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## Political Activity of Women and Men – the Psychosocial Determinants of Conventional Political Activity

**Abstract:** Political activity is a type of social activity displayed by citizens. Observations and research indicate that gender can be a factor which conditions its degree and forms. Apart from biological gender, which shapes the societal roles of women and men, additional factors that are supposedly responsible for their activities include elements of the system of beliefs (i.e. acknowledged political values, conviction that political activity has an importance, level of satisfaction with democracy as well as individualism and collectivism understood as an element of individual's mentality). The impact of those factors on degree of conventional political activities among women and men is the subject of surveys which were conducted in 2004, 2010, and 2014 on a group of 1048 students from Polish universities. The received results show that differences in political activity between surveyed men and women as well as varying determinants in both groups are slowly fading away. The most important predictors of women's political activity include: conviction of its significance in democracy and (dis)satisfaction with the way it functions.

**Key words:** political activity, gender, women's political activity, youth, social role theory

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### Political Activity – Theoretical Background

**P**olitical activity is a form of social activity that people display. It can be perceived in a narrow and a broader way. The narrow perception, also referred to by Krystyna Skarżyńska as behavioural, denotes political behaviour and intentions or readiness to take steps within that scope. In the broader sense, apart from political behaviour and readiness to take steps within it, the notion also includes political comprehension. It refers e.g. to knowledge about political parties, well-defined political opinions and voting habits, or ability to identify people who hold the most important functions in the state (Skarżyńska, 1999).

Political participation can be understood as “an active support for political continuity or political change” or “any form of involvement in the process of affecting the governors' allocations within socially acknowledged values” (Barner-Barry, Rosenwein, 1985, as in: Skarżyńska, 2002, p. 22). For van Deth, political participation is an involvement in politics (understood in line with the Easton's model as a process of creating and allocating socially acknowledged goods) and it often refers to such activities as voting,

participation in a political campaign, demonstrating, involvement in a riot, etc. (van Deth, 1986).

Conventional participation, which is the purpose of this article, is defined as an activity which complies with the existing constitutional order and democratic rules. Thus, it will primarily include all electoral behaviours of citizens and behaviours related to „legal influence of individuals on selection of actions undertaken by politicians” (Skarżyńska, 2002, p. 29). Barnes and Kaase (1979), in addition to the already mentioned voting, and also includes the mass media, discussions and party affiliation in conventional politics.

### **The Role of Gender in Political Activity**

Through many decades, gender has been regarded as one of the most important factors that differentiate voting turnouts. In 1937, Tingsten analysed levels of voting turnout among women and men and concluded that men participate in elections more often than women (see also: Norris, 2007). This inequality has persisted for a very long time. Nowadays, however, the importance of gender in this area is decreasing, the level of voter turnout is equal among both genders and there are also countries where women vote more often than men, e.g. Chile, Finland or Malta (Żukowski, 2011; International IDEA, 2011). Also in the United States during all presidential elections since 1980, the percentage of women entitled to vote, who actually voted, exceeded the percentage of eligible men who did vote. However, as far as other activities related to elections, female Americans are less active than male Americans (Norris, 2007, p. 728). Still, if we analyse the aggregated results of all participating countries in the European and World Values Study, men are shown to have 5% advantage in this field. Women are also less represented in political parties – membership in a party is declared by twice fewer women than men. This difference is lower where membership in a trade union is concerned.

The role of gender in political activity can also be considered in the context of factors that determine its level. Thus, one may wonder how gender translates into material and non-material resources, sense of effectiveness, social bonds or trust (Rosenstone, Hansen, 2003; Verba, Scholzman, Brady, 1995), which may in turn determine the greater or lesser level of political activity. The female gender is often treated as a burdensome factor due to the traditional role attributable to women. The so-called structural approach assumes that the difference observed in the levels of political activity between women and men is related to the lower position of women in the social structure (lower earnings, worse education). Eliminating the impact of those variables results in equalization of political activity levels among men and women (see also: Welch, 1977).

The role of gender in political activity may also depend on contextual factors, especially cultural factors related to the level of social modernization or religious determinants. This way of explaining the differential in political activity among women and men can be found in Hofstede (2007), as well as in the work of Inglehart and Norris (2009).

Apart from the biological gender, additional factors that are supposedly responsible for women's and men's political activities include elements of the system of beliefs, that is the acknowledged political values, conviction that political activity has an importance,



level of satisfaction with democracy, as well as individualism and collectivism understood as an element of the individual's mentality (Reykowski, 1990).

In psychology, structural and cultural explanations of the role of gender are combined under the category of social expectations, regarding the attitudes, functions and behaviours directed at people identified as women and men" (Miluska, 1996). The structural approach, also in relation to gender, is expressed in the conviction that there is a common position occupied by certain groups in the social structure, and there are structural factors limiting our experience at all levels, from family to society (Ashmore, Del Boca, 1981; Deaux, Kite, 2002). Cultural interpretation, in turn, emphasizes that the combination of convictions, recognized values and social skills derives itself from the experience of early childhood accumulated in the process, the purpose of which is to introduce and help young people to adopt social standards (House, 1981). Some importance is attributable to various cultural values which are present in the course of socialisation (Hofstede, 2007). Roles of genders are supposed to explain current behaviours, being a direct predictor of gender differences observed in adult women and men, although they depend on distant variables, i.e. early socialization as well as biological predispositions (Eagly, 1987).

Where the concepts of gender roles are concerned it is assumed that the social system of gender roles emphasizes the following: allocating different categories of activity to people on the basis of their biological gender (professional, household, and civic), deemed necessary and useful for maintaining and improving social life; assigning to people, depending on their biological gender, oppositional personality features, expressed in the stereotypes of masculinity and femininity; and thirdly, higher valuation of everything related to masculinity (Chetwynd, Oonagh, 1978, as in: Pankowska, 2005). In the case of men, it is primarily connected with professional, rather than household activities. Professions related to exercising power (the profession of a politician is categorised as such) are assigned related features such as: independence, rationality, determination, courage, or authority (Pankowska, 2005; see also: Miluska, 1996; Pratto, 2002).

These social expectations that constitute allocated (assigned) roles may translate into subjective (internalized) roles and fulfilled (satisfied) roles. Since the role assigned to women is primarily connected with expectations related to household and private activities, we can expect lower political activity of women. On the other hand, the submissiveness and conventionality of actions, which are stereotypes associated with women, may suggest their lower interest particularly in unconventional activity.

The various factors potentially responsible for political activity of women and men indicated by the authors justify a need for further research regarding this problem, which additionally should take into account the time factor (research conducted in three periods with different characteristics defined by political events).

The aim of the study is to answer the question about extent to which gender, male and female political values, conviction about the value of political activity, the level of satisfaction with democracy, and the level of individualism and collectivism determines the level of political activity. Resolving this issue helps determining the level of activity in the group of women and men over the compared years (2004, 2010, and 2014); what hierarchy of political values do men and women recognize; what is the value of political activity in the group of women and men; what level of satisfaction with democracy are

typical of women and men and what is the level of individualism and collectivism in the group of women and men covered in the research.

It is assumed that level of political activity in the researched group depends on gender, which also conditions individual forms of political activity. It is expected that men will demonstrate greater political activity. Moreover, gender differences in the hierarchy of values were also assumed: men more oriented to instrumental values may have a higher political commitment than women who are oriented to expressive values. It is also expected that the political activity would be influenced by the belief in value of political activity and the level of satisfaction with democracy: in both cases, higher results should be displayed by men. Persons who appreciate activity and remain more satisfied with the democratic system, who supposedly are mostly men, would be more active in a conventional way. It is also expected that the level of political activity should be differentiated by the results achieved on the scale of individualism and collectivism. Women achieve higher results than men in terms of collectivism and thus they are likely to prefer conventional forms of activity. Levels of political activity in the men's and women's groups will also depend on the year of research which has its own political context. Considering the three periods in which the research was conducted, one may reflect on what is the influence of accompanying events on the level of political activity. Disappointment with the political class and politics in general could have discouraged political activity both in 2004 and in 2014. A similar effect could have been exacerbated by the political dispute that took place in 2010 and a certain sense of *entrenchment* of the political scene that accompanied citizens in that time.

### The Research Methodology

We take into account results of research conducted among 1048 students of psychology and political science, including 714 women (68.13%) and 334 men (31.87%). 384 persons from the year 2004 (266 women and 118 men), 367 people from 2010 (237 women and 130 men) and 297 people from 2014 (211 women and 86 men) were surveyed. The average age for women is 23.25 years, and for men 22.98 years.

The age of the respondents indicates that they are people in the period of early adulthood (in its early phase), which begins around 20–23 years of age and lasts until reaching about 35–40 years of age (Harwas-Napierała, Trempała, 2000). In this period of human life, the physiological differences determine social development of young men and women to some extent. For men, working and being successful at work constitute the principal aim of activity. Professional life and social activity in men usually take place independently of family life, he does not exclude his activity in this area both in the matter of establishing and maintaining a family as well as often a large commitment to caring for and upbringing the children. Professional and social activity in women are being interrupted or marginalized more often due to reasons connected with parenthood. Hence, it can be concluded that women involve themselves in any political activity to a lesser extent than men. A significant change that takes place in the period of early adulthood in relation to adolescence, regarding our way of perceiving social reality, results from the fact that we have departed from the idealistic perception of the world, the “ab-

solutist perception of truth,” and adopted of relative view of the nature of solutions. Such a method of attributing value to the affects social and political attitudes.

Political activity was examined in its conventional and unconventional (legal and illegal) dimensions as well as in actual (the form of action undertaken by the surveyed person) and potential (attitudes of the surveyed towards various forms of activity) dimensions. Conventional activity, which is the purpose of this article, is understood as consistent with the order established by constitution and positioned within the framework of democratic institutions, and includes mainly the electoral activities and participation in referenda. The Political Activity Scale was used to measure political activity. It consisted of: seven questions about conventional actual activity, four questions about unconventional legal activity, two questions about conventional potential activity, three regarding unconventional legal potential activity, and five regarding unconventional illegal activity. In the case of conventional actual activity which refers to participation in elections, the following answers were available: “yes,” “no,” “don’t recall.” The scale from 1 to 5 was created and the average value was calculated basing on the number of answers “in favour.” The portfolio of answers to questions about all types of potential activity included five categories: „definitely yes,” „mostly yes,” „hard to say” „rather no,” „definitely not” (the answers were scored from 4 to 0, the number of points was summed up and then the average was calculated). In addition to the scales indicated in the questionnaire, there were two additional questions: one regarding the belief of the surveyed regarding importance of citizens’ participation in elections for the functioning of democracy (the importance of political activity), and the second regarding satisfaction of the surveyed with democracy in Poland.

A modified Sotwin’s (2003) scale of values has been applied to measure the hierarchy of political values. As compared to the original tool, generally defined values were put in a more detailed way. “Equality” was replaced with „equality before the law,” “income equality,” „equality of opportunity,” while instead of „freedom” – „political freedom,” „economic freedom,” “personal freedom” were used; instead of “justice:” “distribution of wealth according to contribution” and „distribution of wealth according to needs” appeared. Moreover, the following values have been removed from the scale: “tolerance,” “world peace” and “political activity.” All of the eight values have been paired and the surveyed persons were asked to select the value which is more important to him or her. Then the number of times each value was chosen by the surveyed was calculated, which allowed for developing the hierarchy of values.

Measurement of individualism and collectivism was done using a 20-item questionnaire developed by J. Wagner (Wagner, Moch, 1986; Wagner, 1995). It investigates five factors: 1) Stand alone: focus on independence and self-reliance, 2) Win above all: extreme inclination to win in competitive situations, 3) Group preference: preference for working with other members of the group, 4) Sacrifice in Group: conviction about the need to sacrifice the individual for the benefit of the group and 5) Individual Thinking: the need to have individual beliefs as a condition of adapting to the group. Factors 1, 2 and 5 are the individualistic factors, while factors 3 and 4 and the collectivist factors.

The factor analysis has proved the existence of those five factors. Reliability of the whole scale has been confirmed in Polish research (Miluska, 2005) and equals 0.71 (Cronbach’s alfa), whereas reliability of individual scales are as follows: “Reliance on

oneself" – 0.75; "Winning" – 0.74; "Preference for the group" – 0.72, "Commitment within the group" – 0.69 and "Independent attitude" – 0.70.

There is a similarity between the described structure of factors and the types of individualism and collectivism in Triandis' concept (1995). „Self-reliance” and “individual thinking” are close to horizontal individualism, which is characterized by a need to differentiate from other, partner-treated people. „Winning” is the equivalent of vertical individualism which emphasizes the value of rivalry and overtaking others, while “preference for the group” is a horizontal collectivism emphasizing importance of mutual dependence between members of a single group. “Dedication to the group” is closer to collectivism, although it does not fit into any of its types distinguished by Triandis, while the questionnaire does not contain items related to vertical collectivism, emphasizing the importance of tradition and respect for the family. The respondents answered questions using a seven-degree scale, where the answer „1” meant „I definitely agree” and „7” – „I strongly disagree.”


The surveys have been conducted in three different years: 2004, 2010, and 2014.

## Research Results

### The level of conventional and actual political activity

Although the answers to the questions in the applied scale were dichotomous in nature, since it was possible to sum up the answers, the developed variable shall be perceived as continuous. If we assume that score „0” denotes lack of conventional actual

**Graphs 1. The level of conventional and actual political activity**



Source: Own elaboration.


political activity, whereas score “1” is a proof of taking the activity, then the average for a group within all the analysed years equals  $M = 0.44$ ;  $SD = 0.23$ . This is not a high level. At the same time, women reach the average of  $M = 0.42$ ;  $SD = 0.23$  and men  $M = 0.47$ ,  $SD = 0.24$ . It is a statistically significant difference ( $F = 9.56$ ;  $p = 0.002$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.01$ ). We can observe a systematic growth of conventional actual political activity among women (e.g. higher voting turnout). The average value within this group in 2004 was  $M = 0.48$ ;  $SD = 0.22$  and among men  $M = 0.58$ ;  $SD = 0.20$  ( $F = 18.53$ ,  $p < 0.000$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.05$ ), and in 2010 in the women’s group it reached the value of  $M = 0.33$ ;  $SD = 0.18$  and in the men’s group  $M = 0.39$ ;  $SD = 0.20$  ( $F = 7.11$ ;  $p = 0.008$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ ), while in 2014 the average values in both groups have come so close to each other that the difference between them did not reach statistical significance (women  $M = 0.45$ ;  $SD = 0.25$  and men  $M = 0.44$ ;  $SD = 0.28$ ;  $F = 0.11$ ;  $p = 0.736$ ).

The level of conventional potential activity

The range of results achievable in relations to conventional potential activity is from “0” (no activity) to “4” (the highest intensity). The average value for the whole group in all the years has reached the level of  $M = 2.35$ ;  $SD = 0.96$ , in a group of women  $M = 2.23$ ;  $SD = 0.90$ , and in the group of men  $M = 2.58$ ,  $SD = 1.03$  ( $F = 34.90$ ;  $p < 0.000$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.03$ ).

The average result that describes levels of conventional potential activity in the women’s group in 2004 was  $M = 2.19$ ;  $SD = 0.79$  and in the men’s group  $M = 2.49$ ;  $SD = 1.01$ : the difference is statistically significant ( $F = 9.95$ ;  $p = 0.001$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.03$ ). In 2010, results

Graph 2. The level of conventional potential activity



Source: Own elaboration.

among women and men were respectively  $M = 2.45$ ;  $SD = 0.9$  and  $M = 2.86$ ,  $SD = 0.91$  ( $F = 17.16$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.04$ ), while in 2014:  $M = 2.05$ ,  $SD = 0.99$  and  $M = 2.38$ ,  $SD = 1.17$  ( $F = 6.12$ ;  $p = 0.013$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ ). This result proves the previous one: not only are men, to a greater degree than women, actually involved in conventional political activity, but it is also more important for them in a potential sense.

#### The acknowledged values

Analysis of the hierarchy of values in the following years indicates that the highest attractiveness, both for women and men, can be attributed to personal freedom, while the lowest assessments concern income equality.

The data indicates a statistical significance for differences in the assessment of „equality of remuneration,” „equality of opportunity,” „personal freedom” and „distribution of goods according to the needs of citizens” (women’s advantage) and „political freedom,” „economic freedom” and „equality before the law” (advantage of men). The result obtained in the group of women is a collection of values indicating the need for a safe standing in the social structure and, at the same time, free choice and action, which may be violated by the sense of security. Men appreciate freedom in given spheres of activities (politics and economy) and they hold equality before the law in a higher esteem.

In 2004, women valued equality of remuneration and equality of opportunity visibly more than men, while men outweigh women in terms of appreciation towards equality before the law and political freedom. In 2010, men more often than women preferred economic freedom, while women – equality of opportunity and division of wealth according to citizens’ contribution. In 2014, women particularly appreciated the equality of opportunity, division of wealth according to citizens’ needs and personal freedom, while men preferred economic freedom.

#### Confidence about importance of political activity

If the result „0” denotes conviction that the activity is invalid, and the result „4” denotes the strongest conviction about the importance of activity, the average  $M = 3.49$ ,  $SD = 0.92$  means that all of them highly value this form of involvement. At the same time, women reached the average of  $M = 3.52$ ;  $SD = 0.81$  and men  $M = 3.31$ ;  $SD = 1.11$ , which is a statistically significant difference that indicates greater acceptance for this political activity in the women’s group ( $F = 8.80$ ;  $p = 0.003$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.01$ ).

In 2004, women achieved an average value of acceptance within values of political activity of  $M = 3.70$ ;  $SD = 0.59$  and men  $M = 3.67$ ;  $SD = 0.88$  ( $F = 0.19$ ;  $p = 0.660$ ), which indicates lack of differences between the groups in the concerned scope. The situation is different in 2010: the average for women is  $M = 3.70$ ;  $SD = 0.64$  and men  $M = 3.46$ ;  $SD = 1.01$  ( $F = 7.52$ ;  $p = 0.006$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ ) and in 2014:  $M = 3.18$ ;  $SD = 1.07$  vs  $M = 2.80$ ;  $SD = 1.32$  ( $F = 6.50$ ;  $p = 0.011$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ ) proving a greater acceptance for this value among women.

### Satisfaction with democracy

The scale of results assumes the minimum as „0” (no satisfaction) and the maximum as „4” (the highest satisfaction). The surveyed group achieved an average result of  $M = 1.34$ ;  $SD = 1.05$ , which indicates a rather unfavourable assessment of its state in Poland. At the same time, women have appraised it averagely reaching the result of  $M = 1.37$ ;  $SD = 1$ , and men  $M = 1.26$ ;  $SD = 1.16$  ( $F = 1.03$ ;  $p = 0.310$ ); the difference is not statistically significant.

In 2004, women reached the satisfaction level of  $M = 1.09$ ;  $SD = 0.96$  and men  $M = 1.12$ ;  $SD = 1.1$  ( $F = 0.06$ ,  $p = 0.798$ ), and in 2010  $M = 1.72$  respectively;  $SD = 1.1$  and  $M = 1.62$ ;  $SD = 1.1$  ( $F = 0.63$ ,  $p = 0.426$ ). In 2014 it was  $M = 1.30$ ;  $SD = 0,08$  and  $M = 1.02$ ;  $SD = 1.06$  ( $F = 5.84$ ;  $p = 0.016$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ ). Only the last result indicates greater satisfaction with democracy in the women's group. In this regard, men seem to be clearly frustrated.

### Individualism and collectivism

On the scale of individualism with a minimum at 1 and maximum of 7, the surveyed group achieved an average of  $M = 4.01$ ;  $SD = 0.87$ , which gives an indication of above-average intensity of this orientation. Difference between women ( $M = 3.89$ ;  $SD = 0.83$ ) and men ( $M = 4.25$ ;  $SD = 0.91$ ) is statistically significant ( $F = 25.65$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.04$ ) and indicates greater level of individualism in the men's group.

In 2010, the average value in the women's group was  $M = 3.92$ ;  $SD = 0.81$ , and in the men's group  $M = 4.29$ ;  $SD = 0.95$ , which indicates the significant advantage of men in terms of intensity at being individualistic ( $F = 15.20$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0.04$ ). Similar interdependencies manifest themselves in 2014: differences between averages  $M = 3.86$ ;  $SD = 0.86$  vs  $M = 4.20$ ;  $SD = 0.87$  are statistically significant ( $F = 9.63$ ;  $p = 0.002$ ;  $\eta^2 = 0,03$ ).

On the scale for collectivism with a range of results from 1 to 7, the researchers obtained an average result of  $M = 4.56$ ;  $SD = 0.82$ , which proves a relatively high level of collectivism. The average value in the women's group is  $M = 4.54$ ;  $SD = 0.81$ , and among men  $M = 4.61$ ;  $SD = 0.86$ : the difference is not statistically significant ( $F = 0.85$ ;  $p = 0.356$ ).

In 2010, the average level of collectivism within the women's group was  $M = 4.54$ ;  $SD = 0.82$  and in the men's group  $M = 4.57$ ;  $SD = 0.85$  ( $F = 0.13$ ;  $p = 0.722$ ). In 2014 it was  $M = 4.55$ ;  $SD = 0.80$  vs  $M = 4.66$ ;  $SD = 0.89$  ( $F = 1.12$ ;  $p = 0.291$ ). There are no significant differences between the surveyed genders within this scope.

### Determinants of political activity: multiple regression analysis

The estimation has been conducted with a progressive step method, which allowed for avoiding problems with collinearity of descriptive variables. Factors which significantly affected levels of political activity have been determined based on the level of

importance of the model parameter valuation. In turn, due to the differences in scales of explanatory variables, the hierarchy of significance related to factors taking part in the study was built on the basis of probability values (p-values). The following potential predictors were adopted in the analysis: the aforementioned eight values, conviction about the importance of political activity, satisfaction with democracy in Poland, individualism, and collectivism.

For the whole sample in all the years covered by the research, the model for conventional actual political activity has not achieved the required adjustment. All regression coefficients turned out to be insignificant.

Results of the regression analysis ( $R = 0.45$ ;  $R^2 = 0.20$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.19$ ;  $F(9,654) = 18.32$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) indicate that important factors influencing the conventional potential activity were arranged in the following order: belief in importance of activity ( $\beta = 0.37$ ,  $p < 0.000$ ), collectivism ( $\beta = 0.11$ ,  $p = 0.002$ ), individualism ( $\beta = 0.10$ ,  $p = 0.004$ ), equality before the law ( $\beta = 0.10$ ,  $p = 0.005$ ), and economic freedom ( $\beta = 0.09$ ,  $p = 0.011$ ).

Results for the both gender groups are as follows: for women the predictor of conventional actual activity (adjustment of the model:  $R = 0.20$ ;  $R^2 = 0.04$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.03$ ;  $F(4,366) = 3.91$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) is the "equality before the law" value ( $\beta = 0.114$ ;  $p = 0.030$ ) and conviction of the activity importance ( $\beta = 0.11$ ;  $p = 0.041$ ). The level of conventional potential activity (adjustment of model:  $R = 0.48$ ;  $R^2 = 0.23$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.22$ ;  $F(7,440) = 19.15$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) depends on belief in importance of the activity ( $\beta = 0.41$ ,  $p < 0.000$ ), collectivism ( $\beta = 0.14$ ,  $p = 0.000$ ) and the value of „personal freedom” (negative dependence;  $\beta = -0,09$ ;  $p = 0.044$ ). In the group of men, the conventional actual activity (adjustment of model:  $R = 0.24$ ;  $R^2 = 0.06$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.04$ ;  $F(3,197) = 3.86$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ) at the highest degree depends on the belief in importance of the activity ( $\beta = 0.18$ ,  $p = 0.011$ ) and acceptance of remuneration equality ( $\beta = 0.15$ ,  $p = 0.038$ ), value of „personal freedom” (negative dependence;  $\beta = -0,09$ ;  $p = 0.044$ ). The factor that determines the level of conventional potential activity (adjustment of model:  $R = 0.44$ ;  $R^2 = 0.19$ ; Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.17$ ;  $F(5,210) = 9.94$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ) is conviction of the activity importance ( $\beta = 0.37$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ).

## Discussion

The hypothesis that gender differentiates level of political activity has been positively verified in most of the conducted analyses. Conventional actual political activity turned out to be considerably closer for men than women. This difference was confirmed by the research conducted in each year except 2014. On the other hand, men turned out to be more interested in conventional potential political activities. As far as this scope is concerned, the results obtained for all the years as a whole as well as the results for respective research stages were higher. Importantly, other results from research conducted in a different age group (11–17 years of age) were obtained by Anna M. Zalewska and Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz (2011), who analysed the relationship between developmental and subjective factors with civic activity of the young, including political activity. These studies have shown that level of political activity (declared conventional activity) does



not depend on gender. The only factor out of variables that include gender, age and the place of residence which turned out to have significance for this form of civic activity was the third one. Young people from smaller cities displayed greater readiness to be politically active in the future. Differences in the level of civic behaviour between girls and boys were revealed only in the field of passive citizenship (sense of national identity and patriotism) and social activity (e.g. fundraising, volunteering, participation in local actions). Thus, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis that potential conventional activity becomes more important in the period of early adulthood.

In both groups of women and men, the most preferred value is personal freedom, while equality before the law or equality of opportunity takes the second place. Similarly, the most rarely selected values in both groups referred to equality of remuneration and division of wealth according to citizens' needs. Some of the analyses indicate significant differences in preference for a given value among representatives of one of the genders, but this does not significantly change their hierarchy. Out of all values included in the analyses, only some of them turned out to be significant predictors of political activity. Equality before the law affects the level of conventional actual activity in the group of surveyed women, while in the same group the equality of remuneration affects the level of unconventional legal potential activity. On the other hand, acknowledgement for equality of remuneration has an importance for conventional actual activity among men, a lack of appreciation for personal freedom is related with a tendency to conventional potential activity. A value which has not been included in the analyses yet presents significance to political participation, is an experience of being secure. In the women's group it acts as a predictor of individual and collective political activities (Klamut, 2014).

The second detailed hypothesis regarding expected higher support for importance of political activity in the group of men was not confirmed in the obtained results because it turned out that women are more convinced of its importance. Such a conclusion is the result of analysing data from all the years together and separately the years 2010 and 2014. No difference has been observed only with regard to the data from 2004. Conviction about importance of political activity seems to be the most stable predictor of women's involvement and it is important for each type of activity. This interdependency proves itself for men only in the case of the conventional activity.

The hypothesis about a greater level of satisfaction with democracy in the group of surveyed men has also been verified negatively. Most of the conducted research does not allow for drawing such a conclusion. Only the 2014 data prove the differences. In this example, however, higher satisfaction with democracy was observed among women.

Results of analyses concerning differences in the level of collectivism between women and men suggest to disregarding the hypothesis about its higher level in the women's group. On the other hand, significant differences were noted in the level of individualism. Its level turned out to be much higher in the group of surveyed men. Along with its increase the tendency to undertake political activity of unconventional, illegal and potential nature also increases. Collectivism has a varying impact on political activities in women, as opposed to men. In relation to women, it affects tendencies for starting conventional potential activities, while in relation to men it affects unconventional legal potential activities.

As shown by the above results, women and men differ not only at the levels of political activity, but also differ when it comes to its conditions. Analysis of dynamics of those changes as well as determinants of political activities among women and men allows for drawing the following conclusions.

The level of conventional actual activity was diagnosed to be the highest in 2004 both among women and men, although it was significantly higher among men than women. In 2010 it has considerably decreased in both groups, yet still men were found to be more active to a greater degree. On the other hand, data from 2014 indicate a significant increase in this type of activity among women and a slight increase among men, so that no significant differences were observed between representatives of both genders in its level. Taking into account the data collected at all stages of the study, the variables determining the level of conventional actual activity include primarily the conviction about importance of the activity and recognition for equality before the law in a group of women and recognition of equality of remuneration in the group of men.

In all stages of the research, differences in the level of conventional potential activity between representatives of both genders have been maintained. What is more, its average level was relatively stable (with a slight increase in 2010). The predictors for this type of activity included primarily the conviction about importance of activity, and for women: collectivism as well as the lack of recognition of values of personal freedom.

The research context seems to have no importance for the level of conventional political activity among the surveyed. This may be a result of the fact that the research was carried out in years accompanied by events that lower confidence in politics and politicians and discourage involvement. In addition, in each case the research covered young people, usually less interested in this area of activity, as indicated in the introduction when characterizing the studied group (see also: Liberska, 2004; Szafranec, 2012; Turska-Kawa, 2012; Marzęcki, 2013).

To a significant degree, the trends of changes in political activities revealed by researches comply with the changes being observed in this scope. A lot of research on political participation (European Values Study, World Values Study) registers a decrease in citizens' interest in activity, especially those of conventional nature. Discouragement and lack of trust in the political elite and political parties results in a decrease in the voter turnout in most countries – both in mature democracies as well as the new ones. What is more, membership in political parties, which is a basic, conventional activity, is also decreasing (Rucht, 2010).

In turn, slow blurring of previously observed differences in political activity between women and men is also observed in other studies, especially those conducted in countries being more advanced in the modernization process (e.g. Coffe, Bolzendahl, 2010; Norris, 2002). As R. Inglehart and P. Norris point out, the shift towards post-materialist values that accompany these processes favours equalization of the position of women and men in the political area as well (Inglehart, Norris, 2009). The fact that in the concerned studies gender ceased to be a factor differentiating level of both conventional and unconventional legal political activity only in 2014 allows the suspicion that this change has only just begun (see results of research on values, e.g. Bartkowski, 2009; Jasińska-Kania, 2011).

The most doubtful and questionable are the results that refer to conditions of political activities taken up by women and men. It is difficult to identify the factor which is con-

ductive to undertaking political activity in both surveyed groups to the same extent. An important predictor of any type of activity among women was the belief in importance of being active in democracy, which for men was only important in the case of conventional activities. Obviously, it is not strange that undertaking political activity is related to conviction that the said activity is important (more about relationship between political participation and attitudes and beliefs see: Quintelier, van Deth, 2014). It is worth noting, however, that women's conviction about the importance of activity in democracy is growing, which may be the result of intensified actions carried out by feminist organizations stressing the importance of mobilising women in the political sphere. The fact that it is accompanied by an increase in political activity among the surveyed women may be an indication of interdependency between those factors.

On the other hand, interdependencies between individualistic or collective orientation and political activity of women and men were more complex. According to the assumption, men had stronger individualistic orientations than women. Support for unconventional illegal activity has been increasing together with the increase in individualism, which cannot be regarded as a surprise. Activities of this type undermine the existing rules and they are often a manifestation of a rebellion against the rules imposed by a dominant group. However, the picture of interdependencies was more complicated in the case of collectivism. In case of women, it caused greater support for potential conventional activity (which is in line with expectations – participation in elections can be treated as an expression of support for group norms and attention to social order). In the case of men, however, it translates into higher support for unconventional legal activity.

Furthermore, the noticed interdependencies between importance of given political values and political activity create a complex and vague image. While the dependencies between political activity and the choice of equality before the law or political freedom that have been found in the group of women can be explained, a link between equality of remuneration and political activity (found in the group of men) is more difficult to explain. It seems that it would be worth carrying out more in-depth research focused only on relationship between political values and political activity of women and men.

Conducting this type of research on the relationship between gender and political activity is important in the context of controversies related to quotas introduced in the Polish political system as well. According to opponents of this type of solution, such artificial activation of women may cause them to enter politics by accident, because the number of females who are really interested in this sphere is smaller than the number of men. Detection of factors determining the level of political activity among women and men brings us closer to answering the question of where the possible differences in this activity come from.

Although the research was conducted on a relatively small group (young people, who were still students<sup>1</sup>), and as such does not give grounds to generalize the results, it does not mean they are not very important. Research conducted among students helps to identify certain trends in changes within the sphere of activities among men and women.

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<sup>1</sup> Among students there were students of political science, which could suggest their greater interest in political activity, but analyses carried out for the purposes of another article indicated that differences related to the field of study in the subsequent years of research tend to fade away (see also: Miluska, Pająk-Patkowska, 2014).

Young people, especially well-educated, are the first carriers of specific attitudes that will probably appear in future society (Koseła, 1999; Rogowska, 2000; Szafranec, 2011; Szafranec, 2012). Krystyna Szafranec emphasizes that „young people are a very good point of reference for observing what is happening to the whole society. [...] It is a barometer of changes and social moods” (Szafranec, 2011, p. 11). By examining it, one can try to answer the question: „what will be the shape of Polish social life in the future and what role will young people play in it” (Zalewska, Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, 2011, p. 238).

It is worth emphasizing that keeping track of conventional political activities and their evolution is also vital from the perspective of democratic system stability and legitimacy. Researchers working on this subject cannot agree which degree of political activity (whether low or high and respectively how low or how high) poses a threat to stability of democracy. However, citizens' participation in elections is identified as a crucial factor allowing to consider political elites and the democratic system itself legitimate (Mider, 2013; Dzwonczyk, 2011; Pająk-Patkowska, 2015). Joanna Dzwonczyk points to an important issues connected with political activities. According to her opinion, besides obvious relation between participation in elections and legitimacy of the political system, it is also vital to note that a high turnout constitutes „a some kind of a mechanism which safeguards against such detrimental factors as over-participation and over-parliamentarisation. The first one refers to appropriation of public space by political parties, while the latter makes parliament the only place of political debate, which can be negatively perceived by the society if it becomes unrepresentative due to low turnout” (Dzwonczyk, 2011). This may be particularly dangerous for young democracies, among which the Polish democracy should still be counted, because it undermines trust in democracy and the solutions which it advocates.

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### Aktywność polityczna kobiet i mężczyzn – psychospołeczne uwarunkowania konwencjonalnej działalności politycznej

#### Summary

Aktywność polityczna jest jednym z rodzajów aktywności społecznej człowieka. Obserwacje i badania wskazują na znaczenie płci jako czynnika decydującego o jej poziomie i formach. Poza płcią biologiczną kształtującą role społeczne kobiet i mężczyzn, dodatkowymi czynnikami potencjalnie odpowiedzialnymi za ich aktywność, są elementy systemu przekonań, czyli uznawane wartości polityczne, przekonanie o wartości aktywności politycznej, poziom zadowolenia z demokracji oraz indywidualizm i kolektywizm traktowany jako element mentalności jednostki. Wpływ tych czynników na poziom konwencjonalnej aktywności politycznej kobiet i mężczyzn jest przedmiotem badań kwestionariuszowych przeprowadzonych w roku 2004, 2010 i 2014 na grupie 1048 studentów polskich uczelni. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują na powolne zanikanie różnic w poziomie aktywności politycznej badanych kobiet i mężczyzn oraz zróżnicowane jej uwarunkowania w obu grupach i w zależności od formy aktywności. Najważniejszymi predyktorami aktywności politycznej kobiet są: przekonanie o wadze aktywności w demokracji oraz (nie)zadowolenie z jej funkcjonowania.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Słowa kluczowe: aktywność polityczna, płeć, działalność polityczna kobiet, młodzież, teoria roli społecznej





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## Implementation of the Quota System in the Regional Assembly Elections: the Analysis of Electoral Results in the Context of Women's Representation on Electoral Lists

**Abstract:** The following article concerns selected aspects of the implementation of the quota system in elections to the regional assemblies (*Sejmik wojewódzki*) in Poland. This comparative analysis concerns two elections: in 2010 (before the quota system was introduced) and in 2014 (after its introduction). The key questions the authors would like to address involve the number of women represented on the electoral lists in 2010 and 2014 respectively, and the number of mandates in regional assemblies awarded to women before and after the quota system was introduced, as well as the relationship between the position on the electoral list and mandates awarded to female candidates. The authors also focus on the personnel policies of political parties. Out of all regional elections, the regional assembly elections were characterized by the highest level of party dependency.

Introducing the quota system resulted in an increase in the number of women represented on electoral lists, yet it did not help increase the number of mandates awarded to female candidates. One of the reasons for this situation was the strategy adopted when the positions on the electoral lists were awarded by the parties with the largest political support. The representation of women on the upper positions of the electoral lists is smaller than the quota of female representatives imposed by the electoral law, and the larger number of women on the positions further below on the electoral lists translates into smaller chances of these candidates gaining a mandate. The source data for this research analysis comes from the National Electoral Commission.

**Key words:** women, quota system, elections, regional assemblies, political parties

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Employing institutionalized methods to support women's participation in politics depends on the type of electoral system. In proportional representation, such a method is constituted by establishing a particular quota or parity to represent both genders when placing candidates on electoral lists. The quota mechanism consists of indicating the minimum percentage of male and female candidates represented on the lists. Parity is a specific type of quota, where half the available slots on a list are allocated to each gender (Musiał-Karg, 2014, p. 68). An additional mechanism conducive to equal opportunities is the zipper system, which entails alternate placing of men and women on electoral lists. To guarantee a quota or parity on electoral lists is one of the postulates proposed by organizations working for women's equality, as well as some political parties. Not only are guarantees of places on electoral lists suggested, but also that political parties should introduce certain rules concerning occupying positions in party structures, assuring a quota or gender parity for women in their midst. These might constitute an

obligatory statutory requirement which all political entities must obey; they might also be voluntary, internal regulations used by political parties when choosing their candidates. Quotas might be used in relation to candidates, as well as elected party members (Wawrowski, 2007, pp. 592–593).

In Western European parties, introducing parities and specific policies linked to equal opportunities for women has correlated with a growing presence of women in political parties and their representation in parliaments, evident since the 1970s. An exceptionally high increase in female parliamentary representatives has been observed in left-wing parties (Caul, 1999, p. 85), which were among the first to introduce quota systems. The first political party to do so was the Socialist People's Party in Denmark, which in 1977 established a quota of 40% (Wawrowski, 2007, p. 609). Similarly, left-wing parties were the first political organizations in Poland to introduce minimum quotas for the participation of candidates of a particular gender on electoral lists, as an internal regulation embraced by the parties themselves (Sznajder, 2009, pp. 62–63). This decision resulted from the pressure of the organizations working for women's equality. In the Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD), according to a 2001 resolution, the representation of a particular gender could not be smaller than 30%. A similar approach was adopted by other left-wing parties. However, introducing internal regulations did not necessarily mean that the political parties would abide by them in practice.

Already in the early 1990s, ideas and initiatives concerning legal solutions which would support equal opportunities for men and women in elections appeared in Poland. There were two means by which launching a universally applicable mechanism for gender equality in elections was attempted. One approach posited introducing a quota mechanism as part of the legal act on the equality of men and women, the other – as part of the electoral system. In 1996, a bill on the equality of men and women was drafted by the Women's Parliamentary Group, which, once amended, was again motioned in 1997, yet was not considered by the parliament due to the fact that the Sejm's term had ended. Subsequent bills voted on in 1998 and 2002 were rejected. With regards to the possibility of changing the electoral system, a bill was proposed in 2001 by the MP and Deputy Marshal of the Sejm, Olga Krzyżanowska, on behalf of the Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności*) (Urbaniak, 2011, p. 70). The motion postulated a minimum quota of 30% for each gender on the candidate electoral list. However, this bill was also rejected (Fuszara, 2011, pp. 121–122). In 2009, the Women's Congress (*Kongres Kobiet*) put forward a citizens' initiative bill aimed at increasing the number of women on electoral lists, so that their number would be equal to that of male candidates. This bill was put before parliament in 2010, and subsequent drafts resulted in the proposed parity being reduced to 35%. The legislative act amending the electoral system was adopted in January 2011, and the law concerning quotas was maintained in the Election Law of August 2011, which regulates all types of elections, including those for the decision-making bodies of regions, counties and towns.

Introducing quotas in regional elections necessarily led to an increased percentage of women appearing on electoral lists across the country, but in most constituencies, as in previous elections, it was still less than what the introduced law detailed. The size of constituencies suggested that the percentage of female candidates on electoral lists would be higher than the quota demanded by the legislation.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that the number of mandates awarded to women would increase. Research shows that, in the situation of ranked voting where the elector may indicate one candidate on a chosen list, an increase in the percentage of representation of a particular group in an electoral list does not have to translate into an increased number of mandates awarded to this group (Norris, 2004, pp. 187–198; Flis, 2012, pp. 80–101). A discussion on equal opportunities for women and men in elections does not only concern the issue of quotas, but also of the placement of candidates on electoral lists. As Małgorzata Fuszara has noted, to provide an elector with the appropriate conditions for making a choice between a man and a woman, “both male and female candidates should be placed proportionally on the electoral lists, and both these groups should be given access to at least similar placing” (Fuszara, 2007, p. 682). The analysis of the results of past elections in Poland, both parliamentary and regional, shows that candidates placed in the initial positions on electoral lists are privileged when it comes to the chances of winning a mandate (Siemieńska, 2005, p. 61; Flis, Gendźwiłł, pp. 7–8, 17–18). For instance, in regional assembly elections, the leaders of the lists are awarded circa 50% of mandates (Cichosz, Starzyk, 2017, p. 317). On the other hand, Niżyńska’s conclusions are more cautious, as, in her analysis of the electoral results of women in regional assembly elections in 2010, she linked electoral chances to the ideological profile of the political parties on whose lists these candidates were placed, thus suggesting that female candidates’ results were more correlated to the political preferences of their electors and their open-mindedness towards female candidates than to their placing on the list (Niżyńska, 2011, pp. 8–9).

The purpose of this research was to establish the consequences of introducing quotas in the electoral law in Polish regional elections. Our attention was focused on several selected issues: the number of women on electoral lists, the number of council mandates won by women, as well as the position of women on electoral lists and the connection between their electoral chances and their electoral list placing. The analysis encompassed two regional assembly elections: 2010 and 2014. The former took place before the amendments to the electoral law were made, while the latter was conducted in accordance with the regulations concerning quotas launched in 2011. This choice of data allowed us to observe changes in personnel policies introduced in political parties when recruiting candidates for electoral lists, as well as fluctuations in the number of women represented in regional assemblies before and after the quota system was implemented.

We would like to posit a hypothesis that the introduction of the quota system into, for instance, the regional assembly (*Sejmik wojewódzki*) elections in Poland resulted in a larger number and percentage of women on electoral lists in 2014 in comparison to elections in 2010, yet it did not translate into greater involvement of women in regional assemblies, which retained their shape after both elections. The reasons behind this preservation of the *status quo* is the practice of placing female candidates in lower positions on electoral lists, especially by the political entities which are the key ones in regional assembly elections, i.e. the largest political parties, Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska RP*, PO), Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS), the Polish People’s Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, PSL) and the Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD).<sup>1</sup> Among other things, this means that,

<sup>1</sup> In the analyzed elections, SLD registered lists in 2010 as the electoral committee of the political party, and as a coalition with smaller social entities in 2014, named *SLD–Lewica Razem* (SLD–LR).

of all candidates placed on first positions on electoral lists, women are represented to a smaller extent than their percentage of all candidates on the list would entail. At the same time, the over-representation of women among the candidates located in the lowest positions on the lists (from 6<sup>th</sup> position to the last one) can be observed (H1). Some regional differences concerning the representation of women in electoral lists and in the regional assemblies may be also noted. Particular electoral committees have different personnel policies when creating their electoral lists, which means that we can identify regions which are more or less open to women's electoral participation (H2). The scope of this research is as follows:

- the change in the number of women participating in both elections examined here, and their percentage among all candidates, allowing for varieties in particular regions
  - in this part of the analysis, all electoral committees participating in both elections (48 in 2010 and 53 in 2014) were included in this research;
- the placement of women on electoral lists of the electoral committees participating in the allocation of mandates divided into regions – this analysis concerned, above all, the four largest parties in the country (PO, PiS, PSL, SLD – in 2014 as *SLD–Lewica Razem* [SLD–Left Together] committee), as well as entities of a regional character, which achieved the election threshold: in four regions in 2010 (Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Świętokrzyskie) and in 2014 in six regions (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie, Śląskie, Wielkopolskie and Zachodniopomorskie<sup>2</sup>); in total, the research entailed 381 regional lists in 2010 and 373 regional lists in 2014;
- the change in representation of women in regional assemblies in 2010 and in 2014, and their positions on the lists in which they won their mandates. When it comes to the analysis of their placing on electoral lists, the list placements were divided into three groups:
  - I – first positions, the most important ones, leaders of the list;
  - II – positions 2 to 5, within the limits of the minimum number of mandates awarded to a given constituency;
  - III – the rest of the positions, from position 6 to the end, where most often a very small number of candidates have a chance to win a mandate.

The analysis was performed on the basis of data made available on the websites of the National Electoral Commission.

### **The number of female candidates and their placement on electoral lists**

A smaller number of candidates participated in the regional assembly elections in 2014 in comparison to the elections of 2010 (see Table 1). Although in 2014 the number

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Yet, due to the fact that in both cases SLD was the dominant entity, it is justified to compare the results of both committees in these elections.

<sup>2</sup> In 2014, these included the following electoral committees: Non-Party Regional Councillors (*KWW Bezpartyjni Samorządowcy*) (Dolnośląskie), Better Lubuskie (*KWW Lepsze Lubuskie*) (Lubuskie), German Minority (*KW Mniejszość Niemiecka*) (Opolskie), Autonomous Silesia Movement (*KW Ruch Autonomii Śląska*) (Śląskie), Wielkopolska Now (*KWW Teraz Wielkopolska*) (Wielkopolskie), Non-Party Zachodniopomorskie (*Bezpartyjni KWW Pomorze Zachodnie*) (Zachodniopomorskie).

of mandates in regional assemblies decreased (555) in contrast to the 2010 elections (561 mandates), the number of electoral committees participating in the elections increased: from 48 in 2010 to 53 in 2014. Therefore, the smaller number of candidates in 2014 should be linked to the inability of small political entities to put forward electoral lists in all constituencies and to incomplete lists being put forward.

Despite the fact that the number of candidates decreased, the number of women exercising their right to run for office increased by over a thousand (from 2,650 female candidates in 2010 to 3,961 in 2014; see Table 1), and their percentage among all candidates was almost 45% (44.51%, to be exact). A list with over 40% of women was put forward in each of the regions, including those where in 2010 there were fewer than 20% female candidates in regional assembly elections (Podlaskie).

Table 1

#### Women on electoral lists in regional assembly elections, 2010–2014

Region	Number of candidates				% of women on the electoral lists		
	total		women		2010	2014	difference
	2010	2014	2010	2014			
Wielkopolskie	540	700	162	316	30.00	45.14	+15.14
Kujawsko-Pomorskie	616	541	188	247	30.52	45.66	+15.14
Małopolskie	669	611	184	263	27.50	43.04	+15.54
Dolnośląskie	549	500	156	217	28.42	43.40	+14.98
Lubelskie	634	510	179	225	28.23	44.12	+15.89
Lubuskie	401	498	115	223	28.68	44.78	+16.10
Łódzkie	585	490	186	220	31.79	44.90	+13.11
Mazowieckie	975	997	334	446	34.26	44.73	+10.47
Opolskie	337	459	95	203	28.19	44.23	+16.04
Podlaskie	359	444	68	201	18.94	45.27	+26.33
Pomorskie	526	431	174	180	33.08	41.76	+8.68
Śląskie	1,047	1,077	311	482	29.70	44.75	+15.05
Podkarpackie	459	475	124	210	27.02	44.21	17.19
Świętokrzyskie	473	377	145	170	30.66	45.09	+14.43
Warmińsko-Mazurskie	357	376	108	177	30.25	47.07	+16.82
Zachodniopomorskie	377	412	121	181	32.10	43.93	+11.83
Poland	8,904	8,898	2,650	3,961	29.76	44.51	+14.75

Source: Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

The most significant increase in the percentage of women on electoral lists was noted in the following regions: Lubuskie, Opolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie (record-breaking) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie. The least noticeable rise in female candidacy occurred in those regions which had already a relatively high quota (over 30%) of women on their lists in 2010, that is Pomorskie and Mazowieckie.

This data involves all registered electoral committees and electoral lists put forward by them. This also means that those electoral bodies that had little chance in the competition, as they did not, for instance, put forward electoral lists in all constituencies, were also included in the research. As the study concerning regional assembly elections in 1998–2014 shows (Alberski, Cichosz, 2017), the nationwide parliamentary parties are most likely to win mandates. It is therefore valid to narrow down the analysis to focus on

such parties and the effects of their personnel policies, including those regional political entities which achieved the election threshold.

Table 2

**Women's positions on the lists of electoral committees participating in the division of mandates by region**

Region	Number of women					
	I position		II–V positions		other positions	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
Wielkopolskie	1	7	24	44	56	120
Kujawsko-Pomorskie	4	7	33	36	30	79
Małopolskie	5	5	30	30	47	93
Dolnośląskie	5	5	31	44	43	101
Lubelskie	3	4	24	33	40	57
Lubuskie	3	2	15	39	44	90
Łódzkie	4	3	34	33	45	77
Mazowieckie	9	8	42	49	73	117
Opolskie	4	3	25	32	38	88
Podlaskie	1	2	15	20	28	73
Pomorskie	1	1	22	27	46	82
Śląskie	4	5	36	62	67	121
Podkarpackie	3	5	16	23	35	84
Świętokrzyskie	1	2	21	14	69	91
Warmińsko-Mazurskie	4	4	19	39	29	70
Zachodniopomorskie	2	6	24	42	35	82
Poland	54	69	411	567	725	1,425

**Source:** Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

The data included in Table 2 indicates that women are definitely under-represented in the head positions of electoral lists, that is, those places that offer the biggest chance of winning a mandate. In 2014, women were positioned in the first places in 69 cases, that is 18.5% of lists included in this part of the analysis. It should be added, however, that this number constitutes a rise in comparison to 2010, when analogically 54 candidates were positioned first, constituting 14.14% of electoral lists of political entities participating in the division of mandates. When reviewing regional differences in this respect, one might notice the case of Pomorskie, where only one out of 20 electoral lists was headed by a female candidate. This is a repetition of the situation in 2010; it should be stressed, however, that this was the same person, a female candidate from SLD. Women were awarded first places on the lists more often in 2014 than in 2010, especially in Kujawsko-Pomorskie (3 female candidates more, that is, a rise from 16.7% to 29.2%), Zachodniopomorskie (4 female candidates more, a rise from 10% to 23.3%) and Wielkopolskie (6 female candidates more, a rise from 4% to 23.3%). Yet, it should be remembered that in the two latter regions, in 2014 a larger number of electoral committees was taken into account.

As has been mentioned, electoral competition in regional assembly elections is dominated by the largest nationwide political parties, and out of all regional elections it most resembles those to the national parliament. This similarity has been observed since 1989, and even though the structure and description of the regional political markets is shifting,

this trend seems to be relatively stable. Therefore, it is worthwhile examining how the largest national political parties implement the quota system in regional assembly elections.

Table 3

**The position of women on electoral lists of the main political parties**

Political party	Number of women (total)				Number of women on electoral list					
	2010		2014		I position		II–V positions		other positions	
	number	%	number	%	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
PO RP	291	26.17	486	43.94	16	25	108	130	167	331
PiS	268	24.43	470	42.38	10	12	83	101	175	357
PSL	258	23.20	470	42.77	14	10	93	132	151	328
SLD	333	32.21	486	44.30	14	18	114	149	205	319

Source: Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

On the basis of the data presented in Table 3, one may conclude that the electoral lists of committees which did not participate in mandate division are more open to female candidates than the lists of four largest political parties. Among the latter, only the SLD–LR lists in 2014 came close to the national average in terms of the percentage of women on electoral lists. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the participation of women among party candidates significantly rose (by 10–20%) in 2014 in comparison to 2010.

The largest number of leading positions on electoral lists (25 of them, which is 29.41% of all first places) was given to female candidates by PO, which is 9 more than in 2010. Secondly, SLD was represented by 18 women (21.17%) placed first on the lists. When it comes to PiS, in comparison to 2010 the number of female candidates placed first on the lists rose by only 2 (in 2010: 10 female candidates, in 2014: 12 female candidates – 14.11%). PSL represents a special case, as in contrast to 2010 this party reduced the number of first places allocated to female candidates in 2014 (10 places, 11.76%).

In the next section of the electoral list indicated above (places from 2 to 5), the number of female candidates increased, although a difference between the percentage of places allocated to women on electoral lists and the percentage of women in this section is still noticeable. In this case, PO was represented by women in 38.24% of places (130 places), while PiS in 29.70% of places (101 places), PSL – 38.82% (132 places), and SLD – 43.82% (149 places). Yet, women were over-represented in section III of electoral lists, that is, from positions 6 to the ends of the lists. In the lists of PO they constituted 48% of all candidates, in PiS – 52.19%, PSL – 48.66%, and SLD–LR – 47.32%.

Yet, when contrasting this data with that of 2010, one should note a change in the personnel strategy of political parties. Although this does not concern the percentage of leading positions allocated to female candidates, which in 2010 was on average 15.51% for those four parties<sup>3</sup> (in 2014 it was 18.08%), there are shifts in proportions between the percentage of female representation in places 2–5 and later positions. In 2010, in the section of positions from 2 to 5, the percentage of female candidates was on average 28.59%,<sup>4</sup> and in

<sup>3</sup> The data for particular parties is as follows: PO – 18.39%, PiS – 11.49%, PSL – 16.09%, SLD – 16.09%.

<sup>4</sup> The data for particular parties is as follows: PO – 31.03%, PiS – 23.85%; PSL – 26.72%, SLD – 32.76%.

the section of positions from 6 to the end of the list, it was 26.9%.<sup>5</sup> In 2014, these average percentages were, respectively, 37.64% (section II) and 49.04% (section III). This means that the quota system was implemented in the construction of electoral lists in regional assembly elections by searching for female candidates, only to allocate them those positions on the lists which offered little chance of winning a mandate.

### Female candidates' electoral results

The number of female candidates who won mandates as councilors in regional assemblies was similar in both elections, as in this group there were only two women more in 2014 than in 2010. A similar situation is also visible in the percentage of women participating in councils, that being 21.8% in 2010 and 23.1% in 2014. This obviously constitutes less than the 35% required by law, and significantly less than the number of female candidates put forward on the electoral lists. The difference between the percentage of women on the electoral lists and in councils increased significantly, which results from the larger percentage of women on electoral lists in 2014 (by 14.75%) with little simultaneous increase in their electoral effectiveness, that being at 1.3% (see Table 4).

Table 4

#### Candidates elected to regional assemblies in 2010–2014, divided into men and women

Region	Number				% of women		
	women		men		2010	2014	difference
	2010	2014	2010	2014			
Wielkopolskie	6	10	33	29	15.4	25.6	+10.2
Kujawsko-Pomorskie	8	6	25	27	24.2	18.2	-6.0
Małopolskie	8	8	31	31	20.5	20.5	0.0
Dolnośląskie	10	8	26	28	27.8	22.2	-5.6
Lubelskie	6	6	27	27	18.2	18.2	0.0
Lubuskie	6	5	24	25	20.0	16.7	-3.3
Łódzkie	13	11	23	22	36.1	33.3	-2.8
Mazowieckie	17	21	34	30	33.3	41.2	+7.9
Opolskie	5	5	25	25	16.7	16.7	0.0
Podlaskie	2	5	28	25	6.7	16.7	+10.0
Pomorskie	9	5	24	28	27.3	15.2	-12.1
Śląskie	13	13	35	32	27.1	28.9	+1.8
Podkarpackie	4	7	29	26	12.1	21.2	+9.1
Świętokrzyskie	3	3	27	27	10.0	10.0	0.0
Warmińsko-Mazurskie	7	8	23	22	23.3	26.7	+3.4
Zachodniopomorskie	9	7	21	23	30.0	23.3	-6.7
<b>Poland</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>+1.3</b>

Source: Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

In 2014, only in Mazowieckie was the number of female councilors larger than 35%. In 2010, this was only the case in Łódzkie. Yet, in 2010, women constituted 30% or more

<sup>5</sup> The data for particular parties is the following: PO – 24.67%, PiS – 26.43%, PSL – 22.30%, SLD – 34.22%.



of the regional assembly in three regions (Łódzkie, Mazowieckie and Zachodniopomorskie), while in 2014 only in two (Łódzkie and Mazowieckie).

In six regions the presence of women in councils decreased both in number and in percentage terms. These regions include: Dolnośląskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Lubuskie, Łódzkie, Pomorskie and Zachodniopomorskie. In five regions the number of women in councils stayed the same; these were: Lubelskie, Małopolskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Świętokrzyskie. In Śląskie, the percentage of women in regional representation rose, which, nevertheless, resulted from the general decrease in the number of councilors. The number of women in regional assemblies increased in five regions: Mazowieckie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Wielkopolskie.

In three regions – Wielkopolskie, Podlaskie and Podkarpackie – the increase in the number of women elected to regional assemblies in 2014 was the largest, yet that number was the smallest there in 2010. In the 2010 elections, in 16 regions, the number of women participating in these elections was above average in half of them, and below in the other half. Yet, in 2014, in six regions the percentage of female participation was higher than the average. The rise in the number of female candidates on the lists did not directly translate into an increase in the number and percentage of women in councils.

However, it should be noted that there are constituencies where female candidates were exceptionally effective. For instance, in constituency no. 7 in Mazowieckie, 7 out of 10 mandates were awarded to women.

When it comes to mandates won from particular positions on electoral lists, in the national perspective, the results of the 2010 and 2014 elections are similar. Female candidates who were allocated first five positions on the lists won the largest number of mandates.

Table 5

#### Positions on electoral lists and mandates won by women, divided into regions

Region	Number of mandates won by women:					
	I position		II–V positions		other positions	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
Wielkopolskie	1	5	4	4	1	1
Kujawsko-Pomorskie	3	2	5	3	0	1
Małopolskie	2	4	5	3	1	1
Dolnośląskie	3	4	7	4	0	0
Lubelskie	2	1	4	5	0	0
Lubuskie	2	1	3	3	1	1
Łódzkie	4	3	8	6	1	2
Mazowieckie	6	7	8	12	3	2
Opolskie	3	3	2	2	0	0
Podlaskie	1	1	1	3	0	1
Pomorskie	1	0	6	4	2	1
Śląskie	4	4	7	8	2	1
Podkarpackie	3	4	0	3	1	0
Świętokrzyskie	0	0	2	2	1	1
Warmińsko-Mazurskie	4	4	2	4	1	0
Zachodniopomorskie	1	3	7	4	1	0
Poland	40	46	71	70	15	12

Source: Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

The number and percentage of mandates awarded to female candidates in first positions on electoral lists in the general number of mandates won by women rose from 31.7% to 35.9%. When it comes to positions from 2 to 5, it fell from 56.3% to 54.7%. The mandates won from positions 1 to 5 constituted 88.1% of all mandates won by women in 2010 and 90.6% in 2014. In turn, 11.9% of mandates won from lower places on electoral lists were gained by female candidates in 2010, and 9.4% in 2014. Obviously, the crucial thing is the number of mandates awarded to a particular electoral committee in each constituency. For instance, in the case of winning two mandates, at least one will be won by a candidate from a position lower down than no. 1.

Only in Świętokrzyskie did none of the female candidates placed first on the list win the mandate, neither in 2010 nor in 2014. However, this region belongs to one of those regions where women were awarded the smallest number of first places on lists in the electoral committees which participated in mandate division. Similarly, the only female candidate positioned first on the electoral list of SLD in Pomorskie in 2014 did not win the mandate. In this case, the party did not achieve the election threshold.

The importance of the leading position on electoral lists is evident when one analyzes the percentage of female candidates placed first on the lists, placed from 2 to 5, and placed further away from the top, taking into account the committees of political parties with the largest support, and those local committees which participated in the mandate share. Among women in leading places in 2010, 74.1% won mandates, and 66.7% in 2014. Among women located in places 2–5, 17.3% won mandates in 2010, and 12.3% in 2014. Female candidates located further down the list won 2.1% of mandates in 2010, and only 0.8% in 2014. When divided into regions, all women who were located as the first candidates on the lists in 2010 won mandates in Łódzkie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Pomorskie, Śląskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Wielkopolskie. In 2014, only in Łódzkie, Opolskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie regions did all female candidates from first places win mandates.

Table 6

**Positions on electoral lists and mandates won by female candidates,  
divided by electoral committees**

Electoral committee	Number of mandates won by women:					
	I position		II–V positions		other positions	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
PO RP	15	23	42	34	10	5
PiS	10	11	15	19	3	2
PSL	5	9	6	16	2	5
SLD	10	1	7	–	–	–
Others	–	2	1	1	–	–
Total	40	46	71	70	15	12

Source: Own work based on National Electoral Commission data.

Regarding the electoral committees of the main political parties, the largest number of women were elected from the list of PO – 67 and 62 respectively in each election. This constituted about a half of all mandates won by female candidates, although the number of women representing PO in regional assemblies decreased. In terms of the

number of mandates won by women, PiS comes second, as the number of its female representatives in regional assemblies rose from 28 to 32. The most significant increase is observed in PSL. In 2010, 13 women represented this party in regional assemblies, while in 2014 there were 30 women from PSL. In the case of the three political parties with the largest support, the number of women elected from the first positions on electoral lists increased; in terms of numbers, the most significant increase occurred in PO, in terms of percentage – in PSL. Female candidates from places further down the list won mandates only in the committees with the largest support. It should also be noted that the number of female representatives of political parties in regional assemblies stayed the same and amounted to 125 councilors. Regarding the two parties with the largest support (PO and PiS), rarely did a female candidate from the first place fail to gain a mandate. In the 2010 elections, PO had only one such case among 16 female candidates, while in 2014 – two such cases among 25 female candidates. All female candidates positioned as the first on PiS's electoral lists in 2010 won mandates, while in 2014 among the twelve female candidates from the first place on PiS's list, only one failed to win the mandate.

### Conclusions

In the regional assembly elections in 2014, the number of women represented on the lists of electoral committees significantly increased in comparison to the 2010 elections, rising by 49.47%. The legally introduced quota was exceeded, as women constituted about 45% of all candidates. A larger than average number of female candidates who won mandates may be found in two regions: Łódzkie and Mazowieckie. In both elections, women constituted over one-third of elected councilors. Only in Mazowieckie was the percentage of female candidates higher than legally required quota in the 2014 elections. The region which was the least “female candidate-friendly” was Świętokrzyskie, in which both before and after the introduction of the quotas, only one in ten mandates was awarded to a woman.

Although electoral committees did implement the quota law, they did not introduce it in terms of the place allocation on electoral lists, particularly when it comes to first positions. Still over 80% of leading places on electoral lists were reserved for male candidates. It may be deduced that since 2010 the strategy of the largest political parties in terms of constructing their electoral lists has changed. This does not concern women in the leading places on lists, which increased, albeit insignificantly, but the proportion of female candidates in places from 2 to 5, or 6 and lower. While in 2010 the percentage of women in places 2–5 and from 6 to the end was larger, in 2014 these proportions were reversed. Such a situation may be explained by the smaller political clout of women in comparison to men (Cwalina, Falkowski, 2005, p. 219), but also by the smaller overall number of women engaged in party politics. In order to fulfil the quota requirement, political parties were forced to look for female candidates, thus reaching deep into their support (e.g. family members, friends, etc.) to find persons previously unengaged with politics and without electoral potential. A similar mechanism has been observed regarding parliamentary elections (Flis, 2012, p. 94). In this way, the percentage of women on

electoral lists increased, but the situation did not offer a fair chance to female candidates to win mandates.

The number of female representatives of the largest parties in regional assemblies did not change. Among women elected to regional assemblies, about one-third were candidates located on first positions on electoral lists. It was much easier to gain mandates from leading places than from further down the electoral lists. In 2014 elections, among all female candidates positioned first on the lists of electoral committees which participated in mandate division, two-thirds won mandates, while in the same elections, among female candidates positioned below place 5, only one candidate in a hundred was awarded a mandate.

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**Wdrażanie systemu kwot w wyborach do Zgromadzenia Regionalnego:  
analiza wyników wyborów w kontekście reprezentacji kobiet na listach wyborczych**

**Streszczenie**

Artykuł dotyczy wybranych aspektów realizacji systemu kwotowego w wyborach do sejmików województw w Polsce. Analizą porównawczą objęte zostały dwie elekcje w 2010 (przed wprowadzeniem systemu kwotowego) i 2014 r. (po wprowadzeniu). Zasadnicze pytania, na które autorzy poszukują odpowiedzi dotyczą liczby kobiet reprezentowanych na listach wyborczych komitetów wyborczych w 2010 r. i 2014 r. oraz liczby mandatów w sejmikach województw zdobytych przez kobiety przed i po wprowadzeniu systemu kwotowego, a także zależności między miejscem na liście a uzyskaniem mandatu przez kobiety. Zwrócono uwagę na strategię kadrowe partii politycznych. Wybory do sejmików województw charakteryzowały się największym stopniem upartyjnienia wśród wszystkich rodzajów wyborów samorządowych.

Wprowadzenie systemu kwotowego spowodowało wzrost liczby kobiet na listach wyborczych, ale nie wpłynęło na wzrost liczby mandatów uzyskiwanych przez kobiety. Jedną z przyczyn takiej sytuacji mogły być strategię obsadzania miejsc na listach wyborczych przez największe pod względem uzyskanego poparcia partie polityczne. Mniejsza, od przyjętej w prawie wyborczym kwoty, reprezentacja kobiet na pierwszych miejscach list wyborczych i nadreprezentacja kobiet na miejscach dalszych, dających mniejsze szanse na zdobycie mandatu. Bazę źródłową wykorzystaną w trakcie badań stanowiły dane udostępniane przez Państwową Komisję Wyborczą.

**Słowa kluczowe:** kobiety, system kwotowy, wybory, sejmiki województw, partie polityczne



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## Social Network Analysis as a research method in political science. An attempt to use it in coalition research<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** The main aim of the article is to argue the need for better focus of researchers conducting their research in the field of political science on some digital analytical tools used in social network analyses. Additional objectives are to outline the historical context of SNA's development in this discipline, as well as to present possible fields of exploration and using of this method, both in basic and in applied research. Particular attention was paid to the potential of SNA in the study of the processes of cabinet coalitions formation, as well as to the important limitations of this method. The article was constructed as a methodological essay. We inevitably accept – because of its focus on network analyses – a structural perspective on social reality. We verify the hypothesis that the greatest potential of SNA could be currently to create a visualization of social relations based on large data sets, but at the same time the most important barrier to the development of the method are limitations in the access to these data, which could be used as a basic analytical material for visualization of the network and generalization of the statistical conclusions. Presenting some political science research in Poland and around the world, in which SNA tools are used, we used the historical as well as the case study method.

**Key words:** Social Network Analysis; SNA; networks; research methods; coalition

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### Introduction

In the discipline of political science, the Social Network Analysis (SNA) method was not received enthusiastically. While psychologists, sociologists and economists have been actively trying to develop SNA tools and apply them to their research (Festinger, 1949; Cartwright, Harary, 1956; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952, 1957; Katz, Lazarsfeld, 1955), there are no such large-scale trials made by political scientists. Until now, in many academic textbooks devoted to research methodology in the political science discipline, there is no references to SNA as a potentially prospective and useful method of analyzing political phenomena – this applies to both Polish and English-language works (see: Johnson, Reynolds, Mycoff, 2010; Marsh, Stoker, 2006; Krauz-Mozer, Ścigaj, 2013; Antoszewski et al., 2009; Bäcker et al., 2016).

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At the same time, within the most important world congresses and in the largest international scientific association gathering political scientists, there are active groups of researchers who share the results of their analyzes, which were carried out with the assistance of SNA tools. In 2017, a ground-breaking methodological publication – *The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks* (2017) – was published. It was devoted exclusively to this method and its application in political science. In the scientific journals, articles presenting the empirical results of research conducted in the network perspective are also increasingly published (Albert, Barabási 2002; Bian et al., 2014; Hoppe, Reinelt, 2010). In the effect, the SNA method itself, as well as its potential applications in the discipline of political sciences, must become the subject of a deeper theoretical and methodological reflection.

### **Inclusion of SNA tools into the political science research – historical perspective**

It is not purposive to present – even in a sketchy form – the history of SNA development as a research method, especially since numerous considerations on this topic are included in the most important methodological textbooks that are devoted to it (Prell, 2012, pp. 19–59; Scott, 2013, pp. 11–40; Robins, 2015, pp. 17–38; Wasserman, Faust, 1998, pp. 3–21). As in the case of many research methods, their authors do not agree, where to find sources and points of breakthrough in the application of this method (Barabási, 2002, pp. 2–3). Undoubtedly, it is worth emphasizing that SNA developed autonomously in many disciplines, which is probably a consequence of a wide spectrum of its potential applications – networks can be analyzed in a biological, technological or social perspective, that is wherever dependencies can be found between the elements that make up a specific structure (see: Watts, Strogatz, 1998; Grivan, Newman, 2002; Granovetter, 1985; Salomon, Sagasti, Sachs-Jeantet, 1994).

Most often, the network perspective is associated with the achievements of political psychologists such as Paul Lazarsfeld or Bernard Berelson (see: Knoke, 1994, pp. 1–29). The work of Robert Putnam, who has highlighted and demonstrated the importance of the informal network of contacts between people involved in specific social relations (Putnam, 2008, pp. 158–195), can certainly be regarded as a kind of breakthrough. However, it is difficult to treat the efforts of individual researchers in particular sub-disciplines as a manifestation of some greater interest in the SNA method itself. Especially that in the case of the cited authors, we can talk at most about adopting a specific network perspective using other research methods (mainly statistical analyzes).

Scott D. McClurg and Joseph K. Young draw attention to the possible causes of exclusion of the political science from the relational return in broadly understood social sciences. In their opinion, important paradigms, within which researches were developed, such as behavioralism, theory of rational choice or neo-institutionalism were based on the assumption that the individual is responsible for making decisions, therefore the analysis of motivations that guide people should be made on a single actor level, and then possibly aggregated on a macro-scale. This assumption was in clear contradiction with the foundations of network research. In this perspective, it is presumed that social relations and structures



are important predictors allowing to explain the most important phenomena of social life (McClurg, Young, 2001, pp. 39; Banaś, Zieliński, 2015, p. 33).

David Lazer lists three areas in which SNA has developed most dynamically in the United States. Firstly, the method proved to be useful in research on innovations in the field of public activities (network management, communication improvement, new methods of coordination). Secondly, it was used to explain the impact of broader social structures (family, peer group, employee group) on electoral decisions of individuals. Thirdly, it was useful in research on the influence of the individual's position in a given network (structure) on the ability of the authority and control (Lazer, 2011, p. 62; Banaś, Zieliński, 2015, pp. 33–34).

### **Institutionalization of SNA in political sciences**

The increasing interest of political scientists in the SNA tools was accompanied by a peculiar institutionalization of research activity. Currently, the most important scientific conference bringing together SNA researchers from around the world is organized annually by the scientific association “International Network for Social Network Analysis” (INSNA), Sunbelt Conference. The association was founded in 1977 in Delaware (US) and focused on researchers seeking to develop research in the field of SNA. The founder of INSNA and its first president was Barry Wellman, considered today as one of the most important scholars for SNA (see: Wellman, 1983; Wellman, Berkowitz, 1988). B. Wellman made his scientific career at the University of Toronto, where he founded and professionalized the virtual laboratory NetLab. Despite the fact that during the conferences organized within the Sunbelt Conference series (the last took place in 2018 at the University of Utrecht) numerous results of research in the discipline of political science are presented, the formula of this event is definitely wider – SNA method remains the axis of all presentations and it is used in research of various disciplines or interdisciplinary research.

Unfortunately, SNA researchers are not represented in the scientific committees of the most important world political science organization – the International Political Science Association (IPSA). This issue is sometimes taken up by members of the Concepts and Methods Research Committee (RC01), and attention is paid to SNA at the annual conferences organized by the Political Power Research Committee (RC36).

Political researches with the use of SNA tools seem to be most dynamically pursued by researchers concentrated in two continental associations: the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). In the first of them, the research section of Political Networks operates, whose members organize the Annual Political Networks Conference and Workshops (in 2018 the 11th edition of this event took place).

Within the ECPR, also under the name Political Networks, so-called Standing Group has been established. The Standing Group on Political Networks aims to accelerate the use of perspectives and network tools to better understand the political dynamics characterizing modern societies – from social movements, through individual political behavior to the use of information and communication technologies as a tool for participation

in political life. To achieve this goal, the Standing Group regularly organizes events and discussion panels during the ECPR General Conference, workshop sessions and methodological schools.

### **The most important concepts of SNA applied in political science research**

First of all, one should distinguish thinking about the network structure as a defined metaphor from treating the network as a structured relation between actors, which can be visualized and measured using appropriate algorithms and parameters (Dowding, 1995). The understanding of the network in terms of metaphor can be found in these scientific and popular science papers, in which the existence of links between the consequences of actions of specific entities is indicated. Perhaps in recent years the most popular term that can be perceived as an exemplification of the metaphorisation of the network is the “network society.”

Although SNA grew on the basis of observation of the social world understood as a structured form of relationship and initially this metaphor was used as an argument to develop network research, nowadays one can observe the striving to “materialize” the network in the form of determining their most important characteristics, which could – on one hand form the basis for the description of a single network, and on the other hand be a building material for comparative analyzes of many networks. The most important parameters of the network measurement are presented below with examples from the studies of Zygmunt et al. (2009) on the blogosphere.

Networks are always sets of interconnected nodes. The connection between the nodes is defined as the edge. Visualization of the network is a type of graph (hence we can notice very frequent references to terminology taken from graph theory – see Barabási, 2016, chapter 2). Some experts in the field of SNA indicate that the assumption that the graph represents a social network is a wrong simplification (Robins, 2015, p. 18). In this case, what factors are useful in order to distinguish a social network from a graph? First of all, the social network is made up of social actors, who are attributed to network activity, very often with motivational or strategic background. In the network, the ties between the actors can be positive or negative. Graph, on the other hand, has only nodes and edges. While these types of ties have an impact on the network’s expansive capabilities, this does not have a major impact on the computing capabilities of the network itself. We can still measure various indicators (Everett, Borgatti, 2014, p. 111).

Each network can have its basic descriptive statistics. One of them is density, which is understood as a number of ties in the network as a proportion of the total number of possible ties that are present (Robins, 2015, p. 22–23). In the complete graph, there are all possible edges, then the density = 1. When the graph is empty and has no ties, then the density = 0. It is also worth briefly explaining degree index. In the undirected graph degree of a node is simply the number of edges emitted from it. In the directed graph there are two variations of this index. In-degree is the number of ties directed to a node, while out-degree is the number of ties directed away from it. It is also possible for each node to measure individual average degree per node. In practice, degree also correlates

strongly with other measures, especially the measures of centrality, making it a powerful summary index (Butts, 2008, p. 21).

One of the most important categories in SNA is the already mentioned centrality of the network. It describes the position of the node in the network structure and determines its validity, significance and influence on other nodes in the network. The centrality of a node can be measured in various ways. Bary center is a measure describing a given node, calculated on the basis of all the shortest paths leading to this node from other nodes. In the study of Zygmunt et al. it was assumed that the blogger with the highest bary center index can quickly obtain information gathered in all blogs in the Internet (Zygmunt et al., 2009, p. 675).<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the measure of betweenness centrality (there is definitely no unified and consistent translation of the term in Polish language) is calculated on the basis of the shortest paths between particular nodes that pass through a given node (Brandes, 2001; Newman, 2005). In practice, this means that a node with a high rate of betweenness centrality has a big impact on other nodes of the network because it transmits information. In the study Zygmunt et al. it was assumed that blogs with high values of this measure can be treated as critical points of the network, the removal of which may hamper the flow of information in the network (Zygmunt et al., 2009, p. 676).

It is also worth to highlight that networks themselves may differ from each other and therefore researchers using SNA tools often distinguish binary networks (attention is paid only to the fact that there is a connection between nodes, but this connection is not characterized) and weighted networks (connections can have different weights, reflecting different levels of intensity of interaction). Taking into account the criterion of direct targeting in a network, it is also possible to distinguish directed networks (connections between nodes have a direction designated usually by arrowheads) and undirected networks (links have no direction) (Jarynowski, Boland, 2013, p. 36).

There are also networks in which one can specify hubs, or nodes getting a visibly higher than average number of connections. Such an important type of network is called a complex network – a concept that was developed by Albert-László Barabási and Réka Albert (2002).

The research procedures of SNA depend strongly on a complete database of relations between entities that form a network of mutual relations. Each such relationship should be coded by assigning appropriate values to it, which can then be used for visualization or statistical analysis (Prell, 2012, pp. 68–87). The prescribed value depends, however, on the subject of the study. Different attributes of connections will be taken in to considerations in analysis concerning social media (media science), different in networks reflecting flow of goods (logistics), and different in research on coalition negotiations (political science).

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<sup>2</sup> This is an example that has a great didactic value, because it shows what is actually being researched using SNA tools and what benefits it can bring. The authors pay attention to: a) blogosphere modeling, thanks to which one can better understand the structure and properties of the blogosphere: dependencies between bloggers, blog posts or various types of blogs; b) clustering of blogs, i.e. automatic linking of blogs (e.g. based on tags describing blogs) in similar groups to facilitate browsing the blogosphere; c) identification of influential bloggers that can influence the sale or promotion of the brand (Zygmunt et al., 2009, p. 674).

Researchers, visualizing networks and distinguishing their the most important attributes, use a software available either under a free license or commercially provided by various companies. The most popular tools include UCINET, Siena, Pajek (see Fig. 1) and Pnet. An increasing number of researchers deciding to use the R programming environment (Luke, 2015; Kolaczyk, Csárdi, 2014), which makes the SNA method even more demanding – in addition to knowledge concerning a subject of studies, some programming skills or knowledge how to create a large databases and manage it are also required.




Fig. 1. The control panel for Pajek – a free software tool for SNA

**Source:** Print screen – authors own elaboration. Pajek can be downloaded from: <http://mrvar.fdv.uni-lj.si/pajek/>.

### Possible applications of SNA in the discipline of political science

In the discipline of political sciences the fields of exploration where the SNA tools are applicable are practically boundless. The only barrier that might appear in this context is a limited access to data. Precise data set is indispensable to create a network's visualization and take measurements of its most important parameters.

However, there are several areas where SNA applications contribute to the study of political networks in the most substantial manner. The first one – probably the easiest to link with SNA – is the new sphere of interference between social media and politics. The number of analysis on building and maintaining relationships emerging on Facebook or Twitter, between non-institutionalized users and professional broadcasters, such as parties, governments, media, electoral staffs, have burst up after Barack Obama 2008 presidential campaign. The researchers, however, are going nowadays far beyond well-

examined elections in United States. Kokil Jaidka, Saifuddin Ahmed and Marko Skoric using comparative studies on three different Asian countries (Malaysia, India, and Pakistan) tried even to prove – with a quite convincing effect – that is possible to predict the final outcome of a general elections basing on “sentiment analysis” combined with SNA (Jaidka et al., 2018).

The use of SNA in electoral studies are not limited although to the changing dynamics in candidate-voter relations introduced by the advent of the Web 2.0. Another area where SNA is applied successfully are studies on intra-party relationships and networks of their cooperation with external entities. In such studies Suzanne M. Robbins uses network tools to analyze cash-flow among donors supporting two main political parties in USA through the system of highly criticized by her “political action committees” (Robbins, 2010).

The discussed method is also applicable to studies on beneficiaries of social assistance, sustainable transport, education policy and other types of public policies. Studies of Frédéric Varone, Karin Ingold and Manuel Fischer proved, with a help of SNA, how public administrative entities can become more flexible, adopting different functions in a policy network (such as a “network facilitator,” “policy broker” or “mediator in social conflicts”) when abandoning a state-centric vision and strictly hierarchical models (Varone, Ingold, Fischer, 2018).

SNA is also an increasingly relevant research method in the field of international relations studies. Analysis concerning global trade, diplomatic contacts and – in a broader sense – relations between states and international organizations occurred to be perfectly fitted to SNA application. With such intention, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery use SNA, putting in a question a conventional view on power in international relations. Using a toolkit related to network studies they asses the ability of different kind of actors to increase their power by exploiting their position in networks in different models of cross-border cooperation (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, Montgomery, 2009).

Similar analysis are conducted also in the area of security studies, bringing to the front the problem of functioning of organized crime networks, in particular – terrorist groups. The study of David Bright, Chad Whelan and Shandon Harris-Hogan successively employ SNA to indicate how seemingly distinct *jihadists groups* working in the Western countries coordinate their actions through the actions of network brokers and how such groups thanks to network-like structures achieve long lasting durability (Bright, Whelan, Harris-Hogan, 2018).

Finally, SNA is also used for self-analysis of particular scientific disciplines. By means of this method, researchers analyze patterns of cooperation between scientists, related to an implementation of joint researches or publication projects. The network beyond shows the results of the research of German scientists, indicating the most important clusters of cooperation and researchers with the highest centrality and prestige.

The opportunities and barriers related to SNA method might be well illustrated by the attempt to apply this method to the analysis of cabinet coalition formation processes. The use of SNA in this field seems to be responding correctly to some primary expectations of scientists – negotiation processes have always a relational nature and are based on interaction between at least two political entities (actors-nodes). An additional advantage




Fig. 2. Network’s cluster of publishing cooperation among German political scientists<sup>3</sup>

Source: Leifeld P. et al. (2017).

of SNA could be also its focus on links between particular individual actors instead of entire organizations. This is important especially when political parties are not perceived as monolithic entities. However, it is puzzling in this context that the review of world literature does not provide a vast number of SNA analyzes regarding cabinet coalitions. Michał Banaś and Mateusz Zieliński tried to fill this research gap in Poland by examining the process of creating a PO-PSL coalition in 2007 with the SNA (Banaś, Zieliński, 2015).

Despite the fact that the authors managed to confirm some very important conclusions (including the existence of internal divisions in political parties, the crucial role of the party leaders in the negotiation process, the influence of external actors on the coalition formation process, a key character of actors’ communication skills in the process of maintaining relations and the multi-aspect nature of the coalition formation process), they

<sup>3</sup> Centrality does not mean that people at the center of the network publish the most (or most efficiently), but that they are important from the point of view of the relationship between network actors.

concluded by stressing that the application of SNA to research on the coalition formation process faces many problems. The most important included the lack of information on negotiations conducted in a narrow circle of negotiators who are usually not willing to provide a reliable insight into the process, and the inability to avoid subjective opinions of journalists describing the coalition's process (Banaś, Zieliński, 2015, p. 126).

A methodological proposal that could enable the use of SNA tools for research into coalition formation processes may be the separation of different networks depicting ontically differentiated relations (Żukiewicz, Domagała, Zieliński, 2017). One can distinguish her three different networks:

- 1) networks of direct and confirmed meetings between political (*direct actor-to-actor connections*);
- 2) network of mediated by media contacts between political actors (*mediated actor-to-actor connections*);
- 3) network of media-speculated contacts between political actors (*supposed actor-to-actor connections*).

Such a solution requires application of additional tools such as a semantic analysis that allows to a researcher to extract more specific connections from a database and assign to them certain values (*semantic network analysis* – see Atteveldt, 2008). There is no doubt, however, that the media remains the only “provider” of data in the event of coalition negotiations. Direct actors are rarely willing to participate in the survey, providing in-depth interviews or completing a questionnaire.

Reliable reconstruction of network relations must, therefore, take into account the diverse status of media coverage – different meaning (and scientific value) will have media coverage of direct meetings between political actors, different media release about coalition preferences of certain politicians, and still different opinions of journalists, experts and other non-participating in direct negotiations actors regarding parties' potential coalition strategies. Although all three levels of analysis jointly create a specific “climate” of talks on the creation of a coalition, their precise methodical separation may allow to indicate which actors had the greatest impact on the real negotiations, and who held a central position in the coalition media discourse, although not participating in the negotiations. The comparison of statistical parameters of individual networks may therefore provide additional arguments and evidence for hypothesis about the importance of the media in the process of making the most important political decisions, and thus enrich the classic theories of coalition formation with an absent (till now) media component.

## Conclusions

One can agree with Sławomir Kotylak, who notes that “SNA from conventional social research tools is distinguished by the fact that the focus of this method lies in the so-called relational data, not attributes. In the case of social network research, it is cooperation or communication on substantive issues that indicates the actual role of a given unit (or group of people) as part of the process of creating and accessing information” (Kotylak, 2011, pp. 165–166). The potential use of the SNA method seemed to be unnoticed until recently in the discipline of political sciences. Nevertheless, the development

of information technologies, widespread acceptance of the importance of “networking” in the cross-linked global society and the activity of the most important researchers developing the SNA are slowly changing this situation. The SNA is becoming a well accepted research method, and the most important political research associations create sections in which scientists exchange their experiences.

Analysis of the literature on the subject indicates that SNA is – and probably will be – applied in numerous research fields. Particularly strongly marks its presence in analyzes carried out on large data sets (big data), mainly because it gives a simplified view of the complex network structure of the studied phenomena and their relational nature. At the same time, relying on the researchers abilities to collect such data may be the biggest barrier and obstacle in the development of the method: it will remain unusable where access to the data is limited or impossible to reach.

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***Social Network Analysis* jako metoda badawcza w dyscyplinie nauk o polityce.  
Próba adaptacji do badań nad koalicjami**

**Streszczenie**

Celem głównym artykułu jest uzasadnienie konieczności większego zainteresowania badaczy prowadzących swoje badania w dyscyplinie nauk o polityce narzędziami analitycznymi (w tym cyfrowymi) stosowanymi w ramach społecznej analizy sieciowej. Celami dodatkowymi pozostają nakreślenie kontekstu rozwoju SNA w tej dyscyplinie, a także ukazanie możliwych pól eksploracji i wykorzystania metody, zarówno w badaniach podstawowych, jak i w badaniach stosowanych. Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na potencjał SNA w badaniu procesów formowania koalicji gabinetowych, wskazując jednocześnie na ważne ograniczenia tej metody. Artykuł ma charakter metodologiczny i przyjmuje w nim – w sposób nieunikniony, jeśli rzecz ma dotyczyć analiz sieciowych – strukturalną perspektywę oglądu rzeczywistości społecznej. Weryfikuję hipotezę zakładającą, że największym potencjałem SNA jest obecnie możliwość generowania wizualizacji relacji społecznych w oparciu o duże zbiory danych (*big data*), jednocześnie jednak najistotniejszą barierą rozwoju metody stanowią ograniczenia w dostępie naukowców do tych danych, które mogłyby posłużyć jako bazowy materiał analityczny do wizualizacji sieci i generowania wniosków natury statystycznej. Prezentując stan badań politologicznych w Polsce i na świecie, w których wykorzystuje się narzędzia SNA, pomocniczo wykorzystuję metodę historyczną oraz metodę studium przypadku.

**Słowa kluczowe:** społeczna analiza sieciowa, sieć, metodologia nauk o polityce, koalicje

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## The effect of new technologies on civic participation models

**Abstract:** The development of new technologies will enable decentralization and freedom of communication for large numbers of people, by overcoming the barriers that once rendered direct participation of society unfeasible. The continued development of information and communication technologies (ICT) makes it possible for people to participate in political life. Today, the use of e-tools is becoming a way of adapting democracy to the needs of contemporary states and strengthening civil society. The aim of this paper is to answer questions about the essence of ICT and forms of civic engagement through electronic forms of participation. The author seeks answers to the following questions: How does ICT influence political processes? How do electronic communication systems create the conditions for the political engagement of citizens? Can the use of information technologies have a real impact on participation?

**Key words:** e-participation, information and communication technologies, electronic democracy, e-tools

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### Introduction

**M**odern information technologies seem to make it possible to overcome the traditional limitations of civic participation. The crisis of democracy means weakened conventional political groups, antipathy and distrust towards authorities, and the belief that society has no real influence on politicians' decisions and cannot effectively control what the government are doing. One way to overcome the crisis is to use electronic technologies, which build communities and promote greater political participation. First of all, the internet is developing as a tool that rationalizes governance; it is a new tool for political dialogue, an independent means of participation and political debate, and a tool for shaping public opinion.

However, the impact of new technologies on the improvement of democracy does not depend so much on the solutions themselves as on the model of democracy, democratic traditions, the technological and economic potential of the state and citizens' access to information and communication technologies (ICT) and computer literacy (Nowina Konopka, 2008, p. 23).

Many researchers claim that the use of modern technologies significantly increases the level of citizen involvement in public affairs. Civic participation is an important element of democracy. Many theories of democracy consider the level of civic participation as one of the key markers of its strength. Today, the model of democracy based on citizen participation in the political decision-making process (deliberative democracy, participatory democracy) is becoming more and more popular. Such participation can take a variety of forms, from displaying slogans and symbols, through voting, participation in public consultations and political demonstrations, to membership in political parties and the creation of electronic discussion platforms (Kapsa, 2017).

Jan van Dijk and Kenneth Hacker go even further and point out that the use of ICT to strengthen political democracy or citizen participation in the democratic process leads to 'digital democracy' (Lakomy, 2013, p. 139). In contemporary democracies, more and more emphasis is being put on the decentralization of state power and the more general involvement of the public in the decision-making processes, as well as on self-resolution of problems by those who are the most directly affected by them. By sustaining or ensuring the desirable development of such a trend, attention is drawn to direct democracy on a local scale by means of new technologies.

In this context, the aim of the study is to analyze the role of the internet in political life and to answer the question of how the use of technologies has changed the ordinary citizen and affected government-citizen relations. In addition to the theoretical approach, e-participation tools are presented, as well as critical opinions on this particular method of civic engagement.

### **An attempt to define some key terms**

Polish authors analyzing the impact of new technologies use terms such as electronic democracy, cyber democracy, teledemocracy, internet democracy, virtual democracy, technopolitics or electronic democratization. However, in international literature the term 'electronic democracy' is the most common. Martin Hagen believes that electronic democracy is any democratic political system in which computers and computer networks are used to perform the basic functions of the democratic process (communication, articulation and aggregation, decision making) (Hagen, 1997).

Experts on this issue distinguish three different notions: teledemocracy, cyber democracy and electronic democratization. These concepts differ in the use of direct or indirect forms of governance and the passive or active role of citizens. What they have in common is interactivity, the ability to receive feedback, and a large amount of information. Another shared element is the belief that new technologies can change democratic mechanisms and will improve certain aspects of the democratic process (Nowina-Konopka, 2006, p. 86).

As Ferdinando Mendez put it, "depending on the aspect of democracy to be promoted, electronic democracy can use a variety of techniques to increase the transparency of the political process, to strengthen direct involvement and participation of citizens, and to improve the quality of the opinion-forming process by creating new spaces for debate." Electronic democracy was seen as a remedy for the various shortcomings of political life, but emphasis was naturally placed on strengthening the role of citizens in the democratic process (Porębski, 2011, p. 98).

In general, electronic democracy can be defined as the ability of new information technologies to strengthen the level and quality of civic participation in governance. E-democracy means the use of electronic networks to create a more direct form of democracy and to increase the role of online votes and official online debates. Some approaches emphasize that e-democracy is about using the power of new technologies to stimulate civic participation in local decision-making in the inter-election period (Sakowicz, 2008, p. 311).

Of course, the most obvious point of reference in this context is ‘the internet.’ In fact, the internet has become a milestone on the road to popularization and dissemination of new technologies on a mass scale. As Leszek Porębski puts it, when discussing the concept of the internet, at least two factors must be borne in mind. First of all, the term ‘internet’ itself is a very capacious category which includes many technical solutions enabling various types of activities. Secondly, the internet – understood as a computer network – is the best known and most strongly analyzed, but not the only, new technology changing the rules of communication and information flow. Therefore, in the context of the impact on social life discussed here, the notion of ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) seems to be more adequate than the notion of the internet alone. It is a term commonly used in English literature, exactly for the reasons mentioned above (Porębski, 2001, pp. 11–12).

In the opinion of Pawłowska, e-democracy covers all forms of electronic communication between political authorities and public administration on the one hand and citizens on the other. The aim of implementing electronic tools is to increase citizens’ involvement in political processes. E-democracy assumes the use of information technology methods for performing the basic functions of the democratic process, i.e. information, communication, articulation and aggregation of interests as well as the decision-making process. In e-democracy, the most important aspect is not online voting, but the use of digital technologies to strengthen the process of democratic relations between the governing institutions and the governed. However, the mere existence of these technologies is not the only condition for success; they are merely a tool whose use is determined by the social, cultural and moral standards prevailing in a given country (Pawłowska, 2003–2004, p. 130).

Jan van Dijk writes about how ICT increases citizens’ involvement in political life. He calls this ‘electronic participation’ (or e-participation). E-participation is defined by van Dijk as the “use of digital media to facilitate and transform the relationship between citizens on the one hand and governments and public administration on the other, towards greater civic participation.” E-participation is part of more broadly defined e-democracy, as it involves the use of available technological and informational solutions for the more thorough involvement of citizens in public affairs (Musiał-Karg, 2012, p. 61).

The repertoire of electronic participation methods is extremely vast, including solutions such as electronic aids (webcast, FAQs, blogs), electronic consultations (online polls, surveys and questionnaires, forums, panels) and interactive participation (electronically created communities, chatrooms). Among the techniques, one can add extending e-access to information, access to projects planned by the state authorities, submitting one’s own proposals (which in local governments takes the form of participatory budgeting), e-petitions addressed by citizens to public authorities and administrative bodies, e-voting forms and various types of e-forums (Jacuński, 2016, pp. 35–36).

Justyna Matusiak emphasizes that e-democracy understood in this way includes electronic voting, electronic citizen involvement, electronic consultations and electronic control. Electronic voting (e-voting) is understood as voting by means of electronic devices. Such devices may serve the purpose of electronic registration of voters, electronic counting of votes, or even electronic voting with the use of a dedicated tool, first and foremost the internet. Electronic engagement (e-engagement) refers to engaging citizens

in public affairs using electronic means of communication; electronic consultation (e-consultation) refers to the exchange of opinions and views between citizens and officials; and electronic controllership (e-controllership) refers to the verification by citizens of the costs and quality of planned services or investments. One of the basic forms here is participatory budgeting, a tool used not only for electronic voting or electronic consultations, but also for electronic engagement or controllership (Matusiak, 2016, pp. 135–136).

According to Magdalena Musiał-Karg, as well as traditional forms of implementing democratic principles, novel solutions based on new technologies are emerging, such as e-voting, e-initiatives, e-courts, e-archives, e-petitions, e-electoral campaigns, combining the most important democratic principles with innovative forms of implementation (Musiał-Karg, 2012, p. 52). In the monograph *Institutions of Direct Democracy in Practice*, the following tools were listed among those that can be implemented using existing technical capabilities: public hearings, participatory budgeting, civil projects as part of specific public tasks, polling procedures (in particular, so-called deliberative polling) (Jabłoński, 2016, pp. 18–19).

Importantly, the term ‘e-tools’ suggests that technical applications may change or transform a certain condition of civic activity, give citizens greater influence on decision-making and strengthen self-governance in local political life (Sakowicz, 2008, p. 312).

### **Conditions of civic e-participation: pros and cons of online spaces**

It is worth mentioning that discussion on this subject should focus on the following question: how do electronic communication systems create conditions for the political involvement of citizens? Firstly, the internet removes the barriers faced by users of conventional media, enables many-to-many communication (based on the model of the Athenian Agora, where every eligible individual had the opportunity to speak), and improves the exchange of information between politicians and the general public. Three features make it different from other media: the internet is free from spatial limitations; there are no time constraints; and the cost of participation is lower (Kotowicz, 2006, p. 285).

The interactivity of ICT allows citizens to request information, express opinions and demand responses from their representatives; it takes the hassle out of dealing with the state and its institutions, both in an up-front (e.g. the possibility to do everything online) and background (more efficient public service in general) sense; ICT helps people with disabilities, who can now use public services without the need to go to an office in person. Positive effects can also be seen in the functioning of local democracy. Thanks to better access to information, the transparency of local government policies has increased, which also enables better monitoring of local authorities’ activities by residents (Peszat, 2012).

On the other hand, however, citizens must meet certain new demands. The development of political engagement requires knowledge of democratic values, mastering political culture and awareness (political socialization), experience of participation in political life. It is necessary to prepare citizens for the use of computers and to secure appropriate funds. An important empirical indicator is determined by the formation of a ‘culture of

participation,' or 'civic culture.' According to Norris, online citizens should be able to familiarize themselves with and comment on plans of state bodies, including budgets or zoning plans; comment on and participate in government activities through special discussion forums or polls; and vote online (Norris, 2007, p. 163).

It is also worth noting the more skeptical school of thought regarding new technologies. Their opponents argue that electronic debate may turn into a populist plebiscite, or become dominated by people who lack the skills and knowledge to make good decisions. Security is another crucial issue. Other most important arguments include insufficient computer literacy, lack of necessary equipment and insufficient internet access (Węglarz, 2013, p. 22).

According to Dahl, citizens are informed about political issues via telecommunication links and can take part in discussions with experts and among themselves. Despite this, there is inevitably a limit to the political awareness of the general public, and while technical means will help citizens to follow the discussion and vote, they will do so on the basis of incomplete knowledge (Nowina-Konopka, 2008, p. 21).

*The Myth of Digital Democracy* by Matthew Hindman is worth mentioning here. According to this author, and contrary to popular belief, the internet contributes little to expanding the boundaries of public discourse; on the contrary, it reinforces the power of narrow elites. The author notes that, although the internet has positively influenced the development of some forms of political participation and changed the methods of organization and mobilization, elites still define the way in which content of all kinds is presented on the internet and who can access it to a large extent. Hindman's argument also relies primarily on the notion of digital exclusion, but notes that the user's skills are more important than mere access to new technologies. The possession of such skills defines the main axis of digital exclusion today (Hindman, 2009, pp. 1–3).

Marek Troszyński, a sociologist from Collegium Civitas, emphasizes that the internet is first of all a medium and not a new world or a new way of understanding reality, nor is it a way of life. In his opinion, the internet has been and still is changing our world in the field of communication. People are still people, and they still feel the need to live with others and create communities. Now, they have a completely new range of communication possibilities and make good use of them (Troszyński, 2016, p. 83).

Gibson, Nixon and Ward believe that the various forms of participation in e-politics give a false sense of community, because in the virtual world, the user can usually remain anonymous, which means that individuals can merely pretend to be engaged and active (Jacuński, 2016, p. 38). Actual involvement in a certain cause requires breaking free from one's routines, breaking through everyday patterns. Eventually, it is connected with the danger of facing the problem, which is not the case when things are done online.

In addition, attention is drawn to such barriers to electronic democracy as: 1) unequal access to the internet (digital divide, digital split, e-exclusion); 2) lack of interest in this form of participation on the part of the less educated, the elderly and low income citizens; 3) the high costs of implementing technological solutions, particularly unwelcome by elected authorities whose perspective is usually limited by the date of the forthcoming elections; 4) lack of skills (competences) in using modern technologies among members of a given community, and so on (Nodzak, 2017, p. 358).

Interesting insights can be found in *Information Society in Poland in 2016*, a report published by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS). It indicates that the process of computerization of the Polish society is accelerating every year and the demand for a better quality of ICT services and products is growing. More and more households have computers or other IT devices, and most of them have internet access (in 2016, 80.4% of households were online, 75.7% of which enjoyed broadband access). However, according to the same report, a large group of citizens still have no internet access at home, most often for such reasons as lack of need to use the internet (70.6%), lack of appropriate skills (52.1%), or the prohibitively high costs of hardware (28%) or access services (21.3%) (GUS).

A survey by CBOS shows that the internet is most often used by people aged 18–24 (93%). Interestingly, the percentage of internet users seems to be decreasing with age: 34% in the 55–64 age group use the internet, and only 11% of people above 65 years of age. The urban-rural divide is also visible – internet users living in rural areas represent just 35% of the total population with internet access. The larger the local government unit (with particular emphasis on the largest cities), the greater the possibility of using ICT tools for conducting civic dialogue (CBOS).

### **Implementation of e-tools as a means of promoting participation**

Technological progress and the dynamic development of local government can to some extent be measured in institutional terms by observing the growing number of local democracy initiatives and tools. It is evident that there are more and more new projects aimed at increasing citizen participation in the life of local communities. However, often the following questions are asked: Does it ‘pay’ to try hard and devote time and even money to electronic platforms? Do they actually help to build civic society at the local level, or should they be treated as one of the many marketing measures aimed at improving or brushing up the image of the local authorities? Kedzia emphasizes that the development of communication via a computer network plays a significant role in democratic changes; in other words, a higher level of democracy is associated with better communication (Marczewska-Rytko, 2001, p. 193).

Creating new opportunities for citizen participation in public life is not enough to change the face of democracy. Electronic democracy “cannot, by itself, democratize the communities it serves. The creation of a public space, the articulation of views and the process of creating active citizens require involvement and participation in public debate. Opportunities created by the instruments of electronic democracy are likely to be just an empty shell if they are not embraced by the public and filled with the desire for political participation” (Rachwał, 2013, p. 55).

From the point of view of a citizen, Porębski distinguishes “the fundamental right to shape political democracy” (which includes participation in petitions or the implementation of electoral procedures). This means that e-participation is not only a form of legitimizing the authorities and citizens’ identification with their decisions, but also a way to improve the functioning of the administration and management. Democracy is therefore not a matter of voting once every couple of years – it also engages citizens in dialogue with the authorities and in co-decision making (Porębski, 2010, p. 161).



Practice shows that individuals care much more about those problems which directly affect them, and those for which they can clearly predict and identify the consequences of their own decisions/opinions. The more opaque the decision-making process is, and the more responsibility for the decision is unclear, the less opportunity there is for citizen involvement.

Many interpretations of participatory democracy draw attention to the fact that the local level is conducive to the development of civic participation. The smaller the community, the greater the participation of its members in the political decision-making process. It seems, therefore, that cities should be the pioneers in developing electronic civic participation, increasingly common and desirable in the era of digitization and virtualization of life, including public life. Ambitious and modern cities aim at improving citizens' lives by using technology. In cities, various citizens' initiatives may emerge through discussion. There are websites allowing every internet user to read and support someone else's initiative, appeal, request or protest submitted to a public institution in the form of a petition (Kapsa, 2017).

Regardless of the advantages and disadvantages of particular solutions, a number of online tools designed for political participation have been created all over the world. Examples from the United States, Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom show that the design of a tool for organizing online participatory activities depends only on the needs of the contracting authority and the funds it can allocate for the project. Some platforms are simple tools focused mainly on exchanging information, generating ideas and commenting on them. Others act as simulators and, in addition to collecting information, also show users the likely consequences of their proposed decisions (Maczak, 2015, p. 241).

E-consultation is an increasingly popular form of participation, carried out online and/or by email. One example of an electronic tool for conducting consultations are special consultation platforms (e.g. the Warsaw Consultation Platform, [www.konsultacje.um.warszawa.pl](http://www.konsultacje.um.warszawa.pl)). Another solution for collecting feedback from residents are internet applications, combined with smartphone apps, which allow the reporting of minor problems in public spaces to the city administration (e.g. uneven sidewalks, potholes in roads, illegally dumped waste) and the informing of residents about the progress of repair works (e.g. SeeClickFix.com, <https://www.fixmystreet.com>, [dost//www.fixmystr](http://dost//www.fixmystr)) (Podgórnjak-Krzykacz, 2016, p. 38).

E-petitions are one example of dialogue initiated by individuals. *Gopetition.com* is one of the internationally recognized websites of this kind, operating in 75 countries. The most popular one in Poland is *petycje.pl*. By analyzing the type of addressee or the title of the e-petition, one can conclude that such petitions are most often addressed to local government authorities, central administration, companies, private individuals and the media. This shows that local communities are increasingly interested in conducting civic dialogue using ICT (Kuć-Czajkowska, 2014, p. 119).

The methods of direct engagement of citizens in the processes of planning and providing public services are also important. One of the basic forms of electronic participation is participatory budgeting. It is not merely a tool for electronic voting or electronic consultations, but also one for electronic engagement or control. It can be used not only for the online presentation of information about consultations on participatory budgets,

but also for posting training materials (including multimedia), accepting online budget proposals and, finally, for setting up separate websites devoted exclusively to a given initiative, with online voting as an additional feature. As a result, participatory budgeting itself is a form of public consultation, helping citizens to become involved in the life of the local community and contribute to its development, and to monitor budget execution in qualitative and quantitative terms.

The involvement of the NGO sector is particularly noteworthy. It has resulted in the creation of *Naprawmy to* (Let's fix it), an internet portal enabling local communities to report problems in public spaces to the local government responsible (Kuć-Czajkowska, 2014, p. 121).

It should be noted that institutional solutions introduced in Poland are clearly aimed at facilitating citizens' access to public information via the internet, thus enabling them to co-decide on policy directions. The internet is mainly used for information and educational activities (Nowina Konopka, 2008, p. 24).

Despite the attractive appeal and rapid development of e-participation and its tools, the notion does raise certain concerns. First of all, the ambitions for fundamental changes in public management which were to be ushered in by the use of ICT tools turned out to be unrealistic. Meijer et al. identify three key factors that have had an impact on the implementation of e-participation: leadership (including, in particular, new leadership, which means moving away from traditional bureaucratic roles); incentives for citizens to take advantage of new tools and opportunities; and the trust necessary for citizens to speak freely about their preferences, opinions and identities in a manner and to an extent that is comfortable for them (Matczak, 2015, p. 246).

However, as Nodżak puts it, examples of using electronic forms of participation borrowed from administrative practice also show that the use of modern technologies does not guarantee an increased interest on the part of individuals (citizens) in public matters. A closer look at the practical use of tools such as local government websites and the e-consultations available on those websites clearly shows that the number of passive users (not to mention the active ones) of such solutions is rather unimpressive (Nodżak, 2017, p. 360).

It seems, however, that the present situation could change if citizens themselves start interacting more often and more actively with their representatives. The level of political participation depends on many factors: (1) citizens' awareness and level of civic education. Active participation increases citizens' knowledge about the functioning of local authorities, including their capabilities and constraints. (2) Citizens' actual control over the authorities. Increased interest of citizens results in greater transparency of public finances, which leads to more efficient control and less risk of problems such as corruption. (3) The opportunity to decide on changes in the public spaces results in an increased sense of co-responsibility for those spaces. (4) Creating additional opportunities for the exchange of ideas between the authorities and citizens. (5) Increased trust of the community towards local authorities. Greater civic awareness, knowledge about the functioning of the public sphere and transparency of local government activities have a positive impact on the authorities' image among residents (Krześ, 2014, p. 102).

The above arguments clearly speak in favor of introducing new forms of citizen participation. It can therefore be concluded that the implementation of these instruments on a wider scale depends on whether or not the public can be more effectively informed

about their rights, and on whether local authorities themselves can change their attitude; currently they are largely reluctant towards new forms of citizen participation, as they are aware that their work will be assessed and monitored more closely. For many public sector bodies, the new approach is just another statutory obligation that needs to be carried out, apparently without any associated benefits. The problem of cohesion, i.e. the creation of a solution enabling true citizen engagement, has been viewed as a threat. Last but not least, it is necessary to ensure commitment by adapting political processes to the opportunities offered to citizens by the new solutions (Porębski, 2001, p. 15).

Ways of increasing citizen participation in the life of the local community should be sought first of all in unrestricted access to public information, introduction of electronic public consultations concerning the activities of local government institutions or assessment of the performance of public bodies and their officers. The same goes for the wider use of direct democracy mechanisms (consultations, referenda) in cases involving the most controversial projects. This creates an opportunity to build trust in public authorities, which can in this way demonstrate that the needs and well-being of their communities truly matter. As a result of this, local and regional democracy could develop and grow stronger (Grosse, 2008, p. 150).

## Conclusions

In conclusion, it should be stated that modern electronic methods do not always bring measurable benefits or the intended results. There are many people who do not use new technologies, internet users often do not believe that they can actually make a change, and the culture of online dialogue can often contravene acceptable standards of decency. Therefore, ICT tools alone are insufficient, and it is necessary to combine them with offline tools, with conversations in the real world.

On the other hand, information technologies influence democratic processes by complementing, accelerating and streamlining three different types of activities: communication, involvement in political debate and participation in political decision making. As a result, the interactivity of e-tools which strengthen participatory processes must always be adapted to the context and environment in which they are intended to be used and to the objective to be achieved.

It needs to be emphasized that it is too early to clearly assess the impact of the internet on democracy. On the one hand, communication technologies eliminate space and time constraints, but do not necessarily overcome political barriers. On the other hand, due to technical difficulties and mindset limitations, the technological (information) revolution will take many years to complete.

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## Wpływ nowych technologii na modele partycypacji obywatelskiej

### Streszczenie

Rozwój nowych technologii umożliwia zdecentralizowanie i swobodę w komunikowaniu się wielkich mas ludzi, przyczynia się do nierealnego wcześniej przewyższania barier. Postępujący rozwój technologii informacyjnych powoduje, iż człowiek może stać się uczestnikiem życia politycznego. W dzisiejszym świecie wykorzystanie e-narzędzi staje się sposobem dostosowania demokracji do potrzeb współczesnych państw oraz wzmocnienia społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest odpowiedź na pytania o istotę technologii informacyjnych oraz o formy zaangażowania obywatelskiego za pośrednictwem elektronicznych form partycypacji. Autorka szuka odpowiedzi na pytania: Jak ICT wpływają na procesy polityczne? W jaki sposób systemy komunikacji elektronicznej tworzą warunki do politycznego zaangażowania obywateli? Czy zastosowanie technologii informacyjnych może mieć realny wpływ na formy partycypacji?

**Słowa kluczowe:** e-partycypacja, technologie informacyjne, demokracja elektroniczna, e-narzędzia



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## Participation of city residents in the ongoing activities of public transportation providers

**Abstract:** The organization and management of public transportation is one of the most important responsibilities of local authorities. In view of the dynamically changing conditions of modern cities' transportation policies, actions in this area pose a challenge, involving the standardization of transportation and its adjustment to the transportation needs and expectations of residents not only of individual cities, but of entire metropolitan areas. One of the ways to tailor transportation to the needs of residents is to continuously coordinate on the basis of diagnosis and analysis of residents' demands. Public transportation passenger councils provide a forum for exchanging views on this issue. In Poland, only the authorities of Warsaw have thus far decided to establish such a body.

**Key words:** urban public transportation management, functional areas of large cities, civic participation

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Studies on new methods of managing local government units emphasize the need to expand the involvement of the general public in the shaping of urban policy. Attention should be paid to studies which connect the problem of low turnout in the elections of representatives for auxiliary units, in local government elections, with low levels of participation in public consultations and so-called participatory budgets. Quite often, authors point to Western European or Scandinavian countries as model examples of participation in local policy-making. New ways of encouraging people to participate more actively in the life of their municipality are indicated. In Poland, local democracy is still at the stage of building relationships between people and local governments based on trust, which relies on credibility and transparency in public life. The creation of a sphere of trust is a long-term process directly connected with the change in the way of thinking about the role and place of citizens in local politics, and the role of its executive decision-making bodies at every local government level. The examples of Polish cities as Poznań, Warsaw, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Kraków and others, in which members of urban movements are becoming more and more active, show that the residents of these cities have untapped potential in terms of working for the benefit of their local community. The voice of residents on matters directly affecting them can help local authorities to make better decisions, addressing residents' needs in a more effective way.

The change in the perception of authority also applies to those who are in power. To a large extent, it is up to the latter whether they will involve wider groups of residents in local decisions, and which legal measures they will use to do so. They also have at their disposal informal channels of communication with residents, such as open meetings, during which topics important from the point of view of the district or city are discussed. With regard to mass public transportation management, the opening up of transporta-

tion providers to the opinions of passengers is a step towards the better identification of transportation needs and passenger demands, regarding quality of service, the planning of new connections, architectural barriers limiting the availability of stops, or defining the frequency of a given service.

This study addresses the issue of the participation of residents in the activities of the city related to the organization of public transportation. In Germany, in addition to regular public consultations (on e.g. changes in timetables, plans to renovate transportation infrastructure, etc.), transportation providers work alongside public transportation passenger councils (appointed by the providers). Consequently, in the first part of the paper, the author will elaborate on the theoretical justification for the establishment of advisory bodies in public transportation, in the second part German and Polish models of passenger councils and their rights and responsibilities will be discussed, and in the third part the concept of a passenger council for the city of Poznań, which provides mass transit for the metropolitan area, will be presented. The aim of the study is to answer the following research problem: how can one involve residents of cities which organize public transportation (municipalities covered by the agreement/creating a local authority association) in the process of consultations and seeking opinions on urban transportation policy? The author puts forward a proposition that the deliberative nature of urban space management opens it up to residents, empowers and engages them, and builds new forms of identification with the locality. It changes the nature of the relationship between residents and the local government/local administration. The creation of high-quality, effective public policy requires an appropriate approach which facilitates mature deliberation in various forms. The author's reasoning is evaluated by answers to the following research questions: What are the conditions for and threats to deliberative local democracy? Which of the known deliberative theories describes local forms of consultation and opinion seeking with regard to public transportation passenger councils? What are the means used by the residents of Western European cities to influence transportation policy? Are there any examples of passenger councils in Poland? Which of the models which have been tried and tested in other cities can be implemented by the Poznań transportation provider?

### **1. A review of literature on contemporary cities**

It is easier to observe macro processes of social change taking place in cities than in other places. According to Sassen, it is in big cities that globalization and the information revolution are taking place, where global capital is concentrated, and where vast numbers of immigrants settle (Piłat-Borcuch, 2012, p. 133; after Gałkowski, 2008, p. 95). In the context of urban planning, perceived as “the art of shaping space, and also as a field of science” (Paszkowski, 2011, p. 10), the city is considered to be a set of architectural and landscape forms, of symbols, values, and social structures, overlapping in time. They are an expression of human moral standing, and show current achievements in the area of technology, aesthetics or design. Consequently, urban space is an architectural challenge. It can be furnished in a specific way, determining the functions of specific quarters of the city, and thus influencing the city lifestyle. Hence, “in the shadow of great urban planning, alternative methods of social co-residence are being developed, which are a response to mega-



development. These are the ideas of 'new urbanism,' 'smart growth' and the 'slow city,' which promote models of sustainable cities. They are based on social and spatial values, ignoring the developer-focused, profit-oriented, accelerated urban development model of new city districts and entire cities" (ibid., p. 13). At the same time, they propose a different model of resident participation in the life of a housing estate, district, or municipality. They encourage and somehow 'force' participation within various forums, at different levels of local decision making. Thus, a city is something more than just an agglomeration of units equipped with municipal goods, or a simple constellation of institutions and administrative systems. The city is a product of human nature (Jałowiecki, Szczepański, 2009, p. 19; after Park, p. 20), and is also shaped by human nature.

The city is a socio-political organism equipped with an administrative system to facilitate the management of public affairs. Researchers of contemporary cities emphasize the multifaceted nature of phenomena taking place in urban areas, which means that an interdisciplinary approach is required to capture, understand, and research this issue. The city is "a reflection of market forces in time and space, in which periods of both economic growth and economic and political crises are recorded. The city as a socio-cultural space is a place of exchange of thoughts, and a place of civilizational development reflecting the yearnings, aspirations, and culture of its residents" (Paszkowski, 2011, p. 17). Barber grasps this nicely by writing: "Regardless of whether or not urbanity lies in the nature of people, it is part of our history and – by coincidence or by choice – it defines the way we live, work, play, and create communities. Regardless of the contracts we design on a macro-scale, politics starts right next to us – in our neighborhood, and city" (Barber, chapter I).

Turning to residents is usually a conscious decision by city authorities, which involves residents in projects of key importance to them, such as economic activity, spatial development, transportation policy, housing policy, the provision of recreational space, and the establishment of local forms of nature protection. These are the subject of public debates and partnerships in the co-management of the city (Szymańska, Korolko, 2015, pp. 31 and 32). Among the available deliberative methods, one can distinguish the method of deliberative determination of public opinion preferences, the method of citizens' panels, the method of planning cells, and consensus conferences (Sroka, 2009, p. 120 ff.). These methods are an element of multi-stream management focused on the coordination of relationships between power centers and entities cooperating with these centers, especially in the situation of so-called incomplete contacts (ibid., p. 86), which characterize the societies of large urban centers (Tomaszyk, 2016, p. 208).

Civil participation in urban space has developed particularly well in large cities which have been assigned metropolitan functions. Such activities address the expectations of the changing community of residents, which, due to many factors, is becoming less stable and more heterogeneous (the so-called community of incomplete contacts). Cities forming agglomerations are characterized by a diversity of interests and the inflation of expectations and demands, which cannot always be met. Therefore, the inclusion of residents in the decision-making process is sometimes a conscious move by the authorities, in order to show how decisions are being made, and to engender responsibility for the consequences of such decisions. The concept of civic inclusion in urban development, known as 'smart governance,' is in fact a deliberative policy that connects societies – the political system with networks of the political public sphere (ibid., p. 209). "One of crucial outcomes of

this process is a dynamic ‘focus shift’ in the relationship between the three main resources required for social integration, and political-and-administrative control” (Sroka, p. 26). The enthusiasm associated with the implementation of new forms of resident participation, also in relation to sectoral municipal policies, may be weakened by the lack or low level of deliberative capacity, understood by John Dryzek as “the extent to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is *authentic, inclusive, and consequential*” (Juchacz, 2015, p. 431; after Dryzek, 2000, p. 1384). Importantly, *inclusiveness* is understood as actual inclusion of all stakeholders, and a wide range of discourses being present in a given political environment, while *consequentiality* is related to having – direct or indirect – influence on decisions or social changes (Juchacz, 2015, p. 432). Deliberation as such is threatened by a number of deep-rooted problems in the deliberative system, e.g. entrenched partiality denying the right to participate in a debate to certain groups (Juchacz, 2015, p. 405). Resistance to deliberation is a step backwards in the expansion of the sphere of public debate, since deliberation should open up space for residents, empower and engage them, and build new forms of identification with the locality. It changes the nature of the relationship between residents and the local government/administration. The creation of high-quality public policy requires an approach that facilitates mature deliberation in a variety of forms. It should lead to the creation of rational knowledge, showing the scale and complexity of public problems (cf. Zybała, 2004, p. 4).

The incorporation of forms of deliberation within urban spaces and current local authority policies must not be limited solely and exclusively to the use of obligatory forms of social consultation. An interesting concept of an integrated deliberative system was formulated by Carolyne Hendriks.




Figure 1. The spheres of deliberative discourse according to Carolyne Hendriks

Source: Own compilation on the basis of: W. P. Juchacz (2015), *Deliberatywna filozofia publiczna. Analiza instytucji wysłuchania publicznego w Sejmie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z perspektyw systemowego podejścia do demokracji deliberatywnej*, Poznań.

According to the diagram above, the system of deliberative discourse consists of “a number of different discursive spheres, i.e. areas in public space within which deliberation takes place” (Juchacz, 2015, p. 420). The key task of a well-functioning deliberative system in a city is the creation of links between the various arenas of deliberation, and the elimination of exclusion from the debate (cf. Juchacz, 2015, p. 420). In reference to the public transportation passenger councils discussed in this study, out of the three spheres discussed by Hendriks, the macro-discursive sphere encompasses in its description the form of passenger activity. It is characterized by a low level of formalization, a broad forum for debate allowing for the representation and activity of social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists, interest groups, or opinion-formers (cf. Juchacz, 2015, p. 423). The creative exchange of ideas between different types of players combines broader public discourse with the discourses and decisions of the political elite (cf. Juchacz, 2015, p. 423; after Hendriks, p. 501).

## 2. German models of passenger councils

The existence of passenger councils established alongside and by providers of passenger transportation are a characteristic feature of the German model of the organization and management of public passenger transportation. The work of passenger councils is an expression of the openness and trust of the provider towards passengers and local residents.

Of the numerous responsibilities of the providers of passenger transportation in urban public transportation, some can be carried out in cooperation with the users of the services. These include, but are not limited to:

- a) Studying and analyzing needs in public transportation, taking into account the needs of the disabled and those with reduced mobility;
- b) Taking action to implement or update an existing transportation plan;
- c) Ensuring appropriate conditions for the operation of public transportation, in particular by defining standards for stops and stations, rules of using stops and stations, the operation of integrated transportation hubs, integrated tariff-and-ticketing systems, and passenger information systems;
- d) Determination of transportation stops and stations owned by local government units and those belonging to other owners;
- e) Setting fares and other charges for services provided by the operator within the scope of public transportation (Act on Collective Public Transportation, Article 15).

The figure below illustrates the German model of passenger councils and the providers of public transportation.

As can be seen from the diagram above, German passenger councils are formed at the initiative of transportation providers, service providers, or transportation branches of municipal associations. Their members, some of whom are directly elected, meet regularly on predetermined dates (cf. Meyer-Liesefeld, 1999, p. 89; cf. Schnippe, 2000, p. 176). There are known examples of passenger councils consisting only of representatives of users of public transportation, but equally popular are ‘mixed councils’ representing the transportation provider, carriers, and other institutions whose competences




Figure 2. German model of public transportation passenger councils

Source: Own compilation.

lie in the field of urban transportation. For example, the Frankfurt-am-Main passenger council, which has been in operation since February 27, 1997, consists of the widest possible representation of local public transportation policy bodies, residents of municipalities covered by the transportation network, and passengers. Due to the ongoing evaluation of the council’s work, this group underwent a reform in June 2013 (Fahrgastbeirat FF Main: Konzeption). The council is composed of 11 representatives of passengers, and the following entities:

- cyclists – Allgemeiner Deutscher Fahrrad-Club;
- student self-government – Allgemeiner Studierenden-Ausschuss (AStA) der Universität Frankfurt a. M.;
- economic self-government – Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main;
- disabled people – Frankfurter Behinderten-Arbeitsgemeinschaft (FBAG);
- industry and trade representatives – Industrie- und Handelskammer Frankfurt am Main;
- immigrant representatives – Kommunale Ausländer- und Ausländerinnenvertretung;
- pro-railway association representatives – Pro Bahn, Regionalverband Großraum Frankfurt;

- senior citizens – Seniorenbeirat der Stadt Frankfurt am Main;
- parents' council representatives – Stadelternbeirat Frankfurt am Main;
- transportation enthusiasts' club – Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD).<sup>1</sup>

Passengers who are not members of the council may submit their motions, complaints, and recommendations in writing, by e-mail or by phone. Applications submitted in this form are handled by the customer service center, traffiQ.<sup>2</sup>

The average number of council members in Germany<sup>3</sup> is between 12 and 50 people. Passenger representatives are most often chosen in direct elections from among the candidates submitted by authorized associations, urban movements, and groups of passengers. Contrary to the well-known clubs of public transportation customers in Germany, passenger councils should represent the widest possible representation of residents who do not use trams or buses on a daily basis. Their observations and remarks are important for the development of solutions that will win over new, preferably regular customers, and thus contribute to the change of the local mobility culture.

In Bremen, for example, the council has been appointed as coordinator of the dialog between service providers and customers, and the passenger transportation provider. The council meets six times a year. As a rule, members are responsible for cooperating to plan the network of connections throughout the association, evaluating the current and planned transportation system, and bringing quality-improving requests both to carriers and to the association's board. The council is divided into working groups, which meet once a month. The term of office of the council members is three years. The council consists of 19 members, of which six are members designated by the transportation association, and 13 are representatives of the residents.

The councils have a consultative and advisory nature, and allow the transportation provider to take up topics often overlooked by the administration, and propose changes. In order to give credibility to the establishment of such advisory bodies, the role of the transportation provider and carriers must be reduced to analysis of the proposals in terms of their implementation, and to the systematic implementation of the proposals voiced by the council. The method of operation of the council makes sense only if the outcomes of its work are practicable. The discussion of urban transportation and mobility will be authentic only if it takes place without any means of coercion. The decision-making system in this area must be deliberative, i.e. it must have structures that enable deliberation to take place.

Unlike the German councils, the powers of their British counterparts are broader. British members of passenger councils can co-decide on fares and ticketing systems, as well as changes to the connection network. They also spend some of their budget on the promotion of public transportation and the co-financing of the upgrading of stops, or the elimination of minor architectural barriers. In the case of Austrian advisory bodies, the scope of advisory and decision-making competencies includes, *inter alia*, timetables,

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.traffiQ.de/1487.de.fahrgastbeirat.html#a71714>.

<sup>2</sup> E-Mail: [fahrgastbeirat@traffiQ.de](mailto:fahrgastbeirat@traffiQ.de).

<sup>3</sup> Passenger councils are active in the following German lands: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia.

fares, public transportation lines, adjustment of the fleet or rolling stock to align with passenger volumes, quality of service, and tidiness of stops and public transportation vehicles (Blümel, 2004, p. 72).

### **3. Polish examples of passenger councils – the Warsaw Public Transportation Council**

Among the Polish cities whose authorities provide public transportation, only the Capital City of Warsaw has decided to establish a passenger council. The composition, competence, method of selecting members, and authorization and time schedule of meetings of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council are similar to their German equivalents. According to the adopted Regulations (*Regulamin*), the electoral body of the council members is the Public Transportation Authority in Warsaw. Entities specified in the Regulations have the right to propose candidates for members of the council. The regulatory framework of the council assumes that it is an opinion-forming and advisory body under the Director of the Public Transportation Authority. The Warsaw Public Transportation Council is composed of representatives of the following entities: NGOs operating in the Capital City of Warsaw, representatives of operators, and representatives of self-government units of the Warsaw urban agglomeration and those municipalities which have signed an inter-municipal agreement with the Capital City of Warsaw on joint organization and management of public transportation. The council consists of a total of 18 members. The number of elected seats is limited to 10. As in other councils, the elected seats are defined by type as follows: 2 – for representatives of environmental NGOs; 2 – for NGOs operating in the field of social interest and social assistance, but not represented in the Sectoral Committee for Social Dialog of the Capital City of Warsaw, of which 1 seat is for a representative of the disabled; 2 – for business NGOs; 1 – for a representative of the Transportation Sectoral Committee for Social Dialog; 2 – for representatives of local government units of the Warsaw urban agglomeration, save that 1 seat is for representatives of those units which have signed an inter-municipal agreement with the Capital City of Warsaw on the organization of bus and train transportation, while the second seat is for those units which have signed an agreement exclusively for transportation services provided by bus. One seat is for the operators of the services provided. To ensure the continuous work of the council, a solution was introduced whereby appropriate entities designate so-called reserve members. The other rules of electing council members seem self-explanatory, for example, members must not remain in an employment relationship with the Warsaw City Office, or limiting the number of candidates designated by authorized entities to one. In accordance with Section 2(8) of the Regulations, a person may become a council member if they have the support of at least two NGOs acting for the development of the Capital City of Warsaw, or 5 municipalities of the Warsaw urban agglomeration, or three operators (*Regulamin*).

During the council's current term of office, in March 2018 representatives of individual entities were elected during two meetings initiating the establishment of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council. If there is disagreement and no candidates

with the required support are put forward, the exclusive right to appoint members of the council is vested in the Director of the Public Transportation Authority. The correct procedure for electing members of the Passenger Council at the Warsaw Public Transportation Authority is overseen by the Electoral Commission (appointed by the WPTA), which also verifies documents confirming the status of the association and candidates' letters of support, and prepares a shortlist of members positively verified for approval by the Director of the Public Transportation Authority. The council also includes experts representing the academic community. Formally, members of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council are appointed by the Mayor of Warsaw. Members hold their term of office for three years. A person ceases to be a member of the council upon taking up employment in the Warsaw City Office, or after a decision by the Director of the Warsaw Public Transportation Authority on a motion signed by at least two-thirds of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council. The Regulations also specify the maximum number of members of the Council, which is 20. However, in justified cases, the Public Transportation Authority Director may expand this group.




Figure 3. Composition of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council

Source: Own compilation

A facilitator leads the work of the council. The council takes decisions by consensus. Should there be no agreement, an additional working group is set up to reach a consensus. The proceedings of the working group can be supported by an independent expert. Twice a year, the Public Transportation Authority organizes open meetings with residents, attended by council members, during which council members have the opportunity to report on their activities and opinions. This is also a well-established practice in Germany, where a so-called transportation forum or a mobility forum is organized. The council meeting agenda is drafted on the basis of submissions made during consultation and election meetings with NGOs and local government units of the Warsaw urban agglomeration. Additional topics can be submitted for discussion as so-called extraordinary motions, subject to approval by at least half of the participants of the council meeting (cf. *Rada Warszawskiego Transportu Publicznego*). The council's meeting schedule shows that it meets once a month in the offices of the Director of the Public Transportation Authority. The diagram shows the order of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council decision making process.




Diagram 1. Phases of the decision-making process of the Warsaw Public Transportation Council

**Source:** Own compilation based on the *Rada Warszawskiego Transportu Publicznego – zasady funkcjonowania*, *Warszawski Transport Publiczny*, ppt., downloaded from: <http://www.ztm.waw.pl/?c=711&l=1> on August 12, 2018.

The Warsaw passenger council is the only Polish example of formal cooperation between passengers, representatives of NGOs, public transportation operators, transportation providers, and experts. Hopefully, the results of the work of this body will inspire other transportation providers.



#### **4. The concept of the Poznań Urban Transportation Authority's Poznań passenger council**

The work on the Poznań passenger council is at the stage of exchanging views and drawing up preliminary concepts. In Poznań, more and more importance is attached to a participatory style of city management, and social activists and other residents are invited to discuss the city and its future. An unambiguous evaluation of these measures from the point of view of deliberative democracy would require more in-depth research and a separate study. Given that the integrated public transportation system covers almost all municipalities within the Poznań urban agglomeration of around 900,000 people, and in light of the city's efforts to improve environmentally friendly mobility, combined with its current low numbers of public transportation users, the establishment of a public transportation passenger council in the city is worthy of consideration. The competences of the Poznań passenger council could draw on the above-mentioned examples. Members of the Poznań passenger council could give oral and written representation. A written representation would be required, for example, to change transportation regulations, fares and fare reductions, changes in the public transportation sustainable development plan, changes in the bus and tram line layout, and changes in the bus and tram timetables concerning the frequency of services. Additionally, the passenger council, in its advisory capacity, would serve the transportation provider under the Poznań Urban Transportation Authority in the following areas:

- 1) Quality of transportation services provided by system operators selected by the provider and related to: punctuality, cleanliness of vehicles and stops, driving culture, the visual appeal of vehicles and stops, legibility of timetables, efficiency of passenger information, environmentally-friendly transportation, trip comfort, etc.;
- 2) Day and night connection frequencies;
- 3) Location of Poznań City Bike stations;
- 4) Identification and elimination of architectural barriers in accessing stop infrastructure;
- 5) Offers of private providers of car and bike sharing services;
- 6) Passenger friendliness tests for new means of transportation;
- 7) Availability of brick-and-mortar and electronic ticket purchasing points;
- 8) Fare policy in the city of Poznań;
- 9) Urban public transportation development direction.

Whenever a written opinion is mandatory, the issuance of such an opinion would require the consensus of the council members present at a meeting of the passenger council. Should a consensus be not possible, the facilitator of the council operations could appoint a working group composed of council members and chaired by an external expert. The council could meet once quarterly at the offices of the Urban Transportation Authority. The council would work under the direction of a facilitator chosen by the Director of the Urban Transportation Authority from outside its members. Council meetings would be convened at least quarterly, or more frequently at the request of the Director of the Urban Transportation Authority. The council would submit a report on its operations to the Director of the Urban Transportation Authority by the end of the first quarter. The term of office of the council, due to the five-year term of office of the local

government, would be 2.5 years. The mandate of a passenger council member could be renewable. No remuneration should be paid to members of the passenger council for their work. However, in order to encourage active participation, it should be possible to give directly-elected members 3-month tickets for the entire public transportation network. It would not be possible for elected council members to be employees or family members of employees of operators with whom the Poznań Urban Transportation Authority has a signed contract for the provision of transportation services, or employees of the local government administration of the Poznań agglomeration municipalities.

All registered residents of municipalities for which the City of Poznań is the provider of passenger transportation would have the right to vote for the council members. The right to stand as candidates for the council members, on the other hand, would be given to all registered residents of municipalities covered by the Urban Transportation Authority system, who on the day of submitting their candidacy are at least 15 years of age, hold a PEKA (Poznań Electronic Agglomeration Card) card and have purchased a periodic ticket for a tram or bus line or for the whole network in the current calendar year, or who, in the current or previous calendar year, made at least two t-wallet transactions.

The right to propose directly-elected candidates for the passenger council would be granted to persons or entities registered in one of the municipalities covered by the joint Poznań system of public transportation, representing:

- a) registered disabled people with reduced mobility;
- b) visually impaired or blind people;
- c) alliances of Poznań university student self-governments;
- d) further education colleges;
- e) municipal youth councils;
- f) auxiliary units – villages, housing estate councils;
- g) NGOs acting for the benefit of the local community;
- h) entrepreneurs and institutions representing them.

Each of the entities meeting the above criteria would have the right to nominate one candidate. A nominated candidate would have to be supported by at least three sectoral organizations operating in the area covered by the network of the Poznań Urban Transportation Authority. Nine members of the council would be elected by all people who have the right to vote electronically via an account in the Poznań Electronic Agglomeration Card system. The Poznań passenger council would also include employees of the Urban Transportation Authority (appointed by the Director), and employees of the Poznań Municipal Roads Authority (appointed by the Director). Representatives of system operators with whom the Urban Transportation Authority has signed transportation service contracts, as well as representatives of municipalities, should be represented on an equal rotational basis. Figure 4 shows the proposed membership of the Public Transportation Passenger Council.

After the selection of the entire passenger council, its first meeting should be convened by the Director of the Urban Transportation Authority. At the first meeting, the members would elect three members who would form the executive committee of the council. The executive committee would consist of a facilitator and two members selected from the elected council members. Overall, the passenger council would consist of 17 members. The work of the passenger council could be supported by subject-matter

experts with appropriate knowledge and experience. However, their number would be limited to two, they would have only an advisory capacity, and they would have none of the rights enjoyed by council members.




Figure 4. Membership proposal of the Poznań Public Transportation Passenger Council

Source: Own compilation

### 5. Summary

The aim of the study was to answer the research problem formulated in the introduction. In the performance of its statutory tasks, the public transportation provider may involve residents and passengers. Due to the fact that public transportation policy is strongly correlated with residents' needs, in order to implement it effectively, passenger demands and needs should be very well understood, and an ongoing evaluation

of them should be carried out. To that end, states with longer democratic traditions use deliberative methods of involving residents to jointly decide on local policies. German, British, and Austrian transportation providers or operators set up passenger councils in order to tailor providers' services to the needs of the local population. The councils are advisory bodies, but in the UK they have a budget, and co-decide on the allocation of the budget. The deliberative nature of urban space management opens it up to residents, empowers them, and engages and builds new forms of identification with the locality. It changes the nature of the relationship between the residents and local government/local administration. The creation of high-quality, effective public policy requires an appropriate approach that facilitates mature deliberation in various forms. Polish local governments are becoming more open to new trends in thinking about the city, its function, and its role in the lives of residents, but also in relation to their functional areas. Residents have the right to expect a change in the carrying out of public duties. With regard to public transportation, only the authorities in Warsaw have decided to take advantage of Western European experience and set up the first public transportation council in Poland. This way of implementing current transportation policy can be mutually beneficial.

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## Udział mieszkańców miasta w bieżącej działalności podmiotów świadczących usługi transportu publicznego

### Streszczenie

Organizacja i zarządzanie transportem publicznym jest jednym z najważniejszych zadań władz lokalnych. Ze względu na dynamicznie zmieniające się warunki polityki transportowej nowoczesnych miast, działania w tym zakresie stanowią wyzwanie, polegające na standaryzacji transportu i jego dostosowaniu do potrzeb i oczekiwań transportowych mieszkańców nie tylko poszczególnych miast, ale całych obszarów metropolitalnych. Jednym ze sposobów dostosowania transportu do potrzeb mieszkańców jest ciągła koordynacja na podstawie diagnozy i analizy wymagań mieszkańców. Rady pasażerów transportu publicznego stanowią forum wymiany poglądów na ten temat. W Polsce tylko władze Warszawy zdecydowały się dotychczas na powołanie takiego organu.

**Słowa kluczowe:** miejskie zarządzanie transportem publicznym, obszary funkcjonalne dużych miast, uczestnictwo obywatelskie



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## A forecast of international migration flows into EU countries until 2050

**Abstract:** The subject of this paper is international migration into EU countries. The research objective is a quantitative estimation of the volume of international migration flows into European countries and their close neighbors until 2050. The forecast of international migration flows is based on the author's own model of global international migration. The model is based on a synergetic approach and assumptions that the level of migration is determined first of all by the number of existing migrants from that country. The data used for the forecast is UN data on migration flows in 1990–2015, and the UN's predictions regarding changes in population between now and 2050. The forecast is based on the medium scenario of demographic development offered by the UN. Countries with a current population of more than 5 million are taken into consideration as potential sources of immigration. The predicted values of the total number of international migration flows to each of the EU and neighboring countries for each five-year period until 2050 are determined. The predicted migration flows from EU countries are also determined. It is concluded that the forecasts allow us to claim that the problem of migration will continue for EU countries. However, the essence of this problem is not the prevention of excess migration, but attracting migrants to the countries of the 'second Europe.'

**Key words:** forecasts of international migration flows until 2050, simulation of international migration, migration to the EU

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### Introduction

**M**anaging international migration is a generally recognized problem for the world. Nowadays, there are many theoretical views regarding causes and factors relating to migration. Various macro- and micro-level neoclassical theories are being gradually replaced by more complex and perhaps more realistic theories. These include the NELM-theory – the theory of the new economics of labor migration, the theory of the 'dual labor market,' the world system theory, the theory of migration networks, the transnational migration theory, the theory of cumulative causation, and others (Davis, 1988, pp. 245–261). Each of the theories more or less systematically creates its own hierarchy of factors that affect migration flows at a macro- or micro-level. Numerous detailed and complex models are built according to these theories. However, it should be admitted that the increasing detail of theoretical concepts makes it difficult to construct predictive models that could be based on these theories (Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, Siliverstovs, 2003, p. 68; Raymer, 2013, pp. 801–819). When attempting even medium-term forecasting, defining the parameters of such a model becomes almost impossible. Consequently, such models do not enable us to construct a method for predicting the dynamics of world migration for a period of ten to thirty years (*World*, 2002).

Consequently, in contrast to the prevailing approaches regarding further detailing of migratory flows and volumes within certain groups of countries or regions, we consider

it necessary to turn to a global assessment of the expected migration flows in the medium and long term.

The task of this paper is to describe a modeled forecast of the quantity of international migration flows into the European countries and their close neighbors until 2050, based on the prediction of migration flows between countries of the world and analyzing the predicted potential for international migration. The forecast is based on UN models of change in world population by 2050 (*World, 2015*). The research is based on the model of global international migration created by the author, which is based on a synergetic approach.

### **Data characteristics and base assumptions of the forecast**

For the forecast, data from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat was used (*Trends, 2015*). The UN data includes information on the total number of international migrants per country and territory with uncertain status (232 countries in total) for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. This means that, in the case of UNPD data, we are dealing with somewhat heterogeneous cumulative data on migrants. Due to the UN data being constantly updated we preferred the UNPD data released in 2015, on which we based our assessment of the numbers of potential migrants (*Trends, 2015*).

The UNPD also provides data for three scenarios – low, medium and high – for forecasting population size by 2100 (*World, 2015*). Medium scenario data was used, limiting our attempts to provide a forecast by 2050. The grounds for using only the medium scenario of the UNPD data are discussed in our paper (Polovyi, 2017). Only countries with a current population of more than five million are considered as significant targets and sources of international migrants.

In contrast to the more common approach, in this model the concepts of supplier countries and recipient countries are abandoned. Each country in the model, before and during every iteration, is considered both as a potential supplier and as a potential recipient of international migrants. The ascending hypothesis in constructing this model of migration flows is the assumption that it is possible to determine the degree of mutual attraction for migration flows between pairs of countries at a certain moment, which will determine the direction and intensity of migration flows for the next forecasted period.

The model of international migration takes into consideration the fact that the potential attraction of migrants to a country depends on the following factors:

- the presence and relative size of a diaspora from the source country in the potential destination country;
- the presence and relative number of immigrants from other countries in the potential destination country;
- the dynamics of the increase in the number of immigrants in a potential destination country, and the ratio between the increase in the number of immigrants from each country and the increase from all countries.

The volume of potential migration flows in each pair of ‘migration interactions’ between countries is influenced by the presence and relative number of ‘extra people’ in a potential supplier country. This is determined by:



- the ratio between the available population in the given country and the number of people who emigrated from it during the last observation period;
- the population size and rate of population growth in a given country.

Thus, in model terms, 'extra people' are those who are potentially ready for emigration, based on the trends of migration from this country in past periods of observation, and those who are 'doomed to emigration' by existing socio-demographic trends in a given country. Consequently, these are individuals who are expected to emigrate from a given country in the forecasted period. It should be noted that the model we created as a result of the data used is adapted to estimate the extent of legal migration. The forecasts based on it are not intended to provide forecasts of illegal, or, for example, seasonal production migration. Forecasts of migration flows are formed for five-year periods, from 2020 to 2050.

Verification of the model based on materials from 2010 was described in another article (Polovyi, 2017). The model represents the flows of migration between 118 countries with a population of more than five million people and takes into account 95% of the actual migration between all of these countries. For the purposes of this paper, migration links between these 118 countries and the European countries and their close neighbors are considered. The EU member states and several non-EU states bordering and/or closely related to the EU countries – Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia – were taken into consideration as the targets of migration flows.

### **Predicted levels of international migration flows**

With the help of the created model, the matrices of the paired indexes of the mutual attractiveness of EU countries for migrants were developed for each fifth year from 2020 to 2050. Based on these matrices and in accordance with the UN's medium scenario of demographic development, a scenario for forecasting trends and volumes of legal migration for every five years up to 2050 was constructed, considering all EU (and neighboring) countries and the countries evaluated as a source of migration. The predicted values of the total number of international migrants in each of the EU countries until 2050 were determined.

The tables containing the predicted number of migrants by country until 2040 are posted on the websites <http://myko.name/forecasts/> and <https://independent.academia.edu/FieldNick>. Let us consider the obtained results of the forecast for the above-mentioned EU and neighboring countries.

The total number of immigrants in the studied European countries will increase from 64 million in 2015 to 80 million people in 2050. On average, the proportion of international migrants in these countries is:

- in 2015 – 9% migrants (out of the total population);
- in 2050 – 12% migrants.

In 2015, the largest number of migrants was in Germany, France, Britain, Spain, and Italy; ranging from 11 to 5 million, in descending order; and 10 million in the Russian Federation. In 2050, the largest number of migrants is predicted to be found in almost the same countries – Germany (13 million), France (10.7 million), Britain (8.1 million),

and Spain (5.8 million). However, Switzerland will take 4th position among the countries that have accepted the largest number of migrants. Russia, which will receive the largest number of migrants – more than 13 million – is outside our rating and taken only for comparison.

Analysis of the number of international migrants in relation to the total population of the countries is more informative. In 2015, the percentage of migrants in the European countries' populations ranges from 25% (Switzerland) to 0.6% (Romania). In 2050, the change in the percentage of migrants in relation to the total population of the country is predicted to range from 50% (Switzerland) to 0.8% (Serbia).

Let us consider the detailed distribution of countries by the percentage of migrants in their population: in 2015, the top five countries in terms of the percentage of international migrants were Switzerland (25.5% migrants out of the total population), Sweden (14.4%), Austria (14.2%), Germany (14.1%), and Norway (12.2%). My forecast is that in 2030 the composition of top five countries with the highest percentage of international migrants will change to Switzerland (34%), Belgium (19%), Germany (15%), Austria (15%), and the Netherlands (15%).

As we can see, Belgium and the Netherlands are moving fast to the top of the list. In 2040, an even greater percentage of migrants is predicted in Belgium and the Netherlands. The top five countries will be Switzerland (42%), Belgium (23%), the Netherlands (19%), Germany (16%), and Austria (15%).

In 2050, the top five countries with the largest number of migrants replicate the configuration of 2040. It will be: Switzerland (50%), Belgium (27%), the Netherlands (24%), Germany (18%), and Austria (15%). But, let it be noted, according to the forecast, even in 2050 there are not many countries in which the percentage of international migrants exceeds numbers usual for today (Table 1).

Table 1

**Ratio (in %) of the number of migrants to total population [as forecasted by the UN]\***

	2015 (fact)	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Austria	14.19	15.15	15.32	15.23	15.16	15.15	15.17	15.23
Belarus	10.84	10.99	11.20	11.47	11.78	12.09	12.39	12.67
Belgium	11.59	13.88	16.34	18.55	20.67	22.76	24.82	26.88
Bulgaria	1.27	1.41	1.47	1.54	1.62	1.71	1.80	1.89
Czech Republic	3.66	4.24	4.67	5.08	5.53	5.97	6.41	6.85
Denmark	8.58	8.76	8.76	8.65	8.52	8.41	8.33	8.24
Finland	4.47	5.1	5.65	6.22	6.83	7.46	8.12	8.79
France	11.43	12.05	12.67	13.31	13.70	14.12	14.60	15.11
Germany	14.03	14.45	14.82	15.26	15.77	16.33	16.96	17.65
Greece	6.06	6.13	6.23	6.34	6.45	6.56	6.69	6.84
Hungary	4.4	5.19	6.35	7.57	8.84	10.15	11.49	12.86
Italy	8.33	8.34	8.37	8.43	8.49	8.57	8.68	8.81
Netherlands	9.72	10.96	13.08	15.22	17.33	19.45	21.59	23.73
Norway	12.2	12.95	12.69	12.23	11.83	11.50	11.20	10.92
Poland	1.41	1.41	1.43	1.46	1.50	1.54	1.59	1.64
Portugal	6.74	7.36	8.03	8.57	9.15	9.83	10.62	11.56
Romania	0.62	0.73	0.82	0.88	0.91	0.94	0.98	1.02

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Russian Federation	7.06	7.43	7.85	8.32	8.83	9.34	9.81	10.27
Serbia	0.65	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.76	0.78
Slovakia	3.17	3.57	3.93	4.10	4.19	4.28	4.39	4.50
Spain	12.18	12.17	12.23	12.34	12.44	12.56	12.72	12.95
Sweden	14.37	14.49	14.27	14.00	13.74	13.47	13.18	12.89
Switzerland	25.54	27.87	30.78	34.17	38.00	42.09	46.12	49.98
Ukraine	9.32	9.57	9.86	10.22	10.63	11.05	11.47	11.90
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10.9	11.19	11.16	11.06	10.97	10.89	10.81	10.76

\* Countries alphabetically.

Source: Trends, 2015 and the author’s model.

In addition to the five leaders, ten more countries (including Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) will have more than 10% of international migrants in their population by 2050; these countries are France, Spain, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine, Portugal, Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

It is interesting to note that throughout the period from 2015 to 2050, Ukraine and Belarus remain in the middle of the list, with a range of 9–12% international migrants in their populations. At the same time, at the beginning of the considered period, all Eastern European EU member states are at the bottom of the list, with a proportion of migrants of 0.6–4%. According to our forecast, only Hungary will actively replenish its population with foreign migrants, and by 2050 it will overtake several Western European countries in terms of the ratio of migrants in its population, including Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

It should also be noted that, according to our forecast, any significant increase in the actual number of international migrants before 2050 will occur only in the following countries (Table 2): France, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium – by more than 2 million people; Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Hungary – by more than half a million people. Finally, in six more countries, the forecasted increase in the number of international migrants before 2050 will be more than one hundred thousand people: Portugal, the Czech Republic, Finland, Spain, Austria, and Sweden. In other countries, the increase in the percentage of international migrants will be caused not so much by the increase in their absolute number, but by the decrease in the predicted local population.

Table 2

**Forecast of the number of international migrants (sorted by total number of new migrants until 2050) (in millions)**

	2015 (fact)	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	Total number of new migrants in the country arriving 2015–2050
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
France	7.36	7.92	8.48	9.05	9.46	9.88	10.31	10.75	3.39
Russian Federation	10.13	10.62	11.09	11.54	11.98	12.41	12.81	13.20	3.07
Switzerland	2.12	2.41	2.76	3.15	3.59	4.07	4.54	5.01	2.89
Netherlands	1.64	1.88	2.28	2.68	3.07	3.45	3.82	4.18	2.53

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Belgium	1.31	1.61	1.93	2.23	2.52	2.80	3.09	3.37	2.06
Germany	11.32	11.62	11.85	12.10	12.36	12.63	12.89	13.15	1.83
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7.05	7.46	7.65	7.76	7.84	7.93	8.02	8.11	1.06
Hungary	0.43	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.89	0.98	1.07	0.64
Portugal	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.84	0.89	0.94	1.00	1.07	0.37
Czech Republic	0.39	0.45	0.49	0.53	0.57	0.61	0.65	0.68	0.30
Finland	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.47	0.51	0.26
Spain	5.62	5.62	5.64	5.67	5.70	5.73	5.77	5.80	0.19
Austria	1.21	1.31	1.34	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	0.14
Sweden	1.41	1.47	1.49	1.51	1.52	1.52	1.53	1.53	0.13

Source: *Trends*, 2015 and the author's model.

Let us briefly consider the states which are the main sources of international migrants for the countries of the EU. We will describe only the meaningful data for a few countries.

- Switzerland: in 2020, the main sources of international migrants in Switzerland will be Germany, Italy, Portugal, France, Serbia, Turkey, Austria, Spain, and Brazil. Nationals of these countries will make up more than 80% of all international migrants in Switzerland. In 2050, 80% of the predicted 5 million foreign migrants in Switzerland will be made up of nationals from just six countries. These are Germany, Italy, Portugal, Austria, France, and Serbia.
- Belgium: in 2020, almost 90% of international migrants in Belgium will be from France, the Netherlands, Italy, Romania, Morocco, Poland and Spain. In 2050, more than 80% of the predicted 3.3 million foreign migrants in Belgium will come from Romania, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Guinea, France, Italy and Morocco. It is worth noting that Poland, for example, will not be among the main sources of migration into Belgium.
- The Netherlands: this country is characterized by the extreme fuzziness of its sources of international migrants. Thus, in 2020, 80% of the international migrants in the Netherlands will come from 11 countries: Poland, Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia, Germany, the Russian Federation, China, Belgium, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2050, more than 80% of the predicted 4.1 million foreign migrants in the Netherlands will come from Poland, Greece, Hungary, Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia, Germany, and the Russian Federation.
- France: this country (like the Netherlands) is characterized by a large number of sources of international migrants. In 2020, the sources of 80% of international migrants (out of 7.3 million) in France will include eleven countries: Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium and Madagascar. In 2050, more than 80% of the predicted 10.7 million foreign migrants in France will come from the same eleven countries, but in a slightly different order (in decreasing order): Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Tunisia, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Germany, and Madagascar.

## Conclusions

Thus, a forecast of international migration flows into European countries until 2050 has been described. As can be seen from the forecast data, European countries in the next thirty years will experience a gradually increasing influx of immigration. It should be noted, however, that, according to the forecast, immigration flows will be characterized by a low growth rate. The rate will be comparable to maintaining the status quo. This forecast runs contrary to populist statements about the massive, unstoppable influx of migrants into Europe.

It should be noted that a significant proportion of migrations take place within Europe itself, between European countries. For example, 80% of immigrants in Switzerland in 2050 will be from five European countries, of which only Serbia is not yet a member of the EU. Thus, although every second resident of Switzerland is predicted to be an immigrant in 2050, the Swiss government should not have additional causes for concern, as eight out of ten of these people will come from similarly developed European countries. In general, it can be stated that the vast majority of emigrants from EU countries will migrate within the EU's borders.

Obviously, thirty years is a long time, and therefore we can expect significant adjustments to the trends indicated in the forecast. Among the main factors that can cause the acceleration of migration flows is an acceleration of economic growth in the EU countries. Although such a scenario does not seem inevitable at present, it should not be discounted. Such an acceleration of economic growth can create two complementary levers for migration: (1) additional attraction for labor forces, and (2) a further increase in the level of social and medical support for EU residents, which will be accompanied by a continuing increase in life expectancy and, accordingly, an increase in the proportion of the elderly remaining within the working population. This second process will create an additional driver for labor migration. Paradoxically, slow or negative economic growth in EU countries should be considered a factor slowing down immigration to and within the EU. Forecasting the economic dynamics of EU countries is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be admitted that the presence of such a forecast would make it possible to clarify the forecast of migration flows. At the same time, the impact on migration of the current and projected economic dynamics of EU countries should not be overestimated. The current gap in the living standards of the EU and developing countries has created a significant reserve for economic migration, which is relatively small considering current levels of economic development.

Finally, an important and highly unpredictable factor affecting the accuracy of forecasts of migration flows into EU countries is the social legislation of the EU countries. The generosity of the welfare state in modern EU countries serves as a constant attracting factor for migrants from the least developed countries. Undoubtedly, legislatively reducing the size of social assistance guaranteed by the state can significantly reduce the attractiveness of the country for such migrants. One example confirming this is contemporary Ukraine. With all the attractiveness and richness of its nature, with the low cost of living in Ukraine, potential successful immigrants can hope for a state allowance of 0.5 euros per month, which does not look attractive even in countries such as Somalia.

However, the consideration of the practical possibility of legislative limitation of guaranteed social benefits in the EU countries is beyond the scope of this paper.

It should be emphasized that the forecasts based on this model allow us to state that the problem of managing migration will continue for EU countries. However, the essence of this problem is not how to get rid of the influx of superfluous migrants, but how to attract migrants to the countries of the 'second Europe' – practically to all countries in Eastern Europe, as well as Portugal, which will experience ever-stronger depopulation. This depopulation will be intensified by the ever-increasing scale of intra-European migration.

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## Prognoza przepływów międzynarodowych migracji do państw UE do 2050

### Summary

Tematyka prezentowanego artykułu dotyczy problematyki międzynarodowej migracji do państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Celem badawczym artykułu jest ilościowe oszacowanie wielkości międzynarodowych przepływów migracyjnych do państw europejskich i ich bliskich sąsiadów do 2050 r. Autor posłużył się autorskim modelem migracji w skali globalnej. Opiera się on na synergicznym podejściu i założeniach, że poziom migracji określa przede wszystkim liczba istniejących imigrantów z tego państwa. W artykule wykorzystano dane ONZ dotyczące przepływów migracyjnych w latach 1990–2015. Umożliwiło to oszacowanie prognozy dotyczących m.in. zmian w populacji między rokiem 2050 a stanem obecnym. Prognoza ta opiera się na średnim scenariuszu rozwoju demograficznego ONZ. Jako potencjalne źródła imigracji autor wziął pod uwagę współczesne państwa o populacji powyżej 5 milionów. W przedłożonym tekście ujęto przewidywania dotyczące wartości całkowitej liczby przepływów międzynarodowych do każdego z państw UE i państw sąsiednich na każdy pięcioletni okres do roku 2050 oraz przepływy migracyjne z państw UE. Stwierdzono, że prognozy pozwalają nam twierdzić, że problem migracji będzie cały czas dotyczył państw UE. Jednak istotą tego problemu nie jest zapobieganie nadmiernej migracji, ale przyciąganie migrantów do krajów „drugiej Europy”.

**Słowa kluczowe:** prognozy międzynarodowych przepływów migracyjnych do 2050 r., Symulacja migracji międzynarodowej, migracja do UE





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## The cultural and social assimilation of immigrants, and systemic solutions – Poles in Norway and Ukrainians in Poland in the light of comparative research

**Abstract:** The article presents the problem of migration and assimilation of newcomers in the countries of residence. One of the main reasons for migration are economic and social considerations, this applies to both non-European arrivals and internal migration. The aim of this study, conducted by scholars from Norway and Poland, is to compare systemic solutions both within the social legislation and the functioning of the labor market with respect to Poles and Ukrainians, confronting them with existing barriers regarding the possibility of assimilation and obstacles related to the transformation of economic into settlement migration. The methodological and theoretical basis of the team's research is comparative methods, including comparative politics. The research on immigrants was conducted using both quantitative methods – statistical and qualitative data analysis – and research using the in-depth interview method. Poles and Ukrainians are not at the same stage of formal migration due to the formal plane. According to the analysis, Ukrainians have much greater opportunities for actual assimilation than Poles in Norway. Smaller cultural differences and linguistic barriers to the Ukrainians in Poland are conducive to this process. If the state and Polish society take advantage of this situation and enable the settlement of Ukrainians and make their job offers more attractive, there is a chance that they will fill the emerging demographic gap. It would be for the benefit of both societies.

**Key words:** migration, assimilation of immigrants, Poles in Norway, Ukrainians in Poland

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### Introduction

The problem of migration and assimilation of newcomers in the countries of residence has become the leading topic of both political and media debate in Europe. One of the main reasons for migration are economic and social considerations, this applies to both non-European arrivals and internal migration. One of the examples of internal migration of an economic nature is the migration of Poles after 2004 within the European Union and the European Economic Area. According to various data, about 2.5 million citizens emigrated from Poland, mainly for business purposes. One example of this migration is that of Poles migrating to Norway, who in a short space of time have become the second largest nationality in the country apart from Norwegians. In the case of this group, non-resident migration is still dominant – due to the formal and legal possibilities, among others, of gaining full social rights, which Poles can avail in Norway. The resulting gap on the Polish labor market is filled by employees from Ukraine. There are about 1.5–2 million of them in Poland. In this case, the motives for migration are also of an economic nature. At present, Ukrainians

do not have analogous rights to those Poles have in Norway. This applies both to the labor market and economic migration itself. The aim of this study, conducted by scholars from Norway and Poland, is to compare systemic solutions both within the social legislation and the functioning of the labor market with respect to Poles and Ukrainians, confronting them with existing barriers regarding the possibility of assimilation and obstacles related to the transformation of economic into settlement migration. Comparing Norway's attractiveness for Poles and Poland's for Ukrainians is a matter of both interest and importance.

### **The research methodology**

The basis of this article is the research undertaken by an international research team implementing the project titled *Labor migration and the moral sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state* funded by the Research Council of Norway as part of the *Welfare, Working Life and Migration* Program (Velferd, Arbeidsliv og Migrasjon – VAM) and similar surveys carried out in Poland with respect to Ukrainian citizens. The research in Poland was carried out from the resources of the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism and contained additional quantitative research based on the method of direct interview conducted at the beginning of 2018 on a group of 1,300 people. The research area in Norway was the Hardaland district, and in Poland – Wielkopolska. The methodological and theoretical basis of the team's research is comparative methods, including comparative politics (Landman, Robinson, 2009). The research on immigrants was conducted using both quantitative methods – statistical and qualitative data analysis – and research using the in-depth interview method (Weiss, 1995; Kvale, Brinkmann, 2009).

The study benefited from the snowball effect. As the number of people tested and the trust in the testers increased, subsequent people gave contacts to other respondents. Efforts were made to ensure that this selection was adequate to the situation of Poles in the Norwegian labor market and in the Polish immigrant group. An analogous rule was applied to Ukrainians in Poland.

The anonymity of the respondents was very important. Interviews and surveys were voluntary.

After conducting research in Norway, the areas of assimilation related to the social and cultural situation, access to services, norms and principles functioning in both communities, experiences exported by Poles from the country of origin were separated. Then, research was conducted on Ukrainians in Poland using the same assimilation planes for comparative analysis within assimilation.

### **The socio-economic conditions and legal situation – Poles in Norway**

Already in the 19th century, Poland (Kaczmarek, 2008, p. 13) was one of the most important areas of net emigration in Europe. These were mainly labor migrations, some of them were transformed into settlement migrations. Very large migratory movements in relation to Poland took place after World War II, because at the end of the war, 5 million people were abroad, about 20% of all those who survived the war (Kersten, 1974,

p. 320). An equally large wave of migration took place in the 1980s, according to available data, 2.2 million people emigrated from Poland during this period (Okólski, 1994, p. 25). This was related to the gradual abolition of restrictions and the socio-economic situation. Some emigrants left for political reasons.

Introducing the socio-economic determinants with regard to Poles living in Norway, one should bear in mind the fact that Polish citizens constituted one of the largest groups from Central and Eastern Europe who decided to migrate after the fall of the Iron Curtain, as well as the cessation of economic, military and political ties with the Soviet Union. For Poland, the transformation was symbolized by the national elections of June 4, 1989, in which the political opposition, mainly related to the Solidarity movement, was involved. The main motive for migration was economic, the desire to change the situation of their families who remained in the home country. Salary differences in Western European countries and Poland were very significant at that time.

Soon after, on January 1, 1992, the agreement on Poland's association with the EEC entered into force, which meant in practice the abolition of entry visas for Poles and made it possible to take up work. In the initial period, seasonal work was legally undertaken.

Before Poland's accession to the European Union, as a consequence of bilateral agreements concluded with Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland, legal labor migration from Poland, including cross-border migration at the end of the 1990s, was around 300–400,000 people per year (Czop, 2013, pp. 34–44). The migration model, such as having a home and family in Poland and working abroad, had been created. The main directions of migration were Germany and the United States. People migrating from regions with large migration traditions often left their homeland. The migration of the 1980s and 90s was mainly short-term and was associated with taking up employment abroad, mainly in Western Europe, the USA and Canada.

The accession of Poland to the EU on May 1, 2004 was a breakthrough due to institutional changes in the migration of Poles. The European Union guaranteed workers' rights to newcomers from Poland, and the migration ceased to have its occasional nature. Norway, as one of the countries of the European Economic Area, experienced an immediate migration effect. As in other European countries, a new type of employment migration prevailed. In the initial period, Norway mostly took specialists and agricultural seasonal workers from Eastern Europe, and their number never exceeded several thousand annually (Brox, 2009). For the eight new EU member states of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, transitional employment arrangements were in force in the years between 2004–2009 (NOU: 2011:7, p. 71). The consequences of being a member of the EU brought far-reaching, highly beneficial changes in terms of the possibility of using the social benefits available in Norway. Poles became part of the Norwegian *welfare state* overnight (Nowiak, 2011).

Under the existing solutions, they acquired rights to:

- equal treatment – citizens from the EEA from day one of their stay are treated in the same way and can enjoy the same rights as Norwegians;
- common benefits – everyone may exercise the rights acquired in other EEA countries in Norway. An example of this is pension benefits, where the Norwegian system requires a minimum of three years of employment to acquire rights. This must be a period of working in Norway;

- proportionality – this means in practice that the recipient (pensioner) receives a partial benefit from the state from which he transferred to Norway;
- opportunities to export benefits – this means in practice that an employee from the EEA who acquires rights to benefits can obtain them thanks to permanent residence in Norway. An example is cash benefits, if the spouse and children of a Polish employee live in Poland, he/she gets a cash equivalent for not using the Norwegian kindergarten (Frieberg, 2013, p. 19). After the transition period, barriers concerning the employment of Poles in Norway were completely removed.

The research carried out in Norway on immigrants from Poland indicates that most of them came to work, which they sought while still in Poland. This was the result of the functioning of Polish and Norwegian employment offices (Frieberg, 2011). Poles, like citizens from other countries that joined the EU in 2004, worked mainly (as much as 77%) in three sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry and construction. This situation changed slightly after 2010, when women started to come to Norway and take up paid work. Other industries include cleaning services, trade, transport, hospitality, and public services, including health and social services. As for women, they mostly found their first employment in the cleaning industry, based on private contracts. This is undoubtedly related to the language barrier. Women do not work in large groups, as for instance men do in the construction industry, therefore knowledge of the language is the key prerequisite for them in order to get a job.

During the ten years of membership (2004–2014), the increase in the amount of Poles in Norway reached a level of 1,101%, a greater increase was recorded only for Lithuanians 3,694% (Aftenposten, 2014). In absolute numbers, according to data on January 1, 2015, immigrants and immigrant children with Polish roots accounted for 99,400 people, out of a total of 804,963. This meant that Poles were the largest group, before Lithuanians – 39,300 and Swedes – 39,100 (*Invandrerne*, 2015). Poles have become the dominant national group in this country among all immigrants to this country. It is difficult to estimate the final number of Poles staying and working in Norway, because, as research indicates, despite the possibility of legal employment, a group still works in the grey economy (Nowiak, Narożna, Cappelen, 2016).

Despite significant changes related to the development of Poland after joining the European Union, falling unemployment, higher salaries and an increasing standard of living, a very large percentage of Poles still harbor the desire to emigrate from Poland for economic reasons. According to the 2017 report by the Work Service, *Labour Migration of Poles*, 14% of professionally active people were prepared to leave Poland. This means that the number of Polish emigrants may increase to about 3.1 million people. The third country preferred by Poles after Germany (32%) and Great Britain (19%) is Norway (11%) (*Migracje Zarobkowe Polaków VII*, 2017).

In the case of Poles leaving for work, it is very difficult to estimate the number of people who left Poland with the intention of taking up permanent residence, because the only indicator is the number of people resigning from permanent residence in Poland. As can be seen in the list below, in the peak year of 2006, the total was 46,936 people, while in 2017 it was only 11,888. It can be concluded that a significant part of Poles who started working abroad, despite its multi-annual character, do not sever their family ties. In fact most of them plan to return.

Table 1

**The number of people who have resigned from permanent residence in Poland between 2004–2016**

	Years													
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>Total</b>	18877	22242	46936	35480	30140	18620	17360	19858	21200	32103	28080	–	11970	11888
<b>Men</b>	9716	11880	27237	20874	16162	8411	7975	9154	9951	14874	13803	–	6195	5930
<b>Women</b>	9161	10362	19699	14606	13978	10209	9385	10704	11249	17229	14277	–	5775	5958

Source: Own study based on data contained in the Central Statistics Office (Demography Database), <http://demografia.stat.gov.pl/bazademografia/CustomSelect.aspx>, 24.06.2018.

The largest increase in terms of permanent exits was noted in the first years of Poland's membership of the EU. After 2007, the number of people leaving the country with the intention of taking up permanent residence abroad has been systematically decreasing. In the initial period, a significant amount was the result of a process of family reunification, involving people who had previously left; and also the opportunity to benefit from equal social rights and travel by young people who saw the opportunity of a lifetime in the opening up of legal labor markets in the EU and the European Economic Area.

### **Socio-economic conditions and legal situation – Ukrainians in Poland**

After proclaiming independence on August 24, 1991, and the formal breakup of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, Ukraine and its citizens found themselves in a similar situation as Poland. Citizens of Ukraine, under the Regulation of the Council of the European Union 539/2001, were included in Annex I (countries whose citizens need a visa to the Schengen area). This resulted in significant restrictions regarding the possibility of traveling to Poland.

After Poland's accession to the EU, Ukrainians, together with the citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Russian Federation were subject to special procedural facilitations. They could take up work in Poland without the need to apply for a work permit. From 2007, they were allowed to work for three months in a six month period, and from 2008 for six months in a year. Similarly to Polish citizens, visas were abolished in 1992, so the breakthrough date for Ukraine was May 11, 2017, when the Council of the European Union adopted a regulation on visa liberalization for Ukrainian citizens coming to the EU for a period of 90 days in a six month period.

In practice, this meant the increasing attractiveness of other EU countries when it came to employing workers from Ukraine due to higher earnings for instance in Germany. Meanwhile, in Poland, certain areas of the economy could not do without employing Ukrainians. Without them, such sectors as retail, agri-food processing or the construction industry would be badly affected due to a lack of workers. Poland, bearing in mind the new situation, reacted to change the situation immediately. On July 20, 2017, under the new law on employment of foreigners from outside the EU for short-term and seasonal work, district employment offices registered approx. 1.8 million statements on the intention to employ foreigners, 85% of work permits and 95% of the statements went to citizens Ukraine. As of January 1, 2018, the rules of employing workers from Ukraine were simplified on the basis of a declaration on employing foreigners at the District Employment Office for a period of up to six months. Such a statement is entered in a register, on the basis of which a person staying under the visa-free regime can be legally employed or apply for a visa at the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Ukraine, enabling legal stay in Poland. During the term of the contract, an employee from Ukraine has the same employment rights as a Polish citizen. Citizens of foreign countries, including of course Ukrainians who permanently reside in Poland, are subject to Polish social insurance. After three months of work by a foreigner as part of the declaration procedure, if the employer wants to continue cooperation with him based on a contract of employment and on conditions not worse than those specified in the statement, he may apply to the gov-

error of region for a work permit (or a foreigner's application for a residence and work permits). Such permission is issued without the so-called labor market test. In this case, the foreigner has the right to legally perform work for the above-mentioned employer during the waiting period for the decision on the permit.

Seasonal work permits, which are given to all foreigners from non-EU/EEA countries, are issued by a district head or District Employment Offices acting on his behalf. This type of permit:

- entitles you to work for a period of nine months within one calendar year (cost PLN 30.00);
- when applying for this permission for citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, it is not necessary to obtain information from a district head on the inability to satisfy personnel needs;
- concerns working in sectors regarded as seasonal;
- on the arrival of a foreigner in Poland, the employer is obliged to inform the District Employment Office and provide the foreigner's address – only after this does the office issue a seasonal work permit entitling the foreigner to work;
- in subsequent years of cooperation with a given foreigner, the employer can apply for so-called multi-season entry (up to three years);
- a foreigner may work while awaiting a seasonal work permit, i.e. after the entity informs the District Employment Office about the arrival of the foreigner. However, the work must be carried out under the conditions set out in the certificate of entry previously issued by the DEO;
- a foreigner may also work while waiting for the extension of a seasonal work permit from the same employer;
- the employing entity is required to conclude a written contract with the foreigner and to present it beforehand with a translation into a language comprehensible to the foreigner in accordance with the conditions specified in the statement (the contract must include the conditions included in the declaration);
- the employing entity is obliged to comply with all obligations resulting from employment, just as in the case of Polish citizens.

As can be seen here, Poland wants to make work opportunities more attractive for employees from Ukraine, thus protecting itself against the mass departure of Ukrainians from Poland to the West. Probably some of them will be tempted by several times higher salaries, like in Germany, for instance. However, it should be remembered that they will not be able to work legally there, and the German inspection system in this area is very efficient.

According to the available data, 16% of Polish companies employ Ukrainians, and the largest enterprises hire them: we find them in 44% of large companies, 21% of medium-sized companies and 13% of small firms. Ukrainians are employed primarily in companies in the manufacturing industry (24% of enterprises in this sector employ them), followed by the service sector (20%) and trade (14%). Earnings of workers from Ukraine are comparable to the level of earnings of Poles, which was primarily affected by raising the minimum wage in Poland to PLN 13.00 gross hourly pay. Citizens of Ukraine can often count on additions to salaries, such as accommodation, food, transport to and from the workplace, as well as social benefits.

Employing a citizen of Ukraine to work, Polish entrepreneurs primarily use employment agencies (38%). A further 35% find workers through family and friends. Ukrainians, like other foreigners staying on the basis of a visa (national or Schengen), are not entitled to social assistance. They have full rights to education, education up to the age of eighteen is obligatory for foreigners, regardless of their status. When making statistical comparisons in relation to Poland, in terms of the number of immigrants, including citizens of Ukraine, we can clearly see a smaller influx of people with the intention of taking up permanent residence. This is undoubtedly associated with lower attractiveness of Poland compared to other EU and EEA countries.

Table 2

**The number of people immigrating to Poland between 2004–2016**

	Years														
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
<b>Total</b>	9485	9364	10802	14995	15275	17424	15246	15524	14583	12199	12330	–	13475	13324	
<b>Men</b>	4800	4873	5938	8503	8984	11145	9011	8863	8106	6854	6777	–	7299	7200	
<b>Women</b>	4695	4491	4864	6492	6291	6279	6232	6661	6477	5345	5553	–	6176	6124	

Source: Own study based on data contained in the Central Statistics Office (Demography Database), <http://demografia.stat.gov.pl/bazademografia/CustomSelect.aspx>, 24.06.2018.

As for the citizens of Ukraine, they constitute only a small percentage of migrants with the intention of taking up permanent residence in Poland. This can be seen on the table below.

Table 3

**The number of Ukrainian citizens immigrating to Poland between 2004–2016**

	Years														
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
<b>Total</b>	1196	1067	682	777	776	609	599	619	607	630	749	–	1351	1396	
<b>Men</b>	310	314	211	230	227	195	213	181	204	242	295	–	550	590	
<b>Women</b>	886	752	471	547	549	414	386	438	403	388	454	–	801	806	

Source: Own study based on data contained in the Central Statistics Office (Demography Database), <http://demografia.stat.gov.pl/bazademografia/CustomSelect.aspx>, 24.06.2018.

Ukrainians are the dominant group when it comes to people who have been granted a positive decision for permanent residence by a regional governor in Poland. According to the data from the Office for Foreigners, in 2016 there were 5,920 permits out of a total of 9,042 positive decisions, this number increased significantly in 2017, amounting to 7,866 out of 13,304 permits (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, 2016). Altogether, this was the largest group of foreigners, and in the middle of 2016 it totaled 83,490 people (Ostaszewska-Żuk, 2016, p. 24).

In the case of settlers from Ukraine, the trend of temporary migration prevails. It has already been scrutinized that unlike in the case of all migrants, who have changed their place of residence due to economic reasons, women are the dominant gender. While among the total number of employees from Ukraine and the majority of people who



settle in Poland are men, this tendency does not apply to female Ukrainians. It can be assessed on this basis that the dominant motive for so to speak female settlement in Poland is a marriage to a Polish citizen motif.

In addition, it is clear that for citizens of Ukraine, especially women, Poland became more attractive immediately after joining the EU. Settling and getting married meant being a citizen not only of Poland, but also of the EU. Similarly, after 2016 and the gradual opening of the Polish labor market, we see an increase in the inflow of Ukrainian citizens for permanent residence. Not without significance is the fact that the most significant ease of employment restrictions in relation to them only appeared in 2018. Hence, analogous studies can only be carried out a few years from now.

### Cultural and social assimilation – Poles in Norway

Bearing in mind the issues related to the assimilation of a given group of immigrants in the country of temporary or permanent residence, the authors' assessment should take into account several areas that allow the assessment of the group, regardless of the legal situation of the persons. Assuming objectively that the object of the analysis is persons legally staying and migrating to a given state, one should take into account **(a)** the axiological plane, connected with the fact of belonging to a religious group that is dominant in a given group. Similarly, **(b)** the plane associated with the state of consciousness and behavior of individuals and groups assessed within a given community may be significant in the way of perceiving the reality. Also important are **(c)** social relations between visitors/immigrants and the society/community in which they found themselves. The reasons for integration or alienation may be: **(d)** family relationships functioning in a given community, identical or not with relations in the country of residence; functioning and dominant **(e)** mechanisms and relations of an economic nature, perceived as beneficial or not and affecting the material status of immigrants and their families; adaptation to **(f)** norms and rules operating on the labor market, with temporary immigrants working or permanently employed; and finally, **(g)** the degree of acceptance and participation in political life, as well as the attitude to dominant norms, constitutional principles and value systems.

In the case of Poles taking up employment in Norway and the decision to reside in this country, language is the biggest barrier to assimilation and the possibility of getting to know native Norwegians. The basic obstacle to assimilation is also the nature of the work and motivation behind the migration. Despite the improving economic situation in Poland, the motives are still economic, related to a desire to ultimately return to Poland (Nowiak, Narożna, Kuhnle, 2016c).

The dominant group among Poles living and working in Norway are men, about 70%. Construction is the predominant employment sector, often the majority of employees carry out a specific construction job. The only Norwegians they encounter in this case are the owners of the construction companies, investors or technical supervisors, who only come into contact with some of the Polish employees working on those construction sites. They are often recruited by intermediaries in Poland, then employed in Norway. Most Poles do not have a command of any foreign languages, this also applies

to English, because they do not need it. The research proves that, among other things, the functioning of Poles and Polish families in Norway, changes when women start working there and educating their offspring, sending them to local schools.

Referring in more detail to the areas identified at the outset, based on research conducted in Norway, among Poles living and working in this country, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- 1) the vast majority of Poles are part of the so-called 'Nomadic migration' – they are not interested in integration;
- 2) they are socially and culturally connected with their group. Many times they live together in houses rented by Norwegian employers (groups from a handful to dozens of people);
- 3) isolation is conducive to the nature of living – due to the above mentioned 'worker residences,' a kind of 'worker hotel;'
- 4) very often, they do not accept and do not understand many of the standards, principles and institutions commonly accepted by Norwegian society;
- 5) since most migrants are aware of their temporary stay and the closed nature of Norwegian society, they are not interested in breaking into it;
- 6) an element conducive to isolation is belonging to different denominational community – Poles are mostly Catholics, while Norwegians are Evangelical Lutherans;
- 7) a very important obstacle in making decisions about changing economic migration into settlement migration is the climate;
- 8) more often, partial assimilation occurs among young people who have decided on settlement migration;
- 9) partial assimilation occurs when the process of children attending kindergartens and schools begins;
- 10) the children of Poles living with their parents are mostly bicultural, which results in the duality of life/value systems that are often mutually exclusive. There is the syndrome of a child brought as a 'suitcase' – no one asked him whether he wants to go to Norway. Very often there is a sudden break of peer bonds in Poland as well as loss of contact with grandparents and other family members. Children are angry at their parents, but they have no choice. These ties are renewed when organizing, for example, First Communions, very often in Poland;
- 11) the importance of traditional, integration institutions is decreasing, they are being replaced by websites and social networking sites;
- 12) a significant part of Poles feel a sense of discrimination due to the Norwegian asylum policy, which additionally encourages alienation;
- 13) Poles accept and follow patterns in the field of standards and rules operating in Norwegian work environments;
- 14) Poles do not accept Norwegian work culture, where there is a place for rest and due breaks or benefits;
- 15) Poles, despite the formal possibilities of participating in the life of local communities of a self-governing nature, do not get involved in their lives.

As can be seen from the above-mentioned partial conclusions, due to the nature of the labor migration prevailing among Poles and the character of the Norwegian national community, the assimilation of Poles migrating to Norway is mainly of a formal nature.

It manifests itself mainly in the sphere of work (legality of employment) and access to the social system.

### **Cultural and social assimilation – Ukrainians in Poland**

A great convenience for Ukrainian citizens coming to work in Poland and deciding on migrations is their knowledge of the Polish language, as well as the closeness and similarity of the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian languages. This is related to the historical ties of Western Ukraine with Poland. Before World War II, it was part of Poland, and to this day many residents of this part of the country use this language or have relatives or friends who identify with their Polish roots.

As research indicates, half of Ukrainians come to Poland to work for 1–3 months. During talks with the Ukrainian research agency Rating Group, which cooperated in the creation of the Barometer (400 citizens of Ukrainian origin working in Poland were questioned), the Ukrainians admitted that they treated their stay in Poland as an opportunity for short-term earnings. They emphasized that they chose Poland as a profit-making destination, because it is close. Thanks to this, they can quickly return home when they need to. They are also compensated by local earnings (44% of respondents). In Poland, a Ukrainian earns an average of four times more than in their own country. During their stay, they try to spend as little as possible. They put savings aside and take them back to their home country. Ukrainians gather funds and then take them to their homeland, when their visa expires, rather than sending back a specific sum every month. In this way, they avoid fees for international bank transfers (*Większość Ukraińców...*, 2018). The situation of Ukrainian citizens is similar to that in which Poles found themselves in the association period with and in the case of EEA countries in transition periods. Hence, research into their presence and levels of assimilation are not fully comparable to the conditions in which Poles currently operate in Norway, although similarities are visible in many areas due to the typically commercial nature of the migration.

Referring in more detail to the areas of assimilation under analysis in relation to Poles migrating to Norway, and on the basis of the experience and lessons learned from the presence of Ukrainian citizens in Poland, the following conclusions can be drawn for each of them.

- I. The axiological plane, associated with the fact of belonging to the dominant religious group in a given community. Most Ukrainians who come to Poland are Orthodox believers. The system of values, the functioning of societies covered by Orthodoxy and Catholicism, is not so divergent.
- II. The plane associated with the state of consciousness and behavior of individuals and groups assessed within a given community may be significant in the way of perceiving the reality. In the case of Poles and Ukrainians, there are no major socio-cultural differences in the perception of reality in terms of the behavior of both communities.
- III. Social relations between newcomers/immigrants and the society/community in which they found themselves. There is a noticeable difference in the approach to Ukrainians depending on the nature of contacts, or their absence and the situation on the local labor market, e.g. unemployment rates.

- IV. Family relationships functioning in a given community, identical or not with relationships in the state of residence. In this case, there are no significant differences, both communities are characterized by the traditional patriarchal character of families and the same approaches to children, their rights and duties.
- V. Mechanisms and relations of an economic nature, perceived as beneficial or not and affecting the material status of immigrants and their families.
- VI. Norms and rules operating on the labor market, with temporary immigrants or those permanently employed. Employees from Ukraine functioning on the Polish labor market, in addition to equal treatment in terms of remuneration, benefit from the same regulations regarding norms and principles of labor law and social protection as employees from Poland.
- VII. The degree of acceptance and participation in political life, as well as the attitude to dominant norms, constitutional principles and value systems. Due to the nature of their stay, the relatively frequent changes of regulations regarding their employment and seasonality, there is no possibility of their wider participation in social life. They also do not have political rights with regard to the possibility of participation in local elections.

The conclusions drawn both on the basis of qualitative and quantitative research in relation to immigrants from Ukraine residing and working in Poland indicate the greater probability of their assimilation. This depends on the progressive suppression of their stay and work and the extension of social legislation to their family members.

Much now depends on the situation in Ukraine, especially the stabilization processes and the possible return of Poles residing abroad. Ukrainians feel at home in Poland as it facilitates cultural and linguistic proximity, which is also connected with the fact that the majority of those who come to Poland also speak Russian. This language is known to many Polish citizens, hence the ease of communication. This fact often causes that Ukrainians, despite lower salaries, choose Poland, not Germany as their destination of migration.

## **Conclusions**

As can be seen from the above analysis, economic considerations are the main motive for the migration of both communities. In the case of Ukrainian citizens, the internal crisis connected with the conflict over the part of the country that is in a state of civil war is also very important.

Poles and Ukrainians are not at the same stage of formal migration due to the formal plane. The scope of their rights is not the same. The gap created by the absence of millions of Poles, working abroad, in Norway, among other places, is filled by Ukrainian citizens. They have far greater opportunities for actual assimilation than Poles in Norway. If the state and Polish society take advantage of this situation and enable the settlement of Ukrainians and make their job offers more attractive, there is a chance that they will fill the emerging demographic gap.

In a few years, Poles became the second largest national group in Norway, the largest minority that has developed from only several thousand people in the early twentieth

century. Ukrainians are one of the largest national minorities in Poland, and they have a chance of occupying a similar place in Poland as Poles in Norway.

As can be seen from the analysis of the assimilation planes, the feasibility of this prognosis is very high.

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**Kulturowa i społeczna asymilacja imigrantów a rozwiązania systemowe  
– Polacy w Norwegii i Ukraińcy w Polsce, w świetle badań porównawczych**

**Streszczenie**

Przedmiotem analizy jest problem migracji oraz asymilacji przybyszów w krajach pobytu. Jednym z głównych powodów migracji są względy o charakterze ekonomicznym i społecznym, dotyczy to zarówno przybyszów spoza Europy, jak i migracji wewnętrznej. Celem badania przeprowadzonego przez uczonych z Norwegii oraz Polski jest porównanie rozwiązań systemowych zarówno w obrębie prawodawstwa socjalnego, jak i funkcjonowania rynku pracy w odniesieniu do Polaków oraz Ukraińców. Skonfrontowanie ich z istniejącymi barierami dotyczącymi możliwości asymilacji oraz przeszkód związanych z przekształceniem migracji zarobkowej w osiadłą. Podstawę metodologiczno-teoretyczną zespołu stanowią metody komparatystyczne. Badania dotyczące imigrantów, prowadzone zostały przy użyciu metod zarówno ilościowych – analizy danych statystycznych, jak i jakościowych. Polacy i Ukraińcy nie znajdują się z uwagi na płaszczyznę formalną na tych samych etapach migracji, zakres ich praw nie jest taki sam. Jak wynika z przeprowadzonej analizy, Ukraińcy mają dużo większe możliwości faktycznej asymilacji w Polsce niż Polacy w Norwegii. Sprzyjają temu procesowi mniejsze różnice kulturowe oraz bariery językowe w odniesieniu do Ukraińców w Polsce. Jeśli państwo i społeczeństwo polskie wykorzystają tę sytuację i umożliwią osiedlanie się Ukraińców, a także uatrakcyjnią im oferty pracy, istnieje szansa, iż wypełnią oni powstającą lukę demograficzną. Byłoby to z korzyścią dla obu społeczeństw.

**Słowa kluczowe:** migracja, asymilacja migrantów, Polacy w Norwegii, Ukraińcy w Polsce

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## Towards authoritarianism. Internal situation in the Slovak Republic (1994–1998)

**Abstract:** This article discusses the internal situation of the Slovak Republic in the years 1994–1998, the period in which the country was governed by the coalition of Movement for Democratic Slovakia, the Slovak National Party and the Slovak Workers' Association, and the prime minister was Vladimír Mečiar. The main objective of the research was to analyse the actions undertaken by the coalition government in the context of violations of civil and political rights and freedoms, which could indicate an authoritarian way of exercising power and the dismantling of a democratic state of law. In the analysed period, the role of the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition was marginalised, the role of the media limited, the rights of national and ethnic minorities violated. There was also an ongoing, sharp conflict between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and President Michál Kováč. The effect of this governance was the union of almost all political forces and seizure of power after the elections in 1998. In order to answer the research questions, the author used the method of institutional and legal analysis, decision analysis and the statistical method. The research confirmed the hypothesis that, against the background of other Visegrad Group countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, in the case of Slovakia there were many instances of human rights violations in the period analysed. This led to the drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with many countries and the slowdown of Slovakia's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

**Key words:** Vladimír Mečiar, Slovak Republic, human rights, Michál Kováč, Mikuláš Dzurinda

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### Introduction

On 1 January 1993, a new state emerged on the political map of Europe, as a result of the disintegration of the Czech and the Slovak Federal Republic: the Slovak Republic. The purpose of this article is to present the internal situation in Slovakia 1994–1998, namely the government of Vladimír Mečiar. The author tried to answer the question of to what extent the decisions taken by this government led to the dismantling of the democratic state of law and what consequences it had for the Slovak Republic in the international arena. The main hypothesis is that, compared to other countries of the Visegrad Group, in the case of Slovakia there were many instances of human rights violations and the result was a drastic deterioration of bilateral relations with the majority of states and slowdown in the process of accession to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The way power was exercised by the then coalition of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovakian National Party (SNS) and the Union of Slovak Workers (ZRS) was referred to by Timothy Garton-Ash as a democrature (Garton-Ash, 2000, pp. 408–414), whereas Viatcheslau Avioutskii quoted the words of the US Secretary of State Madelaine Albright, who described Slovakia as the “black hole of Europe” (Avioutskii, 2007, p. 21). In order to answer the research

questions and to verify the hypothesis assumed in the study, the institutional and legal method was applied, which allowed me to analyse legal acts. Decisional analysis was of great importance, as it allowed me to present the situations and processes that were the culmination of decisions taken by representatives of the then authorities. Statistical methods were used to analyse data referring to the results of parliamentary elections.

### I. Parliamentary elections in 1994

The elections of 30 September and 1 October 1994 shaped the political scene of Slovakia for almost four years, a scene which was clearly polarised into a government coalition and a completely marginalised opposition. The Movement for Democratic Slovakia won them once again, gaining similar support as two years earlier (35%). The anti-Meciar coalition proved too weak to compromise the position of HZDS. First and foremost, it was the animosities between the politicians of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Left Party (SDL) that determined the results (*Parlamentné voľby 1994...*; Žarna, 2015, p. 108).

Table 1

#### Results of parliamentary elections in 1994

Party	Result (in %)	Number of seats
Movement for Democratic Slovakia	35.0	61
Common Choice	10.4	18
Hungarian Coalition	10.2	17
Christian Democratic Movement	10.1	17
Democratic Union of Slovakia	8.6	15
Association of Slovak Workers	7.3	13
Slovak National Party	5.4	9
Democratic Party	3.4	–
Communist Party of Slovakia	2.7	–
Christian Social Union	2.1	–
others	4.8	–
Together	100.0	150

**Source:** *Parlamentné voľby 1994 on Slovensk*, [www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/parlamentne-volby/1994/vysledky](http://www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/parlamentne-volby/1994/vysledky), 29.07.2018.

The Movement for Democratic Slovakia this time stood for election in a coalition with the Slovak Agricultural Union (RSS), which was of little significance on the Slovak political scene. The second place was taken by the coalition Common Choice (SV) formed by SDL, Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Rural Workers' Movement (HPRS). The electoral results obtained by KDH, the Hungarian Coalition created by the Hungarian Citizens' Party (MOS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) and the Community (ESWS), as well as by the Democratic Union of Slovakia (DÚ) can be seen as confirmation of the stabilising position of these movements and political parties. The results of the elections confirmed the dominant position



of HZDS. In turn, the lack of a stable political structure was the result of ongoing divisions on the political scene (Bajda, 2010a, pp. 78–83).

## II. The government of Vladimír Mečiar

On 3–4 November 1994, an extraordinary parliamentary meeting was convened, during which the parliamentary majority centred around Vladimír Mečiar, while voting continuously for 23 hours, deprived the opposition of influence on the state. All parliamentary committees, television and radio supervisory boards, the Supreme Audit Office, the National Property Fund, the Prosecutor General's Office, and the Special Service Inspection Commissions were filled with government supporters. This event has gone down in history as the “night of long knives.” In response, the European Union issued a *démarche*, expressing hope for the continuation of democratic reforms in Slovakia (Jagodziński, 1994, p. 6). The creation of a new coalition government consisting of HZDS, SNS and ZRS with Mečiar as Prime Minister on 13 December 1994, was not without a significant impact on the entirety of socio-political life. In the electoral manifesto of 1994, HZDS highlighted the need for further strengthening of state sovereignty and economic development. The program also included declarations on membership of the EU and NATO.

In the context of relations with neighbours, the readiness to sign agreements, among others, with Hungary, was declared. Cooperation within international organisations, including the UN, was to continue. In contacts with the Council of Europe, attention was paid to the need to respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and ethnic groups. The importance of systemic transformation in the economic sphere, too, was emphasised, as well as the activation of diplomatic means in order to achieve stabilisation in Central Europe (Košta, Greguš, 1996, p. 24).

In the case of the Slovak National Party, attention was paid to the priority of the national interests of the state, making membership of NATO and the EU dependent on the preservation of cultural diversity. The manifesto underlined the threats posed by the policy of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and, as a result, the threat of the loss of part of its territory. The unstable situation in Ukraine, or the internationalisation of the crisis in the Balkans was also a major concern. In connection with the possibility of joining NATO, the SNS paid attention to the positive aspects of cooperation within the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The necessity of introducing the „Slovak Card” addressed to compatriots living mainly in the Czech Republic was presented (Košta, Greguš, 1996, p. 28).

The biggest surprise was the parliamentary entrance of the radical leftist Slovak Workers' Association (ZRS). The group was founded by a former politician of the Democratic Left Party (SDL) Ján Lupták. It was a demagogic party appealing to the electorate consisting of people dissatisfied with the consequences of socio-economic changes. The ZRS was reluctant towards the accession of Slovakia to NATO and the EU (Košta, Greguš, 1996, pp. 28–29). Ryszard Herbut noticed the fact that, analysing the left wing in Slovakia, one can distinguish two basic manifesto options: a democratic one, whose representative is SDL, and the so-called populist one, identified with the Communist Party

of Slovakia (KSS) and the ZRS. Unlike both left-wing populist parties, SDĽ supported market reforms, including privatisation, but it expected that this would not happen at the cost of lowering the standard of living of citizens. In the economic concept of this party, elements of the social market economy model with strong liberal elements were visible. This party opted for decentralisation of the decision-making process and strengthening the idea of local self-government. It strongly supported accession to Euro-Atlantic structures (Herbut, 1998, p. 144). Andrzej Antoszewski classified SDĽ as the reformed post-communist left, which accepted the principles of market economy and liberal democracy as a real alternative to the communist system (Antoszewski, 2005, p. 58).

Among the members of the new government there were twelve representatives of the HZDS, four of the ŽRS and two of the SNS. The new deputy Prime Ministers were Sergej Kozlík (Minister of Finance) and Katarína Tothová from HZDS, and union activist Jozef Kalman appointed by the ZRS. Juraj Schenk, a sociologist from Comenius University in Bratislava, took over the job of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The creation of the coalition was made possible due to a change in the ZRS's position (Henderson, 2003, p. 92).

On 20 December 1995 the Prime Minister presented a statement of policy. Focusing on international policy, Mečiar emphasised that the continuity of actions which aimed at achieving full accession to the EU and NATO would be maintained. In regard to the first, it was assumed that Slovakia would become a member by 2000 at the latest, and for this purpose the government undertook to prepare a membership application. One of the government's priorities was to harmonise the legal system of the Slovak Republic with EU law. In the matter of international security, Mečiar stressed that the government would make efforts to join NATO, because membership would give Slovakia the greatest guarantee of security.

To this end, the government intended to intensify work under the PpP program and undertake actions to strengthen security in Europe, taking an active part in the work of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN. The Prime Minister declared the intention to develop bilateral relations, first of all with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and to create favourable conditions for the development of political and economic cooperation. Among countries with whom cooperation was crucial, the Prime Minister counted the USA, Canada, Japan and Russia. He also announced the active participation of the government in the activities of international organisations dealing with the protection of human rights. All problems of representatives of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of Slovakia were to be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and of the applicable international agreements. Speaking on behalf of the government, Mečiar stressed that he condemned manifestations of intolerance, chauvinism, aggressive nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. The implementation of the foreign policy objectives presented for the years 1994–1998, in the Prime Minister's opinion, would be successful mainly thanks to the professionalisation of the foreign and diplomatic service, consistently enforcing the interests of the state. The employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were to positively distinguish themselves in terms of moral values and treat their work as a matter of honour and devotion to their homeland. An important task for the Slovak foreign service was to support the state's trade by creating conditions for the development of exports (Bajda, 2010b,

p. 261). Mečiar also announced that he would seek to expel members of the Democratic Union from the parliament, because in his opinion they failed to collect the 10,000 signatures entitling them to participate in elections. Although the Main Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court rejected these accusations, a special commission consisting of members of the HZDS, established during the extraordinary session of parliament, maintained these allegations and threatened sanctions. There was also anxiety in a large part of society. On 8 December 1994, Slovakian students organised a demonstration for the second time within a month with over 10,000 participants. In addition to the organisers, representatives of the Chancellery of President Michal Kováč, the Slovak Episcopate and the largest trade unions also appeared for the first time (Jagodziński, 1994, p. 6). During this period, the conflict between the head of state and the Prime Minister was escalating. When Kováč could not be forced to resign, HZDS and its coalition partners chose the tactics of limiting his competences. Having a majority in parliament, they gradually deprived the President of his powers, handing them over to the government. The battle between the two power centres reached its culmination on 5 May 1995. Just after the elections, parliament set up a commission to examine the circumstances of the dismissal of the first government of Mečiar and the role of the Slovak Information Service in the events of the time. The Commission presented the results of the investigation, which were supposed to indicate that the events of March 1994 had been inspired by the President himself. Despite many reservations, MPs from the government coalition voted in favour of a vote of no confidence in the President. This was inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, which is why the chairman of the parliament declared that the vote had no legal consequences for the President. It was aimed at creating a social atmosphere of condemnation of the head of state. Unable to deny the President the right to deliver a message, on 17 May, the public television authorities postponed his speech to late evening (Krajčír, 1995, p. 69). These events led to clear divisions in society. The opposition parties organised support rallies for the President. Paradoxically, at that time Michal Kováč, once a politician of the HZDS, became a symbol of struggle against Mečiar's authoritarian system of exercising power (Slobodnik, Chmel, 1995, pp. 8–9). On 6 September 1995, Kováč presented the State Report in parliament and referred to foreign policy. He noted that there were no circumstances prompting a change in its priorities. The process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures remained one of the main factors determining the development of the state. The continuation of this direction was justified by historical and economic reasons, as well as the geopolitical location of Slovakia. In his opinion, strengthening the international position of the state depended on the arrangement of bilateral relations with neighbouring states, which was to be of importance for the whole of Central Europe. In this matter, the President demanded the further creation of a basis for the normalisation of Slovak-Hungarian relations (Pytlik, 2010, p. 246). Mečiar's return to the post of Prime Minister was seen as an announcement of the escalation of conflicts in relations with the President. The main goal of the politicians of the new government coalition was to remove the President from office. The main obstacle to this task was the fact that the government coalition did not have the required qualified majority of 3/5 of votes. In this situation, the politicians of the coalition parties took a number of actions leading to limiting the possibilities of action and discrediting Kováč. To achieve the intended purpose, Mečiar did not hesitate to use

the special services. The actions undertaken became the reason for EU ambassadors to hand over to the government, on 25 October 1995, a *démarche*, which stressed that the government's actions against the President were inconsistent with the provisions of the Slovak Constitution and with the political practice of the EU countries that perceived these events with anxiety. A protest was also submitted by the US ambassador, who expressed concern about the further fate of Slovak democracy (Samson, 2001, p. 371). On 17 November 1995, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on the need to respect human rights and the fate of democracy in Slovakia. The EP's concerns pertained not only to the actions of some political parties seeking to dismiss the head of state, or the participation of special service employees in actions to discredit the President, but also to disregarding representatives of the opposition when filling the positions of chairmen of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (National Council) or the so-called Act on the State Language of 1995 (Zákon NR SR č. 270/1995...). The EP also called for discussions on the issues presented in the forum of the European Parliament and National Council joint committees. The answer of the Slovak government to the resolution is interesting. In its opinion, it was a worthless monologue, harmful to Slovakia in the process of accession to the EU and NATO. In addition, government representatives stated that they regarded the resolution that had not been discussed with them to be unlawful (Bajda, 2010a, p. 94).

Human rights violations once again met an international reaction. In a statement issued on 7 March 1996, the International Organisation of Journalists protested against the abuse of economic resources to block the activities of independent press in Slovakia. During the general meeting at the end of October, the organisation addressed the situation in the Slovak media and expressed concern about the economic pressure exerted on independent means of communication (Madera, 2001, p. 180). In order to combat political opponents, in 1996 an attempt was made to amend the penal code. The new code prohibits activities of parties or organisations that would harm the state's defence or promote the spread of false information about the state. The President did not sign the amendment, fearing that the government would use the law to limit political party activities, and thus the new penal code was not implemented (Bajda, 2010a, pp. 94–95).

In addition to the scandal associated with the abduction of the President's son, a lot of emotions were stirred by the murder of Robert Remiáš, which involved special services under the leadership of Ivan Lexa. This was one of the most influential figures in the analysed period. After graduating in chemistry at Polytechnic, he worked at the Slovnaft petrochemical company. In January 1991, he became the director of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar's office for several months. He was the first head of the chancellery of HZDS founded by Mečiar. After the party had won parliamentary elections in 1992, he was promoted to the government plenipotentiary for the organisation of the office of the President of Slovakia, and at the same time he was the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers. In the years 1993–1994, he was deputy Minister for Privatisation in the government of Mečiar, and then he headed the special services (SIS) until 1998. In 2000, he fled the country. In the summer of 2002, he was detained as an illegal immigrant in South Africa and deported to Slovakia (Lesná, 2008). Former SIS officer Oskar Fegyveres was the first to reveal that special forces had been responsible for the kidnapping of Kováč junior. On 29 April 1996, a car exploded with Remiáš on board. A later expert

opinion ruled out the initial version that the accident was caused by a gas cylinder explosion; it was caused by a remotely controlled payload (Grabiński, 2002, p. 12).

During this period, the conflict between the President and the Prime Minister intensified further. On 22 May 1996, the aforementioned Ivan Lexa read a report in parliament in which, as enemies of the state, he named the President, opposition leaders and journalists. This speech made sense in the context of the *SIS Information of 26 May 1995*, the document found after the 1998 election, which was an analysis of the steps that secret services could take to bring about the resignation of the head of state. One scenario suggested investigating the activities of members of his family and finding materials that could compromise the relatives of Kováč. A second scenario was to build a constitutional majority to vote for the President's impeachment. A third scenario assumed abandoning attacks on the President, because he could become a symbol of democracy for the society around which they would unite (Bajda, 2010a, p. 94). First of all, Mečiar accused the Chancellery of the President that they were taking actions that made it an independent centre of foreign policy. In fact, these allegations were addressed to the organisational unit dealing with the generally understood foreign policy. The lack of their validity is evidenced by the fact that this unit of the Presidential Office, employing several people, dealt primarily with the organisation of foreign travel of the head of state, foreign correspondence and coordination of activities related to broadly understood foreign policy between the President and the government and parliament. It should be noted that every year the funds allocated for the activities of the Chancellery of the President were decreased in the budget act, which was one of the elements of conducting political struggle (Žarna, 1995, p. 116).

A lot of controversy arose from the case of Emil Spišák. He was to replace the late SNS MP Bartolomiej Kunc, but he did not take over this function as a result of internal fighting. He justified the deportations of the Jewish population during World War II, and he once became famous for claiming that national heritage had fallen into the hands of a small group of Jews (Avioutskaa, 2007, p. 20). SNS nominated Ladislav Hruška. This was explained by the fact that, in the meantime, Spišák had left the party. He asked the Constitutional Court to investigate whether his rights had been violated. At the beginning of January 1998, the Court decided that National Council had violated Spišák's constitutional rights, preventing him from entering parliament. What is more, the parliament violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to the Court, National Council was obliged to abolish the adopted resolution on the entry of deputy Ladislav Hruška to the parliament and to give the seat to Emil Spišák. Contrary to the verdict, the majority coalition rejected this ruling (Madera, 2001, pp. 165–166).

An effect of the policy model pursued by Mečiar was the mobilisation of the opposition in face of the elections for the National Council proposed for 19 September 1998. In the autumn of 1996, the so-called Blue Coalition, composed of the centre-right parties, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Union of Slovakia and the Democratic Party was founded. On 3 July 1997, it was extended to include two left-wing parties, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia and the Green Party in Slovakia, and this newly formed element of the Slovak political scene adopted the name of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). Politicians associated in its structures announced that, after victory in the election and the establishment of a government, they would make efforts in

favour of Slovakia's return to the group of candidates for the EU and NATO. However, before the next parliamentary elections took place, the Prime Minister positively assessed the achievements of Slovak foreign policy in 1997 (Cichosz, 2010, p. 140).

Faced with the consolidation of the opposition, Mečiar attempted to change the electoral law. The bill was submitted in March 1998, only six months before the election date. This met with a fierce reaction from opposition politicians. The draft bill changed electoral constituencies by introducing one constituency. A lot of controversy arose from the amendment in which the Hagebach-Bishoff method of counting votes and the 5% electoral threshold introduced in 1992 were maintained, but this solution applied to every political party, regardless of whether it was a part of a one-party election committee or an electoral coalition (Sokół, 2007, pp. 415–417).

An important aspect of the conflict between the head of state and the Prime Minister was the crisis associated with the next presidential election. The term of President Kováč's office expired on 2 March 1998 and the National Council, due to the inability to obtain the required majority of votes, was not able to elect a new president. From March 1998 to May 1999, according to the provisions of the Constitution, Mečiar was the head of state. The leader of HZDS used this situation to implement his own political plans. In this period, he dismissed 28 pro-opposition ambassadors and blocked proceedings pending in political matters, and four months before the next parliamentary elections introduced an amendment to the electoral law that would benefit his party. The aforementioned new ordinance imposed exceptionally high demands on the coalitions which concentrated most opponents of the government. In this situation, the opposition evolved from "party coalitions" into "coalition parties" with complex structures and names (Pytlík, 2010, p. 249). What Mečiar gained was that for several months the leaders of the opposition did not have time for the election campaign.

In addition to the mobilisation of opposition parties, representatives of non-governmental organisations played an important role. In October 1997, the Citizens' Campaign project came into being (OK-98). In March 1998, during the congress in Zvolen, 35 Slovak NGOs officially launched an initiative. The campaign focused on three basic goals: deepening the voters' awareness, ensuring a high turnout and increasing the influence of citizens on the election process by supervising it. As part of its activity, OK-98 initiated 60 educational projects that were addressed mainly at young people. According to Avioutskii, in 1998 380,000 voters reached electoral age, which constituted 10% of those entitled to vote (Avioutskii, 2007, p. 24). The activity of OK-98 was met with a fierce attack from the pro-government „Slovenska Republika" which suggested that the organisation was financed by the USA. Two of the founders, Pavel Demeš and George Soros („Slovenská Republika"...), were also attacked on its pages.

### III Parliamentary election of 1998

In the electoral manifesto of 1998, HZDS politicians paid special attention to economic relations, mainly regarding the need to attract foreign investment capital to Slovakia. The necessity of membership in NATO and the EU was also emphasised, but taking into account other arrangements and the geopolitical location of Slovakia. Nevertheless,

the electoral manifesto was still different from the previous practice implemented by the government of Mečiar. In his comments, the head of the parliamentary committee for European integration, Augustin M. Húška, even argued that integration posed a threat of globalism, cosmopolitanism and the consumerist lifestyle of the West (Wlachovský, 1998, pp. 63–77).

Representatives of SNS strongly criticised the intention of Slovakia joining NATO and the EU. It was emphasised that Slovakia would lose much in EU structures, and NATO was blamed for conducting an aggressive military policy. The anti-NATO rhetoric was then particularly strong, due to the intervention in Kosovo. SNS leader Ján Slota, negatively oriented toward the Hungarian nation, stressed that its appearance in Europe was a real misfortune. There was strong criticism of the Slovak elite, who were accused of extreme cosmopolitanism. For the SNS, a pro-Russian policy was also hardly comprehensible, as Russia set itself visibly imperial political goals (Wlachovský, 1998, pp. 63–77). On 25–26 September 1998, elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic were held and HZDS won again.

Table 2

**Results of parliamentary elections in 1998**

Party	Result (in %)	Number of seats
Movement for Democratic Slovakia	27.0	43
Slovak Democratic Coalition	26.3	42
Democratic Left Party	14.7	23
The Hungarian Coalition Party	9.1	15
Slovak National Party	9.1	14
Party of the Civic Agreement	8.0	13
Communist Party of Slovakia	2.8	–
Association of Slovak Workers	1.3	–
New Slovakia	0.5	–
Slovak People's Party	0.3	–
Hungarian People's Movement for Prosperity and Reconciliation	0.2	–
Independent Initiative	0.2	–
Slovak National Unity	0.1	–
Bečko – Revolutionary Workers' Party	0.1	–
The Uniform Workers' Party of Slovakia	0.1	–
Slovak National Alternative	0.1	–
Movement of the Third Way	0.1	–
Together	100.0	150

**Source:** *Parlamentné voľby 1998 on Slovensko*, [www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/parlamentne-volby/1998/vysledky](http://www.vysledkyvolieb.sk/parlamentne-volby/1998/vysledky), 29.01.2018.

As already mentioned, the politicians put in a lot of work ahead of the election in order to unite their forces and ensure that no voter's voice of anti-Meciar views was wasted. An important role was played by the non-public television station Markiza, which obtained a broadcasting license during Mečiar's rule. He hoped that he would gain another advantage in the campaign, however it turned out otherwise. Markiza fiercely opposed

the Prime Minister and constituted a significant force. To some extent, the director of Markiza television created the figure of Mikulaš Dzurinda as the future head of the government (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 18). In response, a report appeared on public television in which politicians associated with the KDH were attacked for allegedly having exported works of art abroad (Mačkowiak, 1998, p. 20).

Representatives of the OSCE missions present during the 1998 elections, invited by the Slovakian Foreign Ministry, decided that the elections had been carried out correctly. However, they were forced to note that, with the exception of Markiza, other TV stations were not objective in their comments, not hiding their pro-government sympathies. It was also pointed out that one could have reservations about the composition of electoral commissions which did not give opportunities to non-governmental organisations. Similar doubts were aroused by the electoral law itself, which could hinder Mečiar's opponents from creating a government coalition. The Prime Minister himself ran the campaign on a really impressive scale. On 10–13 September 1998, Claudia Cardinale and Gerard Depardieu, and the top model Claudia Schiffer (Green, 1998), took part in the HZDS pre-election meeting.

Despite electoral success, Mečiar did not manage to create a government that would have a parliamentary majority. In this situation, this mission was entrusted to the SDK leader Mikulaš Dzurinda. The negotiations lasted over a month, and the fact of entering the coalition by the representatives of the Hungarian minority aroused a lot of emotions. At the very beginning of talks on the creation of a coalition, SDE politicians put forward the idea of forming a government without the participation of the Hungarians. Trying to discern the reasons for this objection, Rudolf Chmel claimed that the SDC politicians probably were after ministerial seats, some of which would have been theirs if the Hungarians had not entered the government (Chmel, 1999, p. 21).

Finally, due to protests by the other coalition parties, the idea of SDE did not come into effect and representatives of the Hungarian minority entered the government. As Martin M. Šimečka remarks, many Slovaks realised that in the Slovak parliament, Hungarian deputies were the only ones who consistently voted for all acts of transformation and against all laws limiting democracy (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 18). The Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) itself was also hastily created after Mečiar had changed the electoral law. It consisted of Béla Bugár's moderate Christian Democrats, Laslo Nagy's liberals and Miklos Duray's radical nationals. SMK in principle did not run an election campaign outside the regions inhabited by Hungarians. Nevertheless, young, educated Slovaks from large cities voted for this party (Mačkowiak, 1998, p. 20).

The coalition agreement was signed on 28 October. The government coalition was a peculiar phenomenon and did not have an equivalent in Europe. It was created by SDK, SDE, SMK and the Civic Alliance Party (SOP). SDK received nine ministries, SDE six, and SMK three. Mikulaš Dzurinda became the head of the government that was a complicated conglomeration of various factions, and of which, paradoxically, the main binder was Mečiar himself, should the threat of his return turned out to be real (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 19). Mečiar did not hide his disappointment. On 30 September, in a TV speech, he rebuked voters who failed to support his party and would regret their decision in the near future, because the new coalition would sell Slovakia to the West. He finished his speech with tears. He gave up his parliamentary mandate to Ivan Lexa,



and as a result, every request to hear the former head of the special services had to undergo a complicated parliamentary procedure to lift his immunity. Mečiar, acting as the head of state in the first half of 1998, granted an amnesty to his close associate and all those involved in the abduction of the son of the president. Although Dzurinda cancelled the decision on amnesty, the constitutional court decided that it still remained in force (Grabiński, 2002, p. 12).

According to Šimečka the September election proved to be a democratic revolution, the significance of which was greater than that of November 1989. At that time, the events had actually echoed those in Prague, and it had soon turned out that Slovak society had not yet been prepared for real change. Yet in 1998, the same society demonstrated great energy (Szimeczka, 1999, p. 21).

### Conclusion

Among the countries of Central Europe, the internal situation of Slovakia had the greatest impact on the delay of the accession process to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. While the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland were invited to start accession negotiations during the EU summit in Luxembourg in 1997, the Slovak Republic was on the margins of this process. The Slovaks started negotiations under the provisions of the Helsinki summit in 1999, after Vladimír Mečiar had been removed from power. It was similar in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance; the three countries in question joined NATO in 1999, whereas Slovakia became a member a few years later. The key factor was the policy conducted in the years 1994–1998 by the coalition government of HZDS-SNS-ZRS under the leadership of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. In this period there were many instances of violations of civil and political rights and freedoms. As a result of decisions taken by the then authorities, the opposition, both parliamentary and non-parliamentary, was completely marginalised. The rights of persons belonging to national and ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians and Roma, were also restricted. The opposition media also became the object of discrimination on the part of the rulers. The symbol of the political situation in this period was the conflict between Prime Minister Mečiar and the head of state. The government attempted to totally limit President Kováč's prerogatives and to discredit him in the eyes of the public. The Prime Minister even used the special services, which kidnapped the President's son. A number of actions taken in the years 1994–1998 explicitly pointed to an authoritarian way of exercising power. In none of the other countries of the Visegrad Group did such a situation occur, and the analogy could be traced rather in the Balkan states.

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**W stronę autorytaryzmu. Sytuacja wewnętrzna w Republice Słowackiej (1994–1998)****Summary**

Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy sytuacji wewnętrznej Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1994–1998, czyli okresu, w którym rządy w tym państwie sprawowała koalicja Ruchu na rzecz Demokratycznej Słowacji, Słowacka Partia Narodowa i Zrzeszenie Robotników Słowackich, a funkcję premiera pełnił Vladimír Mečiar. Głównym celem badań była analiza działań podejmowanych przez koalicyjny rząd w kontekście naruszeń praw i wolności obywatelskich i politycznych, co mogło wskazywać na autorytarny sposób sprawowania władzy i demontaż demokratycznego państwa prawa. W analizowanym okresie doszło do zmarginalizowania roli opozycji parlamentarnej i pozaparlamentarnej, ograniczenia roli mediów, naruszenia praw mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych, a także ostrego sporu pomiędzy premierem Vladimírem Mečiarom a prezydentem Michálem Kováčem. Efektem tych rządów było zjednoczenie niemal wszystkich sił politycznych i przejęcie władzy po wyborach w 1998 r. W celu odpowiedzi na pytania badawcze autor posłużył się metodą analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej, analizy decyzyjnej i metody statystycznej. W wyniku badań potwierdzono założoną hipotezę, że głównym założeniem artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że na tle innych państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: Czech, Polski i Węgier w przypadku Słowacji dochodziło do wielu przypadków naruszeń praw człowieka. Implikacją tego było drastyczne pogorszenie bilateralnych stosunków z wieloma państwami i spowolnienie procesu akcesji Słowacji do Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego i Unii Europejskiej.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Vladimír Mečiar, Republika Słowacka, prawa człowieka, Michál Kováč, Mikuláš Dzurinda



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## The State of Air in the European Union and Quality of Europeans' Life

**Abstract:** This article aims to present the impact of air pollution on the quality of life of EU residents. With the aid of institutional-legal and statistical analysis an attempt has been undertaken to answer the following research questions: 1) negative concentrations whose pollution exceeds norms set out at EU levels, 2) causes of above-norm pollution concentrations and 3) impact of pollution on the health of Europeans. During the conducted research it was demonstrated that the quality of life of Europeans is being lowered by a continuing above-norm concentration of air pollution whose exposure is related to people feeling worse, numerous diseases related to the breathing system, circulation, nervous and even reproductive system as well as increased death rate and shortening of life expectancy. The estimated number of premature deaths in 2014 resulting from exposure to fine dust, ozone and carbon dioxide in the EU amounted to 487,600. As the investigation shows, the best quality of life, taking into consideration air quality, is afforded by Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

**Key words:** ecological security, environmental security, health security, quality of life, air quality, European Union

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The quality of life is understood as “the degree of meeting material and non-material needs – fulfilling standards or realising values such as biological, psychological, spiritual, social and political, cultural, economic and ecological of individuals, families and the community” (*Nowa encyklopedia powszechna PWN*, 1997, p. 121; *Encyklopedia PWN*). It is not possible therefore to experience a high quality of life in a polluted environment, whose part – the atmosphere, is subjected to strong anthropogenic impact, especially as a result of burning fuels, power stations and power-heating plants, household fireplaces and in transport, technological and construction processes as well as the use of artificial fertilisers. The impact of air pollution on people’s health became the object of interest on the part of public opinion after the occurrence in December 1952 of the great London Smog. In the space of five days as a result of respiratory tract infections, ischaemia and asphyxiation, approximately 4000 people died, while in the following months another 8000 as a result of respiratory tract diseases. The above was caused by a pocket of air together with its pollution from particulate matter, arising from the burning of coal in the three London power plants and in households attempting to heat their flats and houses at a time of extremely cold weather and sulphur dioxide emitted by various means of transport (Wojtalik, 2012).

Air pollution, that is all permanent substances of a liquid and gas nature whose emissions can be harmful to people’s health or the environment, damage material goods or worsen their aesthetic qualities, continue to constitute a challenge for the majority of EU Member States, especially in urbanised areas (Poskrobko, Poskrobko, 2012, p. 195). According to the *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, (OECD),

unless new initiatives are undertaken for the protection of the atmosphere from pollution, by 2015 the poor quality air will become the main environmental cause of death across the globe. According to the estimates of the above, premature deaths caused by exposure to breathing particulate matter could amount to 3.6 million people by 2050 – more than as a result of the lack of access to clean drinking water and washing facilities, or indeed malaria. In turn, exposure to ground-level ozone can cause the premature death of around 750,000 people (OECD, 2012, p. 276).

In EU environmental policy the protection of air quality from harmful pollution for people's health and the environment constitutes one of its fundamental pillars. The most important aspects of the protection of air quality are regulated in EU law and concern the definition of its standards and quality, the control of polluted emissions and the setting of respective country levels. European regulations impose the responsibility of formulating plans for the protection of air quality for areas where the concentration of pollution in the air exceeds normative values. In the space of 20 years in the EU a significant lowering of sulphur dioxide emissions has been observed – around 80% and that of nitrogen monoxide and volatile organic compounds – around 40 to 50% (European Commission, 2016).

Nonetheless, the EU aims for the improvement of air quality to an extent where it is possible to reach concentrations of defined compounds below levels harmful for public health and the environment. A significant problem remains, as indicated in the 7<sup>th</sup> Environment Action Programme of initiatives up to 2020, *Living well, within the limits of our planet*, remains 'a good quality of life taking into account the limitations of our planet', in particular the emission of particulates emitted into the air (particulate matter) dangerous for the health of EU residents and the pollution of the ozone, harming the human organism (Decision No. 1386/2013/EU, appx. 7, pt 44).

### **The most significant air pollution in the UE and its source**

Acceptable levels of pollution considered as safe for people's health and environment in the EU as well as methods for their evaluation were defined in the Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ EU L 152/1, 11.06.2008), known as the CAFE<sup>1</sup> Directive and Directive 2004/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004, relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air (OJ EU L 23/3 26.01.2005). On account of the deleterious effects of air pollution on citizens' health in EU Member States and evaluation of their quality in respect to the contents of 11 substances is made: sulphur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nitrogen dioxide (NO<sub>2</sub>), carbon monoxide (CO), benzene (C<sub>6</sub>H<sub>6</sub>), O<sub>3</sub> zone (O<sub>3</sub>) and particulate matter (PM<sub>10</sub> i PM<sub>2.5</sub>), as well as heavy metals present in the latter PM<sub>10</sub> such as lead (Pb), arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), nickel (Ni) and benzo(a)pyrene (C<sub>20</sub>H<sub>12</sub>). Three particular substances are analysed in respect to the protection of plants: sulphur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nitrogen monoxide (NO<sub>x</sub>)<sup>2</sup> and ozone.

<sup>1</sup> The acronym CAFE stands for *Directive on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe*.

<sup>2</sup> The high temperature at which mining fuels are burnt leads to a reaction between nitrogen and oxygen. Nitrogen oxide (NO) arises, which in the air oxidised into NO<sub>2</sub>. The value of these two oxides is therefore given in total and written as NO<sub>x</sub> (NO<sub>x</sub> = NO + NO<sub>2</sub>). See further: Juda-Rezler (2006), p. 59.

### Particulate matter

Particulate matter, (PM) it is a mixture of fine particulates and minute ambient liquid drops, which are pollutants equally, as initial, directly emitted into the atmosphere as well as secondary, arising in the atmosphere as a result of chemical reactions. Primary particulate matter has its origin in natural sources in the form of for example, forest fires, sea air, desert particulates, volcano eruptions, material of plant origin or that of animals as well as anthropogenic. As far as sources tied to the activities of man, in the main one can point to the processes of burning fuels, especially solid fuels and industrial processes. Further, significant amounts of particulates are emitted from the energy sector, mining, metallurgical, chemical, construction and transport, where the larger part of emissions arises from the friction of tyres, brakes and road surfaces as well as the urban-household sector. Secondary particulate matter arises as a consequence of the transformation of particulates –  $\text{SO}_2$ ,  $\text{NO}_x$  and volatile organic compounds (VOC) (Kamiński, Strużewska, 2018, p. 7).

On account of the size of particulates there is a general division of particulate matter into *fine*, when particulates are smaller than  $2.5 \mu\text{m}$  and *coarse* for those larger than  $2.5 \mu\text{m}$ . Particulate matter less than  $10 \mu\text{m}$  in diameter is able to adsorb heavy metals (lead, cadmium) and chemical compounds, in particular of organic origin, in the main belonging to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) (Pałasz, 2016, p. 58). Table 1 presents a taxonomy of particulate matter together with their properties.

Table 1

#### Ambient particulate matter

Diameter	Properties	Properties
$> 10 \mu\text{m}$	Very coarse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– arise in a mechanical way as a result of friction or crumbling in various types of materials such as the friction of tyres and brakes particulates of natural origin such as sea salt,</li> <li>– fall rapidly,</li> <li>– easily removed from the atmosphere by processes of sedimentation and fall,</li> <li>– have a limited radius of transfer,</li> <li>– people near the source of emission are prone to their activity.</li> </ul>
$2.5\text{--}10 \mu\text{m}$	Coarse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– mineral particles from production processes, construction work (i.e. demolition) and burning,</li> <li>– biological particles, (the pollen of some plants, mushroom spores),</li> <li>– ambient for short periods (after several hours),</li> <li>– easily removed from the atmosphere as a result of sedimentation processes and with showers,</li> <li>– carried mainly short distances (from several to several hundred kilometers).</li> </ul>
$\leq 2.5 \mu\text{m}$	Fine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– result from burning (wood and mined fuels), agricultural or industrial work and technological processes,</li> <li>– ambient for relatively long periods (from days to weeks),</li> <li>– May be carried for hundreds and thousands of kilometers.</li> </ul>
$\leq 0.1 \mu\text{m}$	Very fine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– emitted mainly in burning processes,</li> <li>– ambient for very short periods (from minutes to hours),</li> <li>– can be transported for tens of kilometers,</li> <li>– their concentration falls quickly as a result of dilution.</li> </ul>

**Source:** Author's taxonomy based on M. Reizer, *Co to jest pył zawieszony?*, in: *Pyły drobne w atmosferze. Kompendium wiedzy o zanieczyszczeniu powietrza pyłem zawieszonym w Polsce*, eds. K. Juda-Rezler, B. Toczko, Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska, Warszawa 2016, pp. 12–14.

In 2015 in the EU 42% PM<sub>10</sub> was emitted by households and buildings belonging to public institutions and business, while 17% arose from industrial processes, 15% from the agricultural sector, 11% Road transport, 5% burning fuels and industry, 5% in the production of energy and its distribution, 3% rubbish tips and 2% from transport other than road (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 22). The total emission of PM10 in the UE for 2016 in respect to the year 2000 fell by 26%, from 2,783 Gg to 2,064 Gg. The greatest reduction of emissions was attained by Malta (75%), Estonia (65%), Cyprus (58%), Greece (43%) and France (42%). In the above-mentioned period emissions increased in Lithuania (38%), Romania (21%), Slovenia (12%) and Bulgaria (2%). The greatest contribution in total emissions in the EU (above 10% total emissions), according to latest data available for 2016 had Poland (12.6% – 259 Gg) and France (12.4% – 255 Gg). It should be noted however, that France's contribution for total emissions for 2016 in comparison to that of the year 2000 decreased by 3.4%, whereas in the case of Poland it rose by 1.5% (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 61).

The source of PM<sub>2.5</sub> emissions in 2015 in the UE had the following forms: 57% fine particulate matter was emitted by households, buildings of public institutions and business, 11% came from road transport, 10% from industrial processes, 7% burning fuels in industry, 5% from the production of energy and its distribution, 4% from agriculture, 4% rubbish tips and 2% from transport other than (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 22). In the period 2000–2016 the total emission of PM<sub>2.5</sub> in the UE fell by approximately 28% – from 1,861 Gg to 1,343 Gg. Malta, the Netherlands, Greece, Cyprus, France and Croatia were the countries that in the space of 17 years were able to lower the most emissions of fine particulates respectively by 74, 57, 55, 48 and 45%. Only in four countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Hungary did the emission of PM<sub>2.5</sub> increase, respectively by 24, 17, 17 and 10%. In 2016 the greatest, more than 10% contribution in emissions from the EU occurred in France (12.7% – 170 Gg), Italy (12% – 162 Gg) and Poland (10.8% – 146 Gg) (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 59). The sources of emission of the most significant precursors to particulate matter in the UE, which are nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide, are discussed in a subsequent part of the article.

The binding norms in the European Union for PM<sub>10</sub> is the acceptable average daily value of 50 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, which cannot be exceeded more than 35 times in the course of a year and the average yearly value at the level of 40 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Member States have agreed to maintain both of these standards as of 2005, though in 2015 19% of measuring stations in the EU recorded more than 35 days where average daily norms were exceeded in 20 Member States – a 95% in urban areas or outer urban. The largest breaks of pollution thresholds took place in Bulgaria, Poland and Italy. The concentration of PM10 above average annual was recorded by 3% of measuring stations, first and foremost in three countries: Bulgaria, Poland and Italy. Moreover, at least one station reordered a breaking of thresholds in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Greece, Spain and Hungary. In addition, taking into account the more restrictive proposals of the *World Health Organization* (WHO), which were presented for the above-mentioned in the publication of pollution in Table 2, the average annual norm was exceeded in 54% of measuring stations, in all EU Member States apart from Estonia and Ireland (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 31, 33). According to the wording of the CAFE Directive, the EU in establish-



ing aims in respect to the quality of air should take into account the WHO norms and therefore one should expect a tightening of these standards at the EU level.

For the particulate  $PM_{2.5}$  in the UE a norm was defined in the form of average annual values amounting to  $25 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , which should not be exceeded from 2015 and  $20 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  from 2020. At present, three Member States have not reached the binding standard established in 2015 – Poland, Czech Republic and Italy. Some 93% of thresholds that were exceeded took place in urban or outer urban areas, affecting 6% of all UE measuring stations. Taking into account the average annual recommendation of WHO for  $PM_{2.5}$  amounting to  $10 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , 75% of stations recorded thresholds being exceeded. Air quality fulfilling WHO norms was experienced only by the residents of Estonia, Finland, Ireland and Sweden (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 33 and 35).

As a consequence of exceeding EU norms in respect of the quality of air regarding particulate matter, the European Commission in September 2015 brought against Bulgaria and in December the same year also Poland, a complaint to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg. Both countries were found guilty of breaking EU law. CJEU judges found that Bulgaria from 2007 to at least 2013 included and Poland from 2007 to at least 2013, systematically did not abide by acceptable average daily norms (respectively in five and in thirty-five areas of assessment) and average annual norms (respectively in five and nine areas of assessment) of  $PM_{10}$  concentration values and did not undertake the necessary action to mitigate thresholds being broken in the shortest possible time (judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 5 April 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:267 and judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union 22 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:94).

In January 2018 a meeting took place between the EU Commissioner for the environment, Karmenu Vella, and the ministers for the environment of nine Member States: Czech Republic, France, Spain, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Great Britain and Italy in respect to the breaking of thresholds in respect to air quality. The European Commission therefore announced that should the situation in this matter not improve in respect of the above-mentioned countries, it shall bring these Member States to the EU Court of Justice in this matter (Bodalska, 31.01.2018).

### Tropospheric ozone

Ozone is a colourless gas composed of three oxygen atoms ( $O_3$ ), which in the atmosphere constitutes the main oxidising compound. Approximately 90% of atmospheric ozone occurs in the ozone sphere – a layer of the stratosphere at a height of 10 to 50 km above the surface of the Earth, where for the main part it absorbs ultraviolet radiation harmful to living organisms. Ozone in the lower layer of the atmosphere – troposphere, constitutes secondary pollution and arises under the influence of solar activity from ultraviolet radiation on nitrogen oxide ( $NO_x$ ) in the presence of compounds containing carbon such as: carbon monoxide (CO), arising mainly from the energy and urban-household sectors, methane ( $CH_4$ ) emitted by the mining industry, during distribution of fuels, agriculture and rubbish tips as well as non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) originating in the transport and industry sectors as a result of burning mining fuels or

the use of solvents (Juda-Rezler, 2006, pp. 50–51). Ozone in this situation is known as tropospheric, surface-level or ground-level.

Episodes of sudden and very high concentrations of ozone are known as photochemical, summer or Los Angeles smog. These are formed over large urban agglomerations, where foremost there are many precursors of ozone emitted ( $\text{NO}_x$ , CO, VOC) from the transport sector, which are the source of smog. The above occurs during summer, spring, during warm and hot (temperatures between 25–35°C), windless and damp days – in the case of Europe from June to September (Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska, 2016). The phenomenon of smog is reinforced by very tall urban architecture, which creates a barrier in the distribution of pollution arising from communication routes as well as geographical aspects such as depressions or encircling mountains where towns are situated.

The acceptable level of eight-hour concentrations for ground-level ozone in respect to protecting people's health, binding for Member States as of 2010, amounts to 120  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  and in a calendar year must not be exceeded more than 25 times. In the EU a concentration norm for tropospheric ozone was also set for plant protection. Moreover, for the purposes of long-term goals a level was defined below which, according to the state of contemporary knowledge, a direct harmful impact on the health of people or the environment as a whole is not likely (Ustawa Prawo ochrony środowiska [Protection of the Environment Bill], Journal of Laws from 2001, No. 62, item 627). It was accepted that from 2020 the measure of eight-hour concentration will not be exceeded in any case. WHO also defined a recommended eight-hour concentration for the ozone in respect to people's health – at the level of 100  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (World Health Organization, 2006, p. 14). In all, 18 EU Member States recorded excess levels of acceptable concentration levels on more than 25 occasions. Countries that exceeded such thresholds were Italy, Germany, France and Poland. In this context some 41% of measuring stations recorded excess levels of polluted ozone concentrations. The quality of air according to WHO norms was only met by 4% of measuring stations (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 39).

### **Nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide**

Nitrogen dioxide ( $\text{NO}_2$ ) is a red-brown, poisonous gas that finds difficulty in dissolving in water. Nitrogen oxides arises naturally in the atmosphere as a result of volcanic eruptions, processes arising in the oceans and soil in the context of nitrogen circulation in nature as well as photo-oxidation of nitrogen, and as a consequence of man's activity. The source of anthropogenic emissions is burning mining fuels at a high temperature (Juda-Rezler 2006, pp. 58–59). Nitrogen dioxide is present in the atmosphere for between 20 and 100 years (Janka, 2014, p. 18). In the EU the greatest sources of such emissions from man's activity are road transport (39% total emissions in 2015), the production of energy and its distribution (19%), households, buildings of public institutions and commercial premises (14%) as well as the use of energy in industry (12%) (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 22). In the space of 27 years (between 1990 and 2016) the emission of  $\text{NO}_x$  fell in every EU Member State and as a whole in the EU significantly – by 58%, from 18,139 to 7,644 Gg. The greatest reductions of emissions

were attained by the Czech Republic (80%), Great Britain (72%), Slovakia (69%) and Italy (63%) (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 49).

The respective norms binding in the EU from 2010 for nitrogen dioxide in respect to the protection of health, in accord with the recommendations of WHO, are at a level acceptable for one-hour concentrations amounting to  $200 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , which cannot be exceeded more than 18 times in the course of a year and average annual values at a level of  $40 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . In 2015, in 22 EU Member States the average annual norms in this respect were exceeded. Among those that emit the most nitrogen dioxide – 10% or more emissions are Germany (15.9%), Great Britain (12%), France (11%), Spain (10%) and Italy (10%). In 2016 Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Poland and Slovenia recorded greater concentrations of  $\text{NO}_x$  than in the previous year (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 49). The harmful impact of nitrogen dioxide on plants resulted in the establishment of also an average annual level acceptable for their protection amounting to  $30 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ .

Sulphur dioxide ( $\text{SO}_2$ ) is a colourless gas, which is poisonous for people and animals as well as being harmful for plants. It is characterised by a high degree of solvency in water. In the air it reacts with steam from water, constituting as a consequence the main course of acid rain arising. It also arises from natural sources such as the explosion of volcanoes, disintegration of volcanic matter processes, forest fires and the erosion of soils as well as anthropogenic reasons – first and foremost from the burning of mining fuels polluted by sulphur such as coal and crude oil. The consequences of a significant amount of  $\text{SO}_2$  emissions from energy sources of tall chimney stacks are often its transport over long distances (Juda-Rezler, 2006, p. 44). In the EU sulphur oxides in the main arise from the production of energy and its distribution (59% w 2015 r.), use of energy and industry (19%), households, buildings of public institutions and commercial premises (13%) as well as industrial processes (7%) (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 22). The limitation of sulphur dioxide emissions in the EU should be recognised as highly effective. Between 1990 and 2016 such emissions fell by 91%, from 25,078 Gg two 2,378 Gg (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 54).

For the purposes of protecting health, the EU defined an acceptable level of one-hour concentrations of sulphur dioxide at the level of  $350 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , which must not be exceeded more than 24 times in the course of a year. Moreover, Member States are bound to observe an acceptable level of average daily concentrations of  $\text{SO}_2$  amounting to  $125 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  with the number of such thresholds being broken in the course of the year is not more than three. These norms have been binding since 2005. In 2015, two stations, in Bulgaria and France, recorded thresholds being broken of both the above acceptable levels. The recommendations of WHO for average daily concentrations are six times lower, amounting to  $20 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (European Environment Agency, 2017a, p. 45). EU Member States responsible for the emission of the most sulphur dioxide are Poland (582 Gg, constituting 24.5% of emissions in 2016), Germany (356 Gg, 15%) and Spain (218 Gg, 9.2%). In 2016 in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Sweden and Cyprus there was an increase of  $\text{SO}_x$  emissions in respect to 2015 (European Environment Agency, 2018, p. 54). In respect to the protection of plants, the EU also defined the acceptable level of average daily concentrations of  $\text{SO}_2$ , which are in line with the recommendations of WHO, amounting to  $20 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . Moreover, the above level of sulphur dioxide concentrations cannot be exceeded during winter, that is the heating season, from October 1 to March 31.

The success of the EU and limiting emissions of SO<sub>2</sub> and (though to a lesser degree in respect to the continuous growth of the numbers of motor cars) NO<sub>2</sub> is a consequence of the introduction of what has become known as the ceiling directive 2001/81/WE in respect to country levels of emission for some types of air pollution (OJ EU L 309, 27.01.2001). The above binds Member States to a differentiation of ceilings for the emission of four types of pollution transported at long distance, including both of the above mentioned gases, from all sources in the EU apart from international maritime waterways and emissions from civil aviation, but with taking into account emissions associated with landing and starting of airplanes. The given limits were to be reached in 2010 and in subsequent years maintained, which is being realised by Member States. The directive was treated as an *acquis communautaire*, as a consequence of which countries entering the EU after its introduction are also bound to preserve defined ceilings of carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ammonia and NMVOC emissions (*Report*, 2011, p. 2).

### **Air pollution and its consequences for peoples' health**

Pollution from air can permeate into the organism of a person through their respiratory tract, digestive track and permeate through the skin. Further, it has a negative influence on the respiratory tract, circulation, nervous and reproductive systems. Those that are particularly at risk are children, the elderly and individuals with diseases of the respiratory tract and circulation system. The former are more sensitive to pollution for they breathe in approximately 50% less air per kilogram of body mass than adults and at the same time, spend more time outdoors. Their respiratory tract is still immature and their defence system weaker than is the case in adults. Exposure therefore to pollution in the air is tied with an increased death rate and shortening of expected life expectancy. In the EU the estimated number of premature deaths in 2012 as a consequence of exposure to PM<sub>2.5</sub>, O<sub>3</sub> and NO<sub>2</sub> amounted to 491,000 (European Environment Agency, 2015, p. 44) and in 2014 487,600 (European Environment Agency, 2017, p. 56).

In towns and cities with a large intensity of road traffic, exposure to particulate matter is often correlated with exposure to other forms of pollution – especially nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide (CO), which makes difficult formulating a specific indication of the impact of each of these forms of pollution. In spite of this, thanks to various forms of research such as epidemiological, clinical and toxicological first and foremost in Europe, the United States and Canada, it is possible to ascribe particular forms of pollution to specific forms of impact on people's health. Thus particulates because of their differentiated health have effects relative to their size at the level of concentration and chemical composition. Particulates of a diameter measuring 2.5–10 µm can accumulate in the upper respiratory tract and cause coughs, whistling breath and dyspnoea. This leads to the exacerbation of chronic diseases such as asthma or Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD).<sup>3</sup> Moreover, they are responsible for lower indicators of lung

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<sup>3</sup> As a result of COPD there is a partial limitation of the passage of air of the respiratory tract, which is associated with a chronic inflammatory reaction of the respiratory tract to harmful substances. See further: Jędrak, Konduracka, 2017, pp. 44–47.

activity, which in turn increases the risk of COPD occurring in future (Krzyżanowski, 2016, pp. 17, 19–20).

Fine and very fine particulates accumulated in the lower respiratory tracts cause damage and a lessening of the surface of gas exchange in the lungs. Particulates of a diameter less than  $2.5 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  therefore, cause chronic inflammation around respiratory tracts. Very fine particulate matter permeate through the wall of the lung alveoli into the circulatory system, interact with the endothelium of blood vessels, initiating the growth of an atherosclerotic plaque,<sup>4</sup> and as a result lead to dysfunctions of the heart's rhythm, ischaemia and high blood pressure. The consequences of every growth in the concentration of fine particulates measuring  $10 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  is the growth in the number of hospitalisations as a result of infarctions by 0.8% as a result of ischaemia of 0.7%. Increased exposure to  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  for several hours up to several weeks may result in a heart attack (infarction), stroke, or even death (Mazurek, 2018, pp. 26–27). In Europe over 3% of deaths from diseases of the circulatory or system is caused by particulate matter (Milanowski, 2018, p. 11).

Particulate matter also has a negative influence on the nervous system. Very fine particulates that enter the blood vessels from the lungs reach various organs, including the brain. These may cause headaches, anxiety, hyperactivity, problems with concentration, dementia, Parkinson's disease, dysfunction of cognitive processes and memory in children and youth, and increase the tendency towards aggressive behaviour. The significant interdependence between concentrations of  $\text{PM}_{10}$ ,  $\text{NO}_2$ ,  $\text{SO}_2$  and CO and the number of suicide attempts in Vancouver and the number of cases of depression brought to hospitals in seven Canadian towns has been proved statistically (Jędrak, Konduracka, 2017, p. 74, 76, 78).

The agenda of WHO and *International Agency for Research on Cancer*, IARC in 2013 found that external air pollution in general is the cause of lung cancer and a factor increasing the risk the occurrence of a cancer of the urinary bladder. In 2010, 223,000 (15% deaths were ascribed to cancer of the lung. Research in respect to the influence on people's health of just particulate matter led to its classification by the IARC as being carcinogenic (IARC, 2016, p. 34). On the basis of long-term research conducted in the USA, Western Europe and Japan, it is claimed that together with a growth of ever  $10 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  long-term exposure of a person's organism to  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  and  $\text{NO}_2$ , the incidence of lung cancer increases respectively by 9% and 4% (Jędrak, Konduracka, 2017, p. 54).

Fine particulate matter can permeate through the placenta and be responsible for congenital defects in the embryo. Above-normative concentrations of  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  result in the worsening of such parameters as weight at birth, length of the body and natal circumference of the head, which are associated with a weekly developed effectiveness and functioning of various systems, including the immunological. The consequences of a lowered resistance are the children's predilection to recurrent diseases of the respiratory tract (inflammation of the bronchi and pneumonia). Further, the negative influence of fine particulates on the development of the nervous system of children born to women exposed to compounds from the PAH group (components of particulate matter) has been

<sup>4</sup> The atherosclerotic plaque is a change created in the external membrane of arteries, decreasing their diameter. For more on the subject of atherosclerosis see: Szczeklik, Gajewski, 2014, p. 160.

confirmed. In the research conducted in Kraków, the children concerned had an intelligence quotient lower on average by 3.8 points on the IQ scale in comparison to children of mothers living in an environment with cleaner air (though not free of fine particulates) (Jędrychowski, Majewska, pp. 2, 6, 8–9).

Long-term, over several years, exposure to fine particulate matter, occurring among others in Poland or Bulgaria, can lead to an abbreviation of the expected life expectancy by several months or even years. The European Environment Agency has estimated that in EU Member States anthropogenic emissions of PM<sub>2.5</sub> are responsible for a shortening of life by an average of 8.5 months. In the 2014 such emissions were the cause of 399,000 premature deaths, including: 66,080 in Germany, 59,630 in Italy, 46,020 in Poland, 37,600 in Great Britain and 34,800 in France. The greatest number of deaths per capita was recorded in Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and in Romania, while the lowest was noted in Ireland, Sweden and Finland (European Environment Agency, 2017, pp. 56–58).

The harmful effects on people's health can also be seen in the case of raised concentrations of gas pollution, including tropospheric ozone and dioxides of nitrogen and sulphur. Ozone, similar to nitrogen dioxide, does not react well with water, which leads to imposing a negative effect on the entire respiratory tract. The first symptoms of exposure to the effects of ground-level ozone are cough, itching in the throat and sleepiness as well as headaches. Excessive exposure in this context can result in a fall of blood pressure, inflammations of the eye and respiratory tract diseases such as pneumonia, fall in lung capacity and intensification of the symptoms of asthma. The human organism, defending itself from ozone entering the lungs, lowers the amount of oxygen intake, which may lead to an intensification of diseases of the circulation system (Albiniak, Czajka, 2017, p. 31). Further, ozone can be carcinogenic as research would seem to indicate (Wojewódzki Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska, 2015). The number of premature deaths in the EU ascribed to the pollution of the ozone amounted in 2014 to 13,600: 2,900 in Italy, 2,200 in Germany, 1,630 in France, and 1,600 in Spain. *Per capita*, the most serious situation was recorded in Greece, Italy, Malta and Croatia, whereas the lowest number of deaths in this context took place in Ireland, Finland and Great Britain (European Environment Agency, 2017, p. 57 and 58).

Moreover, nitrogen oxides cause an aggravation of the mucous membranes of the throat, while in greater concentrations, death. Nitrogen oxide absorbed by the human organism reacts with haemoglobins and inside the tissues quickly oxidises into nitrogen dioxide. The symptoms of poisoning by nitrogen oxide are a general weakening of the organism, dizziness and numbness of the lower limbs. In the case of high doses of poisoning there occurs cyanosis of the mouth, weakening pulse and shivering. NO<sub>2</sub> as a rule does not occur independently and its impact on the human organism depends on accompanying compounds. It causes dizziness and headaches and dilates the blood vessels, which causes a fall in blood pressure. In low concentrations it leads to the irritation of the respiratory tract and eyes, whereas in large such doses to oedema of the lungs, weakening pulse and degeneration of the heart muscle as well as a narcotic effect on the nervous system (Mysłowski, 2011, p. 37). Prenatal exposure to nitrogen dioxide can cause retardation in the intellectual development of a child (Mazurek, 2018, p. 33).

The IARC in 2012 entered the fumes emitted by diesel engines (containing significant amounts of  $\text{NO}_2$ ) onto the list of carcinogenic compounds (IARC, 2012). It is not nitrogen dioxide alone that is responsible for cancer but other substances that are correlated with it such as VOCs, very fine particulate matter and polycyclic aromatic carbohydrates (PAH) that are found in diesel fumes. It has been proven that together with every growth of  $10 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  in respect to a long-term exposure of the human organism to  $\text{NO}_2$  the incidence of lung cancer increases by 4%. Research has also shown that exposure on the part of adults to nitrogen dioxide in their place of residence is tied to an increased risk of the occurrence of brain tumours and cervical cancer. Children in turn, whose mothers during pregnancy were exposed to inhalation of nitrogen dioxide, were shown to fall ill more often to cancers in early childhood (Jędrak, Konduracka, 2017a, p. 54 and 57). The number of premature deaths in the EU ascribed to air pollution in respect to  $\text{NO}_2$  in 2014 amounted to 75,000: 17,290 in Italy, 14,500 in Great Britain, 12,860 in Germany and 9,330 in France. The greatest losses of human life with reference to population occurred in Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, Germany and Greece, the Netherlands and Spain. Those in Ireland, Finland, Estonia and Sweden breathed air least polluted by nitrogen dioxide (European Environment Agency, 2017, pp. 57–58).

Sulphur dioxide is absorbed by the upper section of the respiratory tract and from there reaches the blood circulation. It can cause a feeling of malaise and irritates the throat and eyes. Exposure to high concentrations of this gas can lead to chronic bronchitis, intensification of diseases of circulation system and a lowered resistance on the part of the lungs to infections – especially among children and the elderly. The greatest threat to human health is the occurrence in winter of episodes of very high concentrations of sulphur dioxide, fine particulate matter and organic compounds known as London Smog or Black Smog (Kozłowska-Szczęśna, Krawczyk, 2004, p. 44). High concentrations of  $\text{SO}_2$  (400–500 ppm) can lead to spasms of the glottis and oedema of the larynx or heart failure, which leads to sudden death (Mysłowski, p. 38).

## Conclusions

The state of air is a key to the quality of life of every person, foremost in respect to the unfavourable consequences of health that its pollution causes. Health, according to the definition of WHO is “A state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organization, 1946, p. 1). The aspects of pollution discussed in this article can significantly worsen the physical state of a person’s organism, leading to a shortened life expectancy, while particulate matter, nitrogen and sulphur dioxides cause dysfunctions in the nervous system. Moreover, pollution in the atmosphere has a negative impact on the environment, limiting the potential of using its natural elements such as forests. The quality of air in the EU is slowly improving though a significant proportion of the urban population is exposed to above-normative concentrations of some of the air pollution such as particulates or ground-level ozone. The number of people living in areas of poor air quality is significantly greater when one considers the recommendations of WHO as shown in Table 2 for the period 2013 to 2015.

Table 2

**Percentage of the urban population in the EU exposed to air pollutant concentrations above certain EU and WHO reference concentrations (minimum and maximum observed between 2013 and 2015)**

Pollutant	EU reference value ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ) <sup>[17]</sup> <sub>SEP</sub>	Exposure estimate (%)	WHO guideline ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ) <sup>[17]</sup> <sub>SEP</sub>	Exposure estimate (%)
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	rok (25)	7–8	rok (10)	82–85
PM <sub>10</sub>	dzień (50)	16–20	rok (20)	50–62
O <sub>3</sub>	8 godzin (120)	7–30	8 godzin (100)	95–98
NO <sub>2</sub>	rok (40)	7–9	rok (40)	7–9
SO <sub>2</sub>	dzień (125)	<1	dzień (20)	20–38

**Source:** Author's taxonomy based on European Environment Agency (2017b), *Exceedance of air quality standards in urban areas*, Copenhagen, p. 6; Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, appx. VII, XI, XIV & World Health Organization (2006), *WHO Air quality guidelines for particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide. Global update 2005. Summary of risk assessment*, Geneva, pp. 9, 14, 16, 18.

Despite noted, continued lowering levels of pollution in the EU, their normative values, first and foremost particular matter, continue not to be observed by many Member States such as the Czech Republic, Germany or Italy. There is cause to assume that calls on the part of the European Commission for a quick introduction of remedial action in this respect will not bring results and therefore complaints will be brought before the EUJC in respect to a breach of obligations concerning the Directive on quality of air and clean air in Europe. Further, both Bulgaria and Poland, already found guilty of breaching the above-mentioned directive as a result of exceeding thresholds concerning quality of air norms for particulate matter PM<sub>10</sub>, testifying to a lack of undertakings for sufficient remedial action, face the threat of high fines.<sup>5</sup> It would appear therefore that only an imposition of financial penalties by the EUCJ may provide the impetus for Member States to introduce systemic solutions for cleaner air such as for example, in Poland establishing at a national level quality standards of solid fuels where they are yet to be introduced.

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<sup>5</sup> The Supreme Audit Office has estimated possible fines for Poland at a maximum of 4 billion PLN. See further: Supreme Audit Office (2014), p. 24.



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## Stan powietrza w Unii Europejskiej a jakość życia Europejczyków

### Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wpływu zanieczyszczeń powietrza na jakość życia mieszkańców Unii Europejskiej. Przy wykorzystaniu metody analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej oraz ilościowej podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze: 1) stężenia których zanieczyszczeń przekraczają normy wyznaczone na poziomie unijnym?; 2) jakie są przyczyny ponadnormatywnych stężeń zanieczyszczeń?; 3) jaki jest wpływ zanieczyszczeń na zdrowie Europejczyków? W toku przeprowadzonych rozważań wykazano, że jakość życia Europejczyków obniżana jest przez utrzymujące się, ponadnormatywne stężenia zanieczyszczeń powietrza, na które ekspozycja wiąże się z gorszym samopoczuciem, licznymi chorobami układu oddechowego, krążenia, nerwowego, a nawet rozrodczego, a także ze zwiększoną umieralnością i skróceniem oczekiwanej długości życia. W Unii Europejskiej oszacowana liczba przedwczesnych zgonów w 2014 r. w wyniku narażenia na pył drobny, ozon i dwutlenek azotu wyniosła 487,600. Jak wynika z przeprowadzonej analizy, najlepsze warunki życia, biorąc pod uwagę jakość powietrza, panują w Finlandii, Irlandii i Szwecji.

**Słowa kluczowe:** bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne, bezpieczeństwo środowiskowe, bezpieczeństwo zdrowotne, jakość życia, jakość powietrza, Unia Europejska

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## National Income, Strategic Discontinuity, and Converging Trajectories of Macroeconomic Policy Initiatives: An Empirical Study of China

**Abstract:** The framework of converging trajectories of macroeconomic policy initiatives is employed in the context of strategic discontinuity to study the national income of an advancing economy. A model of systemic changes based upon an equation of production and consumption is presented. In this study of the Chinese economy of 1980–2014, over time, the dynamics of policy imbalance is found to decrease considerably, which is consistent with the decreasing trend of shrinking the differences among the impact coefficients of government consumption, private investment, and private consumption.

**Key words:** strategic discontinuity, systemic changes, econometric testing, advancing economy, China

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### 1. Introduction

This paper accounts for a basic framework of the national income of a convergent mixed system with an objective to provide a new theory to facilitate the study of the Chinese economy through revealing its converging trajectories of macroeconomic policy initiatives over time.

For a world economy of modern time, in the process of economic advancement, there are two prominent trends observed over time. For one, it is the convergence of pure market economy toward a mixed economy with pure capitalist production system mixed with (soft) socialist welfare system. For the second trend, it is the convergence of purely planned economy toward a mixed economy with partial socialism (i.e., welfare system and partial government production socialism) mixed with capitalist production system, with the latter based on private property rights.

In this first trend, Keynesian revolution represents the best example of the process of systemic transformations. It is well known that for the conventional theory represented by Keynesianism and new Keynesianism, macroeconomics has been developed on the basis of representative agents, complete rationality, and utility maximization. To the Keynesian approach, some roles of cultures and institutions are supplemented by institutional economics. Besides, new approaches with the concepts of incomplete rationality and even some contradictory behaviors of economic agents have been ad-

vocated by behavioral economics, and the issue of heterogeneous agents has also been tackled.

In this paper, we shall address the problem of world convergence in a course of strategic discontinuity from the perspective of the second trend. In this second trend, to our knowledge, the role of government interventions in the forms of macroeconomic policies has not been fully addressed. To fill in a part of this gap, we shall present a model of systemic changes by focusing on the convergent aspect of the impact coefficients of the private consumption, private investment, and government's spending overtime. The idea is essentially is that, in this process of a planned economy convergent toward a mixed economy, the roles of government spending and investment (i.e., with the latter being a defining feature of planned socialist economy) would be weaken overtime, while the weight of the private consumption would be rising.

Then, to verify the consistency between this model of systemic changes and the reality, an empirical examination of the Chinese economy is then engaged. For this purpose, a study of the Chinese economy and its major courses of strategic turns 1980–2014 shall be presented in Sections 4 and 5. Furthermore, in Appendix B, the model of systemic changes of human activism (HA) comprising the forces of centrality (or government actions), mutuality/co-creativity (or the intermediate force between those of government and the private market), and competition (or market activities) is further provided to finish this paper.

## 2. Systemic Changes of an Advancing Economy in States of Strategic Discontinuity

Following the afore-mentioned convergent process of the second trend, in due course of economic advancement of a nation, let the mixed system comprise the forces of government consumption, private investment, and private consumption. In general, the evolution of the systemic structures of an advancing nation transforming from a planned economy into a mixed economy is staged as follows.

**Stage 1.** Government investment and consumption play the leading role of economic construction because the sector of private business is very small, and at this time national efforts are devoted to develop the basis of heavy and chemical industries. Therefore, from the perspective of consumption, government consumption dominates private consumption in creating the momentum of economic development. Nevertheless, for playing the constraining role, private consumption is still important since, in the long run, any increase in production must be matched by an increase in either government or private consumption.

**Stage 2.** By the growing strengths of private business and the gradual relaxation of government's restrictions on private consumption, now the momentum of economic development derives its growing strengths from private consumption, while the role of government consumption decreases relatively, due to the relative inefficiency of the central planning mechanism. That is, this centrally planned economy has been transforming into an early stage of mixed economy in which private business is gaining its importance over time. Thus, by the growing strengths of private business, private investment is playing an increasingly important role as well.

**Stage 3.** As the mixed economy transforming from an extensive (or input-led) growth path into an intensive growth (or low and medium technology-led path and to some extent high-technology path), both government and private investments play the pivotal role in creating the growth momentum of this mixed economy.

**Results.** In sum, three results are derived from the above. (1) The force of strategic discontinuity of a system would not cease if the strategic objectives of the system are not achieved and if there exist potentials of systemic and strategic changes. (2) The force of strategic discontinuity of a system would not cease if the state of the system is not satisfactory and if there exist potential gains from systemic and strategic changes. (3) In the process of decreasing the degree of strategic discontinuity, the difference among the forces of government spending, private consumption, and private investment shall shrink; as such, the differential marginal contributions of these forces would shrink over time accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. National Income Account Identity and a Model of Economic Advancement in States of Strategic Discontinuity

In the above, we discussed various states of strategic discontinuity among the forces of government spending ( $G$ ), private investment ( $I$ ) and private consumption ( $C$ ) existing in the context of the (real) national income account identity. Below, a specific model of economic advancement in terms of these forces ( $C, I, G$ ) is created. Now, we shall briefly account for the traditions and ample rooms for refinement of the conventional national income account identity:  $Y = C + I + G + X - M$  with the forces of exports ( $X$ ) and imports ( $M$ ) (see Equation (1)).

The framework of national income prevailing in the conventional macroeconomics has been developed from Keynesian theory of marginal propensity to consume to neo-Keynesian economics that embraces AD-AS model, IS-LM model, and Phillips curve, etc. This Keynesian macroeconomics has recently been further developed into new Keynesian economics (Mankiw and Romer, 1991; and in models of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, see for instance Jordi Galí, 2008; David Romer, 2012; Michael Woodford, 2003) in which microeconomic foundations (originally rooted in the system of general equilibrium) are provided. In essence, the major themes of New Keynesian economics concern with forward expectations of households and firms and the role of government interventions more through monetary policy than fiscal policy necessitated by the imperfect competition of the markets in which prices and wages are sticky.

One other direction of Keynesianism has been evolved into the theories of post-Keynesianism (Robinson, Eatwell, 1974; Kaldor, 1980; Davison, 2007; Sraffa, 1960) in which the role of aggregate demand in dealing with long-term unemployment is emphasized (Wikipedia, 2015) and the financial instability of the monetary economy is predicted (Minsky, 1957, 1992).

Now we turn to the model of strategic discontinuity and its trajectory of convergence. Seeking to establish conditions of strategic discontinuity in terms of providing a general framework for the operation of a macro-advancing economy, let  $P$  be the price index,

<sup>1</sup> For the culture-political and economic structures of the Chinese economy, one may also see Tonn (2016) and Tonn (2018).

TC the real costs of national production, Q the real GDP, G the government expenditure, I the private investment, and C the private consumption. Furthermore, let Q be a function of G, I, and C:  $Q = f(Z(\chi\psi_G), M(\chi\psi_I), \Gamma(\chi\psi_C) | \chi \downarrow \chi_0)$ , for  $\psi_G, \psi_I$  and  $\psi_C$  being exogenous strategic factors and  $1 \geq \chi_0 \geq 0$ .

For the national surplus  $\Pi = PQ - TC + N$ , with N (as a function of G, I, and C) being a factor of non-optimization,  $PQ$  be the value of total output and  $TC$  be the total costs, a necessary condition is then:

$$\frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln G} = a \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln I} + b = c \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln C} + d \quad (1)$$

where  $Q = f(Z(\chi\psi_G), M(\chi\psi_I), \Gamma(\chi\psi_C) | \chi \downarrow \chi_0)$ , for  $Q = f(\cdot)$  denoting the function with  $\chi_0 > 0$ , and  $a \downarrow a_0, b \downarrow b_0, c \downarrow c_0, d \downarrow d_0$ , for  $a_0 \geq 1, b_0 \geq 0, c_0 \geq 1, d_0 \geq 0$ .

That is, although in general the dynamic trajectory of strategic discontinuity may either be strengthened or weakened over time, for an advancing economy traversing away from the direction of high-level government control and low-level private initiatives, as in the case of the Chinese economy in the process of development and growth, the variables  $\chi, a, b, c,$  and  $d$  shall all point to the convergent trend toward low-level strategic discontinuity. That is, for the sake of achieving modernity, coefficients of these variables' respective marginal contributions in percentage terms as series of natural numbers must eventually converge to a vicinity of absolute equality. As the development of economic structure proceeds well, the space of strategic operations and the scope of strategic discontinuity contract over time by the internal laws of motion. Simultaneously, the efficiency or marginal contribution in percentage term of the government expenditure would increase while that of the private consumption would decrease. As for the private investment, it is related but neutral to the strategic positions of the private and public sectors and is also well connected to the operational mode of the domestic economy as well as that of the global economy. As such, logically in terms of its direction of strategic momentum, the private investment is expected to follow the generally growing trend of the economy.

Now, to facilitate our econometric study of the Chinese economy (presented in the next section for being compatible with the context of the national income account identity), in this section, starting with the equation of production and consumption, we shall convert this equation of production and consumption into a form more comprehensive than that of the conventional approach. To bridge the gap between Equation 1 and the conventional approach of national income identity, let  $y, c, s, c^G, s^G,$  and  $f$  be the real measures of GDP, private consumption, private saving, government saving, government investment, and net exports (or foreign sector), respectively. Then, for  $y$  being the real GDP of production and consumption, let the equation of saving and consumption be:

$$y = c + s + c^G + s^G + f \quad (2)$$

Assume that  $s = \xi i + \beta = i + \beta' + \beta = i + \beta''$ , for  $i$  being the private investment,  $\xi$  the factor of productivity of the private investment; and  $\beta'' = \beta + \beta'$  a constant. Furthermore, assume  $s^G = \zeta^G i^G + \alpha = i^G + \alpha' + \alpha = i^G + \alpha''$ , for  $i^G$  being the government investment,  $\zeta^G$  the productive factor of the government investment, and  $\alpha'' = \alpha' + \alpha$  a constant. Besides, let the national income account identity be:  $y = c + i + g + f$ , for  $i$  denoting the private investment and  $g = c^G + i^G$ . From the above reasoning, it derives:

$y = c + \xi i + c^G + \xi^G i^G + f + (\alpha + \beta) = c + i + (c^G + i^G) + f + (\alpha'' + \beta'')$ . It follows then:

$$y = c + (\xi i + \beta) + (g^\# + \alpha) + f, g^\# = c^G + \xi^G i^G \tag{3}$$

$$y = c + i + g + f + \rho, g = c^G + i^G \tag{4}$$

Equation (2) is the equation of production and consumption with  $\rho = \alpha'' + \beta''$  representing the forces of “private and government productivity” as the linearly approximation of the term  $(\xi\phi)^b$  (introduced below, corresponding to the term  $b\tau$  in Equation (2)). The logarithmic form corresponding to Equation (2) is  $y = cigf(\xi\phi)^b \sim (c + i + g + f + \rho)$ , with  $\phi$  and  $b$  being constants, and  $\rho$  as the “force of production” representing the factor of approximation in the process of linearization.

By reasonable assumptions, it is seen from Equation (3) that the greater value of  $(g^\# = c^G + \xi^G i^G)$  would increase the value of  $y$  by assuming  $\xi \geq 1, \xi^G \geq 1, (\alpha'' + \beta'') > 0$ , and holding all others constant. This means the increase in the modified government expenditure  $g^\#$  (with positive effects of  $\xi^G$  and a neutral or positive effect of  $\xi$ ) is beneficial to the economy with all other variables remain constant (for instance, at a time of severe economic crisis).

Let  $y^{Conv}$  depict the real GDP of the (conventional) national income account identity:  $y^{Conv} = c + i + g + f$ . Then, by denoting  $c$  as  $c^\#$ , from Equation (4), it derives:  $y - y^{Conv} = (c^\# - c) + (\xi i - i) + (\xi^G i^G - i^G) + (\alpha + \beta)$ , and thus:

$$(-g^\#) = -(y - y^{Conv}) + (c^\# - c) + (\xi - 1)i - g + (\alpha + \beta) \tag{5}$$

Equation (3) implies that as  $(-g^\#)$  increases, both  $(c^\# - c)$  and  $(\xi - 1)i$  would increase, by holding all others constant. This is true because  $c^\# > c$  and  $\xi > 1$  due to the assumed positive effects of government actions on  $c^\#$ ; for example, reducing  $g^\#$  would leave more income for the private consumption and investment through time lags.

Below, for the model of economic advancement, in order to prepare for transforming into a logarithmic form, let the production function be:  $y = cigf(\xi\phi)^b$ , for  $b$  and  $\phi$  being the adjustment factors (i.e., to help induce  $\xi$  to adjust so that  $y = cigf(\xi\phi)^b$  in corresponding to the process of linearization). Then, the following formula can be derived as follows:

$$Y(t) = C(t) + I(t) + G(t) + F(t) + b\tau \tag{6}$$

with  $\ln\tau = \ln\xi\phi = \ln(\gamma\kappa\ell k) + \ln\phi$ ,  $C(t)$ ,  $I(t)$ ,  $G(t)$ , and  $F(t)$  being the real output generated by the private consumption, government expenditure, and net exports, respectively in logarithmic forms. Essentially, Equation (4) explicates the real GDP as a weighted average of “ $C + I + G + F$ ” and  $\tau$  with weights of 1 and  $b$  respectively, with this  $\tau$  as the “force of production” (corresponding to  $\rho$  in linear approximation) being consistent to Blanchard and Quah’s (1989)’s concept of productivity.

The economic system involving Equation (6) is made complete by the inclusion of the following formulae. That is, the production function is  $y(t) = \ell^\zeta \kappa^\theta k^\eta(t)$ ;

$C(t) = H(y) + \pi P(t)$ , the private consumption in logarithmic form ( $c \ln(c)$ ) is a function of real output of the economy in logarithmic form (i.e.,  $H(y) = \ln(h(y))$ ) plus the price index  $P$  multiplied by a constant  $\pi$ . Here,  $P(t) = \ln(p)$ ,  $p(t) = \mu m(t)$ , with  $p$  being the price level as a positive function of “ $m$ ” at time  $t$ , “ $m$ ” the fixed level of money supply, and  $\mu$  the weight associated with “ $m$ ”. Therefore,  $P(t) = M(t) + M_0$ ,  $M(t) = \ln(m(t))$ ,  $M_0 = \ln(\mu)$ . In addition, let  $L(t) = N(t) + L_0$ ,  $L(t) = \ln \ell(t)$ , and  $N(t) = \ln(n(t))$  for  $n(t) = n(t-1)\ell_0$  being the population of time  $t$ , and  $\ell_0$  a constant. Note once again that all variables written in in capital letters are in logarithmic forms.

In the production function,  $\ell$  stands for the employment of labor under constant technology,  $\zeta$  stands for the culture-institutional coefficient associated with  $\ell$ ,  $k$  stands for the capital stock under constant technology, and  $\kappa$  stands for the technological factor associated with  $k$ ; so that  $y'(t) = \ell^\zeta \kappa^\theta k^\eta(t)$ , with  $\zeta$ ,  $\theta$ , and  $\eta$  being constants.

Consider  $\varepsilon_S(t)$  as the “production residual” and  $\varepsilon_D(t)$  the “consumption-plus residual”. Then, by introducing lag terms of time and for  $\varepsilon_S(t)$  corresponding to  $b\tau$  and  $\sum_{j=1}^{p-1} b_j \varepsilon_D(t-j)$  to “ $C(t) + I(t) + G(t) + F(t)$ ,” Eq. (6) leads to the following equation:  $Y(t) = \varepsilon_S(t) + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} b_j \varepsilon_D(t-j)$ . Therefore, it derives:

$$\Delta Y(t) = \varepsilon_S(t) - \varepsilon_S(t-1) + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} b_j [\varepsilon_D(t-j) - \varepsilon_D(t-j-1)] \quad (7)$$

#### 4. The Chinese Economy and Its Major Courses of Strategic Turns 1980–2014

Following the theories formulated in the above, an econometric study of China is presented below in Section 5 to check whether the essential features of its three-stage development (also see Results of Appendix B) is substantiated.

Before turning to this econometric study, we shall have a brief account of the process of economic transformations of the Chinese economy. Since 1949, the economy of China (i.e., PRC) has experienced uneven paces of economic development and growth. Nevertheless, from 1949 to 1978, its annual average real GDP growth rate was approximately 4.2%; and from 1978–2014, this growth rate was approximately 9.4%. Note that it was approximately 9.9% in the period 1989–2007 and 8.8% in the period 2007–2014.

Since 1978, China initiated its drive for modernization through learning significantly from its East Asian neighbors and countries of capitalism. Over time, China’s economic system transformed away from that of quasi-Soviet-type socialism in 1978 to a partially marketized new system. In this new system, the role of government expenditure remains strong, while the roles of private investment and consumption gain their surging momentum over time.

The Chinese economy has so far exhibited major features of special Chinese characters (Shi, 2010, logically related to Steven Cheung’s theory of tenants), rapid economic growth (Guo, 2007; Hu, Khanp, 1997; Lin et al., 1997; Lin, 2010; Yueh, 2013; Zhang, 2013; Chris, 2014), rapid infrastructural, industrial, and technological growth (Dees, 1998, Cao et al., 2009; Kwan et al., 1999; Ning, 2009; Sahoo et al., 2012; Yueh, 2013), socialist market and SOEs (Chang, 2012; Hu, 2012), regional balance (Démurger, 2001),



capital investment and rapid trade expansion (Qiao, 1998; Lin, 1999; Kwan et al., 1999; Turpin, Liu, 2000; Graham, Wada, 2001; Lum, Nanto, 2002; Qin et al., 2005; Cao et al., 2009; Serger, 2009; Sharma, 2009; Gutrie, 2012; Sahoo et al., 2012), significant or non-beneficial FDI inflow (Wei *et al.*, 2001; Liu et al., 2002; Serger 2009), and privatization and Washington consensus (Zhang, 2012; Williamson, 2012; Wu, 2013).<sup>3</sup>

In general, the economic reforms in the 1970's are prompted by the low level productivity of the agricultural sector under People's commune and that of the industrial sector under central planning.

One problem of low agricultural productivity under People's commune was partially caused by the low morale under rigid management system of the central planning mechanism. In People's commune, the reward to peasant does not correspond to one's efforts. This system retarded one's enthusiasm for production and provided no opportunity for individual and local initiatives. In terms of resource allocation, beyond the issue of insufficient inputs allotted to the agricultural sector, due to the guiding principle of subsidizing industrial development by drawing upon agricultural resources under Soviet-type planning (modified to fit the Chinese reality), the missing of effective market guidance is obvious. The role of market in a capitalist system is to employ price signals so that higher prices induce more outputs while lower prices decrease outputs. In this Chinese case of agricultural development, market mechanism is constrained by central planning and the social force of mutuality; and for the former, the planner does have an aggregate target and some essential means to increase the production of basic food staples (for instance, with generous tax treatments, fiscal subsidies, and even technical assistance), whereas for the latter, the agricultural productivity is fundamentally determined by the level of technology conditioned upon the force of mutuality – the level of engineering education and the quality of its scientific or R&D community.

It is easily seen that the relationship between market and central planning mechanism is more than the conventional Western wisdom of price signals. Even though the central planner is hard to calculate and obtain the correct prices to guide the SOEs, the market may not generate correct prices in order to foster the stability of the market and to promote technological progress. Nevertheless, the market does help to generate effective price signal in some cases. And yet the market is most likely distorted by reasons well beyond the market imperfection of oligopoly and monopoly, attested by the phenomena of imperfect information, risk and uncertainty, human's partial irrationality, adverse selection, and moral hazard, and etc., the interventions of socio-political forces (for instance, corruption and over and covert social and racial biases), and the external adversary forces of global economic development.

Below, the Chinese economy up to 2014 is divided into three periods. In the first period 1980–1988, there were at first the introduction of household responsibility system allowing peasants to profit from raising the productivity of agricultural activities and later the industrial reforms to allow SOEs to have substantial autonomy in management (Lin et al., 1999).

In terms of our model of systemic advancement, the development of household responsibility system (also see ADV 1 of Appendix B) was designed to partially incorporate the forces of individual creativity and market competition, and industrial reforms (also see ADV1 of Appendix B) were designed to improve the operational efficiency of centrality.

Beyond the introduction of modern fiscal and monetary policies (related to ADV1 of Appendix B), the tax sharing system between the central and local governments was also established in 1994 to improve the efficiency of centrality. Over all, one may consider the essential direction of 1990s as a movement inclining somewhat toward Washington Consensus (Zhang, 2012, p. 189) while retaining a significant role of central planning.

In the second period 1989–2007, China stepped up its reforms of state-owned enterprises and financial market including the new development of stock exchanges, partially flexible exchange rate, and the creation of other financial institutions.

This movement of financial reforms was designed to improve the market efficiency and to serve as a first step toward eventual integration into the global economy (see ADV 2 of Appendix B). At times, government debts rose rapidly, and China joined WTO in 2001. China's private enterprises started to gain a greater share of employment than that of government enterprises in the 1990s (Cheng, 2007; Hu, 2010), and even secured a larger share of output than their government counterparts after year 2000. This enlargement of the role of private enterprises (resulted from ADV1 of Appendix B) leads to the high-level efficiency of the individual's creativity and the force of market competition is further promoted.

In the third period 2008–2014, the overall economic momentum of China was directed toward balancing between the real and financial production, between the coast and inland development, between the domestic consumption and export expansion, and between technological imitation-modification and invention-innovation (also see ADV 4 of Appendix B).<sup>2</sup>

In this period, by the impact of 2007–2009 Great Recession of the West and the increasing wage rates of the domestic economy, the external demand for Chinese exports have significantly reduced. This causes the marginal contribution of private investment to decrease. To compensate for this economic down turn, Chinese government's stimulus packages of four trillion yuans (He et al., 2009) have contributed to the marginal impact of government consumption onto the economy. By its very nature, this is more than a conventional type of Keynesian stimulus, since it is operated under the guidance of central planning (or the Committee for National Development and Reforms).

Then as the Chinese economy transformed from a centrally planned economy of production to a system of human activism (or mixed economy), only a much smaller space is left for major economic overhaul, except in the directions of stimulating domestic consumption, international financial integration, and technological invention and innovation.

In sum, to gain efficiency of operations overtime, in China the force of government operations or government consumption shall dwindle, while the momentum of private activities or private consumption shall gradually ascend. The above observations do confirm this direction of strategic evolution of China in its three periods of moving toward the direction of ever higher level of modernity with the reducing momentum of strategic discontinuity over time.

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
<sup>2</sup> One may see Tonn (2014). Strategically speaking, the overall direction of China's economic advancement has been the pursuit of an innovative or "leap strategy" to bypass the "conventional world center" or the politico-economic and military strengths of its rivals (for example, internally in engaging disproportionately in developing high-technological industries and technologies of outer space exploration, and externally in forming quasi-alliances with third world countries). By the force of the centrality or government in states of strategic discontinuity, China attempts to create a new center or order of the world (Tonn, 2009, pp. 180–183).

### 5. A Case Study of the Advancing Economy of China

For the Chinese economy of the period 1980–2014, the data is chosen from Oxford Economic Database (with seasonal adjustment and deflated by prices, in US dollars). The variables studies are  $GDP_t$  (amount of real gross domestic product),  $C_t$  (amount of real private consumption),  $I_t$  (amount of real private investment),  $FDI_t$  (amount of real foreign direct investment),  $G_t$  (amount of real government consumption,  $X$  (amount of real exports), and  $M_t$  (amount of real imports).

For the period of 1980Q1–2014Q4 with 140 points of quarterly observations, the data is plotted and presented below as the trends of variables in logarithmic form.

Figure 1. Trends of Variables in Logarithmic Form



Let the vector of variables be:  $Y'_t = [\log GDP_t \ \log C_t \ \log I_t \ \log G_t \ \log X_t \ \log M_t \ \log FDI_t]$ . This  $Y_t$  may not be a stable series. For a regression model like this to be tested, the problem of spurious regression may spring up; and long-term trend and the interactive relationship between long-term and short-term adjustments may not be accurately detected. Thus, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is chosen and tested in order to verify whether any long-term stable relationship exists. After positive identification of this relationship, one shall then proceed to estimate the long-term coefficients of interactive relationships among variables and their short-term impacts. In this juncture, Equation (6) derived below represents what are in states of strategic discontinuity for the reasons provided previously in Section 3 and later in assessing the values of C, I, G, and so on in the empirical study of the Chinese economy.

From Equation (5) of Section 3, our empirical model is constructed as follows:

$$\Delta Y(t) = \gamma_1 + \delta_1 t + \alpha(\beta' Y_{t-1} - \gamma_2 - \delta_2 t) + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} D_j \Delta Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{8}$$

with  $t$  being the trend variable,  $\Delta Y_t$  the difference of  $Y_t$ ,  $\gamma_1$  and  $\gamma_2$  the intercepts, and  $\delta_1$  and  $\delta_2$  the coefficients of the trend (for determining which whether or not to incorporate the intercepts and trend variables). Since  $\beta'$  depicts the coefficient of long-term stable relationship among variables and  $\beta' Y_{t-1} - \gamma_2 - \delta_2 t \neq 0$ ,  $\Delta Y_{t-1}$  would affect  $\Delta Y_t$  through the coefficient  $\alpha$ .

In estimation, through difference variables and the canonical correlation obtained by distracting serial effects from the difference variables, one would verify whether there is any co-integration relationship or stable relationships among variables. As such,  $\Delta Y_t$  accounts for the amount of short-term variation, while  $\beta' Y_{t-1}$  explores long-term stable relationship.

For selecting the appropriate model, we shall adhere to Schwarz Criteria (SC) and follow the rules of MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) or VAR model without any constant terms and ECM term with constant terms:  $\gamma_2 \neq 0$ ,  $\gamma_1 = \delta_1 = \delta_2 = 0$ . For the table providing information of model selection, see Appendix A.

Below, we analyze the data for periods of 1980–1988, 1989–2014, 1989–2007, 2008–2014.

(1) The period 1980–1988. By the pairwise Granger causality test (Engle, Granger, 1987), the following results are detected. The first level of Granger causality is:  $C \rightarrow GDP$  (very significant impact); the second level is:  $FDI \rightarrow GDP$ ,  $I \rightarrow GDP$ ,  $G \rightarrow FDI$ , and  $X \rightarrow GDP$  (significant impacts); the third level is:  $M \rightarrow GDP$ , and  $FDI \rightarrow GDP$  (impacts being not that significant); and the surprising effect:  $G \rightarrow -GDP$  (see the explanation for Equation (3) in Section 3).

For this period, by employing a Johansen co-integration model (JCM) to take into account the relationships between long-term and short-term adjustments, the results are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log GDP_t = & -0.120063 \left( \begin{array}{l} \log GDP_{t-1} - 0.1730 \log C_{t-1} - 0.0855 \log FDI - 0.6420 \log(I_{t-1}) + 0.6283 \log(G_{t-1}) \\ -0.4105 \log(X_{t-1}) - 0.1406 \log(M_{t-1}) + 0.15776 \end{array} \right) \\ & -0.0497 \Delta \log GDP_{t-1} + 0.7330 \Delta \log GDP_{t-2} - 0.0654 \Delta \log C_{t-1} + 0.4180 \Delta \log C_{t-2} \\ & + 0.0689 \Delta \log FDI_{t-1} + 0.0260 \Delta \log FDI_{t-2} + 0.3533 \Delta \log G_{t-1} + 0.02277 \Delta \log G_{t-2} \\ & -0.1908 \Delta \log I_{t-1} - 0.2269 \Delta \log I_{t-2} - 0.0318 \Delta \log X_{t-1} + 0.1882 \Delta \log X_{t-2} - 0.1188 \Delta \log M_{t-1} \\ & -0.046 \Delta \log M_{t-2} + \epsilon_t \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

$R^2 = 0.527980$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.180177$ ,  $SSE = 0.012324$ , S.E. of equation = 0.025468, F-statistic = 1.518041, log Likelihood = 86.44004, the individual equation's AIC = -4.202355, SC = -3.528961.

From the CCR model of 1980–1988, it derives:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln y_t = & 0.7495 \ln C_t + 0.2523 \ln I_t + 0.1415 \ln G_t + 0.1163 \ln X_t - 0.0765 \ln M_t \\ & + 0.0197 \ln FDI_t - 0.7729 + \eta_t \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$


(2) The period of 1989–2014. By the pairwise Granger causality test, the following results are detected, and the directions of impacts are:  $I \rightarrow GDP, I \rightarrow FDI, GDP \rightarrow G, I \rightarrow G, G \rightarrow FDI$  (coefficient positive and small).

Below, through testing a Johansen co-integration model, the long- and short-term coefficients and adjustment coefficients are reported in Equation (11) and Equation (12) is derived by testing a CCR model.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Delta \log GDP_t = & -0.1342 \left( \begin{array}{l} \log GDP_{t-1} - 0.5795 \log C_{t-1} - 0.04977 \log FDI - 0.1827 \log(I_{t-1}) - 0.0874 \log(G_{t-1}) \\ -0.4248 \log(X_{t-1}) + 0.3312 \log(M_{t-1}) - 1.6026 \end{array} \right) \\
 & + 0.08672 \Delta \log GDP_{t-1} + 0.2240 \Delta \log GDP_{t-2} + 0.1011 \Delta \log GDP_{t-3} + 0.0873 \Delta \log GDP_{t-4} \\
 & - 0.0293 \Delta \log C_{t-1} + 0.0618 \Delta \log C_{t-2} + 0.1427 \Delta \log C_{t-3} - 0.0342 \Delta \log C_{t-4} \\
 & - 0.0299 \Delta \log X_{t-1} - 0.0090 \Delta \log X_{t-2} + 0.0110 \Delta \log X_{t-3} - 0.0552 \Delta \log X_{t-4} \\
 & + 0.0002 \Delta \log FDI_{t-1} + 0.00076 \Delta \log FDI_{t-2} - 0.0006 \Delta \log FDI_{t-3} + 0.00089 \Delta \log FDI_{t-4} \\
 & - 0.0594 \Delta \log G_{t-1} - 0.1134 \Delta \log G_{t-2} - 0.1178 \Delta \log G_{t-3} + 0.03433 \Delta \log G_{t-4} \\
 & + 0.1310 \Delta \log I_{t-1} + 0.1734 \Delta \log I_{t-2} - 0.01196 \Delta \log I_{t-3} - 0.02283 \Delta \log I_{t-4} \\
 & + 0.01605 \Delta \log M_{t-1} - 0.0262 \Delta \log M_{t-2} - 0.0101 \Delta \log M_{t-3} - 0.0487 \Delta \log M_{t-4} + e_t
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{11}$$

$R^2 = 0.306028$ , Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.020275$ ,  $SSE = 0.004469$ , S.E. of equation = 0.008107, F-statistic = 1.070953, log Likelihood = 346.6465, the individual equation's AIC = -6.549413, SC = -5.779654.

**Figure 2. The charts of Relevant Variables Logarithmic Forms (JCM), China, 1989–2014**




$$\ln y_t = \underset{(0.0544)}{0.3195} \ln C_t + \underset{(0.0206)}{0.2360} \ln X_t - \underset{(0.0067)}{0.0201} \ln FDI_t + \underset{(0.0270)}{0.1471} \ln G_t + \underset{(0.0520)}{0.4621} \ln I_t - \underset{(0.0230)}{0.1623} \ln M_t + \underset{(0.1948)}{1.9707} + \eta_t \tag{12}$$

(3) Period 1989–2007. Now we further break up the years 1989–2014 into two periods: 1989–2007 and 2007–2014. Below, the major results of Granger causality Test for the period 1989–2007 are:  $I \rightarrow G, GDP \rightarrow I, FDI \rightarrow GDP, GDP \rightarrow FDI, I \rightarrow FDI$  (at 5% level of significance); and  $I \rightarrow G, GDP \rightarrow I, FDI \rightarrow GDP, GDP \rightarrow FDI, I \rightarrow FDI$ , and  $G \rightarrow I$  (10% significance).

As the results of our testing, the charts of dynamic responses of these variables are recorded below.

**Figure 3. Charts of Dynamic Responses of Variables (CCR), China 1989–2007**



Then, by the method of canonical co-integration (CCR), the long-term relationships between these variables and GDP in the period 1989–2007 are revealed below:

$$\eta_t = \log GDP_t - 0.273 - 0.676^* \log C_t - 0.386^* I_t + 0.0112 \log FDI_t - 0.078 G_t - 0.139^* \log X_t + 0.159^* \log M_t \tag{13}$$

with FDI becoming statistically insignificant (i.e., without the sign \*),  $\eta_t$  being the long-term coefficient of deviation in equilibrium, and the short-term adjustment coefficient to be  $-0.14077$ .


(4) Period 2008–2014. In this period, it is discovered that the role of government consumption has improved significantly, and the government consumption apparently exerted a significant impact on GDP:  $G \rightarrow GDP$  (at 5% level of significance). In addition, the following sets of Granger causality are uncovered as well:  $G \rightarrow GDP, GDP \rightarrow FDI, I \rightarrow GDP$  (at 10% level of significance).

In the period 2008–2014, the method of canonical cointegrating regression (CCR) is employed with the results shown below.

$$\log GDP_t = 2.759 + 0.5102^* \log C_t + 0.1436^* I_t + 0.00088 \log FDI_t + 0.2135^* G_t + 0.0396^* \log X_t + 0.0509^* \log M_t + \eta_t \tag{14}$$

Judging from Equation (14), one of the results is what has been expected, the elasticity of government consumption with respect to GDP is moderate and yet relatively large. The value of the impact coefficient of G on GDP is 0.2135, only smaller than that of private consumption (with the coefficient of 0.5102), but larger than that of private investment (with the coefficient to be 0.1436).

**Figure 4. Charts of Dynamic Responses of Variables (CCR), 2008–2014**



From the results of our testing, two tables and a figure recording the dynamic responses of these variables are presented below. As seen in Table 1 (with information drawn from Equations (9)–(14)), in general, in the Chinese economy 1980–2014, the impact coefficients of exports (X) on GDP have increased slightly over time (except a few years right after 1989). The impact coefficients of private consumption on GDP, as the most prominent factor detected in our study, have been decreasing over time. This appears to be the mirror reflection of the impact of government consumption with its coefficients being turned from a large negative (i.e.,  $-0.6283$  in 1980–1988,  $JCM_{\square,1}$ ) to moderate positive numbers over time. As for the foreign direct investment (FDI) on GDP, its impact coefficients were found to be (relatively) small.

Table 1

**Changing Pattern of Impact Coefficients on GDP, China, 1980–2014**

	1980–1988 CCR $\bigcirc_{,1}$	1989–2007 CCR $\bigcirc_{,2}$	2008–2014 CCR $\bigcirc_{,3}$	1989–2014 CCR	1980–1988 JCM $\square_{,1}$	1989–2014 JCM $\square_{,23}$
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Government Consumption	0.1415	0.078!	0.2135	0.1471	-0.6283	0.0874
Private Investment	0.2523	0.386	0.1436	0.4621	0.6420	0.1827

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Private Consumption	0.7495	0.676	0.5102	0.3195	0.1730	0.5795
Exports	0.1163	0.139	0.0396	0.2360	0.4105	0.4281
Imports	-0.0765	-0.159	0.0519	0.1623	0.1406	-0.3312†
Foreign Direct Investment	0.0197	-0.013†	0.0009!	-0.0201	0.0855	0.0498

G = Government consumption, I = Private investment, C = Private consumption, X = Exports, M = Imports, FDI = Foreign direct investment, JCM = Estimated through Johansen co-integration model, CCR = Estimated by the method of canonical co-integrating regression, “†” = statistically insignificant.

Table 2

**Largest and Average Gaps of Impact Coefficients of G, I, and C, China 1980–2014**

	1980–1988 $\triangle_{,1}$	1989–2007 $\triangle_{,2}$	2008–2014 $\triangle_{,3}$	1980–1988 $\diamond_{,1}$	1989–2014 $\diamond_{,23}$
Gap of (G, I) Pair	0.1108	0.308	0.0699	1.2703	0.0953
Gap of (I, C) Pair	0.4972	0.290	0.3666	0.4690	0.3968
Gap of (C, G) Pair	0.608	0.598	0.2967	1.3573	0.4921
Average of All Gaps	0.5711	0.399	0.2444	1.0322	0.3281
Largest Gap	0.608	0.598	0.2967	1.2703	0.4921

G = Government consumption, I = Private investment, C = Private consumption.

From Table 2 (constructed from Table 1), by the CCR measures (seeing  $\triangle_{,1} \rightarrow \triangle_{,2} \rightarrow \triangle_{,3}$ ), one observes that: (i) the largest gap of the pairs of the impact coefficients of G, I, and C has decreased over time (0.608  $\rightarrow$  0.598  $\rightarrow$  0.2967); and (ii) the average gaps of G, I, and C have decreased over time as well (0.5711  $\rightarrow$  0.399  $\rightarrow$  0.2444). As the results of employing JCM (seeing  $\diamond_{,1} \rightarrow \diamond_{,23}$ ), it shows: (i) the largest gap of the pairs of the impact coefficients of G, I, and C has decreased over time (1.2703  $\rightarrow$  0.4921); and (ii) the average gap of G, I, and C has decreased over time as well (1.0322  $\rightarrow$  0.3281). Both of these results exhibit the unmistakable trend of decreasing from a higher level to a lower level of strategic discontinuity. And this is consistent with the downward trend in terms of the dynamics of strategic discontinuity predicted theoretical in Section 1 and actually detected in Section 3.

From the information of vectors provided in Table 2 comprising the impact coefficients on GDP of government expenditure, private investment, and private consumption:  $\odot_{,1}$  corresponding to (0.1415, 0.2523, 0.7495) in  $\odot_{,1}$ ,  $\odot_{,2}$  corresponding to (0.078, 0.386, 0.676) in  $\odot_{,2}$ , and  $\odot_{,3}$  corresponding to (0.2135, 0.1436, 0.5102) in  $\odot_{,3}$ , a three-dimensional figure can be constructed as Figure 5.


In Figure 5, all the vectors of the impact coefficients of government consumption (G), private investment (I), and private conception (C) on GDP in states of strategic discontinuity are plotted on the same graph. Then, these vectors are seen to converge over time toward the direction of the origin O:  $\odot_{,1}' \rightarrow \odot_{,2}' \rightarrow \odot_{,3}'$ , for  $\odot_{,3}'$  lying within the dotted circle (which is intuitively drawn, and yet actually calculable) with these numerical labels, such as  $\odot_{,1}'$ ,  $\odot_{,2}'$ , and  $\odot_{,3}'$ , been introduced in Table 1.

Thus, one may conjecture as follows. (1) The “ultimate point of strategic discontinuity” with regard to G, I, and C of the Chinese economy may locate in the origin-centered circle with a small to moderate radius. (2) In the case of China, the realm of strategic discontinuity might converge toward (but would not reach) the origin O over time, with



the radius of convergence having a natural lower bound. If so, this appears to imply the Chinese economy is becoming more stable and so far relatively more efficient, and the degree of strategic discontinuity of China has been diminishing over time associated with the diminishing momentum of China’s economic growth.

**Figure 5. Impact Coefficients on GDP and Converging Trajectory, China 1980–2014**



□<sub>,1</sub> = JCM 1980–1988, □<sub>,23</sub> = JCM 1989–2014, ○<sub>,1</sub> = CCR 1980–1988, ○<sub>,2</sub> = CCR 1989–2007, ○<sub>,3</sub> = CCR 2008–2014, ○<sub>,1</sub>' = from ○<sub>,1</sub>, ○<sub>,2</sub>' = from ○<sub>,2</sub>, ○<sub>,3</sub>' = from ○<sub>,3</sub>.

Evidently, the message presented in Figure 5 is fundamentally consistent with the results of Section 2.<sup>3</sup>

### 6. Concluding Summary and Remarks

The strategic initiatives of the Chinese economy in periods of 1980–1988, 1989–2007, and 2008–2014 are succinctly investigated, and our theory provides a rationale for the direction of weakening dynamics of strategic discontinuity over time for the Chinese economy.

To conduct an econometric study of the Chinese economy in these periods, the technique of Granger causality tests on dynamic VECM models is then employed. Subsequently our findings through the CCR method and JCM reveal that private consumption had the highest elastic impacts upon GDP with coefficients decreasing over time, exports and private investment had moderately elastic impacts with varying

<sup>3</sup> (Also see (6) **Results** of Appendix B). The empirical results differ somewhat from the evolutionary process of systemic structural changes due to several developments. The costs of the political turmoil of China in 1989 include for a while some degree of isolation of the Chinese economy from the economies of the West and Japan. Especially the government sector was then affected, and the marginal contribution of government consumption went down to deviate from the theoretical trajectory on which the marginal contributions of government consumption and private investment are expected to increase.

values of coefficients, and government consumption had elastic impacts with coefficients changing from small positive (or negative) to moderately positive values over time. Finally, assessed from transforming vectors of the impact coefficients of government consumption, private investment, and private consumption, the trajectory of the Chinese economy traversing from higher level to lower level states of strategic discontinuity is clearly demonstrated. Therefore, the consistency between our theory of strategic discontinuity and the Chinese reality in this period of study is evidently confirmed.

Thus, following the world's second trend of convergence toward a mixed economy, we have provided a new useful framework to study the Chinese economy by the approach of searching for the strategic discontinuity among the forces of government consumption, private investment, and private consumption.<sup>4</sup> This approach of ours is implicitly rooted in the framework of production and consumption. In contrast, the conventional macroeconomic approach (including that of stochastic dynamic general equilibrium) is based upon the foundation of aggregate demand and aggregate supply equilibrium.

Now a few remarks are warranted. First, our findings revealed the prominent impact coefficients of the private consumption on the real GDP and the moderate impact coefficients of exports and government consumption. Secondly, our finding of the significant impact coefficients of the private consumption on GDP confirms the general perception about the Chinese economy of the past as a production-oriented economy. Due to "under consumption," the "marginal contribution in percentage term" of private consumption was higher than those of all other variables according to the CCR method. Thirdly, the finding of the impact coefficient of government expenditure before 1989 (by Johansen cointegration model JCM) to be negative is somewhat surprising. Although it may point to the direction of government failure, there may also exist some hidden causes such as the necessity of an early stage of national building to justify its role at the time. Last but not least, in this period, the converging trajectory of strategic discontinuity of China is inferred as the trend of moving partially and limitedly toward the equalization of sectoral contributions to the economy. This appears to be a welcoming trend, and it confirms well the consistency between our theory of strategic discontinuity and the Chinese reality in this period of study.

### **Appendix A Table of Model Selection**

Seeing Tables A.1 and A.2, there are 4 to 5 sets of co-integration relation verified by judging from the trace of maximum eigenvalues of co-integration relations. It follows that, by the criterion of SC selection, we identify the second model, or the one with long-term intercept but without any trend term.

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<sup>4</sup> With regard to Appendix B, this new framework seeks to explore the strategic discontinuity or cross-sectional systemic imbalance among the forces of centrality, mutuality, and competition, applicable both to the production/aggregate supply and consumption/aggregate demand sides of the modern economy.

Date: 12/16/14 Time: 17:31

Sample: 1 102

Included observations: 96

Series: LNC LNEX LNFDI LNG LNGDP LNI LNIMPORTS

Lags interval: 1 to 5

**Table A.1 Selected (0.05 level\*) Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model**

Data Trend:	None	None	Linear	Linear	Quadratic
Test Type	No Intercept	Intercept	Intercept	Intercept	Intercept
	No Trend	No Trend	No Trend	Trend	Trend
Trace	4	5	4	5	4
Max-Eig	2	3	2	4	4

\* Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999).

**Table A.2 Information Criteria by Rank and Model**

Data Trend:	None	None	Linear	Linear	Quadratic
Rank or	No Intercept	Intercept	Intercept	Intercept	Intercept
No. of CEs	No Trend	No Trend	No Trend	Trend	Trend
<b>Log Likelihood by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)</b>					
0	1625.331	1625.331	1637.250	1637.250	1644.796
1	1655.505	1657.946	1669.861	1670.515	1677.237
2	1674.742	1683.458	1695.230	1696.476	1702.632
3	1687.740	1702.388	1711.900	1720.077	1726.178
4	1700.403	1715.328	1724.792	1736.746	1742.729
5	1707.487	1727.047	1731.810	1747.783	1752.141
6	1711.089	1733.703	1736.650	1754.797	1758.762
7	1711.213	1737.121	1737.121	1758.799	1758.799
<b>Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)</b>					
0	-22.21247*	-22.21247*	-22.12797	-22.12797	-21.95236
1	-22.17546	-22.17876	-22.14172	-22.10780	-21.96257
2	-21.91060	-21.99708	-22.00461	-21.93549	-21.82601
3	-21.51574	-21.67828	-21.68626	-21.71399	-21.65090
4	-21.11392	-21.23469	-21.28922	-21.34808	-21.33009
5	-20.59588	-20.76566	-20.76980	-20.86483	-20.86053
6	-20.00528	-20.19114	-20.20500	-20.29778	-20.33284
7	-19.34224	-19.54917	-19.54917	-19.66797	-19.66797

### Appendix B Systemic Changes of Human Activism in States of Strategic Discontinuity

(1) **ADV 1.** This is the period in which the cultural backgrounds of the economy are starting to transform from Cul I to a mix of Cul I and Cul II. Here, Cul I is the cultural system of groupism with wealth accumulation at the household level (i.e., the household's objective being the maximization of wealth accumulation) under the institution of group-oriented family (for passing wealth to the offspring) and with national surplus maximization (or practically maintaining high-level GDP growth rates) at the national

level under the institution of HA I (human activism I, i.e., the structures of Confucian guanxi-network at the social level and central planning and SOEs at the national level). In contrast, Cul II is the cultural system of (capitalistic) individualism oriented toward consumption (i.e., striving for maximizing the value of consumption and service goods measured in subjective prices) and technological creation at the household level under the institution of individualistic family (competitive or even imperfect market being the background) and with consumption maximization (or practically the goal of full employment) at the national level under the institution of HA II (human activism II, i.e., structures of government interventions conducive to fiscal, monetary, and other government policies and regulatory measures).

(2) **ADV 2.** This is a process of transforming a closed economy into an open economy by internalizing foreign commercial forces and advanced technologies. Naturally, the background is the development of the domestic economy.

(3) **ADV 3.** With the notations of “<sup>H+</sup>” depicting the idea of “extremely high level,” “<sup>H</sup>” the idea of “high level,” “<sup>M</sup>” the idea of “medium level,” “<sup>L</sup>” the idea of “low level,” and “<sup>L-</sup>” the idea of “extremely low level,” now we have ( $Z^{H+}$ ,  $M^L$ ,  $K^{L-}$ ) denoting the HA Hybrid, with “<sup>H+</sup>” force of centrality H, “<sup>L</sup>” force of mutuality M, and “<sup>L-</sup>” force of market competition K.

(4) **ADV4.** With the notations of “<sup>H+</sup>” depicting the idea of “extremely high level,” “<sup>H</sup>” the idea of “high level,” “<sup>M</sup>” the idea of “medium level,” “<sup>L</sup>” the idea of “low level,” and “<sup>L-</sup>” the idea of “extremely low level,” it is assumed to have a long-term trend of continual decline in the degree of strategic discontinuity for the first three stages as follows: “( $Z^{H+}$ ,  $M^L$ ,  $K^{L-}$ ) ↔ developing defense industry, agriculture, and light industries” → “( $Z^H$ ,  $M^M$ ,  $K^L$ ) ↔ developing defense industry, agriculture, light industries, and heavy-chemical industries” → “( $Z^M$ ,  $M^H$ ,  $K^M$ ) ↔ developing defense industry, high-tech industries, finance, and international trade” ⇒ “Slow growth path → rapid growth path → approach/moderate growth path.” Here ( $Z^H$ ,  $M^M$ ,  $K^L$ ) denotes HA Hybrid of stage 2, and ( $Z^M$ ,  $M^H$ ,  $K^M$ ) denotes HA Hybrid of stage 3.

(5) **Results.** Three results are implied by ADV1–AD4. (1) The force of strategic discontinuity of a system would not cease if the strategic objectives of the system are not achieved and if there exist potentials of systemic and strategic changes. (2) The force of strategic discontinuity of a system would not cease if the state of the system is not satisfactory to the planner and if there exist potentials of systemic and strategic changes. (3) In the process of decreasing the degree of strategic discontinuity, the difference among the forces of centrality, mutuality, and competition shall shrink; as such, the differential marginal contributions of the forces of centrality, mutuality, and competition would shrink over time accordingly.

To be connected to the econometric study of China presented in this paper, the important consequence for the formulation of the evolutionary process of an advancing economy is the shrinking state of strategic discontinuity. That is to say, in terms of the concepts of centrality, mutuality, and competition, as the economy advances over time, the divergent forces of centrality, mutuality, and competition shall reduce their respective momentum, and thus the degree of strategic discontinuity among them shall be reduced over time (also see Section 3 of this paper). That is, for an advancing economy, with the forces of centrality ( $Z$ ), mutuality ( $M$ ), and competition ( $K$ ) embedded in Hybrid HA,

let  $Y$  be the real output, and  $Z$ ,  $M$ , and  $K$  be the real outputs of the sectors of centrality, mutuality, and competition of the domestic economy, respectively. Then we have:

$$Y = Z + M + K + F \tag{15}$$

with  $F$  referring to the real output of the foreign sector. Moreover we have:

$$\frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln Z} = a \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln M} + b = c \frac{\partial \ln Q}{\partial \ln K} + d \tag{16}$$

as a necessary condition of strategic discontinuity (for more details, also see Formula (1)).

Note that, for this  $Z$  in Formula (15), one may assume  $\Delta Y^Z = \tau_Z \cdot \Delta Z$ , for  $\tau_Z$  being transformational operator of production out of the sector of centrality,  $\Delta Y^Z$  being the change in the real output of the economy out of centrality. Furthermore, one could have:

$\tau_Z = \alpha'' \times \beta'' \times \gamma''$ ,  $\alpha'' > \beta'' \geq 1 > \gamma'' > 0$ , with  $\gamma'' = \frac{1}{1+\beta''}$  and  $\alpha'' = \frac{1}{1-FTL}$ ; for  $\alpha''$  being the value associated with of the force of centrality, with  $0 \leq FTL < 1$ ,  $FTL$  being the fraction of total investment devoted to the sector/operations of centrality,  $\beta''$  being the value associated with the sector/operations of competition and  $\gamma''$  being the value associated with mutuality. For example,  $\tau_Z = \alpha'' \times \beta'' \times \gamma'' = 10 \times 2 \times \frac{1}{3} = \frac{20}{3}$  by assuming  $FTL = 0.9$ ,  $\beta'' = 2$ . Similarly, one could have analogous formulae for the variables  $M$  and  $K$ .

The cultural system of Confucianized Legalism (内法外儒 nefa wairu, Confucianism outside with Legalism inside) with institutions of central planning mechanism and the Chinese Communist Party is necessary for the force of centrality the way it practiced so far in China, and the cultural system of Confucianism is necessary for the force of mutuality the way it practiced in China to this date. What is special about the Chinese cultures is that both of these Legalism and Confucianism share the same root with Taoism, and therefore the Chinese “relative centrality” and “relative inward-looking mutuality” (i.e., not to be excessive reciprocal as to avoid coercion and corruption) have great potentialities to evolve into a form of modernization. Over time, in essence, these traditional cultural foundations would be in conflict with the transplanted cultures of Marxism-Leninism and capitalism.

It is insightful to compare with the experience of the former Soviet Union in which the integration of the forces of market with central planning failed miserably. The success story of China so far has essentially been about the contributions of the role of mutuality playing in a strong form HA. Through the intermediary function of guanxi network (force of mutuality, for examples, the guanxi network supporting the establishment of shadow banking system on one side and the CCP operations on the other side) to bridge the gap between central planning system and capitalist market system, the Chinese economy has achieved reasonably (or a somewhat acceptable degree of) smooth operations of both SOEs and private business sector. In terms of economic institution, it is this guanxi network based on Confucian ethics that enables China to engage successfully in a continual series of economic reforms, and in terms of economic structure, it is the lack of this type of the mechanism of mutuality that the former Soviet Union failed. In this case of China, underlying the forces of centrality, mutuality, and competition, the cultural basis of Tao-

ist activism (i.e., active but not passive Taoism) is indispensable. That is, without this active (and somewhat inward-looking) ethics and (systemic/holistic) rationality of Taoism, the Chinese system of human activism would not operate effectively and smoothly. Evidently, different cultural forces have contributed to the different experiences of China and the former Soviet Union in terms of economic reforms.<sup>5</sup>

The new ideas presented in this paper are included in order to fit for the study of an advancing economy of nations (for instance, China, and similarly for Japan, India, and some Islamic countries, etc.), with the necessary bases of cultures and institutions to be internalized.

The trajectory for the future (or stage 4 dynamics) of China may also lie fundamentally in, while keeping the efficiency of centrality and mutuality intact, internalize the culture of the West in individual spontaneity and scientific creativity through a process of creating new culture from the bases of Hybrid Cul and Hybrid HA. In general, it is hard to successfully learn from the West, and it is extremely difficult to create a new culture.

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<sup>5</sup> In the near future, in general, it is pointed out that this advancing economy may be stagnating (in stage 4), and an apparent direction to rejuvenate this system is to move onto the trajectory of a matured economy of the West. By the words of Fukutama (2015), a fundamental problem for the existing "Chinese model" is that it is composed the philosophy of "Marxism-Leninism and Confucianism" and "both are not compatible," and further incorporate the spirit of "selfishness." This is a system "without consistent philosophy."

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### **Dochód narodowy, strategiczna nieciągłość i zbieżne trajektorie inicjatyw polityki makroekonomicznej: empiryczne badania dotyczące Chin**

#### **Summary**

Ramy zbieżnych trajektorii inicjatyw polityki makroekonomicznej są stosowane w kontekście strategicznej nieciągłości w badaniu dochodu narodowego rozwijającej się gospodarki. Przedstawiono model zmian systemowych opartych na równaniu produkcji i konsumpcji. W analizie chińskiej gospodarki z lat 1980–2014 z biegiem czasu zauważalna jest znaczna redukcja dynamiki nierównowagi politycznej, co jest zgodne ze spadkową tendencją zmniejszania się różnic pomiędzy współczynnikami wpływu konsumpcji publicznej, inwestycji prywatnych i konsumpcji prywatnej.

**Słowa kluczowe:** nieciągłość strategiczna, zmiany systemowe, testy ekonometryczne, postęp ekonomiczny, Chiny



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## The Regional Development of Democratization and Civil Society: Transition, Consolidation, Hybridization, Globalization – Taiwan and Hungary<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes can be identified when comparing East Central Europe and East and South Asia. The two regions face similar global challenges, follow regional patterns of democratization and face crises. In communist times, East Central Europe was economically marginalized in the world economy, while some parts of Asia integrated well in the global economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment encouraged the former communist countries to opt for the Western-style rule of law and democracy. Different external factors helped the Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, which benefited from the support of the United States and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to develop their human rights culture and democracy while facing their totalitarian counterparts, namely the People's Republic of China and North Korea. The very different positions Taiwan and Hungary have in their respective regions follow from the different capacities of their transformation management since 1988–1989. Taiwan preserved its leading role and stable democracy despite the threat to its sovereignty from the People's Republic of China. Hungary never had such an influential and problematic neighbor and was ensured security and welfare partnership by the European Union, which Taiwan lacked. While Taiwan was less secure, economic and social conditions were more favorable for democratization than those in Hungary. Hungary, in turn, held a leading position in democratization processes in the period of post-communist transition which was lost during the crisis and conflicts of the last decade (after 2006 and especially since 2010). Despite the fact that liberalization prepared the way for peaceful transition in both countries and resulted in similar processes of democratic consolidation in the 1990s, Hungary joined the 'loser' group in its region, whereas Taiwan is among the top 'winning' countries in its region. Taiwan at the moment is starting comprehensive reform processes toward enhanced democracy, civil rights and the rule of law, and Hungarian development is criticized by many external and internal analysts as straying from the path of European-style consolidated democracies towards illiberal trends and hybridization. Western global concepts of democratization may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and weaker factors in the democratic transitions in Asia and Europe within the Third Wave democracies.

**Key words:** democratization, hybridization, regional development, Central Europe, East Asia, Democracy, party system, political protest, social movements, mobilization, authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism

### Introduction

The paper is based on the results of discussions from global and European political science and international relations, including:

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- the “end of transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002);
- “anti-democracy promotion and democracy promotion/development strategies” (Carothers, 2015; Whitehead, 2014);
- “hybridization and new authoritarianism” (Diamond, 2002; Morlino, 2009; Krasztev, Til, 2015; Levitsky-Way, 2010; Babayan, Risse, 2015; Soest, Whitehead, 2015; *Authoritarianism*, 2015).

Carothers' (2002) seminal work on the end of the transition paradigm heralded a new era of studies on the many kinds of the Third Wave transitions. Literature on illiberal tendencies, hybridization and new authoritarianism has resulted in a much-debated new approach. A few analysts, such as Ekiert (2011), Mislivetz (2012), Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014), Krasztev, Til (2015), Whitehead (2016), Szabó (2015) – have tried to reach a conclusion on the challenge of the crisis for post-authoritarian and post-communist civil societies.

However, Dahrendorf (1990), in his famous stage model, made it clear that, after the emergence of a new civil society, its political culture will mature only after a long and conflict-ridden period leading to the establishment of a new constitution, political system and market economy. Linz and Stepan (1996) reflected on civil society as a prerequisite of democratic consolidation embedded in the framework of democracy, the market economy, statehood, and the new rule of law. Democracy in relation to civil society was the precondition for democratic stabilization and consolidation, as defined by Wolfgang Merkel (1994) and his various research groups. Within literature, after the global civil society enthusiasm of the 20th century, a more self-critical and self-reflective approach emerged, focusing on the effects of economic and political crises on civic development (Berg-Schlosser, 2015; Shin, Kim, 2016), which will be reflected in this project.

Transition literature on South European and South American trends had become elite-centric. Later, the analysis of East Asian and Eastern European transitions, mainly the latter, brought civil society to the fore (Arato, 1992). To discuss the democratic progress, it is important to differentiate the concepts of liberalization, democratic transition and democratic consolidation. For Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), the first indicates a non-democratic state with a mix of policy and social changes, such as reduced censorship of the media and toleration of opposition; the second indicates free competitive elections; and the last indicates that democracy has behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally become ‘the only game in town.’ They proposed five necessary arenas as working definitions of consolidated democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, usable bureaucracy, and economic society (Linz, Stepan, 1996, pp. 1–11). Consequently, here we will adopt the above-mentioned criteria for discussion, for two reasons: (1) their comprehensiveness and theoretical coherence (not to clarify all prominent definitions from different viewpoints); (2) it is possible to dynamically and strictly assess the progress and regression of consolidation, which could not be achieved by negative single-index concepts. For Linz and Stepan, civil society refers to self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, that attempt to articulate values, create associations, and advance their interests. Thus, in this arena, they believed that the primary organizing principle would be freedom of association and communication; furthermore, rule of law which might establish legal guarantees, would be one of the necessary supporting conditions from other arenas (Linz, Stepan, 1996, pp. 7, 14).

As analysis of the development of civil society in former communist countries has shown, a varied social map of new civil societies has emerged (Ekiert, Kubik, 2014; Bába, 2016; Ekiert, Foa, 2011, 2017), with Central and Eastern Europe similar to established European models, and Russia and post-Soviet Central Asia under new authoritarian regimes. In the process of EU accession, the Central and Eastern European and Baltic regions made progress towards European and global models. Risks to the democratization processes were stressed in the transition literature, in contrast to the evolution/progress-based strict stage models (Schmitter, Schneider, 2014). Issues of hybridization have long been discussed, especially related to the multiplicity of forms of political participation and political conflict resolution (Morlino, 2009; Levitsky, Way, 2010). For a long time, Central and Eastern Europe was seen as a success story compared to other regions (Merkel, 2010). However, problems of consolidation and economic and political crises produced counter-trends to democratic consolidation in Hungary and, recently, elsewhere (Ekiert, 2011). Hybridization and illiberal tendencies endanger pluralism and tolerance, core values of the old and new civil societies, and weaken the rule of law, enabling government intervention in the autonomy of civil society (Bozóki, 2015).

### **Central and Eastern Europe: a system transition towards European civil society?**

In Poland, the mass movement Solidarity, in Czechoslovakia, the small intellectual network Charter 77, in Hungary, different networks of critical intellectuals – all articulated the demands of civil society (Bába, 2016). National autonomy and independence as an opportunity for the development of civil society within the individual communist countries was limited by Soviet intervention; in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in the Soviet-supported Polish military takeover in Poland in 1981, the Soviet Union maintained the forced integration of the former socialist countries.

Crises in the planned economy, centralized one-party rule, and international, East-West conflicts made autonomous national policies more possible within the Eastern bloc in the 1970s and 80s. The general trend in Central and Eastern Europe was the use of the political sphere by the communist elite to gain popular support by formulating autonomous foreign and domestic policies. There were some experimental openings towards civil society in Hungary and Poland (Arato, 1992; Frenzel-Zagórska, 1990) but authoritarian patterns were simultaneously reinforced and civil society survived in a 'catacomb' existence. However, the liberalization processes in Poland and Hungary opened up political space for the development of true civil society and political opposition (Falk, 2003).

The legacy of the past, of pre-communist and anti-communist civil society played a role in the new beginning. Social solidarity, Christian and Catholic social and moral values, national traditions and democratic aspirations established a strong civil society as a mobilizing force in Poland throughout the 1980s (Ekiert, Kubik, 2014). The organizational and symbolic unity of Solidarity (Ekiert, 1996) could not be preserved in the framework of pluralist democracy after 1989. Strong organizational unity even hindered the development and differentiation of a multi-party system. Compared with Poland, there has been considerable political stability in Hungary since 1956 (Tóké, 1996).

Kádárist policy opened up possibilities for the second economy, and the formation of civil society on the level of economy. A much less politicized civil society emerged in this way in Hungary than in Poland (Michta, 1997; Miszlivetz, 1999; Renwick, 2014). Fragmentation and differentiation of opposition intellectual groups and circles had already developed before system transformation, and their capacity for political bargaining with reformers from the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were much more formidable than in Poland. No huge waves of repression comparable to martial law in Poland, took place in Hungary after the 1956 revolution and its aftermath. Thus, no umbrella organization representing national solidarity was established beyond the temporary unity of opposition groups which emerged in order to bargain with the communists at the Round Table (Tökés, 1996).

Civil society developed in Poland and Hungary within the established framework of statehood, which enabled the global and international opening up of a network of NGOs supported by the government and foreign aid. Czechoslovakia's historical background to the regime change is the normalization process introduced after 1968, with the strong backing of the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership (Bába, 2016). All reform communists were excluded from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and even Soviet reforms of the 1980s were ignored by the communist elite, as in the GDR. Opposition groups developed in an intellectual subculture against the old system, and strict political-administrative control forced them to be united. Strong repression and rigidity of the communist rulers helped to bring national and democratic issues together in opposition discussions. Political solidarity from non-conventional artistic groups and former reform communists emerged in the form of Charter 77.

The processes of institutionalization and differentiation are connected in Czechoslovakia (Olson, 1997) with the re-emergence of the issues relating to separation, Czech and Slovak nation-building and state-building, and the eventual split. The difference in political culture between the more Westernized and industrialized Czech regions, and the less developed Slovak regions suffering from socio-economic and ethnic problems, as well as the unresolved conflict among factions in the new political elite, led to separation and the peaceful dissolution of the federation into two sovereign states in 1992. The potential for nationalist mobilization is more serious in Slovakia, while the political traditions and culture of the Czech regions have a more Western-European civic orientation (Olson, 1997). Czech civil society has been able to develop without significant political interference, while in Slovakia civic groups have been united against the authoritarian experimentation with nationalist mobilization and the anti-Western attitude of some political groupings.

The activities of the US-based international philanthropist George Soros began in Hungary in the mid-1980s, as it was then the most open country in the region in which to support the development of an open society in a former communist country. Among others, the Soros Foundation became an important regional player, and was one of the first to bring international aid to Eastern civic initiatives from the material and cultural resources of Western civil societies. The Soros network spread throughout the whole region after 1989, and helped the development of civic engagement with material support, by providing training abroad and especially by facilitating networking among Eastern civic initiatives, and between Eastern and Western civil societies (Quigley, 1997).

Protest movements and nation-wide alternative civic organizations emerged as leading forces in the democratic breakthrough of 1988–1990. The resurrection of civil society, self-organizing, bottom-up approaches, new groups of elites and competition between them, and new organizational forms fast gave shape to the civic sphere, where, instead of the former ‘catacomb’ networks, nation-wide mass mobilizations took place and reshaped the state and society (Arato, 1992). Civic and political space opened up for the umbrella organizations, all-embracing national fronts, thanks to agreements at Round Table talks involving civic and political forces to constitute a new political community, national institutions and national leaders, renewing the basis of the political community (Bába, 2016). The movement organizations and political leadership of the first democratization period had to be restructured by new political conflicts. As long as the communist party maintained political and administrative control, the new movements were connected in a united front. After the dissolution of the monopoly of power, and the establishment of new political opportunities, new leaderships and ideologies emerged to fill the pluralistic political field, and the formerly united civil society was fragmented into various movements and counter-movements.

Throughout the phases of system transformation, socio-political changes took place. Social movements mobilized by the crisis and protests set up transitory coalitions with temporary organizational consequences. The emergence of a party system is an important step in institutionalization (Dawisha, Parrot, 1997). With free elections, the distribution of power and formulation of national policy converge in the setup of new institutional structures, which represent national interests within pluralistic, conflict-based modern societies. Civil society, with its network, is established on the basis of the new economy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and regional and global networks. Associations, foundations, and different types of NGOs are established. Civic activism develops in a progressive way, if it is not hindered by wars, civil wars, ethnic conflicts or resurgent authoritarianism.

The processes of system transformation in Central and Eastern Europe had a similar dynamic, but with considerable differences. There are some common elements, based on common historical and cultural heritage and geographic, economic and social ties to Western Europe in this region, especially compared to post-communist development in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. One of the important distinctive features of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe is the absence of violent ethnic and territorial conflicts, unlike those which followed the dissolution of multi-ethnic federal states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that territorially-based ethnic minorities do exist, the violent mobilization of the majorities did not occur. Ethnic violence seems to be under control in this region, where new political institutions, constitutional frameworks and political parties are accepted as channels for the distribution of power. The Europeanization process, the dynamics of European integration and its effects produced a largely supportive trend for the development of Central and Eastern European civil society.

The international, as well global and regional, dimension of democratization processes was clear within the revitalization process of civil society. International organizations and foreign governments had to become key supporters, as the new capitalists were less involved in philanthropy in the new market system. Government support is, on one hand,

rare during the transition to a market economy; on the other hand, NGOs do not always ask for government support. The scarcity of internal resources is one reason why foreign, especially international and Western, aid was and is so important for the new sector of NGOs in the new EU member states (Jensen, Miszlivetz, 2006).

The demonstration effect of Western models is also very important in the rebirth of NGOs. Pre-communist traditions were broken by communist totalitarianism, and the government-led pseudo-autonomous organizations of the communist period did not provide a sustainable model for the new beginning after 1989. The geographical and cultural presence of the Western European, especially German, model of society is characteristic of democratization in Hungary, but Anglo-Saxon, especially US-American, material and intellectual support has also been influential through the institutions and programs affiliated with the US Embassy and the network of the Soros Foundation (Quigley, 1997). Internationalization, globalization, and regionalization were especially important for the emerging or re-emerging civil movements, characterized by the 'poor' situation, scarcity of resources, and lack of experience with pluralist conditions. Poor Eastern movements were looking for richer Western partners and cooperation, and there were attempts among Eastern movements to network beyond national levels and increase the effectiveness of their own resources (Schreier, 2015).

Hungarian civil society remained weaker than that in Poland even after the transition, despite a considerable amount of Western aid. In Hungary, domestic civil society never reached a level of strength comparable to that of its counterpart in Poland (which included a large independent trade union). By the end of the 1980s, organizations which had emerged to fill the void (Danube mobilization, Hungarian Democratic Forum) quickly transformed themselves into political parties during the democratization process, and this very fact left civil society relatively empty, resulting to some extent in a 'civil vacuum' in the new Hungarian democracy. Civic organizations and NGOs may not have lacked financial backing but they did lack membership, supporters and local networks. This weakness can partly explain the low level of civic mobilization in Hungary (compared to Poland) and the weakness of watchdogs during the 1990s.

The general attitude of the new regime was positive, affirmative and helpful towards NGOs, and the legal and political situation was often reformed with the aim of improvement. One general difference between NGOs and civil society in stable Western democracies compared to those in post-totalitarian/authoritarian former communist countries is the higher level of innovation in the latter group compared to the former, but more efficiency and stability in the former group than the latter. Conditions in some Western democracies for NGOs are stable, legitimate, and effective in the long run, while conditions in new democracies are in constant flux, and therefore their legitimacy and effectiveness can be weak (Kuti, Sebestyén, 2004).

By joining NATO, the OECD and the EU, Hungary became part of the circle of donor states within Europe and the world system. The level of governmental financial support is still below the average of the welfare democracies, thus analysts still encourage or demand more and more government support in order to finance the functions (in culture, welfare, education, etc.) that have been abandoned by government agencies and overtaken by NGOs. While the cry for more government support has been one of the repetitive echoes of discussions on NGO finances since regime transition, at the same

time they demand self-government and autonomy. To find a compromise between these two is the task of the schemes developed to finance NGOs in Hungary, based upon internal resources and encouraging private initiatives. The systems of tax remission and tax donation could be seen as a large macro-system of citizen re-education for philanthropy and civic engagement. On the other hand, this 're-schooling society' process is based upon the changing political opportunity structures, which affects the government policy of NGO financing. The present system is a top-down scheme, although the basic idea was bottom-up, based upon liberal philosophy.<sup>2</sup> Nowadays, NGOs in Hungary act in the multi-layered environment of the global, EU, national, and local policy actors, who should develop their resource-mobilization strategies in this multi-organizational field with different types of stakeholders.

### **Transition, consolidation and civil society in East Asia**

A general starting point for discussion is whether the democratic transitions in Asia could at all be interpreted in the same theoretical framework as democratic transitions in other parts of the world (Cotton, 1997; Shin, Kim, 2016). In the 1990s, research on democratic consolidation was already raising serious questions around East Asian Third Wave democracies, using various arguments which mostly still remain relevant today. As a counterweight to homogenizing approaches, a regional analysis for limits and achievements of democratization was proposed, which is still under development. Western-style pluralist opposition as an important agent and actor against the authoritarian regime was apparently a less marked phenomenon in East Asia than in Southern and Eastern Europe. The blooming economy under authoritarian but benevolent regimes (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) established more openness to the authoritarian past than in Eastern Europe or South America.

However, there are many aspects warranting comparison between post-authoritarian Asian and Central and Eastern European countries, based upon the following issues:

- Struggling with the past;
- Lack of, or weakness of, human rights culture;
- Instability of the constitution and human rights regimes after transition;

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<sup>2</sup> The general state of civil society was depicted in 2009, and continues to be relevant today: "Despite the high level of social self-organization, there is only a limited opportunity for social participation in political-economic decisions. In fact, real civic control, influence and enforcement of interests are hardly typical for the sector [...]. The gradual devaluation of the civil sphere was caused among other, by the lack of citizenry (citoyen), aborted historical development, or [...] the 'defective protest culture' also contributed to that phenomena just like the lack of trust and solidarity between citizens, citizen's legitimacy deficit against the state or bad regulations (a 'civil' organization founded by the state and the local government) [...] regardless of the increasing economic power of the civil sector, the status of its economic base still cannot be considered stable [...] Hungarian civil society cannot make its voice heard in domestic politics and is even incapable of participating on equal terms in political decision making with the representatives of the central and local (municipalities) power. [...] over the past 20 years the Hungarian civil sphere has been unable to create and strengthen such institutions (e.g. social publicity, protests) that would ensure society's self-protection against the abuses of the state (and the parties) and that would provide some help battling democracy deficits" (Fodor, Kern, 2009, pp. 189–191).

- Tendency towards economic and financial crises;
- External factors, such as being surrounded by authoritarian or regimes, local conflicts and tensions, migration waves.

This research paper attempts to discuss the different forms of civic engagement and partisanship, development of civil society, and sustainability of the achievement of civic development. The two regions are far away from each other in space and in terms of cultural tradition, and there are manifold differences, but they are bound by global networks, and in this way they are both divided and integrated by the effects of globalization. In both regions, Central and Eastern Europe and post-authoritarian East and South East Asia, a wide body of literature has been established regarding some focal points which are characteristic for each region. In Central and Eastern Europe, the tradition of the planned economy, the need to rebuild the market economy after communism, the opportunities for European networking, extended welfare services and the tradition of interwar developments can be identified (Dawisha, Parrot, 1997); and in Asia, integration into the world economy, the successes of economic development under authoritarian rule, the challenge of the poorly dealt with authoritarian past, civilian-military relations, and the relationship between ancient Asian culture and religion and Western-based global human rights values and concepts are the main lines of differentiation (Diamond, Plattner, 1998; McAllister, 2016; Croissant, 2004).

Shin (2008, 2016), Fukuyama (2012) and others established a network of analytical aspects for the interpretation of problems and achievements of new democracies in East and South East Asia, relating to the Third Wave and subsequent consolidation:

- East Asia is a region where the Third Wave of democratization could not achieve sustainable results, and different tendencies towards illiberal democracies are documented;
- Some of the important authoritarian regimes are located there, especially China, North Korea, and Vietnam (and Russia nearby);
- China is traditionally the core state of reference for Asian civilizations;
- Authoritarian-capitalist states as China, Vietnam and especially Singapore maintain an alternative to democracy with high opportunity costs and support authoritarian nostalgia for former developmental authoritarian regimes;
- There is no regional organization for implementing human rights and democratic values as efficiently as the EU; ASEAN has a much weaker profile;
- Benevolent authoritarian dictatorships have a long tradition in the region, from ancient to modern times;
- Economic success, wellbeing and development is associated with the current authoritarian regime ('China-factor,' Singapore as a success story);
- Traditional value systems; 'Asian values' of Confucianism have a contemporary influence which is different than Western-style human rights and democracy;
- Civil society is much less developed and younger than the authoritarian-bureaucratic state; political culture has a hybrid character within the region, involving authoritarian, anti-liberal and democratic and liberal elements;
- There is no general, regional consensus on the 'rules of the game,' unlike in the EU;
- The persistence of the idea of benevolent authoritarian rulers, and the need for 'strong men' as top leaders;



- Less tolerance than in pluralist US- or European-based systems towards press freedom;
- Weak roots of party systems, which need more experience of periodic elections than the ‘double test’ of Huntington; two peaceful changes of the governmental power;
- Weak civil society, combined with a new type of political mobilization in the new civic culture, living together with deeply rooted traditional forms of legitimacy;
- A narrow, Schumpeterian concept of electoral democracy, spread out and stabilized as a starting point for further democratization.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are countries where liberal democracy has proved to be stable in the long term, but only with the help of majoritarian electoral systems, hegemonic or two-party systems, and strong ideas of an enemy among the authoritarian states (e.g. China, North Korea), or some combination of these elements. Here, development of a middle class, the mobilization of civil society and value changes in favor of the rule of law and democracy have helped to consolidate democratic regimes, albeit not without serious problems. In other cases, cycles of crises have annulled or hybridized democratic regimes, as in the case of the Philippines or Thailand (Croissant, 2004).

All of these trends and patterns are not far removed from those observed in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The emerging new political culture was lacking the values and experience of tolerance, multi-party systems were still under development, and traditional values – of course, different than those found in Asia – became influential once more after the fall of communism. The rejection of the old regime was more radical, as well as the discontinuity inherent in the transition away from the communist planned economy and system of scarcity. Meanwhile, urbanization, modernization, and even globalization characterized the fast-growing and innovative economies of the authoritarian developing dictatorships of Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore. In this way, Southern Europe was more similar to East Asia, in that no radical change of property or economic system occurred there alongside democratization, at least not in such a radical way as in the former communist countries.<sup>3</sup>

Thinking back to Central and Eastern Europe at the time of the transition, more optimistic predictions for that region were based very much on the external framework, the prospect of EU accession and Western aid, as well as hopes for the newly emerging market economies. EU accession and the process of Europeanization helped to build a consensus among the different factions of the political elite, and Europeanization seemed to have great potential to influence the new democracies and market economies of Eastern Europe, despite the conflicts which emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. However, the common denominator for the new South and East Asian democracies was less clear, and the development of ASEAN never provided a similar dynamic to the Europeanization process at that time. On the global scene, China was an emerging actor, and the US supported democratization and consolidation processes in the region, not with the same intensity and engagement in each and every country, but according to the regional interests of their foreign policy. Democratic consolidation in Japan, Taiwan

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<sup>3</sup> The prospects for consolidation were rather moderate, as stated: “In short, where democratic consolidation has been proceeding, it has not always established the conditions that are fundamental for the reproduction for a Western-style democracy. Finally, the present era [end of the 90s – M.Sz.] may not be as favorable to democratization as the latter part of the 1980s was. In particular, the imperatives of globalization may reduce the attractiveness of democracy” (Cotton, 1997, p. 116).

and South Korea, which are considered to be stable, free and liberal democracies in the region, is partly due to the US presence and support based on security concerns in these countries, with powerful enemies on the other side (Diamond, 1997; Shin, Kim, 2016; McAllister, 2016; Croissant, 2017).

The Third Wave produced a ‘muddling through’ of unconsolidated systems, and the emergence of a ‘reverse wave’ against democratization can be documented and observed in the region. According to Larry Diamond (1997, 1998, 2014), the role and importance of external factors and their interplay with internal factors was the key to consolidation in Taiwan and South Korea. Their role within the global economy, internal economic and technological development and the effect of this on the social structure produced a unique Westernization, combined with their role in the Asian security and general policy of the US, i.e. their geopolitical situation.<sup>4</sup>

Discussions surrounding consolidation have emphasized the wide range of democracy promotion activities (Carothers, 2015) in the form of various resources that Eastern Europe enjoyed, e.g. being targeted by the developed democracies from Western Europe and elsewhere. This kind of help reached the East and South Asian countries in the form of new or long-established cultural and educational exchange, mainly from the US/Canada/Australia, and to a lesser extent from Western Europe. Strengthening party systems, civil societies, public media discourse, and the inclusion of passive citizens in political mobilization posed similar challenges to Eastern Europe, but the different structures of the pre-democratic authoritarian regimes demanded different strategies and concepts of democratic aid. Moreover, global structures, such as the UN global human rights regime, which was established or re-established after the Cold War, made similar challenges relating to the rule of law, legal culture and institutional reform of the two regions. The introduction of new institutions and the growth of a new culture of human rights presupposed civic activism by human rights initiatives, which had been developing since the transition in both regions. However, civic activism has a different profile in the two regions. Asian values of collectivism, the importance of the public good, deference to authority, and communitarianism are missing in Eastern Europe, where the

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<sup>4</sup> “With the reunification of Germany, these two democracies [Taiwan and South Korea – M.S.] are now unique in their status as divided countries, facing threats to their very existence from communist regimes of the same nationality that claim sovereignty over them. [...] The resulting threats to the national security of the two democracies have slowed efforts to democratize civil-military relations and to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian national – security laws and structures. At the same time, the quest for international legitimacy and Western (especially U.S.) support have driven forward the processes of democratization in many other respects [...] The dilemma is particularly acute for Taiwan, given mainland China’s economic dynamism and substantially greater size and power. Yet precisely because Taiwan is so threatened – and by one of the world’s most authoritarian states – democracy has become a resource and a legitimating symbol in its quest for an accepted place in world affairs” (Diamond, 1997: XXXIV–XXXV). “The export dependence of Korea and Taiwan has pushed political development in a democratic direction. Closer economic and political integration with the advanced industrial democracies [...] will become virtually impossible if these two countries cannot implement and maintain democratic systems. At the same time, however, middle classes aware of the need for socioeconomic stability to maintain international competitiveness have not been sympathetic to militant mobilization by labor and other organized groups. Thus the high degree of involvement in the world economy also generates a bias for stability and moderation that tends to limit the potential for polarizing conflict over socioeconomic issues” (Diamond, 1997: XXXV).

pseudo-collectivism of communism gave rise to individualism, lack of trust in institutions and communities and neglecting the public good (Hankiss, 1990).

Philippe C. Schmitter (1997) made a clear-cut and systematic differentiation between civil society in the East and West. He stressed that the diffusion of Western civil society reached Asia by way of colonization, cultural globalization and economic ties, as well as migration (Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc. communities in the US, Australia, Europe). He mentioned the possibility of initiating and implementing the role of civic associations in the development of rule of law procedures, and legal and administrative reforms after the transition (such as bar associations, alumni associations, etc.) drawing from Western and global rule of law cultures. Based upon his own earlier research on neo-corporatism, Schmitter characterized civic associations employing Asian values as intermediaries between the state and society at the level of local, regional and professional organizations and self-regulation. In his view, in Asia, the Hegelian-German-European polarization and clear divide between state and civil society is less pronounced, and even Hegel in his *Philosophy of Law* categorized corporate associations as mediators between state and society. Following the French 19<sup>th</sup> century Liberal thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville, Schmitter argues that the authoritarian regimes in Asia built such strong connections between state and society in the liberalization phase that these mechanisms were able to survive during the latter phases of democratic consolidation.

This organized, embedded transformation, as in the case of Taiwan, enabled a non-violent and less conflictual regime change, although the inherited informal mechanisms of the previous regime may prove hindrances and obstacles to legal change in the direction of a Western-style human rights regime in the long run. This point makes the Taiwan-Hungary comparison of system transition later in this study particularly pertinent. The reform-oriented elite factions played an important role in the two transitions, despite the remarkable differences between Taiwan and Hungary in many respects.

The unique case of Taiwan (Chu, 1998; McAllister, 2016), where the state was based on the Kuomintang army and administration coming from the mainland China after defeat by the communists, produced a militarized, Leninist-style regime in Taiwan, which copied/reproduced certain characteristics of the Russian and Chinese party-state (Cheng, Haggard, 1992). Instead of conflict between state and civil society, both the state and civil society were organized based on the top-down military and political network of the mainland Chinese elite. This elite penetrated the civilian population, military, state and society and suppressed the local Taiwanese elites for a long time, forcing them to build up a counter-elite against the state and military. The strong interconnectedness of state-Kuomintang party-army established the conflict between civil society and the military regime. This was also present in other Asian post-war authoritarian/developmental regimes, but in the case of Taiwan it was strengthened by the conflict between the KMT and PRC, as well as with local Taiwanese groups (Wu, Wen, 1992). This division was established during the liberalization and democratization processes as the main axis of conflict, i.e. the split between the major parties, the Kuomintang party versus the Taiwan-based pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, which has been the mainstay of party competition since 1986. Political parties emerged from both factions, but the two camps, the Blue (the KMT, who came from mainland China and hope for some kind of reintegration with the mainland) and the Green (the DPP, focused on Taiwanese cultural and political independence and recruit-

ed from groups who have been based in Taiwan longer), still form the main dividing line in the political and social system. Such a marked division, going back to the political and social realm of the former authoritarian system, is mirrored in Eastern Europe in the divide between the former nomenclature and non-elite groups and religiosity vs. secularization as the main points of differentiation between the political left and right, as in case of Hungary (Körösi et al., 2009). However, this is not bound so strongly to (sub)ethnic, language and local identities as in Taiwan. Civil and political development in Taiwan would have to leave this pre-democratic pattern behind to unite a nation, a real macro-political community identity, instead of the 'separatist' identity of an island (McAllister, 2016). However, the strong external challenge from the People's Republic of China, among other factors, has formed the dual party system of Taiwan, based upon the issue of separation vs. integration. After the democratic transition, the Kuomintang became the party of understanding and dialogue with China, and the DPP (Lu, 1992) became associated with setting boundaries and demanding guarantees to avoid a too strong and rapid integration with the mainland, which could endanger the results of the democratic transition and consolidation, as well as Taiwanese independence (Bush, 2014). Both parties frame the 'China factor' differently, and analyze and perceive the experience of the Chinese principle of 'one country – two systems' in Hong-Kong and Macau according to their own world view (Ortmann, 2010, 2015; Ngok, 2008).

Statehood as one of the important five realms of democratic consolidation, according to the concept of consolidation developed by Linz & Stepan (1996), is not a fully developed institution in the case of Taiwan due to its lack of sovereignty. State power, in the sense of monopoly of control over the territory, exists, but sovereignty is contested by China and therefore is not acknowledged by the majority of states and international organizations. China implements the 'one China principle' in a very consequential way in bilateral and multilateral relations, due to its growing economic, military and international position of power. The sovereignty of Taiwan is accepted only by a small circle of diplomatic allies (Chu, Moon, 1997). The vast majority of states and international organizations, including the UN, do not accept Taiwanese statehood, unless with the consent/support of PRC and according to its rules, as the 'Chinese Taipei.'

Aurel Croissant (2004), as well as other scholars of the region such as McAllister (2016), consider that Taiwan, alongside South Korea and Mongolia, is one of the best examples of democracy among the Third Wave transition countries in Asia. In his view, the South East Asian new democracies are under constant threat of crisis and internal problems, which is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy. However, he and other analysts have identified problems of freedom of expression, rule of law and horizontal accountability, as well as serious corruption problems, even in these well-performing political systems (Garner, 2011).

Another recent analysis by Larry Diamond and co-authors (2014) stresses that, in Taiwan and South Korea, we are dealing with maturing democracies, which are comparable to the established new democracies in Europe and South America, but, due to the challenges to their statehood/sovereignty, nation-building issues, and policies towards China and North Korea, as well as internal defects in their constitutions, rule of law and polarized party system, they are vulnerable to political crises. The recent political crisis in 2016/17 in South Korea involving the presidency, informal influence, cor-

ruption networks and parallel challenges from the aggressive military policy of North Korea underlined this problem, and made the internal and external problems of South Korean democracy very visible (Diamond, Shin, 2014). The success of demonstrations and rallies against the president in South Korea resulted in the ruling of parliament and Constitutional Court against the corrupt president, and criminal proceedings against former President Pak began, which serves as proof of the strength of civil society and the constitutional order against anti-democratic tendencies.

Concluding this chapter, we may state that Western global concepts of democratization may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and weaker factors within democratic transitions in Asian and Central and Eastern European Third Wave democracies. Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes can be identified comparing Central and Eastern Europe and South and East Asia. Facing similar global challenges, some regional patterns of democratization and resulting crises are developing. Central and Eastern Europe was economically marginalized during communist times, whereas some parts of Asia were well integrated into the global economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment helped former communist countries to become oriented towards Western-style rule of law and democracy, and external factors helped Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, aided by US and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships, to develop their human rights culture and democracy in the face of their totalitarian counterparts in the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea. This strong conflict was, on the one hand, a reason for the strength of the military and security power in these countries, and on the other hand the external threat strengthened the need to draw dividing lines with the enemy, which helped to establish strong human rights and democratic engagement, combined with a pro-development state supporting world market integration. The democratic development of these two countries is based upon the outward challenge from autocratic regimes and political-military support of democratic regimes such as the US. These developments helped to establish the polarized party systems and political cultures based upon the division of the Chinese and Korean nations.

The tendency towards hybridization among new democracies is globally evident, and consolidation after transition is endangered by the resurgence of populism, nationalism and new authoritarianism. Concepts of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, Way, 2010) and of hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002; Morlino, 2009) help to analyze the different outcomes of democratic transitions. The challenge of hybridization is present in both East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary and Taiwan will be compared as two diverging, but in many respects similar, cases of a state with an authoritarian tradition, followed by a democratic transition and various waves of consolidation and de-consolidation.

### **Some of the general trends of changes in the former underground clandestine protest movements in the new democracies of Hungary and Taiwan**

In 1989–1990, the transitions in Taiwan and Hungary had similar characteristics; a peaceful change, rather top-down in nature, withdrawal of the authoritarian system and the organs of repression (army, police, secret service). However, in 1990, in Hungary the

new parties emerging from the opposition movements gained power, whereas the first change from the reformed KMT, Kuomintang to the former underground Danwai- a way similar to Solidarity in Poland- movement party, the Democratic Progressive Party, took place in 2000. There are several reasons why this occurred; in Taiwan, the economic system did not have to be changed, and political power remained with the old ruling elite, while in Hungary, huge economic and social changes led to a change of elites in elections – there were two kinds of transition.

This democratization made possible a long but consequential struggle with the authoritarian past, which led to protest events and the mobilization of social movements after transition in both countries. The main protest events have been demonstrations, memorial meetings, marches related to the former anti-authoritarian struggles or/and for the goals of democratization and national independence in both cases, especially large demonstrations in the capital, or other major cities.<sup>5</sup> Similar dynamics of protest waves can be observed in both cases. Protests tend to be focused on single issues, mainly peaceful, taking the form of demonstrations and strikes, with some conflict centered around civil disobedience and non-conventional action.

The present ruling parties, Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan, and Fidesz (Alliance of the Young Democrats) in Hungary, both of which emerged from the anti-authoritarian, former opposition-dissent movements before transition, have become major parties and important political actors after transition. They have had to change and be challenged by various new civic protest movements such as Sunflower, Wild Strawberries, and White Shirts in Taiwan, as well as students, environmentalists, or right- and left-wing radicals in Hungary.

In Hungary after the 2010 elections resulted in the Fidesz led hegemonic party system and divided opposition, new extra-parliamentary democratic movements have emerged. These new movements have tried to mobilize active citizens and have worked to build a new political landscape from the bottom up, from civil society. Their mobilization has been directed primarily against the policies of the hegemonic party Fidesz. These new democratic movements are members of, and supported by, international and especially European civic and human rights networks, and are highly Europeanized and globally-oriented. There is civic, political and media pluralism in Hungary, however restricted, as in many other recent competitive-authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Levitsky, Way, 2010; Whitehead, 2016). Peaceful forms of protest can be exercised within the framework of the assembly/demonstration law of 1989/2018, and there are even political and media 'spaces' for civil disobedience. Not only do the ruling majority and its affiliated organizations have a voice in public, but also the old and new protesters. There exists a limited, selective pluralism for protest movements (Jensen, 2015; Szabó, 2015).

In Taiwan, since the system transition, the two main political alternatives have been Chiang Kai-shek's former party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the party formed from the

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<sup>5</sup> The research on social movements and protest in Taiwan is based upon on the long term research of Ho and of Hsiao; see Ho (2005, 2014, 2015) Hsiao (1992, 2006). They continue their Taiwan based but Asian comparative research projects involving many Taiwanese and Asian scholars. On Hungary and Poland in East-Central European perspective Ekiert (1996, 2011), Ekiert, Kubik (1998, 2014), as well as Ekiert, Foa (2011, 2017), Miszlivetz (1999), and Jensen (2015), Jensen, Miszlivetz (2006, 2015), works are there as well as the collective volume of Krastev and Til (2015) on Hungary in English and of works of mine Szabó (1996, 2000, 2015).

opposition movements in 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Elections and important government actions and decisions by the DPP presidencies elected in 2000 and 2004 were followed by intra- and extra-parliamentary protest by the KMT. Mobilization of supporters against the democratically elected president and parliament/government were included into the political culture of the new democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, the KMT have built strong ties with PRC and the Chinese Communist Party, and in this way their protests developed a pro-unification, pro-China character. This is an important issue in Taiwan, where the Kuomintang established Republic of China is seen by the mainland “Communist” Chinese elite, and also many Taiwan’s citizens, as an illegal separation from the ancient Chinese state. The DPP stands for Taiwanese independence, and after loosing presidential and governmental power in 2008, they supported pro-independence civic movements against the newly re-established KMT government. The DPP in opposition renewed its networks within civil society, which started protest campaigns against the policy failures of the KMT government and president.

The biggest mobilizations successfully campaigned against the lack of human rights for people in military service and the KMT cross strait policy. The KMT government lost its support partly because of the protests and critical discourses on illiberal tendencies within civil and political society. The ‘China-factor,’ the specific relationship between the KMT and Chinese Communist Party created a ‘shadow of China’ on the liberal democracy of Taiwan. The electorate at the 2015 municipal/local and the 2016 presidential/parliamentary elections voted with a two-thirds majority for the DPP, and demanded a clear transition towards more independence and autonomy for Taiwan, as well as restoring human rights culture. As well as the victory of DPP, the party of the Sunflower movement, the New People’s Party also gained a few seats in the 2016 parliamentary elections. They have tried to bring into public discourse the radical demands of social movements and civic groups. The in 2016 elected DPP government and president aimed to be agents of reform within Taiwanese politics, breaking long-standing deadlocks, such as inquiries into the violence of the authoritarian regime before 1989, reaching a consensus with the colonized aboriginal tribes, reforming the penal system and strengthening human rights and the rule of law. However the independency policy and the distance to China resulted in sever economic losses and the austerity policy provoked huge protests 2016–18 against the DPP government. Civil society activists were disillusioned by the slow and moderate reforms of the rule of law. Both opponents and former supporters alienated from the DPP regime, and wide range of population felt to be worsening its quality of life and economic situation compared to the former KMT regime. The 2018 November local elections produced a landslide victory of the opposition party KMT, huge losses of the DPP in local governments and Prime Minister offered his resignation as well the president gave up the parallel position being the same time DPP party president after the 2018 local elections.

## Conclusions

The party system in Taiwan and in Hungary is focused on a central conflict; between the nationalist-illiberal parties of the right and Europe-oriented, liberally-minded left in Hungary, and between the pro-China/nationalist KMT (the Green) and the pro-inde-

pendence, liberal DPP (the Blue) and their allies in Taiwan. These very strong central conflicts have mobilized protest movements led by both parties in both countries, in Hungary as well as in Taiwan. Protest campaigns have contributed to two-thirds majority victories in the next elections for the protesting parties, of Fidesz (2010) in Hungary and of the DPP (2016) in Taiwan. Both parties have tried to use their dominant position at the legislation and the government as well as in the presidency to guarantee their own political future within a bipartisan system, accusing the former governing party of corruption and abuse of power, the KMT in Taiwan and the Socialist and the Liberal parties in Hungary. This fight against the former government parties produced elements of competitive authoritarianism and an uneven playing field for the two main competitors, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in Hungary and the KMT in Taiwan. The tendency towards hybridization is very clear in both cases, but especially in Hungary where Fidesz received two-third majority three times on national elections (2010, 2014, 2018) this seems to be a long-term trend in Hungary (Magyar, 2016), but it is not a present danger in the case of Taiwan, where on the 2018 November local elections the opposition party KMT received huge support and the much less supported DPP government and presidency is in crisis in the aftermath of this election. Both parties, Fidesz and the DPP, understand their political success, the two-thirds majorities that they received, as a mandate to finish the democratization processes, which they consider incomplete, in their own way, securing their own continued dominance, and oppressing the former ruling parties with authoritarian past.

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## **Regionalny rozwój demokratyzacji i społeczeństwa obywatelskiego: transformacja, konsolidacja, hybrydyzacja, globalizacja – Tajwan i Węgry**

### **Streszczenie**

Porównanie Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej z Azją Południową pozwala określić ich punkty startu obu regionów, podobne procesy i zróżnicowane wyniki. Oba regiony borykają się z podobnymi globalnymi wyzwaniami, realizują regionalne wzorce demokratyzacji i stają w obliczu kryzysów. W czasach komunistycznych Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia była ekonomicznie marginalizowana w gospodarce światowej, podczas gdy niektóre znajdujące się pod rządami autorytarnymi regiony Azji dobrze zintegrowały się z gospodarką globalną. Europeizacja i sprzyjające otoczenie zewnętrzne zachęciły byłe kraje komunistyczne do wyboru rządów prawa i demokracji typu zachodniego. Inne czynniki zewnętrzne pomogły demokracji „trzeciej fali” w Azji, zwłaszcza w Korei Południowej i na Tajwanie, które skorzystały ze wsparcia ze strony Stanów Zjednoczonych i innych globalnych partnerstw gospodarczych, wojskowych i kulturalnych, pozwalających im rozwinąć swoją kulturę praw człowieka i demokrację, stojąc twarzą w twarz z totalitarnymi odpowiednikami – Chińską Republiką Ludową i Koreą Północną. Odmiennie pozycje Tajwanu i Węgier w ich regionach wynikają z różnych zdolności zarządzania transformacją w latach 1988–89. Tajwan zdołał zachować swoją wiodącą rolę i utrzymać stabilną demokrację, pomimo zagrożenia suwerenności ze strony Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Węgry nigdy nie miały tak wpływowego i problematycznego sąsiada, a gwarantem ich bezpieczeństwa i partnerstwa w drodze do dobrobytu była Unia Europejska – czynnik nieobecny w Tajwanie. Podczas gdy poziom bezpieczeństwa na Tajwanie był niższy, panujące tam warunki ekonomiczne i społeczne były bardziej korzystne dla demokratyzacji niż na Węgrzech. Węgry z kolei miały wiodącą pozycję w procesach demokratyzacji w czasach postkomunistycznej transformacji, którą utraciły w czasie kryzysu i konfliktów w ostatniej dekadzie (po 2006 r., a zwłaszcza od 2010 r.). Mimo że liberalizacja przygotowała grunt pod pokojowe przemiany w obu krajach i doprowadziła do podobnych procesów demokratycznej konsolidacji w latach 90. dwudziestego wieku, Węgry dołączyły do grupy przegranych w swoim regionie, podczas gdy Tajwan jest jednym z głównych liderów w swoim regionie. Tajwan w chwili obecnej rozpoczyna kompleksowe reformy zmierzające do wzmocnienia demokracji, praw obywatelskich i praworządności, a węgierski rozwój jest krytykowany przez wielu zewnętrznych i wewnętrznych analityków jako odejście od ścieżki demokracji skonsolidowanych typu europejskiego w kierunku nieliberalnych trendów i hybrydyzacji. Zachodnie globalne koncepcje demokratyzacji mogą pomóc zidentyfikować podobieństwa i różnice oraz porównać mocniejsze i słabsze czynniki przemian demokratycznych w Azji i Europie w ramach demokracji trzeciej fali.

**Słowa kluczowe:** demokratyzacja, hybrydyzacja, rozwój regionalny, Europa Środkowa, Azja Wschodnia, demokracja, system partyjny, protest polityczny, ruchy społeczne, mobilizacja, autorytaryzm, autorytaryzm konkurencyjny

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## China's influence on Taiwan's media and politics

**Abstract:** Taiwan's democracy and freedom of the press provide the Chinese authorities with an opportunity to use Taiwanese businessmen to influence Taiwan's media outlets and politics. China uses three inter-related strategies to influence Taiwan's media in this way: persuading businessmen with pro-China views to purchase Taiwanese media outlets, pressuring existing media owners, and placing advertisements in Taiwan's media in order to purchase political influence. In addition, the Chinese government also employs cyber-propaganda strategy to attack Taiwanese political parties and politicians.

**Key words:** Taiwan, self-censorship, freedom of the press, cross-strait, cyber-propaganda

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In the early 1990s Taiwan began to democratize under President Lee Teng-hui, a process that included gaining freedom of the press. President Chen Shui-bian further promoted a policy of "Regulation to Remove Political Parties, the Government and the Military from the Media" (*Dangzhengjun tuichu meiti tiaokuan* 黨政軍退出媒體), which his government implemented in 2003. Consequently, Taiwan's media became more diverse and competitive. However, Taiwan's freedom of the press and capital markets provided the People's Republic of China (PRC) an opportunity to influence Taiwan's free-wheeling media and politics. From the early 2000s, the PRC employed clandestine media warfare against Taiwan. China first used Hong Kong and other overseas media to attempt to influence public opinion in Taiwan (Tao Sheng-ping 陶聖屏, Lin I-chin 林宜瑾, 2007, pp. 31–52). Later, the PRC employed Vladimir Lenin's idea, "The easiest way to capture a fortress is from within." They also practiced "using businessmen to surround the government" (*yishang weizheng* 以商圍政), in an effort to unify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland (Tao Sheng-ping 陶聖屏, Lin I-chin 林宜瑾, 2007, p. 40).

Since 2008, after Ma Ying-jeou's victory in the presidential election, Ma's policy of closer economic integration with China, as well as Tsai Eng-meng's 蔡衍明 takeover of the China Times Group in 2008, China has deeply influenced Taiwan's media. The PRC urged the unification of Taiwan with China, and the PRC regarded propaganda as an important tactic in its United Front strategy against Taiwan. The PRC's media strategy against Taiwan has three inter-related approaches. First, the PRC uses tycoons with pro-China views to purchase Taiwan's media. Second, the PRC pressures media proprietors who have invested or intend to invest in China. Third, the PRC uses embedded advertising/advertorials in Taiwan's media to influence the media's outlets and public opinion. These approaches by China have had some success in influencing Taiwan's media, and they have worried many in Taiwan. The controversy over the proposed sale of the pro-democratic Taiwan Next Media became a trigger for many Taiwanese to oppose China's "black hand" in Taiwan's media. Many domestic and overseas Taiwanese

students launched an “Anti-Media Monopoly” movement against Tsai Eng-meng and China’s “black hand.”

### **The pro-China views of Tsai Eng-meng and the *Want Want China Times Group***

The owner of the *Want Want China Times Group*, Tsai Eng-meng, is a Taiwanese businessman who started to invest in China in 1989 when most countries boycotted China because of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In an interview with the *Washington Post* in January 2012, Tsai Eng-meng denied that there had been a massacre in Tiananmen Square during June 3–4 1989. This interview clearly disclosed Tsai’s pro-Beijing views. In addition, many stories published in the *China Times* (*Zhongguo shibao* 中國時報) also showed the Chinese authorities’ deep influence on the *Want Want China Times Group*.

The *China Times Group* of Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠 included the *China Times*, the *China Times Express* (*Zhongshi wanbao* 中時晚報), and the *Commercial Times* (*Gongshang shibao* 工商時報). In 2002, the *China Times* merged with CTi TV (*Zhongtian dianshi* 中天電視). In 2005 it further merged with China TV (*Zhongshi* 中視), and the Broadcasting Corporation of China (*Zhongguang* 中廣; BCC) (which the KMT had owned), to become a media conglomerate with newspaper, TV and radio holdings.<sup>1</sup> After the Tsai Eng-meng 2008 takeover of the *China Times Group*, the group began to publish the *Want Daily* (*Wangbao* 旺報) in 2009 and the online English *Want China Times* in 2010.

After Tsai Eng-meng, tycoon of the *Want Want Group* took over the *China Times Group* in November 2008 and re-named it the *Want Want China Times Group*; there was controversy over the unusual relationship between the Chinese government, Tsai Eng-meng, and the *Want Want China Times Group*. According to Poe Ta-chung 卜大中,<sup>2</sup> a venture of Next Media which publishes the *Apple Daily*, had intended to purchase the *China Times Group* for approximately ten billion Taiwan dollars (more than US\$300 million). Next Media spent several months calculating the value of the *China Times Group* and examining its financial statements. However, just before the deal was to go ahead, Tsai Eng-meng suddenly called the owner of the *China Times Group*, Yu Chien-hsin 余建新, the son of the late Yu Chi-chung, offering to purchase the *China Times Group* for double the price offered by Next Media (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中, 2012). Tsai Eng-meng obtained ownership of the *China Times Group* for 20.4 billion Taiwan dollars on November 3, 2008 (Chao Chih-ling 趙芷菱, 2009).

Many have questioned whether the Chinese government was involved in financing Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the *China Times Group*. Several sources have indicated that the Chinese government has repeatedly tried to purchase Taiwanese media to influence the Taiwanese people. According to Tung Li-wen a huge amount of capital from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, totaling US\$300 million, was transferred to Taiwan and Hong Kong from China in 2007 with the goal of purchasing Taiwanese media (Tung Li-wen 董立文, 2011). Thus, Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the

<sup>1</sup> In December 2006, the *China Times Group* sold BCC to former Chinese New Party Secretary-General Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康.

<sup>2</sup> Poe Ta-chung is the former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *China Times*.

*China Times Group* created many doubts in Taiwan about the role of China in his purchase. In 2009 Tsai Eng-meng also acknowledged that he knew the Taiwan Affairs Office had commissioned agents to purchase the *China Times Group*, but Tsai denied he was the agent (Tien Shih-hao 田世昊, 2009).

Despite Tsai's denial, some sources pointed to the close relationship between Tsai Eng-meng and the Chinese authorities. According to an interview with a senior Taiwanese government official, the Publicity Department of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China became involved in Tsai's purchase of the *China Times Group*.<sup>3</sup> This senior government official further said in an interview that, according to an unidentified source, the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee did not want to see Next Media take over the *China Times Group*. Therefore, the publicity department ordered the Taiwan Affairs Office to intervene. The Taiwan Affairs Office cooperated with a senior KMT leader, to convince Tsai Eng-meng to purchase the *China Times Group*.

Some other accounts demonstrate Tsai's close relationship with the Chinese authorities. Some two weeks after Tsai's purchase of the *China Times Group*, on November 16, 2008 Tsai Eng-meng gave orders to the senior managers of the *China Times Group* to: strongly support the Ma Ying-jeou administration, to clear up misunderstanding between Taiwan and China, and to avoid discussing unification and independence in media of the *China Times Group*. However, these senior managers interpreted Tsai Eng-meng as having said that the *China Times Group* must suppress Taiwanese Independence (Chen Mien 陳免, 2008, p. 8). One month after Tsai Eng-meng's purchase of the *China Times Group*, on December 5, 2008, Tsai visited the Director of the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi, in Beijing. Tsai reported his success in buying the *China Times Group*, and relayed his intention to improve the development of Cross-Strait relations (Lin Hsing-fei 林幸妃, 2009, pp. 35–38). According to an interview with a former senior editor from the *China Times*, in early 2009 Tsai Eng-meng said at an editorial meeting that “suppressing” the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was necessary and that even the Americans would have done so. Tsai further said that the Tiananmen Square “Massacre” was just the propaganda of Western countries.<sup>4</sup> The informant argued that Tsai's point of view on the Tiananmen Square Massacre was the same as the Chinese authorities. Later, the informant indicated that Tsai had also implied that the *China Times* could not discuss the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang (East Turkistan). During the negotiation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), Tsai gave an order that the *China Times* could not report or publish any news or comment against either ECFA or the 1992 Consensus.<sup>5</sup> According to this informant, in early 2009 Dr. Honigmann Hong 洪財隆 published an article in the *China Times* to criticize the ECFA (Honigmann Hong 洪財隆, 2009). As this article dissatisfied Tsai Eng-meng, the *China Times* did not allow Hong to publish any further articles on the ECFA. The informant concluded that the *China Times* editors self-censored, with regard to China-related issues.

Some other indicators also illustrate the unusual relationship between Want Want and the Chinese authorities. Firstly, despite *Want China Times*' announcement of being

<sup>3</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 9 January 2012.

<sup>4</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 14 August 2012.

<sup>5</sup> The initial term for ECFA was the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). The Ma Ying-jeou government re-named it ECFA in late February 2009.

based on “Taiwanese spirit,” a remarkable amount of their news items were drawn from the English edition of the official Chinese *Xinhua News Agency*, according to the same interviewee above. The *Want China Times* seems to be a representative of the *Xinhua News Agency* in Taiwan. Secondly, another anecdote about the *Want Daily* also indicates the influence of China on the *China Times Group*. The *Want Daily* published a daily feature, “Today’s History Across the Strait.” On June 4, 2010. This feature discussed a story of June 4, 1983 on Taiwan, and a story of June 4, 1985 from China, but no mention was made of the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989. This edition of the *Want Daily* aroused many Internet users to condemn the *Want Daily* for concealing the Tiananmen Square Massacre in China. Finally, the Chinese government’s industrial subsidies for *Want Want China*, demonstrated *Want Want’s* close relationship with the PRC. In 2011, *Want Want China* received a subsidy of US\$47 million dollars, accounting for 11.3% of its annual net profit, from the Chinese government (The Economist, 2013).

Many criticisms were made in Taiwan condemning the *China Times* for pandering to China. For example, in January 2010 the *China Times* unexpectedly discharged Hsia Chen 夏珍 from his position as Editor-in-Chief because of a headline on December 26, 2009. The headline quoted a Taiwanese official’s remark that the PRC’s Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Chen Yunlin 陳雲林, was unimportant in China. President Ma Ying-jeou expressed his disagreement with this characterization of Chen and the Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, Chiang Pin-kun 江丙坤, also apologized for this statement. Evidently, this report infuriated the Chinese authorities. According to the *Apple Daily* both Tsai Eng-meng and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC were enraged by the article and, as a result, the *China Times* dismissed Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen (Hsu Pei-chun 徐佩君, et al., 2010). This incident demonstrated China’s influence over the *China Times*, but this was not an isolated case. According to an interview with a senior journalist, a *China Times* journalist finished a travelogue about China and sent it to the editor for approval. However, the editor asked the journalist to obtain approval from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC instead.<sup>6</sup>

On January 20, 2012 the *Washington Post* published an interview with Tsai Eng-meng conducted by its Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Andrew Higgins. In this interview, Tsai Eng-meng said that when he saw the famous picture of the Tiananmen Square Massacre “tank man,” “I realized that not that many people could really have died.” Tsai also responded to a question about the discharge of Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen, saying the reason was that he “hurt me by offending people, not just mainlanders.” Tsai also believed that China “is very democratic in lots of places (Higgins, 2012).” Tsai’s statements, however, infuriated many academics in Taiwan. Consequently, more than 17 societies, dozens of academics, and more than 600 activists, called for a boycott of the *Want Want China Times Group* (Luo Wei-chih 羅暉智, Su Sheng-yi 蘇聖怡, 2012).<sup>7</sup> In addition, Tsai Eng-meng told the *Washington Post*, “whether you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later,” and “I really hope that I can see that.” Thus, Tsai has displayed his strong identification with the PRC.

<sup>6</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 19 April 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Wang Dan, a leader of the Chinese democratic movement in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, was the first to urge for a boycott of the *Want China Times Group* on his Facebook page on 23 January 2012.



Tsai Eng-meng's interview with the *Washington Post*, the self-censorship of the *China Times*, the question of Chinese capital in Tsai's purchase of the *China Times*, and Tsai's report to Wang Yi, have aroused considerable criticism in Taiwan. The *Apple Daily* reflected this widespread sentiment and accused Wang Yi of brainwashing the Taiwanese people, propagandizing the CCP's political ideology, and serving as an agent for Beijing to "unify" Taiwan (Apple Daily, 2012). As outlined above, this critique accords with the evidence, and the *Apple Daily's* criticisms that the *China Times* has become part of the Chinese propaganda effort in Taiwan are persuasive.

### China's Pressure on Taiwanese Media's Owners

Since the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businessmen have invested in China, and this situation has enabled the CCP to influence Taiwanese politics and elections (Lin, 2004). Some believe that Taiwanese business tycoons' vocal support of the "1992 consensus," under the CCP's pressure, contributed to the DPP's defeat in the 2012 presidential campaign.<sup>8</sup> Similarly the CCP has employed the same strategy of applying pressure on many other businessmen, particularly on media owners. Taiwan has six 24-hour news channels and I take both pro-DPP FTV and pro-DPP SET, as well as ERA, as main examples to discuss CCP's media strategy in Taiwan.

#### FTV

The birth of the free-to-air Formosan Television Incorporated (民視 *Minshi*; FTV) in 1997, broke the monopoly of KMT's control over free-to-air TV. Because the funds of FTV were raised from Taiwan identity people in the early 1990s, FTV announced itself as a Taiwanese TV station, which clearly identified China as a different country from Taiwan.

The founder of FTV, Chai Trong-rong 蔡同榮 (1935–2014), announced that the purpose of FTV was to protect Taiwan against China and to spread awareness of Taiwanese history, geography, culture, customs and languages. He stated that the principal goal of FTV was to construct Taiwanese nationalism (Chen Shu-chen 陳淑貞, 2010, p. 35). In order to defend the Taiwanese identity, and establish Taiwanese nationalism, FTV utilized many means to integrate the Taiwanese identity into its programs.

Under Chen Shui-bian's media reform policy, the Legislative Yuan enacted the so-called "Regulation to Remove Political Parties, the Government and the Military from the Media" in 2003. Many critics focused on the relationship between FTV and its founder Chai Trong-rong, who was a legislator and a member of the *Democratic Progressive Party* (DPP) Central Standing Committee (CSC) at the time. Despite Chai's claim that he had withdrawn from FTV and stepped down as chairman,<sup>9</sup> Chai still had an office at

<sup>8</sup> The author conducted this interview with Poe Ta-chung in Taipei on 4 November 2012.

<sup>9</sup> In December 2003, the Legislative Yuan amended three acts—the Cable Radio Act, the Radio and Television Act and the Satellite Broadcasting Act to restrict political power in influencing media.

the station and went to FTV every day. According to Lim It-hong 林一方,<sup>10</sup> he often slept in his FTV office suite while the chairman of FTV, Tien Tsai-ting 田再庭, only went to the office one day per week.<sup>11</sup> Many sources indicated that Chai Trong-rong was the real boss of FTV, and Chai Trong-rong also used FTV as a bargaining chip to negotiate with DPP politicians. For example, when Chai wanted to renew his term as the DPP caucus leader of the Legislative Yuan in June 2010, causing his rivals in the DPP to criticize him. Chai had hinted that the DPP needed FTV in the 2010 campaign for the mayors of the five special municipalities (Lin Ho-ming 林河名, Chao Ta-chih 趙大智, 2010).

In July 2009 the Melbourne International Film Festival's invitation to the film "The Ten Conditions of Love," a documentary about the Uyghur East Turkistan independence movement spiritual leader Rebiya Kadeer, angered China. China thus boycotted this film festival and withdrew both Chinese and Hong Kong movies from it. Additionally, a Chinese hacker hacked into the official website of the Melbourne International Film Festival (Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮, 2009). The DPP decided to support Rebiya Kadeer and to launch the showing of this film around Taiwan from August 2009. In the DPP CSC, Luo Wen-jia 羅文嘉 suggested that the FTV broadcast this documentary, but Chai Trong-rong declined to purchase it. Chai indicated his powerlessness within FTV to the DPP CSC, claiming he had no position in FTV.<sup>12</sup>

According to some articles about FTV, Chai Trong-rong only influenced the News Department and could not sway other departments. Despite all Taiwan identity media opposing ECFA, the Business Department of FTV won its bid for an ECFA advertisement project from the Ma Ying-jeou government. It was alleged that the News Department fought with the Business Department about this. Some people in FTV argued that FTV should not have entered a bid for this project, owing to its stance on Taiwan identity (Yen Chen-kai 顏振凱, Chang Che-ming 張哲鳴, 2009). Furthermore, the Business Department asked the News Department to restrain its coverage of the DPP's criticism of ECFA (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, 2009).

The ECFA incident was not the only case of conflict between business and identity. FTV also cooperated with the official Chinese TV station *China Central Television* (CCTV) in business, with CCTV broadcasting some Taiwanese-speaking soap dramas obtained from FTV and dubbed in Mandarin Chinese.<sup>13</sup> Since doing business with CCTV probably violated Taiwanese law, Lin Cho-shui criticized FTV for illegally cooperating with the official Chinese TV station to produce the drama "Dr. Dadaogong" (神醫大道公 *Shenyi dadaogong*).<sup>14</sup> As well as producing the ECFA advertisement, in collaboration with the KMT, so as to smear Taiwan identity Taiwanese (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, 2009).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The author conducted this interview with Lim It-hong in Taipei on 17 August 2010. Lim It-hong is a Taiwan Independence activist, who was the producer of "feichang guangdie" [Very VCD], a video which attacked the KMT Taoyuan County Magistrate candidate, Eric Chu, in the 2005 election campaign.

<sup>11</sup> Tien Tsai-ting lives in Taichung, but the FTV office is located in Taipei.

<sup>12</sup> The author conducted this interview with Luo Wen-jia in Taipei on 1 October 2009.

<sup>13</sup> The author conducted this interview with Sylvia Feng in Taipei on 9 November 2009.

<sup>14</sup> This drama was also supervised by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China and some other organizations of the "United Front Work" in China.

<sup>15</sup> For this advertisement, FTV contrived a "non-standard Mandarin Chinese" speaking comic Taiwanese character who opposed ECFA. The character was poorly educated and short-sighted. This ethnic discrimination in the ECFA advertisement drew much criticism.

The above anecdotes point out that FTV put business with China ahead of politics and national identity. However, FTV was not the only so-called pro-DPP or Taiwan identity medium that contradicted its own political stance. SET was another important instance of China's influence on Taiwan's media.

### SET

As SET (*Sanli dianshitai* 三立電視台; Sanlih E-Television), FTV, and the *Liberty Times* (*Ziyou shibao* 自由時報) often attacked President Ma Ying-jeou's China-friendly policies; President Ma called this media trio the "*sanmingzhi*" [sandwich], which sounds similar to *san-min-zi-an* abbreviation of SET, FTV and the *Liberty Times*-to express his unhappiness with their criticism of him. This suggests SET is a pro-DPP and a Taiwan identity TV station. Its firmly pro-DPP and pro-Taiwan stance began in 2005 when SET Chairman Lin Kun-hai's good friend, Frank Hsieh, became Premier. SET's famous talk show program, "Big Talk News" (*Dahua xinwen* 大話新聞) demonstrated SET's political and national identity. "Big Talk News" started in 2002, and began to reveal DPP and Taiwan identity from 2005.<sup>16</sup>

Due to the high TV rating of "Big Talk News," the Ma Ying-jeou government monitored the program, and many officers of the Ma government often called in to the program during its on-air discussions of Ma's policies and administration. In addition, the popularity and influence of "Big Talk News" also prompted Beijing to monitor it (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 78).

However, SET began to self-censor after Ma's election in 2008. A senior producer contended that "Big Talk News" was troublesome for SET because the KMT held power, and SET wanted to do business with China to produce dramas after 2008.<sup>17</sup> For the purpose of expanding the market in China, the former Executive Vice-President of SET, 蘇麗媚 Su Li-mei, served in 2010 as Advisor-in-Chief to the leading Chinese online video enterprise Beijing-based "Tudou.com" (*Tudouwang* 土豆網)<sup>18</sup> to produce TV dramas. Despite the fact that Taiwanese dramas had been popular outside of Taiwan, especially in China, SET created a new term "Chinese drama" (*huaju* 華劇) in December 2011 to replace the traditional term "Taiwanese drama" (*taiju* 台劇).<sup>19</sup> SET intended to use "Chinese drama" in order to open the overseas market. SET President 張榮華 Chang Jung-hua expected the "Chinese drama" to lead a "Chinese Wave" (*hualiu* 華流), similar to the Korean Wave of popular soap-operas (Cheng Chiu-shuang 鄭秋霜, 2012).

<sup>16</sup> "Big Talk News" remained neutral during the 2004 presidential campaign. President Chen Shui-bian attended "Big Talk News," but the other programs of SET also invited the Pan-Blue candidates and politicians.

<sup>17</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 4 May 2011.

<sup>18</sup> Tudou.com was the first and leading online video platform in China before the challenge of Youku.com. Su Li-mei served as the Advisor-in-Chief of Tudou.com from May 2010. In March 2012, Youku.com merged with Tudou.com.

<sup>19</sup> The first "Chinese drama" was "*Zhen'ai zhao mafan* 真愛找麻煩" (Inborn Pair) which began broadcasting on SET on 13 December 2011.

Because of SET's business in China and under pressure from the SET leadership, "Big Talk News" was not permitted to discuss the Tiananmen Massacre, the Dalai Lama, or Rebiya Kadeer, nor could it criticize China (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 39). In addition, SET even decided not to invite pro-Tibetan independence activist Freddy Lim,<sup>20</sup> the Chairman of Amnesty International Taiwan, to "Big Talk News" under pressure from the PRC (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 140). A senior anchorperson of SET also verified this, saying that SET restricted the coverage of the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the Falun Gong.<sup>21</sup> On July 27, 2011 "Big Talk News" criticized China's high speed railway accident using such titles as "Neglecting human rights, suppressing freedom of press, who wants unification?" and "What kind of country? China destroys evidence in high speed railway accident," to criticize China. SET President Chang Jung-hua phoned the staff of the show and told them not to use such strong phrases to criticize China. An informant from SET argued that Chinese Internet users could strongly condemn the Chinese government on this tragedy, but "Big Talk News" in Taiwan must keep silent.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, according to another source, while many other media outlets attacked the Want Want China Times Group for Tsai Eng-meng's denial of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in an interview with the *Washington Post* in January 2012, SET ordered its talk show programs, including "Big Talk News" and "Go New Taiwan" (*Xin Taiwan jiyou* 新台灣加油) not to discuss the matter.<sup>23</sup>

During the 2012 presidential campaign, SET sent representatives to negotiate with the Chinese authorities to broadcast their TV dramas in China. However, the Chinese authorities implied that if SET did not axe "Big Talk News," they would prevent SET from making money in China (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 78). After Ma Ying-jeou won re-election in 2012, rumors circulated that SET would axe the program. According to the same source on June 6, 2012, right after the 2012 election, SET management had suggested "Big Talk News" should alter its political identity.

On May 15, 2012, "Big Talk News" interviewed former President Lee Teng-hui. The same source pointed out however, on the same day, Vice General-Manager of the SET News Department Kao Ming-hui talked with "Big Talk News" host Cheng Hung-yi 鄭弘儀. He advised that SET had decided to stop the show in June. Subsequently, SET axed "Big Talk News" at the end of May 2012. Many sources have discussed the potential motivations for SET canceling "Big Talk News," the most plausible being pressure from Beijing as SET attempts to break into the Chinese TV market (Wu Chih-wei 吳志偉, 2012). Ma Wei-ming 馬維敏, the Editor-in-Chief of the pro-democratic *Apple Daily*, responded to this incident. Wei-ming said that the "China factor" could determine the content of a Taiwanese TV program, as well as a program's host, and asked what would be next. Ma Wei-min argues that Taiwan's media and journalists have to be aware of the return of the "Taiwan Garrison Command (Ma Wei-min 馬維敏, 2012)." In summary, the "China factor" has deeply impacted SET, causing it to self-censor and even terminate a popular program.

<sup>20</sup> Freddy Lim became a Legislator in 2016.

<sup>21</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 4 May 2011.

<sup>22</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 17 August 2011.

<sup>23</sup> The author conducted this interview via email on 6 June 2012. The interviewee is a senior staff member of SET.

## ERA

SET serves as a good example of how the Chinese successfully put pressure on a medium, which intended to do business in China. Narratives from ERA Communications (*Niandai dianshitai* 年代電視台; ERA) show how the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, intervened in Taiwan's TV programs. During the 2012 presidential election ERA tended to support James Soong and its famous talk show program "Facing News" (*Xinwen mian dui mian* 新聞面對面), often criticized Ma Ying-jeou. This political stance angered the CCP. According to an interview, because the Chairman of ERA Lien Tai-sheng 練台生, had some business in China, the Taiwan Affairs Office officials ordered the ERA officials to file a report with them. Lien Tai-sheng sent Executive Vice-President Yen Chih-ching to visit Beijing three times, but the Chinese authorities were unhappy until Lien Tai-sheng personally visited Beijing himself to "make a report."<sup>24</sup>

In fact, the *Liberty Times* has also revealed some similar stories. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council often interfered in Taiwanese media's comments and coverage on China. Some media received "complaints" from the Taiwan Affairs Office and some media officials also visited Beijing to be educated by such Chinese officials as the spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office, Yang Yi 陳毅 (Tzou Jing-wen 鄒景雯, 2011).

Of course, China's pressure did not only happen to the three media outlets above. For instance, *The Journalist* became more critical of China in mid-2012; causing one of main shareholders of *The Journalist*, who intended to conduct business in China, some trouble. Consequently, Editor-in-Chief Ku Pi-ling 古碧玲, who published some special issues on Chinese affairs in order to criticize China, stepped down in January 2013 (Citizen Journalism, 2013).

In short, stories in FTV, SET and ERA show different aspects of China's influence on Taiwan's media. For FTV, although it maintained its firmly pro-DPP and Taiwan independence position, it conceded its political stance to China when negotiating business in relation to China. SET's story also demonstrated how China's pressure impacted its programs when SET dealt with business in China. What happened with ERA indicated that the Chinese authorities could directly influence Taiwan's media, particularly if they had business in China.

### China's Embedded Advertising/Advertorials in Taiwan's Media

Another important source of Chinese influence on Taiwan's media is the placement of advertisements, in the form of apparent news coverage (*zhiruxing xinwen* 置入性新聞; embedded advertising or advertorials), in Taiwanese media. The *Want Want China Times Group* played an important role in this through helping the Chinese authorities place these items in Taiwan's media.

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<sup>24</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 15 August 2012. The interviewee is a senior journalist.

The Control Yuan member Frank Wu 吳豐山, in November 2010, made an investigation that confirmed China's advertorials in the *China Times* were in violation of Taiwan's legal regulations. In fact, examples of such advertorials could be found in both the *China Times* and the *United Daily News* (*Lianhebao* 聯合報) (Shih, 2010). According to the Foundation for the Advancement of Media Excellence (*Xinwen gonghai fangzhi jijinhui* 新聞公害防治基金會), illegal Chinese advertising in Taiwan's media had reached 269 instances within two years. For instance, 25 Chinese advertisements were embedded in the *United Daily News* and the *United Evening News* (*Lianhe wanbao* 聯合晚報) in November 2012 (Huang Yi-ching 黃以敬, 2013). Informants indicated that Want Want was actually the agent helping the Chinese authorities to place embedded advertising in Taiwan's media.<sup>25</sup>

In March 2012 the Governor of China's Fujian Province, Su Shulin 蘇樹林, visited Taiwan and the *China Times* reported details of Su Shulin's visit. New Talk (Xintouke) revealed a *China Times* document entitled "The 2012 Propaganda Plan of the Governor of Fujian Province's Visit to Taiwan" (*Erlingyi'er Fujian sheng shengzheng fantai xuanchuan jihua* 2012福建省省長訪台宣傳計畫), and made a detailed report about this propaganda plan and the coverage of the *China Times*, but the *China Times* still denied this. The Fujian Province authorities, however, admitted that this was a matter between the Fujian Province authorities and the Want China Times Group (Lin Chau-yi 林朝億, 2012). Finally, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan 賴幸媛 confirmed New Talk's coverage in the Legislative Yuan, and the *China Times* was fined NT\$400,000 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Chen Hung-chin 陳虹瑾, 2012).

Chang Chin-hwa 張錦華, a professor at National Taiwan University, said that "the *China Times* accepted always embedded advertising from the Chinese government and has a reputation for always publishing good news about China and leaving out the bad (Jang Show-ling 鄭秀玲, 2011)." Chang Chin-hwa thus argued, "It was the darkest moment for freedom of speech in Taiwan (Tai Chih-chuan 戴智權, 2011)." The *Want Want China Times Group* even sued the media academics that had criticized the *Want Want China Times Group*. In an interview with the *Liberty Times* Chang Chin-hwa said that the *China Times* presented advertorials paid for by the Chinese government as "news," and also served as an agency for the Chinese authorities to help China to buy "news" in the *United Daily News*, illegal activities according to Taiwan's regulations. Chang Chin-hwa was also concerned that the purchasing of "news" by the Chinese authorities would make Taiwanese media a megaphone for China, so as to propagandize Chinese official ideology and to control news coverage in Taiwan. Chang Chin-hwa further connected these Chinese embedded advertisements to Hu Jintao's idea of media warfare against Taiwan, which involved "Entering the Island [of Taiwan], Entering the Household, and Entering the Mind" (*rudao ruhu ru'nao* 入島 入戶 入腦) (Tzou Jing-wen 鄒景雯, 2011). Hu Jintao's idea was a unification strategy against Taiwan, through Chinese propaganda in Taiwan's media. In light of the revelations about *Want Want* it is entirely possible that the *China Times* is one means through which Hu's idea of propaganda permeating through Taiwan, has been put into practice.

<sup>25</sup> The author conducted these interviews in Taiwan on 14 April, 19 April and 26 July, 2011.

### The Controversy on the Sale of pro-Democratic *Taiwan Next Media* and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement

In 2012, despite pro-democratic *Taiwan Next Media's* popularity among Taiwanese, the owner, Jimmy Lai decided to sell the media. There were many reasons for Lai selling Taiwan Next Media, the main motivation being the huge losses of Next TV (*Yi dianshi* 壹電視).<sup>26</sup> Jimmy Lai established Next TV in July 2009, but did not receive a broadcasting license until July 2011. Lai believed the Ma Ying-jeou government was tightening controls on Taiwan's press and intentionally obstructing Next TV's license application (Lai, 2010). In addition, more than a quarter of Taiwan's cable systems, which were under the influence of Tsai Eng-meng's *Want Want China Times Group*, such as the China Network Systems, blocked Next TV after it received the license. This further contributed to Next Media's losses.<sup>27</sup> Spokesman of Next TV Chang Hsiu-che 張修哲 said that Next TV had actually reached a deal with CNS, to broadcast Next TV's programs on CNS's channels. However, the CCP received this information and requested that Tsai Eng-meng block Next TV (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, pp. 94–95). In fact, another main cable TV system, Kbor (*Kaibo* 凱擘), which owns 12 cable TV systems and has more than 1.1 million subscribers (by households), also blocked Next TV. Kbor belonged to the Fubon Group (Fubang jituan), and Fubon operated many banks in both Hong Kong and China. This business probably explains why Kbro also blocked pro-democratic Next TV.<sup>28</sup>

In an interview, Columnist of the *Apple Daily* Antonio Chiang suggested three factors involved in Jimmy Lai's decision to sell Next Media. The first is the huge losses mentioned above. The second is that Lai had grown tired of fighting the pro-China Ma Ying-jeou government and the *Want Want China Times Group*. The third, Jimmy Lai was disappointed with Taiwan's democracy, which happened to be the reason for Lai coming to Taiwan in 2001. Chiang further added that the KMT actively suppresses Next Media while the DPP does not offer any support, and thus such a political environment may also have been a factor in Lai stepping away.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, the editorial writer of the *Apple Daily*, Poe Ta-chung; believed the sale of Next Media would result from a conspiracy of the KMT and the CCP. Poe added that the KMT first intentionally delayed Next TV's broadcast license and the cable TV systems; while owners who have much business in China blocked Next TV, after it received a license.<sup>30</sup>

The main parties in the purchase of *Next Media* included *China Trust Charity Foundation* Chairman Jeffrey Koo Jr. 辜仲諒, Formosa Plastics Group Chairman William Wong 王文淵, and *Want Want China Times Group* Chairman Tsai Eng-meng among others. Poe Ta-chung believed that Tsai Eng-meng's becoming closer to the Chinese au-

<sup>26</sup> Jimmy Lai founded Next Media in Hong Kong in 1990, where Next Media first published the *Next Magazine* and the *Apple Daily*. The Taiwan Next Media started to publish the *Taiwan Next Magazine* (*Yizhoukan*) in 2001, the *Taiwan Apple Daily* in 2003 and to establish Next TV in 2009.

<sup>27</sup> CNS owns 11 cable TV systems with more than 1 million subscribers (by household). The *Want Want China Times Group* also owns 3 other cable TV systems with more than 200 thousand subscribers (by household).

<sup>28</sup> In the beginning, Fubon was one of the potential buyers in the sale of Taiwan Next Media.

<sup>29</sup> The author conducted this interview with Antonio Chiang in Taipei on 4 November 2012.

<sup>30</sup> The author conducted this interview with Poe Ta-chung in Taipei on 4 November 2012.

thorities after purchasing the *China Times Group*, had encouraged both Koo and Wang to buy Next Media.<sup>31</sup> In the beginning, many suspected capital supposedly from Singapore was actually from Tsai Eng-meng. President of the Apple Daily Union Tsai Jih-yun 蔡日雲 also suspected it, but both Jeffery Koo and Jimmy Lai denied it. No evidence showed that the Chinese authorities got directly involved with the purchase of Taiwan *Next Media*, but both the *Formosa Plastics Group* and *China Trust* have significant corporate interests in China. Poe Ta-chung believed that *Next Media* would not maintain a pro-democratic position after a takeover by any tycoon.<sup>32</sup>

Still, the sale of the pro-democratic Taiwan Next Media deeply shocked many in Taiwan. Because pro-CCP Tsai Eng-meng was involved, many Taiwanese students launched a campaign opposing the sale. Actually, before the sale of Taiwan *Next Media*, students had already launched some protests against the *Want Want China Times Group*. In July 2012 the National Communications Commission (NCC) gave conditional approval to *Want Want China Times Group's* acquisition, of the cable TV services owned by the *China Network Systems* (*Zhongjia wangle* 中嘉網路; CNS). In response to this trade, Ketty Chen, a political scientist at National Taiwan University, said, "People are extremely uncomfortable to the point of being angry at him, knowing that he has a pro-China stance and that he has publicly advocated that Taiwan be part of China." Ketty Chen added that "That's the main reason why people don't want him to become the Rupert Murdoch of Taiwan (Mishkin, 2012)."

On July 31, 2012 hundreds of students protested against this trade because they believed that it would make *Want Want* a media "monster," which would monopolize Taiwan's media market and limit Taiwan's freedom of the press. On the same day some academics, including Dr. Huang Kuo-chang, hosted a press conference with more than ten TV stations in attendance to support the students. However, only Next TV broadcast this press conference. All other TV stations self-censored the press conference as well as the student protest, because their media owners would not displease Tsai Eng-meng and risk their right to broadcast their programs on CNS (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, pp. 81–85).

In addition, *Want Want* intentionally tried to discredit Dr. Huang Kuo-chang 黃國昌 by contriving fake news to attack him.<sup>33</sup> *Want Want* accused Dr. Huang of paying students to attend a protest against *Want Want*. This incident angered students and netizens, with numerous netizens blaming *Want Want* for the scandal (Loa, 2012a). One month later the group apologized to Dr. Huang, saying it had no proof he had done so (Shan, 2012). On September 1, 2012, Journalists' Day, thousands of students, journalists, academics, and social activists took to the streets in Taipei. They protested against *Want Want's* monopolisation of the media, and demand that the NCC help break monopolization of the media (Loa, 2012b).

As a measure to protest *Want Want's* acquisition of *Next Media*, Taiwanese students launched a campaign entitled "Anti-Media Monopoly," declaring "Oppose media monopoly, reject the black hand of China, uphold freedom of the press" around the world. Not only did thousands of overseas Taiwanese students and young people join the cam-

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Huang Kuo-chang became a Legislator in 2016.



paign, but so did some foreign academics such as; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Noam Chomsky, New York University Professor Ned Block, Monash University Professor Bruce Jacobs and Hamline University Professor Richard Kagan.

According to Freedom House's *Freedom in the World 2013*; both deals, *Want Want's* acquisition of CNS, and the sale of Next Media to a consortium comprised of some individuals who had substantial business interests in China, could negatively affect diversity and press freedom in Taiwan (Tsao, Hsu, 2013). For the students the sale of Next Media chiefly raised concerns about Tsai's intention to monopolize Taiwan's media, and his relationship with the Chinese authorities.

Consequently, Tsai Eng-meng's *Want Want China Times Group's* actions were the main drive behind the students' launch of a campaign to safeguard Taiwan's freedom of the press and to oppose media monopoly. However, because some famous and important international scholars supported this movement, the *Want Want China Times Group* attacked those students and claimed that Noam Chomsky, along with Ned Block, were "misled" by not having the full content of the Chinese message on the placard explained to them (Cole, 2013). The controversy centered on the part of the text that read in Mandarin: "Say no to China's black hands," a reference to Chinese influence in Taiwanese media (Cole, 2013). A few days later, Noam Chomsky denied he was misled and reiterated his support for the anti-monopoly movement. Chomsky said that he was under the impression that the poster called for freedom of press and opposed media monopolization, and said nothing about China. He assumed it was simply a misunderstanding, resulting from the fact that he could not read (Cole, 2013; Rawnsley, 2013).

Yet, after several months, this controversial media deal collapsed as Tsai Eng-meng decided to withdraw. There were rumors around this collapse, with one source indicating that the CCP had lost patience with Tsai and his inability to take over the media in Taiwan.<sup>34</sup> Mark Simon, the spokesman for Jimmy Lai's Next Media in Hong Kong, said, "Beijing didn't want a cashed up Jimmy Lai." Simon also suggested that perhaps "mainland China sent a message out that this is not a necessary fight to have" (Mullany, 2013). Consequently, Next Media Group Chairman Jimmy Lai promised that he would not attempt to sell his print businesses in Taiwan, because the businesses were profitable (Wang, Kao, 2013). However, Jimmy Lai did sell Next TV to ERA Chairman Lien Tai-sheng on June 1, 2013. No matter what was the real factor in the collapse of this sale, this result can be viewed as a victory for those who oppose a media monopoly in Taiwan and those who counter China's intention to influence Taiwan's media.

But, right after the end of the anti-media monopoly movement, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services signed between Cross-Strait representatives on 21 June 2013 has resulted in many new concerns for a vast number of Taiwanese.<sup>35</sup> Critics argue that the agreement will threaten Taiwan's freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom on the Internet (Chen, Chun, 2013; Lin, 2013).

Professor Jang Show-ling 鄭秀玲 at National Taiwan University believes that allowing Chinese investment in printing poses risks to freedom of speech (Chen, Chun,

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<sup>34</sup> The author obtained this source from a Google Group discussion on 26 March 2013. The informant is a foreign journalist in Taiwan.

<sup>35</sup> Due to its controversy, the Legislative Yuan has of December 2013 not yet approved the agreement, which is necessary before it comes into force.

2013). Professor Chang Chin-hwa considers that the agreement in printing shows China's intention to influence Taiwan's press (Peng Hsien-chun 彭顯鈞, Chen Hui-ping 陳慧萍, 2013). Senior journalist Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 said that Chinese-run print services in Taiwan will potentially restrict Taiwan's freedom of speech at crucial moments such as during elections and in Cross-Strait issues.<sup>36</sup> However, President of *Business Today* (*Jin zhoukan* 今周刊), Liang Yung-huang 梁永煌, and CEO of Taiwan's biggest publishing group, Cite Media Holding Group, Ho Fei-peng 何飛鵬, believe that the service pact will not influence Taiwan's press because of Taiwan's democracy and free market.<sup>37</sup> They added if Chinese-run printing services intend to influence Taiwan's press, Taiwanese publishers could choose other printing services. Still, Liang believes that China's flat advertising in Taiwan will restrict Taiwan's freedom of speech in the press, though the agreement does not include flat advertising.

The service pacts also cover communications services, including the Internet, which has become one of Taiwan's major concerns with regards to national security and freedom of speech. Professor Lin Ying-dar 林盈達 at National Chiao Tung University thinks that category-2 telecommunications services will not only threaten Taiwan's national security and privacy, but also freedom of speech.<sup>38</sup> Owing to the pact's inclusion of Internet service providers (ISP), Lin believes that Chinese-run ISPs may censor "sensitive issues" or block news websites just as Beijing does in Chinese cyberspace. To conclude, the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services is also considered a threat to Taiwan's media, especially on the Internet.

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Chinese influence on Taiwan's media has been steadily expanding since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. First, the PRC could use economic affiliation as a means to co-opt some Taiwanese media, manage the coverage and criticism of China in Taiwan's media by means of media acquisition by pro-China capitalists. Therefore the PRC uses pro-Beijing tycoons, to control Taiwan's media. The *Want Want China Times Group* presented itself to be a typical example in this respect. Second, as the political orientation of tycoons or businessmen is generally linked with their business, the PRC cunningly put pressure on those Taiwanese media owners who have invested or intend to invest in China. Thus those Taiwanese media outlets will side with China, or self-censor, in any issue related to China. Evidently, the cases of the *Want Want China Times Group*, FTV, SET and ERA indicate China's success in this strategy. Although FTV and SET sided with the DPP and Taiwan identity, following China's subtle tactics, both had to surrender their political identity to China in consideration of their business with China. Third, the Chinese authorities have published certain types of advertisements in the form of news coverage in Taiwanese media. The PRC's placing advertising and advertorials in Taiwan's media facilitates influence by being

<sup>36</sup> The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 3 December 2013.

<sup>37</sup> The author conducted the interview with Liang Yung-huang in Taipei on 19 November 2013 and Ho Fei-peng in Taipei on 20 November 2013.

<sup>38</sup> The author conducted this interview with Lin Ying-dar through email on 12 December 2013.

a source of advertising revenue, thereby making Taiwan's media a propaganda agent of the Chinese authorities. Finally, the sale of the pro-democratic *Apple Daily* worried Taiwanese students and academics about Taiwan's freedom of press even though this media deal was to end in a controversial collapse.

Above all, increasing and closer Cross-Strait economic ties has put China in a dominant position in respect to some Taiwanese media. For these media, Chinese marketing consideration of Taiwan media industry had combined with pressure to move away from criticism of China. For those media proprietors, particularly tycoons, the market is king and Taiwan's freedom of the press and political self-determination is not much of a consideration.

Taiwan's democracy and freedom of the press, its free capital markets, and the increasing and closer economic integration between Taiwan and China, provide Chinese authorities with an opportunity to use Taiwanese businessmen to influence Taiwan's media outlets. China uses three inter-related strategies to influence Taiwan's media in this way: persuading businessmen with pro-China views to purchase Taiwanese media outlets, pressuring existing media owners, and placing advertisements in Taiwan's media in order to purchase influence. There is increasing concern in Taiwan that these strategies are eroding freedom of the press.

Actually, the Internet has currently become another new strategy to influence Taiwan's media outlet and politics after Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016. It is believed that the Chinese government relies on "news content farms (內容農場 *neirong nong chang*)" outlets in mainland China, that generate and distribute fake news/disinformation that attack Taiwanese political parties and politicians (Chen Liang-yen 陳諒言, 2016, pp. 22–27). In the absence of systematic filtering, these fake news and disinformation could easily shape people's political views and influence Taiwan's politics. Therefore, we should pay attention to China's new and ongoing cyber-propaganda strategy.

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**Wpływ Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej na media i politykę republiki chińskiej na Tajwanie****Streszczenie**

Tajwańska demokracja oraz wolność prasy stwarzają możliwości dla władz Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej, aby poprzez tajwańskich biznesmenów, wpływać na treści prezentowane w mediach i konsekwentnie na politykę Tajwanu. Władze ChRL używają trzech powiązanych ze sobą strategii wywierania wpływu na tajwańskie media: nakłaniając pro-chińskich biznesmenów do zakupu tajwańskich mediów, naciskając na istniejących właścicieli mediów oraz umieszczając reklamy w tajwańskich mediach w celu uzyskania wpływu politycznego w zamian za przychody z tytułu publikowania ów reklam. Dodatkowo rząd ChRL używa specjalistów od cyberpropagandy, w celu atakowania konkretnych partii politycznych oraz polityków na Tajwanie.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Tajwan, autocenzura, wolność prasy, cyber-propaganda

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