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On the Road to the Membership of the European Communities. Political, Economic and Social Changes in Greece, Spain, Portugal discussed in the “Polityka” weekly magazine (1981–1987)

Introduction

At the beginning of 1957, the government of the Peoples Republic of Poland (PRL) established a new socio-political weekly “Polityka”. Its editor-in-chief was Stefan Żółkiewski, whereas Mieczysław F. Rakowski took the position of a deputy editor-in-chief. The goal for the weekly magazine was to support the Gomułka’s political views and defend them against revisionism and dogmatism. The magazine covered both domestic and international affairs. Over time, the analysis of international affairs became the quality hallmark of “Polityka”. The magazine achieved a significant position in the domestic press. After a few years, it also won recognition abroad, mainly in Eastern Europe¹. Editors of “Polityka” commented, among other things, on the multi-faceted rivalry between the USSR and the USA, as well as between socialist and capitalist states, not to mention also the so-called German issue. Between 1957 and 1989, the magazine assessed the process of deepening political and economic integration in Western Europe.

In the last decade of the People’s Republic of Poland, the attention of the weekly’s socio-political columnists was primarily directed towards the southern enlargement of the EEC to include Greece (1981), followed by Spain and Portugal (1986). It discussed these enlargements in connection with these countries membership or candidacy for NATO. Of the southern countries discussed, only Portugal had been a member of the North Atlantic Alliance since 1949. Although Greece became a member of the organisation in 1952, it did not participate in NATO’s military structures from 14 August 1974 until 20 October 1980. Moreover, for many years, the government and society were uncertain about deeper cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. Spain, on the other hand, with some resistance finally become a member of NATO in 1982.

Most of “Polityka” publications stressed that there were both political and economic difficulties on the road to EEC membership for Greece, Spain and Portugal. Initially, political issues became an obstacle to the membership of the European Communities,

¹ For more on the weekly “Polityka” and the attitude of its editor-in-chief Mieczysław F. Rakowski towards the development of Western European integration: See: A. Barabasz (2021), *Between negation and engagement. European integration in Mieczysław F. Rakowski’s journalism and political activity in 1958–1990*, “Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, no. 15, pp. 319–336.

i.e. the dictatorship in Greece by the 'junta of the black colonels', in Spain by General Francisco Franco, and in Portugal by António de Oliveira Salazar. The weekly also highlighted economic shortcomings in the new candidate states. It was pointed out that the economic potential of these countries, in the run-up to the negotiations with the European Communities, was unsuitable to match the economic power of the other countries of the 'nine'.

Moreover, the editors of "Polityka" closely followed political and social changes taking place in the above-mentioned countries. They analysed the rivalry for power between political parties and supported socialist and communist groupings in the southern states. Many articles suggested that the issue of European integration was treated instrumentally by the Mediterranean states to achieve far-reaching goals in their foreign policy and to implement domestic political agendas in the countries concerned.

The community associated with the socio-political weekly repeatedly drew up scenarios for the development of the international situation in the world and in Europe. They envisaged the creation of the United States of Europe, the third global power with extensive contacts and dependencies, a power which could achieve its status through, among other things, the accession of new member states. At the same time, it was emphasised that, due to its former links, Spain was to be the gateway to contacts with Latin American countries, and Portugal with Africa and the Far East.

The primary aim of the article is to present views and opinions of the "Polityka" editors on the expansion of the European integration to include Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1981–1987. The author's intention is to present the reaction of the columnists associated with the opinion-leading weekly in Poland to the political, economic and social changes taking place in southern Europe.

Before the accession of southern states

Although Greek contacts with the EEC date back to the 1950s, Athens took their first real steps towards signing an EEC accession agreement in the 1960s. First, an agreement between the Single Market and Greece on Greece's accession to the Customs Union was signed in 1959. Then, two years later, on 13 July 1961, Greece and the EEC signed an Association Agreement, which entered into force on 1 November 1962. The ruling of the 'junta of the black colonels' (1967–1974) postponed Greek efforts to join the EEC for several years. During the aforementioned period, in contrast to other press periodicals in Poland,² "Polityka" did not publish any significant commentaries on the political and economic situation in Greece and Greek efforts to move closer to the West and the EEC.

In the same vein, in the Iberian countries, contacts between Madrid and Lisbon and the EEC intensified in the 1950s. These contacts were underpinned by both political and

² The topic of the efforts of Greece, Spain, Portugal to join the European Communities was widely taken up in the Polish press. See more: A. Barabasz (2018), *Polska wobec zachodnioeuropejskich procesów integracji w latach 1946–1989, po II wojnie światowej (do 1989 roku) (Poland vis-à-vis West European integration processes from 1946 to 1989, after World War II (until 1989))*, Poznań, pp. 231–267.

economic reasons. Spain and Portugal faced similar problems that prevented close cooperation with the Single Market. The dictatorship exercised in both countries, uncompetitive industry and low-productivity agriculture put both countries at a disadvantage from the outset. Therefore, both Madrid and Lisbon saw rapprochement to the EEC as an opportunity for so much needed financial injections into their backward economies. They also hoped for support due to political and social changes in their countries.

The path of both countries to EEC membership was very similar. For the reasons mentioned above, the application of both Madrid and Lisbon to become EEC members was initially rejected by the Commission of the European Communities. Both countries could merely sign preferential trade agreements with the EEC. As in the case of Greece, there was initially little information about Spanish and Portuguese efforts to join the EEC discussed in the Weekly. As the situation developed, we could find the first comments in the second half of the 1970s.

In 1978, "Polityka" wrote, "Lisbon's negotiations with the EEC began in December 1978, and the process of adapting Portuguese law to the requirements of the Communities continued until 1980. It is worth mentioning that in 1975, Portugal received a low-interest loan of 75 million pounds sterling from the European Communities to adapt their economy to the EEC standards" (No author, 1975, p. 2).

The enlargement of the European Communities to include the Mediterranean states and political and economic changes in these countries were vigorously discussed and commented in "Polityka" in the 1980s. These issues were discussed from the perspective of rapid economic and political changes brought about by the European integration and benefits and challenges of the process for the candidate countries. The discussion adopted the perspective of the Cold War rivalry between East and West. It was argued that a precondition for EEC membership was NATO membership, or at least a form of cooperation between the Mediterranean states and the North Atlantic Alliance that would provide an opportunity for NATO to deploy weapons and/or troops in these countries.

The political scene in the Mediterranean countries, the rivalry for power between parties and the situation of the ideologically close socialist and communist parties in the South were closely followed. The weekly emphasised heterogeneous and sometimes even indecisive position of the candidate states. It was dictated by the rapidly changing international and domestic political situation. Occasionally, the weekly magazine developed a profit and loss account for the Polish economy and the Polish state in the event of the prospective accession of the southern states.

In the first half of the 1980s, the aforementioned changes in the Mediterranean countries were closely followed by Kazimierz Kik in the pages of "Polityka". As early as February 1983, in his article entitled 'Mediterranean Socialism', he noted that the political changes in the Mediterranean countries determined their political reorientation and the attitude to their EEC membership. He did not hide his satisfaction that, in addition to Italy and France, there was a shift of government to socialism in two other southern countries. In 1981, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) took over in Greece, and in Spain, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) came to power in 1982. In the author's view, however, these changes "could not in any positive way affect the tense relations between East and West" (Kik, 1983, p. 13).

Another weekly columnist, Jerzy Klechta, joined the discussion on the changes taking place in the southern European countries. He commented on the reshuffle of power in Portugal that took place in 1983. As he noted, the government that emerged from the spring election, a government which consisted of a centre-left coalition of socialists (PSP), took power at a difficult time for the country. He stressed that the ruling team of Prime Minister Mario Soares found the economy in a deplorable state after the governments of his predecessors. Although the Socialists' immediate response was to announce reforms, these were not supported by the people. This was because the changes were geared towards drastic austerity, raising the prices of basic products and made living difficult for working people in general. In Klechta's opinion, one of the priorities of the Socialist leader's policy was to modernise the economy and prepare it for integration with the EEC, which he called an unattainable goal for the time being. Klechta assessed that the country's Prime Minister was trying by various means – both in official meetings and behind the scenes – to gain more favour for Portugal's efforts to join the EEC. Despite the Portuguese Prime Minister's good recognition in European elites and close relations with some European politicians, the efforts so far failed to produce the desired effect. Portugal continued to be treated as a poor and peripheral country. According to Klechta, the Portuguese politician used various ways to bring the country closer to the EEC. He was aware of the link between EEC accession and membership of the North Atlantic Alliance, of which Portugal had been a part since 1949. He was therefore ready for even deeper cooperation and solidarity with NATO. He intended “to make further areas of the country available for military bases and even to give up land in Beja in eastern Portugal for the installation of nuclear weapons in order to obtain a quick guarantee of accession to the European Communities” (Klechta, 1983, p. 13).

At the beginning of 1983, an interesting perspective on the adaptation problems of the second Iberian country, Spain, was offered by Maciej Łuszczkiewicz, another respected columnist of the socio-political weekly. The author, known for his publications in “Sprawy Międzynarodowe” and “Kultura”, in addition to his critical assessment of the adjustment of the economy in the candidate country to the European Communities and Madrid's fulfilment of political conditions, drew attention to social and cultural adaptation problems of the Mediterranean countries. For example, Łuszczkiewicz assessed whether Spaniards were mentally ready for West European integration. In an article entitled “The Spaniard's Economic Complex”, he pointed out that the average Spaniard approached economic issues differently from other Europeans: He did so primarily recklessly, nonchalantly, and superficially. In his opinion, this manifested itself both in the work culture and its organisation. Łuszczkiewicz took a closer look at the Spanish economic history and stressed that the former colonial power began to lose its importance after the gold price fell on world markets. In his opinion, for a number of years, Spaniards had learned neither entrepreneurship nor to think about work in terms of competition. Therefore, Spaniards mentally were more like Africans than Europeans. It was only quite recently, since the late 1950s onwards, that a group of young technocrats emerged in the country, giving hope of changing the existing status quo. It did not appear by chance. It was General Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain until 1975, who, as suggested by his advisors, gave high-ranking positions in the state

to representatives of the Opus Dei organisation – young technocrats who, referring to Christian motivation, wanted to implement religious excellence at work in various positions. In view of the fact that in Spain the religious factor plays a very important role in the life of the population, it was decided to combine religion with ethical elements that translate into work efficiency. As the author noted, “the organisation has close links with industry, insurance companies, and banking. [...] Technocracy is the concept of the effective management of society through modern technology” (Luszczkiewicz, 1983, p. 12). In the conclusion to the article, the well-known columnist identified the current Spanish foreign policy goal as Europeanisation, i.e. EEC membership. He left open the question of whether the uncompetitive economy of the Iberian country would withstand the economic race inside the European Communities, and whether the Spanish people would finally overcome the complex of inefficiency and poor management while being inside the European Communities.

In early 1984, Kazimierz Kik wrote about the dependence of the Spanish EEC membership on the country’s deepening military cooperation within NATO. In an article entitled “The State is Changing”, he assessed the main directions of changes in domestic and foreign policies introduced by the ruling socialist PSOE party. He mentioned that, with regard to Madrid’s possible membership in NATO’s military structures, the ruling party announced a national referendum scheduled for 1985. In Kik’s view, the prospect of Spain’s admission to the EEC became instrumental, and the country’s membership of the European Communities was now the most important foreign policy objective of the government and the Socialist party in power. As he noted, unfortunately for Spain not all the capitals of the EEC member states were in favour of the Spain imminent accession. With Madrid’s path to the EEC being held back to some extent by Paris, the leader of the ruling party Felipe Gonzalez began to seek support from other EEC and NATO members. Gonzalez travelled to Bonn, where he sought support to overcome France’s stance on his country’s EEC membership. To this end, during a meeting in the German capital, he supported the decision made in March 1983 by US President Ronald Reagan for the US to introduce medium-range nuclear missiles into Western Europe. Kik emphasised that “the Prime Minister also approved in full the West German solution to the so-called German problem” (Kik, 1984a, p. 13).

Again in May 1984, Kazimierz Kik wrote about the difficulties to overcome the economic crisis in Portugal before their accession to the EEC and the link between the necessary economic aid for the country and political decisions of the government in Lisbon, decisions which were favourable towards the US. Kik, who later became a professor of social sciences, stressed that the ruling Socialist Party and party leader Mario Soares were trying various options to counteract the growing unemployment in the country and deepening economic crisis. In the opinion of the “Polityka” columnist, “one solution could be an alliance with the Social Democrats (PSD) and a gradual ‘turning’ of the ruling party towards the right” (Kik, 1984 b, p. 12). As he noted, from the beginning of 1984, the Soares government mitigated the effects of the reforms initiated by interim governments in Portugal between 1974 and 1976, reforms which manifested themselves, among other things, in the nationalisation of industry. According to Kik, changes initiated by the Socialists were intended to meet expectations of democratic economies of the Western world and thus create favourable conditions for

the country's EEC membership. This was because they assumed that it was necessary to surrender some branches of the economy (capital markets and industrial markets) to private competition. As Kik noted, the socialist government made many decisions controversial to its electorate and initiated changes adapting the economy to the EEC requirements. In doing so, it fell into disfavour of the electorate of the relatively ideologically close Portuguese Communist Party, which openly proclaimed that Portugal's membership of the EEC was a threat to small merchants, peasants, entrepreneurs, and it would not only fail to solve Portugal's basic problems, but would exacerbate them. In the concluding section of the article, Kik mentioned that Soares also began to seek financial assistance from the US, which Washington made conditional on Portugal becoming even more closely tied to NATO and its allies.

In 1985, Portugal saw a change in the position of the ruling party. After the Socialist rule, the Social Democratic Party took over power in Lisbon for 10 years. This transition was assessed by Jerzy Klechta in his article 'Barcelos did not crow'.

The experienced writer and weekly columnist assessed the victory of the Social Democrats (PSD) in the Portugal's parliamentary election and the assumption of power by Anival Cabaco Silve on 6 November 1985. Klechta attributed the success of the party led by the economist to mistakes made by the previous ruling team under the three-time prime minister of the country, Mario Soares. According to Klechta, these were the draconian austerity measures that turned the public away from the socialist party. Later in the article, the "Polityka" columnist assessed the programme of the winning party and, in view of Portugal's difficult economic situation, did not expect positive changes in the country. "Cuts in subsidies to nationalised industry, tax hikes, and a freeze on public sector wages are just some of the controversial decisions that will be introduced by the winners. An additional difficulty that the winners of the October general election will have to face is the formation of party alliances and coalitions, which will be necessary as the PSD will not have a majority in parliament" (Klechta, 1985, p. 13). According to Klechta, economic and social targets in politics were to be more difficult than foreign policy goals, i.e. EEC membership.

Post-accession. Greece, Spain, Portugal members of the European Communities

The Greek accession to the EEC took place in 1981. It was widely commented on by the Polish press, including "Polityka".³

In autumn 1981, Greece held its first post-accession parliamentary election. For the first time in the country's history, the socialist party PASOK, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement led by Andreas Papandreu won the election. The party almost doubled its popular support from 25% of vote it enjoyed in 1977 to 48% of vote in 1981. "The victory gave it 174 seats in the parliament" (Bonarek, Czekalski, Sprawski, Turlej,

³ PAP (1981), *Grecja 10 członkiem EWG (Greece the 10th member of the EEC)*, "Życie Warszawy", January 2, p. 4; Z. Kamiński (1981), *Grecja – najsłabszy partner w EWG (Greece – the weakest partner in the EEC)*, "Życie Warszawy", January 16, p. 7; A. Muńko, W. Rybowski (1981), *Rozszerzenie EWG. Przesłanki i skutki (Enlargement of the EEC. Rationale and consequences)*, "Życie Gospodarcze", no. 1, p. 11.

2005, p. 633). On 18 October the same year, shortly after the election, Papandreu was elected Prime Minister of the country. However, due to the divergent opinions among the Greek society on consequences of the country's accession to the European Communities and PASOK's reluctant stance towards the country's full membership of the EEC, a discussion on the legitimacy of the country's presence in the EEC heated up in Greece. This was also echoed in the Polish press.

Even before the 1981 autumn election in Greece, the weekly magazine featured a conversation between Krystyna Mikulanka and Andreas Papandreu, during which the Greek leader was to declare that his country was not in favour of either capitalist or socialist states. At the same time, he criticised US interference in Greek affairs and assessed that his country should not be a full member of the EEC. In his interview with the Polish columnist and later diplomat, the PASOK leader also pointed out that NATO, the military structure of Western European countries, was not an ally of Greece. Therefore, the party's goal was to support Greece's exit from the alliance. Papandreu described to the Polish expert the political profile of his party (PASOK) as "a socialism in which the community and the regions of Greece have the chance to promote their own development within the framework of a national plan [...]. We would like to give people work in the countryside and in the city, the right to express themselves. In other words, we believe in a pluralist society" (Mikulanka, 1981, p. 12).

In the following issue, "Polityka" columnists reported on personal changes in the Greek government. Issue 44 of 31 October 1981 mentioned that A. Papandreu, the leader of the PASOK, the party that was victorious in the last elections, "will take over the position of the prime minister and the minister of defence in the government" (*Za granicą*, 1981, p. 2).

In the same issue of "Polityka", Grażyna Bernatowicz-Bierut, an analyst of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, in her article entitled "Changes under the Acropolis", pointed out that already a few weeks before the dissolution of the Greek Parliament and the calling of new election scheduled for 18 October 1981, opinion polls indicated that the PASOK would succeed in the election, but no one expected such a spectacular victory. In the 18 October election, the PASOK won 48% of the popular vote, which translated into 174 seats in the 300-seat Greek parliament. The author noted that in the past years PASOK's ratings had risen significantly at the expense of the New Democracy led by Konstantin Karamanlis, the former leader on the Greek political scene. According to Bernatowicz-Bierut, "the fundamental mistake of the previous government was Greece's poor relations with the EEC and NATO" (Bernatowicz-Bierut, 1981, p. 12). The author further noted that the Greek left had criticised the country's accession to the EEC in the first place and suggested that the Greek EEC membership would destroy the country's small and medium-sized industrial sector, would not facilitate the access of Greek products to EEC markets, and would not improve the situation of Greek workers abroad. The PISM analyst referred to the words of A. Papandreu, who defined the Greece's foreign policy vector and announced that "the Greeks should not attach much importance to relations with the EEC. For Greece belongs to Europe as well as to the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, and its diplomacy should be equally active in all these regions" (Bernatowicz-Bierut, 1981, p. 12).

The PASOK rule in Greece lasted until 1989. From the Greek accession to the EEC in 1981 until the end of the socialist rule in Greece in 1989, the Greek presence in the EEC and its membership in NATO divided the Greek society. At election meetings, rallies and street demonstrations, supporters and opponents of the aforementioned issues often clashed.

This was noted in the pages of the socio-political weekly by Zbigniew Fałęcki. In his article entitled "Dancing on a tightrope", the long-time employee of the Polish Press Agency drew attention to a speech by PASOK leader Andreas Papandreu at the party's December 1983 demonstration. The demonstration was a summary of the Socialists' recent rule. According to the weekly columnist, the Greek public returned from the demonstration at which some 40,000 people had gathered "in the mood in which football fans return after a match that ended in a draw" (Fałęcki, 1983, p. 13). He alluded to the polarisation of the Greek society, which focussed its attention on issues of Greece full presence in NATO and EEC membership. Fałęcki attempted to map the prospects for Greeks political participation. He noted that the PASOK would have to compete on the Greek political scene in the future with Konstantinos Karamanlis's New Democracy, a party supporting Greek presence in the EEC, and fight to remain in power after the election scheduled for 1985.

The next Greek parliamentary election of 1985 again resulted in a victory of the Socialists over National Democracy (PASOK with 45.8%, National Democracy 40.8% of the vote).

In "Polityka", this event was assessed by Bronisław Troński in his article "Operation Hump". As he noted, the Greek people's disappointment with the current economic situation was largely due to the EEC's actions towards Greece. He stressed that, although the Community had provided a large amount of money (more than 1.4 billion-dollar credit) to the country, the use of the funds was subject to severe conditions for the Greek economy, i.e. reducing inflation and the budget deficit, and not increasing the country's foreign debt. Troński also pointed out that Greek economic difficulties were the legacy of not only structural negligence in the economy and industry, but also by the unfavourable global economic climate. He concluded that so far "Greece has failed to create an industry capable of competing with those in more developed EEC countries. It has not adapted its economy to the new conditions of the 1970s energy crisis and has not made any steps towards restructuring and modernising its economy" (Troński, 1986, p. 9). According to Troński, the long-time foreign correspondent of the Polish Press Agency, the leader of the party that won the parliamentary elections, Andreas Papandreu, announced far-reaching economic and social changes that were to lift and modernise Greek industry, at the expense of previously much more important sectors, such as trade, shipping and tourism. Being a representative of the nation as a whole and not just of the PASOK party, Papandreu promised to introduce numerous social privileges that were supposed to reduce the disillusionment of Greeks with the current economic situation, i.e. free medical treatment, free schooling, and the decentralisation of power in companies. According to Troński, the Greek difficulties not only related to the economy. The Papandreu government's lack of a transparent foreign policy especially in relation to NATO and the US might have created an impression that the socialist leader was inconsistent and unpredictable in his political actions. On

the one hand, he spoke of dismantling military bases on the Greek soil after the expiry of the agreement with Washington, which was due in 1988, and of refusing to the US to renew Greek arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, he was happy to benefit from the \$500 million annual lease fee Greece was getting from the US for the use of the military bases. The country also had the NATO AWACS early warning aircraft at its disposal and participated in meetings and deliberations of the Nuclear Planning Group and the Military Committee. At the end of his article, Troński noted that for all these reasons, Greece has been called a 'wayward alliance partner' by NATO members (Troński, 1986, p. 9).

Spain and Portugal's paths to the European Communities were relatively similar. Both countries became members of the EEC in 1986 and both took a long time to adopt political and economic changes in their countries. Shortly after their accession to the EEC, the first interesting comments on the EEC integration of the Iberian countries appeared in the pages of "Polityka".

Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myśnik, in her article entitled "Ten plus two", suggested that at the beginning of 1986 the ten EEC member states had welcomed the two Iberian countries into the Community, but that there would still be a long period of convergence of the Spanish and Portuguese economies to the Community Market. Many political, economic, social factors were to stand in the way. Among the political ones, she mentioned Spain's slow departure from the authoritarian rule, which *de facto* ended with the death of the dictator General Francisco Franco in 1975. Other factors concerned economic issues. The author emphasised the weakness of the Iberian industry protected by high tariff barriers. She identified Spanish agriculture as underfunded and uncompetitive. In this context, she drew attention to the same Mediterranean profile of Spanish agriculture for years promoted by other EEC members, such as France, Italy, Greece, and Portugal. On this point, she stressed that the EEC's self-sufficiency in olive oil, citrus, wine and the agricultural surpluses which the Community had and which it also traded with the Maghreb, the Mediterranean countries trading with the EEC, could be an obstacle for these members to integrate with the Community. On the other hand, she saw an opportunity for other European countries, including Poland, "perhaps these countries, looking around for markets other than those of Western Europe, will look in our direction", she wrote (Sobolewska-Myśnik, 1986, p. 9). In her opinion, another problem for the EEC countries, apart from agriculture, was fish production. Together with the two Iberian countries, the Community became the largest producer of fish in the world. This determined the internal rivalry within the Community who and how much fish they should catch or how many ships they should operate. Other challenges for the enlarged EEC were personal ambitions of its members. For Spain did not want to be treated as a beneficiary of a unifying Europe. Its return to Europe was hardly accompanied by Madrid's conviction of being Europe's link to Latin America. As she noted, Britain 'brought' its Asian contacts to the EEC, France its African ones, and Spain was to be the gateway to relations with Latin America. According to Sobolewska-Myśnik, the later professor of social sciences, there was another important argument in favour of the European integration of the Iberian countries and especially Spain. Interestingly, it was the transatlantic argument related to the relations of Western European countries, including the EEC, with the US. As she

noted, Washington was counting on Spain to stay in NATO as a result of the upcoming referendum⁴ on the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, in her view, although not spoken out loud, there was a view in the air that “the integration within the EEC and NATO was a more complete form of European integration” (Sobolewska-Myśnik, 1986).

In the following sections of her article, she diagnosed the development of the European integration. The so-called “12”, she noted, would take a long time to arrive, and political decisions within the group, affecting all its members, would sometimes be controversial for the autonomous regions of Spain accustomed to regional governance. In her analysis, she also predicted a politically and economically unified Western Europe in the 1990s, which would develop into the United States of Europe.

Shortly after the result of the referendum of 12 March 1986 was announced, an interesting article by Jacek Wędrowski entitled ‘Gonzalez won’ appeared in “Polityka”. It referred to the circumstances of the referendum on Spain remaining in the North Atlantic structures. In his, the referendum was the political completion of government’s actions related to the EEC accession. The weekly’s publicist quoted the words of Prime Minister Gonzalez, who had brought Spain into the EEC and kept it in NATO, “for our political future it is necessary to remain in NATO, because Spain is an element of European unity and Spanish autonomous foreign policy would reduce its credibility in the eyes of Western partners” (Wędrowski, 1986, p. 11). In Wędrowski’s view, the example of Spain showed that in the EEC “there are many countries for which the presence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the price of their entry into the European Economic Community” (Wędrowski, 1986).

Following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC, a great deal of political and economic changes accelerated in the southern European countries in 1986–1987. This did not escape the attention of columnists working for the weekly magazine “Polityka”.

In the early 1987, Kazimierz Kik, a specialist on the Mediterranean countries, wrote in the weekly magazine about the difficulty of keeping electoral promises made by political parties to the electorate and the obligations arising from EEC and NATO membership. The weekly’s columnist regretted the declining interest of European societies in socialist parties in southern Europe. As he noted, at the present time (early 1987) they only exercised full power in Spain and Greece, and lost it partially or completely in Italy, Portugal and France. In his view, the reason for their failure was the high radicalisation of reforms, which was incompatible with the interdependence of the EEC capitalist economies. These issues were also exacerbated by the economic crisis. Kik went on to list the most important mistakes made by ruling parties, “trusting pragmatism and neo-liberalism in economic matters, giving a primary role to the private sector rather than to the state, limiting the expenditure allocated to social purposes [...], placing emphasis on economic efficiency in by changing the industrial structure and modernisation of these countries, which contributed to the unemployment of the working masses” (Kik, 1987, p. 13). The socialists in Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal

⁴ On 12 March 1986, a referendum was held in Spain on the eggs to remain in NATO. The result was that more than 52% were in favour and 32% voted against Spain’s presence in the North Atlantic Alliance.

also made a turn in their foreign policies. Although expected, the Spanish and Greeks did not take their countries out of NATO. Moreover, the Portuguese and Italians made their bases available for the deployment of US cruise and pershing missiles. In doing so, they staked their claim to the pro-Atlantic option and thereby exposed themselves to pacifists, environmental movements, and many supporters of socialism in Europe. In Kik's view, the European left was then fractured, lost its identity, and was moving toward a Christian democratic and centrist direction.

In the spring of 1987, "Polityka" published an interesting conversation between Mirosław Ikonowicz and Francisco F. Ordonez, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The contents of the conversation confirmed Spain's conciliatory attitude to the processes of European integration taking place on the old continent in the second half of the 1980s. In his conversation with a PAP correspondent in Madrid and Lisbon (1973–1980), the Spanish head of diplomacy said that he was in favour of the reconstruction of the whole Europe, its full integration and not its divisions. As he pointed out, "Spain is a country that has made a significant contribution to the image of European unity". "I am in favour of rebuilding Europe, just as Warsaw was rebuilt, rebuilding our continent from the rubble of misunderstanding and division [...] an image of Europe as a certain unity, not a fragmented Europe. We are a new member of the European Community and the European Council, but I do not intend to ignore such European realities as the Warsaw Pact countries, neutral countries, and the non-aligned countries that are part of Europe" (Ikonowicz, 1987, p. 11). The publicist stated that Madrid expressed a strong desire to establish close relations with Eastern Europe, and was striving to achieve European unity with all Eastern countries, including Poland.

Around the same time, a text by Witold Pawłowski appeared "Polityka" as a the then current summary of the presence of another Iberian country, Portugal, in the European Communities.

Already at the beginning of the text, the "Polityka" columnist suggested that immediately after Portugal's entry into the EEC, none of predicted scenarios, either unambiguously positive or extremely negative, came true. In his opinion, the member country's economy was weak, its citizens were considered the cheapest labour force in the European Communities and its industry was twice as inefficient as in the other EEC countries. Later in the study, the author stated that Portugal's accession also entailed positive effects. It contributed to an increase in the wealth of a certain group of people called *jeeps* – young entrepreneurs with great financial potential released precisely after the country's entry into the EEC. On the other hand, Portugal's integration into the Common Market led to the plunge into economic and social problems of another social group, the *retornados* – those returning to the country after the loss of their colonies in the late 1970s.

Pawłowski made an insightful assessment of the situation in Portugal and concluded that its weaknesses could become its greatest asset and a protective shield for the economy of the young member state "foreign goods and capital do not push through the doors and windows here, because the market is modest and the purchasing power of the population is small. And small and large local industry that remained under foreign pressure cannot go bankrupt because it is so indebted that sinking would drag the whole banking system down with it" (Pawłowski, 1987a, p. 12). In the last part of the article, he stressed

that the country's entry into the EEC was of great political and economic importance for both the country and the European Community. In his justification, he added "Portugal, the agricultural Israel of Europe? Why not...similar climate and soil conditions to flood the continent with a river of avocados, mangoes grapefruits. [...] Still a second more serious one: Portugal as the great link between Europe and Africa, taking advantage of all the old relations and good contacts" (Pawłowski, 1987a).

Three months later, in the pages of the weekly, the same author published a text summarising the year and a half of another Iberian country, Spain's membership of the EEC. In his article entitled "Europe joined to Spain", Pawłowski drew attention to the disillusionment of Spanish farmers with European integration, which, in their view, was leading to an increase in Spanish imports of goods from EC countries, particularly from France.

In Pawłowski's opinion, the then objectives pursued under the EEC Common Agricultural Policy were leading the country's economy into gigantic waste, and this caused frustration among the majority of farmers. As the author stressed, the main objector to Spain's accession to the EEC was France, which wanted to protect its market and flood Spanish markets with its goods. Denmark and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were sending pigs to Spain that the country did not need. According to Pawłowski, the Spaniards' disillusionment with the EEC Common Agricultural Policy was to last for a long time, "the ten-year transition period nullifies the Spaniards' export opportunities, and the EEC's export calendar protecting the newcomers and the minimum market price below which they could not go nullify the advantage of cheap Spanish labour" (Pawłowski, 1987b, p. 13).

Summary

At the beginning of 1987, the progressing Western European integration was reviewed by the long-serving editor-in-chief of the weekly "Polityka" (1958–1982) Mieczysław Franciszek Rakowski. During the period, from 1981 to 1985, he held the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Poland in Wojciech Jarużelski's government, and from November 1985 to June 1988 he was Deputy Speaker of the Sejm. Before that, from 1958, he published dozens of articles on domestic and international issues in the opinion-forming weekly. As far as international issues were concerned, his journalism was primarily concerned with the so-called German question and he had a broad understanding of international issues. The attention of the later First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the last in the PRL also focused on European integration processes. Over the years, as a columnist, he assessed, among other things, the effects of the EEC's enlargement to include Great Britain,⁵ and changing political and economic situation in Spain in the 1970s dictated by Madrid's need to meet the criteria on the road to EEC membership.⁶

⁵ See: M. F. Rakowski (1974), *Angielskie wybory (English Elections)*, "Polityka", no. 10; M. F. Rakowski (1980), *Na prawicowym kursie (On the Right Course)*, "Polityka", no. 21.

⁶ See: M. F. Rakowski (1974), *Hiszpania jest inna (Spain is different)*, "Polityka", no. 21; M. F., Rakowski (1975), *Hiszpania polityczna (Political Spain)*, "Polityka", no. 23.

He also warned against German domination in the European Communities⁷ and drew attention to the anti-socialist edge of Western European integration initiatives.⁸

In 1987, he wrote a document of several dozen pages entitled 'Comments on certain aspects of the political and economic situation in the People's Republic of Poland in the second half of the 1980s'. which was not only a courageous analysis of the situation in the country. Rakowski assessed the progressing West European integration at the time and expressed his positive attitude to such initiatives. As he stated, the text was prophetic (Rakowski, 2005, p. 115). It was this document, among other things, that was decisive for Rakowski's membership in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1987.

In a secret paper, Mieczysław Rakowski presented a pessimistic assessment of the economic situation in Poland, an assessment which was extended by Rakowski's comparison of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon) with the European Economic Community (EEC). The then Deputy Speaker of the Sejm saw the slow and apparent development of economic ties within the socialist community. He recognised that it was not determined by the needs accentuated by member states, but by political and administrative decisions. The Comecon, in Rakowski's view, was an artificial and USSR-controlled organisation. He stated that links between the various socialist countries were weak and insufficient. This was said to be due to the backwardness of the individual countries of the bloc, the lack of capitalist traditions in this part of Europe, and also due to structural barriers separating the countries of the socialist community, such as customs duties, border controls, etc. According to Rakowski, the disparities in development occurring between the Comecon leader, the USSR, and the rest of socialist states were also important in this context. Further on, the then deputy speaker of the Sejm described the weaknesses of the Comecon in comparison to the rapidly developing EEC, "the unification of the economic potential of the socialist countries can only come about if, for example, the borders between the member states become permeable. As long as there are strict customs controls, special regulations (e.g. between the People's Republic of Poland and the GDR), as long as a young Pole cannot board a Warsaw–Moscow or Warsaw–Prague train to visit his colleague without an invitation from Moscow or Prague, and vice versa, all solemn resolutions and no less solemnly proclaimed intentions will to a large extent remain wishful thinking. So far, there is no evidence that the socialist countries intend to give up their closely guarded borders, or the bureaucratic structures that regulate the various exchanges between our countries [...] our party should be the forerunner [...] we should approach the parties that are part of the Comecon with a proposal for a serious discussion on the subject" (Wolicki, 1988, p. 11). Mieczysław Rakowski referred to initiatives of the twelve countries planned for the 1990s, As for the challenges mentioned, it is worth recalling that in 1992, i.e. in five years' time, the EEC countries will completely abolish the existing borders between them. Customs chambers, passports, etc. will disappear. Western Europe will enter a new phase of development from a qualitative point of view. I wonder if the people setting tactics for our foreign policy

⁷ See: M. F. Rakowski (1979), *Francuskie niepokoje (French unrest)*, "Polityka", no. 18.

⁸ See: M. F., Rakowski (1972), *Wkraczamy w rok 1972 z dużymi nadziejami (We enter 1972 with high hopes)*, "Polityka", no. 1.

are thinking about the implications of the changes that are taking place in the field of coexistence between the twelve nations (Wolicki, 1988 p. 13). Although written much earlier, the secret paper was discussed at a Politburo meeting in February 1989. It did not arouse as much interest among its members as the author had expected. It caused more interest of foreign embassies. The document was a sober, unemotional analysis of Poland's difficult political and economic situation and an attempt to compare the potential of the socialist countries with those of the EEC. As mentioned earlier, this comparison was painful for Poland and its allies.

In 1981–1987, the interest of the editors of the weekly magazine “Polityka” in the political and economic situation of Greece, Spain and Portugal and their path to integration with the European Communities increased steadily from year to year. The magazine emphasised the interdependence between the countries' efforts to become members of the in the EEC and their commitments and/or readiness for membership and deeper cooperation within NATO. The weekly also drew attention to the numerous absorption issues in the southern countries and resulting economic and social problems for the societies of the candidate countries, which translated into internal rivalries between ruling parties in these countries. It was emphasised that in the second half of the 1980s the EEC was growing into the third economic and political power in the world. Among other things, this was due to the southern enlargement of the EEC to include further members.

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Summary

The main aim of the article is to present the views and opinions of the editors of the *Polityka* weekly on the extension of the European integration process to Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1981–1987. The author's intention is to present reactions of journalists writing for the opinion-forming weekly in Poland to the political, economic and social changes taking place in the southern European states. The article uses the historical method and the analysis of sources and press articles. The following methods also proved to be useful: institutional and legal, comparative, decision-making and behavioral.

Key words: European integration, PRL, NATO, EEC

Na drodze do członkostwa we Wspólnotach Europejskich. Polityczne, ekonomiczne i społeczne przemiany w Grecji, Hiszpanii, Portugalii na łamach tygodnika "Polityka" (1981–1987)

Streszczenie

Zasadniczym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie poglądów i opinii redakcji tygodnika "Polityka" na rozszerzenie procesu integracji europejskiej o Grecję, Hiszpanię i Portugalię w latach 1981–1987. Zamierzeniem autora jest przybliżenie reakcji publicystów opiniotwórczego tygodnika w Polsce na przemiany polityczne, ekonomiczne i społeczne zachodzące w krajach południa Europy. W artykule zastosowano metodę historyczną, metodę analizy źródeł i wartości prasy. Przydatne okazały się również metody: instytucjonalno-prawna, porównawcza, decyzyjna oraz behawioralna.

Słowa kluczowe: integracja europejska, PRL, NATO, EWG

