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SAUDI ARABIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY DURING AND AFTER ARAB UPRISING: A DEFENSIVE REALISM APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

Saudi Arabia and Turkey are two significant regional players in the Middle East. Since the eighteenth century, Turkey (so-called Ottoman Turkey) has turned its face to the West. This has been called the Westernization of Turkey. Particularly, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and emerging as a new state, Turkey refrained to engage in Arab affairs for decades and it was not a major player until 2002 except for the 1950s. However, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming to power, Turkey engaged more in the Middle East. Although Saudi Turkish relations were improved after the 2003 Iraqi war, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia has altered with the following Arab uprisings in 2010 since both countries had different stance on the uprisings that creates opportunities and challenges for two countries. Therefore, their regional interests were different and this difference was the clearest on the case of Egypt and Syria. Turkey took the position on the side of protesters against the regimes of Mubarak in Egypt and Assad in Syria and became a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Such support has been perceived as a challenge by Saudi Arabia, a regional hegemon, and led Saudi Arabia to shift its foreign policy to prevent Turkey's rising influence in Egypt and Syria. In this context, the research question is how has the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia been shifting towards Turkey in Egypt and Syria during and post-Arab uprisings? Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are Islamic countries and they have common sect. With the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak regime, an ally of Saudi Arabia, in Egypt and coming to power Muslim Brotherhood, which has close relations with Turkey, had already curtailed the influence of Saudi Arabia. Besides that, the rising risk of fall of Assad's regime in Syria and the possibility of Turkey's rising influence in Syria would significantly narrow the sphere of the hegemony of Saudi Arabia in the region. In order to answer the research question, the posed hypothesis is Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia towards Turkey has been shifting by supporting local actors in Egypt and Syria due to Turkey's engagement there. To verify the hypothesis, the article aims to analyze the shifts in Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia towards Turkey in

Egypt and Syria by grounding Saudi Arabia's reaction on the framework of defensive realism. As Nolte points out "countries in the regions themselves could form counteralliance against the emerging regional power" (Nolte, 2010). Besides that, a regional power can mobilize its resources to curb active regional power's actions. With regard to that Saudi Arabia has strengthened its alliances with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alongside local actors such as Abdul Fattah al Sisi (later on became president of Egypt) and the People Protection Unit (YPG) which defeated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in North East of Syria. In the parallel of Turkey's engagement, two countries, Egypt and Syria, have become the center for shifts in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia.

The literature on Turkey-Saudi relations is limited in comparison to relations between other regional powers in the Middle East. Studies on the Saudi Arabia Turkey relations can be separated into two categories. The first one is about the strategies followed by Turkey and Saudi Arabia toward Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010. In this context, for instance, Meliha Benli Altunisik highlights the positions and priorities of Saudi Arabia and Turkey on Arab uprisings, in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria (Altunisik, 2012). Likewise, Crystal Ennis and Bessma Momani assess the evolution of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and Turkey during the process of Arab uprisings (Ennis and Momani, 2013). On the other hand, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are Sunni Islam in terms of sectarianism. In this regard, the second category is about the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for the leadership of the Sunni Islamic world. With regard to that Evangelos Venetis explains the historical backgrounds of two countries in terms of sectarianism and its influence on the foreign policy of two states (Venetis, 2014). Nevertheless, the main reason that led to shifts in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy stems from Turkey's rising influence in Egypt and Syria which creates fears of challenging its hegemony for Riyadh. Therefore, this article explains Saudi Arabia's stance through defensive realism. With regard to that, first of all, defensive realism will be explained as a conceptual framework. Secondly, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards Turkey will be touched. Lastly, stances of Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria will be examined and strategies followed by Saudi Arabia to prevent Turkey's rising influence in Egypt and Syria will be examined. In this way, the goals Riyadh wanted to achieve and has achieved during and post-Arab uprisings will be clarified.

DEFENSIVE REALISM

Structural Realism is one of the main theories of International Relations, which takes power to centrality. Kenneth Waltz subdivides Structural realism into two factions which are defensive realism and offensive realism. Defensive realism came on the scene in the late 1970s with the appearance of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. A defensive realist state tries to read other states' behaviors in order to update its evaluation of other states' intentions and conduct its strategies. As Sandra Destradi emphasizes "hegemonic states provide material incentives to their weaker counterparts in order to establish a stable international order" (Destradi, 2010: 916). Saudi Arabia's

supports to General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and YPG in northern Syria can be assessed within this context. While offensive realism attempts to get more power to achieve security through domination and hegemony, defensive realism attempts to maximize security by maintaining the existing status quo (Waltz, 1979).

One of the main divisions between offensive and defensive realists is the anarchical nature of the international system. Offensive realists argue that anarchy leads states to compete for power in a struggle for hegemony, whereas defensive realists argue that anarchy leads states to adopt defensive, moderate, and restrained strategies. For defensive realists, security is plentiful. The main strategy of major powers is defense, which aims to maximize their security by maintaining the existing balance of power (Lobell, 2017). Likewise, it claims that the international system provides incentives for expansion under certain conditions. Under anarchy, states seek to increase their security and decreasing other's security. Defensive realism suggests that states should generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security (Taliaferro, 2000: 129). Therefore, in a defensive realism world, states seek security with defensive approaches, and they don't seek and grab opportunities to threaten others (Tang, 2010: 107). Defensive realism not only rejects offensive behaviors but also recommends moderation, self-restraint, and cooperation (Jervis, 1978). Due to a defensive realist state does not seek conquest and expansion, it is more likely to adopt a defensive military doctrine than in offensive weapons in comparison to an offensive realist state. In addition to that for defensive realism, the alliance is almost exclusively for defensive purposes. The strategic goal of a defensive realist state is mostly for deterrence and defense, rather than expansion through offense (Tang, 2010: 110).

SAUDI ARABIA'S POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly one of the most important players in the Middle Eastern scene. Modern Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 by Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd Rahman al-Saud after a 30-year long campaign for the unification of the Arabian Peninsula. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has been both cautious and conservative, and until recently, it has been best characterized as reactive rather than assertive (Czornik, 2020: 179). Including those made by King Salman, Saudi moves have been undertaken with the goal of protecting the kingdom from regional threats (Dumke, 2019).

Saudi Arabia sees the Arabian Peninsula as its backyard and its natural sphere of influence. Therefore, Riyadh seeks hegemony in the region and does not want outsiders, particularly non-Arab powers, as a rising power in the region. Historically, Saudis have consolidated such influence. For instance, confronting Egyptian military forces in north Yemen in the 1960s and in south Yemen in the 1970s. Similarly, resisting Iran's effort to down the Dhofar rebellions in Oman in the 1970s are among the examples. Having the virtue of its territorial size and its economical wealth, Saudi Arabia is the dominant power in the Arabian Peninsula. Nonetheless, when it comes to the wider Middle East, Riyadh is not capable of that kind of power. The advantage of being rich is not enough to overcome the political, economic, and military advantage of rising

regional powers (Gregory and Gause, 2011: 173–176) such as Turkey. Saudi Arabia's relationships with regional powers in the Middle East have been shaped by modern Saudi Arabia's distinct phases of growth with the reigns of its first five kings. During this time, relations with Turkey have ebbed and flowed (Dumke, 2019: 56).

Saudi Arabia has two major tools that they effectively benefit from to achieve their foreign policy goals. The first one is aforementioned financial power, which helps Riyadh to support its regional allies for a balancing strategy. Supporting "front-line" Arab states in the conflict with Israel after 1967; providing and loaning to Saddam Hussein \$25 billion during the Iran-Iraq War in 1980–1988; financial aid to Egypt through the Camp David accords are among the examples. The second one is the interpretation of Islam, which is called Wahhabism (Gregory and Gause, 2011) that has been influential not only in domestic affairs but also on foreign policy during the last few decades. For instance, Wahhabi ideology played a significant role in Afghanistan War in 1979 (Al-Rasheed, 2010). Similarly, after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, Wahhabism has mainly been applied by Saudi Arabia on the rivalry towards Iran.

Following the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, there have been two rival blocks: Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Ideologically, Riyadh was gathering the region's Sunni regimes under its umbrella against Shia Iran. In this way, by profiting ideology as a tool on the foreign policy, Riyadh was conducting pragmatic policies in the region. Therewithal, with AKP coming to power in Turkey in 2002, a third rival block, Sunni Turkey, which has more potential to challenge Saudi Arabia's hegemonic position, has emerged. Therefore, despite some short conjectural rapprochements, Riyadh consolidated its alliances, particularly with United Arab Emirates (UAE) to keep the geopolitical status quo in the region. As Venetis emphasizes, the geopolitical antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for the leadership of the Sunni Islamic world is an ongoing and process in the Middle East mainly in Egypt and Syria. Efforts by Riyadh and Ankara in the Sunni world are driven by both geopolitical interests and ideological reasons. (Venetis, 2014: 4–5). Although, some independent religious figures in Saudi Arabia were pro-encouraging the Arab uprisings with regard to an overthrown of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya due to their stance on Wahhabism, these rulers were the main pillars of the status quo for Saudi Arabia in the region. Furthermore, Hosni Mubarak's Egypt was the main ally against Iran.

The Arab Uprisings in 2011 have caused alterations in the Middle Eastern strategies and political morphology. Long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya, have collapsed. These developments have transformed the structure of alliances that led to the struggle for power and influence in the region (Zarras, 2018: 119; Dalacoura, 2013). On the other hand, relatively declining U.S. influence in the region was already pushing Turkey to fill the vacuum. In this context, Turkey's regional power aspirations led Ankara became more engaged in the Middle East. As Meliha Altunışık points out, adopting anti-Israeli rhetoric after the 2006 Israeli Wars in Lebanon made the AKP government very popular in the Arab world. As a result of the Iraq War in 2003 and the Arab uprisings in 2010, which reshaped the regional order, created a context which deeply affected the relationships between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Particularly, regional politics post-Arab uprisings led to resistance from Saudi Arabia to

prevent Turkey's involvement to play an active role in the Middle East (Altunışık, 2019: 18–19).

STANCE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND TURKEY ON EGYPT AND SYRIA

With the AKP coming to power in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy has been shifted from an engagement with Europe to an engagement with the Middle East. Particularly, turning back to its former imperial lands in the Arab world (Ibish, 2018: 9). Especially, the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 had an immense impact on Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East. Ankara perceived the transformations in the Middle East and North Africa as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. It was thought that the removal of leaders such as Muammar Qaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, and Bashar Assad and the coming to power of new regimes, would work to the country's benefit. Thus, regional developments fueled Turkey's aspirations for being a hegemon in the Middle East (Altunışık, 2019: 25). Likewise, the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu explained Turkey's position in the following words "at this process, the place of Turkey is with the peoples of the region. Turkey will stand side by side with the peoples, their legitimate aspirations and work tirelessly for the realization of these aspirations in a stable and peaceful fashion" (Davutoglu, 2011). In a similar way, Turkish decision-makers portraying Turkey as a leader of the Sunni Islamic world is a direct challenge to Saudi Arabia, which presents itself as the leader of the Sunni Islamic world since the 1920s.

The Arab uprising in Egypt caused the toppling of Hosni Mubarak's regime, which was a key ally of Saudi Arabia in the region and led the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a political party. That party came to power in the first election under Mohammad Morsi's presidency in June 2012 and the new administration of Egypt had close ties with Turkey, which was rising as a third rival block in the region. Having long-established relationships with Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey had a significant influence on the new administration of Egypt. Such a power transition in Egypt endangered Saudi Arabia's hegemony in the region. Ankara's strategic calculation was based on an ideological perspective since AKP leadership counted on these long-established ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. These ties date back to Necmettin Erbakan's National Vision, which AKP derived from, movement and were carefully built up during the period of AKP rule (Baskan, 2016: 63–64). Additionally, having excellent relations with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Turkey was content with the rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt and sought to capitalize on it, providing all diplomatic, economic and financial aid they could to Egypt.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was concerned about the rise of the Brotherhood. Riyadh had no formal Muslim Brotherhood branch, but had Islamist groups, owed the rise of the Brotherhood could embolden these groups. Having founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood became a quite popular movement across the Middle East and it was moved to Saudi Arabia by Egyptian scholars since the 1950s. Subsequently it not only gained popularity among Saudi indigenous, but also formed the most serious opposition structure in Saudi Arabia. For instance, during the local elec-

tions which were held in 2015 in Saudi Arabia, the candidates supported by Muslim Brotherhood had won all major cities such as Riyadh, Mecca, Jeddah, Dammam, Taif, and Tabuk (Menoret, 2016: 3). Such an election success of the Muslim Brotherhood shows how Saudi Arabia seriously takes the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood against its own Wahhabi ideology which is a pillar of the Saudi regime in the country. With regard to that, the Muslim Brotherhood could steer Egypt away from Saudi Arabia (Başkan, 2019; McDowall, 2012). Furthermore, it creates a threat to Saudi Arabia's regime security meaning the policies followed by the elite coalition holding power in a country to ensure their political legitimacy against internal and external challenges to their power, and to protect their physical assets and interests (Ryan, 2009; Jackson, 2007). In the competition for influence over the opposition, Ankara's stance vis-a-vis the Muslim Brotherhood-associated factions has constituted divergence with Saudi Arabia (Lacroix, 2014). Under such an atmosphere Egyptian military staged a coup and overthrew Muhammed Morsi in July 2013. Turkey criticized the coup and the ensuing crackdown on the protesters. Turkey's continued criticisms led to a total collapse in Turkey's relations with Egypt. In late November 2013, for instance, Egypt declared Turkey's ambassador persona non grata and asked him to leave Egypt. Moreover, reduced the diplomatic representation in Turkey to the chargé d'affaires level (Başkan, 2019: 92–93).

In this parallel, for Riyadh, “the anti-monarchist republican ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood organization is regarded as a threat for the Kingdom's stability. The Saudi decision to support General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization came as a blow” (Zarras, 2018: 123). Therefore, Saudi Arabia differed from Turkey in its reaction to the military coup as it criticized neither the coup nor the crackdown (Abueish, 2020). Riyadh not only recognized the legitimacy of the coup but also extended generous financial aid to Egypt in the aftermath of the crisis (Nordland, 2013). “After the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi was overthrown from his presidency by Egypt's military coup in 2013, Saudi Arabia formed a close alliance with his successor, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and invested a reported US\$5 billion into the Egyptian economy to help prop up his new regime” (Anon, 2019: 2). In this way, Turkey's rising influence on Egypt has been prevented. Having been restored relationships between Saudi Arabia and Egypt led to maintain the status quo which benefits Saudi Arabia's regional hegemony.

On the other hand, despite the decline of Turkey's influence in Egypt, Syria has been the second country where Turkey's rising influence has challenged the regional status quo in terms of both ideology and military presence. Despite having valuable relations with Bashar Assad's Syria, once the wave of Arab uprisings arrived in Syria, Turkey's stance on Syria has altered. Syria was perceived as a second gate by Ankara to turn back to former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Having already been appointed as Turkish foreign minister in May 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu had begun to engage in the Middle Eastern countries in the hope of transforming the region into Turkey's sphere of influence. Despite Davutoglu's misreading of the Middle East, the Arab uprisings in the region, particularly once the wave arrived in Syria, exacerbated Ankara's tendency to see the region through the prism of its

own Ottoman nostalgia. Over and above that Turkey's calculations were based on Assad's overthrow within several months. Davutoglu, during a press conference, stated that this process (regime change in Syria) is not a matter of years, rather it is a matter of months even weeks (Evrensel, 2012). Such calculations were mainly relaying the advance of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that began to coordinate the rebel activities inside Syria. In addition to FSA, other rebel groups have emerged. The most significant rebel groups in this category were ideologically Salafi-Jihadist, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra, brigades. Especially Jabhat Al-Nusra, an extension of Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch, which later became ISIS, has deepened the proxy wars in Syria.

By contrast, when it comes to Saudi Arabia's position, the alliance of an Arab country with Iran in the region is not in preference of Riyadh. Furthermore, a regime change with the Sunni Islamist government in Syria would serve better Saudi interests. As Joshua Jacobs points out "toppling Assad and replacing his regime with a more ideologically symmetric Sunni Islamist government would thus be the greatest possible prize in Saudi Arabia's struggle with its Persian foe. Not only would it remove Iran's greatest Arab ally, but it could potentially sever Tehran's connection to Hezbollah and Hamas" (Jacobs, 2012). Nevertheless, taking Turkey's rising power in the region into consideration, such a regime change constitutes more serious challenges to Saudi Arabia's regional hegemony in terms of geopolitics and ideology. As for geopolitics, for instance, Turkey has launched five military operations so far in Northern Syria between 2015 and 2020 mainly against (YPG) which is perceived as a Syrian branch of PKK by Ankara. On the other hand, in the perception of Riyadh, those military operations would provide geopolitical interests to Turkey which means a return of neo-Ottomanism to the region. When it comes to ideology, such a regime change in Syria would bring Muslim Brotherhood to the power. As it mentioned above, taking Riyadh's attitude towards Muslim Brotherhood into consideration, such a scenario would be nightmare for Saudi Arabia. In this context, the difference between the two countries' stance on the toppling Syrian regime has been deepened. While Turkey's put its stance pro-opposition, Saudi Arabia has taken its position pro-Syrian regime.

With regard to that Riyadh acted in May 2012 against private attempts to raise funds for Syria. For example, Riyadh has banned a private campaign to collect money for Syria and urged its citizens to deliver their aids through official channels instead (Almhamdi, 2012). Following that in June 2012, a member of the Saudi state's Senior Council of Religious Scholars stated that it was religiously forbidden to travel to Syria to fight the regime. A few months later, a security spokesman of the Interior Ministry stated, "it's illegal to go abroad and get involved in any ... military actions or fighting" and warned those who go to Syria would be investigated (Başkan, 2019: 91). All these steps were in benefit of maintenance of regime in Syria which means a barrier for Turkey's rising influence. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia held serial meetings with YPG in Raqqa, where controlled by YPG, in 2017 and backed YPG to counter Turkey in Syria.

Likewise, since the beginning of the 2018 Saudi Arabia together with its partner, United Arab Emirates, have provided more financial and political support to the Syrian

Democratic Forces (SDF) which is encountering Turkish troops in Northern Syria. Beside that UAE sent significant military advisors to help train SDF. On the other hand, financially, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested heavily in the civilian reconstruction of the northern Syria, where is controlled by SDF, known as Rojava and in Arab areas around Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor (Anon, 2019: 3). As a part of their partnership, by October 2018, Saudi Arabia paid 100 million US dollars to the YPG for the reconstruction of areas in Syria that is controlled by YPG (Cafiero, 2019). The Saudi Embassy described it as the largest coalition contribution to date (Al-Awsat, 2018). The biggest threat to toppling the Assad regime was ISIS. In a time when ISIS was rapidly expanding its territories, it was the first time defeated by YPG. Providing logistics to the YPG by Saudi Arabia on the field helped to defeat ISIS which led the Syrian regime to take a deep breath. Therefore, Assad's remaining in power, to some extends, has prevented changing the balance of power in the region, which serves Saudi hegemony in the region.

CONCLUSION

In this article the shifts on the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards Turkey during and post-Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria have been argued within the framework of defensive realism due to Turkey's engagement in two countries. In this context, firstly defensive realism has been discussed in order to comprehend Saudi Arabia's reactions to the Arab uprisings. Secondly the stances of both Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the uprisings in Egypt and Syria have been examined. Lastly, the strategies followed by Saudi Arabia to encounter Turkey's rising influence has been examined. The findings presented in this article have shown that despite some rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the Arab uprisings in 2010 has led both countries find themselves in different positions. Particularly, Turkey's support to Muslim Brotherhood has been perceived by Riyadh as a threat to its core interest in the region. Since the establishment of the creation of modern Saudi State by the family of Saud in 1932, Saudi Arabia has been a hegemon in the Sunni Arab world. Turkey's engagement in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Syria, has led to threat perception by Riyadh in terms of Saudi Arabia's hegemony in the Middle East. This article argues that the shifts in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards Turkey in Egypt and Syria during and post-Arab uprisings aim to maintain status quo rather than enlarging its sphere of influence. With other words, Saudi Arabia's approach is a reaction to prevent the influence of a rising regional power in these two countries. In this context, rather than maximizing its power, Saudi Arabia's main strategy has been increasing its security by maintaining the existing status quo. The main strategy followed by Riyadh is providing supports to local actors in Egypt and northern Syria. With regard to that, Saudi Arabia's reaction can be explained better through defensive realism. Defensive realism argues that states effort to maximize their security rather than their power. Under certain conditions, once a state perceives a threat from another one, it seeks to increase its security by defeating the perceived threat.

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ABSTRACT

The Arab Uprisings in 2011 have led to redistribution of power in the Middle East. It has brought challenges and opportunities for regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. While Turkey has perceived the developments as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region, it has created threat perceptions for Saudi Arabia's hegemony in the Middle East. Especially, due to Turkey's rising influence in Egypt and Syria it has been perceived as a second rival, after Iran, by Riyadh. This article argues that due to Turkey's rising power in Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards Turkey has been shifting by supporting local actors in Egypt and Syria in order to maintain the status quo. The paper aims to analyze shifts in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy towards Turkey during and post-Arab uprisings in the Middle East in the framework of defensive realism through the regional level of analysis.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Defensive Realism, Arab Uprisings, Egypt, Syria

**POLITYKA ZAGRANICZNA ARABII SAUDYJSKIEJ WOBEC TURCJI
W OKRESIE ARABSKIEJ WIOSNY ORAZ PO JEJ ZAKOŃCZENIU
W UJĘCIU REALIZMU DEFENSYWNEGO**

STRESZCZENIE

Wydarzenia arabskiej wiosny 2011 roku doprowadziły do redystrybucji władzy na obszarze Bliskiego Wschodu. Stworzyło to nowe wyzwania i możliwości dla mocarstw regionalnych, takich jak Arabia Saudyjska i Turcja. Turcja postrzegła arabską wiosnę jako okazję do zwiększenia swoich wpływów w regionie, tworząc tym samym poczucie zagrożenia u roszczącej sobie hegemoniczne aspiracje na Bliskim Wschodzie Arabii Saudyjskiej. Turcja, zwiększając swoje wpływy w Egipcie i Syrii zaczęła być postrzegana przez Rijad jako drugi po Iranie najważniejszy rywal w regionie. Artykuł dowodzi, że ze względu na rosnącą pozycję oraz wpływy Turcji w Egipcie i Syrii, polityka zagraniczna Arabii Saudyjskiej wobec Turcji zmienia się poprzez wspieranie lokalnych aktorów w Egipcie i Syrii w celu utrzymania *status quo*. Artykuł ma na celu analizę zmian w polityce zagranicznej Arabii Saudyjskiej wobec Turcji w trakcie i po wydarzeniach arabskiej wiosny na Bliskim Wschodzie w ujęciu paradygmatu realizmu defensywnego.

Słowa kluczowe: Arabia Saudyjska, Turcja, realizm obronny, powstania arabskie, Egipt, Syria

