

MEDIA AND HUMAN ASPECTS OF SECURITY

Jędrzej SKRZYPCZAK

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5906-3802>

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THE EFFECT OF THE ‘CHINA FACTOR’ ON TAIWAN’S MEDIA SYSTEM SECURITY AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE ‘PRIVATIZATION AND OUTSOURCING’ OF CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE DIGITAL AGE

The term ‘media system’ is understood as “any and all institutions and organizations that, in their specific characteristic ways, participate in intermittent interpersonal mass communication; this concerns primarily the mass media (the press, radio and television) and any institutions and organizations that either complement their activities (such as news agencies and distribution companies) or that supervise or control them” (Sonczyk, 2009: 75). Another definition describes the media system as “a structure embedded in media legislation, journalistic education and the activities of numerous industry organizations (press publishers, journalists and radio and television broadcasters) as well as regulatory agencies and the distributors of individual media types” (Adamowski, 2008: 7–8). In their attempt to compare media systems, D. C. Hallin and P. Mancini explored the sophistication of media markets and the advancement of mass press, political parallelism (i.e. the extent and nature of links between the media and political parties and, speaking more broadly, the extent to which a given media system reflects major political divisions in society), journalistic professionalism and the extent and nature of state interference in media systems (Hallin, Mancini, 2007: 21). One can therefore assume that media systems encompass all social media, institutions and organizations and any other mutually-interacting entities that constitute a coherent whole in a given geographic area, including the press, radio and television, and media content providers, along with the legal, economic and social environments that affect their operation. The article attempts to apply the term, as defined above, to describe the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. It should immediately be pointed out that describing Taiwan’s entire media landscape has been impossible due to editorial constraints which is why the scope of this discussion is limited to the single aspect of the security of the system in question.

It should also be clarified that ‘media security’ is a term rarely used in the doctrine. However, another notion, namely that of (tele)information security, in which entities (such as states) guarantee the integrity, completeness and credibility of the information they hold regardless of form, whether electronic or other, is also in common use. The term refers to “any efforts made to protect sensitive information (information of vital importance for the efficient functioning of state structures and society) and provide an

information-related advantage by acquiring new or more up-to-date data and by staging disinformation campaigns against potential adversaries (state or other)” (Madej, 2009: 18–19). In another approach, the media system is described as an internal and external condition in which the strategic information resources of a given state are not at risk, in which the authorities make decisions on internal and external matters on the basis of true, checked, reliable and timely information, while the flows of such information remain undisturbed. It is also a condition in which the state is required by law to ensure the security of public ICT networks and of the legal system used to protect information and citizens’ personal data, in which citizens have the right to privacy, in which in the process of gathering intelligence on citizens, organizations and their activities, public and private institutions do not violate established legal standards, and in which citizens and their representatives (the media, non-governmental organizations, members of parliament, and oversight bodies) are entitled to know what the government is doing (Suchorzewska, 2010: 48–49; Bączek, 2005: 74).

Furthermore, media system security refers to any institutional, economic and functional solutions that ensure the stability of the media system and enable the press to perform its key functions, which are to disseminate information (inform the public of important events), help form opinions (influence the views and behaviors of various groups), ensure social control (in the sense of society having control over public entities), organize social life, integrate groups and, to a lesser extent, entertain the public (provide content that entertains rather than informs). Without a doubt, the successful provision of media security defined as above requires safeguards (including constitutional protection) that protect the freedom of speech and the media, laws that enshrine media pluralism and govern media ownership concentration, and means of combatting disinformation.

The above inspires reflection on the extent to which state policy should safeguard media security. State policy safeguards are fraught with dangers. They may potentially erode if not fully sabotage freedom of speech and freedom of the media. Admittedly though, international agreements on freedom of speech provide for certain exceptions. For instance, Art. 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹ guarantees, on the one hand, that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” On the other hand, paragraph 3 provides for certain exemptions. It reads: “The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.” Evidently, the state is allowed to step in under exceptional circumstances, e.g. when national security is at stake. Bear in mind, however, that such interference is only acceptable as long as the conditions enumerated in this paragraph are met.

¹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 (accessed on April 2, 2019).

In this age of digital revolution, media systems and communication models undergo profound transformations. One of their effects is a shift in the way media are consumed, including their choice of platforms. What is equally important is that the communication model is also changing. As digital media are inherently interactive, they enable anyone to share content. One might venture to say that anyone can become a broadcaster, using e.g. social media. Such media also allow message personalization (or tailoring to individual targets), as content can be shared in either one-to-many or one-to-one communication models. The audiences themselves can customize the content they receive. Given its global reach, the internet enables content sharing across state boundaries. While this creates great opportunities, it also poses serious challenges. The global nature of the internet impedes the enforcement of national laws preventing courts from imposing sanctions on the purveyors of content through foreign servers (Skrzypczak, 2015: 129). It is also paradoxical that top global players (such as FB, Google, and YouTube) are governed by local legislation (US law in the case of these specific companies).

Social media also allow the use of bots, algorithms and fictitious accounts to distribute content and create an illusion of huge public interest in specific issues. They can therefore be used to seriously manipulate the media and misinform the public. This makes them a powerful tool for influencing public opinion.

When addressing the issues signaled in the title of this article, it is worth noting that the Republic of China, or Taiwan, is officially an East Asian island. Its historic name derived from the Portuguese language, is Formosa. It is located on the Pacific Ocean to the east of the People's Republic of China, separated from Mainland China by the Taiwan Strait (Fu-Lan Lee, 2014: 95). The literature distinguishes several periods in the history of this country (Sławiński, 2001: *passim*). The oldest of them is the time when the island was inhabited by speakers of Austronesian (Malay-Polynesian) languages. The next period, covering the seventeenth century, saw attempts to colonize the island by the Spaniards and Dutch, ushering in a period of Dutch domination. In 1662, Cheng Cheng-kung (Zheng Chenggong or Koxinga) liberated the island from Dutch influence. This resulted in the creation of a state loyal to the continental Ming dynasty. In 1683, during the reign of the Qing Dynasty, the island was incorporated into Mainland China. During the next period, post 1895, a defeat in a war forced Mainland China to hand over the island to the Empire of Japan. Its fate turned in 1945, when the island was returned to Mainland China (Lumley, 1976: 56; Gawlikowski, 2004: 3). After the civil war of 1945–1949 and the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), members of the National Party Kuomintang, along with the defeated army and a loyal population of about 1.6 million, were evacuated to the island, effectively moving the Republic of China to Taiwan. During the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States refused to recognize the PRC and provided comprehensive political and military assistance to Taiwan. At the time, representatives of the Republic of China on Taiwan enjoyed the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council and held membership of other international organizations. Their political and international-law status changed dramatically in 1971 after diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China were restored. Henceforward, representatives of Mainland China replaced those of Taiwan on the international stage. In 1979, the United

States officially recognized the Beijing government and broke off diplomatic relations with Taipei (Gawlikowski, 2004: 4; Metzler, 2017: 21–111). The PRC views Taiwan as a rebellious province. In contrast, the Taiwanese have created their own national identity (Rawnsley, 2003: 147–166) and hold independence as a key issue in their public discourse (Jia-wei Liu, 2016: 127–136).

While several different stages can be distinguished in the history of Taiwan's media,² only those that follow the year 1949 are of interest for the purposes of this study. In the first of them, an early phase of the state of emergency in 1950–1975, the government assumed complete control over media coverage and established strict censorship. In principle, it transferred to Taiwan the censorship laws that were in effect in Mainland China during the civil war, complete with the censorship authority (dubbed the Government Information Office) that was tasked with permanent and scrupulous surveillance of all publications. The body was also empowered to determine the number of pages to be included in periodicals. Restrictions also affected press distribution allowing only state-endorsed titles to enjoy unrestricted circulation (Chai Winberg, 2000: 133). During this period, four major dailies remained in circulation – these were *Central Daily News*, a mouthpiece of the ruling Nationalist Party, *Shin Sheng Pao*, which spoke for the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the government-funded *United Daily News* and *China Daily News*. Publishers and editors-in-chief of these newspapers were selected from among persons with close links to Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, no one could apply for such posts unless the President personally endorsed them. The sole source of both domestic and, in particular, foreign news for these periodicals was the Central News Agency (CNA). Note that the CNA maintained a network of correspondents around the world. Over time, the Agency's monopoly was eroded as the government issued successive licenses to other press agencies, such as the Military Information Service, which specialized in military matters, China Union Press, the TATAO News Agency, the International News Service, the Overseas Chinese News Agency, the Overseas News Service, the Free China News Syndicate and the Chung Hsing Agency. The latter had monopoly on all news from Mainland China. It was forbidden to obtain any information from the continent from any channels other than the official ones. It was also prohibited to receive any items by post from Mainland China, not even from relatives (Chai Winberg, 2000: 134).

The next period began upon the death of Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, 1975 and continued until the lifting of martial law on July 15, 1987. Power was then transferred to Chiang Kai-shek's son Chian Ching-kuo, although he did not formally assume the office until May 1978 (Chai Winberg, 2000: 134). Over time, the censorship regime was relaxed slowly but surely. Ever more articles critical of the government were allowed.

The next period, which lasted from the lifting of martial law on July 15, 1987 until the early 1990s, brought the abolition of censorship, triggering a rapid proliferation of press titles. While previously, two newspaper groups and three terrestrial television stations formed an oligopoly (Lihyun Lin, 2018), the number of newly created dailies increased from 31 to 123 over the following six months. The National Press Council

² A Comparison and Analysis of Taiwan's and Singapore's Media System, <https://epiclawyers.wordpress.com/taiwans-media-system/> (April 2, 2019).

was then established as a self-regulatory body that replaced the censorship authority, i.e. the Government Information Office (Chai Winberg, 2000: 134).

In the early 1990s, under the Lee Teng-hui administration, Taiwan underwent its initial democratization with far-reaching consequences for press freedom and the growth of the media industry (Rampal, 2011: 69–93). The industry became largely deregulated.

Finally, the last significant period in the history of Taiwan's media system came in the years following 2002, after the election of Chen Shui-bian as president. Chen Shui-bian proposed a new media policy and media regulations intended to end the influence of political parties, the government and the military. This further spurred the growth of the media scene, bringing the number of press titles in circulation to ca. 2,200 by 2011. What is more, Taiwanese media became more pluralistic and competitive. This led to significant changes in the media landscape. By 2013, the country's biggest daily was *The Liberty Times* (Ziyou shibao) with a circulation of nearly 630,000. *The Apple Daily* (Pingguo ribao) came in second in terms of sales, with 380,000 copies in distribution, followed by *United Daily News* with a circulation of approximately 150,000. The following place in the ranking went to *China Times* with a circulation of 100,000 (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2018: 515–516). In television broadcasting, up until the 1990s, the industry was an oligopoly controlled by three networks. As satellite television grew in popularity in the 1990s, many new players moved in (Shu-Chu Sarrina Li, Chin-Chih Chiang, 2001: 105–119). Six 24-hour news channels established themselves on the market in the last two decades. A lion's share of the distribution relied on cable. As of December 2006, 81.6 percent of households had access to cable television (Ping-Hung Chen, 2002: 41–55; Shu-Chu Sarrina Li, 2004: 279–294; Ping-Hung, 1999: 206; Ping-Hung, Chen, 2002: 37). The most popular stations were TVBS, SET (Sanli), ERA (Niandai), EBC (Dongsen), CTi (Zhongtian), as well as Formosa TV (Minshi, FTV) (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2018: 516). Multi-channel television became the dominant platform, reaching 85 percent of households. Notably, during the last decade, Taiwan enjoyed the highest pay-TV penetration world-wide. Meanwhile, the newspaper industry suffered a sharp decline from 76 percent in 1992 to a mere 30 percent in 2015, effectively losing more than a half of its readers (Lihyun Lin, 2017). During the most recent decade, information media have migrated to online platforms. The shift has resulted from the 20 percent annual growth on the advertising market in the internet and, above all, the growing popularity of online sites and content aggregators offering not only news but also such additional services as e-mail, discussion forums and online auctions. Eighty-eight percent of Taiwan's population of 23 million declare having internet access (Lihyun Lin, 2017). A 2017 survey found that 55 percent of viewers accessed their news via computer, 20 percent used tablets and 65 percent smartphones. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents pointed to television as their key news source, 23 percent indicated the radio, 41 percent printed press, 57 percent social media and 88 percent online media. Only 31 percent declared trust in news regardless of platform, while only 17 percent believed news was immune from political influence (Lihyun Lin, 2017). According to a report by Digital News – Taiwan,³ the most popular news sources⁴ in

³ See <http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/taiwan-2017/> (April 10, 2019).

⁴ Declared to have been accessed during the most recent week.

2017 were: TVBS News (52%), followed by the Eastern Broadcasting News Channel (44%), Sanlih E-Television News (40%) Apple Daily (39%), Chung Tien News (39%), Formosa TV News (37%), Linerty Times (30%), ERA News (26%), Next TV News (25%), Taiwan Television News (24 %), United Daily News (23%), China TV News (23%), Unique TV News (23%), Business Weekly (17%), Chinese Television System News (16%), China Times (15%), Public Television Service (PTS) (14%), Common Wealth Magazine (11%), and CNN (9%) (Lihyun Lin, 2017). The most popular online media brands in 2017 were Yahoo News with a 48 percent market share,⁵ followed by Apple Daily online: 37 percent, ETtoday.net: 36 percent, TVBS online: 29 percent, Sanlih News online: 24 percent, United Daily online: 23 percent, cnYes.com: 18 percent, Liberty Times online: 18 percent, China Times online: 16 percent, Storm Media: 14 percent, Business Weekly online: 14 percent, Common Wealth Magazine online: 13 percent, China TV online: 12 percent, Nownews: 11 percent, Chinese Television System online: 11 percent, GoTv, Chung Tien News online: 10 percent, Global Views Monthly online: 9 percent, PTS online: 9 percent, and New Talk: 9 percent. Fifteen percent of the respondents were willing to pay for online news while 20 percent used ad-blockers. The most popular social media with the Taiwanese were FB (55%), followed by Line (45%), YouTube (36%), PTT (bulletin board) (11%) and FB Messenger (6%) (Lihyun Lin, 2017).

Taiwan ranks 42nd among 180 countries in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index. It has retained its ranking from the preceding year and advanced by three places from 2017, ahead of Poland, which ranks 58th. For the sake of comparison, the index has Mainland China ranking at the opposite end of the spectrum, in the 177th place⁶ (Rawnsley, 2007: 63–78; Istnic, 2012: 67–77; Tay, 2000: 223; Wei, Ran, Leung Lou, 1999: 71).

Article 11 of Taiwan (Republic of China)'s Constitution⁷ guarantees “freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication.” Article 15 states that “the right to existence, the right to work, and the right to own property shall be guaranteed to the people.” Paradoxically, while constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the media and of a market open to foreign capital have created opportunities for the industry's growth, they also pose a threat, especially of late and particularly from investors who come from or cooperate with Mainland China.

As noted in the literature, the People's Republic of China launched a secret strategy of ‘media warfare’ against Taiwan in the early 2000s. The initial idea was to involve media outlets located outside of Mainland China, e.g. in Hong Kong, as well as other Beijing-dependent countries, to influence public opinion on Formosa (Tao Seng-ping, Lin I-chin, 2007: 31–52). These efforts were stepped up post 2008, after Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election on the island, and began promoting a policy of economic integration with Mainland China. The threat was noted by Freedom House,

⁵ Declared by the respondents to have been accessed during the most recent week.

⁶ See <https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2019#> (April 2, 2019).

⁷ Article 11 “The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication.” Taiwan (Republic of China)'s Constitution of 1947 with Amendments through 2005, Oxford University Press, Inc., translated by Max Planck Institute, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005.pdf (April 2, 2019).

which voiced concerns over the direct and indirect influence of the Chinese government on media freedom in Taiwan.⁸ The danger was recognized in connection with the strengthening of trade ties between Taiwan and Mainland China after the conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010.⁹

As part of the strategy, attempts were made to pressure Taiwanese entrepreneurs seeking to invest on the continent to return the favor of being granted trade privileges and commercial licenses in Mainland China by buying press titles and subsequently disseminating pro-Beijing ideas and values. A prime example of this strategy is the Want Want Group (旺旺). Its owner, Tsai Eng-meng, who began to invest on the continent in 1989, despite the general boycott of Mainland China in response to the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre, is widely regarded as a pro-Beijing operator. After his takeover of the China Times Group, which includes *The China Times*, *China Times Express* (Zhongshi wanbao), and *The Commercial Times* (Gongshang shibao), the media group distinctly changed its course, not least by ceasing to release coverage that is critical of the Beijing government. In addition, in 2002, *The China Times* acquired CTi TV (Zhongtian dianshi). Further takeovers took place in 2005 with the buyout of China TV (Zhongshi) and the Broadcasting Corporation of China (Zhongguang, BCC). This resulted in the establishment of an enormous holding company spanning the press, television and radio broadcasting industries (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2014: 518). In 2008, the group was renamed Want Want China Times Group (萬華). Suspicions arose that the entire effort to concentrate media ownership has been orchestrated by Beijing using financial contributions and other means (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2014: 520). The Want Want Group also sought to buy out the largest cable TV operator, sparking protests that led to the emergence of the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement in 2012. FTV and ERA Communications (Niandai dianshitai) are another example (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2018: 524–530).

Mainland China's strategy on Taiwan has also led to attempts to influence Chinese businesses to acquire Taiwanese media companies. A case in point is Foxconn Technology Group, which bought a cable television network in February 2017 (Lihyun Lin, 2017). According to Amnesty International, news media ownership on the island is being concentrated, raising concerns over media freedom and editorial independence in Taiwan.

Another prong of Beijing's strategy on Taiwan is to place in Taiwanese media advertisements and sponsored articles that favor China's policies, including the policy of integration with Mainland China (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2018: 517). The Foundation for the Advancement of Media Excellence has reported 269 such publications over a two-year span (Chien-Jung Hsu, 2014: 532).

The above suggests that China is pursuing a strategy of 'commercializing censorship' (Kurlantzick, Link, 2009: 13–28), which refers to the modern, authoritarian model of media control created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early twenty-first century. The idea is to transfer preventive control over media content from the public to the private sector. This means that censorship is 'outsourced' to private media companies and large corporations. The outsourcing is to ensure actual control exercised not by state agencies but by media owners or advertisers who exert pressure, usually economic, to gag journalists seeking to publish critical articles. The end result is an emergent system

⁸ See the Report at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2010/taiwan>.

⁹ For more, see <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/data/051116322071.pdf>.

of censorship or self-censorship of content deemed sensitive by the Beijing authorities. Such pressure instills in journalists an inner belief that it is inappropriate to raise certain issues or critically tackle certain topics due to possible disapproval from publishers or advertisers, who may choose to take their business to another magazine or newspaper next time around. Such journalists may also fear for their jobs. Needless to say, the practice of media owners and advertisers pressuring media content producers is not unique for China and can be observed in many other countries, including democracies. The unique part of this case is the deliberate strategy of a state to involve third parties to achieve its goals. Some authors refer to this strategy as the 'China factor.' According to Wu Jieh-min, China displays a general tendency to exert political influence on other countries by economic and other means seeking to absorb such countries into its sphere of economic influence. Taiwanese media houses end up embedded in China's capital and advertising markets. The Chinese government secures their cooperation through various economic incentives and threats leading to self-censorship and drumming up support for biased news that favor China's policies. The approach is often referred to as "the outsourcing of Chinese censorship" (Jaw-Nian, Huang, 2017: 1).

Many countries (including the United States during its last presidential election, and the United Kingdom during its Brexit campaign) have recently seen disinformation and fake news being spread through social media. Such activities are also part of China's strategy of influencing Taiwan's media. Perhaps the most famous case of this kind could be observed in 2018. It concerned military exercises conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Taiwan Strait. At the time, social media reported Chinese aircraft and vessels being spotted patrolling not only international space but also Taiwan's territory. It was found that the reports originated from social accounts linked to members of the Chinese military. As a result, mainstream TV news channels carried stories prepared by the PLA. No one checked the accuracy of such reports. This, in fact, was not an isolated incident, which shows that the PRC runs a consistent effort to use official and unofficial channels to spread fake news and manipulate the Taiwanese public (Lihyun Lin, 2018).

As a consequence, in the 1990s, concerns over the independence of Taiwan's commercial media prompted postulates to create public media and, in particular, public television as an antidote to misinformation, leading to the actual establishment of such a station in 1998. More recently, reputable journalists sought to create independent news websites such as Storm Media and New Talk (Lihyun Lin, 2018). The spread of misinformation through online media, and social media in particular, has been raising serious concerns worldwide. Various efforts are afoot to counter such negative trends. Non-democratic states that engage in domestic preventive censorship use the freedom of the media and the opportunities offered by social media to influence public opinion for their own political gain. Note also that the trend involves the commercialization and outsourcing not only of censorship in the sense presented above, but also of propaganda. To accomplish the latter, either state agencies or institutions and organizations controlled by political decision-makers 'hire' various subordinate organizations, commonly from the private sector and based in third countries, to deliberately disseminate and endorse specific views and ideas in the interest of the former. In social media, this is done increasingly using online bots and algorithms that are either run or merely launched by agencies

from a specific country or by subsidiary entities. One can therefore venture to say that propaganda has been 'dronicized' (from the word 'drone'). It seems that as the age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) draws nearer, the trend is bound to grow stronger.

As shown above with respect to Taiwan, one can clearly conclude that China is pursuing a calculated strategy of influencing Taiwan's media system at various levels and by a variety of means. Part of the approach is to commercialize and/or outsource censorship. More recently, public opinion has been additionally influenced through social media. Paradoxically, such actions may turn out to be more effective than military operations. This strategy is also referred to as 'propaganda privatization or outsourcing.' The strategy can be described as an invasion of sorts that is not of a coercive and/or external nature but rather is performed from the inside, aimed directly at the hearts and minds of the country's citizens. The paradox is that this kind of strategy tends to be more effective against democratic media systems that adhere to the principle of freedom of speech. In this way, authoritarian states take advantage of freedom, including the freedom of speech and even the freedom of investment, to influence other states and champion their undemocratic causes. This 'China factor' increasingly gains visibility in Taiwan's media landscape. Its effectiveness may have grave consequences not only for the media system itself but also for the political system of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in general, putting in jeopardy even the very independence of this state.

The next logical question is whether such strategies can be fought successfully and what means of combatting them are most effective. Without a doubt, media policy can play a central role in this effort by appropriately safeguarding media pluralism and preventing media conglomeration. Note, however, that such means are less effective in the digital age in which media licensing and permit requirements are being phased out. The fact of the matter is that the worldwide web allows broadcasting from any location on earth. Another paradox is that states surrender some of their powers and authority over media in the name of freedom of speech. Furthermore, legal means turn out to be ineffective as the internet is a global network that transcends state boundaries and evades national legislation. It is therefore essential to adopt solutions that reduce media conglomeration. However, as mentioned earlier, national regulations may have limited effect. It may therefore be more appropriate to provide media education and promote reliable and professional journalism. It appears that these objectives should be permanently enshrined in media policies and media security strategies of modern democratic countries.

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ABSTRACT

The study aims to examine the security of Taiwan's media system. Its main hypothesis is that the People's Republic of China is pursuing a deliberate strategy of influencing Taiwan's media at various levels by a range of means. Some authors refer to this approach as the commercialization and outsourcing of censorship and propaganda. The approach has had the effect of routinizing self-censorship. Research questions are also asked about the methods and strategies adopted by China to influence Taiwan's media, including the commercialization and outsourcing of propaganda. The idea is to 'hire' various state institutions and agencies or their subordinate organizations, commonly from the private sector and from third countries, to deliberately disseminate and endorse views and ideas aligned with China's interests. The strategy can be described as an invasion of sorts that is not of a coercive and/or external nature but rather is performed from the inside, aimed directly at the hearts and minds of the country's citizens. The paradox is that democratic media systems that protect freedom of speech are more vulnerable to this strategy. An attempt is made to demonstrate that the 'China factor' is increasingly present in Taiwan's media landscape. Its effectiveness may have grave consequences not only for the media system itself but also for the political system of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in general. In addition, the article seeks to identify the most appropriate and effective strategies and means for countering and combatting such threats. In drafting this article, a range of research methods were employed, including that of inductive and deductive inference, the historical method (used to outline the historical background behind significant social and political transformations in Taiwan), the institutional and legal analysis method (used to explore the influence of institutions on specific social phenomena), the legal text exegesis method as well as the statistical method (to describe Taiwan's media system).

Keywords: Taiwan's media security, 'China factor' in Taiwan's media system, commercialization and outsourcing of censorship and propaganda

WPLYW „CZYNNIKA CHIŃSKIEGO” NA BEZPIECZEŃSTWO SYSTEMU MEDIALNEGO TAJWANU JAKO PRZYKŁAD ZJAWISKA „PRYWATYZACJI I OUTSOURCINGU” CENZURY I PROPAGANDY W ERZE CYFROWEJ

STRESZCZENIE

Celem badawczym niniejszego opracowania jest analiza stanu bezpieczeństwa systemu medialnego Tajwanu. Główną hipotezą pracy jest założenie, że w ostatnim okresie dostrzec można zaplanowaną i celową strategię wywierania przez CHRL na różnych płaszczyznach i różnymi metodami wpływu na system medialny Tajwanu. Podejście określane bywa w literaturze jako

komercjalizacja i outsourcing cenzury lub propagandy. W rezultacie dochodzi dodatkowo do upowszechnienia autocenzury. Stawia się także pytania badawcze dotyczące metod i strategii wpływu czynnika chińskiego na system medialny Tajwanu, w tym dotyczące zjawiska tzw. komercjalizacji i outsourcingu propagandy. Polegać to miałyby na „zlecaniu” przez określone państwowe instytucje i agendy lub podmioty zależne, często z sektora prywatnego, niekiedy umiejscowione w innych krajach, celowego działania prowadzącego do rozpowszechniania i promowania określonych poglądów i idei, korzystnych dla zlecającego takich działań. Strategię taką możemy określić jako pewien typ inwazji, tyle że nie zewnętrznej i dokonywanej nie środkami siłowymi, a od środka, poprzez „serca i umysły” obywateli tego państwa. Paradoks polegać może na tym, że tego rodzaju strategia okazuje się skuteczna wobec demokratycznych systemów medialnych hołdujących zasadzie wolności słowa. Jak próbuje się wykazać, ów „czynnik chiński” w systemie medialnym Tajwanu, okazuje się coraz bardziej obecny w pejzażu medialnym tego kraju, a jego efektywność może spowodować bardzo poważne konsekwencje i to nie tylko w systemie medialnym, ale i systemie politycznym Republiki Chińskiej na Tajwanie. Artykuł próbuje także poddać analizie jakie strategie i środki należy podejmować, aby przeciwdziałać tego typu zagrożeniom i jakie środki są w tym zakresie najbardziej efektywne. Przygotowując pracę skorzystano z wielu metod badawczych, w tym z metody wnioskowań indukcyjnych i dedukcyjnych, metody historycznej, szkicując tło historyczne dla istotnych przemian społecznych i politycznych na Tajwanie, metodę analizy instytucjonalno-prawnej, próbując wyjaśnić wpływ instytucji prawnych na określone zjawiska społeczne, metodę egzegezy tekstu prawnego oraz metodę statystyczną, opisując system medialny Tajwanu.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo medialne Tajwanu, czynnik chiński” w systemie medialnym Tajwanu, komercjalizacja i outsourcing cenzury i propagandy

