The issue of raw material security in Poland ’ s contemporary national security strategies

This article examines the issue of ensuring raw material security as seen in the contemporary national security strategies of Poland. The temporal framework identified as “contemporary” indicates that the analysis embraced documents from the period 2003–2020, which mark a significant qualitative change in terms of defining and understanding security as an area which is not dominated by its hard, military aspect. The study aims to identify, discuss and compare various concepts of ensuring raw material security to Poland on the basis of the four strategies of Poland’s national security. The following research problems were formulated to achieve the research objectives defined in this way: to what extent is the issue of Poland’s raw material security present in the documents analyzed? What tools have the authors of the strategies employed to ensure security in Poland in terms of raw materials? What are the main difficulties in ensuring raw material security to Poland highlighted by the analyzed national security strategies? Are there any convergences in the visions of ensuring Poland’s raw material security presented in the analyzed strategies? The research questions formulated in this way served as the basis for the following research hypothesis: given an increase in non-military threats, the raw material-related dimension of security is increasingly emphasized in national security strategies. The research methods used in this article include the comparative method and source analysis. The technique of analysis was also used.


Introduction
A ccess to raw materials and, more importantly, the ability and means to ensure their extraction and processing into a finished product and commodity have long been one of the determinants of the significant role states play in a globalized world. It should be emphasized that the concept of raw material security is a relatively young term, both in European and Polish political discourse. In fact, threats to raw material security were first addressed by the European Commission in 2002. It was not until 2013 that the Strategic Implementation Plan for the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials was adopted. Its main goal was to promote innovation in the overall chain of creating added value of raw materials by operating in technological and non-technological areas, as well as by international cooperation (Kudełko, Kulczycka, 2013, p. 237). The concept of raw material security is one of the pillars of the economic security of the state (Dębski, Górka-Winter, 2003, p. 86). The core of raw material security is the capacity of the economic system of a given state to ensure access to resources, both from domestic and foreign sources. It is important for these resources to meet the economic needs of the state (Jakubczak, Flis, 2006, p. 396). The literature on the subject often indicates three conditions for the raw material dimension of security: ensuring uninterrupted acquisition PP 4 '20 of raw materials based on primary and secondary domestic sources, their rational use, and ensuring the stability of foreign supplies of raw materials identified as scarce (Galos, Nieć, Radwanek-Bąk, Smakowski, Szamałek, 2012, p. 34).
Raw material security pertains also to strategic, key and critical raw materials. The former include mineral deposits which are of essential importance for the development of the economy, the defense industry or high technologies (Szlachta, Bujak, 2017, p. 122). The difference between key and critical raw materials lies in the role they play in the national economy. The former play a significant role in satisfying the vital needs of society, while the latter are defined as difficult to obtain (Polityka Surowcowa Państwa, 2019).
A specific delay in recognizing the role and significance of raw material security can also be seen in domestic policy. It was not until the regulation of May 9, 2016 that the Government Plenipotentiary for the State's Raw Material Policy was appointed. The primary tasks of the Plenipotentiary include developing a concept shaping the state's raw material policy, coordinating and initiating activities regarding the state's resource policy, developing new legal and economic solutions in the field of state resource policy, monitoring the implementation and operation of solutions developed, and coordinating information and educational activities conducted by government administration bodies regarding the state's resource policy (Rada Ministrów, 2016, § 2). In the same year, the Prime Minister appointed the Interministerial Team for the State's Raw Material Policy, whose main task is to develop a draft of the state's raw material policy and to provide instruments for its implementation (Szamałek, 2018, p. 192).
Accentuating Poland's raw material security is also reflected in the main strategic documents on the national security of Poland.

The 2003 and 2007 National Security Strategies -addressing new threats
The 2003 National Security Strategy emphasized the protection of the state's sovereignty and independence as the basic objectives of the security policy. The Strategy was designed in a special international situation, and in response to the new global threat of terrorist attacks after September 2001 in the United States. The document in question laid the foundation for a further change in how state institutions perceived the security paradigm. It emphasized the need to shift the focus from hard, military threats towards a type of security that would more clearly address its soft areas (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2003). In the 2003 National Security Strategy, the issue of security in terms of raw materials was mentioned only twice, mainly in the context of the socio-economic background of Poland's security and the need to guarantee supplies of energy and energy sources. The global increase in demand and rising oil and gas prices were mentioned as the main threats to the raw material security of Poland. At the same time, the challenge for Poland in the form of diversifying supplies of energy sources and participating in the elimination of threats to their extraction and transit was emphasized.
A clear quantitative and qualitative increase in the type of security discussed here can be seen in the 2007 National Security Strategy. Its authors pointed to both its internal and external dimensions. They emphasized that one of the factors that might indirectly increase the threats to Poland is some countries' use of raw materials as an instrument of political pressure in the competition between great powers for access to, and extraction of such raw materials (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2007, p. 7). In this context, the policy of the Russian Federation was specifically discussed, which turned raw material security into a political tool strengthening its supra-regional position while simultaneously discriminating against certain EU and NATO member states (Ibid., p. 6). This forces other countries to cooperate on a transnational basis in order to guarantee energy security, search for alternative energy sources and strive to stop undesirable climate change.
The strategy in question emphasized the need to ensure alternative energy sources and diversify the supply of energy resources. The Polish state was therefore obliged to undertake activities aimed at diversifying supplies and preparing a national structure, in cooperation with the European Union and NATO, enabling Poland to respond to adverse changes on the raw material market (Ibid., p. 9).
The raw material security of Poland depended on the creation of an independent industrial infrastructure ensuring uninterrupted access to supply sources. In order to achieve this goal it was of key importance to continue tightening the cooperation with natural gas and crude oil producers in the North Sea and the Norwegian Shelf, by connecting Poland through gas pipelines with Scandinavian countries. The construction and commissioning of an LNG terminal in Świnoujście 1 was an investment of strategic importance for independence in natural gas supplies. An additional investment diversifying the supply of raw materials involved the project to import gas to Poland via the "Baltic Pipe." It consisted of five components: a gas pipeline at the bottom of the North Sea, the expansion of the Danish transmission system, a gas compressor station in Denmark, a gas pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea and an expanded transmission system in Poland. According to the adopted agenda, gas transport is scheduled to be launched on October 1, 2022 (Baltic Pipe Project, 2020).

A new dimension of raw material security. The 2014 National Security Strategy of Poland
The subsequent strategy, designed in 2014, continued to give increased attention to the issue of the raw material security of Poland. In addition to the above-mentioned measures contributing to the improvement of security, the necessity to expand and use the existing grid, and the mining infrastructure in order to search for unconventional deposits was also indicated. In order to strengthen Poland's security in this dimension, the necessity of further efforts to liberalize energy markets and create favorable conditions for investments in the energy sector, while integrating energy systems with other member states of the European Union was emphasized (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2014, p. 40).
The dependence of the level of raw material security in Poland on the necessity to develop uniform rules and instruments enhancing the energy aspect of security was further emphasized. The 2014 Strategy stressed the significance of the dependence of European Union states on imported energy resources, which potentially posed a threat to Poland PP 4 '20 (Ibid.,p. 23). This was a specific response to the guidelines of the European Commission, which in 2011 published the first list of critical raw materials (CRM) that were strategic for the functioning and economic development of the European Union. The criterion the European Commission adopted developing this list was based on two factors, namely economic importance and the degree of risk in securing CRM supply chains. Taking into account the high pace of changes in this area, the list was to be updated every three years. Initially, in 2011, fourteen CRM were identified. In 2014, this list was extended to twenty. In the same year, the methodological approach was changed, and emphasized such factors as dependence on imports (measured in terms of global supplies and the true supply of the European Union), existing export barriers and the detailed allocation of raw material used in specific industries, thereby extending the list of CRM to twenty-seven in 2017 (Komisja Europejska, 2017).
In September 2020, the European Commission presented the latest list of raw materials considered critical to the security of the European Union. A further three raw materials were added to the existing inventory, thus extending the number of CRM to thirty. From the point of view of Poland's raw material security, the inclusion of coking coal on the list is worth emphasizing. The European Union imports it from countries such as Canada, Mozambique and Russia, thus extending the supply chain. Poland and the Czech Republic are the only producers of this raw material in the whole of the EU (Instytut Chemicznej Przeróbki Węgla, 2020). The 2014 National Security Strategy was the first document of its type to address the importance of rare earth minerals as a source of the economic and technological development of states (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2014, p. 19). Rare earth minerals are a group of seventeen chemical elements, including lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium (from the so-called lanthanide group), scandium and yttrium (Kamprowski, 2020, p. 112). Importantly, contrary to their name, these elements are relatively frequent in nature, for example, lanthanides. They can be obtained in the form of a chemical element or compound (Skarżyński, 2015, p. 253). The name "rare" is applied not only due to the amount of a given metal in the earth's crust, but also to rare earth minerals being found exclusively in the ground, where they form water-insoluble oxides. The mere presence of a given rare element does not make it attractive in market terms. The process of its separation is important. Rare earth metals cannot be treated as a whole in the context of their importance for national economies. Their prices and the profitability of extraction need to be analyzed. This is related to the increasing potential for international conflicts in the race for access to these elements. Countries are divided into those dependent on the supplies of raw materials and those enjoying a monopoly on their extraction, such as the People's Republic of China. As regards the implementation of the new climate policy by the European Union, the importance of rare earth minerals used in the production of industrial goods and green technologies is becoming fundamental (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013, p. 120).
As concerns the topic of this study, the 2014 Strategy also emphasized the importance of the activities of secret services in the field of security. Intelligence activities related to energy and raw material policy played a special role in this respect (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2014, p. 32).

Raw material security in the 2020 National Security Strategy
The new National Security Strategy was approved by the President of the Republic of Poland on May 12, 2020. Compared to the strategies discussed above, in many respects it is a redefinition of Poland's security and defense systems. It emphasizes that the security strategy of Poland is the supreme document when establishing uniform strategic planning (Szopa, 2020). The situation of Poland in terms of security is described there as uncertain and unpredictable, and the policy of the Russian Federation identified as the most serious threat (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2020, p. 6). Raw material security, which is the subject of this study, is recognized as essential for Poland. It is indicated in the strategy that the dominant position of the Russian Federation in gas and crude oil supplies, and its implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project will increase the dependence of Poland and other countries in the region on these raw materials. The risk of Russia selectively supplying its gas as an instrument of political pressure is recognized as a security threat to the same extent as in the previous strategies (Ibid., p. 8). The authors of the document also point to the internal threats to the raw material dimension of security such as, first and foremost, the poor condition of the Polish transmission infrastructure, power plants and crude oil and fuel storage network.
One of the four pillars of the strategy in question involves energy security with a focus on uninterrupted supplies of energy sources. In order to ensure the national dimension of energy security, the capacity to generate energy, transmission grid and distribution of electric energy should be expanded and enhanced. Hard coal-and lignite-burning thermal power plants continue to have the largest share in electricity production in Poland. In 2018, hard coal was the main source in electricity production, with as much as 47.8 per cent of the share, while the share of lignite accounted for 29 per cent of the energy produced for Poland (rynekelektryczny.pl, 2020).
The next stage in curbing the threats to the raw material security of Poland will involve the progressive diversification of crude oil and gas supplies. This is to be achieved using the Świnoujście LNG terminal's increased intake capacity and the construction of a new terminal in the Bay of Gdańsk. Another investment of strategic importance is the PP 4 '20 expansion of the north-south transmission line of natural gas and storage system (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2020, p. 34). Grzegorz Baziur rightly notes that "one of the most important issues for the states in the Three Seas Initiative is the diversification of energy resources, which may gradually make them independent of supplies from a single source, in this case mainly from Russia" (Baziur, 2018, p. 31).

Conclusion
Raw material security is an important element of the national security of Poland. Taking into account the frequency with which specific statements and categories have been used, it should be stated that the issues in question have increasingly been addressed by subsequent security strategies. The 2014 National Security Strategy should be viewed as one marking a quantitative and qualitative change in discussions of the raw material dimension of security. This trend is presented in the table below. The analysis conducted in this article demonstrates that the authors of subsequent national security strategies have seen the raw material-related dimension of threats and presented plans to strengthen this area. In the future, it will require further tightening of Poland's cooperation with both the European Union and NATO. However, the expansion of the internal transmission grid and the progressive diversification of supplies of strategic raw materials should not be abandoned either. The challenge that the political decision-makers will have to face will certainly involve the adaptation of the internal resource infrastructure to the requirements of the European Union's climate policy. PP 4 '20 chronologiczne wskazują, iż analizie poddano dokumenty z lat 2003-2020 stanowiące istotną zmianę jakościową w definiowaniu i rozumieniu bezpieczeństwa jako obszaru niezdominowanego przez jego twardy, militarny charakter. Celami podjętych przez autora badań jest wskazanie, omówienie i porównanie koncepcji zapewnienia Polsce bezpieczeństwa surowcowego na podstawie czterech strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski. Do osiągnięcia tak określonych celów badań posłużyły następujące problemy badawcze: w jakim zakresie zapewnienie Polsce bezpieczeństwa surowcowego jest obecne w analizowanych dokumentach? Poprzez jakie narzędzia autorzy strategii kreowali w Polsce surowcowy wymiar bezpieczeństwa? Jakie główne trudności w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa surowcowego Polski uwypuklają badane strategie bezpieczeństwa narodowego? Czy istnieją zbieżne elementy wizji zagwarantowania Polsce bezpieczeństwa surowcowego ujęte w badanych strategiach? Tak sformułowane pytania badawcze stały się kanwą do sformułowania następującej hipotezy badawczej: wraz ze wzrostem zagrożeń o charakterze pozamilitarnym, surowcowy wymiar bezpieczeństwa jest coraz wyraźniej akcentowany w strategiach bezpieczeństwa narodowego. W poniższym artykule posłużono się następującymi metodami badawczymi: porównawczą oraz analizy źródeł. Zastosowano również technikę analizy.