WHY IS THERE NO PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The philosophy of social science deals with ontological, epistemological and methodological issues that are relevant to the disciplines of the social sciences. The ‘big six’ of social sciences usually encompasses economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history and political science. Examining the individual disciplines, it can be noted that, with one exception, all of them systematically address the philosophical issues pertaining to their research field. Thus, there are philosophies of economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology and history. However, there is no line of thought that could be named the ‘philosophy of political science.’ Why is that?

In the textbook on the philosophy of social science, in the section devoted to the philosophies of individual disciplines, Bruno Verbeek and Lee McIntyre (2017) inserted a chapter entitled *Why Is There No Philosophy of Political Science?* Although they argue that this does not mean that there are no studies on the philosophy of political science, they do not give any example of such a text. Honestly, I am not aware of a book, an article, or a conference speech, which contains the term ‘philosophy of political science’ in its title. Looking at the table of contents of several dozen recognized textbooks in the philosophy of social sciences written over the last twenty years, I have found only one (Kincaid, 2012) that even mentions political science in the part devoted to the sociology of knowledge. So why is there no philosophy of political science?

Verbeek and McIntyre indicate three reasons for this. According to them, the first reason is the relatively late emergence of political science as an academic discipline. Political science was founded around 1860 in the United States. Researchers identifying with the new discipline deliberately refused to deal with the normative political theory they considered to be ‘literature,’ ‘philosophical speculation,’ ‘phenomenology,’ or ‘hermeneutics,’ turning to positive political science instead. Subsequent generations of political scientists also denied the usefulness of the historical approach in favor of modeling their discipline after natural sciences. The emerging discipline was too busy implementing a positivist model of science to deal with a philosophical reflection on its theories, concepts and methods. Yet this reason does not seem very convincing, because other social disciplines witnessed similar processes, which nevertheless developed their own philosophies.

The second reason may be the fact that political science has always embraced many points of view, theories, methods, objects of research and intellectual traditions. Political science consisted of various, often remote sub-disciplines, such as political theory,
political comparative studies, international relations, public law, public administration, and political economy. These divisions have additionally been emphasized by the competing scientific philosophies, social theories and methodologies that political scientists have referred to (positivism, behaviorism, rational choice theory, structuralism, poststructuralism, realism, institutionalism, pluralism, interactive symbolism, interpretivism and others). As a result, political science has never been a homogeneous and unified discipline. Again, it is difficult to consider this argument as convincing, because this kind of diversity has also characterized other social disciplines, which nevertheless created their own philosophies.

Finally, the third reason finds expression in the thesis that the lack of a philosophy of political science is a consequence of the lack of specific philosophical problems arising as a result of research carried out by political scientists. As a consequence, the philosophical problems encountered by political scientists do not differ from those that are relevant for other social disciplines. However, if the philosophy of political science does not exist because the philosophical issues it addresses can be reduced to those in other disciplines, the question seems to be: what is political science? For example, the application of the formal methods of economics in political science may mean that political science is the economics which examines politics (Verbeek, McIntyre, 2017: 434–435).

Even if the philosophy of political science does not exist, should it exist? Many fundamental philosophical questions specific to the study of human political behavior can be indicated. It is difficult to deny that numerous philosophical analyses of this behavior are conducted within the framework of political theory. Yet the basic goal of political theory is not to consider the philosophical aspects of political science. We are not talking about the need for the philosophy of politics, but about the need for the philosophy of political science, as is the case with the philosophy of history, philosophy of economics or philosophy of psychology as sub-disciplines of the philosophy of social science, which is a sub-discipline of the philosophy of science itself. The philosophy of political science, as a sub-discipline of the philosophy of social science, should help political science at least to face its ontological, epistemological and methodological problems.

PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

The absence of a philosophy of political science raises justified concerns about the philosophy of International Relations (IR) that are widely considered a sub-discipline of political science. If there is no philosophy of political science, is there an IR philosophy? As concerns its form, this question is reminiscent of similar questions asked in the history of IR, as a discipline, by Martin Wight [why is there no international theory? (Wight, 1960)] or Justin Rosenberg [why is there no international historical sociology? (Rosenberg, 2006)].

Before answering this question, let us accompany Hayden White, briefly turning to the ‘philosophy of history.’ White emphasizes that the more history attempted to transform itself into an objectivist, empiricist ‘science,’ ‘the more remote the knowledge
of the past which it produced became for generations confronting new social realities” (White, 2014: 58). When Karl Marx, Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud demystified the world of the bourgeoisie, only ‘history’ remained as a resource of ‘facts and realities’ on which the idea of the present and the vision of the future could be founded. According to White, “[w]hen the flourishing of what professional historians would condemn as ‘philosophy of history,’ born of the effort to generalize and synthesize the particular truths turned up by professional historians in their plundering of the archives of old Europe” (Hayden, 2014: 58–59).

Looking for analogies between the emergence of history and IR, despite the temporal shift, it should be remembered that professional historiography was introduced to universities in the first half of the nineteenth century to serve the nation-state. The most important task of historiography was to create national identities and train teachers, politicians, administrators of empires and political ideologues. After the criticism of social Darwinism and of the myth of progress, historiography was assigned a position by the philosophy of positivism in the form of common sense empiricism that justifies neutrality and non-involvement. Usually, the ‘philosophy of history’ was rejected as being an ideology. Meanwhile, the philosophy of history (Comte, Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, Croce) was seen as a kind of extension or supplement, as White says, for what is called historical science or history proper. “Most philosophers of history – from Hegel on – regarded their work as an extension of or supplement to the work of ordinary historians. They saw themselves as providing procedures for summarising, synthesising or symbolising the myriads of works written by working historians in order to derive some general principles regarding the nature of human beings’ existence with others in time” (White, 2019: 17).

One hundred years later, after World War Two, part of the American political elite feverishly sought knowledge and justification for their thinking and acting in the world. For many years, the ‘philosophy’ they needed was supplied by the theory of political realism. Its authors and supporters sought to cover the whole range of IR with its theory. In this context, Stefano Guzzini formulates an accurate assessment of the core of political realism, arguing that the evolution of realistic thinking can be understood as repeatedly undertaken, unsuccessful attempts to translate the maxims of nineteenth-century European diplomatic practice into the more general laws of American social science and the goals of the foreign policy of the new superpower (Guzzini, 1998: 1). This led to an ambivalence between ‘scientific’ IR and the historicist approach in the process of formatting the discipline in American universities. Consequently, the dispute over the philosophy of IR resulted in two approaches. One argued that history should be recognized as the foundation for understanding international relations; the other denied history any significant importance in analyzing and interpreting international relations. However, more important than this division is the fact that the promotion and expansion of political realism, understood as the perspective of thinking about international relations, seemed to erase all the alternatives. To put it short, political realism has been assigned the role of both the theory and philosophy of IR. From this perspective, the dispute over the role of history was of secondary importance. Therefore, if we ask about the philosophy of IR, it was this special dual role assigned to political realism that partly determined its absence.
Let us begin by explaining why, despite the significant intellectual and institutional development of IR after World War Two, it did not generate any ‘grand ideas’ that would influence the broadly understood humanities. Barry Buzan and Richard Little metaphorically identify this problem by talking about the semi-permeable membrane insulating IR from other disciplines, which lets in ideas from outside only and blocks their movement in the opposite direction. It is therefore difficult to answer the question of what other disciplines have learned from IR. Among the few exceptions worth mentioning is Michael Mann, who argued that historical sociologists have ‘invaded’ political realism and returned with valuable ‘spoils.’ The significance of this expedition is diminished by the fact that, independently of international relations researchers, they concluded that wars make states and states make wars (Charles Tilly). Historian Paul Schroeder tried to remove the differences, mainly those in understanding the role of theory and methodology, between history and IR. John L. Gaddis and Jack S. Levy indicated the potential synergy between international history and IR. However, these cases can only illustrate that the theory of international relations does not exceed disciplinary boundaries. Also the ‘big names’ of this discipline – Hedley Bull, Hans J. Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, James Rosenau and Kenneth Waltz – are virtually unknown outside of IR. This lack of exchange seems to contradict IR understanding itself as a discipline that by its name indicates that it deals with an inter-subject matter.

Buzan and Little see the reasons for this situation in IR defining its subject matter in a surprisingly narrow and traditional way – as relations, mainly between states. It essentially places its object of research within political science, limiting the scope of IR to the sub-discipline of ‘international’ politics, with the ‘political’ element at its center. Two symbolic works of American political realism, Politics Among Nations (1948) by Hans Morgenthau, and Theory of International Politics (1979) by Kenneth Waltz explicitly chose this option, assuming that removing from sight everything but international politics is a necessary condition for an effective theory of internality to be constructed. Social Theory of International Politics (1999) by Alexander Wendt continues the same tradition (Buzan, Little, 2001: 30). Buzan and Little seek to remedy this condition with the concept of the ‘international system’ understood not only as relations between states, but as a network of interactions binding people in the political, economic, social and ecological aspects. They see the potential of such an approach to transform IR into a kind of ‘meta-discipline’ that can systematically combine the macro-perspectives of social science and history. The comparative advantage of the discipline is seen in its potential for constructing a holistic theoretical model capable of appealing to political scientists, economists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists and historians (Buzan, Little, 2001: 20–21). However, the attempt to fulfill this promise with International Systems in World History (2000), with all due respect, can hardly be considered as a game changer.

Justin Rosenberg also tries to indicate and explain these reasons, arguing that at a deep level IR has never been established as an area ‘in its own right.’ The fundamental thesis by Rosenberg is that IR has never realized the potential of its subject matter: the international dimension of the social world (Rosenberg, 2017: 90). Developed as an extension of political science, IR has remained imprisoned in the
ontology borrowed from political science, something Rosenberg dubs ‘the prison of Political Science.’

According to Rosenberg, the emergence of IR as an extension of political science is the primary cause of IR being unable to produce ideas that would be inspirational to other disciplines. Answering the question of what this ‘prison of Political Science’ is, Rosenberg draws arguments from one of the fundamental texts of IR, namely *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939* by Edward H. Carr [1946, (1939)].

Carr uses a simple diagram of the development of scientific disciplines to indicate that if a discipline is at the initial stage of its development, normative goals dominate over the analysis of facts. Researchers pay less attention to facts and causal analyses and focus on developing visionary projects instead. When the implementation of these projects fails, the researchers reach for analyses and studies which close the initial (utopian) period of the development of each discipline. Thus, the teleological aspect dominated in the emerging ‘theory of international politics.’ After 1931, when the course of events in international relations showed that ‘pure aspirations’ were inadequate as a foundation for the theory of international politics, serious, critical and analytical thinking about international problems became possible. Carr names the period in the development of the discipline that follows its utopian stage – ‘realism.’ When used in the analysis of international practice, realism emphasizes the importance of operating forces and the inevitability of existing tendencies, indicating that the highest wisdom lies in the acceptance of and adaptation to these forces and tendencies. Mature thinking combines goals with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are therefore two faces of political science. A realist defined in this manner treats political theory as a kind of codification of political practice, but does not *a priori* reject the transformative role that political theory can play in the political process. Realistic political science must be based on the recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice that can only be achieved by combining utopia and reality (Carr, 1946, (1939): 4–12).

Carr attempts to redesign the ‘theory of international politics’ by indicating its first principles. The beginning of chapter 7, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, seems to be a promising attempt: “Man has always lived in groups.” Carr appears to notice this universal feature of the human world, which should provide the theoretical and empirical starting point for the discipline called IR: the coexistence of multiple social groups. Therefore, we expect that IR will make this feature the foundation of its separate object of research and will recognize the special significance of this internationality for general social existence.

Unfortunately, as Rosenberg notes, we quickly discover that Carr does not see this. He does not address the question of the coexistence of multiple societies in any way. What he does see is expressed in his fundamental statement on politics. Since man has always lived in groups, one of the functions of each group was to regulate the relations between its members. Referring to Aristotle’s thesis about man as a political animal by nature, Carr indicates the subject matter of political science: it deals with the behavior of people in organized groups [Carr, 1946, (1939): 95; see Rosenberg, 2016b: 4]. Individual behavior is characterized by both the tendency for individual egoism and the ability to cooperate. Similarly, the political society embodied by the state contains this duality that is expressed by the need for both coercion and legitimization. This dualism
determines the nature of politics. Ultimately, what is true in relation to *internal* politics must be equally true in relation to *international* politics. ‘The infancy of the science of international politics’ consists of the fact that this science has not yet realized this basic fact about its subject matter. As a result, Carr legitimately titles this chapter of his book *The Nature of Politics*, and his reasoning cannot be accused of being irrational.

Nevertheless, as Rosenberg points out, there is something special about Carr’s considerations. In the opening sentence of *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, speaking about politics, Carr does not talk about the infancy of political science, but about the infancy of the science of *international* politics. One of the most important goals of his deliberations is to formulate deeper premises on the basis of which this new science could be developed. However, despite this declaration, Carr focuses on the analysis of relations within social groups rather than relations between them. Although he further analyzes the role of power, economics, morality and propaganda *within* and *without*, he in fact applies everything he knows about the nature of politics *per se* to his understanding of *international* politics.

Thus, Carr only apparently sets the foundations for IR while, in fact, he does not so much identify the premises specific to international politics, but rather extends the premises of politics formulated by political science to international relations. This is a philosophy (ontology) of political power (even more crucial in the sphere without a central government) rather than the ontology of *internationality* as such. Rosenberg stresses that this approach prevails in IR and it is difficult to find a proposal to define this discipline in a different way in the canon of international relations (Rosenberg, 2016b: 4–5). Even if such attempts appear, they are often assessed as explaining nothing. It is therefore less surprising that, also in the institutional dimension, the units of academia that study International Relations are part of Political Science.

Meanwhile, disciplines such as geography, history or sociology have their respective ‘hard cores’ (ontologies), features of social reality that emerge from specific indications and constitute the essence of their object of research and, at the same time, decide about their separateness. Generally speaking, *spatiality* is such a foundation for geography, *temporality* – for history, and *society* – for sociology. Each discipline ‘owns’ something that establishes and constitutes the most general dimension of the social world. To a large extent, thanks to this their studies produce concepts and theories that can move around and be used in other humanities. And this is actually happening all the time (Rosenberg, 2016b: 6).

Carr’s conceptualization was not an exception in this respect. The study of the nature of politics has been of permanent interest to researchers in international relations. Beginning the theorization of international relations with considerations on the nature of politics was to provide the foundation knowledge for understanding internationality. Hans J. Morgenthau in *Politics among Nations* (1948) declares that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. In the 1959 article titled *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, Morgenthau reiterates his earlier theses; (1) that the theoretical goals of international relations are the same as those of international politics; (2) that the theory of international politics is only a special type of the general theory of politics; and, finally, (3) that the general theory of politics is the same as political science (Morgenthau, 1959: 15). Bernard de Jouvenel (1955) begins his work on
Why is there no Philosophy of International Relations

Why is there no Philosophy of International Relations? Martin Wight, in his landmark article titled Why Is There No International Theory? (1960), deals with the essence of political theory and explains why there is no international theory and why only the history of diplomacy can deal with internationality. Although this kind of reflection and the related debates have almost completely disappeared from our research field, the tradition forged in this way still makes us take it for granted that the co-formation of internality and internationality is the best way of identifying the ontology of international relations.

As a result, none of the theories of international relations, nor political realism, nor its alternatives in the form of liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism or postcolonial theory set out the unique properties of internationality as their foundation. None of these theories formulate a fundamental claim to IR’s own subject matter in the way geography, history or sociology do. This leads to the conviction that international relations do not have to be formed by those aspects of the social world that are specific to them, and can be interpreted in terms of ideas imported from disciplines that examine the aspects specific to them respectively. The basic disadvantage of this openness of IR to other disciplines is the lack of consideration on its own ‘deep ontology.’ This seems to be the main reason for the lack of the philosophy of IR.

As a result, in the absence of such philosophical and metatheoretical reflection, no grand idea travels from IR to other disciplines. Researchers of international relations have not formulated any ideas about the unique importance of internationality for the human world, following the model of grand ideas brought from geography, history or sociology. It is this state of affairs that Rosenberg describes with the metaphor of IR being in ‘the prison of Political Science.’ There are three main reasons why IR is in this prison. Firstly, because IR is unable to reject being perceived as a sub-division of political science. The subordinate identity of IR can be changed only when we create a broader and deeper definition of internationality, or rather propose a philosophy of internationality that will embrace its political dimension without being limited to this dimension only. Secondly, the lack of the philosophy of internationality embeds IR within another discipline, preventing it from developing freely and fulfilling its own potential as a particular perspective on the social world. Finally, like in a real prison, IR has visitors, but cannot reciprocate their visits. IR adopts ideas formulated by other disciplines, but cannot return the favor with its own ideas. Regardless of the significance of internationality for other social sciences, an imprisoned IR is invisible to them (Rosenberg, 2016b: 8).

This ongoing embedding of IR in political science is illustrated by its status in the United States. Between 1890 and 1910, American academia developed a system of separate disciplines that were institutionalized on a national scale in the form of separate departments (faculties) established at universities and conducting research and teaching in each discipline (Abbot, 2001: 122–123). When such a disciplinary map of social sciences emerged, IR as a course was placed within the framework of political science and has remained there ever since. The vast majority of American international relations researchers have obtained doctoral degrees in political science and remain employed within faculties of political science. IR is one of the many sub-disciplines
that make up political science, and international relations researchers typically account for around twenty percent of their faculties’ members (Oren, 2016: 21). By this token, all organizational issues, but also the reputation of IR, depend on the evaluation of colleagues representing other research fields within political science, usually including, in the case of American academia, the evaluation by researchers into US politics. They usually are the largest or dominant group in the faculties of political science. They also exert the greatest influence on the policies of leading political science journals. Whereas they do not decide what research problems are considered to be the most important within IR, they have a significant impact on how these problems should be investigated. Research standards prevailing in American political science usually consist of ‘testing hypotheses’ with quantitative methods. As a result, it is very difficult to achieve academic success in American political science by conducting research that deviates from the neo-positivist orthodoxy. Even in the times when the ‘theoretical oligarchs’ (for example, Kenneth Waltz or Robert Keohane) exercised the greatest influence on IR, postulating that research should be based on grand theoretical ideas, their students were pressured by political scientists, who expected that research would be conducted in accordance with the standard of testing hypotheses (Oren, 2016: 22). This pattern has become popular, and dominates in the vast majority of countries, including universities in Poland.

**INTERNALISM, EXTERNALISM AND CORRELATIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

I accomplish two basic goals in this text. Firstly, I challenge the legitimacy of attitudes dominating in IR, which I call internalism, externalism and correlationism, and – referring to Rosenberg’s proposal – I present a concept of ontology on which the philosophy of IR can be based. Secondly, I present the nature and consequences of the negative character of IR, which involves the absence of the philosophy of the discipline and studies of internationality following the model applied by political science. Understanding this ‘strange orthodoxy’ may open the way to overcome it, thereby facilitating the possibility of conceiving an ontology of IR, or outlining a path that could lead to the philosophy of International Relations.

**Internalism in International Relations**

One of the complicated problems in social science is usually referred to as ‘internalism,’ ‘unilinearity’ or ‘methodological nationalism.’ The core of internalism seems to lie at the root of sociology and involves the conceptualization of society in its singularity. The result is an inability to theorize the importance of social multiplicity for the social world. From the point of view of IR, in short, internalism is an approach that explains internationality through internality. Internalists assume that the key to understanding international relations is provided by what is within society. Internationalism has founded sociology as a ‘science of society’ on the assumption that the changes and
development of any society can and should be explained through its internal constitution. As a result, sociologists approached interactions between societies as insignificant, and their effects as negligible, in the pursuit of understanding society (Tenbruck, 1994: 75). However, society should not be treated like a set starting point, but rather like a puzzle that sociologists should try to solve. An internalist attempt to understand international relations may be somewhat useful, but ultimately leads to theorizing the subject matter of IR in the form of an unrealistic model that removes everything that results from the ‘eternal’ fact of a multitude of societies. This type of theorizing dominates in the classical social theory.

The early-modern way of resolving relations between the most important entities, and expressed in the principle of the sovereignty and exclusivity of the state, led to a fundamental distinction between the locus of ‘real’ internal politics and barely any space for relations between states, a space whose location nobody actually knows. The secondary character of these relations is most fully reflected in the etymology of the word outside (external, not included in, from the center to the edges). People rooted in this internalist way of thinking believe that the need to distinguish between what is inside and outside can justifiably and simply be ignored by reducing all social action to a robust joint foundation: power struggles, instrumental rationality, and universal ethics, none of which can ever be universal. However, a deeper reflection allows one to see that it is difficult to simply transfer the assumptions adopted in relation to the community in the form of the state, and – in fact – to any form of political community, to an international reality in which such a community does not exist on principle. That is why those who try to understand internationality in internalist terms are always being warned against the danger of the ‘domestic analogy.’ Due to the model of ‘domestic analogy,’ IR cannot indicate its subject matter, its ‘grand idea.’ I believe that this analogy is also responsible for the inability of IR to create its own philosophy. The absence of this philosophy facilitates the criticism of all cosmopolitan ideas which – when confronted with the strict assumptions adopted in relation to the state – are easily discredited as utopian or idealistic.

Externalism in International Relations

Externalism is founded on the assumption that what is external is crucial to understanding the essence of international relations. In the long run, the impact of internationality can be seen in the fact that societies are born and die. Their death is often the result of various internal circumstances and conflicts. However, it may also be caused by external factors that lead to a loss of independence and complete absorption by another society. New societies can also emerge in many ways, by dividing or combining different people and groups. One can hardly defy the statement that “social development has never been the result of internal history” (Tenbruck, 1994: 87).

The advantage of these disputes is the understanding that numerous analyses are based on an unjustified conviction that this duality can be solved by accepting the assumption that monism constitutes one half of a duality. This solution cannot be considered appropriate because neither political theory (internally) nor theories of international politics
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(externally) have been capable of such sophistication, at least for now. As a result, both modern political theory and theories of international politics reproduce this duality. They encourage us to choose one side of this division: a sovereign state or a system of sovereign states. By doing so, we enter “an ultimately irresolvable antagonism between the claims of state and the claims of the system of states” (Walker, 2009: 59).

Externalism in IR is well illustrated by Kenneth Waltz’s theorizing. Waltz’s concept of structural realism as a theory of international politics focuses entirely on externality. States as international actors are theorized as functionally undifferentiated, and their most important behaviors result from the demands made of them by the international system organized according to the anarchy principle. Their internal diversity is not part of the international system, and their international behavior at the system level is independent of ‘their interior.’ In this way, Waltz proposes an economical theory that ‘does not mix’ internal (unit) level factors with external (systemic) level factors. Analyzing international relations as a system, one cannot justify its functioning by referring to data at the unit level. This does not meet the requirements of systemic analysis. Waltz asks: if changes in the results of international activities are directly related to internal changes within the actors of international relations, how can one explain the similarity of these results over time, or their recurrence, if the actors change? He answers that this approach is erroneous because the striking similarity of these relations through millennia is the outcome of the enduring anarchic nature of international relations (Waltz, 1979: 65). Waltz is certainly right in saying that international relations cannot be explained exclusively in internalist terms, by referring to the analysis of unit-level factors. However, similar doubts are aroused by his thesis about this analysis concentrating solely on factors at the international level, thus taking the externalist angle; even though he is convinced of the interaction of factors on both levels. Despite emphasizing the need to distinguish between internal and external phenomena, Waltz has never proposed a doctrine of the actual separation of the two levels. For Waltz, internal processes are both a source of changes in the system and of possible changes to the system itself (Waltz, 1998: 380). Additionally, although Waltz advises international relations researchers to focus on separate theories of internal and international politics, this should be continued until someone manages to integrate both levels into one theory (Waltz, 1986: 340). The ultimate criterion for his choice is not provided by ontology, but by epistemology: the explanatory power of both approaches. Waltz points to the externalist level of analysis as providing greater explanatory power. He is convinced that his systemic theory does not explain everything, but it makes it possible to identify the most important factors for international relations, as opposed to the internal level, which presents an infinite number of variables that can affect the behavior of individual actors.

**Correlationism in International Relations**

Correlationism is a label I give to the attitude where the correlation between what is internal and what is external is a key to understanding the essence of international relations. The concept of correlationism applied as a tool to understand this specific situation of IR directs us towards interpreting the essence (or the ‘hard core’) of IR as
correlate of what is internal and what is external. In this sense, Waltz’s recommendation for international relations researchers to focus on separate theories of internal and international politics until someone manages to integrate both levels into one theory should be recognized as a correlationist postulate.

The concept of correlationism is borrowed from the contemporary French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux [2016, (2006); Harman, 2011; Bryant et al., 2011]. A brief introduction to the essence of correlationism is therefore necessary. For many years, continental philosophy has focused on discourse, culture, consciousness, power, or ideas as constituents of reality. Humans have been the main focus of these works, though reality has been treated only as a correlate of human thinking. Thus, phenomenology, structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstructionism and postmodernism are obvious examples of the anti-realist current in continental philosophy (Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, 2011: 2–3). This current has been manifested in many different ways. It has focused on problems such as death and finitude; aversion to science; concentration on language, culture and subjectivity with prejudice to material factors; the anthropocentric attitude towards nature; rejecting the search for absolutes, and indicating the specific conditions of our historical ‘thrownness’ (Heideggerian Geworfenheit). This current has encompassed also the ‘cultural pivot’ of Marxism, which has led to a growing interest in textual and ideological criticism at the expense of the analysis of economic reality (Bryant, Srnicek, Harman, 2011: 4).

I find the current approach to international relations, which continues to be postulated by IR, to be analogous to the approach of a philosophical correlationist. IR has enduringly postulated and attempted to correlate what is internal with what is external. Correlationists distinguish between internationality (which they understand as the cyclical nature of ‘recurrence and repetition’ and the absence of an international theory [Wight, 1966, (1960): 3], a thesis which is cognitively and normatively insignificant), and what is internal and is expressed as sovereignty, law and progress. Yet the overarching goal of every correlationist is to create an idealization in which this division into internal/external will be abolished. This division is sometimes regarded as universal and timeless, and sometimes – as a particular and modern ‘truth.’ On other occasions it is rejected as reductionist because it characterizes internationality as an antisocial reality which is guided by anarchy, thus ignoring and obscuring the densely structured network of relations which go beyond what is internal. Sometimes, it is considered ideological because, due to its inadequacies and concealments, it is biased and created for somebody, thus becoming part of “the illusion of the epoch” (Selby, 2007: 337–338).

The separation of what is internal from what is external, and the dream of combining the two, has actually led to various forms of correlationism between the two spheres of politics. This desire has linked political science and IR like Siamese twins, who seem to wait eternally for the intervention of the surgeon. This division, and the dream of overcoming it have become so ‘natural’ for researchers that they have forgotten about its genesis, in spite of the effects it has exerted on studies of the dynamics of power and politics. Robert B. J. Walker has no doubt that theories of international relations express the limitations contained in modern political thinking. These theories can be understood as a product of specific historical conditions, which, moreover, no
longer exist. They can also be understood as an ideological expression of the interests of some societies. They can finally be understood in terms of their attitude to the institutionalization of individual academic disciplines; in particular, to the controversy within political science, the discipline that has had the greatest impact on the development of IR as a way of thinking and research (Walker, 1993: 16). If theories of international relations express the historical context of the political community that crystallized in early modern Europe, doubts may arise about their legitimacy as the basis for thinking about another political community. The collapse of universalist political, religious and metaphysical hierarchies was a problem that Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke tried to resolve. These seem to be the most important reasons for the importance of their texts for contemporary thinking about international relations, rather than for eternal truths about realpolitik or international anarchy. Establishing this kind of correlation by finding the foundations for thinking about international relations in these texts must inevitably lead one astray. The historical specificity of this correlation is systematically obscured by philosophically trivial but discursively effective theses of, for example, inherited intellectual traditions, the relation between truth and power, essentialist theories of state, or the theses of unchanging human nature (Walker, 1993: 17). This clearly shows the difficulty of abandoning correlationalism and the resulting limitations in establishing the ontology of international relations outside political theory and political science. Thinking about international relations is particularly interesting in this context because of the difficulties experienced by this discipline in establishing its subject matter. The abandonment of correlationalism must involve overcoming and rejecting the intellectual and political horizons inherited and accepted so far. This is necessary because IR, like no other discipline, is explicitly related to political boundaries. Theories of international relations want to “explain and offer advice about the security and transgression of borders between established forms of order of community inside and the realm of either danger (insecurity, war) or a more universalistically conceived humanity (peace, global politics) outside” [italics – A.G.] (Walker, 1993: 18). In order to go beyond the correlational understanding of the ontology of IR, theories should not be borrowed on the basis of which models and metaphors are constructed and methodologies are legitimized. One should rather seek to understand how the theories of international relations and their ontologies have been constituted on the basis of historical specificity.

In the 1960s, a discussion between the supporters of the ‘scientific’ and ‘traditionalist’ approaches in IR was held. Hedley Bull and Morton Kaplan embodied the two sides in this discussion. Bull argued that the scientific method of studying international relations was inadequate because of the nature of these relations. He was particularly concerned about the process of transferring the philosophical and theoretical assumptions formulated with regard to the political community within the state, to the analysis of relations between states (the ‘domestic analogy’). However, Bull’s interest in whether international relations differ from the internal politics of states and the essence of this differentness has not become the subject of in-depth reflection, and has quickly evolved into an epistemological question of how research should be conducted. Although the debate began with the issue of ontological duality, it eventually and quickly turned into a claim for epistemological monism. Although Bull supported
the traditional view that relations between states are sufficiently different to justify the existence of a separate discipline and different research strategies, the ‘socio-scientific’ approach accepted their fundamental continuity. Thus, nothing stood in the way of building empirically testable models, transferring assumptions, metaphors, research strategies, and the assumption of rational action, from one context to another. This is another reason for the absence of an ontology and philosophy of IR.

Hedley Bull’s attitude may illustrate a form of strong correlationism, which nevertheless does not solve the problem of the subject matter and the absence of the philosophy of IR. This strong correlationism interprets relations between states as ‘something more’ than just anarchy. In this approach, the international system can be understood as a form of political life that makes it possible for cooperation to exist (Bull, Watson, 1984). Robert B. J. Walker makes an attempt to show the way out of this deadlock, or rather looks for the traces of this ‘traditional’ perspective. He finds them in the concept of ‘interdependence,’ in the analysis of international regimes and in emphasizing the reformist potential of international organizations. However, Walker says that few researchers argue that we have to move from a world of state communities to a world of global community. Ultimately, Walker merely observes that in IR, the epistemological demand for a universally applicable scientific method coexists with the opposite approach, expressed in various ways in ontological, ethical and ideological forms, claiming that human life is fragmented (Walker, 1993: 85). However, he does not focus his attention on the essence of this fragmentation, although he is aware that the differences between the perspectives of international relations studies have their ontological causes, and he limits himself to criticizing universal epistemological demands.

Robert Keohane takes a typical correlationalist position and sees the weaknesses of both the rationalistic and the reflective approaches in the very absence of the correlation between what is internal and external. In his opinion, neither approach takes a sufficient account of internal politics. Internal politics is ignored by most strategic analyses based on the game theory and on the analysis of changes in international regimes. Similarly, a reflective approach dealing with the problem of sovereignty clearly separates internal and international politics. Keohane argues that when reflectionists criticize the reification of the state by neorealist theory, they should present how this reification occurred historically and how it is reproduced within the internal/external dichotomy. Such an analysis could produce a fruitful examination of changes in the preferences that result from complex interactions between the activities of international institutions and processes of internal politics (Keohane, 1988: 392).

All this illustrates our enduring tendency to solve problems arising from the internal/external duality through an appeal to temporality, the processes of an emancipatory history, and to a narrative focused on time. Robert B. J. Walker talks about it using the metaphor of the temptation to drive the great bus of linear history down a dead-end street. Such an approach cannot provide a solution to the problem of the form of political life, which has been organized as a relationship between particularity (state) and universality (international system). As a result, although the bus of linear history seems to offer a cheap ride, it can only travel around a short circuit. Hence the endless ride from ‘political realism’ to ‘political idealism’ and back again in IR (Walker, 2009: 59).
SPECULATIVE MATERIALISM

For several years, there have been approaches in philosophy rejecting the traditional focus on textual criticism or the structure of consciousness. Ontological issues become essential instead. All new approaches speculate on the nature of reality in different ways. Their goal is to transcend the critical and linguistic turn towards realism and materialism. This change has been pioneered by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose works from the 1970s and 1980s present an ontological vision of a subjective reality whose subject and thought are the final and residual product. Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou and Bruno Latour are also mentioned as forerunners of the change.

In the course of this shift, the origins of the philosophical movement called speculative realism1 can be traced back, with a precision which is rare in such cases, to an academic meeting which took place at the Goldsmiths College of London University in April 2007. The meeting was attended by, among others, Ray Brassier, Iain H. Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux. Speculative realism, founded on the works and discussions of these authors, has inspired many different philosophical positions and disciplines, ranging from anthropology through archeology, architecture, feminism, medieval studies and musicology to research into science. This inspiration consisted above all of the rejection of what Quentin Meillassoux was the first one to call ‘correlationism.’ While philosophical realists assume the existence of the world independently of human thought (reality exists outside our mind), philosophical idealists deny the existence of such an autonomous world (reality exists only in our mind). The essence of correlationism is to take an intermediate position between realism and idealism. According to correlationists, humans and the world are inevitably correlated, in the sense that the only thing which we have access to are the correlates of thought and the world. Humans cannot know the world without it being mediated by the mind. As a result, correlationists consider the dispute between realism and idealism as a ‘pseudo-problem.’ Correlationists maintain that we can think neither of a human without the world nor of a world without the human (Harman, 2011: 2). Meillassoux labels the contemporary opponent of every form of realism a ‘correlationalist.’ Correlationism takes many forms, in transcendental philosophy, phenomenology and post-modernism. Despite the profound internal diversity of these currents, all of them share the conviction that there are no objects, no events, no laws or beings which are not always correlated with a certain point of view, with a subjective access.

Anyone maintaining the contrary, that is claiming that it is possible to access reality in itself, existing independently of his viewpoint, or his category, or his culture, or his language, and so on, is a realist (Meillassoux, 2014: 9). The aim of Meillassoux’s philosophy is to rebut any form of correlativity by demonstrating that thinking in a way which meets specific conditions provides access to reality in itself. In other words, he maintains that an absolute, that is, a reality that is absolutely separate from the subject, can be conceived by this subject. To be precise, Meillassoux understands correlation-

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1 The term ‘speculative realism’ should be treated as a kind of an ‘umbrella’ encompassing various philosophical approaches sharing an attitude towards the common enemy that is correlationism. Quentin Meillassoux defines his philosophy as ‘speculative materialism’ in order to distance himself from other ‘speculative realists.’
ism not so much as an anti-realism but as an anti-absolutism. It is a modern way of rejecting all possible knowledge of an absolute. It is the claim that we are locked up in our representations – conscious, linguistic, historical ones – without any means to access a timeless reality independent of our point of view (Meillassoux, 2014: 20).

Correlationism was the dominant ontological position in continental philosophy in the twentieth century. Although its roots can be traced back to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant from the late eighteenth century, it still remains the dominant philosophical perspective.

Nowadays, this correlationalist attitude typically argues that if one tries to think about something outside of thought, it leads to a contradiction, because this ‘something’ must enter one’s thinking first. Meillassoux recognizes this argument and treats it as indisputable. He assumes that a correlational circle made of humans and the world is not a trivial mistake or wordplay, but a starting point for any rigorous philosophy. He believes that a position that can be described as ‘strong correlationism’ is possible and different from absolute idealism. This radicalization in the form of strong correlationism leads to a new position Meillassoux describes as speculative materialism.

While the traditional philosophical debate focused on the question of who has the best model of substance, since Kant it has transformed into a dispute over who has identified the true nature of the human-world correlate. “[E]ver since Kant, to discover what divides rival philosophers is no longer to ask who has grasped the true nature of substantiality, but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it the thinker of the subject-object correlation, the noetico-noematic correlation, or the language-referent correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the proper substrate?’ but ‘which is the proper correlate?’” (Meillassoux, 2008: 5–6). Opposing Kant, Meillassoux calls the dominance of this correlational circle not a ‘Copernican Revolution,’ but ‘the Kantian catastrophe.’ The Kantian position that reality ‘revolves’ around the conditions of our thinking is essentially similar to a ‘Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution.’ In this particular historic moment, when science made a leap forward and seemed to seize an absolute, Kant enslaved philosophy by bringing it to a model of finitude that still dominates philosophy today (Harman, 2011: 10). However, despite this criticism of Kant, we cannot go back to being metaphysicians or dogmatists. On this point, we must be the heirs of Kant. Meillassoux argues that we must, therefore, remember about the apparently unanswerable force of the correlational circle. Naïve realism is certainly not a satisfactory solution to this problem.

All these concepts are pillars of both common sense and natural sciences. However, they are in a dramatic contrast to the correlational position. Defenders of correlativism can easily ridicule common sense, but they must seriously treat their answer to the natural sciences. What Meillassoux seeks is a non-dogmatic version of an absolute growing internally from the ashes of the correlational circle. Therefore, any materialism that wants to be speculative, and for which absolute reality is a thoughtless entity, must assume that thought is not necessary (something can be independent of thought) and that thought can think of what must be when there is no thought. In order to avoid Kantian agnosticism (the impossibility of knowing things-in-themselves) and reality ‘collapsing’ into thought, Meillassoux proposes a metaphysics of absolute contingency, where anything can happen without a reason and without warning. Everything can
collapse, from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from the laws of physics to the laws of logic. This may happen because of the absence of any higher law capable of preserving anything from destruction.

THE IDEA OF PLURALITY AS AN ONTOLOGY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Consider what can constitute such a non-dogmatic version of an absolute growing internally from the ashes of the correlational circle in IR. Consider what special feature of the social world can constitute the ‘hard core’ of IR. What will it allow IR to say, in its own language, about its particular subject matter to other disciplines? If we ask this question of the canon works on international relations, the answer must be: we do not know.

Justin Rosenberg, representing international historical sociology, in particular emphasizes that, since its infancy, IR has not found its own subject matter or voice, but it has emerged accepting the fact that it is a simple extension of another discipline, namely Political Science. IR exists, acknowledging the fact that the essence of international politics consists of the same assumptions that have been accepted as politics per se since Aristotle. If IR is only a sub-discipline of Political Science, the only identity it can assume is negative: it can study politics in the same way political science does in the absence of central authority (Rosenberg, 2016b: 7). In addition, the thesis that there is no central authority in international relations raises numerous empirical doubts.

In an article published in 1965, the sociologist Gianfranco Poggi observed that modern sociology had focused mainly on studying the internal structure and dynamics of social units. This resulted in the theoretical inability to include in its field of interests a separate causal dynamics and behavior patterns arising from the interactive coexistence of many societies and countries (Poggi, 1965: 284). Although classical sociology does not treat interactions between societies as completely irrelevant, they are usually overlooked as causative factors in explaining ‘the inner history of societies.’ From Karl Marx, through Ferdinand Tönnies, to Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons it was thought that societies are ‘natural systems’ which change because of their internal conditions. This lack in the intellectual tradition of international theory seemed to duplicate the tradition of classical political philosophy, which was iconically expressed by Martin Wight’s question of why there is no international theory.

The problem of how to theorize international relations has been disregarded in the sociological tradition, inspiring many contemporary historical sociologists and IR researchers to abandon the unitary understanding of society. In the theories of long-term social change, the concepts of ‘networks’ and ‘flows’ have emerged, that operate through and cannot be reduced to individual societies. Social development has been increasingly contextualized in the wider framework of ‘inter-social systems.’ However, when we try to pinpoint concrete progress in a macro-historical analysis by assigning more vital agency to inter-social relations, we usually encounter two approaches to the sense of internationality: the ‘extra-social’ one, which we have called externalist, and a ‘reductionist’ one, which we have named internalist. As a consequence, both IR
and historical sociology have oscillated between the reification of ‘internationality’ by political realists as a supra-historical and supra-social sphere and the reductionist conceptualizations of ‘internationality’ as a separate causal property of the social world in the form of a ‘domestic analogy’. Hedley Bull (1966) showed how to transform ‘internationality’ into ‘domestic analogy’. As a result, this methodological dichotomy and the problems it generated constituted the core of debates in IR (Anievas, Matin, 2016: 4).

In addition to ‘grand theories’ and ‘middle-range’ theories, we need a theory that defines the ‘hard core’ of the discipline. If we look at the ‘big debates’ in IR, none of them has addressed the problem of the ontology of internationality. They have been dominated, first and foremost, by epistemological issues regarding the methods of generating valid knowledge in IR. It is difficult to indicate a debate focusing on seeking the answer to the question of what internationality is.

Let us ask the fundamental question of what feature of the social world can constitute the deepest ontological assumption of IR. The answer is simple and inevitable. The word internationality always leads to the same fundamental circumstance: human existence has never been individual, but always multiple. The multiplicity of internationality has always boiled down to interacting societies. This is an elementary fact of the human world that justifies the existence of IR as an academic discipline. No other discipline places in its ontological center the fact of social multiplicity (Rosenberg, 2016b: 9). Units of this social multiplicity have assumed various forms (of families, clans, tribes, city-states, empires, or states) creating a socially and politically fragmented character of the history itself. Moreover, in international relations, the multiplicity of political units has a decisive influence on the nature of policy itself. It is not limited to politics and power relations, but extends to encompass social, economic and cultural spheres. Ultimately, it is social multiplicity rather than politics that constitutes the deepest code of internationality as a feature of human existence. And this multiplicity demands its own voice, a voice that tells us that social existence has been multiple and interactive since time immemorial (Rosenberg, 2016b: 10, 20).

Rosenberg realizes that all social sciences and humanities face the outcomes of social multiplicity (internationality), just as IR must consider issues related to spatiality and temporality when dealing with its subject of research. However, IR’s ‘grand idea’ defined in this way has important implications for all social sciences. Some of these consequences are partly known to us, although usually in the negative form established in political science, such as the lack of an authority over states. Only to a small extent, however, have we identified the positive consequences of internationality, which Rosenberg terms as copresence of many interacting societies. According to Rosenberg, the most important consequences of internationality include co-existence, difference, interaction, combination, and dialectical change.

Coexistence creates a new level of social reality, an additional type of social phenomenon outside the internal structures of every society. At this level, not only politics acquires special features, becoming geopolitics, but a boat transforms into a ship, money into currency, conflict into war, economics into international economics, sociology into international historical sociology, etc. Coexistence also creates additional social causality and ethics. Social multiplicity generates internationality itself as a separate
dimension of the social world. IR has a special mandate to make this dimension its core and to adopt it as the object of its research. We know from history that human societies have always been multiple, and this multiplicity defines the social world to the same extent as the centralized power existing in them does. Additionally, the lack of central authority in international relations, by definition cannot cause anything, because such authority simply does not exist. As we refer to *internationality*, we need a language that will allow us to properly examine what does exist, and this is a language of multiplicity. One of the legitimate definitions of *internationality* may therefore be as follows: *internationality* is the coexistence of more than one society.

*Difference* is a necessary consequence of multiplicity. The reason for this difference partly is that individual communities occupy different ecological niches, but also the uniqueness of their relations with others. Another reason for this difference is also the distribution of social development that takes different forms in different places at the same time. *Internationality* therefore embeds difference and multi-linearity in the nature of global social development.

*Interaction*, alongside coexistence and difference, is also a result of multiplicity, that is a source of both benefits and threats. On the one hand, the development potential of many societies has been interrupted and destroyed by external pressures, on the other hand there have been many cases of development accomplished through interactions with other societies. All societies have experienced such processes. Interactions form the basic dimension of social action in international relations: cooperation, conflicts, diplomacy, organizations, law, exchanges, etc.

*Combination* as a consequence of *internationality* means that all societies must be a result of constant combinations of locally established development patterns with external influences and pressures. The internal structure of society is conditioned, determined, and sometimes created or destroyed by external factors everywhere. Each society is connected with other societies, interdependent and often formed by socialization processes that intersect them. Through combination, multiplicity is reflected in the internal constitution of the societies themselves.

*Dialectical change* is the concept used by Rosenberg to capture the process of global development. This process must be dialectical in the sense that exchanges between social formations open up new possibilities through mechanisms that are inseparable from the phenomenon of interaction itself. In 1620, Francis Bacon pointed out that the modern world was distinguished from the past by three key inventions: firearms, the printing press and magnetic compass. Even though these inventions had originated in China and came to Europe through trade and communication, in a new environment they developed and exerted an influence which they had never achieved in China. Such transfers from one society to another generate new and different development processes affecting the process of global development itself. Seen in a broader perspective, the birth of the West was also rooted in the dialectical causality generated by the interactions of many societies (Rosenberg, 2016b: 10–13).

Rosenberg asks what these consequences of multiplicity say about the subject matter of IR? Firstly, they tell us all that *internationality* is more than a sub-discipline of Political Science. In addition to attempting to understand international politics, IR is also trying to understand the importance of social multiplicity for the entire social
world, its social structures, economic systems, cultural processes, etc. This means that, as researchers of international relations, we have something important to tell other disciplines about their subject matters. What is the most important thing that we want to tell them, then? Simply put, we want to tell them that in their theorizations of politics, economics, culture, society, human, etc., they should note that each of these activities takes place in a wider context of multiple societies (Rosenberg, 2016b: 14).

Discussing IR, Barry Buzan and George Lawson take a ‘configuration’ approach to ‘global transformation’ emphasizing the contingent relationship between historical events and social processes. The basic assumption of this approach is that big events do not require big causes. Rather, social transformations arise from the conjunctural intersection of sequences of events and processes that are causally, but contingently, interrelated (Buzan, Lawson, 2015: 1). The contingency of this relationship weakens the role of theories, which usually exaggeratedly indicate the relationship of contingently interacting causes; reasons that are of course external to any theoretical scheme.

The source of the great achievements in many contemporary historical-sociological works on the emergence of the modern world (Anderson, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974–2011; Mann, 1986, 1993; Wood, 2002) is obviously seen in their structural approach. Even in the neo-Weberian discourse, the recognition of multiple reasons is not tantamount to rejecting the structural way of explaining, and concepts such as ‘co-determination,’ ‘mutual interdependence,’ ‘path dependency’ or ‘intertwined development’ are not identified with contingency. Even though contingency is given a role, the dominant model of understanding causality in the neo-Weberian perspective is structural (Anievas, 2016: 475).

However, the contingent nature of the social world can be a theoretical assumption. Pointing to the absolute contingency of social processes can be a theoretical argument against the structural approach in IR. Contingency can be internalized in theory as an object of theorizing.

According to the theory of uneven and connected development, inequality leads to developmental diversity both within and between societies. The basic fact of the ontology of human development is the multiplicity of societies which differ in size, culture, political organization and economic system. This can be regarded as a trans-historic feature of the historical process (Rosenberg, 2006). Taking this perspective makes it possible to explain both the quantitative (multiplicity of societies) and qualitative (different societies) aspects of development (Rosenberg, 2013: 576). The theory, however, not only describes the two static conditions of development (multiplicity and difference), but explains how their dialectical interactions create a socio-relational texture of the historical process in which the changing identity of individual societies emerges and crystallizes (Rosenberg, 2006: 324). Pointing to the specific features of the development of every society as a necessary (though highly variable) result of this inter-social environment, historical development itself cannot be reduced to a linear path (Anievas, 2016: 477). Thus, although a particular pattern of socio-cultural diversity at any given time is contingent, the fact of this diversity in itself is not (Rosenberg, 2006: 317).

When different social formations interact, it is impossible to predict the result of these interactions which makes them ‘contingent.’ This indeterminacy of the results of
interaction can be defined as an inherent property of development itself. As a result, the theory of uneven and connected development explains various forms of agency and the results of ‘necessary but contingent’ interactions, while avoiding the deterministic and linear understanding of causality and development (Anievas, 2016: 477). Rosenberg invokes contemporary examples of such uneven and connected development. In Saudi Arabia, a tribal political system has been grafted onto an industrializing society. The state, which owns the wealth of society, is itself owned by about 7,000 members of princely families. Nevertheless, a significant part of global energy supplies rests on this peculiar political hybrid. In China, the communist government is directing the process of capitalist industrialization on an unprecedented scale, creating the second economy in the world. In Iran, theocratic power is locked in a confrontation with the great powers over its use of nuclear technology (Rosenberg, 2016a: 27). The specificity of these examples shows the impossibility of their internalist, externalist or correlationist explanation.

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Why is there no Philosophy of International Relations

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ABSTRACT

Why is there no philosophy of International Relations? Why, despite the significant intellectual and institutional development of International Relations after World War II, has IR failed to generate any ‘grand ideas’ that would influence the broadly understood humanities?

None of the theories of international relations indicates the exceptional features of internationality as its foundation. None of these theories formulates a fundamental claim to its subject matter in International Relations the way geography, history or sociology do. This leads to the conviction that international relations do not have to be formed by aspects of the social world that are specific to them, and can be interpreted in terms of ideas imported from the disciplines that deal with examining aspects relevant to them. The basic disadvantage of this openness of International Relations to other disciplines is the lack of reflection on its own ‘deep ontology.’ This seems to be the most important reason for the lack of a philosophy of International Relations.

The author accomplishes two basic goals in his text. Firstly, he undermines the legitimacy of the three attitudes prevailing in IR on understanding internationality, which he calls internalism, externalism and correlationism. Secondly, he presents the essence and consequences of the negative character of IR, which involves the absence of the philosophy of IR and studying internationality in the same manner as political science does.

The author argues that understanding this ‘strange orthodoxy’ can be a means to overcoming it, thereby opening up the possibility of conceiving the ontology of IR, or outlining the path leading to the philosophy of International Relations. Finally, the author refers to the proposal of Justin Rosenberg, to then present an idea for an ontology on which the philosophy of International Relations could be founded.

Keywords: philosophy of International Relations, internalism, externalism, correlationism, ontology, multiplicity

DLACZEGO NIE MA FILOZOFII NAUKI O STOSUNKACH MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH?

STRESZCZENIE

Dlaczego nie ma filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych? Dlaczego pomimo istotnego intelektualnego i instytucjonalnego rozwoju nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych po II wojnie światowej, nie wygenerowała ona żadnych „wielkich idei”, które wywarłyby wpływ na szeroko rozumiane nauki humanistyczne?

Żadna z teorii stosunków międzynarodowych nie wskazuje jako jego fundamentu wyjątkowych własności międzynarodowości. Żadna z tych teorii nie formuluje fundacyjnego rozszerzenia do własnego przedmiotu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych na sposób w jaki robią to geografia, historia czy socjologia. Prowadzi to do przekonania, że stosunki międzynarodowe nie muszą być kształtowane przez swoiste dla nich aspekty świata społecznego i można je interpretować za pomocą idei importowanych z dyscyplin, które zajmują się badaniem właściwych dla nich aspektów. Podstawową wadą tej otwartości nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych na inne dyscypliny jest brak namysłu nad własną „głęboką ontologią”. W tym wydaje się tkwić najważniejsza przyczyna braku filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych.

Autor realizuje w swoim tekście dwa podstawowe cele. Po pierwsze, podważa zasadność dominujących w NSM stanowisk w kwestii rozumienia międzynarodowości, które nazywa in-
ternalizmem, eksternalizmem i korelacjonizmem. Po drugie, przedstawia istotę i konsekwencje negatywnego charakteru NSM polegającego na braku filozofii dyscypliny i badaniu międzynarodowości na wzór nauk politycznych.

Autor przekonuje, że zrozumienie tej „dziwnej ortodoksji” może otworzyć drogę do jej przezwyciężenia. Jej pokonanie zaś otworzyć możliwość pomyślenia ontologii NSM, czyli zarysować drogę prowadzącą do filozofii nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Ostatecznie, odwołując się do propozycji J. Rosenberga, przedstawia ideę ontologii, na której można budować filozofię nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych.

Słowa kluczowe: filozofia nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych, internalizm, eksternalizm, korelacjonizm, wielość