personally through intentional acts and creates a system of equivocal experiences. The analysis of the specific type of this intentionality, in which the Other introduces itself to me as a correlate of my own *cogito* through the revelation of its noetic-ontic endowment, is the main duty of the phenomenological method. As can be seen, there is no possibility of reaching the sense of Others outside of a pure consciousness that recognizes originally, which, through the reduction to the sphere of that which is its own, steps outside the boundary of its own "privacy" and experiences the intersubjective world. This surrounding world is the communalized world. Nevertheless, Husserl recognizes that "nonetheless everyone manages his own experiences, has his own sphere of occurrences [...]" (Husserl 1982: 133).

What can then be called transcendental intersubjectivity, or rather what is its relation to the objective world in which it exists? As Husserl (1982: 158) writes in *Medytacje kartezjańskie* “Transcendental intersubjectivity can, thanks to this communalization, manage the intersubjective sphere of that which is its own”. In this case, Husserl does not make a distinction between the transcendental ego and the other ego; he writes rather from the perspective of “Us”. This intersubjectivity is characterized by its subject-like relation to the world, which is from now on objective to it. Its realization is the human collectivity. Looking back to the primal division between the objective world and “the intersubjective sphere of that which is its own”, we can conclude that this world “participates” in the sphere’s representations as the immanent transcendent. In this sense, the objective world is not quite an unreachable transcendental reality, but rather a synthesis of the equivocal and common experiences. The ideal objective world, as “the ideal correlate of the intersubjective experience”, is still a possibility which manifests itself in the intersubjective, transcendental community of monads. They, in turn, possess a mutually compatible constitutional endowment which aims to reveal the intentional structures through the communalized experience (Husserl 1982: 158-159).

Here, I will shortly discuss the concept of “co-presenting” (“apresenting”) as an analogous apperception to explain the constitution of the other. This will allow for a clearer presentation of the idea of “pairing”.

In paragraph 50, Husserl (1982), setting the ground for the description of the term: “co-presentation” as it relates to acts in which we perceive other subjects. In this perception, the Other does not yet seem to be a “human” bestowed with sense. Worth noting, however, the constitution of Others (or the Other), is the first stage of the constitutional accomplishment from the perspective of the constitution of the objective world. As Olbromski (2011) writes: “Primordial sphere of that which is intersubjective exists continuously, as if it were in the background of the intentionality of the stream of consciousness. This is a peculiar social intentionality of the stream of consciousness, because the Other is, from the very beginning, present in the stream of consciousness of ‘I’”. As Husserl writes, the essential arrival to the sphere of the Other has the specific character of the reference: in eidetic view I am not presented with the representations the Other experiences. Neither do I have epistemic access to the Other’s inner experiences. Additionally, the German philosopher underlines that if access to the original presentation of the ‘I’ of the Other were available, they would be a part of me. Essentially, he would be me. The fact that this is not so suggests the indirect character of intentionality, which has its origin in the sphere of primal provenance. It presents “the representation of something co-existing (Mit-da) which is not present alone and never can be presented itself alone” (Husserl 1982: 161). Therefore, it must be something that manifests itself in “co-actuation” which Husserl names “co-presentation” (*Appräsentation*).

Co-presentation also occurs in the process of experiencing physical object. During this type of experience, only one side of the object is presented, and through co-presenting, said object reveals its other side.

The problem, however, is in perceiving other subjects. The key question concerns the motivational aspect functioning on the field of primal origin and pertains to the spheres relating to the Others (Husserl 1982: 161). What then is the real role of the intentional-

ity in the analyzed processes of the consciousness? The thinker underlines the semantic concept of the Other. I, as the experiencer, treat the Other as “other I”, as “alter ego”. In turn, I apperceptively treat myself as ego, which is understood as ‘personal I’. This personal I, intentionally endowed, is treated by the philosopher as “the man of original provenance”. During the first phase of the transcendental reflection, I treat the Other as a bodily shape functioning in the natural sphere of original provenance. As a result of the reductive processes, the Other seems to be “the immanent transcendent” because “it is the only natural moment defining myself” (Husserl 1982: 163). In the natural aspect the experiencing subject is the living bodily shape. It perceives other bodily shapes of this kind as living. This is done through “apperceptive transfer”. It presumes basing on the declaration about the existence of itself as a body that is alive. Present is neither the analogical thinking nor inference (Husserl 1982: 164).

Husserl dedicates the paragraph 51 to the description of “primal pairing”. It is closely connected with the procedure of experiencing the Others. Through it, ego and alter ego are necessarily “connected”. It is worth noting that this, which presents itself to the subject through co-presentation, in no way presents itself in the act of proper self-presentation. The acts of pairing, or joining into larger complexes on the higher degree, are the key issues of the transcendental phenomenology. The phenomenologist defines them as the *primal form of the passive synthesis*, called the *association* constituting the Other.

As we can read in Husserl (1982: 166):

the association can be characterized through the invocation of the most elementary occurrence, when to the equivocal consciousness presented are, as something personally distinct, two dates, which on the ground of this consciousness build phenomenologically, as the two mutually different objects, a some kind of similarity; building it, which is now termed a being, in the sphere of pure passivity, thus independently of whether it is perceived or not [...]

The association process, in the context of *alter ego*, and the pairing have their point of origin in the moment of finding the Other in the sphere of my perception, my experience. In the sphere of primal experiencing the experiencing individual apperceives itself as the *psycho-physical I* – including the living shape of its own body. This is a permanent state, which does not depend on the *I* being the doer of any acts at the moment. Therefore, in the situation of perceiving another bodily shape (which has entered the horizon of the sphere of my original provenance) I have the ability to encompass it as a living bodily shape. Husserl writes, that this Other, that enters my field of perception, somehow *reminds* me of myself. He is a bodily shape, which “is built in that way that it must enter an occurring pair together with my body” (Husserl 1982: 167). However, how does it happen that, during the act of perceiving, there is no specific mistake, which would order to treat the Other as a body that belongs to me? Let us here get back to the second type of apperception, mentioned above. For there is no original experience in the sphere of inception.

Unresolved remains the question regarding in which perspective of the surrounding world – meaning the world of my primal origin – I apperceive the Other. As Husserl states, the association connected with it has the direct character. That means that the bodily shape is visible to me through the reconstruction in *modus There*. It is not direct

association that I make apperceiving my own body in *modus Here*. The whole constituting process of the Other is done on the basis of similarity, leading to the regimen of pairing, creating the possibility of completing the acts of converging apperception. As the phenomenologist writes: “it reminds (*erinnert*) the way my body would look like *if I were there*” (Husserl 1982: 175). However, somewhat paradoxically, co-presentation in the sphere of original provenance does not require that to this sphere “belong” the terms belonging to *alter ego* – it is not a part constituting the psychological life of ego. I cannot, intending in the direction of *alter ego*, be simultaneously where there is *the bodily shape’s There and Here*, because my body, being a living body and a monad, is *the Center*. This center is the indicator of *the orientation*. Of course, this privilege is inherently mine in the sphere of my inceptions. As we can read in *Medytacje...*: “Therefore, the whole sphere [...] of moments, defining me as a monad, has the content of Here, not including [...] the content which transforms itself in the any possible act of a certain *Can and do*, not including, therefore, the content of said defined There”. Here returns the context refuting the treatment of co-actuation, co-presentation as leading to the original actuation (Husserl 1982: 176-177).

Following the remarks of the phenomenologist, it is worth noting that underway of his arguments he puts more and more spotlight to the aspect of the community. Husserl asks about the purpose of the community. According to him, it becomes an object of apperceptive conceptualization in its early phases, namely in the moment when I perceive, that in the sphere of my inceptions there are other monadistic egos. As an inherent fundament of a community, Husserl considers the nature. He attributes to it the prime role of a constructor and simultaneously a component of said community, which consists of other living subjects. These other bodies, as ‘I’ made up from the psycho-physical elements, I perceive as similar to my own ‘I’. In that way, in the sphere of my own, immanently defined subjectivity enters subjectivity that does not belong to that sphere. Through co-presenting my subjectivity is percolated by the existence of the alien subjectivity, by its sense and presence. Husserl is intrigued by the question about the nature of the communalization with other alien subjects, which first and foremost element is the one, available to everyone, world (Husserl 1982: 179-180).

As Husserl writes in a paragraph titled “Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding world”, the correct understanding the concept of community is the key to the discovery what intentional acts, leading to the spheres of other ‘I’s’ are possible. Through the medium of co-presenting we can perform “specifically personal acts of the Ego that have the character of acts of mine directed to you, the character of social acts, by means of which all human personal communication is established.” (Husserl 1982: 178).

Besides, a very similar ascertainment can be found in *Idee II...*, where Husserl claims that the existence of a community is dependent on the existence of the acts that are socially communicative (Husserl 1974: 275). Such acts, their study, the arrival to the transcendental clarification of the various varieties of social life are placed very highly in the hierarchy of the scientific importance by Husserl.

4. The communicative aspects in *Erste Philosophie* and *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*

The reflections contained in the above-mentioned works clearly underline the communicative context in the relation to the intersubjective community of communicating monads.

I will begin my argument with the description of the reflections contained in *Erste Philosophie*. This will allow for a fluid passage to *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*. In *Erste Philosophie* Husserl asks about the historical purposefulness, which pertains to the development of the intersubjectivity in the transcendental meaning. He underlines the major role of history in explaining teleology of human existence, which is plagued by the metaphysical doubts. It is the history with its absolute sense that answers the ultimate questions about the human existence, and even is its expressions. The phenomenologist ascertains that the existence of a community (consisting of the absolute I's), which main attributes are the possibility of communication and the constitution of the reality, is fixed only in the history. It is the history that is the absolute and irrefutable representation and confirmation of the being (Husserl 1956: 506; Judycki 1990: 216). In the third volume of *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* Husserl explains the issue of the absolute being, which actuality is revealed in the historic interpretation. This absolute being is created, according to Husserl, by the timeless monads. They exist in the eternity, thus the Husserl's ascertainment of a being of the absolute character. The transcendental monads, constituting the communicative human community, function if the objective harmony created by the history.

We read that:

Human existence, being of the human world – the world that is for the humans – is the existence in the constantly alive history and in the history that is being created, that has constantly a new face in which genesis can be seen and read. The history of the human existence, including the world created by humans together with the arrival of newborns and the departure of the deceased, the generative relationship and based on it history of community as the history of humankind – all of this has the transcendental meaning and is revealed in the phenomenological method.¹ (Husserl 1973b: 391)

The transcendental subjectivity, that creates the nature, reveals its actuality only in the history pertaining to the world. The possibility of defining the origin of the stage of development of the transcendental subjectivity is validated by the nature created by it. It is in the latter that we come to a contact with other people, who function in the boundaries of space-time world. As Judycki (1990: 216) interprets the arguments in the second

¹ In the original: "Menschliches Dasein, Sein der menschlichen Welt – der Welt, die für Menschen seiende ist – ist Sein in beständig lebendiger Geschichte und Sein in sedimentierter Geschichte, die als das ihr immer neues historisches Gesicht hat, dem die Genesis anzusehen, dem sie abzufragen ist. Die Historie des menschlichen Seins, in der von ihm her gewordenen Welt, zugerechnet auch das Hineinwachsen des Geborenen in diese Welt, das Ausscheiden des Sterbenden, der generative Zusammenhang und die von ihm getragene Gemeinschaftsgeschichte als Menschheitsgeschichte – das aller hat transzendente Bedeutung und wird in phänomenologischer Methode enthüllt".

volume of *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, that through the ‘grounding’, meaning giving the placement in space and time, and shape, of the other monads “the creation of the intermonadic communication which is the intersubjective communication on the world level, is possible. As we can read in the aforementioned work:

the subjects, who create with me the universe of shared communication, treat each other necessarily as subjects whose world of experiences relates to the same norm, the same idea, the normal corporality, and whose personal truth is exactly the same for all even when many of them would not know the truth alone in the personal discourse.² (Husserl 1973a: 132)

The importance of the transferring the subjectivity, which was in the sphere of its own transcendence, to the bodily subject, equipped with the tool allowing for an intersubjectal communication, is priceless for the explaining the purpose of history and the significance of the development of the transcendental intersubjectivity. It is through communication that the absolute I can reach the top of consciousness, and the communicative community can realize the immemorial pursuit of self-improvement. That is done so by the collective shaping of science, which results and achievements are distributed between the members of communicating community (Judycki 1990: 216-217).

5. Conclusion

This paper presents the creator of the phenomenology from the different perspective than the one usually associated with Husserl and his method. The ideas of the transcendental reduction and the pure consciousness, which are considered to be the key elements of the phenomenology, push aside his reflections about communications or the world of the other people.

It may seem that the categories with which the characteristic of the phenomenology is performed cannot be harmonically linked with the ideas about communication, the transcendental intersubjectivity, and the interpersonal agreement. It could also be stated that Husserl was so focused on the idea of reaching the quiddity or the arguments concerning the pure consciousness that the sphere of other subjects was not considered or deemed irrelevant. However, this cannot be further away from the truth. I consider the thesis, stated at the beginning, that there is no possibility of realizing the phenomenologist project without accepting the intersubjective communicative community, to be valid and relevant. It is the possibility of the mutual exchange of equivocal experiences, achieved through the interpersonal communication, that can create the idea of common knowledge, the knowledge that serves both the subject and the whole community. The concept of the primordial reduction (suspending the existence of that, which is seen by the consciousness as alien in the transcendental constitution) or the absolute subjectivity

² In the original: “Die Subjekte, die mit mir ein Universum der wechselseitigen Kommunikation bilden, fassen sich notwendig wechselseitig als Subjekte auf, deren Erfahrungswelt auf dieselbe Norm, auf dieselbe Idee einer normalen Leiblichkeit bezogen ist und deren anschauliche Wahrheit genau dieselbe ist für alle, mögen noch so viele die Wahrheit selbst nicht von Angesicht zu Angesicht kennen”.

does not exclude 'I' from the world. Quite the opposite – it becomes the fully conscious part of the common world responsible for its objectivity. Through the communication with the other members of the transcendental community, the absolute 'I' constitutes the teleological, receding in the past, animated with the sense reality.

Worth noting is the clearly saccadic evolution in Husserl's views. In *Idee czystej fenomenologii i fenomenologicznej filozofii* the phenomenologist starts to notice the issues of intersubjectivity in the context of communication. The sphere of other subjects and the possibility of the exchange of the epistemological experiences start to 'warily' become important. He was, after all, conscious that, on this stage of the intersubjective analyses, eideto-transcendental procedures cannot be properly performed. Maybe because of this, in *Medytacje kartezjańskie*, appears the theory of co-presentation and pairing, which, by the intentional acts, the association, lead to the understanding the Other who – importantly – does not appear in an original actuation. This procedure aimed to compile the fundamental theses of the phenomenological method, which should not be 'guilty' of the depriving the transcendental ego the presence of the Other, who is important for the sake of the consultation of the epistemological results. Therefore, the phenomenological mode of discovering the world is based on the social communication, or rather – it cannot be performed without this communication. This is a brave ascertainment, requiring also further analyses.

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