The European Union’s Security Conceptualisation vs. its Risk Prevention Capabilities

The European Union, as an area of unquestionable prosperity, on which the countries that make up it have been working since the 1950s, faces the constant challenge of combating threats to the security of its societies. In a changing world, these threats are constantly evolving. They were first summarised in the European Security Strategy and the list of threats was revised in Global Strategy published in 2016. The Union is therefore aware both of the processes of change in international relations and of the threats that this entails for the Union, its Member States and society. Does this awareness motivate Member States and EU authorities to consolidate their defence efforts? Are the measures to address the risks to the Union adequate to the degree of danger? Are the policies of the Union so developed as to maintain peace of mind in the face of threats? This article analyses the risks and attempts to answer these questions.


The European Union's Security Conceptualisation vs. its Risk Prevention Capabilities
The European Union's Global Strategy announced in June 2016 was focused on describing contemporary international relations, listing the threats to the Union, its Member States and society, and indicating the directions for the development of the EU's security potential (The European..., 2016). While today's world is very different from the one described in the Union's previous security strategy -"A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy" of December 2003 (A secure Europe…, 2003) -the basic mechanisms of how Europe's security could be jeopardised are similar. Today's world is experiencing a reappraisal of forces, where those states that are increasingly able to compete effectively with the previously dominant United States have grown in force. Increased is the number of "destabilised" areas and "ungoverned spaces" (a term quoted after the EU's Global Strategy) -areas not subject to any effective state authority, a new term in the security literature and documents related to this field. The dependence of EU countries on NATO grows as does the US hegemony in the Alliance. However, when comparing the two EU security strategies, one has to observe that although the world is changing and international relations are less stable than they were several years ago, most threats are the same. Despite this analogy, neither the Union nor the leading powers are better prepared to fight them than they were when the previous Union's security strategy was created. On the contrary, because of the instability of international relations, the proliferation of actors who influence them, the fact that these new actors are not part of the international system, as well as the lack of clear principles or strong international law, the same threats are increasingly difficult to manage when comparing the circumstances in which they were required to be counterweight in 2003 and now. Dangers are hard to herd. An example of this can be the failure to implement a strategy of conduct in Afghanistan, where the international forces failed to annihilate the Taliban, the emergence of ISIS and the inability of the "Western" countries to fight it, or the difficulties of the EU countries in controlling the wave of immigration, which in equal part confronts the effectiveness of both the EU policies and forms of integration -e.g. the coherence of the Schengen area. Threats are growing and it is becoming increasingly difficult to control them.
Looking at the list of perils listed in both EU security strategies (e.g. economic inefficiencies, epidemics, limited natural resources required for life, migration of different backgrounds, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the inefficiency of state authorities, regional conflicts, organised crime), one can conclude that the key one that largely enables or facilitates the development of all others is the political, economic and social instability of areas of strategic importance. At the moment, there is a large number of RIE 14 '20 such areas, as one has to include into this group not only the ones on which the EU is dependent directly e.g. in terms of energy resources but also those where the potential for a religious fanaticism is high and where low economic development or climate changes can cause mass migration. Its central significance results from the fact that they are uncontrolled by any state authority connected with the international system. This opens up a space for anarchy in which further threats are likely to develop, such as terrorism linked to religious fanaticism, the works on weapons of mass destruction or their storage, or the consolidation of criminal groups specialising in weapons, drugs and human trafficking. State fragility can also create factors affecting the security of the Union, its Member States and its societies indirectly: to cause waves of migration provoked either by military operations or economic circumstances, epidemics and pandemics, an increase in drug consumption that loosens social cohesion, an increase in crime, as well as the coherence of Member States' policies, and a decline in the support of the Union's societies for the EU's further development. It is mainly, therefore, that the authors of the Global Strategy point to the need for the Union to engage in stabilisation operations beyond its borders as they seem to be key to strengthening its security. A better-balanced environment for the Union seems to be the best prevention of its threats. The recent Security Strategy recommends to: develop instruments of stabilisation, better coordinate programmes and funding schemes, and expand ways to effectively influence countries and post-conflict areas. So, is the Union able to ensure its security by acting outside its borders? This article is a take on the analysis of the EU's political and military capacity to face current challenges to its security.

The EU defence -directions of change
The 2003 security strategy already included recommendations similar to the ones presented in the recent strategy but they were never turned into intensified work on the Union's capacity building, nor did they result in solutions ready to be applied when necessary. The Common Security and Defence Policy is one of the youngest EU policies and touches on areas where the Member States see their traditional role as a sovereign who wants to control their engagement. The possession of an army and the decision to use it is one of the prerogatives of state power and remains so after the state accedes to the European Union. As a result, EU authorities may seem to be the coordinator of defence and security efforts (i.e. they may develop a defence and security policy), but they are entirely dependent on the States in the event of the need to use armed forces. Similarly, in 2003, the EU institutions did not have the power to induce the creation of common armed forces nor did they have authority to demand a coordinated way to spend defence budgets of its Member States. Having a limited budget themselves and no strong arm, the Union's institutions were therefore deprived of two most critical manners to influence the direction of the development of its defence policy. The pace and outlook of this progress were close to fully dependent on the Member States. Not much has changed since 2003 -the EU's defence potential has increased practically only on paper, although it must be admitted that the 2004 enlargement immediately worsened the statistics relating to the military (e.g. a large number of conscripts have emerged who constitute an army incapable of carrying out stabilisation operations and requiring large financial outlays, or an excess of tanks -made in outdated technology -and a shortage of transport aircraft) (Grevi, Helly, Keohane, 2009) and as such handicapped both the actual development and its reporting. Truth be told, while new Member States needed to drastically fast reform their armies (mainly by professionalization at the expense of eliminating conscripts), the old members of the EU were in need to make improvements too, as the character of military involvement was changing from a territorial defence towards preventive deployment abroad. The intensive reform of the defence sector of both new and old Member States required a great deal of effort and no less financial support. Since the changes in the armies take time and the EU at the beginning of the XXI century was far from being capable of coordinating its defence effort, it does not come as a surprise that most of the Member States, most of the time, sought its security guarantee in NATO membership rather than in the EU's security and defence policy.
In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was launched to identify opportunities to economise on external security in the European Union through joint research in the defence sector and joint arms purchases. These two initiatives were expected not only to increases the compatibility of military equipment across the armies in Europe, but also to allow for significant savings. The establishment of the EDA seems to be a very successful venture even though the progress in unification of equipment and consolidation of defence research does not progress speedily. Setting up EDA was unquestionably a step towards achieving one of the synergies for which the Union was established, but the status of the EDA does not allow it (yet) to effectively influence the change in the defence policies of Member States that remain reluctant towards communising defence policies and activities. EDA cannot (yet) directly influence the decision-making process in the EU nor can it impose of any kind of joint procurement or opening of an R&D programme related to defence equipment. However, the very fact that the EDA was established and given a role of an overseer in the two crucial areas: the purchase of defence equipment and the economisation in setting up common R&D projects, next to its growing advisory role to the Council of the EU allows to expect it to become increasingly important in the activities of the institutions of the EU.

The role of the Member States
Despite the institutional problems, the greatest shortcoming of the Union's security system has been and still is, the lack of willingness of Member States to develop binding response mechanisms. This not only hampers the development of security policy but also weakens the Union's defence potential, which currently looks impressive in statistics but lacks effectiveness. As an example, the failure to use formally operational EU Battlegroups can be given: while the troops of most Member States (which are included in statistics related to the European security) take part in stabilisation operations overseas, they rarely do it under a common EU flag, and more often as NATO, UN or coalition forces (usually with the United States as a leader). So can't these forces be used as European battlegroups? Technically, it is possible, but the priority of governments is to participate in operations of organisations and coalitions that are RIE 14 '20 a stronger guarantor of security and have more influence on the shape of contemporary international relations. It, therefore, seems that the European Union, in the eyes of its Member States, which are entirely responsible for its shape and areas of involvement, is still primarily a platform for economic integration and, to a much lesser extent, a platform for consolidating international political effort.

Institutional conflict in the EU
While the EU's new security strategy must be welcomed with optimism, it should also be noted that it is not in the absence of global strategies that the Union's power to carry out external missions efficiently lies. The first problem is the already mentioned lack of willingness of Member States to develop common instruments and capacities. The second -no less important -is the lack of coherence of the Common Security and Defence Policy itself. This policy has not been provided with a uniform mission launch mechanism or a separate fund. It is still based on a whole range of instruments from enlargement policy to development funds and does not have a uniform decisionmaking structure.
In addition to these impairments, the decision-making is marked by conflicts over competences between the EU institutions involved in the policy implementation. The most visible conflict and thus a cause of inefficiency related to the conduct of external missions had been -until the Lisbon Treaty -the one between the European Commission and the Council of the Union. This was due to an inconsistent distribution of responsibilities, in the result of which it was not clear in what circumstances which institution initiated and supervised operations outside the EU. In principle, the Council had been responsible for short-term humanitarian missions, while the Commission had been in charge of other missions (Korski, Gowan, 2009). However, even within the Commission, there had been initiated -and still are being initiated -different simultaneous programmes with no requirement to synchronise with permanent and ad hoc structures that are already in place. These programmes had -and still have -multiple sources of funding with different mechanisms for mobilising money. The Lisbon Treaty did not completely straighten out the complexities of external missions as only a holistic approach to the structuring of external policy actions could radically multiply the EU's potential to influence international relations. A seemingly thorough reform of the institutions was a step forward, but in effect, it replaced the old conflict over competences with a new one. The European External Action Service (EEAS), created by the Lisbon Treaty, was to be the entity that would assume the burden of coordinating actions related to the implementation of CSDP and provide transparency in the planning and launching of external missions. Strengthened by the provisions of the same Treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is to be the decision-making institution for, inter alia, external missions, with a broad remit. However, although the Lisbon Treaty established the EEAS, it did not define its competences -this undertaking was to be given to the High Representative. The EEAS is supposed to assist the High Representative, the President of the Council and members of the European Commission. Thus, the EEAS is not an independent plan-ning institution. Leaving the final shape of the EEAS to the High Representative was both forward-looking and risky. On the one hand, the High Representative has a great deal of leeway to decide on the shape of the institution that is planned to be his aid in the implementation of missions outside the external borders; on the other hand, it was premature to describe the EEAS as a diplomatic corps of the Union, as was eagerly done in the early days of its construction. Flexibility in the formation of the service will allow the institution to adapt to needs. However, given the fact that the European Union has less influence on global policy-making than states (mainly due to the lack of willingness of Member States to coordinate their actions), it is not entirely clear what means it could use. EEAS's activities as a diplomatic corps are therefore also limited.
A second weakness in the solution to set up the EEAS is the one derived from the weaknesses related to the arrangements for the office of the High Representative itself. This is a position that forces three types of loyalty to three different institutions legitimizing the position. The High Representative shall be the High Representative appointed by and accountable to the Council. In parallel to the mandate from the Council, the High Representative is to be Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the preparation and implementation of external policy, policies of enlargement and development, humanitarian aid and international cooperation (excluding trade matters). Such a solution could be seen as a consolidation of competences, i.e. a strengthening of decision-making capabilities -one person across the Union responsible for conducting external actions and implementing policies that have so far supported those actions. Meanwhile, what appears to be a reinforcement results in complications at the level of the decision-making process within the EU institutions. As Vice-President of the European Commission, the High Representative must be appointed by the President of the Commission and accepted by the European Parliament.
There are two problems with a similar procedure: first, there is the need for a situation where, as a result of negotiations between States and institutions, it is possible to appoint the same person for both posts. For example, there is a theoretical possibility that the European Parliament -the only directly elected EU institution and therefore the most independent of them, less dependent on the Member States than, for example, the Council of the Union or the European Commission -will have doubts about the nomination of the Vice-President of the Commission. The process of selecting a candidate for the post of High Representative and legitimising his or her election will then be blocked, which will require political negotiation and compromise with the European Parliament. The probability of blocking the process of selecting the most suitable candidate is a very weak point in any process of governing an institution. This institutional and procedural imperfection shadows not only the ability of EU politicians to design the selecting processes and management systems of the Union but also, more broadly, European security.
The second problem, however, is more important because it can easily be a problem in the day-to-day functioning of the EU institutions: one person in whose hands external policy-making is concentrated is accountable simultaneously to three EU bodies. As High Representative, she or he is accountable to the Council and, as Vice-President of the Commission, to the European Parliament and to the President of the Commission. In the event of an imaginable conflict between the Council and the Commis-RIE 14 '20 sion (a conflict that was frequent around external missions), the High Representative/ Vice-President of the Commission is placed between a rock and a hard place because he or she represents both. This raises the question of where the first responsibility or loyalty of the High Representative lies. The purpose of raising similar questions is by no means to obtain any answer but to point out that allowing similar dilemmas to arise is completely non-functional. The arrival of such a solution with the Lisbon Treaty does surprise mainly because it was precisely the Lisbon Treaty that was intended to solve institutional problems. It did not. The adoption of the new treaty was an excellent opportunity to introduce modern and functional solutions, without the malfunctions that are sometimes forced by the long process of forming institutions and their competencies, and solutions marked by compromises between Member States and EU institutions.
It was probably intending to further consolidate decision-making that the High Representative has also been made the head of the General Affairs and External Relations Council and chairs the Council when it decides on matters relating to foreign policy. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the position was rotational, held by the foreign minister of the country holding the Presidency. This meant that the Presidency of the Council changed every six months and the need for change to ensure greater continuity in the Union's foreign policy was clear. However, given that the Council is the decision-making body of the Member States, or rather their coalitions, one may wonder whether the transfer of the chairmanship of the General Affairs and External Relations Council to the High Representative is a good way of ensuring that the Council is a more effective and efficient decision-making body. Now the High Representative is charged with duties regarding a body over decisions of which he or she has little influence. Besides, chairing the Council can constitute a time constraint and limit the ability of the High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission to fulfil his or her remaining responsibilities.

The Lisbon Treaty, "peacebuilding" and comprehensive approach
The third constraint after the lack of willingness of the states and a back office to carry out missions is the lack of programming and implementation documents concerning generally formulated security strategies: the Global Strategy does not translate further into documents specifying the directions of development of the EU's potential or involvement. The first High Representative for the CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force -Catherine Ashton -defined the problem as follows: "'Peacebuilding' is now the essence of the EU's action outside its borders, although nowhere in the acquis communautaire is it specified exactly what 'peacebuilding' means and what its goals are to be" (Towards..., 2010). No peacebuilding strategy has been developed between the one security strategy and another -each of which emphasises the importance of post-conflict stabilisation or peacebuilding. An example of the lack of progress in the clarification of definitions, objectives, post-conflict stabilisation measures is symptomatic and not isolated. Likewise, regional strategies are incomplete: for example, while the Union is engaged in Afghanistan and prides itself on providing the largest financial assistance to post-war Afghanistan, there is no strategy in place for Pakistan, which is crucial for the development of Afghan domestic policy, peace consolidation and economic development. The EU is Pakistan's largest trading partner -in 2007, 20% of Pakistan's exports went to EU countries -the EU has quadrupled its aid effort to Pakistan for 2007-2010 compared to the previous period, which together can be a huge lever for negotiation that is completely unused in the absence of a strategy towards Pakistan (Korski, 2009, p. 14). Pakistan, on the other hand, is an ally of the Taliban, whose religious fanaticism contributed to the breakdown of statehood in Afghanistan before the last intervention of the international coalition, and is now in opposition to the state authorities, while controlling a large part of the country's territory. While the EU officially considers spending money in Afghanistan a success, 1 the effectiveness of EU action is questionable.
In the area of peacebuilding, the EU has made some efforts and it is worth following them up to see the pace and extent of change. The document which was to be a step towards the preparation of the peacebuilding strategy was "Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy? EU civilian coordination in peacebuilding and the effects of the Lisbon Treaty," published in 2010 by the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Policy (Towards…, 2010, p. 8). The authors summarise the institutional achievements related to the Union's external missions and point out the weaknesses of cooperation structures in the security and defence policy. It is a guide to the direction in which EU decision-makers should develop their actions to create a peacebuilding strategy. The document refers to the new cooperation structures set up by the Lisbon Treaty -its authors intended to create clearer links between the institutions responsible for conducting external actions and to establish a framework for giving them competences so that there is no conflict over them. As mentioned earlier, the old conflict of competences was replaced by a new one.
On the back of the non-dissolved by the Lisbon Treaty lack of functionality of the decision-making process regarding the implementation of external policy and stabilisation missions, Pirozzi puts, for example, a delay in the preparation and publication of another key document in building a more coherent security policy -"Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises" (Joint..., 2013). As a result of continuing disputes between the EEAS and the Commission, the document was finally made public in December 2013 instead of being published as planned in September 2012 (Pirozzi, 2013). This is one of the evidence that new institutional arrangements do not always speed up decision-making on issues that the Lisbon Treaty itself has identified as crucial, such as the need to develop a "comprehensive approach" -a cardinal way to involve the Union outside its borders.
The comprehensive approach, the implementation of which into EU procedures was postulated during the discussions around the Lisbon Treaty, is the most RIE 14 '20 concept and practice of mission implementation within NATO. Its fundamental character was emphasized in NATO's "Lisbon Summit Declaration" of 2010, which stressed that this approach is about coordinating the three dimensions of the implementation of each mission: political, military and civilian. The Declaration also points out the vertical and horizontal coordination, i.e. both between offices and elements of the mission carried out by one organisation and between missions of different organisations. The NATO concept is based on two elements: 1. Work with partner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local authorities, taking into account their capacities, constraints, mandates and tasks, and taking into account their individual decision-making autonomy. 2. Where necessary, to participate in the stabilisation and reconstruction of a postconflict state -up to the limits of civilian capabilities -together with other actors, and to participate in the appropriate planning of crisis management operations (Lisbon..., 2010). In its doctrine of 2017, NATO refers to the experience of Afghanistan and Kosovo, concluding that "military means, although essential, are insufficient to deal with such crises alone. These challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action of a range of military and non-military actors. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute with a shared purpose, based on a common sense of responsibility, openness and determination. NATO's engagement in a comprehensive approach to resolving crises is facilitated through civil-military interaction (CMI) which applies to all military bodies and at all levels" (AJP-01, 2017, point 2.7). The following section sets out how a "comprehensive approach" can make stabilisation efforts more effective: "the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding, collaboration and appropriate resourcing. This is predicated on the desired outcome achieving political agreement. The desired outcome is likely to involve aspects related to security, governance and economic development" (AJP-01, 2017, point 2.9). The authors of the NATO document stress that it may be difficult to achieve cooperation at such an advanced level between many organisations and other entities working for stabilisation. Therefore, they recommend intensifying actions at the state level and lay the foundations for a comprehensive approach: a) Proactive engagement between all actors, both before and during a crisis. b) The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language. c) The value of collaboration, based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate, promote institutional familiarity and information sharing. d) Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome) and ideally, mutually agreed objectives underpinned, in the absence of unity of effort, by harmonization of effort. e) Acknowledging the decision-making autonomy of partner organizations (AJP-01, 2017, point 2.10). If applying the above mentioned NATO's approach to the specificity of the EU, it should be assumed that there is, in the first place, a need to coordinate the instruments and policies of the Union itself and to coordinate the actions of its Member States.
The fundamental sense of "comprehensive approach" as it was defined within NATO would mean for the EU to: -employ all instruments available, -build synergies between military and civilian instruments and -between the capabilities available to the various institutions and the Member States alike. However, if one ventured to create an even broader concept of a "comprehensive approach," it would include the development of a whole, integrated policy for a given area, including a wide range of security and development measures available to the Union and its Member States, based on the 3D principle: diplomacy, development, defence/security (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 8). This wide-ranging concept would bridge diplomatic activities, development programmes and policies and the implementation of a broader defence and security concept.
The authors of the Union's "comprehensive approach" document (i.e. Towards…, 2010) noted that, while the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty had been significant, the High Representative's actions and the development of the EEAS lacked a reference point, as the Union still lacked a coherent strategy for actions on the international arena. In the absence of such a strategy, it was hard to clarify tasks for the High Representative and the EEAS. The Global Strategy, finally announced in mid-2016, was expected to be such a point of reference, but it seems to be -in contrast to the European Commission's guidelines -a very general document. In addition to this, the implementation of most of its objectives requires not only the involvement and coordination of most of the Union's institutions but above all the cooperation of Member States and the use of their resources (Shared…, 2016).
Further on, a comment on the role of the High representative can be found in the document "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises" of 2013. There, it is noted that the High Representative is losing control of development policy, which may be key to effective peacebuilding. The pillar of peacebuilding is a long-term commitment to political stabilisation and economic support of the areas of intervention. The loss of control over development policy may prove to be a great detriment to the success of stabilisation missions also due to the considerable financial resources allocated to its application.
Yet, the authors of the "Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy?..." also addresse financial issues, noting that the ongoing work to enhance coordination between financial instruments -e.g. between the European Development Fund and the Instrument for Stability -brings hope of improving the conditions for mission implementation. However, the authors stress that the efficiency of spending cannot be increased without regulating the decision-making process concerning the objectives and scope of financial allocations: EU funds are distributed through a series of uncoordinated programmes managed by the institutions, which are not required to consult the other institutions. The authors use the word "patchwork" to describe the fragmentation of financial resources and their distribution between the Commission, the Council and the EEAS.
The document also provides recommendations on actions needed to be undertaken to establish a coherent strategy and institutional basis for the implementation of complex EU stabilisation missions in fragile states and in areas where no legitimate author-RIE 14 '20 ity holds. It is estimated that the adaptation measures must combine several elements: 1) in addition to preparing a clear strategy, there is a need for 2) institutional changes, but also 3) taking measures relating to the use of financial resources, and 4) coordination of civilian and military operations.
On the first of the above points, the document stresses the importance of clarifying the vision of peacebuilding, in which the EU institutions, NGOs and civil society representatives should be involved. Only then should a strategy be prepared that combines the vision with the Union's capacity for influence and its internal mechanisms and resources.
The second area of change should be the administrative structure for operations outside the EU. The authors of the document believe that the role of the EEAS should be broad -the EEAS should coordinate EU actions as much as possible, otherwise, it will turn into yet another institution in the chain of shared competences and will only add to the number of existing ones, without solving institutional problems that have long been visible. Strategic planning should be prepared by the High Representative and the EEAS -the institutions designated by the Lisbon Treaty to coordinate external action -and implemented by EU Delegations and by the Commission Directorates-General which implement the policies for which they are responsible.
The third scope for change should be the coordination of financial effort. A synergy effect that would increase the effectiveness of the mission can only be achieved by implementing consistent ways of spending the funds available for external operations. The authors are the advocates of giving the European External Action Service oversight of all funds allocated to external missions.
The fourth type of change should concern cooperation between the civilian and military components of external missions. This underlines the need for better coordination of teams preparing civilian and military operations to achieve a single, coherent mission. The authors of the document note that the main problem in the field of civilmilitary cooperation is that military operations are prepared by the Member States, of which there are many, and whose planning institutions are not coherent with each other. It is therefore not just a matter of combining two different planning units at the EU institution level, but of finding an agreement between the many EU institutions and even more -the Member States. Actors from outside the Union institutions and the Member States, such as the UN, NGOs and financial donors to the area where the operation is planned, should also be involved in the preparation of the operation. Here the authors of the document are sceptical about the possibilities of the EU, writing that "while the EU has given much talk to the comprehensive approach, its institutional resistance to adapt in practice is outstanding" (Towards…, 2010, p. 14).

CSDP after 2016: Integrated Approach
While the pace of progress in preparing the legal framework and operating structures may not be satisfactory, further steps are still being taken. The most notable and potentially direct implications for the security of the Union and its Member States are: -the establishment of the PESCO cooperation platform, -the European Defence Fund (EDF) financed by the Union, -the CARD -Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and -Civilian CSDP Compact in 2018.
In December 2016, the European Council endorsed the plan for the implementation of security and defence actions, which, as part of the implementation of the priority development directions, points to the need to launch a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to strengthen Member States' defence cooperation and establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) as a platform for cooperation between the Member States concerned over the defence field (Implementation…, 2018). The CARD is an annual review of Member States' defence plans, aimed at improving the efficiency of spending by identifying areas of common interest to the Member States and defining the possibilities for creating common research areas. The programme is moderated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in cooperation with the European External Action Service (Coordinated…).
In practical and institutional terms, in 2017 the European Defence Fund was established -a fund that the setting up of which the EDA had advocated for long. The argument reiterated by the EDA from the beginning of its activity was the economization of security through the coordination of defence equipment purchases between EU countries and the coordination of research. The new Fund created by the EU focuses on exactly these two dimensions.
Established in December 2017, PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) is an opportunity to establish another step towards improving the effectiveness of CSDP but operates based on a free declaration by the Member States to initiate programmes and join programmes created by other members. This means that countries can declare their willingness to develop new programmes and choose whether and which programmes they want to join. Out of 47 projects currently divided into 7 categories ("Training and Facilities," "Marine," "Cyber and C4ISR" -Information Collection and Command, "Air Systems," "Land, Formations, Systems," "Enabling, Joint," "Space"), EUFOR Crisis Response Cooperation Core deserves attention in the context of the Global Strategy. The project aims to develop greater readiness to use the armed forces in a crisis and thus to build a bridge between the battle groups and the Global Strategy. Although the establishment of a space for cooperation between states to increase the efficiency of the defence sector is a big step forward, a weakness of PESCO is both the voluntariness of joining the projects and the way it is managed: the European External Action Service together with the European Defence Agency constitute the PESCO Secretariat. The merger of institutions in the management system of the European Union's activities bears the signs of a possible decrease in the effectiveness of these activities.
In November 2018, the Union adopted the Civilian CSDP Compact, which confirmed the return to building the civilian dimension of external missions. Following on from the previous efforts as expressed in the Civilian Headline Goal ten years back, the EU redefined the size of the staff needed for civilian missions. EU involvement in civilian stabilisation missions outside its borders has so far been difficult to launch or maintain due to several factors. Firstly, a large proportion of the Member States of the Union was not convinced of the need to launch such operations, and since it was up to the Member States to recruit and train personnel for civilian missions, these missions constantly suffered from insufficient staffing levels (Korski, Gowan, 2009). Secondly, there was a difficulty to adapt the law of the Member States to the needs of the missions, so that civil servants could participate in these missions. The law of some states did not allow such participation outside their borders. Thirdly, there was also a lack of action plans that would allow for the rapid launch of missions, which often resulted in delays in their implementation. In cases of subsequent deployment, it used to happen that the mission lost its importance as while the EU was planning operation and working towards the completion of personnel and equipment, other organisations and coalitions of states were deploying identical missions.
A similar situation has occurred with the police mission in Afghanistan: EUPOL Afghanistan is assessed to have had little impact on the situation on the ground due to the EU's difficulties in recruiting staff. Korski points out that the size of EUPOL was set at 400 people, of which the Member States were unable to provide even half of the staff (Korski, 2009). The author also adds that the EUPOL mission was overshadowed by the US police mission CSTS-A, which already in 2007 had operational units and started training local police forces in over 350 districts. Korski also notes that several European countries (for example, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany) have participated in the CSTS-A without participating to EUPOL.
A step that did not have an immediate effect, but was a guiding principle for the development of the Union's capabilities, was the adoption by the Council in January 2018 of a new nomenclature relating to further action to address conflicts and crises outside the EU. The key term in the Council conclusions is "integrated approach to conflicts and crises" (Council Conclusions…, 2018). In its conclusions, the Council defines an "integrated approach" as "multi-dimensional," "multi-level," "multi-phase" and "multilateral." It defines them as follows: "The Union has a wide array of policies and instruments at its disposal to respond to these challenges [i.e. the ones introduced in the Global Strategy] including in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond -spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields (multi-dimensional). The Integrated Approach respects and reaffirms the various mandates, roles, aims and legal frameworks of the stakeholders involved. It is applied at the local, national, regional and global levels (multi-level) as needed and throughout all phases of the conflict -including protracted conflicts and crises -(multi-phase) in prevention, crisis response, stabilisation and longer-term peacebuilding, to contribute to sustainable peace. It is an approach that brings together the Member States, relevant EU institutions and other international and regional partners as well as civil society organisations (multi-lateral)." The Council of the Union is thus setting the course for the development of the doctrine of the EU's response to conflicts and crises outside the EU's borders and clarifies the comprehensive approach formulated in 2013. Explaining the rationale for introducing the doctrine in 2013, the Council wrote: "Following the entry into force of the Treaty and the new institutional context it created, including the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security who is also Vice-President of the Commission as well as the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU has both the increased potential and the ambition -by drawing on the full range of its instruments and resources -to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic" (Joint..., 2013).
In specifying the Union's potential, the Council underlines: "Comprehensiveness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and the Member States. The EU has a unique network of 139 in-country EU Delegations, diplomatic expertise in the EEAS including through EU Special Representatives, and operational engagement through Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. By bringing all these together, with the European Commission and the 28 Member States, to work in a joined-up and strategic manner, the EU can better define and defend its fundamental interests and values, promote its key political objectives and prevent crises or help to restore stability" (Joint..., 2013, p. 3). Faleg carefully studies the evolution of the Union's concept from a comprehensive approach in 2013 to an integrated approach in 2018, comparing it with changes in the response doctrines of the UN, OSCE and NATO, and concludes that much remains to be done before the cooperation and capabilities of these four organisations can provide an effective system for tackling global conflict crises (Faleg, 2018). Tardy explicitly concludes his analysis of the evolution from a comprehensive to an integrated approach: "the IA [as in: Integrated Approach] does not seem to add anything that was not already on the EU security agenda, yet it sheds light on issues -such as the multiphased and multi-level aspects -that were not central to the Comprehensive Approach" (Tardy, 2017). The author also relates the experience of the UN-run missions to the future of the EU advanced approach indicating that politicization of UN actions was (and the EU actions will probably be) the greatest handicap in the performance. He furthermore observes that "at first glance, the CA [as in: Comprehensive Approach] and the IA are different words which mean roughly the same thing" adding, that although there is no relevant change in the concept, the new branding helps add visibility to the ideas that need constant development.

Conclusions
Although defence policy has been spoken of in a Europe that has been uniting since the 1950s, i.e. before the today's European Union was established, cooperation in this area has been slow. The initial demands of France in the middle of the twentieth century to organize a common army in Europe have not been much fulfilled. The British concept to station the European security on cooperation with the US appears to be much closer to most EU members, despite the US frustration with the attitude of its European allies, their disproportionate -according to the US -contribution to common security and insufficient funding for the defence sector. Calls for the creation of a separate from NATO, real alliance, capable of joint intervention remain unheeded. Although it has been unreservedly proven that an economically integrated Union brings tangible benefits to the Member States, and although integration in many areas is extremely satisfactory, Brexit paradoxically shows that in the field of security, the Member States so reluctant to transfer defence competences to the Union may be right. Brexit takes away the Union's strongest and most experienced army and a proportionately colossal financial contribution to building security. If Member States were to rely on pooling defence efforts within the EU and weaken their cooperation with NATO, RIE 14 '20 their defence capabilities would be significantly reduced. Overwhelmingly reduced. However, by pursuing a policy of cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at the expense of developing the ability to concretise joint projects in Europe, the Member States remain unwavering, as Britain, even after leaving the EU, remains one of the pillars of NATO, of which so many European countries are members. The only threat to the security of the EU countries associated with the exit of the UK from the EU is the anticipated weakening of the UK economy, which is likely to result in savings in defence spending as well.
Whether with or without the United Kingdom, the Union is determined to develop its defence capabilities by building structures, making efforts to coordinate expenditure and calling on the Member States to increase their commitment to military and civilian missions. But is this enough to build capacity to face the threats it defines in its security strategies? While much has been done to develop the Union's political and defence dimension and improve its external security capabilities, current developments in CSDP work do not dispel doubts about its preparedness to face the dangers that are mentioned in its documentation. Naturally, a lot depends on the attitude of the EU Members, because without their political will there can be no development of security and defence policy, but this is not the only place where the development is deterred. It was the Member States who agreed to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which created an ambivalent institutional order, and it is they who cooperate in creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy, under which the Common Security and Defence Policy is implemented. They are therefore almost exclusively in charge of setting the pace of work on the CFSP. A lesser but still great responsibility for the lack of preparedness to face the threats lies with the Union's institutions, which are unhurriedly setting inconsistent policies, programmes and strategies in motion. However, addressing these inconsistencies in both the institutional and legal dimensions of the acquis communautaire, even if it does not make the Union a fortress resilient to threats, will significantly improve its capacity to prevent and respond adequately to threats. For as it is now, without strong ties and close cooperation with NATO, the EU would find it hard to pull civilian or -especially -military resources to effectively protect its society against threats that originate outside of its borders.