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DOI : 10.14746/ps.2023.1.24

## **THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTRIES TOWARDS THE FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

On 24 February 2022, troops of the Russian Federation launched an attack on Ukrainian territory. The official reason for the aggression was to protect the population of the Donbas from alleged genocide and also to “demilitarise and denazify Ukraine.” Russian news reports did not use the word war, but called it “special military operation” (Wilk, Domańska, 2022). The outcome of this confrontation is certain to determine the international order that will be in place in Europe for decades to come. The Ukrainian struggle is largely a battle over whether great powers can use force to coerce other countries to reorient their foreign policies in the 21st century. Moreover, there is no doubt that the final outcome of the war will also influence the further direction of Russia itself and provide an answer as to whether Russian society will continue to function under such an authoritarian system (Laruelle, 2022). However, it is worth considering how Russian full-scale aggression has affected international relations in the post-Soviet space and what actions have been taken by the authorities of the countries in that region. This article examines the attitudes of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Ukraine and Russia after 24 February 2022.

This article is intended to answer not only the question of how the relations of the South Caucasus countries with Ukraine and Russia were shaped during the first year after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of its western neighbor, but also to indicate the main directions of the foreign policy of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. For the purposes of the article, a research hypothesis was created, assuming that neither Armenia, nor Azerbaijan, nor Georgia, after the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, decided to take actions that would directly harm the interests of the Kremlin which would also be consistent with the policies of the United States and the European Union against the aggressor, because none of the South Caucasus countries bases its political, economic or military security on an alliance with the West. The article mainly uses the decision-making method (which was applied in discussing the decisions that were taken by the authorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Russia and Ukraine after 24 February 2022), the comparative method (in identifying the similarities and differences in the behaviour of all the three Caucasian countries after the start of the Russian full-scale aggression against its western neighbour)

and one of the general logical methods, namely analysis (in determining what factors played a key role in the specific decisions taken by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Ukraine and Russia after 24 February 2022).

### **STRATEGIC SILENCE: ARMENIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE**

Armenia is a country whose political system is marked by great instability, susceptibility to upheaval and anti-government campaigns (Fedorowicz, 2017: 404). In 2018, the country experienced the so-called Velvet Revolution, which brought Nikola Pashinyan to power. As a result of the mass protests that took place in April 2018 as well as the parliamentary elections held in late 2018, the so-called Karabakh clan (Benedyczak, 2018), which had shaped the country's internal and foreign policy directions since 1998, was ousted from power. The actions taken by Armenia's rulers after the start of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine should be described as subdued. The phrase "strategic silence" has even been used in some circles (Giragosian, 2022). Armenia has not officially supported the attacked side either politically or militarily. It is noteworthy that only a week after the full-scale aggression began, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he was saddened that the war had started and expressed hope that the two sides would soon work out a compromise by engaging in bilateral talks (Jagielski, 2022a). Moreover, the camp that is in opposition to the current prime minister, centred around Robert Kocharyan, has also remained silent on the issue. In addition to this, Armenia has made a number of gestures in international forums that have been much welcomed by the Kremlin. During the vote in the Council of Europe to suspend Russia's membership in the organisation, Armenia spoke out against this measure (Ossowski, 2022). It was the only country (apart from Russia) that decided to take such a step (Avetisyan, 2022). Moreover, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that condemned the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory, Armenia was among the countries that abstained (Górzyński, 2022). The visit of Armenian Minister of Defense Suren Papikyan to Moscow on the second day after the start of the full-scale invasion was also poorly received in the West. Some Western political elites began to wonder whether this did not mean Armenia joining the war. However, this was denied by officials of this Caucasian republic.

However, Armenia has refrained from recognising the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, the two separatist entities established in eastern Ukraine. The authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic adopted a completely different stance on the matter, promptly congratulating the separatists on their international recognition by Russia (without, however, deciding to do so themselves). It is also worth noting that no mass rallies were organised in Yerevan (unlike in the capitals of the other South Caucasus countries) to express solidarity with the Ukrainian people after the Russian full-scale aggression (Jagielski, 2022a). Moreover, marches organised by local communists to express support for Russian actions in Ukraine were often held in response to small-scale demonstrations in support of the Ukrainian people,

featuring Russian songs and the infamous letter Z – the symbol of the Russian invasion (Krzysztań, 2022a).

Why have the Armenian authorities, and Armenians themselves, behaved in this way after 24 February 2022? This is mainly due to the fact that Armenia is Russia's closest ally in the region of all the three South Caucasus countries. Indeed, Russia is Armenia's most important guarantor of security (Legieć, 2019). There is a Russian military base on its territory and Russian soldiers support Armenians in the protection of the borders with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran. This is important because Armenia is surrounded on its western and eastern sides by hostile countries. It should be remembered that Armenia borders Azerbaijan to the east (the two countries have been locked in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh for many years) and Turkey to the west (their relations are strained mainly due to the Armenian genocide that occurred in the Ottoman Empire during World War I) (Raś, Włodkowska-Bagan, 2018: 303–304). The closed borders to the east and west mean that Armenia *de facto* operates in some isolation and relies heavily on the development of cooperation with the Russian Federation in the political, economic and military fields. One example of this is that Armenia belongs to all the integration structures that have been created in the Eurasian area at the Kremlin's initiative: it is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian soldiers are permanently stationed in Armenia while Russian companies and concerns dominate the country's economy (the energy sphere is a special example). For many Armenians, Russia is also the main destination for economic migration, as a result of which the country is currently home to the world's largest Armenian diaspora (taking into account all the countries where Armenians live).

Armenia's lack of support for Ukraine also stems from the fact that Armenians remember very well the attitude that Volodymyr Zelensky adopted during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. At that time, Kyiv sided with Azerbaijan in the dispute, as exemplified by its supplies of weapons to this country. Ukraine's backing of the Azerbaijani side obviously resulted from its domestic politics, as support for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh (and by extension Armenia) would have called into question Ukraine's own struggle for territorial integrity and thus would have implied its consent to any recognition of the separatists in Lugansk and Donetsk (Jagielski, 2022a). However, it should also be noted that quite many Armenians view the Ukrainian leader's attitude during the Russian full-scale aggression with much envy. Many of them believe that no Armenian political leader showed such a heroic stance during the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh as the Ukrainian president did in 2022 (Krzysztań, 2022a).

Armenia is watching with great anxiety what impact the war in Ukraine will have on Russia itself. From the outset, Armenia's political elite was aware that the fallout from an economic crisis in Russia (which will worsen as a result of Western sanctions) could affect the situation in this Caucasian republic. This was already evident in the spring of 2022, when the Russian government restricted exports of various goods to the Eurasian Economic Union countries. In the case of Armenia, this caused bread prices to rise after Russia restricted grain exports. Due to the fall in the value of the rouble, we are already seeing a decline in remittances provided by Armenians who have left for the Russian Federation for work (Jagielski, 2022a).

## PLAYING BOTH SIDES: AZERBAIJAN'S ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

These days, Azerbaijan is often called a dynastic republic because power has been held by one family, the Aliyev clan, since 1993. Heydar Aliyev was the undisputed leader of this Caucasian republic from 1993 to 2003 and his son Ilham has followed since 2003 (Siwiec, Baluk, 2007: 207). In this country, all the most important institutions are staffed by people who are trusted by the current president. The Azerbaijani government found itself in a difficult position at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, largely due to the fact that President Aliyev has for years pursued a policy of not entering into closer political alliances, either with the Russian Federation or the wider West. This is expressed in the doctrine of neutrality, which was already in place under the current president's father, Heydar Aliyev. By acting in this way, Azerbaijan seeks to advance its own interests in the international arena without upsetting relations with its northern neighbour.

However, it has become a problem that the Russian Federation, by carrying out its full-scale aggression against Ukraine and recognising the independence of the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics, has undermined something that is central to Azerbaijan's domestic and foreign policy, namely the principle of territorial integrity. Indeed, throughout its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh since the early 1990s, Azerbaijan has emphasised the fact that territorial integrity is an indisputable principle in international relations and that each state should exercise control over the territories that are part of it under international law. By unequivocally supporting the Russian Federation in this conflict, Azerbaijan would have to recognise that the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state is irrelevant and thus inevitably contradict its own policy towards Nagorno-Karabakh to date (Krzysztań, 2022b). The importance of this principle to the Azerbaijani government is evidenced by the declaration on deepening the strategic partnership that Ilham Aliyev and Volodymyr Zelensky signed on 15 January 2022, in which the two presidents pledged mutual support for the territorial integrity of their respective countries (*Władimir*, 2022).

The actions taken by Russia after February 24, 2022 have therefore put Azerbaijan in a rather difficult position. The Azerbaijani government played two sides in early 2022, which is evidenced by the fact that two days before Russia full-scale invaded Ukraine, Aliyev signed an agreement on "strategic alliance" with Russia. This happened at the moment when Moscow recognised the independence of the two separatist entities in eastern Ukraine, the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic. However, the Azerbaijani president said nothing about this fact at the press conference that marked the signing of the agreement (Jagielski, 2022b), which was intended as a form of rapprochement with the Russian Federation in political, military and economic terms. Indeed, the Russian government had for years pursued initiatives to bring Azerbaijan closer to such integration structures as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, Azerbaijan was not and is not interested in real integration, as it considers Russia more of a threat than an ally. Through this agreement, Azerbaijan has managed to achieve what it considers crucial, namely Russian support for the country's

territorial integrity. Furthermore, the Russian side committed not to support any initiatives that would undermine this integrity. This agreement *de facto* confirmed the Russian Federation's consent for Azerbaijan to pursue its multi-vector foreign policy in the international arena (Ochman, 2022).

Baku has opted not to join the Western sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation after it launched the war in Ukraine. It has also refrained from transferring military equipment to the Ukrainian side (Ochman, 2022). Nor have government officials, including Ilham Aliyev, officially condemned the Russian aggression. However, if we look at the decisions taken by the Azerbaijani government after 24 February 2022, we can see that in certain areas Azerbaijan has been closer to supporting the victim than the aggressor in this conflict. For example, it is telling that the pro-government media have taken a pro-Ukrainian stance. Moreover, Azerbaijan has been providing humanitarian support to Ukraine since the very beginning of the conflict. Oil was donated free of charge to medical and fire services at all SOCAR fuel stations in Ukraine. There were also demonstrations in the capital Baku in 2022 which featured slogans expressing support for the Ukrainian side in this war. The regime allowed them to take place, which is also a telling fact given the highly repressive political system that exists in Azerbaijan. The energy factor is also an important factor influencing Azerbaijan's pro-Ukrainian attitude. The authorities in Baku are trying to take advantage of Russia's weakening position on the energy market by developing its relations in this sector with European Union countries. Therefore, they take advantage of the current situation to pursue their economic interests.

Another important thread to examine is the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the Karabakh issue. To a large extent, this war has led to an even greater destabilisation of the disputed region. There is no doubt that Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has encouraged Azerbaijan, which cannot be fully satisfied after the victorious 2020 war, to act even more boldly (Górecki, Strachota, 2021). After all, it has been unable to convert its undisputed victory on the battlefield into political gains, as it has not only failed to regain total control over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also has to tolerate Russian peacekeepers in the region. The victory was achieved thanks to the massive military support that Ankara provided to Baku (Górecki, Chudziak, 2021). This Turkish support for Azerbaijan was also a major factor that deterred Russia from getting involved in these clashes on Armenia's side (Kuzio, 2020). Seeing increased Russian tolerance for its actions, Azerbaijan carried out a series of military operations in 2022 aimed at capturing more territory in Nagorno-Karabakh. One such incident occurred on 28 March 2022, when Azerbaijani forces entered the village of Farrukh located on the border of Nagorno-Karabakh and the former so-called occupied territories (Górecki, 2022a). Similar incidents took place in August and September 2022, with the aim of increasing pressure on Armenia (and indirectly on Russia) to engage in peace talks that would further strengthen the Azerbaijani side (Legieć, 2022). Some researchers are even of the opinion that the events of September 2022 (when local armed clashes occurred on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan) were intended as a test of whether Russia would support its Caucasian ally at a critical moment for Armenia (Glantz, 2022). Indeed, the Azerbaijani government assumes that Russia's involvement in the war in Ukraine will be a key factor that could lead to the signing of an

agreement on terms favourable to the Azerbaijani side (Grigoryan, 2023). In addition, the Russian government is aware that Turkey and Azerbaijan are currently vital trade partners. The development of trade cooperation with both countries is particularly important in the context of mitigating the Western sanctions imposed on Vladimir Putin's regime after 24 February 2022. In addition to this, Azerbaijan also plays an extremely important role in the context of the Russian Federation's economic cooperation with countries such as Iran and India.

### AMBIGUITY: GEORGIA'S ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

The Georgian Dream party has been in power in Georgia since 2012. It has won all the elections held in the country over the past decade. It has triumphed in parliamentary elections three times in a row (in 2012, 2016 and 2020), won local elections three times (in 2021, candidates of the Georgian Dream became mayors in 19 of the 20 largest cities in Georgia), while two candidates it supported (i.e. Giorgi Margvelashvili in 2013 and Salome Zourabichvili in 2018) were elected president of this Caucasian republic. Despite the changes in domestic policy compared to the previous government of the United National Movement, the Georgian Dream officially declared the continuation of the pro-Western direction in foreign policy after 2012 (Legieć, 2022b). Even if we look at the Georgian constitution we can see that Article 78 contains a provision on seeking membership in the European Union and NATO (Maisaia, 2022). The government's actions in recent years (and also after Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine) *de facto* contradict these pledges as its attitude towards the Russian-Ukrainian war can be described as ambiguous. Although Georgia joined the condemnation of the Russian full-scale aggression at the United Nations General Assembly and at the Council of Europe, its government took a number of decisions after February 2022 that certainly did not bring Tbilisi closer to Kyiv or to the West. These decisions (which will be discussed later in the text) raise the question of whether Georgia under the rule of the Georgian Dream is really seeking closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic structures or whether it is becoming an informal ally of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet area. At first glance, this question might seem unwarranted given the history of Georgian-Russian relations in the 21st century. Indeed, it should be noted that Georgia was the first country to face Putin's Russia in open military conflict in the 21st century (Grodzki, 2009: 9). That war ended with Russia *de facto* taking political control of two separatist and strategically important regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (*Parliamentary*, 2020). This was, of course, the result of the pro-Western course taken by the government in Tbilisi after the so-called Rose Revolution of 2003. The group that took power at that time, the United National Movement headed by Mikheil Saakashvili, openly proclaimed its desire to join the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union (Demedziuk, 2017: 185). The 2008 war led to the international recognition of the two separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation and the severance of diplomatic relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, which have still not been resumed.

It would seem, therefore, that a country which clashed militarily with the Russian Federation in the 21st century would adopt an unambiguously anti-Russian stance during the war in Ukraine. However, this has not been the case and what is more, some of the decisions taken by the Georgian Dream government have overtly targeted Ukraine's interests. Georgia has not officially joined the Western sanctions against the Putin regime. From the very beginning of the conflict, the prime minister and other members of the Georgian government declared that Tbilisi would assist Ukraine on the humanitarian level, but would not provide any military support to the invaded side. In early 2023, the Ukrainian government even demanded that Georgia return the Buk surface-to-air missile systems that had been handed over to Tbilisi in 2008. The Georgian side replied that this would not happen as the systems had been formally purchased by the country's defence ministry (*Gruzja*, 2023). Georgian politicians also often claim that Ukraine is pressuring Georgia (by blackmail of sorts) to open the second front in the Caucasus during this war (one such example is the remarks made by the chairman of the Georgian Dream, Irakli Kobakhidze, on 20 October 2022). Of course, the Georgian Dream has not officially abandoned the slogan of regaining control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are an integral part of Georgia under international law, but it has pledged to use diplomatic means in pursuit of this goal. This attitude of Georgia (which involves distancing itself from Ukraine) is largely due to concerns about its own security. The government in Georgia continues to take into account the military threat from Russia and the fact that the West has not provided adequate security guarantees for this country.

The government of Ukraine, as well as independent analysts, increasingly point out that Georgia is helping the Russian Federation to circumvent the sanctions that have been imposed by the West. This mainly concerns the imports of military goods and so-called dual-use goods, which are smuggled into Russia by criminal groups (*Russian*, 2022). The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine raised this issue internationally as early as April 2022. In response to these accusations, the State Security Service of Georgia demanded that the Ukrainian side provide evidence of such trafficking (Górecki, 2022b). Some members of the Ukrainian government have even appealed to Georgian citizens to put pressure on those in power so that they stop allowing the transit of smuggled weapons through Georgian territory. Another highly symbolic gesture was the refusal to allow a chartered plane to take off with Georgian volunteers who wanted to support the Ukrainian troops in the very first days of the war.

When looking for an answer as to why Georgia made a series of gestures after 24 February 2022 that were highly welcomed by the Kremlin, we should take a closer look at the domestic politics of both Ukraine and Georgia itself. For several years, Georgian Dream had been highly critical of the fact that people close to Mikheil Saakashvili were taking up important positions in the Ukrainian administration. Saakashvili himself, after leaving Georgia and losing his citizenship of that country, built his political career in Ukraine (Dickinson, 2020). Importantly, this took place not only under Petro Poroshenko, but also after Volodymyr Zelensky became president. Saakashvili has a very close relationship with Petro Poroshenko, dating back to

the time when both politicians studied at one of Ukraine's universities. Starting from 2015, Saakashvili held a number of positions in Ukraine, having served as Chairman of the Odesa Regional State Administration and also as Chair of the National Reform Council. In addition, many people close to him have taken up lucrative jobs in the Ukrainian administration in recent years, including Alexander Kvitashvili, Eka Zguladze, Gia Getsadze and Giorgi Lortkipanidze (Rukhadze, 2015). This Ukrainian policy has frequently caused tensions in relations between Tbilisi and Kyiv since 2015. Indeed, it should be noted that an integral part of the Georgian Dream's political agenda all along has been to question the policies pursued by Saakashvili during his presidency and by his United National Movement from 2003 to 2012. A number of UNM politicians have been investigated for abuses of power, often resulting in convictions. The charges against and the conviction of Mikheil Saakashvili himself are the prime example of this. The former Georgian president was sentenced in 2018 to six years' imprisonment for abuse of power during his presidency and for organising an attack on opposition MP Valery Gelashvili, who was brutally beaten in Tbilisi in 2005 (*Gruzja*, 2018). An example that fits perfectly in this context came from the Georgian minister of culture, who, a few weeks after the start of Russia's assault on Ukraine, said that Ukraine had become a sanctuary for criminals who had fled the country. It should also be noted that the issue of Mikheil Saakashvili's release became the subject of a major dispute at the Council of Europe in October 2022. The resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 13 October 2022 that condemned Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine and called on its member states to declare the aggressor a "terrorist" state was strongly opposed by the Georgian delegation. The reason for this reaction was that a proposed amendment to the resolution stated explicitly that Saakashvili is now a political prisoner (Gabritchidze, 2022). The amendment also included an appeal to the Georgian government to quickly release the former president and stop repressing him on political grounds.

## CONCLUSION

In verifying the research hypothesis that was put forward in the Introduction to this text, it should be concluded that it is true. Looking at the actions of all the three South Caucasus countries, none of them has openly supported Ukraine on the political or military level. Nor have any of them joined the sanctions imposed on the aggressor by the West. Of course, Armenia's attitude following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine is hardly surprising. This country has been Moscow's most important ally in the South Caucasus region since 1998 (since the rule of the so-called Karabakh clan). The Armenian-Russian alliance has been increasingly put to the test since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, but it nevertheless continues, as Armenia has little choice but to rely on the Russian Federation for its security. Functioning in something of an isolation (with hostile countries across its eastern and western borders), it has been unable to take political or military steps that would be ill-received by the Kremlin after 24 February 2022. The most disappointing attitude



(from the point of view of Ukraine and the Western world) was shown in 2022 by Georgia, which still seeks membership in NATO and the European Union, at least declaratively. However, Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated that Georgia under the Georgian Dream is increasingly drifting away from the West. Its efforts to avoid irritating Russia in the international arena and decisions that align with the Kremlin's interests (such as Georgia's refusal to provide military support to Ukraine and its decision not to join the anti-Russian sanctions) are proof of a reorientation of the country's foreign policy. Paradoxically, the most pro-Ukrainian stance has been adopted by Azerbaijan, the country which is most distant from the Western world in terms of democratic standards. Obviously, this stance does not stem from a desire to improve Azerbaijan's image in the United States and in the countries of the European Union, but from its vested interests, i.e. the imperative of defending the principle of territorial integrity (which naturally relates to the Karabakh issue) and also from the desire to develop its relations in the energy sector with Western countries.

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## ABSTRACT

This article not only seeks to answer the question of how the South Caucasus countries reacted to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, but also to outline how international relations in the South Caucasus are currently evolving and identify the main foreign policy objectives of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. A research hypothesis was developed for the purpose of this article, which assumes that none of the South Caucasus countries are currently viable allies of the United States and the European Union in the region anymore, because following the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, neither Armenia, Azerbaijan nor Georgia have decided to take measures that would strike directly at Russian interests and also align with Western policy. In verifying the research hypothesis that was put forward in the Introduction to this text, it should be concluded that it is true. Looking at the actions of all the three South Caucasus countries, none of them has openly supported Ukraine on the political or military level. Nor have any of them joined the sanctions imposed on the aggressor by the West. The article mainly uses the decision-making method, the comparative method and one of the general logical methods, namely analysis.

**Keywords:** 2022, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, war in Ukraine

## POSTAWA PAŃSTW KAUKAZU POŁUDNIOWEGO WOBEC PEŁNOSKALOWEJ ROSYJSKIEJ AGRESJI NA UKRAINĘ

### STRESZCZENIE

Niniejszy artykuł ma odpowiedzieć nie tylko na pytanie, jak wyglądała reakcja państw Kaukazu Południowego na agresję Rosji na Ukrainę, ale też wskazać, jak obecnie kształtują się stosunki międzynarodowe na obszarze Kaukazu Południowego oraz jakie są główne cele polityk zagranicznych Armenii, Azerbejdżanu oraz Gruzji. Na potrzeby artykułu stworzona została hipoteza badawcza, zakładająca, że obecnie żadne z państw Kaukazu Południowego nie jest już realnym sojusznikiem Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz Unii Europejskiej na Kaukazie Południowym, ponieważ po agresji Federacji Rosyjskiej na Ukrainę, ani Armenia, ani Azerbejdżan, ani Gruzja nie zdecydowały się na podjęcie działań, które wprost uderzałyby w interesy rosyjskie i które jednocześnie byłyby zbieżne z polityką Zachodu. Dokonując weryfikacji hipotezy badawczej, która została postawiona we Wstępie niniejszego tekstu, należy stwierdzić, że jest ona

prawdziwa. Patrząc na działania wszystkich trzech państw z obszaru Kaukazu Południowego trudno dostrzec, aby któreś z nich otwarcie poparło na płaszczyźnie politycznej i militarnej Ukrainę. Żadne z nich nie dołączyło również do sankcji nakładanych przez Zachód na agresora. W artykule posłużono się głównie metodą decyzyjną, komparatystyczną oraz jedną z metod ogólnologicznych, czyli analizą.

**Słowa kluczowe:** 2022, Armenia, Azerbejdżan, Gruzja, wojna w Ukrainie