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Ukraine in the Integration Security System

Abstract: The process of the security system formation in the integrated European space has been continuing for more than seven decades, but its final objective has not been attained yet. The relevance of this topic is the need to study the process of destruction of the established world, the collapse of the system of international relations, lack of understanding and complete disregard by the aggressor of all humanitarian levers in a situation of war and armed confrontation. Every subsequent turn in development of international relations in 20th and 21st centuries and new emerging threats seem to bring countries closer to unity and addressing the security problem, but...

In 2014 Russia, ignoring the principles of the international law, basic treaties with Ukraine, commitments to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, started a war. On 24 February 2022, a new escalation took place when Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring the state of war. What was the reason? The answer could be found in the Ukrainian history that is not a simple one. Russian rulers want to rebuild the Russian empire returning to the borders of the 19th century. This is a threat to Ukraine that is a sovereign European state founded on the bases of European values, peace and international cooperation.

Russia has been trying to eliminate Ukrainian statehood, language, and culture starting from the Kozak times of the 16th century. Thus, this process is at least 500-year old. In the 21st century, Russia attempted to occupy Ukraine by means of the anti-Ukrainian government, but the attempt failed. As a consequence, the Russian president decided to eliminate Ukraine by military means. When the aggression started in 2014, the EU deeply dependent on Russian energy sources, did not react fully to the Russian intervention. Ukraine could not defend its territorial integrity because of the lack of military capacities in the absence of the international military support. But in 2022, the situation is radically different: at the time of Russian invasion, Ukrainian people raise to the defense of their country, and the Ukrainian army thanks to the strong international military and political support continues to defend the existence of the Ukrainian state despite the dominance of the Russian military machine.

Key words: security system, European space, the international law, Russian war against Ukraine, the trans-Atlantic system of European defense

The stages of development of the security pillar of the European integration process

It is necessary to note that from the point of view of modern concepts and relevant terms, the security component is interpreted as a much broader substance than merely a sum of defense and military subcomponents. The security component is understood to cover almost all international spheres that are prone to diverse threats.

In conditions of opposition of the two blocks in the time of the beginning of the Cold War, leading World countries sought to reach a certain balance of forces in Europe and tried to “rescue” Germany from the crisis – the United States considered Germany as a component of European security and as an additional ally to counter-balance the po-

sition of France. In its turn, France considered the need to unite economic capacity of Saarland and Ruhr, and to ensure control over the German military machine. Small European countries considered German capacity as the necessary precondition to neutralise French ambitions to become the leader of the post-war Europe. So, ideas of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman that, in addition to economic issues, the future community should cover also political and defence spheres, started to materialise.

The evolution of European integration processes, as well as multifaceted phenomena, caused by economic crises of that period, and it ended by signature of the Single European Act in 1986. It was a rather turbulent, interesting and complicated period of European development – to a large extent; the period was shaped by and associated with the policy of one prominent individual – the French president Charles de Gaulle.

The development of the security policy of the European Communities was manifested by political and defense initiatives, caused by a certain shaping of the new policy in the USSR, warming in international relations and emergence of certain co-operation prospects. Transfer from dictatorships to democracy in Greece, Spain and Portugal allowed these countries to join the European Communities. However, the expansion generated a range of security problems, as the newly acceded members substantially lagged behind the core countries in terms of their economic development. As a result, transition rules were developed for 10 years and the relevant regional policy, supplemented by the Mediterranean Program that was expected to level living standards gradually in the EEC.

The collapse of the USSR – as a impulse for the EU security system

Deep geopolitical changes of early 1990s started the new stage in the European security configuration: the epoch of bipolar international relations was ending. New countries joined the WEU (Spain and Portugal in 1990), while in 1996 Ukraine reached agreement on associated membership. The Maastricht Treaty (effective since 1993) introduced deep institutional changes that dealt with new spheres of international policy – the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and the joint activities in the sphere of justice and home affairs. These decisions heavily relied on provisions of the Single European Act that regulated such issues as roles of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the European Commission. We will not list components of the first – economic – pillar of the EU. Let us just remind that outside the European Community, the Maastricht Treaty laid foundations for common foreign and security policy and initiated joint activities of member-countries in the sphere of justice and home affairs. Introduction of the Community citizenship was a major step towards EU unification (Article 17 of the Treaty). The Amsterdam Treaty (signed on October 2, 1997 and effective since May 1, 1999) stipulated introduction of a new position – the High Representative on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (identical to position of the Council's Secretary General). As the Amsterdam Treaty transferred some significant issues from the third pillar to the first one (inc. visa and immigration issues, freedom of movement, etc.), the third pillar retained co-operation of police and judicial institutions.

After establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European political co-operation got further institutional development. CFSP still stipulates coordina-

tion of national activities in the sphere of foreign and security policy. At the same time, it does not stipulate delegation of sovereign rights of nation-states to a supra-national European body. The matter is associated with materialisation of Pan European unity ideas in pursuance of common interests of EU member-states. Aims of CFSP incorporate a range of issues: from introduction and protection of common values – including military security – to implementation of vital values of the community of European peoples (Para 1 of Article 11 of the EU Treaty). The guiding principles of signatories of the Maastricht Treaty were based on principles of the UN Charter (1945), the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990). The Council of Europe defines principles of the common foreign and security policy, including principles in the sphere of defence and endorses joint strategies: objectives, means and terms of implementation of CFSP. According to Article 17 of the EU Treaty, CFSP covers long-term development of the joint defence policy that, if deemed necessary, may evolve to the common defence. Therefore, CFSP facilitates movement of the EU to a higher level of political integration, while the Western European Union is defined as the underlying support framework in the sphere (notwithstanding that its members are not necessarily members of the EU).

In respect to CFSP, the European Union recognises commitments of member-states under NATO Treaty and seeks to coordinate its policy with defence and security policy of NATO. In such context, WEU may be considered as the European framework of NATO.

The political compromise with NATO was finally found

The second pillar of the EU – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – definitely lagged behind other components of the European integration. It encountered particular difficulties, as every nation-state defended its national sovereignty. While CFSP was defined by the Maastricht Treaty, but participants of the Maastricht summit had focused on diverse economic issues and due to serious disagreements between the participants, the summit substantially limited the sphere of introduction of key tools of the security mechanism. The summit failed to define specific forms of use of joint European forces and to identify stages of transition to a common political and defence system. Delineation of functions with NATO was arranged by introduction of the concept of establishment of “EU-subordinated forces” – in essence it meant provision of military forces by NATO on request of the Union.

The US operation in Iraq in 2003 became a crush test for the European Union. Opponents and supporters of the US policy had almost halved the European unity, separating clearly into loyal allies and opponents of the American political course. At the next summit in Brussels (April 30, 2003), France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg discussed their own project of a closer co-operation in the sphere of common security and defence policy, that incorporated seven specific military cooperation projects.

Forecasts are always a risky business. After failure of the EC Constitution and signature of the Lisbon Treaty, due to problems in Afghanistan, the United States wanted to make its NATO allies (i.e. EU member-states) responsible for the Afghan campaign.

In their turn, such developments could allow to identify a new milestone in the security policy of the European Union.

Another scenario: developments associated with newly emerging centres of power – i.e. China, India, Pakistan and Japan – also may induce EU countries to make radical decisions in the sphere of their common foreign and security policy. In the latter case, it is fairly possible that European military formations may be used for protection of new assets in relevant regions (i.e. environmentally hazardous production facilities transferred outside Europe). In its turn, it could substantiate development of a new concept of the European Union – expansion of the European zone of responsibility to other regions of the World, in addition to delimitation of zones of responsibility with NATO.

The potential scenario, which has already been outlined in the context of the weakening of European and world security, is connected with Russia's war against Ukraine, Russia's threats to bring its nuclear potential to use. In such a case, Europe's security component must join with the transatlantic component to prevent a global nuclear catastrophe.

2019 year was a symbolic year for European and Euro-Atlantic security. NATO celebrated its 60th anniversary after establishment of the Alliance in 1949, at the same time, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic celebrated 10 years of their NATO membership – a major body of experience on the one hand, and the “adolescent” period of development of security arrangements of European neighbors of Ukraine, on the other. It is worth to note that it was Hungary that had gone through the most difficult and tragic path of protecting rights of its peoples to freedom – from the National Revolution of 1956 to the desperate attempt to quit the Soviet military block (the Warsaw Pact) in 1989. It was the Hungary's secession from the Warsaw Pact that meant the crash of the whole Soviet system, and eventually the crash of the USSR itself (Göncz, 2009).

The energy component of Ukraine-EU relations

Energy issues attract now the priority attention among other contemporary threats in Europe. The energy component of Ukraine-EU relations is of particular importance. Positive developments in integration of the Ukrainian power sector to the EU internal market could be promoted by granting full membership in the EU Energy Treaty to Ukraine (now, the country has the observer status); by consumption of excessive electric power of Ukrainian generation by EU member-states, provided a potential membership of Ukraine in the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity. Ukraine had already signed the relevant memorandum and now it is necessary to develop terms of reference for assessment of the Ukrainian energy system, meet a range of technical requirements and to ensure compliance of the Ukrainian energy system with EU standards. The strategy of Ukraine-EU energy cooperation stipulates synchronisation of the United Energy System of Ukraine (jointly with Moldova and EU) with UCTE – the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity. Ukraine plans to adapt its energy system to the European one in 7–10 years and synchronise it with technically reliable networks that supply electric energy to 500 million consumers.

The energy problem with the Nord stream 2 is the serious threat to Europe and all the world. It is nonsense, that strong countries of Europe don't understand this problem.

In the framework of international communication we see two levels of relations with Europeans. The first level – the inter-personal one – does not pose any questions and is not prone to any problems.

Another project is associated with integration of the Ukrainian gas transportation system into the common European oil and gas transportation networks. Another interesting project is associated with storage of strategic oil reserves in Ukrainian storage facilities that might form a part of strategic oil reserves of the EU. Should the above cooperation options be implemented, our country would get access to separate energy programs of the EU. Among other advantages of Ukraine it is worth to note its transit capacity.

Remaining outside the European Union, Ukraine successfully associates with the process of implementation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Ukrainian proposals on the Trans-Dniester conflict settlement and the Memorandum on Establishment of the EU Mission for Assistance at the Ukraine-Moldova Border (EU-BAM) were major events in the bilateral relations that were positively assessed by the EU.

The framework of EU-Ukraine dialogue

The trans-border aspect, that may pose certain threats, includes a range of complex issues: strengthening of borders and development of border infrastructure; combating illegal migration and human trafficking; border control intensity; combating international organised crime, including terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, combating money laundering, trade in smuggled cars, etc. At the same time, Ukraine could propose the EU a program for strengthening of all Ukrainian borders, in addition to the Western border section. Moreover, it is the Eastern border section where threats of illegal migration are getting stronger, and according to its commitments to the EU, Ukraine is responsible for combating illegal migration. As a result, our country bears the heaviest costs of relevant actions and accommodation of apprehended illegal migrants.

After the failure of the EU constitution, the European Union considered all pros and contras and had not closed the window of opportunities for potential accession of other European countries to the EU. After introduction of amendments by the Amsterdam Treaty (October 2, 1997) and the Treaty of Nice (February 26, 2001), the article on EU membership still exists, albeit with certain interpretations (Article 49), that resulted in complicating the procedure of admission of new EU members. This means that Ukraine, like any other European country, may apply for membership.

Countries-neighbors of Ukraine, that became EU members on May 1, 2004, were offered simplified association-based arrangements for accession. By the way, a similar “simplified” accession format is offered to Macedonia as well. It is clear, that the situation is associated with other geopolitical, strategic levers.

The cooperation with Ukraine

Are there any levers that might induce EU member-states to facilitate their enhanced cooperation with Ukraine? Unfortunately enough, objective realities suggest that in our

case strategic levers exists only in sanction sphere and help to Ukraine by arms. The situation is not associated merely with willingness or unwillingness of EU member-states. First and foremost, it is caused by internal problems of the European community. Other factors are associated with internal and external capacity of Ukraine. From the point of view of leading European countries (especially France) Ukraine is a competitor in the agricultural sector. In terms of gross import of food products, France became the second largest food exporter in the World after the USA. In the case of France, its positive export/import balance is simply astonishing: tens of billions of Euros. France is a major exporter of meat, milk, wheat, fruit and vegetables, cheese, poultry and other types of agricultural products. In addition, political factors also matter: the renewal of French military presence in NATO does not provide for any optimism in connection with potential promotion of Ukrainian interests there.

What dose EU propose to Ukraine instead of a new enhanced agreement? It proposes the Eastern Partnership Program – i.e. establishment of a some sort of mini-EU of European countries that are not EU member-states, as a mini-satellite of the large EU. Such a satellite is expected to remain orbiting around the centre of the European life for an indefinite period of time. The above program strongly resembles the unofficial document on Eastern policy of the European Union (Non-paper), once proposed by Poland. The Polish concept, that accounted for the need to apply tailored approaches to new Eastern neighbors of the EU, provided a vision of future relations with Ukraine that should be based on recognition of the European choice of Ukraine, as the important country for stability and security in the Eastern Europe. At that time, Poland believed that underestimation of EU accession-oriented policy of Ukraine endangered positions of pro-reform and pro-European forces in our country (Chekalenko, 2003, p. 28; 2016, p. 112).

The above options might be implemented through strengthening political dialogues and cooperation in the sphere of foreign and security policy that suggests continuation of the dialogue on implementation of the European Security Strategy and in-depth consultations between Ukraine and the EU on conflict-settling matters.

Some months ago one of potential cooperation options was associated with engagement of our country into the active process of conflict prevention and conflict settlement – including mediation in settlement of the Trans-Dnister conflict in Moldova; involvement of the European Union to support of OSCE and mediators (inc. Ukraine) in settlement of the problem; development of cooperation with Moldova on border issues, including efficient exchange of information on trans-border flows of people and goods through the common border; implementation of results of the three-party expert consultations with participation of Ukraine, Moldova and the European Commission; accumulation of positive experience of Ukraine's participation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the EU Police Mission in FYR Macedonia.

So, cooperation of the EU and Ukraine in the sphere of security includes counter-measures against common threats: russian war against Ukraine, weapons of mass destruction, illegal export of weapons, etc. Ukraine had made a range of commitments in the security sphere under the Action Plan of the European Neighborhood Policy. The strategic component of EU-Ukraine cooperation was discussed with foreign ministers of the Baltic Council with participation of the European Commission representatives.

The issues under discussion included strengthening of the “East direction” of the EU foreign policy with maximal possible accounting for strategic interests of EU neighbors, problems of strengthening energy security in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea regions, as well as prospects of EU-Ukraine cooperation in the contexts of negotiations on a new enhanced agreement. Components of economic cooperation with the EU, namely expansion of trade in goods, expansion of transport corridors, establishment of the energy security system, migration issues, etc. were discussed at the international conference – Ukraine and the European Union: New Approaches. Besides that, the Memorandum on Intentions was signed with Deutsche Bank AG on cooperation in the sphere of climate change. The document deals with prospects of implementation of programs and projects in Ukraine for reduction of greenhouse gases emissions, it stipulates potential investment projects in the sphere of environmental protection, as well as identification of amounts of funding and relevant mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol.

In addition to the above forms of cooperation, training-related cooperation components were also developing – i.e. participation of Ukrainian military units in joint military formations of the EU (e.g. exercises of multi-national Tisza battalion with participation of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine).

Ukraine’s move to NATO

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine introduced the corresponding changes to the legislative acts of the state in 2014. In fact, the Verkhovna Rada returned to the provisions of the national legislation of 2003, including the Law of Ukraine “On the Basics of National Security” of 2003, which clearly stated the European integration and Euro-Atlantic vectors of our foreign policy and provided a clear and extensive plan for the implementation of the mentioned tasks.

In Ukraine, the Law “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the strategic course of the state to acquire full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)” was adopted. This legislative act amends the Basic Law of Ukraine, Art. 85, 102, 116 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states in Art. 85 implementation of the state’s strategic course to acquire full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (Verkhovna Rada, 2019, Amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution).

It should be noted that the members of the Alliance, which are the leading countries of different geographical regions of the world, confirmed that they are all “united in supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders and Ukraine’s inalienable right to independently determine its future and foreign policy without interference from the outside” (*Joint statement*, 2016).

All steps regarding European integration and Euro-Atlantic tasks of Ukraine were confirmed by 28 NATO countries in the final Declaration of the NATO Summit (Warsaw, July 8–9, 2016) (*Joint statement*, 2016). The Alliance defined Ukraine’s new status in relations with NATO – the status of an advanced partner of the North Atlantic Alliance. This Program provides for the implementation of reforms agreed with NATO within the

framework of the Strategic Defense Bulletin – in fact, an action plan for the near future. A similar cooperation format is used by five countries that NATO has given the opportunity to participate in the Enhanced Opportunities Program – Australia, Finland, Sweden, Jordan and Georgia.

NATO implements cooperation with Ukraine through the system of trust funds. A trust fund (*English – Trust Fund*) is a contract that allows private individuals to participate in cooperation. The Alliance chose the trust system of assistance because it already has positive experience in this area. More than 70 percent of the population of Ukraine supports the idea of becoming a NATO member.

So, the changes on the European continent, in particular the aggressive policy of Russia, the military actions of the Russian military machine on the Ukrainian front, paradoxically enough, became useful for the North Atlantic Alliance: they helped to activate the activities of the Organization, forced to change tactics and develop a new strategy. Accelerated the formation of reinforced rapid response forces and their advancement deep into Europe: Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania...

New security challenges made it necessary to combine the security efforts of the Alliance with the European Union, which, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, found itself on a dangerous border and in a dangerous situation.

So, we can state that the war in Europe prompted the West to take active defensive actions: sanctions, anti-missile defense, increased presence in the border countries, such as Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania, on the eastern border of the European Union. In addition, it intensified the introduction of renewed forms of cooperation with the public, such as public diplomacy.

Ukraine even now actively cooperates with the EU in the sphere of foreign and security policy. At the same time, materialisation of European intentions of our country is hindered by external and internal instability. In addressing threats, that are rather difficult to Ukraine to address alone, our country expects for support of European countries, including our strategic partners by activate sanctions against aggressor – Russia.

The current state of war

Russia's war against Ukraine resulted in more than 13,000 victims, according to the official UN data. Such a high indicator of victims, Russia's crimes against people in the occupied territories, the destruction of social infrastructure and economic potential confirm that Russia is waging a war to destroy Ukraine as a state – an existential war, that is, a war of destruction. Russia's new strategy, the statements of its leaders, and Putin in particular, prove that Russia will not give up its aggressive plans.

In such a situation, Ukraine must adopt a new concept of fighting the enemy. The basis of this new strategy should be a cardinal decision to wage war to a victorious conclusion in order to destroy the Russian threat. Only with the destruction of Russia as an aggressor will it be possible to build a peaceful Europe and a peaceful world.

Progressive humanity – advanced states must understand that Russia will not stop at the invasion of Ukraine: Russian invasion plans extend much further – to all European

and Asian countries that were part of the Soviet bloc called “the Socialist Camp.” This is Putin’s main goal. The talk of some Europeans about the need “to observe the rules of tolerance towards Russia” is nothing else than short-sightedness, lack of logic and misunderstanding of the current situation.

The historical coincidence of geopolitical circumstances of 100 years ago is repeating itself. Tomorrow Russian soldiers will break into the European doors of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Germany to build “Russia Today.” And then what will be the response of European leaders? Any project of European and World security development without Ukraine is futile.

Conclusions

Security schemes implemented in international relations have several levels and options for protection. They are formed at the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels. The first is focused on the development of its own security resources, forms internal defense schemes that rely only on the armed forces of its own state. Of course, no one excludes from this option the purchase of foreign and the sale of own weapons, holding joint exercises, etc. The second level, growing from the bilateral support of friendly countries, is designed to protect already two partners. This option is often formed and grows on the basis of a strategic partnership, which is developed, accepted and implemented by both states implementing the named security scheme. The highest manifestation of this kind of protection, in our opinion, is the provision of one’s own armed forces in order to avert the danger that threatens a strategic partner. In the recent history of international relations, although not often, similar cases do occur. A strategic partnership at the highest level was once established by the United States of America with some of its partners such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, etc. However, so far we have not seen in full-scale action the appropriate implementation of the principles of strategic partnership, which we call classic.

According to the scheme, there is also a third level of protection – collective protection, in which several states take part, combining their own efforts in confronting the enemy. Such a scheme is already similar to the safety net with which colleagues in wrestling surround themselves. Such a grid network includes military, information, cyber, ideological defense, and also covers space, air, surface and underwater space, etc. All these directions are clearly developed, the roles of each participant are defined and included in a single scheme of defense against the aggressor.

During the Cold War, Soviet propaganda called such schemes of the enemy military blocs – a vivid example of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), reinforcing the negative component in the name itself. At the same time, the Russian propaganda machine called its own military groups as alliances of states or security associations, such as, for example, the Warsaw Pact Organization (OPSO), formed in 1955 by the Soviet Union with its satellites from the Soviet camp, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), initiated by the Kremlin since the Tashkent Agreement of 1992, which involved some former republics of the USSR. The above-mentioned collective associations mainly have the character of regional deterrence and

protection, that is, they do not assume responsibility for the security of the whole world, and the area covered by all tactical and strategic options does not go beyond their influence.

Traditionally the concept of security as well as the theoretical foundation of political science have been influenced by the paradigm of realism and neorealism. That is, defending their interests, states can realistically resort to the use of military force. The formation of Ukraine's national security system was quite painful and multidimensional. And the end result in this matter has not yet been achieved.

The theoretical foundation of security, which we define as a component of the theory of international relations, is in the process of constant development. And this may explain that there is still no consensus among Western researchers on the concept of security. During the Cold War the concept of security was based mainly on military and to some extent political security. Later with the collapse of the bipolar scheme of relations and dispersion but not the disappearance of its Soviet component purely military elements of the concept were constantly criticized. Gradually, a new interpretation of security theory was formed. Security is now perceived and seen as a broader and deeper substance claiming to be the world's arbiter of peacekeeping.

We may assume that two strategic directions – Euro-integration and Euro-Atlantic ones – will remain priorities for our country. Negotiations on the new Ukraine-EU agreement should be finalised – preferably as an Association Agreement, including provisions on the Free Trade Zone as its important component. Negotiations on visa-free travel for Ukrainian nationals are realised. The most optimal option in this sphere might include provision of so called “road map” to Ukraine, stipulating gradual phase out of visa requirements. Relations with NATO should be shaped by an annual national program that would provide a new format of relations between Ukraine and the alliance.

Integration-oriented movement first of all is a way to security and peace. So, attraction of foreign investments and modern technologies, enhancement of competitive capacity of Ukrainian producers and opportunities of access to the EU internal market. In the political sphere, European integration determines modernisation of the legislative framework of Ukraine, democratisation of its political and institutional systems. Cooperation with the EU will facilitate enhancement of Ukrainian social conditions to the level of European standards, improvement of living standards and wellbeing of the country's population. At the same time, integration with the EU guarantees that participants will be protected against aggressions and territorial claims.

Summing up, we should stress that the evolutionary development is irreversible. This conclusion is indirectly confirmed by numerous European projects dealing with Ukraine and its neighbors. Many examples in the human history suggest that any evolutionary phenomenon may be suspended for some time, but it cannot be prevented, as dialectic laws of social development operate independently and often against the will of participants of historic processes.

Observing coordinated efforts of European countries anti the Russian aggression against Ukraine which is realized in the conditions of the global crisis, we may hope that sooner or later EU member-countries will be able to join their forces for protection European security.

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Ukraina w systemie bezpieczeństwa integracji europejskiej

Streszczenie

Proces kształtowania się systemu bezpieczeństwa w zintegrowanej przestrzeni europejskiej trwa od ponad siedmiu dekad, ale jego ostateczny cel nie został jeszcze osiągnięty. Istotą ujętego w temacie zagadnienia jest konieczność zbadania procesu niszczenia ustalonego świata, upadku systemu stosunków międzynarodowych, niezrozumienia i całkowitego lekceważenia przez agresora wszelkich kwestii humanitarnych w sytuacji wojny i konfrontacji zbrojnej. Każdy kolejny zwrot w rozwoju stosunków międzynarodowych w XX i XXI wieku oraz pojawiające się nowe zagrożenia wydają się zbliżać państwa do jedności i rozwiązywania problemu bezpieczeństwa, ale w 2014 roku Rosja, ignorując zasady prawa międzynarodowego, podstawowe traktaty z Ukrainą, zobowiązania do poszanowania integralności terytorialnej i nienaruszalności Ukrainy, rozpoczęła wojnę. 24 lutego 2022 r. nastąpiła nowa eskalacja, kiedy Rosja zaatakowała Ukrainę bez wypowiedzenia wojny. Co było powodem? Odpowiedź można znaleźć w historii Ukrainy, która nie jest prosta. Rosyjscy władcy chcą odbudować imperium rosyjskie wracając do granic z XIX wieku. Stanowi to zagrożenie dla Ukrainy, która jest suwerennym państwem europejskim opartym na wartościach europejskich, pokoju i współpracy międzynarodowej. Od czasów Kozaków w XVI wieku Rosja stara się eliminować ukraińską państwowość, język i kulturę. Proces ten ma więc co najmniej 500 lat. W XXI wieku Rosja próbowała okupować Ukrainę za pomocą antyukraińskiego rządu, ale próba się nie powiodła. W konsekwencji prezydent Rosji zdecydował się na militarną likwidację Ukrainy. Kiedy w 2014 roku rozpoczęła się agresja, UE głęboko uzależniona od rosyjskich źródeł energii nie w pełni zareagowała na rosyjską interwencję. Ukraina nie mogła bronić swojej integralności terytorialnej z powodu braku zdolności wojskowych przy braku międzynarodowego wsparcia wojskowego. Ale w 2022 r. sytuacja jest radykalnie inna: w momencie rosyjskiej inwazji

naród ukraiński ochoczo broni swojego kraju, a armia ukraińska dzięki silnemu międzynarodowemu wsparciu militarno-politycznemu nadal broni istnienia państwa ukraińskiego pomimo dominacji rosyjskiej maszyny wojennej.

Słowa kluczowe: system bezpieczeństwa, przestrzeń europejska, prawo międzynarodowe, wojna Rosji z Ukrainą, transatlantycki system obrony europejskiej