

Pleasure in the Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Writings

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The literary legacy of Aristotle is generally divided into two groups. The first contains the works which were carefully edited and published by Aristotle. Their target were the educated Greeks who were not connected with the Peripatetic school. These works (called also *exoteric* on the account of their purpose) have not survived and they are only known from quotations, excerpts, paraphrases and testimonies. The reading public of the second group of writings was only the members of Lykeion. These treatises were probably used by Aristotle for his lectures, and they were not published until the first century B.C. by Andronicus of Rhodes. The fragments of the 'exoteric' works were not always viewed as genuine and there are also some doubts regarding the testimonies, as well as the first edition of the passages from ancient literature concerning Aristotle's philosophy made by Valentine Rose, which was not without reason entitled *Aristoteles pseudepigraphus* (Rose 1863). But there were also researchers such as Jacob Bernays (1863) who did not have any doubt regarding their authenticity.¹ The middle view, according to which some of Aristotle's works mentioned in ancient literature are original, while some are of questionable authenticity, was expressed, for example, by Eduard Zeller. This researcher has

¹ See also e.g. Heitz 1865.

also accepted the hypothesis that some of the lost works were written by Aristotle during his stay in Plato's Academy, and that the doctrine contained in these writings was closely affiliated with Platonism. Later on, this hypothesis was accepted by Werner Jaeger, who has claimed that Aristotle's philosophy has evolved and has gradually departed from Platonism to form an original Aristotelian system.¹ Since Rose's compilation, there have been published several collections of the fragments and testimonies. Furthermore, the individual lost works have been variously and separately reconstructed and edited.² The newest and the most extensive edition (Gigon 1987) divides the reports from ancient literature into the testimonies and fragments. The latter is divided in turn into the fragments of the works whose titles appear in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue, works whose titles are not in this catalogue, and the fragments which cannot be attributed to any of Aristotle's known works. The aim of this paper is to present the statements about pleasure [*hēdonē*] which appear in the fragments and to analyse them with reference to the teaching about pleasure found in the surviving works. Passages in which *hēdonē* seems not to have a specific philosophical meaning are discussed in the first part of the article and the rest in the second.³

I

A remark on pleasure can be found in the one of the fragments attributed to Aristotle's dialogue *Symposium*. Pondering the merits of the Rhodian cups from which wine is drunk, the Peripatetic philosopher notes that they strengthen the pleasure of drinking [*hēdonēn eis tas methas pareispherontai*].⁴ The remark seems to have a technical rather than a philosophical meaning, but it shows that Aristotle was engaged with the empirical aspect of *hēdonē*. He used such observations in the philosophical argumentation. Considering the question of moderation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he states that pleasure from the taste can in some cases be excluded from intemperance. A tester of wine and a head chef are examples of those who because of their activities are not exposed to the danger of intemperance. In other cases, the pleasure of drinking wine is caused by the

¹ Zeller (1879: 57 ff.); Jaeger 1923.

² See e.g. Walzer 1934; Ross 1955; Düring 1961; Untersteiner 1963. On the reconstructions of the treatise *On philosophy* and the translations of the fragments see Pacewicz 2012: 169–197.

³ Because of the critical attitude of some researchers towards Gigon's edition (it is considered to be too extensive and to contain many irrelevant references to Aristotle – Gottschalk 1991), I will limit myself in this study to Rose's and Ross's editions. Two fragments are omitted here. The first is Clem. Al. *Paed.* III 12, 84 (= fr. 183 [Rose 1886]), and it is taken into consideration only in Rose's collection. The second is Ath. *Deipnosophistae*, XV 523E (= fr. 557 Rose [1886] = 565, 1 Gigon [1984]) because the reference to *hēdonē* probably does not come from Aristotle; see Hose 2002: 212.

⁴ Ath. *Deipnosophistae*, XI 464c (fr. 111 Rose [1886] = fr. 11 Ross [1955] = fr. 676 Gigon [1987]). In the Polish translation (Bartol, Danielewicz 2010), it is interpreted that the jars have a nice smell. The verb *pareispherein* seems to mean 'to add', 'to improve', and *hēdonē* can denote both the taste and bouquet of the wine.

sense of touch and it can take the form of the vice called intemperance in drinking (*EN* 1118a23–b 1).

The second remark can be found in the scholia to Homer's *Odyssey*. The scholium is related to the famous scene where the old dog Argos recognizes his previous master Odysseus and dies (*Od.* XVII 299–327). Aristotle has to say that the cause of dog's death is *hēdonē* because violent and intense pleasures are destructive [*sphodrai kai ischurai hēdonai dialousai*].⁵ I did not find much the same view in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, but it is worth noting that the Stagirite uses the adjectives *sphodros* and *ischuros* with regard to pleasure (*GA* 723b32–33; *EN* 1150b7). It is also probable that he has shown in the example of Argos that a lack of self-control – quite a natural state for animals because they have no ability to reason – can even cause death in extreme cases.⁶

II

It is known from the afore-mentioned catalogue of Diogenes Laertius (V 22) that there was a one-volume work of Aristotle entitled *On pleasure* [*Peri hēdonēs*]. Unfortunately, no quotation, excerpt or paraphrase has been preserved, and there is no consensus among researchers as to which references in ancient literature refer to this text, because several of them are attributed to the other work – *On Justice*.⁷ As Cicero confirms, in *On Pleasure* Aristotle criticised a type of life based solely on the bodily pleasures associated with food [*edere*] and sex [*exsaturata libido*]. The king of Syria, Sardanapalus, was to admit to such way of life and to find it praiseworthy (as he mentions it in his tombstone inscription).⁸ A key argument to reject such types of pleasure as good things is that they are “animal” in nature, as well as being short-lived and elusive.⁹ The king of Syria

⁵ *Scholia Vindobonenses* on *Odyssey* XVII 337 (= fr. 177 Rose [1886] = fr. 400 Gigon [1987]).

⁶ The moral interpretation of this scene from *Odyssey* can be found in Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* (475A).

⁷ Heitz (1869: 58–59) accepts two fragments: (1) Ath. *Deipnosophistae*, 6D, (2) (a) Ath. *Deipnosophistae*, 335F, (b) Cic. *Tusculanes disputationes*, V 35; (c) *De finibus*, II 32, 106; Rose (1886) believes that these passages come from *On justice*; Ross (1955) approves only (1); Laurenti (1987: 825–826) gives his assent to (2). He adds also the passage from Strabo (XIV 5, 9) and acknowledges (1) dubious. In contrast, Gigon (1987) does not take Strabo's fragment into consideration at all; according to him the passages (1), (2b) and (2c) cannot be ascribed to any known title. The passage (2a) is taken into account wider (335E–336B) it is regarded as the fragment of *On justice*.

⁸ There is no certainty that Sardanapalus was the historical person. A description of his hedonistic way of life can be found in the *Historical library* of Diodorus of Sicilia (II 23–27). The source of it is probably Ctesias of Cnidus (V/IV century B.C.).

⁹ See Cic. *Tusculanae disputationes*, V 35, 101: „quo modo igitur iucunda vita potest esse, a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio? ex quo Sardanapalli, opulentissimi Syriae regis, error adgnoscutur, qui incidi iussit in busto: »Haec habeo, quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido / Hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relictā.« »quid aliud« inquit Aristoteles »in bovis, non in regis sepulcro inscriberes? haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur«; »De finibus, II 32, 106: »corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intellego, cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tantopere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae gloriatur se omnis secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse. Quod enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat, quam dum fruebatur, quo modo id potuit mortuo permanere? effluit igitur voluptas corporis et prima quaeque avolat saepiusque relinquit causam paenitendi quam recordandi».

is mentioned twice in the works of Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, this is used to rebuff one of the wrong concepts of happiness [*eudaimonia*], that is to say, to identify happiness with pleasure. The reasoning is very succinct: if someone chooses this type of life, he or she is in favour of a submissive existence, of which the life of cattle is an example.¹⁰ Naturally, the servility means in this case not only a lack of freedom in the political and legal sense (the opposite of the slave is a free man [*eleutheros anēr*] who is able to manage the polis and to run his or her life according to their own preferences), but also a dearth of proper intellectual abilities and character manifested in the lack of *paideia* (EN 1128a19–22), an inability to show a suitable emotional reaction in various moral situations (*Rh.* 1387b4–15; EN 1126a3–8; EE 1231b5–13), or an inclination to intemperance and to find pleasure in the sense of touch (EN 1118a26–30). In the *Eudemian Ethics* (EE 1216a16–18), Sardanapalos and one of the very rich inhabitants of Sibaris, named Smyndirides,¹¹ serve as examples of people who recognize the identification of happiness with joy [*chairein*], which is the result of a life devoted to joy [*apolaustikos*]. But this way of life has no positive overtones. On the contrary, it is a joy which, if accompanied by those in power, exposes them to contempt on the part of citizens and threatens them with another coup d'état (*Pol.* 1312b21–25). It is worth noting that the interpretations of the way of life of Sardanapalos in both treaties differ in terminology; the term 'pleasure' [*hēdonē*] is used once, as is the verb 'to rejoice' [*chairein*]. Maybe it is just an ostensible difference, and the relationship between the two concepts simply indicates which pleasures and joys are at stake. In *On the generation of animals*, both terms are clearly used synonymously: pleasure/joy is what accompanies sexual intercourse (GA 723b32–724a1).

The problem of pleasure is also raised in the *Protrepticus*. The best reconstruction of the work is that of Ingemar Düring who distinguishes eleven themes.¹² Pondering the role of philosophy in human life, Aristotle points out that it does not require any special tools or space because it can be taken up everywhere. What is more, philosophy enables people to put everyday matters aside and willingly engage in this type of intellectual activity. It is supposed to prove that one philosophizes with pleasure [*meth' hēdonēs*],¹³ because – it seems – people choose philosophy of their own accord [*boulesthai*], so its practice would be a sign of a free man, who is not forced to work. It is work and daily duties that are somehow pushed into the background to deal with philosophy, and since it seems to be

¹⁰ See also Arist. EN 1118b16–21: τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει: ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις; EE 1215b30–35: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὧν ἀνδράποδον.

¹¹ See Hdt. *Historiae*, VI 127; D.S. *Bibliotheca historica*, VIII 18–19; Ath. *Deipnosophistae*, VI 105; Ael. *VH*, IX 24.

¹² Düring 1961; Düring 2005.

¹³ As Düring (1961) rightly observes, a similar thought appears already in Platonic *Eutydemus*, where joy (*charien*) is mentioned.

the opposite of labour, it can be dealt with for a long time and without being exhausted.¹⁴ This attitude towards pleasure can also be found in the *Rhetoric*:

What is not compulsory also [is pleasurable]; for compulsion is contrary to nature. (...) Duties and studies and exertions are painful; for these too are necessarily compulsions unless they become habitual; then habit [*to ethos*] makes them pleasurable. And their opposites are pleasurable; thus, ease and freedom from toil and carefreeness and games and recreations and sleep belong among pleasures; for none of these is a matter of necessity. And everything is pleasurable for which there is longing [*epithumia*]; for longing is a desire [*oreksis*] for pleasure.¹⁵

The correlation between pleasure and philosophy is close not only because of freedom and human will. Aristotle formulated in the *Protreptic* a few arguments in favour of the above relationship, although due to the state of the reconstruction of this work, we do not always find a full justification for this. In analyzing fragments 87–92 in Düring's edition, one can clearly see that the terms 'pleasure' [*hēdonē*, *hēdesthai*] and 'joy' [*chairēin*] are synonymous. The similar closeness in meaning can be found in the analysis of the relationship of virtue with pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN 1104b 3 ff.)¹⁶ and in *Poetics* (Po. 1460a 17–18), when it comes to the role of surprise in the structure of a literary expression. In encouraging a reader of his work to practice philosophy, the Stagirite points out where the greatest pleasure appears and what are the conditions for it. The condition is to achieve the state called *energeia* and to obtain it in a fully developed, perfect [*teleia*] way, with freedom from obstacles [*akōlutos*] (fr. 87 Düring [1961]). The only place in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* where the phrase *teleia energeia* appears is in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and it is in the discussion on pleasure (EN 1174b16–17). It is indicated there that a complete action implies a well-developed working factor and a suitably valuable object to which the action is directed. And if the action is perfect, then both the working factor and the object must be the best. In *Protrepticus*' fragment 87 (Düring 1961) it is suggested that this type of action is *theōrētikē energeia*, which of course is justified by the assumption that there is a certain natural hierarchy on the one hand, and there is also a difference between an accidental action and an essential one on the other.

In the *Protrepticus*, philosophizing is also described as an activity [*kinēsis*], which, because it is performed on its own account and not on that of something else, is essentially (and not accidentally – *sumbainein*) pleasant, i.e. it can be acknowledged as rejoicing

¹⁴ Arist. *Protrepticus*, fr. 56 Düring (1961) (= fr. 5 Ross [1955]). Werner Jaeger (1923: 98) believes that in this passage Aristotle refers to the ideal of a contemplative life of which model could be found in Plato's Academy. This is likely to be the case if it is taken into account a passage from another lost work of Aristotle entitled *Corinthian Dialogue*, which mentions the story of a farmer who, after reading Plato's *Gorgias*, left his job and turned to philosophy; see fr. 658 Gigon (1987).

¹⁵ Arist. *Rh.* 1370a9–18, transl. Kennedy 2007 (the addition of Greek terms is mine).

¹⁶ It should be noted, however, that in the course of further deliberation on the *aretē* (Arist. EN 1005b20–23), joy [*chara*] is an experience [*pathos*] and something that is accompanied by pleasure.

[*chairein*].¹⁷ Activities can be carried out at different levels – one can drink more or less and learn more or less, for example – and the level of activity influences the degree of pleasure and joy experienced. If the action meets two conditions: (1) it represents a *teleia energeia*, and (2) it is carried out without any obstacles, then pleasure and happiness are revealed to the highest level.¹⁸ Philosophy as an activity belongs to a person whose soul works properly [*orthōs*] and perfectly [*teleōs*] when it performs two sub-activities – *phronein* and *theōrein*.¹⁹ Therefore, philosophizing is an actualisation of life in the form of a soul's exercise through thinking and the attainment of theoretical knowledge, and gives a man the greatest pleasure and joy.²⁰

It can be pointed out that the *Protrepticus* contains elements of the theory of pleasure characteristic of the so-called 'esoteric' writings of Aristotle. And so it is worth paying attention to the concept of *kinesis*, which in *Physics* 201a10–11 is defined as the "*entelecheia* of what is potentially in so far as it is potentially".²¹ The analysis of this notion was presented, among others, by Aryeh Kosman, who points out that the term *entelecheia* should be understood here as 'actuality' (and not 'actualization').²² In the case of the *Protrepticus*, however, there is a reference to *teleia energeia* and it means that it is about a special type of action in which "actuality is de-motionalized being not by virtue of having brought to quiescence, but by virtue of having become entelic, having become its own end" (Kosman 1960: 59). In the twelfth book of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle describes the god-mind (an eternal and immovable entity, which thinks about itself), and he states that *theōria* is something most pleasant and the best. The Unmoved Mover experiences eternal well-being [*eu echein*], which is available to man only occasionally (*Metaph.* 1072b22–26). In the *Nicomachean Ethics* we also find the condition that there should be no obstacle in the performance of the activity so that this activity is accompanied by pleasure: it must occur as "the unimpeded activity of the natural state [*energeia tēs kata phusin hekseōs (...)* *anempodiston*]" (*EN* 1153a14–15; see also *EN* 1153b9–12).

A brief mention of pleasure was also included among the testimonies probably concerning the lost work *On Justice*. It is cited by Plutarch in the *De stoicorum repugnantiis* in the context of the criticism that Chrysippus applied to Aristotle's theory. The Stoic philosopher stated that the Peripatetic one mistakenly believed that if pleasure were considered a goal [*telos*], it would be impossible to formulate an appropriate view of justice, or even

¹⁷ Arist. *Protrepticus*, fr. 88 Düring (1961) (= *partim* fr. 14 Walzer [1934] = *partim* fr. 14 Ross [1955]).

¹⁸ Arist. *Protrepticus*, fr. 87 Düring (1961) (= *partim* fr. 14 Walzer [1934] = *partim* fr. 14 Ross [1955]). It should also be noted that in certain contexts, Aristotle recognizes the terms of *kinēsis* and *energeia* as synonymous; see e.g. Arist. *Metaph.* 1047a32; *EE* 1218b36; *GA* 743a28.

¹⁹ Arist. *Protrepticus*, fr. 85 Düring (1961) (= *partim* fr. 14 Walzer [1934] = *partim* fr. 14 Ross [1955]).

²⁰ Arist. *Protrepticus*, fr. 89–91 Düring (1961) (= *partim* fr. 14 Walzer [1934] = *partim* fr. 14 Ross [1955]).

²¹ In *Rhetoric*, in turn, Aristotle describes pleasure as "a certain movement of the soul and the full and discernible resettlement into the original nature" (Arist. *Rh.* 1369b33–35). It is not certain whether Aristotle acknowledged this definition, since attention is drawn to a possible inconsistency with statements made in his other works (especially in the fifth chapter of the tenth book of the *EN*). This was already pointed out by Friedrich A. Trendelenburg (1883: 177 ff.). See also Grimaldi 1980, 244 ff.

²² Kosman 1960: 43; cf. Gosling, Taylor 1982: 301–318.

of any theory of virtue.²³ If in *On justice* there has been an identification of pleasure with purpose, it seems that this should be considered inconsistent with the theory of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Sandbach 1985: 14.), because

If, then, there is some end of things doable in action [*prakta*] that we wish for because of itself, and the others because of it, and we do not choose everything because of something else (...), it is clear that this will be the good – that is, the best good.²⁴

Next, Aristotle accepts that this goal is happiness [*eudaimonia*]²⁵ but rejects the possibility that *hēdonē* expresses the content of the concept of ‘happiness’ (and thus ‘the best’). To do this, he uses the aforementioned argument regarding enslavement and the example of Sardanapalus (*EN* 1095b14–22; 1174a8–9). In this context, this would mean that the purpose of life would certainly not be a bodily pleasure. Is there, however, any other explanation justifying Chrysippus’ critique which is related to the ethical writings of the *Corpus aristotelicum*? The answer demands analysis of three questions: (1) whether it is possible to identify a good thing with pleasure in the Stagirite’s view, (2) whether pleasure as a goal threatens to some extent the concept of justice; and (3) whether it is possible to find a dependence on justice of the individual virtues. It is easy to point out that (3) is present in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle says that justice is not part of virtue, but the whole virtue, when it is considered not relatively [*pros*], but absolutely [*haplōs*] (*EN* 1130a8–13). As far as (1) is concerned, the closest belief to this can be found in the 10th book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the Philosopher states that pleasure is something that complements the activity [*energeian telein*] as *epiginomenon ti telos* (*EN* 1174b31–33).²⁶ Naturally, the use of the undefined pronoun *ti* is important in this statement, as it indicates that the Stagirite only allows pleasure to be a goal. And because a good thing is what everything (i.e., inter alia, art, investigation, practical pursuit, action and choice) achie-

²³ Plu. *De stoicorum repugnantiiis*, 1040E 1–6: Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὐ φησιν αὐτὸν ὁρθῶς λέγειν, ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐσης τέλους ἀναιρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη (= fr. 96 Rose [1886] = fr. 4 Ross [1955] = fr. 6 Gigon [1987] = von Arnim [1964] SVF III 24. Walzer (1934) ascribes this passage to the *Protrepticus* [fr. 17]). More see Moraux 1957; Chroust 1966: 249–263. Various reconstructions and interpretations of this lost work of Aristotle and criticism of Mouraux’s hypotheses are presented by Pattantyus 1970: 82–85.

²⁴ Arist. *EN* 1094a18–22, transl. Reeve 2014; see also *MM* 1184a3–14. In the translation of the passage from *EN*, it is worth pointing out two linguistic difficulties: the first (A) concerns the word *prakton*, which is used in the plural (for an elucidation see Reeve 2014: note 9, 199); and the second (B) concerns the conjunction *kai*, which occurs almost at the end of sentence and can have a copulative (‘and’) or explanative meaning (‘that is’). For the other translations see f.i. (A) “things we do” – (B) “and” (Ross 1925); (A) „ends” – (B) „and indeed” (Rackham 1956); (A) “actions” – (B) “et” (Gomez-Muller 1992); (A) “cose che si possono compiere” – (B) “ossia” (Caiani 1996); (A) “działanie” – (B) “i” (Gromska 1996); (A) “practical projects” – (B) “i.e.” (Broadie, Rowe 2002); (A) “azioni” – (B) “e” (Stelli 2009); (A) „das Tun” – (B) „ja sogar” (Krapinger 2017).

²⁵ Arist., *EN* 1095a17–20; see also *MM* 1184a16–18; 1084b7–8.

²⁶ Again, it is worth paying attention to the translation problem in relation to the participle *epiginomenon*: „an end which supervenes” (Ross 1925); “a supervening perfection” (Rackham 1956); “cel, który się do niej [i.e. czynności – A.P.] dołącza” (Gromska 1996); “un perfezionamento che vi si aggiunge, come ad es” (Stelli 2009); „a sort of supervenient end” (Reeve 2014).

ves, so that pleasure can also be considered a good thing (*EN* 1094a3; 1172b35–36.). What does it mean? Most likely, pleasure can be considered a goal/a good thing in a relative sense, i.e. related to another goal/good thing in itself. An example could be theoretical contemplation, which is a proper goal, resulting in a state of happiness. It is accompanied by pleasure as a good thing/relative goal (*EN* 1152b35–1153a2; 1177a22–27). Thus, the two components can be found in Aristotle's thought, but it does not seem that in this interpretation they can be easily connected with the reasoning presented in Plutarch's work. Perhaps Aristotle's reasoning was as follows: if pleasure, which is not a (settled) disposition to choose/a virtue, is considered as a goal/a good thing/happiness (in itself), it is possible to be happy without a (settled) ethical disposition to choose/a virtue. A justice is a (settled) disposition to choose and it is the whole virtue (i.e. it involves every other virtue), so it is possible to be happy without justice, and thus also without other (settled) dispositions/virtues. But this conclusion is unacceptable, because it may mean that it is possible to be happy by being unjust, cowardly, unwise, and so on.

III

So it can be seen that among the preserved fragments and testimonies of Aristotle's lost writings, there are not many references to pleasure. But almost all remarks about it can be connected to the statements in the esoteric writings of this philosopher. The only exception seems to be the fragment from *On justice* preserved in Plutarch's work, but in this case, the problem may lie in tradition. The thesis formulated by Aristotle is criticised (and thus interpreted) by Chrysippus, and this critique is reported on by the medioplatonic philosopher. The hypothetical reconstruction presented shows the possibility that it was a Stoic philosopher who over-interpreted the Peripatetic's view in order to subject it to criticism in this new form. But there is still the possibility that Aristotle's thesis is quoted accurately and would be in disagreement with his teaching in the esoteric writings. The fact that most references to pleasure can to some extent be aligned with the concepts contained in esoteric writings is above all of historical significance. It allows the formulation of another argument against Jaeger's hypothesis (1923) that the Stagirite's philosophy was subject to evolution. This hypothesis was rejected from differing perspectives by such researchers as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1928), Pierre Aubenque (1963: 15 ff.), Giovanni Reale (1988: 383–387) or Jonathan Barnes (1995).

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Pleasure in the Fragments of Aristotle's Lost Writings

It is well known that Aristotle's philosophical legacy has not survived in its entirety to our time. A large part of it has been lost, and only scattered fragments, paraphrases and testimonies cited by other ancient philosophers have survived. The analyses carried out in the article focus on what the Stagirite says about pleasure in fragments of lost writings, especially in the *Symposium*, *On Pleasure*, *Protrepticus* and *On Justice*. The aim of the analyses is to establish whether or not the statements in these fragments can be correlated with statements from Aristotle's surviving works, and whether or not they are compatible with them. Thanks to the analyses, it is also possible to show that the hypothesis that Aristotle's philosophy may have been subject to evolution is not tenable at least as far as the doctrine of pleasure is concerned.

KEY WORDS

Aristotle, pleasure, *Symposium*, *On Pleasure*, *Protrepticus*, *On Justice*