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INTER-CLAN CONFLICTS AND THE LONG JOURNEY TO STATE-BUILDING IN SOMALIA – INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS

INTRODUCTION

The research is devoted to examine both the internal and external factors that have been taking a leading role as the root cause of the problem in shaping and reshaping the conflict between Somali clans. In light of this situation, this paper focuses on the nature of the Somali crisis since the state collapse in 1991. Generally, the study assesses the achievement of the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), one of the major regional organizations in the Horn of Africa and other non-governmental and governmental organizations, individual states, civic associations in resolving and the Somali conflict using mediation as the feasible approach. As the result of the end of the Cold War, Africa has experienced an escalation of inter-state and intra-state tensions motivated by interlinked and complex issues. These disputes were driven by the reality of differences, between internal political players to manage the state resources which is based on ethnic or clan identity. Moreover, after the end of the role of Superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s from active participation in conflict management in Africa and particularly in the Horn of Africa, internal civil war, mishandling of human rights, economic deterioration and political chaos were followed across the states of the region.

THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Seeking the source of conflict in Somalia, H. M. Adam, states that a nation is not merely a group of people who have certain characteristics in common. A nation is also a group of people or a society communicating with one another. The state of communications within society thus provides a useful indicator of whether national integration is taking place or whether it is possible at all. The Somali language traditionally provided Somalis with an effective means of oral communication. Clan and lineage antagonisms do not preclude a will to unite or a feeling of common destiny, especially with regard to the common foe. Somali (Tribal) genealogies serve both to distinguish clan families and clans and, at the same time to remind them all of the common ancestry (Adam, Lewis, 1983: 33). G. Prunier, explains that "the Somali state is a much more ambiguous notion which has for the time being receded into the gray zone of

a legal abstraction, probably for a good many years to come. This situation is all the more puzzling since at the time of its independence in 1960 Somalia was described as one of the few mono-ethnic states in Africa, one with a common language, a common culture and a single religion, Islam." He also gave evidence that, the Somali people are one of the most homogeneous in Africa (Prunier, 1995).

According to the European Union Agency for Asylum, the traditional political unit among the Somali society is based on a clan-family structure. One of the major clan, the Samaal, which makes almost three-quarters of the Somali inhabitants, split into four main clan-families: the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye. Another clan known as the Saab are divided into the Digil and Rahanwayn clan-families (EUAA, 2023; UNHCR, 2004).

These clans can have thousands of members, each claiming descent from a common ancestor are also subdivided into subclans. For eg. Isaaq: Arab, Ayuub, Garhajis, Habar Awal, Habar Jeclo, Tol Jecle, Sanbuur and Cibraan; Darod: Awrtable, Dhulbahante, Dishi she, Jidwaq, Leelkase, Majeerteen, Marehan, Mora'ase, Ogaden, Geri Koombe: Dir: Issa, Gadabuursi/Samaroon, Madahweyn or Madawini, Quranyow-Garre, Surre, Dabruube, Barsug, Madigan, Biimaal, Bajimal; Hawiye: Abgal, Mudulood, Gugundhabe, Xawaadle, Sheekhaal loobage, Baadi Cade, Jajeele, Geel-Jecel, Duduble, Habar Gedir, Murusade, Gorgate; Rahanweyn and Digil: Dabarre, Jiddu, Garre, Tunni, Geledi, and other minor clan divisions (Anglès, 2023; UNHCR, 2004). The hidden source of instability and long term crisis in Somalia are mainly based on the above mentioned clan differences.

Abdi M. K. investigates the core problem of the Somali conflict, which he expressed as not well understood by scholars. He argues that *scholars in Somali studies, especially that which dealt with the origin and culture of the people have accepted the homogeneity of the people without any extensive investigation of the cultural intricacies of the country* (Kursow, 1994: 31). He also adds that Somali political literature mainly focused on how colonial division had an impact on relations between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. To understand the root problem of the present conflict in Somalia, it is important to get full knowledge of the formation of the origin of the clans, mostly how the clans developed their current identities, nationalistic emotions of solidarity against their external enemies but also their weak side and differences which hindered them not to create strong national unity between them (Kursow, 1982: 183). Even though Somalia has a single ethnic group and religion, its internal politics have long been convoluted through clan factions. The clan dynamics play a central role in any understanding of the situation in Somalia which led to the problem of peace and order in Somalia (Loubser, 2012). According to the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCRD), Clans could have the role of political units. Their territorial exclusiveness, depends on "their regular seasonal movements for pasture and semi-permanent settlements. Clan members derive their identity from their common agnatic descent rather than the sense of territorial belonging. The clan, in other words the upper limit of political action, has some territorial properties, and is often led by a clan-head, but remains without centralized administration or government" (ACCORD, 2009: 6). Without investigation of the socio-political and cultural relations of the past events, it is impossible to explore the present-day disinte-

gration and conflict in Somalia. In line with this, Abdi M. K can be mentioned among others who investigated important circumstances that contributed to the current situations in Somalia (Loubser, 2012).

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS EFFORTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS

The capacity for conflict resolution should be based primarily on building up the knowledge of the local problem. The internal problems of Somalis are clan-based, so clan elders must be taken into consideration for conflict resolution. R. Apthorpe, H. Ketei, M. Salih, A. Wood, argue that the international community lack awareness of this knowledge in the process of conflict resolution in Somalia. They state that, the international community through United Nations peace-keeping operation has paid little attention to this type of conflict resolution mechanism. Mostly this problem happens as the result of the inclination of the United Nations which officially deals only with governments (Apthorpe, Ketei, Salih, Wood, 1995: 72).

Somalia, after its independence, claimed parts of the territories of its neighbors. This includes parts of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. Post-Cold War era conflicts in the Horn of Africa occurred mainly within states rather than between states. This doesn't mean that neighboring states didn't play a significant role in initiating or preparing violence in each state's affairs. A. A. Elmi argues that some interference takes place because of humanitarian disasters, and others want to stop civil conflicts which may destabilize border regions and generate inflows of refugees into their territory as a defense mechanism. Other main reasons for intervention may take place as the result of pursuing their geopolitical interests (Elmi, 2010: 9).

The problem of a structural problem in Somalia was addressed by different scholars. The main problem concerns, the reason that local leaders consider no benefits in institutional reconstruction and had local parallel structures based on clans that provided some kind of authority. The outcome of this phenomenon is that clans became successful self-controlling entities all over the Somali region as they shaped out areas of impact (Cunh, 2013: 79). Generally, the outbreak of civil war in Somalia was not surprising. It was the outcome of the relationship of numerous historical, social and political developments which molded the political and socio-economic construction of this country (Dersso, 2009). The Somali scholars have contributed to fostering solidarity among the Somali nation. Concerning this, issue, Lee V. Cassanelli and John W. Johnson, investigated the concept of formation of a formal association of Somali scholars which was established in 1978 (Cassanelli, Johnson, 1979: 57).

Regional organizations have played a vital role in intrastate conflict resolution such as in Somalia. Various scholars confirm the concept of the emergence of regional organizations' role and its important features of the post-Cold War era, which increasingly is prominent in contemporary international relations. According to Victor A. O. Adetula, mostly international relations affairs in the post-Cold War era are based on complicated correlations of the defining characteristics of the global system which considers a regionalist approach in the process of the management of inter-state in-

teractions. This includes disputes at different stages, including national, regional and global situations. There are also constraints and challenges of states which are defensive in case of their sovereignty, regardless of their complex problems internally or externally. Regional organizations' activity in Africa are playing a significant in ensuring peace and security on the continent (Adetula, 2015: 9–10).

Table 1

Somali national reconciliation conferences

Conference	Date	Parties	Host Country	Facilitator
Djibouti I	5–11 June 1991	SPM, USC, SSDF, SPM, USC	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Djibouti II	15–21 July 1991	SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU, SDM	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti
Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation	January 1993	15 factions	Ethiopia	United Nations
Addis Conference on National Reconciliation	March 1993	15 faction	Ethiopia	United Nations–Government of Ethiopia
National Salvation Council (Sodere)	November 1996–January 1997	26 factions	Ethiopia Government of Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia
Cairo Conference	November 1997	Hussein Aideed's government & NSC	Egypt	Government of Egypt
Somalia National Peace Conference (Arta)	May–August 2000		Kenya IGAD/ Government of Keny	Government of Keny
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (Eldoret/Mbagathi)	2002–2004		Kenya IGAD/	IGAD/Government of Keny
Nairobi Informals	1994		Kenya	United Nations
Yemen	May 1997	Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto	Yemen	Government of Yemen
Nakuru talks	Nakuru talks 1999 Nakuru, Kenya Government of Kenya	1999	Nakuru, Kenya	Government of Kenya
Khartoum	2006	TFG, ICU Sudan Arab League	Sudan	Arab League
Djibouti	2008–2009	TFG, ARS-Djibouti	Djibouti	United Nations

Source: P. Johnson, *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, 2009, https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/2009_Som_Interpeace_A_History_Of_Mediation_In_Somalila_Since_1988_EN.pdf, 2009 (2.02.2022).

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had strongly involved to tackle the conflict in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. This organization consists of seven Eastern African states. Its main aim was to maintain peace, prosperity and regional integration between partner states. Major conflicts in the Horn of Africa embrace the civil war in Darfur, the problem of the fragile state in Somalia, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the conflict between North and South Sudan and a border clash between Eritrea and Djibouti (Healy, 2009: 1). The role of IGAD in the regional security stabilization is not the sole contributor to seek a solution in Somalia, but should be considered as part of international efforts to conflict prevention. On the other hand, this organization deals with the ambitions of the peoples of the continent

to cope with continental and regional crises without foreign involvement. S. Healy, compares the effectiveness of the structural conditions of regionalism in Africa and Europe. She states that, "Regionalism in Europe was built on the foundation of strong nation-states, each comprising a government capable of protecting its borders, exercising control of its territory, enjoying a monopoly of the legitimate use of force and capable of providing security and community to all its citizens. This combination of the attributes of statehood is lacking in many African countries" (Healy, 2009: 1). The above-mentioned fact shows the reality of efforts done by IGAD for the regional stabilization specifically in Somalia and the reason for its failure to bring the last solution to conflicts that happened in the Horn of Africa.

STATE FRAGILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Long-term civil war in Somalia led to fragility and weakened the state apparatus. State failure has traditionally been investigated from the functioning of an institutional point of view. Primarily the emphasis on the capability of institutions and the proper structures of the state administration. In case of civil unrest and chaos in a state like Somalia, problems can be expanded to various groups in the community which could escalate the situation. For example, non-state actors in a failed state may find a chance to enhance their activities within and beyond the borders of the state. Similarly, external groups may take advantage of the anarchy within the failed state to carry out their actions (Gibaja, 2010: 11). The state's success or failure depends on various factors. Among others, the capacity of its efficiency concerning the distribution of the most important needs of the society indicates whether the states are strong or failed states (R. I. Rotberg). This was the real fact that has taken place in Somalia since the beginning of the conflict.

The case of humanitarian space was one of the important issues during the Somali conflict. This concept is based on the legal framework of humanitarian space in International Humanitarian Law. The problem of the lack of adherence by the conflicting parties to the International Humanitarian Law has been one of the major problems. The principle of humanitarian space was regulated by the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols to protect civilians (*Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*).

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE SOMALI CONFLICT

There is no doubt that Somalia's neighbors, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti as well as other two regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have played a significant role in Somalia's internal conflict.

After the end of the cold war, internal conflicts affected almost all states of the horn of Africa, mostly this problem affected Somalia. Neighboring countries have inter-

vened in Somalia for different reasons. Afyare A. M. among others states that (Elmi, 2010: 90):

– Humanitarian motives for humanitarian disasters;
– Fear of civil conflicts which may affect neighboring countries by producing refugees and destabilizing the border regions;
– Intervention for self-defense, there are also strong arguments that, that countries intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries as the result of realizing their own geographical interests.

During the 1990s several international interventions have taken place in Somalia. Among these, between 1992 and 1995 three different interventions had made an effort to improve the violation in Somalia. The initial attempt was to focus on immediate humanitarian aid, but the ultimate goal of the international community was aimed at a peacebuilding operation. D. Kenning writes that, "the motivations, attitudes and actions during these operations have had a large influence not only on Somalia's current situation but also, arguably, have led to grave consequences in subsequent global events such as the genocide in Rwanda" (Kenning, 2011: 63–64).

As the result of the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a conflict broke out in Somalia between various clan factions. The United Nations decided to seek solutions in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other organizations, to address the problem. Severe humanitarian crisis had happened which caused nearly 1 million refugees internally displaced and the other 5 million citizens of Somalia were endangered by famine and poor health situations. In January 1992, the Security Council approved an arms embargo against Somalia. Following worsening situations in Somalia, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (*UNOSOM I*) was deployed in April 1992 (*UNOSOM I*, 1992).

In 1991, the situation in Somalia deteriorated quickly after the downfall of the repressive dictator in Somalia. As the result of uprisings among those who ousted the ruling regime began a civil war. Violence and drought brought a terrible famine throughout the country. Following the deterioration of situations and humanitarian crisis the Security Council resolution 794, was adopted on Dec. 3, 1992 to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Subsequently, President George H. W. Bush, publicly announced that Unites States' ground troops would be committed to Somalia to protect international efforts there. This operation was named Operation RESTORE HOPE, which began on 8 December 1992 under the direction of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (Lofland, 1992; Brown, 1994; Vanderpool, 2022).

In launching Operation Restore Hope, the multinational coalition faced a complex, tense, and rapidly unfolding situation. This mission achieved its goals, including mutual understanding with the Somalis, by combining political, military, and humanitarian actions. However, different approaches of U.S. and UN concepts of the mission and subsequent changes in the mission's scope led almost inevitably to confrontation. (Lofland, 1992; Brown, 1994; Vanderpool, 2022).

According to John S. Brown: "Although the United Nations continued to play an important part in the politics within the country, especially in the delicate negotiations between rival Somali factions, its role was soon overshadowed by U.S. military and

diplomatic power. Security Council Resolution 794, passed on 3 December, endorsed the U.S.-led operation and gave it its international flavor and legitimacy, but the UN simply lacked the logistics, command and control, or intelligence capabilities to undertake such a complex mission" (Brown, 1994).

According to Ahmed Ismail and Reginald Green, the international media didn't reveal the crisis to the international community on time, which delayed intervention of humanitarian response in order to help hundreds of thousands of people that were affected by the civil war (Kenning, 2011: 64).

The international community has been concerned with the deteriorating and terrible condition in Somalia, motivated the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the peaceful solution to the conflict in Somalia (*Somalia, UNISOM I*, 1992).

Initially, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created as the result of coming to power by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006. This force became the dominant power and controlled the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Meantime, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), was supporting the maintenance of peace concerning protection and training Mission which was indorsed by IGAD and the AU to be located in Somalia in 2006. It was substituted by AMISOM, by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 19 January 2007. Based on the common understanding of the situation in Somalia between the AU and United Nations (UN) the UN Security Council (UNSC), through Resolution 1744 of 2007 endorsed the Peace and Security Council decision and approved the deployment of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia (*Exit of AMISOM*, 2022). AMISOM deployed during the frequent eruptions of fights in Mogadishu (the capital of Somalia) which caused the death of many citizens and the dislocation of others. Major tangible, alleviating, successes of AMISOM have been the retaking of large territories which were under the control of Al-Shabaab as well as other Armed factions.

The Somali conflict is a multidimensional conflict that began on January 27, 1991, when President Siad Barre's regime fell. General Barre's regime was marked by excessive brutality, the eradication of both nationalistic and Islamic opposition groups, and the escalation of interclan tensions (clannism). By 1988, dissatisfaction with the administration had led to attacks on government and military posts across the country, with Northern Somalia (modern-day Somaliland) leading the fight, sparking the First Somali Civil War (1988–1991).

The fall of Siad Barre's rule and the Somali Civil War produced a power vacuum, allowing nationalist and Islamic parties, warlords, clan and sub-clan militias, and other actors to carve off swaths of land for their own governance. Following that, different regional and international institutions launched various peace initiatives.

The inter-clan rivalry has exacerbated tensions between the federal government and regional states, making the process of reaching an agreement and establishing states, as well as establishing peace, difficult. The upheaval ended in Somaliland declaring independence in 1991, albeit it is still not recognized by any country, and So-

malia retains control of the northern territory. The Puntland area in northern Somalia declared partial autonomy in 1998, indicating that they retain the freedom to function autonomously while remaining part of the Somalia Federal Government. More than a million people have died as a result of conflict caused by both internal and external sources, with many more fleeing to neighboring nations (*Somali Civil War*, 2022).

Even though some developments have taken place regarding peace and security issues in Somalia after the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012, Al-Shabab still remained the major problem of political uncertainty. In this fragile state, about 2.9 million citizens were internally displaced across the country in 2021, Somalia is characterized by the highest figures of displaced persons compared to similar global problems (*Somalia Crisis Response Plan*, 2022).

THE PROBLEM OF MIGRATION

The civil war caused internal and external migration which was based on push and pull factors. Insecurity and lack of employment related to economic opportunities, hostility between Al Shabaab and government forces, poverty, and political situations such as clan discrimination and oppression are identified as push factors. According to research studies made in 2016, internally displaced persons in Somalia also faced various problems such as lack of basic humanitarian aid and confronted with the problem of social, economic, and political barriers and even integration into their new place within Somalia (*Somalia Country Statement*, 2017). At the same time Somali refugees in camps in Kenya, most notably in the complex at Dadaab, may conclude that sporadic migration to Europe or the Middle East was a more attractive route than returning to Somalia. The uncertain status of Somali refugees in Kenya and disappointments linked with restrictions placed on them by the Kenyan government as well can be considered also as push factors. The study concludes that Somali refugees neither in Kenya nor Somalia could see their opportunities and focused their migration direction to Europe, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, North America was seen as the only possible way to success, which could be regarded as a pull factor. In addition to that, pull factors for Somali migration were associated with the widely accepted opinion of better chances for the Somali diaspora, and the presence of friends and family members living in economically prosperous locations were some of the pull factors (*Somalia Country Statement*, 2017).

From the beginning of 2020, problems such as extensive floods, desert Locust plagues, and the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the worsening of humanitarian situations. The humanitarian needs among the citizens aggravated the already existing widespread poverty and decades of armed conflict and insecurity among Somalis. Climate change also remains one of the major reasons for dislocation in Somalia. For example, flooding displaced 919,000 people in 2020 and demolished essential infrastructure, property, and 144,000 hectares of arable lands (*Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview*, 2021).

In 2022, conflict and insecurity have caused hundreds of thousands of people to escape their birthplaces which remained significant drivers of displacement (*Somalia*

Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2021). Humanitarian organizations sustained to help to ease the hostile consequences of the drought emergency in Somalia. The drought affected about 4.5 million people, in December 2021, and this number is thought to be rising at the time of the report (*Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin*, February 2022). Humanitarian threats in 2022 continued as the result of political disputes, mainly parliamentary and presidential election suspensions which caused armed conflicts, displacing 207,000 citizens in 2021. Violence has erupted between clan militias, security forces and al-Shabab. According to Human Rights Watch, all parties have been suspected of human rights abuses (Watchlist, 2022).

The Somali armed conflict brought tremendous political and social problems. As a result of the conflict, borders became out of the control of the central government. The state lost its main duty, instead, non-state actors play an increasing role in the daily life of the people. Unlawful behaviors such as plundering and robbery have been extended all over the country. Noncombatants paid the heaviest price of conflict rather than fighting factions (Loubser, 2012).

Abdi, Mohamed A., discovered possibilities for conflict resolution and nation-building and introduced some versions as potential approaches for nation-building. Convincingly, he mentioned as a home-grown, traditional mechanisms model which he recommended to attain long-lasting peace and security for Somalia (Abdi, 2010).

RECENT TRENDS IN SOMALIA

The latest realities indicate that there are still deep divisions between Somalis since the end of the Cold War. When Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo came to power as the 9th President of the Federal Republic of Somalia came to power in 2017, he had large public support. He promised to reform the electoral system and that, the next election would be under a "one person, one vote." He wanted to democratize the political system rather than the clan-based one, but the move was unsuccessful because of instability initiated by militias and radical politicians (*Somalia Elects a New President*, 2022). The African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM – has ended its 15-year political and military experiment in post-conflict state-building. On 1 April 2022, a shift took place as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) came into being to pave the way for lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa country (*Somalia is still fragile*, 2022).

CONCLUSION

Numerous peace initiatives including the peacemaking initiative in Somalia have failed. Indigenous clan structures dominate the political and social relations of Somalis, even though they are thought to be the most homogeneous nation in the entire continent of Africa.

The lack of trust between various groups or clans, regarding who might exercise or control the central political power and economic resources of the state are the

major problems. The rivalry by various groups for the control of every aspect of central institutions weakened the role of the central government concerning the state's monopoly of violence. The general concept of the traditional social structures, comprising of the clan and sub-clan identity are the dominant means of seizing political power which is the key source of long-lasting conflict between the Somali clans. National Reconciliation to consolidate the central government is the only viable solution to stop violence and bring peace and economic development to Somalia. The United Nations through its efforts spared thousands of lives through humanitarian aid and tried to end violence in Somalia. Despite its long-term efforts, the UN failed to bring significant and tangible progress concerning national reconciliation and sustainable peace and security. The AU mission has been successful regarding expelling Al-Shabaab from key urban areas, creating space for Somali elites to build institutions and political structures, but it failed to defeat totally Al-Shabaab and stop violence in Somalia.

IGAD has made its best attempts to seek peace and stability in the process of reconciliation in Somalia. The reason for its failure is due to political approaches of the member states towards Somalia; member states of IGAD are also close neighbours of Somalia which could have different approaches regarding concepts of forwarding and implementations of peace process, they also lack financial sources to fund peace operations. The greatest challenge lies not only on the battlefield. Restoring relations between Somali leaders and clans, needs to stimulate diplomatic efforts of peace and security by international community, building an effective Somali national army, refreshing joint efforts of the UN, AU and IGAD to organize all-inclusive, broad-based and representative institutions to hold peace talks are recommended for lasting peace in Somalia.

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ABSTRACT

        The main purpose of the article is to investigate and analyze the inter-clan conflict and its
consequences as well as the role of subregional and international organizations such as Afri-
can Unions in conflict resolution and peace-building efforts in Somalia. Compared to various
regions in Africa, the Horn of Africa was the region that was the most affected by internal and
external conflicts. In this region, Somalia faced not only Clan problems but also suffered from
rule dictatorial rules. The research hypothesis states that, traditional social structures, compris-
ing of the clan and sub-clan identity are the main factors of disagreement and the international
community peace initiatives couldn't bring lasting peace in Somalia. Investigation questions
include: What are the root causes of Somali conflict? What are the effects of the role of regional
and international organizations in Somali conflict resolution? Despite being the most homo-
geneous nations in Africa, why did Somalis have one of the longest civil wars in the Horn of
Africa? The tension in Somalia which began after the downfall of the central government in
Somalia in 1991 convoluted the well-being of the citizens in the region. Among the states of
the Horn of Africa, Somalia turned out to be one the most affected regarding instability and hu-
manitarian and political turmoil. This article tries to explore the main problems Somalia faced
after the end of the Cold War, the consequences of the conflict and other issues related to social
and political problems taken place in Somalia. The research mainly depends on the qualitative
method of data collection analysis.

Keywords: Somalia, clan, conflict, international organization, peace process, state fragility

KONFLIKTY MIĘDZYKLANOWE I DŁUGA DROGA DO BUDOWANIA PAŃSTWA W SOMALII – SKUTKI WEWNĘTRZNE I MIĘDZYNARODOWE

STRESZCZENIE

Głównym celem artykułu jest zbadanie i analiza konfliktu międzyklanowego i jego konsekwencji, a także roli organizacji subregionalnych i międzynarodowych, takich jak Unia Afrykańska, w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów i budowaniu pokoju w Somalii. W porównaniu z różnymi regionami Afryki, Róg Afryki był i jest regionem najbardziej dotkniętym konfliktami wewnętrznymi i zewnętrznymi. W tym regionie Somalia borykała się nie tylko z problemami klanowymi, ale także cierpiała z powodu rządów dyktatorskich. Hipoteza badawcza artykułu stwierdza, że tradycyjne struktury społeczne, na które składa się tożsamość klanowa i podklanowa, są głównymi czynnikami konfliktu, a inicjatywy pokojowe społeczności międzynarodowej nie przyniosły trwałego pokoju w Somalii. Pytania badawcze obejmują: Jakie są podstawowe przyczyny konfliktu somalijskiego? Jakie są skutki zaangażowania organizacji regionalnych i międzynarodowych w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów w Somalii? Dlaczego Somalijczycy, mimo że są najbardziej jednorodną grupą etniczną w Afryce, stoczyli jedną z najdłuższych wojen domowych w Somalii? Konflikt w Somalii, który zaczął się po upadku rządu centralnego w 1991 r., doprowadził do biedy i nędzy mieszkańców. Wśród państw Rogu Afryki Somalia okazała się jednym z najbardziej dotkniętych niestabilnością, kryzysami humanitarnymi i politycznymi. W artykule podjęto próbę zbadania głównych problemów, z jakimi borykała się Somalia po zakończeniu „zimnej wojny”, konsekwencji konfliktu oraz innych kwestii związanych z problemami społecznymi i politycznymi. Badania opierają się głównie na jakościowej metodzie analizy zbieranych danych.

Słowa kluczowe: Somalia, klan, konflikt, organizacja międzynarodowa, proces pokojowy, niestabilność państwa