



Beata Frydryczak

Instytut Kultury Europejskiej, Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza

ORCID: 0000-0003-1700-1918

Aesthetics and the processual nature of landscape¹

Abstract

The main subject addressed in this essay is the idea of landscape approached from a new perspective, namely the aesthetic category of the sublime, as opposed to the historical category of the picturesque. I argue that landscape is something more than an image and a phenomenon, and we should consider it and define anew, since its meaning is both aesthetic and cultural. The re-reading of the sublime as a kind of common sensory experience free of metaphysical connotation offers an insight into the kind of experience accompanying the relationship with the landscape and redefines its essence. In the optics of the sublime, the landscape assumes the nature of a process in which one sees the overlapping of certain socio-cultural relationships and the natural world, as well as the meaning of the surrounding reality, the living, current environment and its sensual perception. We may assume that the significant difference emerging when we try to approach landscape, appears between the landscape as an idea (aesthetic landscape) and the landscape as a process (cultural landscape). Thus landscape is seen as a cultural space of human activity, not a pictorial part of the reality. As such, landscape is related to surroundings. Surroundings are a space of life and activity, while landscape is the space experienced, but both are two aspects of our living-in-the-landscape. Dwelling as the creation of the surroundings is nothing but practice to make landscape present.

Key words:

landscape, cultural landscape, aesthetics experience, the picturesque, the sublime, the participant, being-in-the landscape, the surroundings, dwelling

Streszczenie:

Głównym tematem niniejszego eseju jest idea krajobrazu ujęta z perspektywy estetycznej kategorii wzniosłości w opozycji do historycznej kategorii malowniczości. Twierdzą, że kra-

¹ The article was first published in *Aesthetics of Human Environment. VIII Ovsianikov International Aesthetic Conference*, ed. by S. Dzikevich, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow 2017, p. 7-19.

jobraz jest czymś więcej niż obrazem i zjawiskiem, i należy go zdefiniować na nowo, skoro możemy mówić o jego sensie estetycznym i kulturowym zarazem. Redefinicja wzniosłości jako rodzaju doświadczenia zmysłowego pozbawionego konotacji metafizycznych pozwala na wgląd w rodzaj doświadczenia pojawiającego się w relacji z krajobrazem, co na nowo definiuje jego istotę. W optyce wzniosłości krajobraz przyjmuje charakter procesu, w którym dostrzega się nakładanie się pewnych relacji społeczno-kulturowych i świata przyrody, a także znaczenie otaczającej rzeczywistości, życia, aktualnego otoczenia i jego zmysłowej percepcji. Można założyć, że istotna różnica, jaka pojawia się, gdy próbujemy zdefiniować krajobraz, pojawia się pomiędzy krajobrazem jako ideą (krajobraz estetyczny) a krajobrazem jako procesem (krajobraz kulturowy). Krajobraz postrzegany jest więc jako kulturowa przestrzeń ludzkiej aktywności, a nie obrazowa część rzeczywistości. Jako taki krajobraz jest powiązany z otoczeniem. Otoczenie jest przestrzenią życia i aktywności, krajobraz jest przestrzenią doświadczaną, ale oba są dwoma aspektami naszego życia w krajobrazie. Zamieszkiwanie jako kreacja otoczenia to nic innego jak praktyka uobecniania krajobrazu.

Słowa kluczowe:

krajobraz, krajobraz kulturowy, doświadczenie estetyczne, the picturesque, wzniosłość, bycie-w-krajobrazie, otoczenie, zamieszkiwanie

The concept of landscape belongs to the group of concepts which are seemingly obvious, but prove to be complex and ambiguous under close scrutiny. Our everyday vocabulary and daily dealings with different landscapes do not reveal that intricacy. It is exposed when we realize that landscape belongs to the realm of inter- and transdisciplinary notions, and it owes its ambiguity to the multiplicity of disciplines involved in its definition. In this broad and multidimensional perspective, it reveals a wealth of meanings and possible references to the concept of landscape, whose idea - as an image - has long been rooted in the sphere of art and humanities.

When Jacob Burckhardt (Burckhardt 1991) introduced the notion of landscape into deliberations on the development of European Renaissance culture, he noted that the idea of landscape is connected to the modern perception and maturation of the aesthetic attitude to nature, as well as to changing concepts of nature, the rise of landscape painting, and the development of descriptive geography. The Renaissance discovery of the outer world was that of the landscape as an image and as a phenomenon as well. Although landscape is associated with a specific field of art or science, Burckhardt coupled it with a consciousness capable of revealing the quality of the world. Today, we may ask what has been ignored or neglected by aesthetics as the idea and concept of landscape developed, since nowadays we rarely discuss the relationship between the two facets of landscape, namely that of an image and a phenomenon?

Aesthetics combines landscape with an image and an artistic representation of the world, whilst situating it within real or imaginary frames, whereas geography

and anthropology associate it with space and environment, and thus extend its range to the limits which elude traditional aesthetics. This ambiguity and complexity of the concept of landscape suggests that landscape is something more than an image and a phenomenon, and we should consider it and define anew, since its meaning is simultaneously aesthetic and cultural. This “duality” can be read as two overlapping meanings and they can be treated as two aspects of the same phenomenon.

From the perspective adopted by this author, landscape is associated with a definite aesthetic attitude towards nature, and more broadly - the outside world, where perception does not end with the visual experience, but includes a kind of sense of communing with nature and the surrounding world. This brief formulation overlooks, and yet implies a vast area of related issues which are revealed in their fullness when a broader, - interdisciplinary context of the research is adopted. This engenders a distinct discrepancy between the aesthetic approach and the geographical and anthropological one. The search for junctures between these areas opens up new perspectives which allow one to transcend traditional approach and create opportunities for new solutions. Eloquent in this context, Denis Cosgrove aptly observed “that the idea of the landscape significantly expresses the historical attempt to bond the visual image and the material world” (Cosgrove 2003, 259). In fact, the rift occurred not only in methodology, approach and methods of research, but also in the attitude to landscape and the accompanying experience.

The traditional aesthetic idea of landscape identifies landscape with natural scenery, or its artistic representation, overlapping with an informal meaning of landscape. It seems that this understanding gained a significant advantage and became dominant over the centuries. In traditional terms, landscape is a kind of construct formed when a subject perceives the outside world through an aesthetically inclined eye; in other words nature becomes a landscape when it is reified in the eyes of the observer who experiences it as an aesthetic entity. Thus, the experience of landscape is a visual one and belongs to the subject: it is expressed directly, via visual perception. But landscape also constitutes measurable, topographical space, which is mediated by a pictorial representation of painting, photography, and film. On the other hand, it is associated with the environment and such concepts as space, place, territory, or patrimony, which do not have their source in the picture, but in the “country” as the very core of landscape (Jacson 2008, Olwig 2002). We may assume that the significant difference emerging as one attempts to approach landscape, arises between the landscape as an idea (aesthetic landscape) and the landscape as a process (cultural landscape). This notion echoes the one advanced by Arnold Berleant, who distinguishes between the panoramic landscape, which tallies with the traditional understanding of landscape and the participatory landscape, which takes into account a number of processes taking places within the confine of its field (Berleant 1994). The first and timeless definition of cultural landscape

was articulated by Carl Sauer in *The Morphology of Landscape*, where the author observes as follows: “The cultural landscape is fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group. Culture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result. [...] The shaping force, however, lies in the culture itself” (Sauer 1963, 343). The human has an impact on the environment – through his/her endeavours – thus shaping the cultural landscape. Arnold Berleant confirms this by stating that landscapes bear the marks left by their inhabitants, therefore cultural landscape is the result of practical activities: “Landscapes we inhabit are cultural landscapes, their shapes, vegetation, and processes are influenced by characteristic living patterns of the people who dwell in them” (Berleant 1997, 60). These patterns have changed in the course of history, influenced by new cultural trends, and – let us not forget – new technologies. Thus landscape is seen as the cultural space of human activity, not a pictorial component of reality.

In this perspective, landscape can be understood as a living process, which is constituted in the transition between an idea and a phenomenon, between an image and a topography. These two areas translate into two types of experiences that emerge in subject’s relationship with the landscape: a panoramic view, associated with the traditional, aesthetic meaning of the landscape and a topographic experience corresponding to the processual nature of the cultural landscape. Another distinction appears when we situate ourselves in front of the landscape or in the landscape. One element is common for both instances: the presence of the subject as a receiver or as a participant, since without the subject and their active contribution the landscape disappears. The receiver perceives a landscape as a space of contemplative aesthetic experience, according to the rules of perspective, which enforce seeing landscape as a picture. At the same time, the receiver is compelled by the idea of recognizing scenic or romantic views and having spiritual encounters with nature, although the place they are assigned allows them to commune with nature only at a distance. The participant takes part in the landscape that undergoes natural and cultural processes and for them it is a space of multisensory topographic experience. However, in traditional aesthetics the participant was alleged to lack a “feeling of the landscape”, which reduced them to a figure in the landscape. This conviction, rooted in Kantian tradition, is associated with the idea of perspective and distance as essential circumstances enabling one to distinguish a fragment of nature and space as an image. The idea of disinterestedness, which accompanies this conviction, establishes a distance between the admired view and the subject who experiences it. The experience is one of contemplative thought, resembling the perception of works of art. Joachim Ritter’s observation, that beautiful views such as mountains, forests, or sea need their recipient still holds valid, inasmuch as describes the receiver as a necessary condition for the landscape to exist in general. And if so, it is the attitude of the individual which “makes” landscape. As Ritter says, the eye of the subject transforms the face of nature. That is the question of a “distance of objectivity”.

Thus, the aesthetic landscape tolerates the attitude of a viewer, or receiver. On these grounds, those who are active parts of the landscape and co-create it are excluded from its perception, experience and feeling. This adheres to the Kantian belief that the perception of landscape as a scenery can be attained solely by those only who do not play any active part in it. However, this notion requires a revision and a renewed reflection concerning the part the receiver plays in landscape. As Arnold Berleant observed rightly, “without human presence there would be no perception of beauty and awareness of the value” (Berleant 1992, 82).

The aesthetic understanding of landscape is indebted in the eighteenth-century aesthetic reflection, which introduced two crucial categories into the discourse of landscape: the picturesque and the sublime. It suffices to outline the difference between them in order to grasp that aesthetics ignored an important, active aspect of the experience of landscape, which has become an object of study for geography and anthropology. It is this active aspect which makes it possible to focus on the processual nature of the landscape instead and venture beyond the conviction of contemplative, distanced attitude, which is manifested in the scenic character of landscape, i.e. in the aesthetics of the picturesque. The picturesque was successful, albeit only as a category which facilitated eliciting the landscape and granting it validity; it was incapable, however, of trace the processes and transformations occurring within the framework of landscape. It was also unable to approach nature any closer in order to recognize the living, acting and interacting nature it harboured.

Sublimity as an aesthetic category has a long and complicated history, yet it remains firmly established in philosophical thought and today's interpretations of contemporary culture. We can assume that – similarly to the picturesque – the sublime may be responsible for the experience and descriptions of the idea of landscape. According to the classical approach proposed by Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant the sublime embraces the natural phenomena (and only the natural) characterized by greatness, magnitude, infinity and power, phenomena which transcend rational thinking but arouse imagination, which are not fully recognized, difficult to control and inspire fear or even terror. To illustrate the sublime, Kant invoked the magnitude of mountains, a stormy ocean or a thunderstorm: “threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, volcanoes with their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river” (Kant, 1987: 120). He referred to phenomena which materialize in the form of elements and which manifest the immensity, infinity, mystery, power, and so on. But in fact, these phenomena themselves do not constitute the sublime; it is a kind of feeling one has when facing them. Nevertheless, in this sense, the sublime refers to the third form of nature manifesting in the city. The wild nature and its elements have the power to strip the human of its only weapon – i.e. rational thinking, thus condemning them to fully emotional and sensual perception of the

world. While the picturesque means contemplation and disinterested experience of landscape perceived as a picture, the sublime expresses itself in an experience of fear or even terror, along with an opportunity to conquer it: according to Burke and Kant we find pleasure in being able to overcome our fears: “our ability to resist becomes an insignificant trifle. Yet the sight of them becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place. And we like to call these objects sublime because they raise the soul’s fortitude above its usual middle range and allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is of a quite different kind, and which gives us the courage [to believe] that we could be a match for nature’s seeming omnipotence” (Kant 1987, 120). Here Kant articulates his belief that “a safe place” gives us an opportunity to exchange our fears for aesthetic experience. However, what does “a safe place” mean? It is a distant place or a safe shelter?

A re-interpretation of the sublime not only allows us to answer the question, but also offers new perspectives on the relation between the human and nature, if the category is not perceived as a feeling, but as a power to resist the magnitude of nature. The sublime engendered new possibilities: the experience of the majesty of nature helped the human to become one with nature, as in the Romantic paradigm it assumed the form of worshipping wild nature, or its idealization and sanctification. However, the attitude to nature must change: on the one hand, it needs to be soulful, on the other hand - “materialized” – as only the twofold process offers access to the world available to the senses, and allows one to perceive the real landscape where life goes on, introducing the landscape into historical processes.

Also, one should take into account the suggestion advanced by Theodor W. Adorno, who stated that the sublime is a kind of existential situation. If we combine it with Arnold Berleant’s concept of engagement, we may understand the sublime as an experience which epitomizes an effort to adapt the living environment. In fact, the sublime appears in its two meanings: as a call for what is absent and as a daily effort of overcoming nature. The latter meaning is viable if we draw upon Edmund Burke yet again and realize that for the eighteenth-century philosopher the sublime means absence of what should be overcome. He specified the areas in question: lack of people means solitude, lack of light means darkness and the lack of sounds means silence. Edmund Burke describes the sublime as a path which “finds us in a dark forest and dead silence filled with roar” (Burke, 1968, 74). Such situations entail danger which we are able to overcome since the sublime stimulates the instinct of self-preservation. The sublime appears at the moment of threat, activating the entire body and alerting its sensitivity. This is the instant when perception wakes up by way of a rudimentary principle of “commitment” in the relationship with nature perceived primarily as an aesthetic scenery.

Hence the sublime should not be construed in terms of metaphysical ideas but thought of a possibility of applying the category in practice.

Theodor W. Adorno's sublime designates the exact place the human being occupies in the world of nature, which reminds them not only of their natural roots but also of their mortality. This way it specifies the limits of human domination over nature: the sublime is the aesthetic category which anticipates a moment when the human begins to become immersed in its own belonging to nature. Theodor W. Adorno noticed something that escaped Immanuel Kant's attention: "that aspect in which human domination has its limits and that calls to mind the powerlessness of human bustle" (Adorno 2002, 70). From this perspective, an attempt at re-defining the sublime can be considered as a search for foundations on which human experience is built or can be reconstructed. Arnold Berleant, as he proceeded with the re-definition of the sublime which had begun with Theodor W. Adorno, Berleant argued that the sublime is able to restore a sense of oneness with the natural world: it is feasible on the basis of the experience which assumes the form of engagement representing a kind of relationship with the surrounding world. "The idea of the sublime is a testimony of the great insight in distinguishing different types of aesthetic experience" (Berleant 2011, 2003).

The Berleant's chief objective is to undermine the idea of aesthetic disinterestedness: aesthetics should focus on its primary purpose, i.e. to restore sensual and spontaneous human contact with the world, whereby nature is fully included. The opportunity does arise given the potential of the sublime and the aesthetics of sublime.

Berleant also seeks to restore the concept of experience, which has lost the roots it had in the practice of everyday life, and its essence has been narrowed down to a disinterested, contemplative thought, now disengaged from the human sensorium. The re-reading of the sublime as a kind of common sensory experience free of metaphysical connotation provides an insight into the kind of experience accompanying the relationship with nature and defines its essence anew. It also allows one to go beyond the natural world towards the social and the cultural order, both natural and artificial one. In this new dimension, the sublime emerges as the daily effort of cooperating with and overcoming nature, which means that it is not a "modeling" category of the landscape (like the picturesque), but one which contributes to its shaping. In the optics of the sublime, landscape becomes a process in which multiple elements happen to overlap: certain socio-cultural relationships and the natural world, as well as the meaning of the surrounding reality, the living, current environment and its sensual perception.

The demarcation line which runs between the picturesque and the sublime engenders certain essential oppositions, which set apart: the idea of timelessness and ahistoricity of the beautiful nature and historical, processual dimension of beauty, the contemplation and the multisensory experience, the fixed and the variable (Frydryczak, 2013). Differences between these two aesthetic categories share the

limitations imposed by both aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic movement which galvanizes one into action. The attitude of engagement postulated by Arnold Berleanta seems to be crucial. The concept of engagement enables a conceptual transition from being against the landscape typical of the aesthetics of picturesque to being in the landscape typical of the aesthetics of sublime. An active being in the landscape is possible in two ways: as a resident of a neighbourhood and as wanderer in an area. In both cases, the topographical experience seems to be essential. It is a model which situates the participant in landscape precisely in its centre: the aesthetic experience positions us against the landscape, but the topographical experience leads us through a multiplicity of emerging sensual landscapes. The distance must be surmounted in either case, by means of practical action, or via the multisensory experience of the real, inhabited landscape. The latter belongs to the participant of the landscape, who has been neglected by the traditional aesthetics, i.e. the aesthetics of the picturesque. Being in the landscape means that the landscape takes on a spatial nature and it is detached from its connotation with image. Consequently, landscape transforms into surroundings. There is a difference between view and surroundings, between scenery and scene, space and neighbourhood. The view is a backdrop to human activities: the human functions therein merely as a figure. Surroundings are a space of human activities which unfolds into a symbolic and cultural dimension; they are constructed by being rather than thinking, by action and activity as opposed to contemplation.

The notion of surroundings seems crucial for the understanding of the difference between the aesthetic landscape and the topographic landscape, between a receptive and an active attitude. Surroundings are constructed and reconstructed in practice, "mapped" by work as a daily practical and symbolic activity which lends it its inner rhythm and clearly defined trajectories. They are formed by its residents in terms of cultural, social and topographical meanings. Here, the materiality of surroundings and their characteristics determine the method and type of actions, becoming more important than the view.

Surroundings are a space of life and action, in which an individual leaves his/her traces as signs and symbols readable in the landscape. In this sense, surroundings have their own history, preserved not only in their geomorphological configuration, their flora and fauna, but also in human cultural activity. Thus surroundings are locus where nature and culture, the nature-made and the human-made are reconciled. If this is a space of life with all its aspects, landscape will be the space of experience: we do not inhabit landscape, we are situated in it and activate all our senses, though we do inhabit the neighbourhood area, creating a living environment. The notion of surroundings corresponds with the ideas advanced by Gernot Böhme and Arnold Berleant. The surroundings seem to determine the manner in which the "neighbourhood" is growing. As our most immediate area, neighbourhood includes - according to Böhme - a mood, an atmosphere and all stimuli triggering

our senses. Lowenthal says that “only dwelling enables us to understand what surrounds us.” (Lowenthal 2007, 39). Hence, the surroundings are the “all-embracing context” (Berleant 2011, 131): social, cultural, and natural, where an area, or multiplicity of the surrounding areas are situated. Neighbourhood does not denote the physical and the natural environment exclusively: its cultural, emotional and sensual dimensions are even more important. When Lowenthal says that the landscape is where we make our homes, where we work, live and dream, it seems that he meant just such surroundings (Lowenthal 2007).

We owe to Martin Heidegger the philosophical interest in the notion of surroundings and dwelling should be credited to Martin Heidegger. Another point of reference, otherwise reminiscent of Heidegger and taking advantage of his deductions, is the concept of the temporality of landscape formulated by Tim Ingold. In a highly suggestive fashion, Ingold accepts “the prospect of dwelling” and demonstrates how surroundings are established and maintained using the example of Pieter Bruegel’s *The Harvesters*.

These can be Heideggerian surroundings – “the place of the epiphany of being”. The surroundings are linked to the manner in which a human being exists in the world. The most important is to assimilate what is foreign, render it less alien and make more familiar in order to constitute a relationship of intimacy between the human and its surroundings. That is a mode of creating a space and adapting it with a view to making it a place of habitation. Our being-in-the-world connotes dwelling in the world and establishing relations with it. The relations are nothing else but a process of familiarizing the surroundings. As Arto Haapala notes, “while we are living in the lifeworld, doing and making things, acting in different ways in different situations, we create ties to our surroundings, and in this way familiarize ourselves with it. We make the environment ‘our own’, we create relations which are significant for us and serve our purposes and interests.” (Haapala 2014). Surroundings thus understood not only comprise the environment itself, but also the space “re-worked” by the human in such a way that it expresses all meanings: emotional, cultural, historical, social and landscape-related as well. The Heideggerian surroundings are filled with topography, contents, meanings and ideas which make it complete. The surroundings are a landscape being experienced. In this sense, a person dwelling-in-the-world is an individual wandering-in-the-surroundings. It is that individual, who creates the surroundings and determines their scope and substance, as if wandering and experiencing effected an update, as it were.

Wandering broadens the surroundings. They have their directions that fill the content and lose the quality of being points on the map in order to become particular directions that can be distinguished on the basis of our previous experiences. This is a topography of sides, with a number of routes we take during our wanderings. There can be familiar and unfamiliar sides, social and unsocial sides - but the sides in and of the surroundings are always associated with specific meanings that

fill each space, making up our surroundings. The topography of sides is subjective and as such it constitutes a mental map, "the map in mind."

Place is close in its meaning to surroundings. Its essence lies in the unique content found between topography and the „spiritual content". Berleant says that place is the landscape we inhabit, it is a reciprocity that defines our emotional affiliation. Yi-Fu Tuan adds in a similar vein: place is a "port of call" which makes an area a core of values (Tuan 1987, 175). According to Tuan, surroundings need to possess a dimension of anthropological space where the close – distant, local - alien relationships can be determined. Here, landscape - as Tuan metaphorically puts it - becomes a "family tree." Consequently, place is connected to the surroundings and to the landscape. It has its centre (core) and it develops around a human being. Just as the immediate surroundings, it exists in human's close proximity. Surroundings, unlike place, may expand spatially thanks to the wandering man. Place and surroundings alike have no boundaries other than anthropological ones, contrary to the landscape, which is often circumscribed by natural boundaries. As the surroundings can be experienced through their topography, so the place (even in a topographic meaning) can be experienced by the one who inhabits it.

The idea of dwelling and the surrounding area as a space experienced and created in practice was adapted by Tim Ingold, who subsumed it under the notion of taskscape. Taskscape allows to construe surroundings as a kind of space being practiced - by work and everyday activity. Ingold defines landscape as a set of features, the taskscape - as a set of actions. That may suggest a kind of naturalistic view of landscape as an external background for human activities and a kind of cultural view of landscape as a symbolic ordering of space (Ingold 1993). In this context, Ingold's "perspective of dwelling" is expressed through a perceptual commitment to the environment understood as an all-encompassing universe. Taskscape means any human activity throughout history, an activity resulting in creation and constitution of landscape. Taskscape it is the way in which people "dwell" in a place from generation to generation.

In this sense, the surroundings are narrative: they tell a story of all previous generations which once dwelled there and formed the landscape. The concept of dwelling allows landscape to be interpreted as a kind of palimpsest composed of a plurality of layers to read. In such a landscape each element, whether architecture or nature, gains its meaning, laden with the past and imbued with memory. Memory is inscribed in the structure of landscape, and it finds its expression both in ruins, cemeteries and routes, or avenues of trees. Ingold argues that landscape is constituted as a permanent record of human activity: "Seeing the landscape means evoke memories, a reminder is not so much a matter of summoning the internal image, stored in the mind as active perception of the environment, which is itself pregnant with the past." (Ingold, 152-3). From this perspective, and according to Ingold, landscape is constituted as a testimony to the previous generations, which

lived and left their traces there: it is a world well-known to those who inhabit it, and to those who will be living in it and shape it as their fathers did. It is a world of living, which is forged in the course of people's lives. Taskscape exists as long as people take actions related to dwelling in a particular landscape. "Landscape is not the whole to which you can look, but rather a world in which we give a view of our surroundings." (Ingold, 171). Therefore, when speaking of landscape one should mean both its natural and cultural features and processes, which is why it is convergent with the idea of surroundings.

Bruegel's *The Harvesters* is a well-known painting. In the foreground it shows a group of villagers who take a rest in the shade of a spreading tree: one person is sleeping, some are eating a meal, while other figures are engaged in a conversation. Though it draws viewer's attention, the group of people does not exhaust what is happening in the framed scenery. Further grounds show a space of lively activity, where people work, play, go along a road. The surroundings encompass the space, places and significant landmarks: fields, roads, a church and a tree. The road in the painting seems to be singularly significant. The routes and paths combine the historical and natural orders and open onto the topographic experience: it is the experience of a man carrying a pitcher of water or people walking in the background. All the components which attracted focused Ingold's attention have contributed in constituting the surrounding area: they represent the "collective effort", taskscape, which makes the area a "dimension of life". Every element of the surroundings, each of its significant sites as well as people living there, participate in shaping the landscape, which becomes a kind of experience. Here, the landscape is an experience and the surroundings are the space of life and activity.

Surroundings are created with the well-known and wandered routes which become meaningful through the knowledge of their places, and through their landmarks, which are filled with a particular narrative. Being-on-the-way is a mode of appreciating the surroundings, endowing senses and meanings, and marking it by our presence and our experience. Therefore, we recognize traces of the past in the surroundings, determine how we belong in different places, better or less known, those on which we focus and those that we ignore. This kind of experience fuses the historical, the natural, the social and the cultural. This kind of experience belongs to the dweller of given surroundings. Another issue is that the journey triggers our senses, making the landscape a phenomenon in full sensual (Frydryczak, 2020).

Routes ensure orientation in the surroundings. As he explores these issues, Ingold makes a distinction between a creating maps and a wayfinding, which remains close to a mental map. In his opinion there is no such a thing like a "map in the head", because in finding the way we do not follow places, but our experiences (Ingold 2000, 217). A map needs navigation; a map involves spatial movement from one location to another, whereas wayfinding is about moving between places in the surroundings.

Places are not location, but stories which contain a vivid narrative complemented by the potential context of past experiences and people behind them. Places are the nucleus of the movement. They belong to daily practice, and thus - the daily performances and tasks, so the movement and wayfinding is a skill of the dweller of the surroundings.

Surroundings are also dynamic. Landscape is static as a view, but as an experience it opens itself to a much broader experience. When looking at Bruegel's painting, we can not only listen to the sounds, but also feel the scorching heat pouring down from the sky, which did not prevent a peasant from sleeping, feel the smell of the harvested crop, or "taste" the pears. The landscape is a part of us, as we become its part in our turn. Dwelling as the creation of surroundings is nothing but a practice to make landscape present.

Being-in-the-landscape changes its "location": the landscape is not there, it stays here, like the surroundings we constitute through action and perception. This approach allows to link the landscape with what is dynamic and reject its static model. Such interpretation has an impact on the individual: the viewer and the user should change into a "critical" participant, whose contribution to shaping the reality takes places in three domains : perception, action and awareness. Critical participation means co-creation and activity: an impartial spectator is superseded by an active model of the participant.

Reference list:

- Adorno, Th. W. 2002. *Aesthetic Theory*. Transl. R. Hullot-Kentor, London-New York: Continuum.
- Burckhardt, J. 1991. *Kultura Odrodzenia we Włoszech*, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.
- Berleant, A. 1992. *The Aesthetics of Environment*, Philadelphia : Temple University Press.
- Berleant, A. 2011. *Wrażliwość i zmysły. Estetyczna przemiana świata człowieka*. Transl. S. Stankiewicz, Kraków: Universitas.
- Berleant, A. 1997. *Living in the Landscape. Toward an Aesthetics of Environment*. University Press of Kansas.
- Burke, E. 1968. *Dociekania filozoficzne o pochodzeniu naszych idei wzniosłości i piękna*. Transl. P. Graff, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN
- Cosgrove, D. 2003. *Landscape and the European Sense of Sight – Eying Nature*, in: K. Anderson, M. Domosh, S. Pile, N. Thrift (eds.), *Handbook of Cultural Geography*, London: Sage Publications.
- Frydryczak, B. (2013). *Krajobraz. Od estetyki the picturesque do doświadczenia topograficznego*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk.
- Frydryczak, B. 2020. *Zmysły w krajobrazie*. Łódź: Oficyna.
- Haapala, A. 2014. *Estetyka codzienności [On the Aesthetics of Everyday]*. In: B. Frydryczak, M. Ciesielski (eds.), *Krajobraz kulturowy*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk.
- Ingold, T. 1993. *The Temporality of the Landscape*, "World Archeology", vol. 25, 2.

- Ingold, T., 2000. *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*, London-New York: Routledge.
- Jackson, J. B. 2008. *The World Itself*, in: *The Cultural Geography Reader*, Th. S. Oakes, P. L. Price (ed.), New York: Routledge.
- Kant, I. 1987. *Critique of Judgement*. Transl. Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publishing Co.
- Lowenthal, D. 2007. *Living within and Looking at Landscape*, "Landscape Research" 5.
- Olwig, K. R. 2002. *Landscape Nature and the Body Politic. From Britain Renaissance to America's New World*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sauer, C. 1963. *Land and Line. A selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer*, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Tuan Y.-F. 1987. *Przestrzeń i miejsce*, Warszawa: PIW.