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## **BORDERS, DE-BORDERIZATION AND MIGRATION NARRATIVES IN HUNGARY**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Globalization, one-and-for-all, has shifted history and modernity into its ‘liquid phase’. It has altered the existing and well-known ‘solid’ structures, it radically shifted the arrangements of human cohabitation and social condition under which the life was lived, thus entering into a ‘modernized modernity’ often characterized as a ‘liquid’ one (Bauman, 2005; 2006a; 2006b). This new modernized modernity is described and characterized with various apt terms and identifications, like ‘risk society’, ‘informational society’ and/or ‘postindustrial society’ in order to grasp what is going on today. Although, changes and alterations do not happen without impact on society and as Ernesto Laclau (2007) writes, every major historical change inevitable touches the identity structure, too. Construction of the new ‘modernized modernity’ with post-Cold War context, such as the ‘end of history’, predominance of neo-liberal politico-economic structure, including liberal democracy and economic free market with open and deregulated borders, generate changes in our life and in our identity, namely disintegration of traditional order and stepping into a Giddensian ‘post-traditional social order’ with social reflexivity, where the long existing axioms are turned upside down.

History and historiography can be characterized with obsession of borders because of their strict and impenetrable nature, which was mainly characteristic after the Second World War or because of removal of borders and supporting of free movement of people, goods and capital. Hence, it can be stated that the debate on borders powerfully oscillates between these two narratives that are difficult to reconcile with each other because of their zero-sum nature.

Nowadays, we can experience a massive shift within the realm of border. Powerful narratives are generated that aim to open classical borders and classical binaries either between states, societies and communities and aim to recalibrate the borders within the society itself. Redrawing of a border goes hand in hand with redrawing of an interpretation, narration and meaning. As Henk van Houtum (2012: 412) puts it brilliantly, “A line is geometry, a border is interpretation [...] A border can be drawn spatially everywhere. It is the symbolic meaning attributed to the appearance of the line which must be seen as constructor of the normative form. A border is made real through imagination. So what is important to the study of borders [...] the objectification process of the border, the socially constituent power practices attached to a border that construct a spatial effect and which give a demarcation in space its meaning and influence.”

Similar view is expressed by Gerard Delanty (2006) that border is rather a process instead of being a pure and fixed separating line. This means that border is constituted through political struggles and competitions where power and culture interact.

The research paper is a qualitative study and it uses multi-methodology, specifically it mainly applies desk research that scrutinizes published articles and books regarding borders and their changes; moreover, it applies narrative analysis where the border and migration narratives, articulated between 2015 and 2020, are looked at and researched.

The study is divided into five basic parts. The first part intends to give a brief introduction on Cold War and the change towards the unbounded post-Cold War constellation, namely globalization, free market and a world without, or with limited, borders. The idea of a borderless world could not be emerged without the spread of globalization, free market economy, economic deregulation and without massive introduction of the idea of relative eased movement of people. The second part describes the importance of borders, binary oppositions, the 'Self/Other' nexus and the quest for differentiation within the human conceptualisation. The third part describes the process of deconstruction of borders and the process of reappearing new border frames instead of the deconstructed ones. Nevertheless, deconstruction of borders triggers processes with massive ability to generate fear, insecurity and threat, thus the issue of security and securitization is the object of the fourth part. It explains the role and importance of the narratives, formulations and speech acts in shaping of the world around us. And, migration is very closely linked with the question of open borders, hence the final part works with security narrations on migration which were articulated by the Hungarian Prime Minister between 2015 and 2020.

### **COLD WAR AND THE CHANGE TOWARD THE UNBOUNDED POST-COLD WAR CONSTELLATION**

After the Second World War, a new global international society was established. It was characterised by global but restrained and controlled struggle. This post-World War constellation claimed to be balanced, durable and stable (Waltz, 1964), where the two leading military super-powers, with their opposing identities, generating from profoundly different ideology and world-view (Flockhart, 2016), divided the world into their respective orbits (Stivachtis, 2018) and their spheres of influence (Bull, 1977).

It was a multi-layered world system consisting of an overall international system and two competing international societies (Watson, 1992). Both international systems and societies were eager to prove their success and effectiveness, either in economy or in political realm, be it socialism or liberal democracy. This bipolar competition established an environment that Amin (2006) characterizes as 'negotiated globalization' (Amin, 2006), where the capital was constrained and controlled (Amin, 2004; Bauman, 2006b; 2011; Beck, 2007; Brunkhorst, 2005; Keller, 2006; Harvey, 2011) and limits were imposed on free flow of capital, goods, services and naturally on moving/traveling of people across the borders, thus the free flow was powerfully limited and regulated. Probably, the most known symbolic border frame was the Berlin Wall; although, the function and effect of Berlin Wall was present all around the world ei-

ther explicitly or implicitly. During this international environment, borders and fences played very significant roles, they deeply shaped and directed the everyday life of people, society and economy.

At the beginning of the 90s, a geopolitical and ideological earthquake happened that has brought us into the contemporary post-Cold War international environment. The Soviet Union disintegrated and fell apart and the socialist/communist style of economic management and governance failed, too. It was the era when the famous 'end of history' was articulated by Fukuyama (1989), claiming that the world has approached to its ideal political structure, namely liberal democracy and to its ideal economic framework, namely free market economy. The new introduced frameworks needed open borders, required a more permeable and less limited world. This post-Cold War environment is narrated as a globalized, open and freedom oriented world order. Immanuel Castells (2004) and/or Nial Fergusson (2017) write about this era, when a powerful network society, with wide horizontal network connections supported with information and communication technologies, has emerged. These network structures are hardly controlled by the traditional vertical hierarchies, they easily plough through the fixed borders and they generate massive inflating effect on border frames.

Openness has become the new slogan, a new program and an irresistible narrative that promoted opening of the borders and flow of capital and goods all over the world. In other words, an ultra-flexible economic meta-power with extensive and diffusive global economy (Beck, 2007), which understands openness, globalisation and liberalisation as a correct policy for development (Kiely, 2005), was introduced that has generated a cult of global open world (Dunkley, 2004).

Openness has become a new 'magic formula' which has been adopted and propagated by big (high-tech) companies, private and public sector organizations, educational institutions, culture industry, celebrities and websites. The vision of this idea is to introduce a cosmopolitan world which is freed from the classical border structures. Zygmunt Bauman (2006b: 58) aptly characterizes this phenomenon with the increased possibilities of capital, "Nowadays capital travels light – with cabin luggage only, which includes no more than a briefcase, a cellular telephone and a portable computer. It can stop-over almost anywhere, and nowhere needs to stay longer than the satisfaction lasts."

The post-Cold War deconstruction of borders was triggered at many dimensions. Probably the most known deconstruction was the idea of free flow of capital, goods and free trade, with deregulation of economies and protections and introduction of the neo-liberal economic approach. This turn opened the states and turned them towards world economy, thus bearing all the advantages, but also all the disadvantages, too. Richard Rorty (233) brilliantly characterizes this process, "So the central fact of globalization is that the economic situation of the citizens of a nation state has passed beyond the control of the laws of that state. It used to be the case that a nation's laws could control, to an important and socially useful extent, the movement of that nation's money. But now that the financing of business enterprise is a matter of drawing upon a global pool of capital, so that enterprises in Belo Horizonte or in Chicago are financed by money held in the Cayman Islands by Serbian warlords, Hong Kong gangsters and the kleptocrat presidents of African republics, there is no way in which the

laws of Brazil or the US can dictate that money earned in the country will be spent in the country, or money saved in the country invested in the country.”

The massive push towards globalization, free market and free movement opened the narrative space for challenging, questioning and deconstructing the existing border structures. With deep-penetrating economic opening, the unbounded post-Cold War constellation launched a powerful wave of deconstruction on borders and border frames far surpassing economic domains, including also binary categories and ‘spaces’ of life which were previously seen untouchable and unquestionable. This deconstruction has emerged with capacity to disintegrate the traditional society, order and it has pushed us into a new world constellation, where the known boundaries are challenged and at the same time, new so far unknown boundaries, even cultural ones, are on rise.

### **IMPORTANCE OF BORDERS, BINARY OPPOSITIONS AND THE QUEST FOR DIFFERENTIATION**

Demarcation of space into distinct territories is done through symbol markers. Without boundaries life would be barren and it would be incomprehensible (Tester, 1993), or as Robert Wuthnow (1989: 69) puts it, order has somehow to do with boundaries because order is based on distinctions so ‘we know the place of things and how they relate to one another’. Subsequently, binary and dichotomy oppositions are principal aspects to provide foundation for understanding the world (Bourdieu, 1996), they are integral elements to maintain moral order, for establishing borders and (symbolic) boundaries between communities, promoting and introducing mutual exclusion, where the ‘outsider’ is excluded from the symbolical space of the ‘insider’, hence generating border frames which signify the contours of identity. Using the words of Furedi (2021: 137), binary categories has the ability to transform the confusing reality into a comprehensible reality.

Without any doubt, dichotomy is a substantial feature of our life and it represents a necessity for our orientation and conceptualisation of the world around us, e.g. life vs. death, winter solstice vs. summer solstice, God vs. man, man versus nature, men vs. women, subject vs. object, inside vs. outside, cause vs. effect, theory vs. practice, spiritual vs. material, reason vs. experience, analytical vs. empirical, abstract vs. concrete, mind vs. body, rational vs. irrational, science vs. sorcery, general vs. particular, normal vs. abnormal, high vs. low, light vs. heavy and/or magnetic dipole of south and north. People use to interpret their life within binary idioms and concepts, like the basic structure of life is driven by day and night, vigilance and sleeping, somatic nervous system and autonomic/vegetative nervous system, or even the computer systems also use binary logic during their functioning.

Furthermore, majority of philosophical thoughts from Plato (distinguishing between form and appearance) through Descartes (distinguishing between mind and body) to Ferdinand Tönnies (distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*) build on binary thinking. We could continue with the opinion of Bertrand Russell (1945: 812) who writes that “Almost everything in accepted philosophy was bound up with the dualism of subject and object.”

Furedi (2021: 131) writes that “human beings cannot do without thinking in terms of contrasting categories,” thus it can be expressed that building of identity always includes an inevitable fight and dilemma between competing binary categories (Neuman, 1996). Or, as Edward W. Said (1979) notes, identity is always made up of human effort and identification, partly affirmation, of the ‘Self’ with the ‘Other’.

This means that the principal element of dualistic relationship is the interaction between the ‘Self and Other’. This nexus plays a major role in forming of identity, personality, community, insiders, outsiders and the shared feeling of togetherness. William Connolly (1991: 64), puts it, “identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.” Thus, creation of a ‘we’ can exist only by demarcation of a ‘they’ and it establishes a basic relationship between the friend vs. adversary (Mouffe, 2000; Mouffe, 2005), represents a continual negotiation of differences with the ‘Self’ (Salter, 2002) and/or it generates the relationship between friend vs. enemy as was expressed by Carl Schmitt. Simply, they are the agents that are separated by ‘essential inequality’. Iver Neumann (1996: 148) notes it in the following way, “the other has the status of an epistemological as well as an ontological necessity, without which there can be no thinking self” and/or Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre in Leela Gandhi, 1998: 17) brilliantly expresses this, “I am possessed by the Other; the Other’s look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculpts it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The Other holds a secret – the secret of what I am.”

‘Self/Other’ definition and cultural homogeneity between people function as a precondition for the boundaries, the organized solidarity, organized modernity and the modern state itself. Subsequently, these established boundaries guarantee security and clear structures for human societies and if that nexus is dismantled then it offers space for the emergence of a ‘distorted Self’. In other words, binary thinking is a fundamental feature and practice of human conceptualisation and as Stuart Hall (1997: 236) notes, it is the primal prerequisite for the constitution of the symbolic order, thus they cannot be swiftly ‘updated’ and substituted. Nevertheless, we have been experiencing the attempts that wish to deconstruct the existing dichotomy oppositions and binary categories, thus altering the identity, too. The opponents of binaries call into question the prevailing boundaries because they ‘avow transgression as an act that is good in and of itself’, simply a transgression without an object (Furedi, 2021: 136). Nevertheless, on the other side we have been experiencing the wish to reconstruct the dismantled structures and to form fundamentally new binary categories, oppositions and border frames.

## DECONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF BORDERS

Our everyday life experiences a huge battle between two paths, a battle fought between the globalists and the territorialists. The former group represents a globalized and standardized way of practices, where the agreed and accepted global standards become the norm instead of the specific uniqueness based on regional attributes. While the latter approach underlines the uniqueness of every specific territory, thus empha-

sizing the importance of regional/territorial/state specific attributes instead of the standardised and globalised ones. Struggle of these two paths is often identified and described as 'culture war', a struggle for dominance of beliefs, values and practices, including the border structure itself.

Within this clash, a mobile and globalist class of professionals and managers has launched strong critical approach on every aspect of borders and boundaries. The ages old established boundary frames, like the boundary between different communities, nations and states, between aged and youth, between men and women are explicitly questioned. This generates the narration that the traditional borders are discriminative and outdated, while it idealizes the idea of openness, transparency and claims that a borderless world represents the latest development stage within the civilization progress of humanity. This powerful trend of deconstruction of borders is further encouraged by culture industry, like films, movies, television programmes and musical hits that celebrate the idea of a borderless world and removal of border and traditional boundaries. This deconstructive process of borders celebrate free floating identities, be it transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and varying non-identifiable identity forms, but at the same time they rarely express any support towards national sovereignty, secure border structures and/or towards the traditional boundaries and binary categories.

The idea of openness and a world without borders emphasize that borders constitute a hindrance, either physical or mental obstacles, and they are morally arbitrary for human societies. The traditional boundary structures, including the notion of national citizenship, national sovereignty or even the communityhood are far too exclusivist. This exclusionist frame has to be remade and it has to be recalibrated in order to be more inclusive one. Subsequently, the proponents of a borderless world attempt to deterritorialize the key elements of the traditional world, like community, sovereignty, citizenship, democracy and solidarity (Furedi, 2021). Even more, they attempt to challenge the borders between generations, gender and the public and private boundary, thus entering into a phenomenon that could be identified as the 'spiral of deconstruction'. However, the advocates of open borders are the greatest hypocrites since they know that this will never happen and they only play the 'Beautiful Soul' and superiority to the 'corrupted world' (Žižek, 2017: 8).

However, does the elimination of borders, boundaries and entering into a borderless world with fluid and free floating identity schemes represent a civilizational jump that makes us even more progressed and civilized, or rather is it a process that can eliminate and disrupt, or even explode, our identity and the constitutive 'Self and Other' binary relationship? The former option remains only an idealistic imagination, while the latter option seems to be more realistic and more dangerous with its 'manufactured uncertainties' and with the 'constructed insecurity'. To be more specific, deep-penetrating elimination of borders powerfully disintegrates the traditional built identity, it unbounds cultural and moral norms, it blurs the distinction between acceptable and non-acceptable forms of behaviour, it weakens solidarity, it alienates us from the meaningful limits and it directly kicks us into a swampy space with unpredictable consequences, namely the status of identity crisis.

The concept of identity crisis was pioneered by the psychiatrist Erik Erikson during the 1950s, signalling that structure penetrating changes had been launched decades



ago. Dissolution and disintegration of traditional identity frames goes hand in hand with proliferation and multiplication of identities that is unmistakably a sign of identity confusion. Furedi (2021: 12) characterizes this phenomenon in the following way, “estrangement from borders is not an enlightened step forward – rather it expresses a self-destructive sensibility of estrangement from the conventional sign posts that guide everyday life. Consequently, it finds it difficult to hold the line that separates the positive from the negative dimensions of human experience.”

Introduction of cultural and moral relativity is a concomitant process of proliferation and multiplication of identities, disappearance of traditional border frames. Instituting moral and cultural relativity has immediate consequences, first it brings down the level of morality from the ‘absolute’ to the (actual) standards of human society, which is undeniable a moral free-fall (Miklós-völgyi, 2018), secondly this change deprives societies from their ability to perform effective judgement and decisions, and thirdly it generates self-destructive atomization, feeling of loneliness, loss of solidarity and/or widespread mistrust within the society as such.

Deconstruction of the old structures unstoppably pushes for the invention of new normalities that replace the old ones. This means that side-effect of the deconstruction of traditional identity is an unbearable obsession and increasing demand to draw a new network of micro-boundaries. This new network of micro-boundaries is filled out with cultural character instead of the deconstructed classical binary categories. In other words, it is a ‘fetishisation of cultural identity’. Simply, it is a ‘deconstructive construction’, or as Furedi (2021: 167, 161) aptly writes, “the invention of ‘new normalities’ [...] driven by the desire to displace the old with the new [...] to turn every form of cultural interaction into a potential site for conflict.”

New and often artificial cultural boundaries are able to generate much more powerful non-negotiable boundaries, hence moving towards antagonist relationship, where the ‘Other’ is understood and narrated as an enemy that has to be eliminated instead of understanding the ‘Other’ as an ordinary adversary who has to be ‘only’ challenged instead of termination. In other words, this is the phenomenon of ‘*paradox of borders*’, meaning that “the culture of boundarylessness suddenly mutates into its opposite [...] loss of solidarity, a growing sense of atomisation, and the presumption that you are on your own and therefore feel a sense of wariness and mistrust towards others, creates a demand for drawing up new lines” (Furedi, 2021: 163, 151). Subsequently, new robust cultural boundaries are calibrated, formed, imagined and generated, like boundary between man and woman, between heterosexual and homosexual, between black and white, between the young and the old and/or between private and public.

To sum up, the well-known borders are under the process of deconstruction, be it the biological distinction between male and female, gender traits or private/public relationship. Spiral of deconstruction of the well-known borders profoundly contributes to alienation, it shatters communities and it introduces an abstract quality of existence and intensifies the psychic distance between people. Moreover, psychological risk of openness, risk of identity crises, risk of multitude network of micro-boundaries can lead to an unpredictable and dangerous constellation that is driven by ‘culture of fear’ as a tangible reality that shapes our daily life, as a consequence, quest and sensitivity for personal boundaries and personal space burst out. However, Furedi (2007) underlines that the

only thing we have to fear is the ‘culture of fear’ itself, or as Michel de Montaigne declared centuries ago, ‘the thing I fear most is fear’, because fear implies the overthrow of rule of law, it confronts political values and it may destruct the culture itself (Robin, 2004). Spread of the culture of fear reshapes the notions of our perceptions on security and threat and this directly ‘kicks us’ us into the domain of securitization.

### RISE OF SECURITIZATION

During the Cold War, the issue of threat and security was dominated by (neo)-realist approaches which interpreted security within ‘simplified’ traditional state-centric approach and military conception, namely ‘the main focus of security is the phenomenon of war’ (Walt, 1991: 212), the study of threat, use and control of military forces and international violence (Nye, Lynn-Jones, 1988). This ‘simplified’ security approach was suitable for the Cold War inter-state relations with the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, ‘overkill’ military capabilities, pre-emptive nuclear strike, retaliation, fears of nuclear war, threat of nuclear winter and total annihilation of life. Simply, to secure one state generated the insecurity of another and this triggered a cycle of insecurity between states, thus the state was the main object of security (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

With the end of the Cold War, the international environment was profoundly shifted. The decades long security issues and threats were altered and there was a move from a strict focus on state security; consequently, the (neo)-realist doctrines and approaches were no longer able to appropriately grasp the new sub-state and regional security challenges (Wæver, 1995). Subsequently, the concept of securitization was formulated by the so called Copenhagen School with the aim to broaden the approach of the security agenda through the analytical framework of ‘securitisation’, reflecting on the new security challenges. Nevertheless, even after decades of the transition, the character of the post-Cold War security order is still murky and it is ‘hostly contested’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 1).

Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde articulated a shifted security framework in the 90s. In their path-taking book, ‘Security: A New Framework For Analysis’, they outlined a comprehensive structure of a new, broadened and constructivist method of security studies, claiming that it is easy to identify security issues through the ‘traditional prism’, namely equating security with military issues, but there is a need to move beyond the narrow military sector, “*there are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security onto an ever wider range of issues*” (Buzan et al, 1998: 1). The concept of security and securitization aimed to provide a fresh look at the heavy and exhausted debate between two understandings of threat and security. Namely, a debate between those who claimed that threats are objective in their nature, i.e. threats that constitute real danger to international security, and between those who claimed that security; and threats are subjective in their nature, i.e. threat and security is not a pre-given concept, but rather driven by perception.

According to the Copenhagen School, the notion of security should be rather seen through the prism of ‘speech act’, linked with specific grammar and rhetorical struc-



ture, thus social constructions and narratives of security issues give special status and they legitimise extraordinary measures. *“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.”* (Buzan et al, 1998: 26) and/or Waever (1995: 55) puts it, *“What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security,” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”*

In other words, security and dangers are inbuilt elements of narrative discourses on security. Social constructivist reading of the world and looking at the discourses and narratives are highly important aspects because the interpretation of narrative sociability deeply influence our deeds and practices. Foucault (1972/2004: 54) underlines that discourse should be understood as an action, as a practice that systematically forms the object of the discourse, thus entering into the territory of materiality and is easily linked with physical activities. This means that a discourse, narration and/or representation do not simply describe the world, but directly they constitute it by bringing phenomena into being (Hardy – Thomas, 2014). Simply, discourse is a social construction with constitution of knowledge, social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations, thus security instead of being an objective condition, it is rather the *“outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security issues (...) through which threats become represented”* (Williams, 2003: 513), the speech acts become ‘performatives’, where the phrase itself serves to accomplish a social act (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 77), or as Thierry Balzacq (2005) expresses it, enunciation and expression of security is itself a process of creating new social order. In this sense, securitization is explicitly a social constructivist process, *“issues can become security issues by virtue of their presentation and acceptance as such, rather than because of any innate threatening qualities per se”* (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 78).

## MIGRATION NARRATIVES IN HUNGARY

Migration is inseparable linked with the idea of open and deconstructed borders and both involve significant amount of security and securitization issues. This mean that in the following part, we are going reflect on the most important migration and security narrations which were put forward by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, from 2015 until 2020. Most of the migration and security narratives were articulated during 2015-2016-2017-2018, the 2019 year was less active from this aspect, while 2020 was ‘hijacked’ by COVID, hence the question of migration and its narratives were overshadowed by health issues and the pandemic.

In 2015, the Prime Minister of Hungary expressed serious positions on differentiation between economic migrants and refugees. Namely, the economic migration is an inappropriate political approach and Hungary cannot offer shelter for those who left their home because of economic reasons. Economic migration is also inappropriate for

Europe because might bring dangers into the continent and because of this the migration has to be stopped. On the other side, the issue of political refugees differs from the economic migration and there is a real need to help. There is a need to regulate immigration, because lack of regulation can cause that civil society is endangered and it can transform the image of the European civilization itself. If a multicultural Europe is established, there is no way back to Christian Europe or to national cultures. Subsequently, multiculturalism means a significant threat to the whole continent (*Orbán Viktor mindenkit óv a multikulturális Európától*, 2015).

There are two types of Member States in the European Union, the members with colonial legacy and the members without it. These two groups differently interpret the phenomenon of immigration. The former group is socialized with imperial mindset, e.g. arrival of population to the metropolitan centre from the colonies is not an unknown process. They are prepared for this. Their thinking, culture and socialization are accustomed to this process. Nevertheless, Hungary never had colonial policy. Thinking, culture and socialization of Hungary are not prepared for this process and there is no ability to tackle with multicultural societal structure. A homogenous Hungary is a value and this should not be sacrificed, but at the same time Hungary does not want to dispute the right of members that are otherwise accustomed and are ready to accept the immigrants (*Orbán: sosem voltunk multikulturális társadalom*, 2015).

What the continent faces, according to the writing of the Prime Minister in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*Orbán Viktor teljes írása a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungban*, 2015), is not a simple 'migration problem' or a 'refugee problem' itself, but it is rather a new wave of modern migration with serious dangers. The European Union's flawed migration policy is responsible for the situation and it is irresponsible for any European politician to promise a better life for the migrants if they leave their home. At the same time, management of migration was turned into a lucrative business venture with dangerous and unscrupulous criminal groups. Consequently, protection of the external borders is the first and foremost task. The Schengen Area can function only with responsibility and enforcement of the established and agreed codes. The fence, as a line of defense, derives from the Schengen Convention, so it is a necessary European accessory.

At the beginning of 2016, the Prime Minister articulated the opinion that if the European Union does not have the ability to protect itself, then we destroy the Schengen system within the process of a self-destruction. As a possible solution, the Action plan for Schengen 2.0 was presented at the International Center of Democratic Parties. This action plan involved 10 basic points that could improve the capability of the continent to face migration. The Action plan aimed to give full effect of existing EU and Schengen legislation related to the control of external borders, including the systematic checks of EU citizens; development of the modalities in order to protect the external border; reestablishment of the proper functioning of the Dublin System; management of the asylum procedures outside the EU in closed and protected hotspots before the first entry; agreements on readmission and return; return of the illegal migrants to the safe countries of origin or transit; conditionality of the EU policies in cooperation relation with third countries; support of frontline countries; set up a common European list of safe third countries; and finally answers to demographic and labour market

challenges have to be subject to sovereign decisions of the Member States (*Hungary's 10-point action plan for the management of the migration crisis*, 2016). The Action plan rejected the mandatory resettlement quota system of the EU and it underlined the importance and national competences, i.e. whether a Member State intends to respond to the challenges by relying on national or EU resources and policies, or on immigrants outside from the EU must remain a national competence.

If migration continues then it generates significant burdens that should not be distributed among the Member States, but rather the migration itself should be eliminated. This means that the help should be brought to areas where problems exist, instead of bringing the problem itself onto the continent. Moreover, distribution of the migrants is not an effective policy since it is itself a certain form of invitation until the continent is able to control the situation at the external borders and able to manage the entrance process to the continent, and those migrants who entered illegally must be identified, collected and taken outside of the EU instead of exporting them into other Member States. Furthermore, the article of the Prime Minister in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*Bist Du gegen den Frieden?*, 2016) underlined that a wish for a better life is not a basic right and it cannot be a basic right in the future.

It is a time to apply the European solidarity also towards border protection, too. The security of European citizens were assured from the resources of Hungary, thus the costs should be equally paid by the European Union and by Hungary. Sharing of migration burdens would be the appropriate form of solidarity. Moreover, the form of behaviour that somebody makes a decision on the admission of illegal immigrants on a national basis and then relocates responsibilities and burdens to international level is contradictory to the idea of European solidarity itself (*Orbán Viktor: Szeretem ezt az országot, és nem szeretném, ha külső parancsra valaki megváltoztatná*, 2016). Consequently, the idea of solidarity was rearticulated in 2016, when solidarity is not understood within the process of distribution of borders, but within the process of border protection.

In 2017, the Prime Minister expressed in his year evaluation speech that there is a need to fight with the rising power of international organizations promoting multiculturalism, migration and open borders and with the non-transparent attempts of foreign influence (*Öt nagy támadást kell kivédeni idén*, 2017). At the 6<sup>th</sup> annual forum of the EU strategy for the Danube region, he noted that the events which we experience, as migration, are rather deliberate actions, instead of being simple random events, which aim to create mixed societies in Europe. At first, this plan tests the strength of borders and the ability to protect them, later new populations are moved into the continent in large numbers which leads into parallel societies and parallel administrations within the continent (*Orbán Viktor – bejegyzések*, Facebook, 2017).

Very critical approach was articulated also towards the idea of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism failed and the Western European Member States made wrong decisions in the domain of migration, but the costs of multiculturalism should not be paid by all EU Member States, especially by not those ones who did not allow the migrants inside their states and who protected the borders from their own national resources (*Ideje, hogy az európai szolidaritás a határvédelem ügyében is érvényesüljön*, 2017). Thus, reassuring the need to rearticulate and reimagine the European solidarity that should pay its attention also to the border protection.

In 2018, the Prime Minister expressed that migration has become a problem of democracy itself, meaning that people do not want to live under the threat of terror, they want to live in security and this calls for border protection (*Orbán Viktor – bejegyzések*, Facebook, 2018). The migrants were articulated as a security threat, claiming that the migrants should not be seen as simple Muslim refugees, but rather as Muslim invasion force. They illegally came into the territory, hence it is an invasion instead of a refugee crisis (*Őnök akarták a migránsokat, mi nem*, 2018). Subsequently, solidarity is needed not in the process of distributing the migrants, but in the process of protecting the borders. Borders need to be protected and the Schengen code and the responsibilities of the treaties need to be fulfilled. If some member state does not want to fulfil the responsibility and protection of borders, then there is a need for bravery and the Schengen borders have to be relocated into the border of a Member State which has the willingness and ability to do it (*Orbán Viktor – bejegyzések*, Facebook, 2018).

Migration generates huge financial and resource demanding push for Hungary. If Hungary becomes an immigrant country then it would generate major impact and it would overlie on the developments. It would take away important resources, less money would remain for development of infrastructure, cities, thus money is taken away from the taxpayers of the Member States (*Agyonnyomná a fejlesztéseinket, ha bevándorlóországgá válnánk*, 2018). Subsequently, Hungary cannot accept any EU budget that is linked with the migration quota and which gives more money to migrants receiving Member States. This means that every migrants receiving Member State should pay the expenses from its own budget instead of establishing common burden sharing or financial discrimination (*Minden eszköz rendelkezésre áll az ország megvédéséhez*, 2018). Consequently, special migration tax was introduced, organizations which have supportive activity towards migration should help to carry the burdens in a form of special migration task (*Hatályba lépett a bevándorlási különadó*, 2018).

In this year, the Prime Minister explicitly denied those proposals that aimed to implement internal transformation of the EU, especially the idea that the number of accepted migrants into the Member State should influence the distribution of parliamentary seats in the European Parliament. This is unacceptable since the European Union belongs to Europeans and to the European citizens. Rather, a red card procedure should be introduced which would increase the role of national parliaments, to grant the power to stop the debates if those violate national interests (*Orbán Viktor – bejegyzések*, Facebook, 2018).

In 2019, the prime Minister many times articulated that there is a need to take away the migration issues from the European Commission and it needs to be returned to the competency of the Member States. A council has to be established with participation of the ministries of interior of the Schengen zone, similarly as it was done in the case of the Eurozone (*Orbán Viktor interjúja a Welt am Sonntag című újságnak*, 2019), and the migration card and migration visa needs to be cancelled and responsibility should be taken also by the NGOs for their activity (*Orbán Viktor – bejegyzések*, Facebook, 2019).

In 2020, the security and migration narrative was overshadowed by the COVID-19. Important moment was when the Prime Minister linked the migration with the threat of virus expansion. This means that migration does not only involve a threat to public

security, but it becomes a health care issue since many migrants arrive from areas which were located as focal areas of the virus. This connection further required the notion of border security which has become linked with health protection (*Felszámolja a kormány a tranzitónákat*, 2020).

To conclude, the Prime Minister of Hungary proposed different narrations on migration that was the dominating mainstream discourse. The main difference is that the narration of Hungary presented migration as a source of threat and danger that should be limited, controlled and stopped, while the mainstream narrations rather articulated migration as a positive phenomenon which may bring certain elements prosperity and which may be the solution to some problems in Europe. The Prime Minister put strong emphasis on border control and the Schengen code which could be enforced, instead of concentrating on distributing migrants between the Member States. Furthermore, the notion of solidarity was also shifted towards new narration, namely solidarity of the Member States should be seen within the process of border control and border protection, instead of solidarity within the process of distribution.

## CONCLUSION

The analysis aimed to underline two important moments of our everyday life. The first, moment is represented by the aspect of borders. The process of intense de-construction has profoundly impacted the notion of borders during the decades of globalization. Borders are stigmatized and defamed as obstacles of development, thus they rather should be either removed or transformed into a more permeable form. However, the removal of borders seems to be quite dangerous, because the process does not remove the borders literally, but it relocates them into a much more complex and much nonnegotiable spaces, where the conflict between parties is almost certain and a compromise is practically impossible which may lead us into culture wars with no end in sight. Moreover, the future of borders and their openness/closeness is inextricably linked with the question of migration and its role within the society. The second aim of the analysis was to highlight the importance of security and securitization where the articulated narratives and discourses play major role in constructing the perceived everyday reality. The idea of open borders is inseparable linked with the phenomenon of migration and with the resulting security challenges, hence the narrations of the Prime Minister of Hungary were presented on formulating different security narrations on migration as the mainstream, like the notion of migration as a security threat, importance of border controls and new meanings of solidarity.

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## ABSTRACT

The events and processes of the recent decades drive us to awake from the hypnotic illusion of the ‘end of history’. The ‘return of history’ is not only a necessary step that has to be taken, but it is ontologically inevitable. Blinded by the mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms, we need to see that the processes of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are no different from the old politics which were recorded in history, thus it is unavoidable to think within the ‘dialectics of Old and New’. Globalization, relativization of values, removal of borders and the re-narration of borders in previously unseen areas lead us to an existential zero point. Borders

play significant self-determining and self-definition role in our life and society, thus their relocation, reorientation and blurring of their meaning is a question that has to be analysed and closely watched. Together with the narration of borders, the narration of security plays major role. Migration and the question of open, permeable borders have become one of the most important security narrations of our everyday life.

**Keywords:** border, globalization, securitization, migration

## **GRANICE, DEBORDERIZACJA I NARRACJE MIGRACYJNE NA WĘGRZECH**

### **STRESZCZENIE**

Wydarzenia i procesy ostatnich dziesięcioleci przypominają nam o hipnotycznej iluzji „końca historii”. „Powrót historii” jest nie tylko koniecznym krokiem, który należy podjąć, ale jest ontologicznie nieunikniony. Zaślepieni mobilną armią metafor, metonimów i antropomorfizmów, musimy dostrzec, że procesy XXI wieku nie różnią się od dawnej polityki, która została zapisana w historii, dlatego nieuniknione jest myślenie w ramach „dialektyki starego i nowego”. Globalizacja, relatywizacja wartości, usuwanie granic i re-narracja granic w niewidzianych wcześniej obszarach prowadzą nas do egzystencjalnego punktu zerowego. Granice odgrywają istotną rolę samostanowiącą i samookreślającą w naszym życiu i społeczeństwie, dlatego ich relokacja reorientacja i zacieranie się ich znaczenia, jest kwestią, którą należy przeanalizować i uważnie obserwować. Wraz z narracją granic główną rolę odgrywa narracja na temat bezpieczeństwa. Migracja i kwestia otwartych, przepuszczalnych granic stały się jedną z najważniejszych narracji bezpieczeństwa w naszym codziennym życiu.

**Słowa kluczowe:** granica, globalizacja, sekurytyzacja, migracja

