

Krystian PACHUCKI-WŁOSEK

Jagiellonian University

ORCID: 0000-0002-4527-5441

The Role and Importance of Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs) in Building a Controlled Third Sector in the Republic of Uzbekistan

Abstract: The object of research of the following article is the functioning of the so-called third sector in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Due to the fact that government-organized non-governmental organisations (GONGO) dominate over other forms of organisations, they became the main subject of the research work. This article aims to answer the following research question: What role do GONGOs play in Uzbek domestic and foreign policy? Changing external and internal conditions have contributed to an increased interest in participation on the part of the public, which makes it difficult to maintain control over the third sector, hence the second research question: What measures are being taken by those in power to maintain the dominance of GONGOs over other forms of association? The research was based on the collected research material - literature on the subject, government communiqués and press releases. These were analysed for actions that fit into the research questions posed. They were then collected and presented in the article below. The paper uses: the observational method, document research, and elements of the monographic method by focusing mainly on one form of third sector organisation, using the following tools: synthesis, analogy and deduction. The guiding conclusion is that maintaining the dominance of GONGOs over other forms of association is a key element in the sustainability of the mechanism of state control over citizens.

Key words: Republic of Uzbekistan; GONGO, third sector, foreign policy, domestic policy

Introduction

In order to characterise the third sector in the Republic of Uzbekistan, it is necessary to refer to the definition of **civil society**, i.e., all forms of social activity undertaken by individuals or groups not affiliated with the state and not managed by state authorities (EUR-Lex). The main objective of these activities is to achieve common goals, often related to meeting the needs of the community. In democratic systems, it acts as a mediation platform between public authorities and citizens (Sasinowski, 2012, pp. 32–33).

Another important issue in the analysis of the Uzbek non-governmental sector is the concept of **legitimacy of power**, understood as a state in which power gains social acceptance, recognition, and a sense of justice in the eyes of citizens. This means that people consider those in power to be entitled to exercise authority and obey their decisions not out of fear or coercion, but because they consider their authority to be justified (Janczuk, 2021, pp. 68–70).

The basis for understanding the development path of the third sector in Uzbekistan is **the authoritarian system of government**, understood as a system of government in which power is concentrated in the hands of one person, party, or group that is not

subject to social control, and citizens are required to obey unconditionally (Bankowicz, 2010, p. 25).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, stimulating citizens' involvement in economic and socio-political affairs was a *sine qua non* for developing an efficient model of state governance. Islam Karimov, the ruler of Uzbekistan, focused on building the foundations of a free market economy, which contributed to the creation of the business world, while trying to limit the practice of citizens associating in non-governmental organisations (Salimov, 2018, p. 2). The differences in approach to the two sectors were determined by the belief that the state administration would develop mechanisms for cooperation with the business world that would allow the status quo in terms of the political system to be maintained, which would be difficult in the case of social entities.

The issue of society demanding its rights only emerged at the end of the 1990s, when the economic situation improved. This coincided with liberalisation and increased cooperation with the US and Western countries (Кенжаев, 2021, pp. 79–81). An indirect effect of the rapprochement with the West was the emergence of independent organisations financed by external entities, which were not perceived as a potential threat at the beginning of the wave of colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space. The protests in Andijan in May 2005 led to the closure of independent organisations and the state taking over the role of the main creator of social organisations (Ernazarov, 2020, p. 13). This manifested itself in the mass establishment of government non-governmental organisations (GoNGOs), which became the dominant entity shaping the Uzbek third sector.

This article aims to answer the following research question: What role do GoNGOs play in Uzbek domestic and foreign policy? Changing external and internal conditions have contributed to an increase in public interest in participation, which makes it difficult to maintain control over the third sector; hence the second research question: What measures are the authorities taking to maintain the dominance of GoNGOs over other forms of association?

The first question was answered by analysing the collected research material in the form of literature, official government communications, and press releases. The second question required identifying specific initiatives taken by the state, supported by examples, to maintain the existing order. The study used the observational method by recording specific facts and their mutual relationships, as well as the document research method by analysing government documents and organisation statutes. The main tools used were synthesis through causal association, analogy, and deduction.

Legal and organisational issues conducive to maintaining the dominance of GoNGOs as the primary form of organisation in the Uzbek third sector

After the events in Andijan in May 2005, President Islam Karimov banned most independent organisations supported by external entities, which led to a decline in the number of NGOs from 5,000 in 2005 to 2,247 in 2007 (Ilkhamov, 2005, p. 297; *Количество функционирующих...*, 2008).

The fundamental cause of this mass phenomenon was the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan “*On measures to support the development of civil society*

institutions in Uzbekistan". This document, issued in 2005, was part of the state's official narrative on the need to support grassroots civic initiatives and build a strong, modern civil society. The Uzbek authorities declared their willingness to create an institutional basis for the functioning of NGOs by strengthening their role in public life and guaranteeing them formal support from the state. The official message was that the government upheld its earlier declarations of providing comprehensive support for the activities of civil society institutions, including non-governmental organisations, associations, and foundations.

However, behind the façade of these declarations lay mechanisms that in practice enabled the authorities to exercise strict control over the NGO sector. A key element of the regulation was the creation of the Non-Governmental Organisation Support Fund, which was supposed to support their activities by providing grants, advice, and training. Although formally the fund was intended to strengthen the potential of the civil sector, in reality it became an instrument of centralisation and supervision, as it enabled the state to control the sources of funding for individual organisations and to selectively allocate funds only to those entities that were loyal to the official political line.

In addition, one of the most restrictive provisions was the setting of a maximum limit on foreign donations of USD 2,300 per year per organisation. Such a low amount – completely inadequate to the real costs of running an organisation – practically ruled out the possibility of receiving assistance from international donors. This had serious consequences for independent NGOs, which could not count on domestic financial support due to their critical stance towards the authorities. As a result, many organisations were forced to suspend or terminate their activities due to a lack of funds (Ilkhamov, 2005, p. 303; Постановление Президента..., 2005).

At the same time, the Uzbek authorities launched measures aimed at stimulating the creation of non-governmental organisations using internal resources, i.e., national funds, support institutions and local administrative structures. This course of action was a response both to the need to demonstrate institutional pluralism to the international community and to the need to control and channel civic activity in a manner consistent with the interests of the state. This strategy was based on a mechanism of supporting only those organisations that worked in close cooperation with the authorities, often performing auxiliary functions for the state apparatus.

A significant problem during this period was the lack of transparent legal regulations that would protect independent non-governmental organisations from abuse by the security apparatus and public administration. NGOs operated in conditions of legal uncertainty, exposed to arbitrary decisions by local authorities, tax audits and even repression by the secret services. In response to these concerns, in 2006, "*The Law on Guarantees for the Activities of Non-Governmental Non-Commercial Organisations*" (Закон Республики Узбекистан, 2006) was enacted. This law was an important step towards formally sanctioning the presence of NGOs in the public sphere, and its provisions were aimed at strengthening the legal status of these organisations. Among other things, the document guaranteed:

- the right to freely pursue statutory activities;
- access to public information;
- protection of non-profit organisations' property;

- prohibition of unlawful interference by state authorities;
- the possibility of appealing against administrative decisions in court.

It is worth noting, however, that although the law provided *de iure* protection of the rights of non-governmental organisations, its implementation in practice encountered numerous barriers. First of all, the judicial system in Uzbekistan was not independent, and many administrative bodies continued to interpret the law in a discretionary manner, which undermined the effectiveness of the guarantees provided for in the law.

In 2008, both chambers of the Uzbek parliament adopted another important resolution – “*On measures to strengthen support for non-governmental organisations and other civil society institutions*” (Совместное Постановление..., 2008). This act was a continuation of the policy of formal support for the NGO sector initiated in the mid-2000s and was aimed at strengthening the role of non-governmental organisations in the implementation of public tasks, while maintaining state control over their activities. The document provided for expanded access to public funding, with the aim of creating a stable financial base for NGOs operating at the local and national levels. One of its main objectives was to provide funding not only to existing organisations, but also to newly emerging civic initiatives, which previously had limited opportunities for development due to a lack of support.

An important element of the provision was the introduction of formal mechanisms for cooperation between NGOs and state institutions. It was assumed that this partnership would be based on joint planning and implementation of social projects, exchange of information, and organisation of joint training and information activities.

Although, in theory, this was supposed to promote the democratisation of the decision-making process and increase the role of civil society in public life, in practice it often led to NGOs becoming dependent on state structures, both financially and organisationally. Another element included in the document was the creation of grant programmes aimed at local civic initiatives. The intention was to support grassroots activities in areas such as:

- social assistance (e.g., support for people in difficult life situations, senior citizens, people with disabilities);
- education and upbringing (including civic education programmes and activities promoting equal opportunities);
- environmental protection (e.g., environmental campaigns, local initiatives related to the protection of natural resources);
- public health (promotion of a healthy lifestyle, preventive and educational activities).

All these measures were part of a broader strategy by the Uzbek authorities to delegate some social tasks to the non-governmental sector, while maintaining control over its structure and functioning. It is worth noting, however, that although formally this document created a framework for civic activation and institutional strengthening of NGOs, in reality, it did not address the main barriers faced by independent organisations. In particular, no real mechanisms were provided to protect NGOs from repression by the security services or local administration, which meant that access to funds and co-operation with the state was mainly available to “trusted” partners – organisations that accepted the existing political order and avoided topics considered sensitive (such as human rights, media freedom and judicial independence).

The ruling elite's reduced fear of social pressure for systemic reforms paved the way for the adoption in 2014 of "*The Law on Social Partnership*" (Закон Республики Узбекистан, 2014). This was a landmark piece of legislation, at least at the legislative level, which for the first time comprehensively defined the principles and areas of cooperation between state institutions and non-governmental organisations and other civil society actors. The Act was intended to provide a basis for building a system of cooperation between three sectors: public, non-governmental and private, in the spirit of the so-called tri-sector cooperation. This document specified in detail the areas in which social partnership could be implemented. These included, among others:

- social policy, including social assistance and care for vulnerable groups;
- environmental protection and sustainable development;
- prevention and health promotion;
- activities for young people and families;
- support for education and the development of civic culture.

The Act not only formalised the possibility of cooperation, but also provided for specific instruments of support for NGOs:

- conclusion of partnership agreements between public administration and non-governmental organisations for the implementation of public tasks;
- the possibility for NGOs to receive organisational and training advice;
- the provision of commercial premises for their statutory activities;
- the participation of organisations in the process of reviewing draft legislation and development strategies.

Formally speaking, this was an important step towards building institutional mechanisms for cooperation between the state and civil society, modelled on solutions known from democratic countries. However, the effectiveness of the Act in practice proved to be limited. Key problems remained unresolved: organisations continued to operate in a climate of mistrust and surveillance, there were no clear procedures for implementing social partnership, and most NGOs participating in state projects were still organisations loyal to the authorities, avoiding politically sensitive issues. In addition, the lack of independent sources of funding and the low level of private sector involvement in NGO funding meant that the law did not lead to a balance of influence and did not eliminate existing dependencies. In practice, social partnership was mainly implemented on terms dictated by public institutions, which limited its potential as a platform for genuine social dialogue.

Although the law provided for the creation of platforms for cooperation, public consultation and joint initiatives, in reality these mechanisms remained largely inactive. Public consultations were mostly formal in nature, and the voice of NGOs, especially independent ones, was ignored or marginalised in the decision-making process. Organisations had no real tools to influence public policy, and their participation in the dialogue was often limited to the role of passive implementers of state projects.

Recognising the limited effectiveness of previous measures and the need to revise the model of relations between the state and civil society, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced significant reforms shortly after taking office. On 7 February 2017, "*The Strategy for Action in Five Priority Areas of Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2017–2021*" (Распоряжение Президента..., 2017), also known as the "Develop-

ment Strategy.” This document was a programme for the modernisation of the country, covering politics, the economy, the judicial system, civil society and security, and one of its key elements was the implementation of effective mechanisms for dialogue between the authorities and society. The strategy announced measures aimed at:

- strengthening the role of NGOs and other civil society institutions in decision-making processes;
- expanding public consultations and debates on issues important to citizens’ lives;
- promoting transparency in public administration;
- developing free and responsible media, treated as a tool for social control and a channel for expressing citizens’ opinions.

De iure, these declarations have influenced the development of civil society in the Republic of Uzbekistan, as confirmed by statistics. According to data from 2007, there were 2,247 non-governmental organisations operating in Uzbekistan, while by 2009 their number had more than doubled to 5,103 entities. Another boom occurred between 2009 and 2014, with the number rising from 5,103 to 8,190 (Юсупов, Исаков, 2020). This rapid increase was interpreted by the authorities as proof of the effectiveness of reforms and openness to social participation. From an analytical perspective, it is worth reflecting on the nature of these organisations and the quality of their activities. A significant proportion of the newly established NGOs operate within the so-called GoNGO (government-organised NGOs) system, i.e., organisations created or supported by the state, which do not demonstrate real independence and often serve to legitimise the policies of the authorities. At the same time, truly independent organisations that are critical of the government or financed from international sources continue to experience difficulties with registration, have been subject to control and have had limited access to funds.

The conspicuous dependence of GoNGOs on the state has led to a significant decline in citizens’ interest in getting involved in their activities. As a result, many people have begun to show ambition to create independent non-governmental organisations that could truly represent social interests, rather than merely implementing the guidelines and objectives of the authorities.

Aware of this challenge, the authorities are taking a number of measures to control the development of the third sector and limit the influence of independent initiatives.

Firstly, the Department for Non-Governmental Organisations within the Ministry of Justice plays a key role. It is this body that establishes the formal criteria required for the registration of new NGOs, decides on the acceptance or rejection of applications, and maintains the official register of active organisations (Kenjaev, 2022, p. 45). Despite President Mirziyoyev’s 2018 announcement regarding the strengthening of civil society and the democratisation of the state, the practice of registering NGOs still faces numerous barriers. The procedures remain opaque, and officials often reject applications on the basis of minor formal errors or vague requirements, without clearly indicating all their objections at once. A good example is the situation of a group of students from the Faculty of Sociology at the National University of Uzbekistan, who tried for over two years to register the Young Volunteers Centre. Their application was rejected more than 20 times, each time under a different pretext and with the need to make further amendments (*Uzbekistan: Registration..., 2021*).

Awareness of growing civic aspirations forced the authorities to seek new ways to control and integrate potentially independent initiatives. One such solution was to create state counterparts to social initiatives that were being registered by independent groups. An example of this is the establishment of the Union of Volunteers of Uzbekistan, almost simultaneously with the attempt to register the Centre for Young Volunteers. The union was registered without any problems and immediately gained official status (Maxsudovich, 2021, p. 63). This mechanism allows the authorities to capture social energy and citizen engagement, directing it towards state-controlled structures, which thus gain a tool for social mobilisation while eliminating the risk of truly independent organisations emerging.

Secondly, the authorities are deliberately seeking to absorb independent NGOs under various pretexts, in particular under the banner of improving efficiency and coordination of activities. An example of this practice was the Association of Volunteers of Uzbekistan, which was established during the COVID-19 pandemic and quickly expanded its activities, taking advantage of the president's appeal to increase business participation in financing the third sector (*Государство поддерживает...*, 2020). This independent and relatively well-funded organisation began to be seen as a potential threat to the monopolistic position of GoNGOs. In response, the authorities established the Sponsorship Coordination Centre "Uzbekistan – Mercy and Health" (*В Узбекистане...*, 2020), which quickly became the central point for collecting and distributing funds. Entrepreneurs were obliged to support this new institution, which resulted in the Volunteer Association losing access to its existing funds. Financial restrictions – including a limit on foreign support of up to USD 2,300 – led to an almost complete halt in its activities. As a result, the organisation was forced to submit to the government's GoNGO in order to survive.

Thirdly, as a means of maintaining the dominance of state-controlled structures, the government employs a strategy of breaking up larger organisations into smaller units registered separately in individual wilayats (provinces). This fragmentation allows for control over dispersed entities and prevents the consolidation of power by independent NGOs. Official data indicate that there are nearly 10,000 registered organisations, of which over 6,000 are GoNGOs. However, the actual number of active, independent NGOs is much smaller – estimates indicate around 1,000 entities. For example, the Mahalla Charity Fund has 20 branches, which is also the number of branches of the Youth Union of Uzbekistan (Юсупов, Исаков, 2020). Despite their theoretical autonomy, in practice, these branches are heavily dependent on the central Centre. A similar situation applies to the Women's Union, which has branches in all regions and districts of the country, with each branch registered as a separate organisation. As a result, a single organisation is counted as a dozen or even several dozen separate entities, which artificially inflates the statistics on functioning NGOs.

The significance of GoNGO in the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan

In the political sphere, one of the objectives of supporting the development of non-governmental organisations is to improve the country's image on the international stage (Ismailov, 2013, p. 18). This process was particularly important after the Andijan

events of May 2005 and after the death of the first president, Islam Karimov, in September 2016.

The increase in the number of GoNGOs after 2005 was perceived by the international community – especially by democratic states – as a sign of the authorities' readiness to return to the path of democratisation. Although many of these organisations had no real autonomy and functioned *de facto* as an extension of the state administration, their formal presence and increased activity in the public sphere were seen as a sign of pluralisation of the social scene.

These changes were particularly welcomed by the European Union, which has been involved for years in promoting human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions in Central Asian countries. Observing a certain improvement in the observance of fundamental civil liberties and the regime's openness to the non-governmental sector, even in its state-controlled version, the EU revised its previous policy of sanctions against Uzbekistan. This process culminated in the lifting of the last restrictions on 27 September 2009, which had been imposed in response to the brutal suppression of protests in Andijan in 2005 – events that were widely condemned internationally and led to the temporary political ostracism of Tashkent (Axyonova, 2015, p. 23).

The decision to lift the sanctions was a clear political signal that Brussels recognised the ongoing reforms as a step in the right direction. Importantly, it was not just about technical changes in the number of NGOs or legislative amendments, but about Uzbekistan's symbolic willingness to reopen channels of cooperation with the West. The EU hoped that further rapprochement and intensification of political and economic dialogue would encourage deeper reforms towards liberalisation of the political system and greater participation of civil society in public life.

From the point of view of the Uzbek authorities, the adjustment of policy towards the third sector and the controlled opening up to non-governmental forms of civic activity was clearly pragmatic in nature. This not only alleviated international pressure, but also restored dialogue with European countries, including the EU, which was an important trading partner and source of technology, knowledge and development aid. For Uzbekistan, which has consistently pursued a so-called multi-vector policy (i.e., balancing relations with various geopolitical centres – Russia, China, the US and the EU), unblocking channels of cooperation with the West was of key strategic importance.

The return to the arena of international dialogue not only improved Uzbekistan's image, but also increased its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, allowing it to avoid excessive dependence on a single partner, such as Russia or China. In this context, the reform of the non-governmental sector, even if largely superficial, became a tool of diplomacy and an element of internal policy for legitimising power.

The desire of international institutions and donors to establish cooperation with the non-governmental sector in Uzbekistan necessitated contact with GoNGOs, which were the most active and accessible part of the third sector. From the point of view of external partners, especially international organisations and UN agencies, such actions were often a necessary compromise. Although GoNGOs did not meet the standards of independence, in conditions of systemic control of civic life, they were the only realistic channel for implementing social or environmental projects in Uzbekistan.

In this context, the Fund for the Protection of Diversity in the Aral Sea Region, established on 3 April 2004, deserves special attention. This fund has become one of the main partners for external institutions financing environmental activities, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other donor and development organisations. Although it formally functions as a fund supporting nature conservation and biodiversity, it is in fact subordinate to the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Ecology and Environmental Protection (Постановление Кабинета Министров, 2004), which makes it a tool in the hands of the central authorities.

This institutional subordination of GoNGOs to the state structure enables Uzbekistan to implement foreign-funded environmental projects without incurring any real budgetary costs. In other words, the state uses GoNGOs as intermediaries in obtaining external funds, while retaining full control over the direction, scope and beneficiaries of the activities undertaken. In practice, this means that international donors often co-finance Uzbekistan's environmental commitments, which in other circumstances would have to be implemented with national public funds.

On the one hand, this model enables the implementation of important environmental projects, especially in the regions most affected by environmental disasters (such as Karakalpakstan), but on the other hand, it limits the development of truly independent civic initiatives. The lack of pluralism in the environmental sector and the marginalisation of local NGOs without direct links to the administration mean that the real influence of local communities on environmental policy-making remains negligible. Instead, state-controlled narratives dominate, focused on achieving political, image and diplomatic goals.

After Islam Karimov's death in 2016, the new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, began building a new image for the state, one ready to open up the system to new forms of civic participation and modernise state-society relations.

Although GoNGOs were intended to serve as a bridge between civil society and the state, in practice they were used by Mirziyoyev as a tool to improve Uzbekistan's international image. This was particularly evident in the context of the controversy surrounding the cotton sector, which for many years had been the subject of international criticism for its use of forced labour by children and adults.

Uzbekistan, as one of the world's largest cotton producers, came under pressure from human rights organisations, trade unions and international trade monitoring institutions, which led to an embargo on Uzbek cotton imports, including by the United States. For Uzbekistan's economy, which was largely based on the export of agricultural raw materials, this was both an economic and a prestige blow. In this situation, GoNGOs were involved in efforts to rebuild Uzbekistan's reputation in the eyes of its international partners. Cooperation with the United Nations, specifically with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), was initiated as a way to demonstrate real changes in the labour sector and to break with the practice of forced labour of children and young people during the cotton harvest. GONGO members, acting formally as independent observers, visited cotton fields together with UN delegations, conducting monitoring activities in the affected regions. Their presence was primarily legitimising and propaganda-oriented, as they provided evidence that the Uzbek government, after Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, had indeed implemented reforms aimed at reducing forced labour.

These efforts gained international recognition and culminated in the US Department of Labour's decision on 27 March 2019 to remove Uzbek cotton from the list of goods produced using forced labour. On 29 September 2022, the United States formally lifted all restrictions on cotton imports from Uzbekistan, opening a new chapter in economic relations between the two countries and enabling the return of this strategic raw material to Western markets (*ILO welcomes...*, 2022). For Uzbekistan, this was an event of enormous economic and symbolic significance.

After years of being forced to export to Russia and China, which took advantage of the lack of competition to dictate unfavourable pricing conditions, Uzbekistan gained the opportunity to diversify its markets. The lifting of the embargo led to a marked increase in interest in Uzbek cotton among importers from the European Union, for whom credibility in terms of labour rights and supply chain transparency is an increasingly important condition for trade cooperation.

What is more, this success has also become one of the key elements of President Mirziyoyev's image policy. Since the beginning of his term in office, he has been trying to build an image of a reformist leader who is ready to break with the repressive practices of the previous regime and open Uzbekistan to the West. GoNGOs have played the role of a soft legitimisation tool here, allowing progress to be demonstrated without allowing independent observers full freedom of action.

Solving the problem of child labour in the Uzbek cotton sector not only had a positive impact on Uzbekistan's international image but also opened up new economic prospects, one of the key ones being the country's accession to the EU's GSP+ tariff preference system. GSP+ is a trade mechanism offered by the European Union to developing countries that meet certain standards in the areas of human rights, labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. In exchange for committing to the effective implementation of 27 international conventions, these countries obtain the right to export over 6,200 categories of goods to EU member states duty-free (*GSP+...*, 2021).

Uzbekistan, aspiring to diversify its markets and reduce its trade dependence on Russia and China, treated inclusion in this system as a strategic trade policy objective. One of the main conditions for gaining access to GSP+ was credible evidence of the elimination of forced and child labour, which, in the context of previous sanctions and international criticism, was a difficult but necessary task. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Uzbekistan played a key role in this process. Despite its status as a non-governmental organisation, it functions *de facto* as a classic GoNGO, closely linked to the state and dependent on the authorities for funding and personnel. It was through this organisation that negotiations were conducted and reports and promotional activities were prepared to prove that Uzbekistan meets the requirements for accession to the GSP+ system. The UCCI acted as the main representative of state interests in economic relations with the European Union, acting as a civil partner for European structures, which increased the credibility of the Uzbek authorities' message.

The inclusion of Uzbekistan in the GSP+ system was not only prestigious, but above all practical. Enabling duty-free exports of a wide range of goods, from textiles and agricultural products to industrial components, significantly improved the competitiveness of Uzbek producers in EU markets. Until now, high customs duties have hindered the entry of Uzbek products into Europe, and local exporters have often lost out to cheaper

competition from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Thanks to GSP+, Uzbek companies have gained a real opportunity to increase their share in trade with the EU, which is part of a broader strategy of economic diversification and gradual independence from narrowly focused post-Soviet markets.

The significance of GoNGO in the domestic policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan

The new approach announced by President Mirziyoyev was part of a broader context of liberalisation of the authoritarian model of power that had characterised the previous decade. The leader sought to build an image of a reformer, ready to open up the system to new forms of civic participation and modernise state-society relations (Ernazarov, 2020, p. 11). This goodwill was manifested in the announcement of a willingness to engage in dialogue with organisations, combined with measures to improve human rights in the Republic of Uzbekistan, such as the pardoning of political prisoners, the curtailment of the omnipotence of the security services, censorship and an order to change information policy, extending it to include monitoring of public opinion, were to be met with recognition from international organisations and states (Bodio, 2020, pp. 71–73). This was to translate into the perception of Mirziyoyev as a reformer carrying out extensive liberalisation, leading to fundamental changes in Uzbekistan.

At the national level, expressing willingness to engage in dialogue with citizens through GoNGOs was not only symbolic but also practical, as it created a mechanism for quasi-social dialogue, which had previously been lacking in the authoritarian governance structure. During Islam Karimov's rule (1991–2016), contact between the state and its citizens was limited to channels controlled by the authorities, with no room for independent reflection on social conditions or the needs of local communities. No large-scale public opinion polls were conducted, and society functioned in a state of social atomisation and learned political passivity.

This change only became possible in the era of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, when, despite the authoritarian nature of the system, a cautious opening of channels of communication with citizens began. The instrumentalisation of GoNGOs enabled the authorities not only to conduct controlled surveys of public opinion but also to build an image of a listening state that consults on decisions and listens to the needs of its citizens, albeit through pre-formed structures.

The dominance of GoNGOs as the main form of civic association allows the state not only to maintain a monopoly on the definition of social problems but also to exercise full control over their narrative and political shape. As a result, the process of building civil society takes place top-down, in conditions of institutional asymmetry – the state not only initiates changes, but also designs the framework for their social reception. In this model, citizens do not act as independent political actors, but rather as participants in consultation processes organised within the limits set by the authorities.

From a political perspective, this model offers a number of advantages to the state. Firstly, it allows it to limit social pressure and neutralise potential tensions that could arise from independent non-governmental organisations or grassroots social movements. Secondly, it enables those in power to regain their position as the main initiator and mod-

erator of social change, even when it concerns sensitive or controversial issues such as reforms of the education, health, or labour market systems.

In practice, therefore, dialogue conducted through GoNGOs becomes a tool for legitimising the authorities' policies, seemingly inclusive, but in fact serving to manage social expectations and channel any dissatisfaction in a way that is safe for the system. It is also a form of social control, maintaining narrative hegemony over what civil society is, how it should function and whom it should serve (Pachucki-Włosek, 2020, p. 194).

GoNGOs operating in other areas of social life – such as education, health care, youth policy, family or environmental issues – perform not only executive or organisational functions, but also diagnostic ones. One of their main tasks, according to the official narrative, is to gather citizens' opinions, identify the most pressing problems and report them to the state authorities (Моховикова, 2013, pp. 80–81).

This type of activity is part of a quasi-partnership between the state and society, in which the actual independence of non-governmental organisations is replaced by a top-down form of "social feedback." The authorities use GoNGOs as secure communication channels that can be used both to monitor social sentiment and to shape it in a controlled manner.

The collection of public opinion by GoNGOs is aimed not so much at initiating systemic change as at maintaining political stability. This mechanism is part of a broader social risk management strategy, allowing the state to respond to the most pressing problems before they turn into open discontent or protest. The Uzbek authorities are aware that unmet social needs – especially in areas such as unemployment, corruption, shortage of public services and rising prices – can lead to social crises with potentially destabilising effects.

That is why GoNGOs act as social sensors – they analyse moods, organise meetings with local communities, pass on information to administrative structures and participate in reporting on the social situation. They also often act as a filter or buffer, as they process and present social problems in a manner consistent with the expectations of the authorities, avoiding radical or uncomfortable demands.

Such measures may bring certain benefits, especially in areas where rapid responses to the needs of local communities are required, but at the same time, they keep civil society in a subordinate role. Citizens do not become independent agents of change, but rather sources of data and participants in consultations within a controlled process of social governance. In the long term, this can lead to the perpetuation of social passivity, as people become accustomed to a situation in which it is the state, not society, that initiates reforms and decides their direction. GoNGOs, acting as intermediaries, only reinforce this model, cementing a social structure subordinate to the state's logic of stabilisation and control.

Most non-governmental organisations registered in Uzbekistan focus on the development of entrepreneurship and agriculture – 1,955 out of 9,235 operating in 2018 (Юсупов, Исаков, 2020). This is a significant part of the entire tertiary sector, which shows how important economic activity has become as an area of social (or rather semi-social) activity in Uzbekistan, especially at the local level. After 2005, following the brutal suppression of protests in Andijan, business associations began to be used by the state not only to support economic development, but above all to exercise control over local economic

elites. The experiences associated with these events showed the authorities that, under favourable conditions of liberalisation, businesspeople could very quickly gain real influence over local communities. By creating better working conditions, ensuring higher wages and job stability, entrepreneurs began to be seen as alternative leaders – capable, effective and independent. From the perspective of the central government, this was a threat. In the eyes of the authorities, independent centres of influence – even if they had no political aspirations – could potentially become the seeds of opposition, whose lack of formal roots in the ruling party or state structures made them unpredictable and difficult to control. Therefore, the state adopted a strategy of institutionally “integrating” the private sector into a quasi-public structure by creating and supporting official associations. These organisations were supposed to act as a buffer, providing a channel of communication, but at the same time limiting the independence and autonomy of entrepreneurs.

After the death of Islam Karimov and Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power, there was a change in approach. The new economic policy, in the spirit of reform and moderate liberalism, opened up space for these organisations to return to their statutory objectives – supporting entrepreneurship, training local staff, providing advice and promoting economic activity. Nevertheless, despite the milder approach and progressive deregulation, their control function has not been eliminated.

It is still the recommendation of the association’s management board that can determine whether a favourable loan, grant or preferential access to public resources is obtained. This form of soft pressure means that local businesspeople, although formally operating in a market system, are often forced to respect the recommendations of non-governmental structures linked to the administration. These recommendations often depend on the degree of loyalty to the local authorities, willingness to participate in state initiatives or maintaining the desired social attitude.

In practice, this means that Uzbekistan, despite its declared transition to a free market economy, still maintains elements of a command-and-distribution system. Some of the instruments of economic management have been transferred from the central administration to formally non-governmental organisations, which, however, remain under strict political supervision. This model can be described as a hybrid, combining elements of a market economy with central planning, implemented through the GoNGO structure.

Similar control mechanisms to those observed in the business sector also operated in agricultural organisations, where GoNGOs acted as intermediaries between the state and local agricultural producers. The main objective of their activities was to bring farmers together in formalised structures, which enabled more effective enforcement of state policy and control over individuals reluctant to implement central guidelines.

During Islam Karimov’s rule, Uzbek agriculture, particularly cotton cultivation, operated under a strictly managed command system. The state determined how much of the agricultural land was to be allocated to specific crops (mainly cotton and wheat), and farmers were obliged to implement these plans. However, profits from cotton cultivation were very low, which led to widespread attempts to circumvent the system – crops were hidden and production data falsified (Pachucki-Włosek, 2020, p. 187).

In response to this resistance, the authorities began to organise local farmers into specially established associations, formally intended to support farms, but in practice acting as supervisory institutions. Farmers thus found themselves under double control:

on the one hand, by the state administration (e.g., hokimats or agricultural inspectorates), and on the other, by GoNGO boards, which were responsible for reporting behaviour, keeping production records, and often also mobilising rural communities to participate in compulsory seasonal work.

This structure allowed for greater discipline among farmers and more effective enforcement of state plans. The system, based on fear of sanctions and a lack of alternatives in terms of access to land or credit, effectively discouraged open opposition. As a result, GoNGOs became an extension of the state, but operating at the grassroots level and through local authorities, often elected from among the farmers themselves, which further increased their effectiveness as a tool of control.

It was not until 2020 that the process of phasing out compulsory cotton cultivation began, which can be considered a turning point in Uzbekistan's agricultural policy. The abolition of compulsory quotas and the move away from the planned system forced the authorities to review the role of non-governmental organisations in the agricultural sector. In the new rhetoric, agricultural GoNGOs ceased to be merely a tool of supervision and began to be presented as consultation forums, places for dialogue with the rural community and channels for feedback (Юсупов, 2019).

This change was pragmatic in nature, resulting not from an ideological shift towards democracy, but from the need for prevention and social risk management. Rural communities, which had been operating in difficult conditions for years and had no real influence on decisions affecting their lives, could become a hotbed of protest, especially during a period of structural change, rising living costs and market instability. Regular polling of public opinion, gathering feedback and reporting problems to local authorities is intended to systematically defuse tensions and counteract potential outbreaks of discontent.

However, despite this reformulation of their function, agricultural organisations still act as a selective filter of information, reporting only those voices that fall within the limits set by the state. Farmers may now have more freedom in choosing the type of crops they grow, but they are still caught in a web of formal, financial and political dependencies that limit their independence, for example, in terms of access to means of production, markets and financing.

Trade unions operating in Uzbekistan are also classified as GoNGOs. Although formally defined as independent and self-governing workers' organisations, in practice their activities are limited almost exclusively to large state-owned enterprises, where they remain under the clear influence of plant management and local political structures.

This arrangement helps to maintain stability and control over large groups of workers, especially in strategic sectors such as mining, energy and railways. Employees affiliated to these unions have no real opportunity to conduct collective bargaining, nor are they represented independently of their employer, which violates the International Labour Organisation's standards on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

Despite this, the Uzbek authorities have managed to use trade union structures as an instrument for implementing economic policy objectives, particularly in the process of privatising state-owned enterprises. As part of the reforms promoted by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan opened up to foreign financing and support from international institutions, including the World Bank. One of the conditions for obtaining

credit support was to improve the transparency of ownership structures and to begin a real process of privatisation of selected public sector entities.

In order to meet these requirements and at the same time avoid serious social tensions related to the sale of state assets, the authorities applied a mechanism of bottom-up privatisation through trade unions. Employees affiliated with these organisations were given a share of the companies, which was symbolic and psychological in nature; the employees became co-owners, which weakened potential opposition to ownership changes. In reality, however, these shares often did not translate into real influence on management decisions, and the unions were unable to organise resistance to possible redundancies, restructuring, or plant closures.

On the one hand, this mechanism met the formal requirements set by international donors (such as the World Bank), and on the other, it allowed the government to retain effective control over the privatisation process. The change in ownership structure (at least on paper) unlocked aid tranches and investment loans, which were important for the implementation of the economic modernisation programme.

At the same time, it should be noted that the presence of GoNGOs in the privatisation process limited the possibility of real development of independent trade union movements. Trade unions operating under this model perform a more social function (e.g., organising trips, distributing benefits) than a representative one, and their attachment to the structures of power prevents them from acting in the interests of employees in conflict situations.

Examples of GoNGOs operating in Uzbekistan

After the collapse of the USSR, Uzbekistan's political leader Islam Karimov supported the creation of organisations dealing with social issues. The state's initiatives were aimed at providing as much support and assistance as possible in strengthening its position in order to hinder the activities of independent associations. Between 1992 and 1999, key organisations were established that came to dominate the Uzbek third sector.

The first of these is the Navruz Charitable Fund, which was established by presidential decree on 23 May 1992. Its main objective was to support the development of national culture, traditions and customs, and to promote spiritual values (Указ Президента..., 1992). The multitude of tasks forced it to cooperate with other organisations, including the Children's Fund, the Society for People with Disabilities, the Red Crescent Society, and the Charity and Health Fund. Over time, some of these organisations were absorbed by or became financially dependent on Nawruz. The fund itself also became a place for raising funds from private entrepreneurs for the implementation of social goals. It could be said that in this case, GoNGO became a place for the implementation of corporate social responsibility. In reality, the funds transferred by private entities are used by Nawruz to fulfil tasks resulting from state policy (Ismailov, 2013, p. 15). This has led to a situation where GoNGOs have become a bridge in creating unofficial ties between the business world and state authorities, strengthening the construction of a new reality based on the ideas of corporatism, which aims to integrate all social groups and reconcile their interests, as well as suppress any conflicts between them.

The inclusion of a wide range of activities in the spiritual and cultural sphere has become an argument for denying the need to establish further organisations specialising in these areas (Alonso, Kalanov, 2017, p. 250). The authorities justify this with the desire to avoid the emergence of uncontrolled Islamic movements. The need for selected religious organisations to cooperate with GoNGO and use its financial resources creates opportunities for full surveillance of the religious community and prevents the emergence of extremist groups, which also improves the security of citizens.

Another organisation that has dominated the Uzbek third sector is the Mahalla Republican Charitable Fund, established by presidential decree on 12 September 1992. The main objective of the fund is to support the activities of citizens' assemblies known as Kenes and to help them assume the role of local government. Thus, the fund is intended to stimulate civil society activity (Suda, 2006, p. 351). In reality, it is a place for creating people loyal to the regime, whom the authorities entrust with the role of local government officials, guaranteeing themselves full control over their activities (Urinboyev, Sherzod, 2022, pp. 8–9). In addition, Mahalli perpetuates the traditional model of society based on age hierarchy, which is very beneficial for blocking rapid change. Older people generally have fewer aspirations to change the prevailing reality. Entrusting them with leadership roles guarantees the preservation of the status quo in Uzbekistan. An interesting provision is the support for citizens' assemblies based on clearly defined principles. This shows the complete subordination of their activities to the ruling line.

This organisation's efforts to stimulate public participation in the political life of the state through citizens' panels and various projects for local communities serve as a tool for identifying activists who could be involved in the work of GoNGO, thus preventing them from attempting to establish independent associations. The inclusion of ensuring political and social stability as one of its tasks clearly shows that the organisation is a mechanism for controlling local communities. Since their inception, mahalles have in fact taken on the responsibilities assigned to local government, including the maintenance of roads and public buildings, but in order to receive funding for this, they must obtain it from the central distribution system.

With the reforms undertaken by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, mahalles have been given additional tasks and greater independence (*Реформа института...*, 2021). This fund provides direct support to the poor and disabled, but the number of cases requires partners to participate in this undertaking. Therefore, government and non-governmental organisations have been involved in some tasks. For example, as part of senior policy tasks, financial support was provided to the Muruvvat organisation, which runs Homes of Mercy, providing comprehensive care for the elderly.

There has also been an intensification of contacts at the highest level. In 2019, the Madad organisation was established and entrusted with managing the national legal portal Advice.uz, which was launched in the same year (*Центральный офис...*, 2019). This shows once again that GoNGOs are also becoming a bridge between public administration and society. As they are closer to the people, they help to reduce the distance between them.

The activities of GoNGOs also allow the authorities to maintain control over the process of redistributing foreign aid to the citizens of Uzbekistan. A perfect example is the Soglom Abdol Uchun International Non-Governmental Charitable Fund, established on

23 April 1993. Its statutory objective is to promote a healthy lifestyle and raise funds for this task from domestic and, in particular, foreign sponsors (О Фонде). Flexibility has allowed it to establish contacts with the American humanitarian organisation Spirit of America, which supplies Uzbek hospitals with modern equipment, improving the quality of perinatal care. Cooperation with USAID is also evident within the Food for Peace programme, which provides food for the poorest and runs school feeding programmes – in 2010–2015 alone, total aid in products for Uzbekistan amounted to 1.21 billion (Ibidem, Ilkhamov, 2005, pp. 308–309). The distribution of aid from this programme by government-affiliated organisations makes it possible to deprive opponents of the regime of its support, which allows for obedience.

Conclusions

The lack of a real alternative to government-affiliated non-governmental organisations (GoNGOs) after 2005 led to a situation in which the Uzbek third sector became completely dominated by state-controlled structures. As a result, what formally functions as the non-governmental sector has in practice become merely an extension of the first sector, i.e., state power. This phenomenon means that the third sector does not fulfil its classic role as an independent social space, a forum for pluralism, civic initiative and critical scrutiny of government actions.

Thus, a controlled non-governmental sector, closely correlated with state policy, has emerged in the Republic of Uzbekistan, whose activities serve primarily to strengthen the government's image and implement its priorities. GoNGOs act as propaganda tools and channels of social mobilisation, enabling the authorities to maintain political stability and limit the potential of grassroots, independent civic movements. In practice, this means that these organisations do not initiate or support genuine democratisation or civil society processes, but rather implement state policy in local communities and social groups.

The dominance of GoNGOs in the third sector also limits the space for critical dialogue and public debate. State-controlled organisations rarely address issues that contradict the official political line, and their activities are subordinated to the interests of the authorities. This, in turn, hinders the development of autonomous civic initiatives and the ability of society to organise itself independently to protect the rights and interests of various social groups.

As a result, the Uzbek third sector primarily functions as an instrument of social control, channelling potential discontent and civic aspirations into mechanisms accepted by the state. This enables the authorities to exercise effective control over society with minimal risk of political or social destabilisation. At the same time, the domination of the third sector by GoNGOs hinders the development of truly independent non-governmental organisations and limits social pluralism, which poses a challenge to the democratisation processes in Uzbekistan.

In response to the first research question: What role do GoNGOs play in Uzbekistan's domestic and foreign policy? It should be emphasised that they are a key, multifunctional tool in the hands of the state, serving political, image-building and control functions.

Externally, GoNGOs are a strategic component in shaping a positive image of Uzbekistan on the international stage. Their existence and activities are instrumentalised as proof of the alleged existence of civil society and the ongoing process of democratisation. The authorities present the functioning of GoNGOs as confirmation of compliance with international standards in the area of freedom of association and social dialogue. This illusory openness is part of a strategy to gain advantages in relations with Western partners, both political and economic. As the dominant players in Uzbekistan's third sector, GoNGOs are becoming natural partners for foreign organisations, including financial donors, development institutions and UN agencies. This state of affairs allows the authorities to maintain full control over the flow of foreign funds directed to civil society. Under normal circumstances, this money could go to independent organisations and be used to support grassroots initiatives that are critical of the state or monitor government actions. Instead, they end up in structures subordinate to the authorities, which secures the interests of the regime and minimises the risk of financing potential opposition.

Internally, GoNGOs are used as a tool of social control and a channel for communicating the official state narrative to the public. They act as a filter, gathering information about public sentiment and redirecting citizens' discontent onto paths that are safe for the regime. At the same time, their existence allows the state to claim that citizens have the opportunity to engage in public life – albeit only within the limits set by the authorities.

In response to the second research question: what measures do those in power take to maintain the dominance of GoNGOs over other forms of association? It should be emphasised that these are complex and multi-faceted measures, combining legal, administrative, political and propaganda instruments. Their aim is not only to limit the space for the creation of independent organisations, but also to ensure full control over existing entities operating in the civil society sector.

The oldest and still used mechanism, dating back to the post-Soviet era, is to hinder the registration process for non-governmental organisations. Despite official declarations of support for civil society, in practice the Ministry of Justice (specifically, its Department for Non-Governmental Organisations) has broad discretion in accepting or rejecting registration applications. The procedures are opaque, and rejections are often justified on technical grounds, pointing to alleged formal errors without providing a specific list of corrections. Such actions discourage initiators from further attempts and effectively eliminate undesirable, independent voices from the public sphere.

However, the authorities have recognised that the use of repressive methods alone can lead to an escalation of social frustration and increased tensions. Therefore, the strategy has been expanded to include seemingly liberalising measures, which in reality are aimed at consolidating control over the third sector. An example of this is the breaking up of large GoNGOs into a number of smaller organisations which formally operate independently but in practice are subordinate to the same central structures. This allows the authorities to show a statistical increase in the number of non-governmental organisations, which serves as proof of the flourishing of civil society, even though this is purely a facade.

At the same time, the creation of new organisations dependent on the authorities is used as a way to neutralise grassroots initiatives. When active citizens, often young

activists, students or local leaders, attempt to register an independent association, their initiatives are blocked. The state can then establish a structure under its control with a similar profile and invite those previously involved to join it. This is a classic form of co-optation, aimed at dispersing social energy and directing it in a way that is safe for the system.

Importantly, the authorities are also beginning to realise the inefficiency of organisations that are completely controlled from above, lacking real competence and social roots. Therefore, they are increasingly trying to recruit social activists and people with local authority to GoNGO structures, to increase the credibility of these organisations. However, the fact that their independence has been limited from the outset means that their potential to carry out truly grassroots activities remains negligible. In practice, they serve only to legitimise government-controlled structures.

Finally, the dominance of GoNGOs is maintained by an extensive system of funding and technical support that remains out of reach for unregistered or independent NGOs. Grant funds, local organisation support centres, access to real estate and training materials – all these resources go almost exclusively to state-dependent structures, which further deepens the disparity between GoNGOs and independent organisations and cements their dominance.

In summary, Uzbekistan is characterised by authoritarianism with elements of apparent civic participation. The third sector exists, but its autonomy is limited and its development is selectively supported or suppressed depending on the degree of compliance with the interests of the authorities. Theories of civil society assume active, independent participation of citizens in public life, which is systematically restricted in Uzbekistan. Despite reforms, the Uzbek version of civil society mainly serves a legitimising function rather than a controlling one, which is typical of soft or hybrid authoritarian regimes. Civil society is a key element of a democratic system, but it can also exist in undemocratic systems, in a limited or distorted form.

In Uzbekistan, we are witnessing attempts by the state to control and instrumentalise civil society. Despite this, there is potential for the development of grassroots civic activity, especially in social and local areas. The actions of the Republic of Uzbekistan are aimed at preserving the existing order in the third sector. GoNGOs have become such a key element of foreign and domestic policy that the authorities do not want to allow their position to be weakened. Aware of growing social discontent, the authorities are trying to find a compromise by allowing new organisations to register, but the *sine qua non* condition is subordination to the authorities. However, this model is transitional due to the social changes that are taking place, which is why the authorities are faced with the need to review the current model of operation of these organisations. This will be extremely difficult in a situation where they are trying to maintain full control.

Bibliography

- Alonso A., Kalanov K. (2017), *The role of Khodjas and Mahhalas in Uzbekistan: tools for social stability?*, "Revista UNISCI", no. 45.
- Akiner S. (2005), *Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment*, Johns Hopkins University, Washington.

- Axyonova V. (2015), *The Effectiveness of Sanctions and Regime Legitimacy in Central Asia: Examining the Substance of EU Sanctions against Uzbekistan*, "L'Europe en Formation", no. 375.
- Bankowicz M. (2010), *Autorytaryzm i totalitaryzm: analiza porównawcza*, in: *Totalitaryzmy XX wieku: idee, instytucje, interpretacje*, eds. W. Kozub-Ciembroniewicz, H. Kowalska-Stus, B. Szlachta, M. Kiwior-Filo, pp. 25–39.
- Bodio T. (2020), *Uzbekistan – państwo w totalnej przebudowie*, „Nowa Polityka Wschodnia”, no. 2(25).
- Ernazarov D. (2020), *Analysis of the Policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan Regarding International Non-governmental Organization*, "Journal of Political Science and International Relations", vol. 3, no. 1.
- Eur-lex, *Organizacja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/PL/legal-content/glossary/civil-society-organisation.html>, 16.11.2022.
- Ilkhamov A. (2005), *The thorny path of civil society in Uzbekistan*, "Central Asia Survey", vol. 23, no. 3.
- Ismailov M. (2013), *From Strong State to a Strong Civil Society: Domestic Discourse of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan*, "Developing Country Studies", vol. 3, no. 6.
- Janczuk A. (2021), *Legitymizacja władzy politycznej jako uwarunkowanie stabilności i bezpieczeństwa – model systemowy*, „Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska”, vol. XXVIII(1), pp. 67–86.
- Kenjaev J. (2022), *Features of the Development of Civil Society in Uzbekistan*, "Eurasian Research Bulletin", vol. 12.
- Maxsudovich Q. (2021), *Development of Institutions of Civil Society in Uzbekistan in Democratic*, "Central Asian Journal of Social Sciences and History", vol. 2, no. 4.
- Pachucki-Włosek K. (2020), *Zmiana polityka władz Uzbekistanu wobec uprawy bawelny jako następstwo nieposłuszeństwa obywatelskiego*, „Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne”, vol. 6, no. 2.
- Salimov S. (2018), *Some Aspects of the Principles of the "Uzbek Model" of Economic Progress*, "Arts and Social Sciences Journal", vol. 9, no. 6.
- Sasinowski H. (2012), *Społeczeństwo obywatelskie i jego rola w budowie demokracji*, „Economy and Management”, no. 1, pp. 30–47.
- Suda M. (2006), *The Politics of Civil Society, Mahalla and NGOs: Uzbekistan*, "SRC Slavic Eurasian Studies", no. 10.
- The World Bank (2021), *In Search of a Desert Oasis: Innovative Projects Imagine a Promising Future for the Aral Sea and Central Asian Drylands*, 17.06.2021, WorldBank.org, <https://www.world-bank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/17/a-promising-future-for-the-aral-sea-and-central-asian-drylands>, 16.11.2022.
- Urinboyev R., Sherzod E. (2022), *Informal civil society initiatives in non-Western societies: mahallas in Uzbekistan*, "Central Asian Survey", no. 41(3).
- Uzbekistan: Registration Barriers for Independent Groups. Outdated Rules Limit Freedom of Association*, 7.01.2021, Hrw.org, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/07/uzbekistan-registration-barriers-independent-groups>, 16.11.2022.
- В процессе приватизации в Узбекистане будут участвовать Всемирный банк и международная юридическая фирма Dentons*, 27.08.2021, Davaktiv.uz, <https://davaktiv.uz/ru/news/in-privatisation-of-state-assets-in-uzbekistan-will-participate-the-world-bank-and-dentons-the-worlds-largest-law-firm>, 16.11.2022.
- В Узбекистане запустили «Центр координации спонсорской помощи»*, 3.04.2020, Maxala.org, <https://maxala.org/news/75747-v-uzbekistane-zapustili-centr-koordinacii-sponsorskoj-pomochi.html>, 16.11.2022.

- Государство поддержит великодушных предпринимателей – президент*, 22.04.2020, Sputnik Uzbekistan, <https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20200422/Gosudarstvo-podderzhit-velikodushnykh-predprinimateley---prezident-13979873.html&cd=11&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=ua>, 16.11.2020.
- Закон Республики Узбекистан (2007), *О гарантиях деятельности негосударственных некоммерческих организаций* (№ ЗРУ-85), Национальная база данных законодательства Республики Узбекистан.
- Закон Республики Узбекистан, от 3.01.2007 г. № ЗРУ-76, *О гарантиях деятельности негосударственных некоммерческих организаций*, <https://lex.uz/ru/docs/1101280?ONDATE2=21.04.2021&action=compare>.
- Закон Республики Узбекистан, от 25.09.2014 г. № ЗРУ-376 *О социальном партнерстве*, <https://lex.uz/docs/2468216>.
- Кенжаев О. (2021), *Взаимодействие США с Узбекистаном 2001–2005 гг.*, „Постсоветские исследования”, vol. 4, no. 1.
- Количество функционирующих ННО в Узбекистане резко сокращается*, 8.08.2008, Iwpr.net, <https://iwpr.net/ru/global-voices/kolichestvo-funkcioniruyuschikh-nno-v-uzbekistane-rezko-sokraschaetsya>, 16.11.2022.
- Махалли помогут получить кредиты на открытие бизнеса*, 29.03.2017, Norma.uz, https://www.norma.uz/nashi_obzori/mahalli_pomogut_poluchit_kredity_na_otkrytie_biznesa, 16.11.2022.
- Моховикова М. (2013), *Государственные программы поддержки «Третьего сектора» в Узбекистане*, „Вестник Московского университета. Управление (государство и общество)”, no. 1.
- О Фонде, Международный неправительственный благотворительный фонд «Соглом авлод учун»*, Sau.uz, http://sau.uz/rus/?page_id=2, 16.11.2022.
- Постановление Кабинета Министров Республики Узбекистан, от 3.04.2004 г. № 162 *О создании благотворительного Фонда по защите генофонда Приаралья*, <https://lex.uz/docs/286348>.
- Постановление Президента Республики Узбекистан, от 23.06.2005 г. № ПП-107 *О мерах по оказанию содействия развитию институтов гражданского общества в Узбекистане*, <https://lex.uz/docs/1711869?ONDATE=19.01.2018%2000>.
- Распоряжение Президента Республики Узбекистан, от 14.02.2017 г. № Р-4849 *Об организационных мерах по реализации Стратегии действий по пяти приоритетным направлениям развития Республики Узбекистан в 2017–2021 годах*, <https://lex.uz/docs/3114490>.
- Реформа института махалли в Узбекистане - залог демократизации общества*, 24.02.2021, Kabar.kg, <https://kabar.kg/news/reforma-instituta-makhalli-v-uzbekistane-zalog-demokratizatsii-obshchestva/>, 16.11.2022.
- Совместное постановление Кенгаша Законодательной палаты Олий Мажлиса Республики Узбекистан и Кенгаша Сената Олий Мажлиса Республики Узбекистан, от 3.07.2008 г. № 842-I *О мерах по усилению поддержки негосударственных некоммерческих организаций, других институтов гражданского общества*, <https://lex.uz/docs/1413313>.
- Указ Президента Республики Узбекистан, от 23.05.1992 г. № УП-405 *О создании Благотворительного Фонда «Навруз»*.
- Центральный офис «Мадад» открылся в Ташкенте*, 9.12.2019, Gazeta.uz, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/12/09/madad/>, 16.11.2022.
- Юсупов Д., Исаков О. (2020), *Почему в Узбекистане сложно открыть НПО?*, 14.01.2020, Cabar, Asia, <https://cabar.asia/ru/pochemu-v-uzbekistane-slozhno-otkryt-npo&cd=1&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=ua>, 16.11.2022.
- Юсупов Ю. (2019), *Аграрный сектор Узбекистана: особенности, ключевые проблемы, необходимость реформ*, 25.03.2019, Cabar Asia, <https://cabar.asia/ru/agrarnyj-sektor-uzbekistana-osobennosti-klyuchevye-problemy-neobhodimost-reform>, 16.11.2022.
- ILO welcomes lifting of Cotton Campaign boycott of Uzbekistan*, 14.02.2022, Ilo.org, https://www.ilo.org/europe/info/news/WCMS_839591/lang--en/index.htm, 16.11.2022.

GSP+. *Преимущества и обязательства Узбекистана*, 12.04.2021, Gazeta.uz, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2021/04/12/gsp/>, 16.11.2022.

Rola i znaczenie rządowych i pozarządowych organizacji (GoNGO) w budowaniu kontrolowanego III sektora w Republice Uzbekistanu

Streszczenie

Przedmiotem badań poniższego artykułu jest funkcjonowanie tzw. trzeciego sektora w Republice Uzbekistanu. Ze względu na fakt dominacji rządowych i pozarządowych organizacji (GoNGO) nad pozostałymi formami organizacji, stały się one głównym tematem pracy badawczej. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu znalezienie odpowiedzi na następujące pytanie badawcze: Jaką rolę odgrywają GoNGO w uzbeckiej polityce wewnętrznej i zagranicznej? Zmieniające się uwarunkowania zewnętrzne i wewnętrzne przyczyniły się do wzrostu zainteresowania partycypacją ze strony społeczeństwa, co utrudnia utrzymanie kontroli nad III sektorem, stąd pojawiło się drugie pytanie badawcze: Jakie działania podejmują rządzący, aby utrzymać dominację GoNGO nad innymi formami zrzeszania się? Badania zostały przeprowadzone w oparciu o zgromadzony materiał badawczy – literaturę przedmiotu, komunikaty rządowe i informacje prasowe. Zostały one poddane analizie pod kątem działań wpisujących się w postawione problemy badawcze. Następnie zebrane i przedstawione w poniższym artykule. W pracy zastosowano: metodę obserwacyjną, badania dokumentów, a także elementy metody monograficznej przez skupienie uwagi głównie na jednej formie organizacji III sektora, posługując się przy tym następującymi narzędziami: syntezą, analogią i dedukcją. Przewodni wniosek głosi, że utrzymanie dominacji GoNGO nad innymi formami zrzeszenia stanowi kluczowy element trwałości mechanizmu kontroli państwa nad obywatelami.

Słowa kluczowe: Republika Uzbekistanu, GoNGO, III sektor, polityka zagraniczna, polityka wewnętrzna

Author Contributions

Conceptualization (Konceptualizacja): Krystian Pachucki-Włosek

Data curation (Zestawienie danych): Krystian Pachucki-Włosek

Formal analysis (Analiza formalna): Krystian Pachucki-Włosek

Writing – original draft (Piśmiennictwo – oryginalny projekt): Krystian Pachucki-Włosek

Writing – review & editing (Piśmiennictwo – sprawdzenie i edytowanie): Krystian Pachucki-Włosek

Competing interests: The author have declared that no competing interests exist

(Sprzeczne interesy: Autor oświadczył, że nie istnieją żadne sprzeczne interesy)