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THE SAME EVIL IN DIFFERENT FRAMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NARRATIVES ABOUT THE WEST BETWEEN RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION TARGETING UKRAINE AND CHINESE DISINFORMATION TARGETING TAIWAN

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INTRODUCTION

There are numerous differences between Ukraine and Taiwan, and their international situation. Both bear different historical and cultural legacies and have been in a hybrid war for years, targeted with disinformation campaigns by their authoritarian neighbour, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (PRC), respectively. Ukraine, obviously is in a more advanced stage of the escalation, waging a full-scale war since February 2022 after the invasion of Russia. It has a realistic perspective in front of it to be fully integrated into the Western alliance system being an internationally recognized, sovereign country, with EU membership candidacy since 2024 and participating in regular NATO-Ukraine bilateral meetings. The collective West sides with Ukraine, providing intelligence and information support, and countries on a bilateral basis and in various constructions and cooperations have sent financial and military aid to the country and introduced sanctions packages against the aggressor Russia. There is also a widely shared consensus that it is the West's strategic interest to help Ukraine's self-defence (Flockhart, Korosteleva, 2022: 1; Ash et al., 2023, chap. 9).

Taiwan, on the other hand, is not only geographically further from the countries constituting the Western alliance system but has also weaker perspectives to being integrated into them. The country is a valued trade partner the Western countries, and in certain aspects, it plays a key role in supplying products vital to cater to the strategic security of these countries such as chips and semiconductors. Yet, Taiwan is not internationally recognized as a sovereign country and even though Western countries'

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approaches differ regarding the level of its recognition, it is but a special, autonomous part of China, and it does not seem to be subject to change. Western countries largely align with the PRC's One China policy for more than half a century. Western rapprochement to Taiwan largely means the upkeeping of the status quo and avoiding the fate of Hong Kong which once made an attempt to democratization within China, despite the long-lasting political and social resistance was effectively melted into it.

Both Russia and China, as systemic challengers to the status quo and the hegemony of the United States, have conducted extensive, state-backed propaganda and disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian and Taiwanese audiences. The goal of these campaigns is to undermine public trust in the West and ultimately stop the respective country's rapprochement with the Western alliance system (*China will...*, 2021: 4; Hussain, Shah, Tabiullah, 2023: 2). Regarding the narratives used, there are some overlaps between the Russian and Chinese approaches. Both countries employ tactics such as the use of social media and computational propaganda to spread their narratives (Astuti, Attaymini, Dewi, 2022: 19–27; Cartwright et al., 2022: 15141–15163).

The narratives aim to frame the West in a negative light, portraying it as untrustworthy, unreliable, and a threat to the respective country's interests (Szostek, 2017b: 1–5; Cartwright et al., 2022: 15141–15163). In the case of Ukraine, Russian disinformation has focused on discrediting the West's support for Ukraine, sowing doubts about the credibility of Western media and institutions and promoting narratives that justify Russia's military intervention (Astuti, Attaymini, Dewi, 2022: 19–27; Oleinik, Paniotto, 2024: 17). Similarly, in the case of Taiwan, Chinese disinformation has targeted the island's rapprochement with the West, undermining the credibility of the US and its allies, and reinforcing the narrative of Taiwan's inevitable unification with the mainland (Matsuda, 2020: 57–79; Chang, Haider, Ferrara, 2021: 144–157; Cartwright et al., 2022: 15141–15163). However, there are also numerous differences between the two cases. The specific narratives and framing used by Russia and China may vary depending on the local context and the target audience (Matsuda, 2020). Additionally, the responses and counter-narratives from the targeted countries, Ukraine and Taiwan, have also differed, with Ukraine's efforts to counter Russian disinformation being more visible and organized (Marigliano, Hui Xian Ng, Carley, 2024: 1–24), while Taiwan's approach has been more focused on building resilience and digital civic participation (Chang, Haider, Ferrara, 2021: 144–157).

What makes the anti-Western narratives used in the disinformation campaigns targeted at Ukraine and Taiwan worthy of comparison is the fact, that in both cases the campaigns are state-sponsored and state-backed. The strategic narratives applied by the Russian Federation and the PRC pursue the same goal, which is to stop the given country's rapprochement with the West and surrender themselves to the imperialistic ambitions of their authoritarian neighbors.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The strategic narratives applied by the Russian Federation and the PRC pursue the same goal, which is to stop the given country's rapprochement with the West and surren-

der themselves to the imperialistic ambitions of their authoritarian neighbours. The paper uses the concept of strategic narrative (Steele, 2012: 552–553; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, Roselle, 2013: 15–27). While there are detailed works examining China’s strategic narratives (Hartig, 2015: 245–258; Cole, 2022: 96), they usually work with a broader focus than Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan about the West. Given that Russia’s strategic narratives about the West are a rather well-researched topic (Szostek, 2017c: 379–395; 2017a: 571–539), the comparison is well-founded and possible. The concept of strategic narrative builds on that of soft power (Nye Jr, 1990: 153–171), but puts it in a contemporary environment, exploring the conditions of communication and interaction under which a narrative becomes persuasive to the audiences it targets (Steele, 2012: 552–553; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, Roselle, 2013: 15–27).

Kateryna Smagliy identified the nine mostly used narratives of Russian disinformation abroad, one of them being not only highly critical towards the West but also paying a hyperbolical amount of attention to the problems at the West (Smagliy, 2018: 13–14). There are other information manipulation techniques as well that aim to discredit the West, Western actors, and their deeds (Baumann, 2020: 288–307; Treyger, Cheravitch, Cohen, 2022: 58–69). Based on the existing literature, the author’s assumption was that should Russian and Chinese disinformation machines’ enemy pictures overlap, they would borrow from each other and draw on each other. As demonizing and discrediting the West is a strategic interest of the two regimes, there might be considerable similarities between the two. However, as foreign disinformation is often tailor-made to suit the target countries’ various audiences, one might also assume that there should be considerable differences how these disinformation narratives depict the West. The research focused on comparing and explaining these overlaps and variance on the cases of Ukraine and Taiwan.

The narratives Smagliy (2018) identified, can be considered as Russia’s general, strategic narratives about the West, as she observed them in Russia, Europe and the US applied widely abroad. These are as follows:

- 1) the superiority of Russians and the Russian state compared to other nations;
- 2) the revisionism of Russian/Soviet history;
- 3) denial of Russia’s responsibility for international aggression;
- 4) dehumanizing Ukrainians; bashing Ukraine’s culture and language;
- 5) blaming the West for the Cold War;
- 6) criticism of the West for the ‘loss of its moral compass and ‘degeneracy’;
- 7) hyperbolic focus on the West’s economic and political troubles, which are misrepresented as inherent societal failures;
- 8) criticism of Western institutions;
- 9) obstruction of European integration (Smagliy, 2018: 13–14).

These serve as a perfect starting point to understand the key motives of Russia’s strategic communication, but they do not offer a satisfactorily detailed view of the narratives Ukrainian audiences are being targeted with. The grand-scale analysis of Riaboshtan et al. (2022) which collected the most prevalent Russian disinformation narratives about the West in Ukrainian media outlets is more suitable for this study. Also, the key narratives Riaboshtan et al. collected fit into Smagliy’s broader categories as well.

Propaganda should be understood as a tool: it can be applied toward ends that may be immoral or moral (Lasswell, 1927: 627; 1951: 66–78). Roger Brown (1958) emphasizes that there is an asymmetry of interest between the persuader and the persuadee. It is sometimes claimed that we are dealing with propaganda if the desired ends of the persuader “will be advantageous to the persuader but not in the best interest of the persuadee” (Brown, 1958: 300). Propaganda is regarded as a unique type of information manipulation with a sometimes subtle “spin,” combining (half-) truths and lies in an attempt to sway the attitudes and behavior of specific audiences, encouraging them to take particular actions and leading them to draw particular conclusions. By reducing complicated facts to straightforward clichés, propaganda produces black-and-white, “us” and “them,” good-and-evil dichotomies that are frequently connected to calls to despise or dislike an adversary (Schmid, 2014). As one of the main components of its information warfare strategy, the Russian Federation is a widely recognized producer of propaganda messages that aim to “influence the policies of another government; undercut confidence in its leaders and institutions; disrupt its relations with other nations; and discredit and weaken governmental and non-governmental opponents” (Lucas, Pomerantsev, 2016: 1–66). The Russian Federation’s contemporary propaganda is based on the previous Soviet “4D” technique, which stands for “dismiss, distort, distract, and dismay” (Nimmo, 2015).

Structural differences are to be noted between the approach of Russia’s information warfare against Ukraine, and China’s disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan. For Russia, Ukraine is openly considered the enemy being in a full-scale war with the country. Hence, it has no reason to constrain itself and refrain from the use of certain tools (except taboos such as nuclear weapons). On the other hand, the enosis is still an option Beijing might consider realistic, hence, the entire and final alienation of the Taiwanese society is not desirable. Meanwhile, it is visible that authoritarian countries learn from each other (Cottiero, Emmons, 2024: 12–31), and it entails the copying of disinformation tactics as well. A palpable example of this is the popular Russian disinformation narrative about the secret American biological warfare laboratories in Ukraine (EU vs Disinfo, 2021) which motive appeared in Chinese disinformation too, suggesting that the US plans to build such facilities in Taiwan (Dotson, 2023: 6–9).

METHODOLOGY

The comparative study was built around two research questions:

- 1) How does Chinese disinformation frame the West when it targets Taiwanese audiences?** This question explored the specific tactics and messaging employed by Chinese disinformation campaigns to shape Taiwanese perceptions of Western nations. By examining the content and dissemination of these narratives, we aim to understand how they challenge the legitimacy of Western democracies and promote alternative visions of global order.
- 2) To what extent does this framing overlap with the ones the Russian strategic narratives apply when targeting Ukraine?** This question explores potential similarities and differences in the framing strategies used by Chinese and Russian

disinformation campaigns. By comparing their tactics and messaging, we aim to identify common patterns and unique characteristics that may reveal broader trends in authoritarian information operations.

By addressing these research questions, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the evolving landscape of disinformation and its impact on democratic societies. It sheds light on the specific techniques and narratives used to manipulate public opinion and undermine democratic institutions. Additionally, it highlights the potential for cross-pollination and collaboration between authoritarian actors in their efforts to spread disinformation.

The data collection took place in Taiwan in the form of in-depth interviews with Taiwanese experts and researchers of Chinese disinformation in January 2024. The semi-constructed expert interviews with 10 interviewees were conducted in person and online (Adams, 2015: 492–505). The recorded interviews were transcribed by the software Transkriptor and coded using NVivo. The transcripts, along with the questionnaire are available upon request to the author. The coding was conducted using the codebook created for the purpose of this study. For the creation of the codebook, the categories defined by Riaboshtan et al. (2022) were taken as a base. They conducted a large-scale media monitoring in 2022 (March–July) and identified the key narratives of Russian disinformation targeting Ukrainian audiences. The narratives were organized into 5 larger categories which the author did not find detailed enough, hence, I further divided them to the narratives constituting them to encapsulate the details better. Taking the key narratives of Russian disinformation targeting Ukraine from Riaboshtan et al.'s study, and translating them to a meta-level, this altered version was used for coding the textual corpus of the interviews conducted with Taiwanese experts of Chinese disinformation, to catch the key narratives undermining the Western hegemony.

Table 1
The categories used for coding the interviews

Narratives targeting Ukraine identified by Riaboshtan et al. (2022)	Meta-narrative	Taiwan-specific narrative
		1
Russia shifts the responsibility for the attack on Ukraine to other foreign states.	Accusing the target country with provocation, violence, and malign steps	Taiwan provokes China
	Accusing Western countries with provocation, violence, and malign steps	The West provokes China/ Russia with violence and malign steps
Labelling “Anglo-Saxons”	Certain parts of the West are more hawkish against Russia/China than others	The US-Europe or certain European countries are related to differently, perceived as a threat to a different extent
Distorting history to justify its aggression in Ukraine – belittling, bashing Ukraine	Belittling, questioning the target country's culture, language, history, specialness	Belittling Taiwanese culture, language, history, its specialness
	Suggesting that the target country <i>really</i> belongs to Russia/China	Suggesting that Taiwan <i>really</i> belongs to China

1	2	3
Intimidating other states that they need to prepare for war – that Russia inevitably wins	New world order is inevitably coming (Russia/China is going to rise)	A new world order is inevitably coming; China's rise is unavoidable
EU will collapse	The West is to collapse (hyperbolic focus on social and economic problems of Western countries)	The West is to collapse (hyperbolic focus on social and economic problems of Western countries)
EU is decaying	The decaying West- highlighting fundamental cultural differences	The decaying West – highlighting fundamental cultural differences to Taiwan
Europe and the US start doubting Ukraine's victory	Untrustworthy West	The West is an untrustworthy ally, a “false friend”
Ukraine was bothering everyone (“Without Russia, Ukraine would already be under Western rule now”)	The target country is insignificant for the West – Playing on fears of abandonment by the West	The West is going to abandon Taiwan in case of need
Continuation of the war is profitable for the West	The West is interested in wars, is a malicious warmonger	The West is interested in wars, is a malicious warmonger

Source: I. Riaboshtan, O. Pivtorak, O. Bilousenko (2022), '*Digging their own grave. An analysis of Russia's anti-Western rhetoric about the war in Ukraine*', detector.media, <https://detector.media/in-english/article/201031/2022-07-16-digging-their-own-grave-an-analysis-of-russias-anti-western-rhetoric-about-the-war-in-ukraine/> (14.12.2024).


There are certain limitations to this study which must be noted. One and a half years have passed between the Ukrainian media analysis conducted by Riaboshtan et al. and the interviews in Taiwan. However, the strategic goals of Russia and China regarding stopping and possibly reversing Ukraine's and Taiwan's rapprochement to the West did not change during this period, hence, there is no reason to assume that the strategic narratives applied would have undergone significant changes. Hence, instead of focusing on the propaganda's diachronic (developing over time) nature (Carey, 2009: 110–143), we focus on the concept of the strategic narrative described by A. Miskimmon et al. (2013). Their concept identifies three primary types of narratives: 1) The world order is explained by geopolitical narratives, which include tales of how the world works, the rules that control it, and the lofty ideals of “good” and “bad” throughout the globe; 2) national (identification) narratives, which are accounts of states, their past, aspirations, desires, and actions; they describe how the states see themselves and how others see them; 3) Political issue narratives that explain current public policy, including why decisions are made, how they will further development, who makes the decisions, what the issue is, how to interpret certain events, etc. Since advancing the authority of the state, its leadership, and associated institutions is their main objective, these narratives are interwoven and tied to one another. The first two levels of narratives are typically used to target foreign audiences and the third one domestic ones, but by no means exclusively (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, Roselle, 2013: 15–27).

RESULTS

In the interviews the Taiwanese experts confirmed that Ukraine as a parallel is widely used by the Chinese propaganda reaching Taiwanese audiences, despite the large geographical distance, it is often displayed to them. It is often done by borrow-

ing Russian propaganda materials and framing. The example of Ukraine is used to highlight the untrustworthiness of the West, depicting it as a “false friend” (as the experts described it). The West being a “false friend,” is proved to be the widest-used strategic narrative identified in the interviews. With regards to Ukraine, the respondents assessed that the delay in Western aid packages, and dissatisfactory quantity of arms, are often brought as examples of half-hearted Western help, suggesting that in case of a full-scale conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, the latter could not count on the effective support it hopes for either. Another commonly mentioned example for the falseness of the West is the “beef gate,” according to which story the US exploited its economic advantage and forced Taiwan and Japan to open their markets to American meat products, prepared according to looser regulations using more additives such as ractopamine (Executive Yuan, 2021). This story was widely used to underpin the dictatorial nature of the US to depict it as a false ally that poses as an ally but constantly exploits its advantage and hence, is going to stab Taiwan in the back at the first possible occasion.

Fig. 2. The occurrence of each narrative in the interviews conducted with Taiwanese experts



The most striking difference between the image of the West depicted by the two authoritarian regimes is the lack of the decaying West trope in the Chinese one. Picturing the West as a decadent, backsliding entity losing its moral compass contrasted to Russia which is the stronghold of traditional values is a fundamental part of the Russian propaganda’s messages both domestically and targeting Ukraine. Frequently using invented words such as “Gayropa” and “Eurosodom” (Cushman, Avramov, 2021: 123–154), the propaganda hyperbole focuses on marginally occurring cases, sometimes even criminal ones, and presents them as everyday reality of Europe, juxtaposing it with the “normality” defended and cherished by Russia (Jarkovská, 2020: 138–153). This kind of othering was entirely absent from the Chinese propaganda targeting Taiwan, and no expert mentioned them in the interviews. The reason for the absence of West’s image as a gender-related cultural decay remains to be explored, but the social

and political attitude towards the LGBTQ community seems to be liberal and accepting, with gradually broadening rights. For instance, same-sex marriage became legal in Taiwan in 2019, and same-sex couples may adopt children since 2023 (Lim, 2023). This suggests that the Chinese propaganda might deem that narratives criticizing the West for being too liberal would not be effective or would even be of the opposite effect, this is why they do not tend to apply them.

Picturing the West as a warmonger, sawing chaos worldwide in order to profit from it is a shared feature of Chinese and Russian propaganda apparatuses. Taiwanese audiences are often targeted with messages about how Taiwan and China are “one big family,” where only the US is the intruder to disrupt this idyll. The aggressive, often bullying troublemaker image is particularly used for the United States, while Europe is being portrayed as a weak, soft partner without proper agency, misled and dictated to by the US. The Russian propaganda targeting Ukraine pictures the West as the ultimate beneficiary of the war, for instance presenting any Western help to Ukraine as a way to protract the war against Russia, using the “hands of Ukrainians” (Riaboshtan, Pivtorak, Bilousenko, 2022). Another similar trope is that “the West wants to fight against Russia until the last Ukrainian” (*The West wants to fight...*, 2022). The overall goal is to shift the responsibility of starting and continuing the war. In the interviews with Taiwanese experts, however, prove to be a recurring theme that Chinese propaganda portrays the US not only as a despot but as a weakening hegemon that acts out of despair for gradually but steadily losing its power.

The West’s inevitable collapse is a shared narrative of the two propagandas, however, is not at a too prevalent place in either. Both authoritarian countries juxtapose their own unquestionable rise in the future. The US as the hegemon, the “*bà wáng*” (霸王) is powerful and mighty, but its economic power is clearly weakening along with its ability to move the threads across the globe, according to the Chinese narratives targeting Taiwan. While Russian narratives overexaggerate the damage caused by the sanctions to the West, with dystopic pictures of Europeans freezing without Russian gas (“*The West Is Freezing:*” *Russia...*, 2022), another key narrative is, as mentioned above, the moral and cultural decay the West suffers, while this latter seems to not be present in the Chinese propaganda messages.

Belittling the target country on various grounds is a shared feature of the two propaganda apparatuses. The Russian propaganda targeting Ukrainians harshly criticizes and humiliates Ukrainian politicians, democratic institutions, individual people, language, and culture, deeming it inferior to the Russian or even non-existent (Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, 2021). Chinese propaganda to Taiwan is more “technocratic,” and belittles mostly Taiwanese political structures, and institutions but not the inhabitants or the culture. Eroding trust in the democratic institutions is a recurring theme, especially where Taiwanese authorities can be portrayed as outsmarted by the “false friend” US: according to a commonly referred fabricated story, before the elections, the CIA distributed pens with invisible ink, rendering masses of ballots invalid (*[TFC Disinfo Detector] A brief...*, 2023). The story suggests that the US committed electoral fraud in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese authorities were unable to protect the country’s sovereignty but assisted in the alleged interference.

CONCLUSION

Based on comparing Russian and Chinese disinformation about the West, applied against Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively, one may come to several conclusions. China and Russia are systematic challengers of the status quo and American hegemony, which launch massive propaganda and disinformation campaigns against Taiwanese and Ukrainian audiences. The goal of this messaging is to erode public confidence in the West and prevent their respective nations from moving closer to the Western alliance system. Taiwan and Ukraine are now experiencing rather different situations. Both, however, might be understood as attempts at democratization which goes along with and a process of distancing from the authoritarian neighbor that fosters imperialistic aspirations toward the smaller nation that aims to establish closer ties with the West. The challenger country faces a strategic threat from this rapprochement with the West, thus intends to weaken it through widespread propaganda and misinformation. The narratives employed to sway public opinion in Taiwan and Ukraine are contrasted in this study.

In conclusion, the comparative study revealed that both Russia and China have employed similar tactics of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the West's influence and image as a trustworthy partner while building Russian and Chinese credibility in their respective spheres of interest, Ukraine and Taiwan. The narratives used in these campaigns share common themes, but the specific framing and the responses from the targeted countries may vary based on the local context and the geopolitical dynamics involved. Chinese propaganda directed at Taiwanese audiences frequently leverages the Ukrainian conflict as a cautionary tale to dissuade the island from seeking independence. A key element of this strategy is the portrayal of the West as an untrustworthy "false friend." This narrative is reinforced by highlighting instances of perceived Western duplicity, such as the perceived delay in Western aid to Ukraine or the forced opening of Ukrainian markets. Such examples are used to cast the West as a self-serving entity, prioritizing its own interests over the well-being of its allies.

While Chinese propaganda may not explicitly employ the "decaying West" trope, a common feature of Russian propaganda, it nonetheless shares a similar underlying message: the West as a warmonger that profits from chaos. The United States, in particular, is often characterized as an aggressive bully, eager to exploit geopolitical opportunities. Europe, on the other hand, is frequently portrayed as a weak and easily misled partner, susceptible to American influence. By casting the West in such a negative light, Chinese propagandists aim to undermine trust in potential Western support for Taiwan and discourage the island from pursuing independence.

Furthermore, Chinese propaganda often seeks to shift the blame for conflict onto the West. By highlighting perceived Western aggression and double-dealing, Chinese propagandists can deflect attention from China's own assertive foreign policy and domestic human rights abuses. This tactic allows China to position itself as a peace-loving nation unfairly targeted by Western powers. Ultimately, the goal of Chinese propaganda is to shape public opinion in Taiwan and create a climate of fear and uncertainty about the future. By portraying the West as an unreliable partner and China

as a benevolent protector, Chinese propagandists hope to dissuade Taiwanese from seeking independence and maintain the status quo.

The use of Ukraine as a parallel, highlights the importance of international solidarity in countering authoritarian propaganda. By sharing information and resources, democracies can better defend themselves against disinformation campaigns. There are numerous questions for further studies, for instance, to what extent did the use of Ukraine as a parallel has affected Taiwanese perceptions of the West and China. Also, in order to assess whether the use of the Ukraine-parallel proved effective for the PRC's propaganda, it would be interesting to explore whether its usage strengthened or weakened the Taiwanese popular support for independence.

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ABSTRACT

This paper conducts a comparative analysis between Russian disinformation directed at Ukraine and Chinese disinformation directed at Taiwan, regarding their strategic narratives about the West. These activities aim at stopping the respective country's rapprochement with the Western alliance system and surrender themselves to the imperialistic ambitions of their respective authoritarian neighbours. The analysis is based on interviews with Taiwanese experts and the study of the experts of the Ukrainian think-tank Detektor Media (Riaboshtan, Pivtorak, Bilousenko, 2022). While Chinese propaganda may not explicitly employ the "decaying West" trope, a common feature of Russian propaganda targeting Ukraine, it nonetheless shares a similar underlying message: the West as a warmonger that profits from chaos.

Keywords: strategic narrative, disinformation, propaganda, Taiwan, Ukraine, anti-Western narrative

**TO SAMO ZŁO W RÓŻNYCH RAMACH: ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA
NARRACJI O ZACHODZIE MIĘDZY ROSYJSKĄ DEZINFORMACJĄ
WYMIERZONĄ W UKRAINĘ A CHIŃSKĄ DEZINFORMACJĄ WYMIERZONĄ
W TAJWAN**

STRESZCZENIE

Niniejszy artykuł przeprowadza analizę porównawczą rosyjskiej dezinformacji skierowanej na Ukrainę i chińskiej dezinformacji skierowanej na Tajwan, w odniesieniu do ich strategicznych narracji na temat Zachodu. Działania te mają na celu powstrzymanie zbliżenia danego kraju z zachodnim systemem sojuszy i poddanie się imperialistycznym ambicjom ich autorytarnych sąsiadów. Analiza opiera się na wywiadach z tajwańskimi ekspertami i badaniach ekspertów ukraińskiego think-tanku Detektor Media (Riaboshtan i in., 2022). Choć chińska propaganda może nie wykorzystywać wyraźnie motywu „upadającego Zachodu”, który jest wspólną cechą rosyjskiej propagandy wymierzonej w Ukrainę, to jednak ma podobne przesłanie: Zachód jako podżegacz wojenny, który czerpie zyski z chaosu.

Slowa kluczowe: narracja strategiczna, dezinformacja, propaganda, Tajwan, Ukraina, narracja antyzachodnia