Peitho. Examina Antiqua <p class="oczasopismie">Peitho / Examina Antiqua is an international, peer-reviewed journal devoted to investigation of ancient Greek, Roman and Byzantine thought. The journal publishes original research articles, discussions and reviews in the fields of ancient philosophy, science, literature, history and language. The languages of publication are English, French, German, Italian and Polish. Established in 2010, the journal is published by the Institute of Philosophy at Adam Mickiewcz University in Poland.</p> <p class="oczasopismie"> </p> <ul class="oczasopismie"> <li class="show"><a href="">ABOUT THE JOURNAL</a></li> <li class="show"><a href="">CURRENT ISSUE</a></li> <li class="show"><a href="">ARCHIVES</a></li> </ul> <!--<div class="oczasopismie"><strong>INDEXED IN:</strong><p>INDEX COPERNICUS INTERNATIONAL - IC JOURNALS MASTER LIST; EBSCO PUBLISHING; SCOPUS; ERIH - (2007-2014); ERIH PLUS 2015; CSA LINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR ABSTRACTS; CEJSH; PKP Index, Primo, WorldCat, Cabell's, Google Scholar; DOAJ</p></div><div class="oczasopismie"><strong>JOURNAL METRICS: </strong><p><img src="/public/piotr/ikonki/gs_2.png" alt="" /><br /><br /><img src="/public/piotr/ikonki/mnisw_14.png" alt="" /><br /><br /> <img src="/public/piotr/ikonki/ic_120_51.png" alt="" /><br /><br /> <img src="/public/piotr/ikonki/gs_1.png" alt="" /></p></div>--> <div class="oczasopismie"><strong>INDEXED IN:</strong></div> <div class="oczasopismie"><a title="Peitho. 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Examina Antiqua in WorldCat" href=";referer=brief_results" target="_blank" rel="noopener">WorldCat</a>.</div> <div class="oczasopismie"> </div> <div class="oczasopismie"><strong><br /><br />DOI: </strong><a href="">10.14746/pea</a></div> <div class="oczasopismie"><strong>ISSN: </strong>2082–7539</div> <div class="oczasopismie"><br /><strong><br />Published work are licensed under a <a href="">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</a>. <a href=""><img src="" alt="Creative Commons License" /></a></strong></div> <div class="oczasopismie"><!--<strong>e-ISSN: </strong>2084-4158--></div> <!--<div class="oczasopismie"><strong><strong>ARTICLES ARE LICENSED UNDER A CREATIVE COMMONS:</strong> </strong><a href=""><img src="/public/piotr/cc/cc_4.png" alt="CC_by-nd/3.0" border="0" /></a></div>--> Adam Mickiewicz University Poznan en-US Peitho. Examina Antiqua 2082-7539 <p>Peitho provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.</p> Livio Rossetti nella terra incognita degli Eleati <p>-</p> Roberta Ioli Copyright (c) 2021 Roberta Ioli 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 225–235 225–235 10.14746/pea.2021.1.11 Eleatic Ontology in Aristotle: Introduction <p>The introduction summarizes the six new papers collected in Volume 1, Tome 5: Eleatic Ontology and Aristotle. The papers take a fresh look at virtually every aspect of Aristotle’s engagement with Eleaticism. They are particularly concerned with Aristotle’s responses to Parmenidean monism, the Eleatic rejection of change, and Zeno’s paradoxes. The contributions also focus on the ways in which Aristotle developed several of his own theories in metaphysics and natural science partly in reaction to Eleatic puzzles and arguments.</p> David Bronstein Fabián Mié Copyright (c) 2021 David Bronstein, Fabián Mié 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 13 17 10.14746/pea.2021.1.1 Monism in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I.3–5 <p>Scholars have often seen Parmenides as entirely opposed to earlier materialistic philosophy. In this paper I argue that what is more striking in Aristotle’s <em>Metaphysics </em>Book I is the degree of continuity that he sees between Parmenides and the material monists. I explore this coupling of Parmenides with the material monists to understand better what he takes to be distinctive and problematic with Parmenides’ monism.</p> Thomas Kjeller Johansen Copyright (c) 2021 Thomas Kjeller Johansen 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 19–40 19–40 10.14746/pea.2021.1.2 Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3 <p>I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.</p> Lucas Angioni Copyright (c) 2021 Lucas Angioni 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 41–68 41–68 10.14746/pea.2021.1.3 Aristotle’s Refutation of the Eleatic Argument in Physics I.8 <p>In this paper, I show that Aristotle’s refutation of the Eleatic argument in <em>Physics </em>I.8 is based on the idea that a thing at the starting point of coming to be is composite and is made up of what underlies and a priva­tion. In doing so, I clarify how the concept of accidentality as used in his solution should be understood in relation to the composite nature of what comes to be. I also suggest an explanation of why Aristotle’s discus­sion of the Eleatic dilemma in <em>Physics </em>I.8, unlike his discussion in the previous chapter, is not clear.</p> Takashi Oki Copyright (c) 2021 Takashi Oki 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 69–84 69–84 10.14746/pea.2021.1.4 What about Plurality? Aristotle’s Discussion of Zeno’s Paradoxes <p>While Aristotle provides the crucial testimonies for the paradoxes of motion, <em>topos</em>, and the falling millet seed, surprisingly he shows almost no interest in the paradoxes of plurality. For Plato, by contrast, the plurality paradoxes seem to be the central paradoxes of Zeno and Simplicius is our primary source for those. This paper investigates why the plurality paradoxes are not examined by Aristotle and argues that a close look at the context in which Aristotle discusses Zeno holds the answer to this question.</p> Barbara M. Sattler Copyright (c) 2021 Barbara M. Sattler 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 85–106 85–106 10.14746/pea.2021.1.5 Aristotle, Eleaticism, and Zeno’s Grains of Millet <p>This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.</p> Marcello D. Boeri Copyright (c) 2021 Marcello D. Boeri 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 107–122 107–122 10.14746/pea.2021.1.6 An Ontology for the In-Between of Motion: Aristotle’s Reaction to Zeno’s Arguments <p>This paper proposes an interpretation of Books V and VI of Aristotle’s <em>Physics </em>as being (at least partly) a reaction to Zeno’s four “arguments against motion” that Aristotle expounds and discusses in <em>Phys</em>. VI 9. On the basis of a detailed textual analysis of that chapter, I show that Zeno’s arguments rest on a frame of <em>a priori </em>notions such as part and whole, in contact, between, limit, etc., which Aristotle takes over in order to account for the inner structure (here called “the In-Between”) common to all facts of motion and change. That frame allows him to develop a specific ontology for that inner structure – although it exists only potentially according to the Aristotelian orthodoxy – because he needs such an ontology in order to vindicate the reality of motion and change.</p> Michel Crubellier Copyright (c) 2021 Michel Crubellier 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 123–150 123–150 10.14746/10.14746/pea.2021.1.7 Aristotle’s Mixture in its Medical and Philosophical Background: The Hippocratic De victu and the Aristotelian De generatione et corruptione <p>Aristotle’s notion of qualitative interaction ruling both the process of mixture and the process of reciprocal elemental transmutation is based upon the idea of a physical contrariety endowed with two extremes and a wide central area where the opposite forces reach different equilibrium points (i.e., the so-called mixtures) or can be present to the fullest degree (in this case we do not have a mixture, but an element). Differently from previous scholarship which attributes this notion specifically to Aristotle, we have found, in a text which Aristotle seems to have been acquainted with, the Hippocratic De victu, an incipient structure of a contrariety endowed with extremes and a central area where opposite forces meet and yield respective equilibrium points, mixtures, which, as in Aristotle, give an account of the variety of beings existing in the world. In this article, we suggest the possibility that in the development of the Aristotelian thinking about elemental and qualitative dynamics, the Hippocratic De victu may have contributed to suggesting to Aristotle a way of envisioning the structure of his basic physical contrarieties.</p> Claudia Mirrone Copyright (c) 2021 Claudia Mirrone 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 151–170 151–170 10.14746/10.14746/pea.2021.1.8 Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa <p>The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradic­tion, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the inves­tigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthful­ness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth.</p> Marian Andrzej Wesoły Copyright (c) 2021 Marian Andrzej Wesoły 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 171–196 171–196 10.14746/10.14746/pea.2021.1.9 Truth in Practical Reason: Practical and Assertoric Truth in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics <p>Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the <em>Categories</em>, <em>De Interpretatione </em>and <em>Metaphysics</em>, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of <em>practical truth </em>in the sixth book of <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em>: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.</p> Michail Pantoulias Vasiliki Vergouli Panagiotis Thanassas Copyright (c) 2021 Michail Pantoulias, Vasiliki Vergouli, Panagiotis Thanassas 2021-12-13 2021-12-13 12 1 197–222 197–222 10.14746/pea.2021.1.10