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IN LINE WITH THE PARTY'S MANIFESTO? DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL BELIEFS BETWEEN YOUNG VOTERS OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND ALLIANCES BEFORE THE 2023 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

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Abstract:

Voting for a party identified by researchers as right-wing or left-wing does not necessarily indicate that voters share the core ideological beliefs or statements included in the party's agenda. This paper examines differences in political beliefs among young voters of various political parties in Poland prior to the 2023 parliamentary elections. The responses of 891 individuals were analysed. Participants were young adults aged 18-25 who declared Polish nationality. The Political Beliefs Questionnaire was used to measure political beliefs in cultural and economic dimensions. The results of the study appear to confirm previous findings by researchers, indicating that the left-right divide in Poland and the decision to vote for a particular political party are more closely determined by political beliefs in the cultural dimension than by those in the economic dimension.

Keywords: political beliefs; political parties; young adults; parliamentary elections

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Introduction

Labelling a particular party as extreme, radical, or anti-immigrant is highly controversial. Addressing Polish parties on the right side of the political spectrum, including Law and Justice, Rydliński (2018, p. 20) points out, „Despite their conservative and nationalist attitudes, these parties do not consider themselves part of Poland's extreme right, declaring their status as ‘non-far right’”. In discussing the interactions between Law and Justice and the Confederation Liberty and Independence, Goldstein (2021) defines the former in terms of the mainstream radical right or a radical right-wing party. In the analysis conducted prior to the formation of the Confederation Liberty and Independence, Pankowski (2012, p. 1) described Law and Justice as a mainstream populist-conservative party that „absorbed a big portion of the radical nationalist ideology and cadres during the last years”. However, the reported debates concern not only the assessment of the radical nature of the party's agenda, but also the possibility of characterising them as left-wing, right-wing, or centrist. This issue is linked to the complexity of the construct of political beliefs.

Numerous scholars, including Feldman and Johnston (2014), have questioned the unidimensionality of political beliefs, noting the importance of considering people's beliefs in both cultural and economic dimensions. Following the conceptualisation proposed by Czarnek et al. (2017), the cultural dimension of political beliefs consists of xenophobia and religious fundamentalism. The economic dimension concerns the acceptance of capitalism and anti-welfare. Remarkably, the study by Czarnek et al. (2017) examined whether individual subdimensions of political beliefs predict the willingness to vote for right-wing parties. As noted by researchers (2017, p. 214), „both the cultural dimension and its two sub-dimensions (religious fundamentalism and xenophobia) allow for the differentiation of respondents as right-wing voters in cultural terms, while the economic dimension and its sub-dimensions are irrelevant here”. In a report on the electoral motivations of Poles (CBOS, 2023a), 30.2% of the party's voters cited consistency between their own beliefs and the Confederation Liberty and Independence program as the reason for voting for the party. For 26.4% of Confederation voters, it was important above all that the party's representatives „bring something new, hope for change, are young and 'outside the system', alternatively that other parties have already discredited themselves”, pointing to the importance of the party's anti-establishment

image and the expected change on the political scene. Objection to the admission of immigrants in Poland was a key motive for only 1.7% of the party's voters. Furthermore, the expectation that representatives of the Confederation „will defend traditional, right-wing values in the moral sphere” was a key motive for 3.4% of voters. Economic aspects proved to be important motives for the respondents. Moreover, 10.4% of the party's voters cited the Confederation's liberal economic policy and the expectation that the winners would „take care of entrepreneurs” as the most important motive. Meanwhile, 9.8% of potential Confederation voters would support the party primarily because they expect its victory to improve Poland's economic situation.

As noted by Kosowska-Gąstoł (2021, p. 23), „To conclude the analyses carried out from the results of the opinion poll of experts participating in the CHES project, it can be stated that the left-right divide in Poland is shaped more by ideological than economic issues, thus partially confirming hypothesis 1” [H1: The perception of the left-right divide in Poland is dominated by ideological issues, with economic issues taking a back seat]. Moreover, Filipczak-Białkowska (2021, p. 164) mentioned the possibility that political actors display so-called ideological eclecticism and express „views that belong to different ideologies”. In Halicki et al. (n.d.) study, conducted among people aged 15 to 28, 43.7% described their economic views as 'free market', 49.8% as 'centrist', and only 6.5% expressed support for significant state involvement in the economy. Among conservative party voters, this number was only 2%. At the same time, with regard to social views, which in the study by Halicki et al. (n.d.) were referred to as 'worldview', only 4.5% described them as conservative.

Current study

Moving beyond an attempt to determine the motivations of political party representatives for presenting anti-immigrant and nativist positions, this study examines: 1) political beliefs, and 2) beliefs related to immigration among individuals who declared their intention to vote for specific parties or alliances. This article presents an in-depth analysis of the first element of the investigation: political beliefs. As noted (CBOS, 2023a), voting for a party identified by researchers as radical right-wing does not necessarily imply that voters share the radical right's core ideological beliefs. However, the presence of xenophobia-related slogans in political campaigns prompts reflection on possible differences between groups of voters, especially those that displayed

anti-immigrant sentiments during the election campaign, such as the Law and Justice and the Confederation. If economic issues were to „take a back seat” in the perception of the ideological profiles of political parties (Kosowska-Gąstoł, 2021), it is worth considering whether the voters of the groups that appeal to neoliberal values and economic freedom are characterised by a significantly higher level of acceptance of capitalism and anti-welfare compared to voters of other parties. For this reason, this study investigated whether there are significant differences between people who declare their intention to vote for particular parties, not only in cultural but also in economic subdimensions of political beliefs, especially anti-welfare beliefs.

Although researchers (Czarnek et al., 2017) examined differences in average scores for political belief subdimensions between voter groups, people who stated they did not want to participate in the elections were excluded from the analysis. In this study, persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot were included, along with those who declared no intention to vote.

The following questions were formulated:

- Q1: Do young adults who declared their intention to vote for Law and Justice + United Poland, Agreement, Third Way (Poland 2050 + PSL), and Confederation Liberty and Independence (New Hope + National Movement) differ in their levels of religious fundamentalism and xenophobia from young adults who support the Left (New Left + Partia Razem + PPS + Labour Union) and Civic Coalition (Civic Platform + Nowoczesna + Polish Initiative + The Greens)?
- Q2: Do young voters of Confederation Liberty and Independence and the Civic Coalition differ in their levels of acceptance of capitalism and anti-welfare attitudes compared with young adults who support other political parties or alliances?
- Q3: Do young adults who declared no intention to vote, as well as those who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot, differ in their political beliefs from young adults who decided to vote for specific parties or alliances?

Participants and Procedure

The study was conducted before the 2023 parliamentary elections. The electoral participation of young Poles in these elections has already been analysed (Kądziała, 2024). This research was conducted online in cooperation with the research panel. The main aim of the research project for which funding was obtained was to investigate whether exposure to narratives about national victimhood influences attitudes towards extremism. The analyses presented here are additional analyses. They were conducted in groups that had not yet been subjected to experimental manipulation ($N = 891$).

Only individuals aged 18-25 who declared Polish nationality were invited to participate in the study. The survey included basic information about the study, an informed consent screen, an information sheet on sources of support, and a farewell screen that provided detailed information about the study's purpose. Among the respondents, 52.4% were women ($n = 467$), 46.6% were men ($n = 415$), 0.8% declared a non-binary gender identity ($n = 7$), and 0.2% declared other gender identity ($n = 2$). The average age of respondents was $M = 21.7$ ($SD = 2.3$). The additional sample characteristics are presented in Table 1.

Measures

Political Beliefs Questionnaire. The study was based on the conceptualisation of political beliefs proposed by Czarnek et al. (2017). Two dimensions of political beliefs were distinguished: the cultural and the economic. The first dimension consists of xenophobia ($\alpha = 0.80$) and religious fundamentalism ($\alpha = 0.88$). The second dimension involves acceptance of capitalism ($\alpha = 0.55$) and anti-welfare ($\alpha = 0.77$). This questionnaire consists of 19 statements on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Sample statement: „Large income differences are necessary to ensure prosperity in Poland”. Due to the unsatisfactory internal consistency of the capitalism acceptance subscale, readers should approach the analyses using this variable with caution.

It should be noted that the content of these statements is deeply rooted in the Polish social and cultural context. In this approach, xenophobia refers to an aversion to external cultural patterns. Religious fundamentalism concerns perceived and preferred relations between religion and the state, as well as attitudes toward the Church's influence on public life. Acceptance of capitalism

refers to an attitude toward ownership of the means of production and inequality. Anti-welfare is defined as the rejection of the state's welfare-providing role and opposition to state interference in the national economy (Czarnek et al., 2017).

Declaration of vote in the upcoming elections. Participants were asked: „If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which grouping would you vote for?” The following response options were available: Law and Justice + United Poland, Agreement, Civic Coalition, Third Way, Left, Confederation Liberty and Independence, Agrounia, Kukiz'19, Other, No intention to vote, Spoilt vote.

Statistical analysis

The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to examine differences between groups of voters. This test is robust to unequal group sizes and is well-suited for analysing ordinal variables. Two groups were excluded from further analysis due to underrepresented sample sizes ($n_{\text{Agrounia}} = 6$; $n_{\text{Kukiz'19}} = 4$). The analyses were performed using JASP 0.19.3.0 and IBM SPSS 29.0.2 software.

Results

Tables 2a and 2b show median and interquartile range values for right-wing political beliefs.

Differences between voters in right-wing political beliefs in the cultural dimension

Analysis using the Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant differences between groups in religious fundamentalism, $H(8) = 250.30$, $p < 0.001$. The effect size was large, $\eta^2 = 0.28$. Dunn test revealed significant differences between Law and Justice + United Poland voters and voters of: Civic Coalition ($z = 11.64$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.77$), Third Way ($z = 8.47$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.71$), Left ($z = 14.46$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.87$), Confederation Liberty and Independence ($z = 5.52$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.45$), people who have declared their intention to vote for *other* ($z = 4.87$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.71$), persons with no intention to vote ($z = 7.16$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.61$) and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = 5.59$; $p_{\text{Holm}} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.60$). People declaring their intention to vote for Law and Justice + United Poland were characterised

by a significantly higher level of religious fundamentalism. Significant differences were also found between Left voters and voters of: Agreement ($z = 3.45$; $p_{Holm} = 0.012$; $r_{rb} = 0.60$), Civic Coalition ($z = 3.99$; $p_{Holm} = 0.002$; $r_{rb} = 0.31$), Third Way ($z = 4.38$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.41$), Confederation Liberty and Independence ($z = -8.56$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.60$), people who described their choice as *other* ($z = -3.18$; $p_{Holm} = 0.028$; $r_{rb} = 0.50$), persons with no intention to vote ($z = -7.98$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.58$) and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = -6.25$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.58$). In each comparison, Left voters were characterised by a significantly lower level of religious fundamentalism. Significant differences were also found between Civic Coalition voters and Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -5.37$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.38$). In the second group, the level of religious fundamentalism was significantly higher. Civic Coalition voters also differed significantly from persons with no intention to vote ($z = -4.50$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.32$), and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = -3.45$; $p_{Holm} = 0.012$; $r_{rb} = 0.32$). In both comparisons, Civic Coalition voters were characterised by significantly lower levels of religious fundamentalism. Significant differences were also found between Third Way voters and Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -3.34$; $p_{Holm} = 0.017$; $r_{rb} = 0.29$). A higher level of religious fundamentalism was present among voters of Confederation Liberty and Independence.

The analysis also revealed significant differences in terms of xenophobia, $H(8) = 124.68$, $p < 0.001$. The effect size was moderate, $\eta^2 = 0.13$. Dunn test revealed significant differences between Law and Justice + United Poland voters and voters of: Civic Coalition ($z = 7.26$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.49$), Third Way ($z = 5.40$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.46$), Left ($z = 9.69$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.65$), people who have expressed their intention to vote for *other* ($z = 3.43$; $p_{Holm} = 0.017$; $r_{rb} = 0.50$), persons with no intention to vote ($z = 4.23$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.33$) and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = 3.18$; $p_{Holm} = 0.035$; $r_{rb} = 0.31$). In each comparison, higher levels of xenophobia were found among people who declared their intention to vote for Law and Justice + United Poland. Agreement voters differed significantly from Left voters ($z = 3.14$; $p_{Holm} = 0.039$; $r_{rb} = 0.53$). In the first of the compared groups, the level of xenophobia was significantly higher. Civic Coalition voters had significantly higher levels of xenophobia than Left voters ($z = 3.24$; $p_{Holm} = 0.031$; $r_{rb} = 0.23$), but lower than Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -4.89$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.33$). Civic Coalition voters also differed from people who

declared that they would not vote ($z = -3.07$; $p_{Holm} = 0.047$; $r_{rb} = 0.20$). Among Third Way voters, there was a significantly higher level of xenophobia than among Left voters ($z = 3.23$; $p_{Holm} = 0.031$; $r_{rb} = 0.28$), but lower than among Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -3.46$; $p_{Holm} = 0.015$; $r_{rb} = 0.29$). Moreover, Left voters were characterised by significantly lower levels of xenophobia than both Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -7.44$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.52$), persons with no intention to vote ($z = -5.94$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.42$), and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = -4.77$; $p_{Holm} < 0.001$; $r_{rb} = 0.43$).

Differences between voters in right-wing political beliefs in the economic dimension

The analysis revealed significant differences between the groups in their acceptance of capitalism, $H(8) = 30.66$, $p < 0.001$. The effect size was small, $\eta^2 = 0.03$. Dunn test revealed significant differences only between people who intended to vote for Left and Confederation Liberty and Independence voters ($z = -3.96$; $p_{Holm} = 0.003$; $r_{rb} = 0.27$), and between Left voters and persons who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot ($z = -4.00$; $p_{Holm} = 0.002$; $r_{rb} = 0.35$). In both comparisons, Left voters were characterised by lower acceptance of capitalism.

The analysis revealed significant differences between the groups in terms of anti-welfare, $H(8) = 22.41$, $p = 0.004$. However, the effect size was small, $\eta^2 = 0.02$. There were significant differences in anti-welfare between Law and Justice + United Poland voters and Civic Coalition voters ($z = -3.31$; $p_{Holm} = 0.034$; $r_{rb} = 0.23$), as well as between voters of Law and Justice + United Poland and voters of Confederation Liberty and Independence ($z = -3.21$; $p_{Holm} = 0.047$; $r_{rb} = 0.23$). In both comparisons, Law and Justice + United Poland voters showed lower levels of anti-welfare attitudes. The effect size for both comparisons was small. These were the only significant differences in this subdimension of economic beliefs.

Discussion

The declaration of intent to vote for a particular party or alliance significantly differentiated participants' political beliefs along the cultural dimension. Those who declared their intention to vote for Law and Justice + United Poland

were characterised by higher levels of religious fundamentalism than other groups, except for Agreement voters. Following Czarnek et al.'s (2017) conceptualisation, religious fundamentalism refers to the preferred relationship between religion and the state, as well as to the evaluation of the Church's influence on public life in Poland. It is worth noting that, according to the CBOS (2023b) report, Law and Justice voters declared significantly more frequent participation in religious practices. 57% of Law and Justice voters reported participating in religious practices once a week, while 8% reported doing so several times a week. Among all self-reported voters, the figures were 35% and 3%, respectively.

Left voters are characterised by the lowest level of religious fundamentalism, differing in this aspect from all other groups. The results of this analysis align with the election programs of the parties or alliances discussed. Interesting results concern the level of religious fundamentalism among those who declared they would not participate in the elections and those who declared their intention to cast a spoilt ballot. They were characterised by lower levels of religious fundamentalism than Law and Justice + United Poland voters, but higher than Civic Coalition and Left voters. The results suggest that it is valuable to include these groups in further analyses. Diverse motivations of these voters can be addressed in future studies conducted among young voters in Poland. The question is whether those who refuse to participate or want to cast a spoilt ballot as a „red card for politicians” differ significantly from those voters whose decision stems from a lack of interest in political life and limited knowledge.

It is important to note that the statements within the xenophobia subscale refer to the presence of foreigners in Poland, as well as to foreign cultural norms. The survey results should be examined in the context of the campaign ahead of the parliamentary elections and the 2023 Polish referendum, which included questions about migration. Immigration in Poland was widely discussed during the campaign. Lachowska (2025) identified immigrants as a theme used to create a sense of uncertainty and fear among the target audience. Therefore, the participants may have been exposed to a greater-than-usual presence of anti-immigration narratives. This context should be taken into account when interpreting the study's results. It is worth considering whether similar results would be obtained today. This question is particularly relevant given the introduction of the migration strategy for 2025–2030 (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady

Ministrów, 2024a) and the evolution of the public debate concerning the presence of migrants in Poland.

Individuals who declared their intention to vote for Law and Justice + United Poland were characterised by a significantly higher level of xenophobia compared to all other groups, except for those who intended to vote for Confederation Liberty and Independence and Agreement. Left voters were characterised by the lowest level of xenophobia, although there were no significant differences between the Left voters and those who described their choice as „other”. The higher level of xenophobia among voters of the Confederation Liberty and Independence compared to those of the Civic Coalition and Third Way was not surprising. Notably, immigration-related issues remain prominent not only in the Confederation's agenda but also in its activities and organised events, such as the „Stop immigration!” (Polish Press Agency, 2025). In Czarnek et al.'s (2017) study, cultural subdimensions of political beliefs – but not economic subdimensions – predicted the willingness to vote for right-wing parties. This result appears to confirm Kosowska-Gąstoł's (2021) view regarding the leading role of beliefs in the cultural dimension, which have the potential to differentiate between different groups of voters. The only significant differences among voters in their acceptance of capitalism were between Left and Confederation voters (small effect size) and between Left voters and those who intended to cast a spoilt ballot (moderate effect size). Significant differences in anti-welfare were found only between voters of Law and Justice + United Poland and Civic Coalition voters, as well as between voters of Law and Justice + United Poland and Confederation voters. In each comparison, lower anti-welfare sentiment was found among Law and Justice + United Poland voters. However, the effect size was small. Those results are intriguing, given the programmes of the analysed groups and the content of public discussions about their positions on the left-right dimension. Another explanation concerns the respondents' political awareness. In this study, knowledge of individual political parties' agendas was not examined. The respondents' awareness of not only their own economic beliefs but also those of the parties or alliances they choose may be limited due to the prominence of mass media coverage of issues related to the cultural subdimensions of political beliefs. It is also possible that the social transfers proposed by Law and Justice are perceived by respondents as related to anti-welfare. Numerous scholars (Potulicka & Rutkowiak, 2012; Michałowska, 2013; Rojek, 2019) have investigated the presence of neoliberal thought in educational programs

and a specific hidden agenda grounded in neoliberal ideology. It is worth considering whether free-market views are so deeply entrenched in the political mainstream that they are easier for young adults, including those with low political awareness, to internalise.

Limitations

Several study limitations may have influenced the results. First, the data were collected in collaboration with a research panel. Individuals who participate in research panels, follow groups that share surveys, or frequently take part in online surveys may possess characteristics that distinguish them from the rest of the population, as is often the case in volunteer-based studies (Lönnqvist et al., 2007). The *Political Beliefs Questionnaire* subscale with the lowest internal consistency was used to measure acceptance of capitalism. It should be noted that in the study by Czarnek et al. (2017), this subscale was characterised by low internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.54$). However, it is worth noting that this study did not examine the extent to which participants held well-established views on capitalism that would enable them to form strong, consistent judgments. This issue should be explored in future research. It is possible that participants' political awareness in the economic domain is lower than in the cultural domain, and that they are more frequently exposed to messages concerning the social role of the Church and xenophobia than to those promoting acceptance of capitalism and anti-interventionism. Moreover, some of the compared groups were considerably smaller. In subsequent studies, it is important to ensure that the sizes of the compared groups are similar.

Ethical considerations

Consent for the project „The relationship between national victimhood and attitudes towards violent far-right extremism” was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Silesia. The analyses presented in this paper are additional analyses.

Consent to participate

All participants gave their informed consent to participate in the study.

Data availability

The database containing the raw data has been uploaded to OSF: https://osf.io/znm7s/overview?view_only=d600214a0e8e4727afbb36a27e2bd198

Tables

Table 1. Sample characteristics

Variable	%	n	
Education	Basic education	5.7	51
	Basic vocational education or basic industry-specific education	7.2	65
	Secondary education	54.4	485
	Secondary vocational education	6.5	58
	Higher education	26	232
Employment	Employed, working person	57.6	513
	Unemployed person	12.2	109
	Pensioner or disability benefit recipient	2.1	19
	Student, pupil	42.5	379
	On parental leave, on childcare leave	1.9	17
	On unpaid leave	0.3	3
Place of residence	Village	29.5	263
	A town with up to 10,000 inhabitants	10.1	90
	A town with a population between 10,000 and 100,000	25.5	227
	A city with a population between 100,000 and 500,000	19.1	170
	A city with a population of over 500,000	15.8	141
Religious affiliation	Roman Catholic Church	47.9	427
	Other	11.4	102
	I do not identify with any religion	40.6	362

Table 2a. Median and interquartile range for right-wing political beliefs in subgroups

Variable	Law and Justice + United Poland (n = 116)		Agreement (n = 12)		Civic Coalition (n = 186)		Third Way (n = 83)	
	Me	IQR	Me	IQR	Me	IQR	Me	IQR
Religious fundamentalism	3.7	1.0	3.0	0.8	1.9	1.5	2.2	1.3
Xenophobia	3.7	1.3	3.3	1.2	3.0	1.3	3.0	1.2
Acceptance of capitalism	2.7	1.0	3.2	0.5	2.7	1.0	2.3	1.0
Anti-welfare	2.3	1.1	2.8	0.8	2.4	0.7	2.4	0.9

Note. Me – median; IQR – interquartile range.

Table 2b. Median and interquartile range for right-wing political beliefs in subgroups

Variable	Left (n = 136)		Confederation Liberty and Independence (n = 111)		Other (n = 23)		No intention to vote (n = 151)		Spoilt vote (n = 63)	
	Me	IQR	Me	IQR	Me	IQR	Me	IQR	Me	IQR
Religious fundamentalism	1.3	1.0	2.8	1.7	2.3	1.2	2.7	1.0	2.8	1.1
Xenophobia	2.3	1.7	3.3	1.0	3.0	0.8	3.0	1.0	3.0	1.3
Acceptance of capitalism	2.3	1.3	3.0	1.0	2.7	0.3	2.7	1.0	3.0	1.0
Anti-welfare	2.3	0.9	2.6	1.0	2.6	0.7	2.6	1.0	2.6	0.9

Note. Me – median; IQR – interquartile range.

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ZGODNIE Z PROGRAMEM PARTII? RÓŻNICE MIĘDZY MŁODYMI WYBORCAMI POLSKICH UGRUPOWAŃ W ZAKRESIE POGLĄDÓW POLITYCZNYCH PRZED WYBORAMI PARLAMENTARNYMI W 2023 ROKU

Streszczenie

Oddanie głosu na partię określoną przez badaczy jako prawicową lub lewicową nie musi oznaczać, że wyborcy podzielają podstawowe przekonania lub zgadzają się z postulatami zawartymi w programie danej partii. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje różnice w poglądach politycznych młodych wyborców różnych ugrupowań politycznych przed polskimi wyborami parlamentarnymi w 2023 roku. Przeanalizowano odpowiedzi 891 osób. Uczestnikami badania byli młodzi dorośli w wieku 18–25 lat, którzy zadeklarowali polskie obywatelstwo. Do pomiaru przekonań politycznych w wymiarze kulturowym i ekonomicznym wykorzystano *Kwestionariusz Przekonań Politycznych*. Wyniki badania wydają się potwierdzać wcześniejsze ustalenia badaczy, wskazujące na to, że istniejący podział na lewicę i prawicę w Polsce oraz decyzja o głosowaniu na daną partię polityczną są w większym stopniu determinowane przez przekonania polityczne w wymiarze kulturowym niż ekonomicznym.

Słowa kluczowe: przekonania polityczne; partie polityczne; młodzi dorośli; wybory parlamentarne

Author Contributions (Wkład autorów)

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Nota biograficzna

Justyna Lipka jest pracowniczką badawczo-dydaktyczną w Instytucie Psychologii Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują ekstremizm, poczucie narodowej krzywdy oraz psychologiczne aspekty odbioru filmu. Prowadzi zajęcia i warsztaty w oparciu o ideę psychologicznej pracy z filmem.

Biographical note

Justyna Lipka is a didactic and research employee at the Institute of Psychology, University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. Her research interests include extremism, national victimhood and the psychological aspects of film reception. She conducts classes and workshops based on the idea of psychological work with films.