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THE ROLE OF THE POLISH MILITARY CONTINGENT IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GHAZNI PROVINCE

Several months after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, in March 2002, Polish troops went there as part of the US Operation Enduring Freedom. Their involvement was made possible by a decision issued on November 22, 2001 by the President of the Republic of Poland on the engagement, as part of the Allied Forces, of a Polish Military Contingent in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan as well as in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The decision permitting the engagement of a contingent of 300 troops (Postanowienie Prezydenta, 2001: section 1) was associated with the provisions stipulated in the Law of December 17, 1998 on the Rules of Engagement or Deployment of the Polish Armed Forces Abroad, which permits Polish troops to be deployed in third countries. According to the law, “the engagement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland outside state borders means participation in an armed conflict or in strengthening the forces of an allied state, participation in a peace-keeping mission or participation in preventing acts of terrorism or their consequences” (Ustawa, 1998: Art. 2.1). It was agreed that the deployment of the Polish armed forces outside the country could involve participation in military training and exercises, rescue, search or humanitarian actions, as well as in ceremonial undertakings (Ibid.: Art. 2.2).

This article aims to present the activities of the Polish army within NATO in Afghanistan, in particular to analyze humanitarian aid and indicate the most important areas of support. This will be supplemented with a presentation of the projects implemented and their impact on the reconstruction of the province and the city of Ghazni. Due to the limited length of this article, the military involvement of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) is not described in detail (names and numbers of Polish troops, type of weapons used, retaliatory actions by the Taliban and their military potential, etc.), since this would require a separate study. The article is based primarily on documents and reports on the PMC in Afghanistan.¹

MISSION DESCRIPTION

Initially, the Poles were stationed mainly in Bagram,² but they were also present in Kabul, Kandahar (Qandahar), Sharan (Paktika) and Mazar-i-Sharif. The sappers,

¹ Several research methods are employed in the article, namely the comparative method, systemic method and genetic explanation. All of them make it possible not only to investigate the processes but also to understand the chronology of the changes.

² In 2002–2006 Polish troops were mainly stationed in Bagram, in 2007–2009 mainly in Paktika, and from 2008 – in Ghazni.

logisticians and commandos serving as Group One of the PMC OEF, called the Polish Task Force (*Polskie Siły Zadaniowe*), were sent to the Bagram Air Base in Parwan Province, which is located about 60 km north of Kabul (Jureńczyk, 2016: 232). Their tasks included protection of the airfield, construction of bridges and other infrastructure elements indispensable for the operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and, first and foremost, the removal of mines (Polakow, 2012: 34–36). The Brzeg-based First Engineers Brigade, the Opole-based 10th Logistics Brigade, the Brodnica-based Fourth Anti-Chemical Warfare Regiment, and the Puławy-based Military Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology all served in Afghanistan (Gaj, 2012: 50–52).

Initially, the Polish contingent in Afghanistan was ca. 120 troops strong. Over time, a total of 1,200 troops and military personnel served in Afghanistan within the OEF (Jureńczyk, 2016: 232–235). The contingent operated as the Polish Task Force in 2002–2007, and in 2008–2014 it was stationed in Ghazni as part of the ISAF structure called Task Force White Eagle (*Siły Zadaniowe Biały Orzeł*). From April 25, 2007, the command of the tenth tour of the PMC EFO was taken over by the first tour of PMC Afghanistan operating within the ISAF. This was the largest military contingent in the entire history of Polish Army peace and stabilization missions. It comprised of a total of over 2,600 soldiers and military personnel, and a further 400 soldiers and military personnel in the reserve on the territory of the Republic of Poland (Ibid.: 238–239). At the peak of the mission, the Polish forces included, among others, 21 platoons (including 18 motorized platoons, two reconnaissance platoons and one PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) protection platoon), the Independent Air Group, Task Force 49 and Task Force 50, eight Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) dealing with police training, five POMLTs responsible for military training, and the Civil-Military Cooperation Support Team (CIMIC) (*Podsumowanie*, 2015).

At the time when the ISAF mission in Afghanistan was most active, Polish forces were responsible for security in Ghazni Province. Poland allocated ca. USD 27 million for this purpose. The operation of the Polish peacekeeping mission in Ghazni lasted six years, from mid-2008 to mid-2014. During this time, over 130 tons of various humanitarian aid resources were handed over to the local population (Ibid.).

POLISH PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM IN GHAZNI PROVINCE

US military officers were responsible for the security of Ghazni Province from 2001 to 2008. Later on this task was handed over to Poles and a small number of Ukrainians who were part of the Polish contingent. The operations of the contingent in Ghazni were inaugurated in mid-2008 under the command of Lt. Col. Wiesław Pyć (Polakow, 2012: 34–37).

Polish troops could begin their operations in Ghazni by virtue of the decision issued on October 9, 2007 by the President of the Republic of Poland on the extension of the period of engagement of the Polish Military Contingent in the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Its size was estimated at 1,200 soldiers and military personnel (Postanowienie

Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2007). The PMC had the following main tasks in Ghazni Province:

- to ensure security and stability in the province;
- to train the Afghan National Security Forces;
- to reconstruct civil infrastructure;
- to implement development programs;
- to assist in the distribution of food for the inhabitants of the province (Jureńczyk, 2016: 257–259).

As mentioned above, the Polish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) started its official operation in mid-2008. It consisted in providing military assistance in the field of security in the province, reconstruction and construction of infrastructure in the region, and organization of humanitarian actions, including appropriate health and educational care. These activities were inaugurated at an official ceremony, attended by representatives of local authorities headed by the governor, representatives of the central government from Kabul, members of the Polish Embassy in Kabul, Polish soldiers from the military base stationed in Bagram, and representatives of the American military forces.³

Ghazni Province is located in central Afghanistan. It is one of the provinces inhabited by a large Taliban population. In 2013, Ghazni was elected the Cultural Capital of the Muslim World. At an official ceremony in Tripoli, Libya, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) nominated three cities, Medina in Saudi Arabia, Ghazni in Afghanistan and Kano in Nigeria. The city of Ghazni was eventually chosen, the history of which dates back to the 10th century, when this area came under the rule of the Gaznavid dynasty of Turkic origin. At that time, Ghazni was not only the political hub of the region, but also an important place for the development of scientific activities. Many scientists from various fields were gathered at the Gaznavid court, which, among other things, contributed to the cultural development of the region and the establishment of many schools (Korzeniewski, 2006: 32). In this context, the following eminent scientists, writers and poets can be mentioned: Abu Rajhan Biruni, Nabolqasem Ferdousi, Al-Bajhaki, Al-Hakim ibn Sanai, Al-Hariri, Masud Sa'd Salman, and Farukki Sistani. The city still features nearly 40 monuments dating back to Gaznavid times. The choice of Ghazni as the Capital of Culture of the Muslim World was to show that, although Afghanistan suffered enormous damage during the hostilities, the inhabitants and the country itself have a rich history. If it were not for wars and terrorism, the city would continue to play an important role in the development of culture and education in the Muslim world to this day. The official ceremony of awarding Ghazni with the title of Cultural Capital of the Muslim World took place in April 2013 (*Ghazni Rasman Paytakht*, 2013).⁴

³ When Polish operations began in the province, the author of this article was employed by the governorate, as secretary in the governor's office. At that time, this office was held by Musa Khan Akbarzada. Working there, on an everyday basis the author had the opportunity to observe the activities carried out by the Polish armed forces.

⁴ 3,700 guests from Poland and abroad attended the ceremony. Musa Khan Akbarzada (Governor of Ghazni Province) emphasized that receiving this title was a source of pride for all of Afghanistan

The global celebration of Islamic culture, planned to take place in Ghazni, gave the city and the province an opportunity to develop, including economic development, and raise the standard of living of inhabitants. Due to the choice of Ghazni as the Cultural Capital of the Muslim World, monuments dating back to the reign of Gaznavid were restored and entered on the UNESCO World Heritage List (Rostami, 2013), which contributed to the development of tourism, thus strengthening the service sector. Paradoxically, despite this great distinction, many inhabitants of the province were not satisfied with the changes, feeling that the reconstruction project was too slow (Cegielski, 2014).⁵

The aim of the Polish stabilization mission was to accomplish the first two tasks indicated above, namely to improve security and ensure stability in the province. Poles arrested Afghan Taliban, for example, during the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th tours of the PMC. The soldiers conducted almost 500 combat operations and 22,000 patrols, killing 351 Taliban fighters, injuring 97 and arresting a further 447 (Jureńczyk, 2006: 259–363). As a result, dozens of Taliban activists, including top commanders, were detained. Weapons and explosives were found, seized and systematically disarmed. These were the most important achievements of the Poles, aimed at ensuring security in Ghazni Province. The Polish army cooperated with Afghan security forces, sharing tasks with them. The Afghans did not view the Poles as operational troops, but rather as those providing protection and help as part of the cooperation of international forces in Afghanistan. The process of transferring responsibility for ensuring safety was adapted to the conditions in Ghazni. As a consequence, the Afghan military forces were able to function on their own to ensure security in the province. In order to accomplish the last three of the tasks indicated above, after taking over responsibility for Ghazni Province from the end of October 2008, the two above-mentioned structures were created within the Polish contingent. One was the PRT, which was responsible for the reconstruction of civil infrastructure and the implementation of aid programs. The other one was the Civil-Military Cooperation Support Team (CIMIC), involved in strengthening the structures of the state and civic society, and enhancing education, health protection and the development of the province (Reczkowski, 2016: 118). The Poles realized that security was as important as reconstruction, economic growth and improved governance. It was these elements that had to be taken care of in the first place, as internal security depended on them (Jureńczyk, 2016: 252–255).

POLISH PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED IN GHAZNI PROVINCE

In the first six months of 2008, the Provincial Reconstruction Team completed 17 projects worth a total of USD 1 million. Twelve of them were located in the city of

and added that this distinction could provide an opportunity to organize an international Muslim conference. He also stressed that the Afghans had fallen victim to the hostilities and that the country had become a battlefield for foreign armed forces.

⁵ In 2008, the city of Ghazni and its districts faced threats from the Taliban who closed schools in some districts and banned girls from attending them. The Ghazni Education Department officials found it groundless (*Daha Makateb*, 2008).

Ghazni, two in Gelan District and one project each in the districts of Jaghatu, Jaghori and Moqur. The major project completed by the Poles in 2008 involved the refurbishment of the Central Hospital in Ghazni (*PKW Afganistan projekty*, 2008). Another landmark project was the opening of a high school for boys in Qala-e-Naw in 2008. The construction cost amounted to USD 72,000 and was fully covered by the Poles. The school was officially inaugurated by the then governor Mohammad Usman Usmani, who emphasized the huge role of the Polish armed forces in the creation of this institution. The school facilitated education and thus contributed to the intellectual development of the area. The governor, alongside the leader of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Ghazni, made efforts to ensure that any additional public procurement and projects related to the reconstruction of the province were carried out in the best possible way. Back then, the school had eight classrooms and two office rooms. The building was able to accommodate 300 students. PRT representatives emphasized that their actions were not only military, but also focused on the reconstruction and expansion of various facilities in the province (*Polish forces in Ghazni province*, 2009). Therefore, it seemed obvious that the projects launched, or planned should focus on investments in the expansion of educational infrastructure not only in the city of Ghazni itself, but also in other districts in the province. The inhabitants of the city themselves pointed out the need to build a university and other higher education institutions, believing that the country could be rebuilt only through peaceful and educational activities. There was a general conviction that establishing schools at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels would enable young people to overcome the war crisis. The low level of education and high unemployment and widespread illiteracy it causes have contributed to the development of terrorism and made Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world (Asas, 2017).

In 2009, Polish specialists completed 34 projects worth a total of USD 4.2 million (*Projekty*, 2009), including 24 projects the city of Ghazni, five in the Jaghori district, two in the Khwaja Umari District, and one each in the Gelan, Jaghatu, and Malistan districts. The largest funds (USD 3.3 million) were allocated to the development of infrastructure, primarily the expansion of the road system. One of the projects completed involved building an asphalt road in Ghazni, which was opened on January 9, 2009. It is approximately 1.5 kilometers long – from the Faruqi Bridge to the Sanaje Gate and from the Polyclinic to the Central Hospital in Ghazni. According to Mohamed Usman Usmani, the then governor of Ghazni Province, this investment amounted to USD 500,000 and was to solve some of the transportation problems in the city (*Yak Sarak*, 2009).

As well as reconstructing schools and modernizing roads, Poles were also involved in the construction of water and energy supply networks, renovation of bazaars and the arrangement of green areas as part of the Five Parks Project. Another project which deserves attention was providing the local station of National Radio Television of Ghazni with new equipment in May 2009. The Poles and Americans donated equipment worth USD 200,000 (*Dstgah-e Jadid Rado Tawezom*, 2011).

In 2010, the Poles implemented 32 projects worth USD 5.2 million (*Projekty*, 2010), including 24 in the city of Ghazni, four in Khwaja Umari District, one each in Malistan, Gelan, and Jaghori districts as well as in Ghazni Province. A project of

particular importance for the city of Ghazni was the completion of a park for women on Ali Lala Street. According to a report by the Afghan Information Agency, completing the investment took nine months and the total cost was one million dollars. Ghazni governor – Musa Khan Akbarzada – expressed his satisfaction with the results of cooperation with the Poles. This park turned out to be an important investment in the context of the city being chosen as the Cultural Capital of the Muslim World. Its additional function was to serve women, because only they were allowed to enter there (*Bahra bardare*, 2011). The park hosted a bazaar where women could freely buy and sell their own products, e.g. handicrafts. Unfortunately, however, after the PMC left the province in 2013, the park was taken over by drug users. This confirms the opinion that without foreign support the city was unable to maintain the projects and achieve their goals and assumptions. It is not surprising then that, although Ghazni is one of the most densely populated cities in the country (due to surface limitations), it has the fewest leisure venues for residents. The neglected and underinvested parks were useless, and due to the lack of any investment they require modernization and considerable outlay now. After the Polish forces withdrew from Ghazni in 2013, women could no longer use the parks, fearing for their security (*Ghazni Shari be Tafregah*, 2013).

Since the rate of illiteracy is very high in Ghazni Province (47 per cent among men and as much as 81 per cent among women) educational projects should be stressed, as many as nine of which were implemented during the period discussed. Given the highly limited access to electricity, the organization of courses may seem pointless. Whatever the public might have thought, in addition to English, computer science and computer literacy courses for female secondary school students in the province, reading, writing and math classes were conducted for adult women, as well as practical skills courses such as tailoring. The Poles organized these courses in cooperation with the Department for Women of Ghazni Province, which was looking for people willing to learn. Two were short-term projects (duration of 3 months), targeting around 50 poor women, mainly widows and single women, with the goal of equipping them with specific skills and thus enabling them to earn around 4,000 afghani per month. Such earnings provide sufficient sustenance without any problems. As part of the projects, course attendants were provided with the necessary equipment, such as sewing machines. All activities of this type earn appreciation from province inhabitants, who are increasingly aware that this is the only way for them to fight the omnipresent poverty (through education, personal development, and attempts to become independent) (*Bukdi Herfawe*, 2010).

In 2011, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated nearly PLN 22.4 million (equivalent to over USD 6 million) to the development of Ghazni Province. These funds served to implement 33 projects, most of them related to the construction or extension of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and water management facilities. Fifteen projects were carried out in the city of Ghazni, nine in the district of Ghazni, three in Khwaja Umari District, two in Nawur District, and one each in the districts of Gelan, Jaghori, Malistan, and Moquer (*Polska pomoc*, 2011).

One of the largest projects involved the construction of an over thirty-kilometer-long asphalt road in the city of Ghazni, as well as the construction of a park on the Ghazni River in the city center. The cost amounted to USD 1 million, making it one of the most expensive and most important projects. Launched in April, it was completed

in October 2011.⁶ The project was managed by Afghan engineers, which certainly contributed to its success and the accomplishment of its goals (*Aghaz Kar*, 2011). The team of these specialists was based in the governor's office, who supervised them directly. Their task was to evaluate the Polish and American projects. It should be emphasized that this was the first such cooperation. Until then, neither Poles nor Americans wanted to cooperate with local engineers.⁷ They wanted to coordinate this type of investment themselves, which, it should be noted, was not well received by the Afghans.

The withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan in 2013 and the reduction of aid from the Provincial Reconstruction Team contributed to a great financial crisis in Ghazni. Unemployment increased, residents lost not only a sense of security, but primarily the financial resources for the implementation of province reconstruction programs, which was why in March 2013, a delegation of central government officials and local authorities went to the United States to request help in the modernization of the city. Representatives of the US Department of State for Cultural Heritage promised the Afghan government to help rebuild Ghazni monuments. Their reconstruction became one of the priorities of their program, and a team of American experts was to provide Afghan officials with technical assistance in rebuilding the monuments in the province (*Ghazni*, 2013).

It should be noted that large financial resources were allocated not only by the American government, but also by the Polish side. In 2012, they amounted to an equivalent of ca. USD 5.5 million, for which 37 projects were implemented (*PKW projekty*, 2012), including 17 in the city of Ghazni, seven in Ghazni District, four in Nahur and Jaghatu districts each, two in Khwaja Umari District, and one each in Jaghori, Rashidan and Zanahan districts. One of the major investments involved the purchase of twelve trucks for garbage collection, at a total value of USD 280,000 (*Ibid.*). At the explicit request from the mayor of the city of Ghazni, two of them were purchased by the Polish side (*Hemat*, 2012).

Another important project carried out in 2012 was the modernization of the road to Returnee Town in the city of Ghazni. It is a route connecting the repatriate district with the city center and part of the main artery in the city. This part of Ghazni is inhabited by Afghans who emigrated to neighboring countries during the war, e.g. to Iran or Pakistan, and returned to rebuild their own homes after the war ended and the Taliban regime collapsed in 2001. As it was impossible to provide any commercial or service outlets to facilitate the everyday life of residents in this district, it became imperative to build a road allowing them to reach other parts of the city. The project began on October 12, 2011, and cost USD 404,000. With these funds, a bridge was built over the river and asphalt was put on a road section of 1.5 km in length and 8 m in width. The governor of Ghazni said that this type of activity would solve the transportation problems of people living in the capital of the province (*Hemat*, 2011).

⁶ From 2008 to October 2011, the author of the article was in Ghazni and had the opportunity to observe the projects implemented by the Poles. The park operates to this day and facilities there include two wells, a car park for several hundred cars and municipal toilets.

⁷ All NATO countries trusted Afghan experts only to a certain degree. For a long time, the Poles did not believe that fruitful cooperation with the local population was possible, and used only Polish specialists. In retrospect, this conviction should be considered harmful and erroneous.

In 2013, in connection with the aforementioned selection of Ghazni as the world capital of Islamic culture, the PRT in Ghazni Province implemented 37 projects to a total value of USD 1.6 million, including 25 in the city of Ghazni, four in the districts of Ghazni and Nawur each, two in Khwaja Umari District, and one each in Jaghori and Jaghatu districts (*Projekty*, 2013). The American side also became engaged and nine aid projects were jointly planned. Their goal was to expand the road, electricity and water supply infrastructure. The revitalization of areas adjacent to the river in the city center was also planned, as well as the renovation of the Al-Biruni mausoleum (*PRT angažuje się*, 2010).

The construction of the Crisis Management Center was a very important project completed in 2013. The governor of Ghazni, Musa Khan Akbarzada, emphasized that the task of the center would be to help solve crises, provide a sense of security to the civilian population, and protect them against the impact of floods, earthquakes and fires in the city of Ghazni and its vicinity. Another goal of the center was to provide extraordinary financial assistance to prevent further damage and loss caused by local terrorists. Aid agencies and the Public Health Committee operated in the center. Their purpose was to help combat the aftermath of natural disasters in Ghazni and within a 40 km radius from the city. An additional task was to provide assistance in critical situations to victims of accidents and prevent further damage (Kraśnińska, 2013). The implementation of this project cost over USD 300,000 and was financed by the Polish state, which covered the construction costs and invested in installing 21 cameras on city streets to monitor the city. Importantly, Musa Khan Akbarzad promised to employ 50 men in the center, 40 of them with a technical education. Their duties included conducting training on the use of the monitoring systems, the internet and GPS. Unfortunately, the project did not stand the test of time. The inhabitants of Ghazni were of the opinion that installing cameras on the city streets would certainly contribute to ensuring security and help prevent terrorist attacks in its area (Reczkowski, 2016: 122–123). Unfortunately, the installation of the cameras never went beyond the planning stage. After the establishment of the center, difficulties in the supply of electricity turned out to be a problem, which was why the security cameras did not work. The monitoring system required a constant power supply, and access to electricity is a problem throughout the whole of Afghanistan. The solution was the establishment of the Operations Coordination Center – Provincial (OCC-P) unit in the Crisis Management Center. Serious problems with irregular electricity supply throughout entire Afghanistan continue in 2020.⁸

Summing up, 194 aid projects were implemented in the Ghazni Province reconstruction program in 2008–2014, including: 99 infrastructure projects, 50 training projects and 45 procurement projects, inclusive of the construction of roads (40 km), waterworks (25 km), bridges (5), schools, kindergartens and orphanages (19), hydroelectric power plants (3), dams (4), sewage treatment plants, landfills,

⁸ On October 28, 2019, the author had the opportunity to talk by phone with Governor Musa Khan Akbarzada about the creation of the Operations Coordination Center at the provincial level.

wells (30), and medical waste incineration plants (10). Hospitals (4) were renovated, the power network in the city of Ghazni was expanded, bazaars (4) were modernized, green areas and service and technical areas were developed (9), 4,000 people were trained in the field of administration, judiciary, education and professional activation, and 130 public facilities were equipped to a total amount of over USD 21.5 million. One of the PRT's greatest security achievements in Ghazni Province was the establishment of the Crisis Management Center (*Podsumowanie polskiego udziału*, 2015).

Most Afghan officials believe that the presence of the Poles in Ghazni has facilitated both the economic development of the province and stability in the region. For example, the chairman of the Shura of Ghazni Province, Azizullah Poja is convinced that such rapid development allowed most of the inhabitants to find employment, including during the implementation of these projects, and significantly increased their standard of living. Reservations are raised, however, as to the real rather than declared security level. Łukasz Jureńczyk wrote in his book *Polska misja w Afganistanie. Wojsko polskie w operacji reagowania kryzysowego NATO* [The Polish mission in Afghanistan. The Polish army in the NATO crisis response operation] that the Afghans have varying opinions regarding the presence of the PMC in Ghazni Province. On the one hand, they appreciate the great involvement of the Poles in the reconstruction of the city, but on the other, they indicate that this support did not always turn out to be sufficient or fulfil the expectations of the local community.⁹

The end of the Polish mission raised considerable concerns, both among the local authorities and residents. It was feared that the population would be deprived of any foreign aid when Polish troops withdrew. There were also concerns about ensuring security after the withdrawal of Polish armed forces from the province. The fears of the Ghazni population were related to the growing uncertainty and the lack of protection from the Polish forces. This issue also received varying coverage in the media. Some indicated that, after the Polish Armed Forces had withdrawn from the province, its inhabitants were embarking on a challenging period again, and that the terrorist threat had intensified. The Taliban were increasingly seen in the city, which inspired natural fears and a sense of threat. The withdrawal of the Polish Armed Forces and the presidential election in June 2014 in Afghanistan created a specific vacuum in the field of ensuring security throughout the country (*Masolat Ha-e amnyate dar Ghazni*, 2014).

On December 29, 2014, the then president of the Republic of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski, issued a decision on the engagement of a Polish Military Contingent in the Resolute Support Mission (in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). Its main goal was to train, advise and provide assistance to the Afghan Security Forces. The mission was not combat-oriented (Postanowienie Prezydenta, 2014).

P.S. On December 29, 2017, President Andrzej Duda issued a decision to engage a Polish Military Contingent of up to 350 soldiers and employees in the Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Islamic Republic

⁹ For more see Ł. Jureńczyk, *Polska misja w Afganistanie. Wojsko polskie w operacji reagowania kryzysowego NATO*, Bydgoszcz 2016, pp. 295–296. He quotes, among other things, the opinion of the governor of the province, Musa Khan Akbarzad, and the journalist Nazar Mohammed Mutmaeen.

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ABSTRACT

The article outlines the activity of the Polish army as part of NATO operations in Afghanistan. The analysis concerns humanitarian aid in particular, and identifies the most important activities of the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) carried out in the field of reconstruction and security in the city of Ghazni from 2001. The PMC (Polish Military Contingent) worked for the stability of the city, starting in mid-2008. The author concludes that the objectives pursued by the PMC related to the reconstruction of the city of Ghazni increased the level of security of the local community and the overall stability in the region. The methods used in the article (comparative, research, systemic and genetic explanation method) make it possible to examine and present the processes and changes taking place.

Keywords: PMC (Polish Military Contingent), Afghanistan, Ghazni, mission, stability, security, peace, PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team)

ROLA PKW W ODBUDOWIE PROWINCJI GHAZNI**STRESZCZENIE**

Artykuł dotyczy aktywności wojska polskiego w ramach działań NATO w Afganistanie. Analiza w szczególności dotyczy udzielonej pomocy humanitarnej oraz wskazania na najważniejsze działania prowadzone od 2001 r. w sprawie działalności PRT (*Zespół Odbudowy Prowincji*) w kwestii odbudowy, bezpieczeństwa miasta Ghazni. Od połowy 2008 r. PKW (*Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy*) działał na rzecz stabilizacji wskazanego miasta. Autor przedstawia wniosek, że realizowane przez PKW cele związane z rekonstrukcją miasta Ghazni przyczyniły się do podniesienia poziomu bezpieczeństwa lokalnej społeczności oraz ogólnej stabilizacji w regionie. Wykorzystane w artykule metody (porównawcza, badawcza, systemowa czy wyjaśnienia genetycznego) umożliwią zbadanie i przedstawienie zachodzących procesów i zmian.

Słowa kluczowe: PKW (Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy), Afganistan, Ghazni, misja, stabilizacja, bezpieczeństwo, pokój, PRT (Zespół Odbudowy Prowincji)