

WŁADYSŁAW J. PALUCHOWSKI, KRZYSZTOF PODEMSKI

MENSIVERSARY SPEECHES BY JAROSŁAW KACZYŃSKI AS SPECTACLES OF POWER*

*The prince must deliberately hold
spectacle, in which he himself will
partake in the starring role.***

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The trauma of the Smolensk disaster

The Smolensk air disaster of 10 April 2010 was in many respects an exceptional event. The tragic end of the flight, with 96 key state officials travelling on board of a single airplane, was an unprecedented accident in the history of civil aviation. The fact that it happened as these officials were travelling to commemorate a national tragedy, namely the crimes committed at Katyń by the Soviet Union, which, to make matters worse, Russia continued to deny for almost half a century, lent a mythical significance to the disaster, especially as the airplane crashed near the site hallowed by the blood of past victims. Furthermore, the event coincided with a period of acute political and cultural conflict. Though the shock occasioned by the tragedy overshadowed the antagonism for several days, already on 15 April – following the controversial decision of the Archbishop of Krakow to allow the burial of the president and his wife at the national shrine, the conflict reignited with redoubled strength. That day, a wooden cross was erected in front of the Presidential Palace, under which supporters of the late president would gather. Subsequently, the conflict escalated due to the statement made by the newly elected president-elect on 10 July 2010, who announced that the cross would be moved from its site to a nearby church. Thus, a singular ‘war for the cross’ began.

An important element in the entire process was the extraordinary phenomenon of recurring rallies, held on the tenth day of each month to commemorate the victims of the disaster, president Lech Kaczyński in particular. The culminating moment of the successive rallies was a speech delivered by the

* Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and Higher Education as part of agreement no. 848/P-DUN/2018. Translated by Szymon Nowak.

** Filipowicz (1988): 213.

brother of the tragically departed president and leader of the political camp which at the time remained in opposition, only to gradually take power from 2015 onwards. Those meetings, colloquially referred to as *miesięcznice* (mensiversaries) – though their chief protagonist tended to use the term *marsze* (marches) – received extensive media coverage and substantial attention from the commentators, thus becoming a significant item in the public discourse.

2. Smolensk mensiversaries and their context

The so-called Smolensk mensiversaries began in front of the presidential residence on 10 July 2010 and continued until March 2018. The final 96th mensiversary took place on 10 April 2018 in a different venue, and the event was accompanied by the unveiling of a monument dedicated to the 96 victims of the disaster. The aforementioned leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, did not speak at the first four rallies (May – August 2010). Of the 92 of his speeches, 91 were delivered on the tenth day of each month in front of the Presidential Palace in Krakowskie Przedmieście, and one was given at the final, 96th mensiversary, which was celebrated at the monument in Piłsudski Square.

Our analysis will focus only on the 91 speeches for which the plaza in front of the Presidential Palace provided the stage. The choice of that ‘stage’ as a venue for the assemblies had a profound, symbolic sense. The location symbolizes the highest authority in the country, and therefore functions – albeit indirectly – as a symbol of the Polish State. However, the underlying meanings underwent a change. Initially, the ‘stage’ commemorated the president who had died in tragic circumstances. Then it became a site of demonstrations against his successor, whom the protestors considered ‘unworthy’, not the least because he defeated Jarosław Kaczyński in the elections. Eventually, the place was ‘recaptured’, or ‘regained’.

The first in the series of Kaczyński’s monthly speeches was delivered in what one might call ‘amateur’ conditions, without a podium or professional public address system in place. Those that followed would be increasingly better prepared and involved a growing number of people, not only adherents of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (the ‘Law and Justice’ party, hereinafter also PiS) and the police, but also opponents. The stage for each speech would be set on the sidewalk in front of the Presidential Palace, near the monument of Prince Józef Poniatowski, with the speaker standing on a special platform, the cross and members of the clergy at the back, and PiS politicians and security around him. Gathered before the platform, there were supporters of PiS, many of whom would hold red-and-white flags, with diverse banners and placards bearing political, national, or religious slogans and emblems, as well as lights or candles in the early period. The number of persons who attended varied. A new phenomenon emerged in 2016 with ‘counter-mensiversaries’, by means of which Obywatele RP (one of the newly established social movements) attempted to block the mensiversaries in a peaceful manner. The counter-mensiversaries, the largest of which took place in July 2017, had their emblem as well, as their participants would bring white roses. Naturally, when the

counter-rallies began to be staged, the number of police officers protecting the ‘marches’ grew as well. Throughout that time, particularly after the protests against the mensiversaries started, the proportions of supporters, opponents and the security forces fluctuated. In 2015, the mensiversaries were protected by approximately 150 police officers. In July 2017, the route from the Metropolitan Cathedral to the Presidential Palace was fenced with crowd control barriers, while the security force exceeded the combined numbers of the participants and counter-participants, with as many as 2,482 officers.

Apart from the political context surrounding the speeches of Jarosław Kaczyński, one has to take their symbolic (semantic¹) context into account as well. The substance of the latter was determined chiefly by the so-called defence of the cross erected in front of the Presidential Palace.² The fundamental paradigm which enabled one to identify and interpret social-political reality³ was – according to the narrative of the initiators and the media on their side – the fight of good versus evil. The defenders of the cross, effectively meaning the camp of the PiS party, were on the side of the good, while the incumbent president and the prime minister, that is, the camp of Platforma Obywatelska (the ‘Civic Platform’, hereinafter also PO), were the adversaries siding with evil. The same narrative cast matters in terms of the clash of Christian civilization with liberal, consumerist, and leftist ideology.⁴ In consequence, the ‘national yardstick’ was applied to determine who is a true Pole and genuine patriot, who takes a stand for the cross and faith, and who is their enemy. Lech Kaczyński became the heroic and martyrial representative of the Nation, a figure attacked by the forces of evil, ‘lackeys’ of foreign interests.⁵ In public debate, the death of Lech Kaczyński was considered tantamount to a crisis of the state and a threat to the existence of the nation, which those who are excluded from the community of Poles work towards.⁶ All this caused the protests in defence of values and mourning after the death of Jarosław Kaczyński’s twin brother to transform into political rallies. PiS took one side whereas PO – first the ruling and subsequently an opposition party – stood on the other. Once adopted, this interpretive paradigm made the political opponent an enemy with whom no agreement or conciliation is possible, on moral grounds.⁷

¹ Lipiński (2012); Dziekan (2018).

² Krzemiński (2017).

³ Krzemiński (2017).

⁴ Krzemiński (2017).

⁵ Krzemiński (2017).

⁶ As Krzysztof Jaskułowski observed (2010): “The conventional symbolic association (i.e. metaphorical one) between the president and national integrity, transformed imperceptibly in the collective imagination into a relationship of causal (metonymic) nature. This confusion of two ontological orders constitutes the essence of magical thinking” (ibid.: 36). “He was apparently killed by the “accrued hate” of the PO voters, by the journalists presenting his distorted image, by the “hate-spewing” critics of his presidency; he was “hounded to death” just as president Gabriel Narutowicz had been. Lech Kaczyński was killed by the “evil word” (ibidem: 38).

⁷ Krzemiński (2017).

Still, the marches and Jarosław Kaczyński's speeches would not have achieved such an import on their own, as isolated phenomena. It was media communication which forged the significance of the Smolensk disaster to match the Katyń massacre, fully exploiting the symbolism of the latter.⁸ The shared metaphor of a martyr's death for the community as a singular sacrifice⁹ made the speeches of Jarosław Kaczyński a triggering factor for the powerful and potentially antagonizing emotions in the media space. Public debate after the disaster witnessed such phrases as 'they were killed in Katyń', '[he] fell fighting for truth', 'a second Katyń', 'martyr's death', 'the grace of death in Katyń', 'the last journey leading to the Katyń forest', 'Poles are becoming one great Katyń family'.¹⁰ This was accompanied by the soap-operatic language which painted an iconic, simplified, uncontroversial and mythologized picture of the victims of the air disaster, and of the presidential couple in particular.¹¹

3. Mensiversary speeches

An analysis of 91 mensiversary addresses by the leader of PiS was conducted by the TVN24 journalist Jacek Pawłowski in a 5-page text entitled *Smoleńsk – czterdzieści tysięcy słów prezesa [Smolensk – 40,000 Words of the Chairman]*.¹² Pawłowski relied on transcripts from television footage, which have been kindly made available to the authors of this paper. Having examined the frequency with which particular words were used, Pawłowski concludes as follows: 'Getting at the truth, victory and mobilization – these are the foundations which for eight years served Jarosław Kaczyński to build his Smolensk mensiversary speeches on.' The journalist argues that the speaker's fundamental notion of 'getting at the truth' is a general statement, as it aims to instil a 'sense of unity and community' in the supporters by making the disaster a 'national myth'. The enemy is not named directly but implied, yet the community is well aware who that enemy is. Here, Kaczyński is both a political leader and features in the role of a 'bard-prophet', a 'spiritual leader'. Pawłowski cites the political scientist Andrzej Dudek, who emphasizes that the function of the mensiversaries changed: they did commemorate the victims at first, but as time went by they increasingly served political mobilization.

Our analysis will proceed in a manner similar to Pawłowski's, though it is more systematic, using two text analysis programs. The first of these is STADT (Simple Text Analysis and Dictionary Tools), a software tool which enables coding as well as quantitative and qualitative content analysis,¹³

⁸ Kosiński (2013).

⁹ Dziekan (2018); Krzemiński (2017).

¹⁰ Chwin, Karaś (2010).

¹¹ Chwin, Karaś (2010).

¹² See <https://www.tvn24.pl/magazyn-tvn24/smolensk-czterdzieci-tysiecy-slow-prezesa,147,2603>, [accessed 3 July 2018]. Authors have obtained permission to use the transcripts for the purpose of this analysis.

¹³ A new version of the software released in 2018 (1.3.2; <<http://analiza-tresci.po-godzinach.info/download.html>>) was employed for the analyses described in this paper.

while the second tool we employ is the popular concordance analysis software AntConc.¹⁴ Furthermore, our analysis draws on selected concepts of political language and its analyses.

STADT operates by relying on the premises of quantitative and qualitative analysis based on classical content analysis and grounded theory. By determining the frequency of occurrence of a particular category within a text, it yields a profile of the basic contents which characterize a given text.¹⁵ The software's essential tools are categories (elements which possess certain common characteristics, so-called codes), defined by regular expressions assigned to each category¹⁶ and the categorization key (a system of categories which remains uniform for the entire material under research, designed to analyse a given group of text, otherwise known as a dictionary). The software enables one to search all formally correct regular expressions. Following a preliminary analysis of Kaczyński's speeches and having consulted the relevant literature, a categorization key comprising 36 categories was developed. In addition, the results of coding include such quantitative data as the number of sentences and their average length (characters and words), the number of words (all and unique ones), their frequency list, the lexical density of text¹⁷ and category (code) frequency analysis.

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE COLLECTED SPEECHES: AN ATTEMPT

The following analyses focus on the so-called Smolensk speeches delivered from 10 September 2010 (5th mensiversary) to 10 March 2018 that is over a period of nearly 8 years. It would be erroneous to approach them as a single act motivated by a single intention. Instead, an attempt is made to identify those elements of the corpus which appear in all the speeches given by Jarosław Kaczyński, regardless of the varying social and political circumstances or events taking place at the time when they were made. In a sense, therefore, it is a search for overall regularities which are not predicated on local circumstances but occur in very similar immediate context.

1. The formal characteristics of the speeches

The length of the speeches varies greatly: on average, they are 434.2 words long, but statistical deviation reaches as much as 272.9 words. The shortest address is 112 words long, whereas the longest is 1,571 words long. Consequently, the percentage share of this category is approached as relative and

¹⁴ Kamasa (2014).

¹⁵ Paluchowski (2000); Bujak-Mikołajczyk (2010).

¹⁶ Stubblebine (2008).

¹⁷ Ure (1971).

refers to the sum of frequencies of all STADT categories used to analyse the entirety of the body of material under study (i.e. 7,974 words in total).

Use of repetitions is an important trait of the speeches delivered by Jarosław Kaczyński during the so-called Smolensk marches. The number of all words without repetitions divided by the total words in a text (a quotient resembling lexical density¹⁸) is only 15%. Usually, the ratio is lower in a spoken text – in comparison with written ones – as well as in texts which intentionally seek to induce action, but here it is conspicuously low.¹⁹ Such a formal rhetorical device causes the listener to focus attention on the key words of a given address. Since a similar phenomenon has been observed in Kaczyński's other political communications (rhematization²⁰), it appears to be a peculiar rhetorical mannerism of this speaker. It may be due to the specificity of the community he refers to, or at least a notion of that community, corroborated by the personal experience of an effective populist politician. Numerous studies of Polish voters, including the regular surveys conducted by CBOS,²¹ demonstrate that such a narrative resonates best with the elderly, who are more religious and less well-educated.

2. Core themes – building a community around values

Walery Pisarek draws attention to the role of so-called banner words (*miranda*, the things to be admired, and *kondemnanda*, the things to be condemned²²), which harbour a substantial emotive value, establishing the community of the speaker and the listeners by virtue of reference to morality and dignity.²³ For this reason, the concept of dignity values²⁴ has been employed here to devise a category of universal fundamental values designated as Positive Values²⁵ (defined by such words as *democracy, dignity, unity, nation, independence, homeland, patriotism, Poland, courage, solidarity, justice*, as well as their derived forms) and their counterpart: Negative Values (defined by e.g. *lie, hate, communists, danger*). The former account for 13.4% of words in Kaczyński's speeches²⁶ (the most frequent category); the latter constitute merely 2.1% of words. One can also distinguish other semantic categories which serve to build a community around banner values and – most likely – respond to the needs of the listeners. One such category is Homeland (7.2%; defined by e.g. *Poland, homeland, state, the republic* and their derivatives) or Value of Our Actions (1.9%; they are *important, much needed, true, just*,

¹⁸ Ure (1971); Linnarud (1976).

¹⁹ In a text relating to the Smolensk disaster and addressed to 'our friends, the Russians' it amounts to 70% (possibly also due to the fact that it is a written text subsequently read aloud).

²⁰ Jakubowska (2011).

²¹ Grabowska, Pankowski (2015).

²² Pisarek (2002); Niewiara (2014); Podemski (2013); Puzynina (1997).

²³ Siewierska-Chmaj (2005).

²⁴ Kosewski (2008).

²⁵ These and further categories were formulated and analyzed using STADT software.

²⁶ It may be remembered that the percentage share of a category refers to the sum of frequencies of all categories used to analyse the entirety of the speeches.

honest, our). In total, all the positive references constitute 22.6% of the words which make up categories. It may be presumed that the invoked positive values overlap with the traits of the stereotypical Pole ('Polish virtues'), as well as provide a criterion for the assessment of others and serve to engender an increased sense of self-esteem in the listeners. At the same time, it is a promise of a 'world which is certain and safe, but a closed one, too'.²⁷ One could say that their usage is instrumental, while resorting to multivocal notions is an element of populist rhetoric.²⁸ Furthermore, it is a rhetorical device which stresses the pursuit of a moral or state mission, a form of appeal or agitation. Also, one readily notices that the persuasion strategies employed here are strategies of promise and honour to be gained.²⁹ It is therefore clear that the mensiversary speeches serve to forge a community around the discussed values and – indirectly – the speaker.

The desire to unite the listeners and build a community is also evinced in other categories: *We*³⁰ (4.4% of words; *we* in conjunction with such words as *all, will not allow, have the duty, remember, Poles, shall win, condemn, shall overcome*); *We Take Action* (3.1%; words ending in **śmy*, i.e. past/present verbs in first person plural); *Why We Are Fighting* (2.6%; defined by e.g. *for dignity, for loyalty, for the future, for pride, for reckoning, for investigation*); *What Unites Us* (4.2%; defined by e.g. *emotions, loyalty, anticipation, hope, trust, memory, conclusive resolution, the cause*, and their derivatives), or *Evaluation of the Marchers* (2%; the listeners *are fighting, do not give up, believe, surmount difficulties*). These community-oriented appeals yield a total of 16.3% of the words which constitute categories. *Metaphor of Fight and Defence* (defined by e.g. *to fight, the fight, defence, enemy*) features in the speeches as a category at a rate of 1.4%. This value, associated with the metaphor of the fortress,³¹ may be said to be a negative one but it still manages to unite the participants. It would appear that community building also pursued through the category of *Obligation* (1.5%; defined by such words and their forms as *thank you, gratitude*), which promotes a relationship of reciprocity, solidarity, sympathy, and commitment. It may also be considered a form of ingratiation. Again, it needs to be noted that the opposite of 'we' is a 'you', or at least a 'they', who are attributed sharing values that are not 'ours', in other words anti-values.

One should add that two of the most frequently invoked positive values harbour a latent, negative counterpart. If one calls for 'truth', it presumes the existence of a 'lie' which should be opposed. If 'our' national community is put on a pedestal, it is usually contrasted with other communities. If, by means of rhetorical devices, 'truth' and national community are combined, then those who do not share 'our' truth are excluded from that community.

²⁷ Kochanowicz (2006): 115.

²⁸ Jakubowska (2011).

²⁹ Sobkowiak (1999): 66–67.

³⁰ The category of *I* in the speeches accounts for merely 0.2% of all words in the analysed categories.

³¹ Kowalski (1990).

It is possible to identify further evidence which suggests that the main goal of the Smolensk speeches was building a community and uniting the listeners. This concerns the category Planned Aim of the Marches (8.6% of words covered by categories; defined by e.g. *we are striving towards, we shall reach, the causes, commemoration, monument, homage, independence, justice, sovereignty, victory*, along with derived forms) which describes the envisioned goals of the marches. Other categories relating to that issue occurred relatively less frequently. To sum up, building a community around values accounts in total for 50.4% of the analysed categories.

3. Core themes – striving for the truth

The rhetoric of ‘getting at the truth’ is a vital component of Jarosław Kaczyński’s speeches. The word ‘truth’ in its various classes (‘truth’, ‘true’) and inflections appears 510 times in the analysed corpus (including *prawdy* [Gen.] – 212 instances, *prawda* [Nom.] – 126, *prawdę* [Acc.] – 138). Most often, it functions in such collocations as ‘at the truth’ (53 times), ‘for the truth’ (32 times), ‘the truth about’ (30 times), ‘towards the truth’ (16 times), ‘that truth’ (18 times), ‘truth shall triumph’ (12 times).

Naturally, ‘truth’ is not only a scientific category but also a notion used in colloquial speech. In logic, the opposite of truth is ‘falsity’, while its colloquial equivalent is a ‘lie’, a term denoting the intention of the speaker rather than the actual state of affairs.

Yet another form of uniting listeners is referring to the truth for which the speaker and his listeners jointly fight. The category What the Truth Is Like (7.5%; defined by such words and their forms as *painful, tragic, hidden, liberating, overwhelming, exposing the truth, truth shall triumph* etc.) is intended to galvanize participants of the marches into action for the sake of the truth. Despite being the latter’s opposite, the category What the Lie is Like (1.1%; outrageous, perfidious, Smolensk, systemic, shielded, lost etc.) still serves to unite the listeners around the major goal of joint action. In total, they account for 8.6% of the words making up categories. Taking the nature and the circumstances of the speeches into account, the truth in question is not just any truth, but the truth known to the speaker and grasped by the listeners, that is, ‘our’ truth.

The rationale behind the marches deserves attention as well. Here, one could name the category Definition of the Cause of the March (4.6%; including such words as *march, anniversary, monthly, of Smolensk, commission, church mass, Krakowskie Przedmieście*), which describes the formal reasons for the march to take place, or Ecclesiastical Nature of the March (2.4%; defined by e.g. *Catholics, sermon, church, cross, or prayer*), which refers to the religious aspect of the marches. It is our opinion that the references to the formal (ritual) motives of the Smolensk marches,³² as well as the liturgical aspects of these rallies played a less important role

³² Kołodziejczak (2015).

than the agitation and community-building reasons, though of course these aspects are interwoven.

In other words, one may have the impression that the essential purpose of the mensiversary addresses is not to commemorate the air disaster but to offer a means to an end.³³ Overall, the category of Victim (0.1%; of the 72 politicians in the category, Andrzej Błasik, Stefan Melak, Ryszard Kaczorowski, Stanisław Komorowski as well as Lech Kaczyński and Maria Kaczyńska were mentioned by name) featured very seldom in the speeches. Likewise, Brother (0.1% of words in all categories; expressed in the phrase *my [...] brother* and its derivatives), and Kaczyński (0.9%; *Lech Kaczyński* and its derivatives) are relatively rare, though both categories did appear in almost all speeches. One more often encounters the category of Hero (1.6% of the words covered by categories; defined by such words and their derivatives as *president* and *late lamented*, combined with *Lech Kaczyński*), which lends a special status to Lech Kaczyński³⁴ and attributes distinguishing traits to his personage. As may be seen, the sphere of the sacred and the profane are unevenly divided here.

In the analysed speeches, ‘getting at the truth’ is one of the three fundamental goals of the mensiversaries, next to ‘commemoration’ (chiefly by means of erecting a monument) and ‘victory’. The objective of victory had been accomplished – at least in the political dimension – as PiS won presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015. Three years later another goal was achieved when two monuments were unveiled: Memorial to the Victims of the Smolensk Tragedy (10 April 2018) and the Lech Kaczyński Monument (10 November 2018). It may be noted that the unveiling of the former marked the end of the 8-year run of the mensiversaries.

As for the Greek triad of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, the first element (noun in the nominative) appears five times, the second is absent, while the third is mentioned as many as 117 times. ‘Truth’ is also encountered more often than the most popular ‘ideological’ values, such as ‘nation’ (23 instances), ‘freedom’ (19), ‘justice’ (12), ‘democracy’ (2), ‘community’ (2), not to mention ‘equality’, which does not feature in the nominative even once. Among the ‘banner’ words, only ‘Poland’ occurs more frequently (145 times). ‘Truth’ is therefore the core value in the speeches, which Kaczyński explicitly confirms at one point: ‘There is a value which connects all others. That value is truth. Today, when we speak of truth, we must always remember Smolensk. The truth about Smolensk. This march is for the sake of truth about Smolensk’ (January 2013).

³³ Kołodziejczak (2015): 152–153; 155–156.

³⁴ It may be recalled, however, that a communique of CBOS stated as follows (2010: 1): ‘It could be inferred from an opinion poll conducted a month before his tragic death that as a politician and president Lech Kaczyński did not enjoy substantial support of the citizens, and distrust was the most often expressed sentiment. The air disaster of Smolensk had an impact on his image on the media, which quite conspicuously translated into opinions held by the public. Expressions of recognition for his presidency became increasingly frequent.’

The first reference to ‘truth’ is made only in the second (October 2010) Smolensk speech. From that time onwards, the ‘fight for the truth’, ‘road to the truth’, ‘striving for the truth’ becomes the axis of Jarosław Kaczyński’s successive addresses; it justifies the monthly rallies, and constitutes a requisite for Poland being rebuilt, a reason which renders the struggle for political ascendancy legitimate (with the exception of the speeches in November 2011, as well as from July to September and then in December in the double election year of 2015, which was probably due to the adopted campaign tactics). ‘Truth’ primarily means the ‘truth’ about Smolensk: ‘Today, as in past history, the fight for truth focuses on one single issue. That issue is Smolensk.’ (September 2010), ‘This is the fifth calendar year which sees us walk that route in marches of memory. In marches whose goal, whose very sense is getting at the truth. Getting at the truth of the Smolensk disaster.’ (January 2014).

In the address on the sixth anniversary of the disaster, Kaczyński announces the institutionalization of the truth through historical policy and validation of that truth by means of victory in the narrow, political sense: ‘They cannot win, we must win instead. The truth must also find its way into books, into textbooks.’ (April 2016), because ‘We are the ones who represent truth, freedom, democracy.’ (September 2016). The ‘truth’ of the anniversaries is not limited to the ‘truth about Smolensk’ and ‘truth about Poland’, but also the ‘truth’ about the presidency and the role of Lech Kaczyński, ‘the first president of the Republic who had never been a member of PZPR [Polish United Workers’ Party], who is not mentioned in the pertinent files held at the IPN [Institute of National Remembrance], and the first one to have had relevant education’ (November 2010), ‘the first president who carried the flag of free and independent Poland high’ (May 2015).³⁵

The speaker combines truth with other values, particularly ‘freedom’, ‘Poland’, and ‘dignity’: ‘Poland will not be free if the truth about Smolensk does not come to light.’ (August 2012), ‘And there is no Poland without the truth about Smolensk.’ (XII 2012), ‘Because the dignity of the Republic is in the truth about that tragedy’ (November 2014). Kaczyński very often identifies the ‘truth about Smolensk’ with the ‘truth about Poland’: ‘The one who wants to hide that truth today, is against everything which constitutes Polish faith, which makes up Polish democracy’ (October 2010). Victory is predicated on the disclosure of the ‘truth’: ‘Truth and victory go hand in hand [...] There will be no victory without truth, but there shall be no truth without victory’ (April 2012).

What is that most important truth in the speeches of the chairman of PiS, that ‘truth about Smolensk’? The answer to that question is seldom given. Most often, there are general references to a ‘lie’ or ‘fraud’, but the enemy of truth tends not to be expressly stated, remaining an implied entity. The process of pointing to an enemy begins already in the third Smolensk speech: ‘There are some reasons, let them explain it themselves – for which they are

³⁵ As if one became president thanks to individual virtues as opposed to the decision of the voters!

afraid of that truth, the truth about Smolensk' (November 2010). In the subsequent speeches, there are mentions of 'enemies of the truth' (January 2011), 'defenders of the lie' (II 2010), 'swindlers and manipulators' (III 2011), or those for whom 'the truth about Smolensk [...] is frightening, hence the fury, hence the hate' (May 2017). Only sporadically does Kaczyński refer to the 'liars' and 'swindlers' by name. In his eyes, those are chiefly the authors of the reports of the Russian and Polish commissions.

In June 2016, Kaczyński still describes the investigation of the Miller commission as 'great sham' (June 2016), while in March 2018 he states as follows: 'We know for certain that the findings of the Anodina commission, or should I say, the so-called Anodina commission and the Miller commission, are not the truth' (March 2018), Kaczyński objects to what had been stated in the reports for the first time in August 2011: '[...] several months ago, when we heard the report of the so-called MAK, we were outraged. And rightly so, because we had been insulted. We have heard another report recently. And this time we can say that we were disappointed, bitterly disappointed' (August 2011). Three months later, the speaker goes a step further, no longer alleging oversights or errors of the reports, but downright lies: '[...] there are those who want to hide it, who want the lie, the lie about Smolensk, the lie of Anodina's, the lie of Miller's report to endure' (October 2011).

The theme would recur in later speeches: 'Those twenty months have been a time of great lie [...]. Of the Russian lie and, which is incomparably more painful to admit, of the Polish lie. A lie spread by the authorities. By the authorities scared of the truth, scared of the truth about Smolensk' (December 2011). Those were Poles who fell victim to the lie: 'Poles have been lied to constantly, we, Poles, have been constantly lied to' (April 2015). It is only on exceptional occasions that one hears more explicit interpretations, for instance that the disaster was a result of a 'betrayal': 'They were betrayed, today we know that for certain' (April 2012). Finding out the truth about the disaster is conveyed in Kaczyński's articulations as a 'fight' with those who hide it from the Polish public. A following sequence of associations may be observed in the speeches: the enemies of truth are the enemies of Poland and enemies of Poles.

Kaczyński's addresses are characterized by periphrases (circumlocutions), euphemisms, allusions or presuppositions which the audience should identify and decode. For instance, the word 'attempt' (and its derivatives) appeared only once in the entire body of speeches, in a thoroughly different context at that.³⁶ However, it is substituted with semantic equivalents (e.g. *explosion*, *victims*, *those killed/the fallen*, *attack*, *crime*, *betrayal*, and their derivatives) which, comprised in the category *Attempt* (defined by such words and their forms as *attempt*, *victims*, *those killed/the fallen*) account for 1.3% of the words covered by categories, whereas the category *Conspiracy* (defined by such words and their forms as *conspiracy*, *expose*, *hide*) account for 0.3%. On the other hand, the category *Disaster* (*disaster* and its derivatives) accounts for 0.8% of words. Drawing on certain arguments indirectly or implicitly may

³⁶ 'It turned out that organizing anniversary celebrations is a coup.'

have its propagandistic purposes, while simultaneously enabling the speaker to evade responsibility for what has been stated. Also, it prevents the text from being easily decoded.

It is that fight that he spurs those gathered on to: 'Whenever we are here, we do not do so for just any reason, but because we want to solicit that truth' (October 2011), 'we come here, because we want the truth' (December 2011), 'We gather in the name of truth' (II 2012). The fight for 'truth' is a patriotic duty: 'we can be morally strong only when we fulfil our national duty, when we know what led to the death of 96 Poles, 96 Polish women and men with the president of the Republic foremost among them' (March 2014).

Getting at the truth was a process which continued throughout the period when the mensiversarys were held. The motif is heard in almost each consecutive speech: 'We already have the report of our team. It is near the truth in many respects, but not all material, not all evidence is there yet' (August 2011). The rhetorical device of 'getting close to the truth' is often employed as a matter of routine, when the speaker does not mention any new reports, expert opinions, or facts: 'We are nearer the truth today than we have been not so long ago [...] because many lies [...] have been nailed' (February 2012), 'We are ever closer to the truth. Macierewicz's team are making their way towards the truth with great energy, great strength, great determination' (April 2012), 'Things are different today, Poland is different today, the mood has changed, we know incomparably more, we are getting at the truth [...] that truth is near' (May 2013), 'We are getting at the truth, the exhumations show the infinite Russian barbarity, as well as barbarity of the Polish authorities at the time' (June 2017). The continual effort of 'getting close to the truth' features even in the very last Smolensk speech: 'We are soon going to know what has been found, and what for now, before the experiments which will be conducted at a university in the United States, has not been possible to determine. We are already close to the truth' (March 2018).

The rhetorical devices, the entire patriotic-religious setting of the rallies is designed to mobilize the supporters. The mobilization is to serve electoral victory and thus the return to power. This somewhat 'camouflaged' goal was in fact articulated explicitly on several occasions: 'First of all, I would like to thank all of you for being here today. It has been 18 months already. But I would also like to thank all those who had the courage to vote in our favour yesterday' (October 2010). 'We must get at the truth about Smolensk. [...] Still, let us remember that there is but one way to do it. The way which led to the victory of 24 May. The way which – I hope, I am convinced of it – will lead to a victory in October' (June 2015).

The monthly marches with Kaczyński's keynotes as their focal point are also expected to purge the political scene of those who hide that truth. The 'truth about Smolensk' is a value which purports to legitimize the claims of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość to power, aims to discredit the opponents and lay the foundations for a new, better order. The narrative does not change when power is taken by the Smolensk camp. Despite the formal takeover of all the institutions of the state in 2015 and the seizure of actual control in 2016, the refrain

of ‘we are already close to the truth’ was repeated during the last mensiversary in March 2018, exactly three months after Antoni Macierewicz had been dismissed from the office of Minister of National Defence. The unveiling of the Memorial to the Victims of the Smolensk Tragedy suddenly concludes the many years of ‘marching towards the truth’. On 10 November 2018, Jarosław Kaczyński announces in the evening: ‘We are already so much closer to the truth. [...] It seldom happens in life that one’s goals are realized with a 100 per cent success rate. We have reached such a high percentage in that respect that I can confidently say: we have won. This is the 96th march – as many marches as there had been victims of the Smolensk disaster. This is our last march. [...] We come to an end here, but it is mostly because we have arrived at our destination. Not far away from here, at a beautiful site in Piłsudski Square, a monument has been unveiled.³⁷ The ‘truth about Smolensk’ has disappeared from the public discourse, although no alternative to the findings of the Miller commission has been advanced.

4. The authoritarian style

Authors draw attention³⁸ to the particular needs and social-psychological traits of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość voters, including low self-esteem, a need for acceptance, a sense of belonging, recognition, support, stability of their surroundings, control of the surroundings, sense of security, order, as well as conventionalism, low tolerance/susceptibility to change, attachment to tradition, distrust and anxiety. This corresponds with the characteristics of persons who achieve adjustment through conformity.³⁹ They are susceptible to being led by dogmatic leaders, because they experience a sense of threat, prefer a homogeneity of views, recognize the existence of only one truth concerning public affairs and lack tolerance towards the views of others. Such is the character of Jarosław Kaczyński’s rhetoric after the Smolensk disaster.⁴⁰ The category of Obvious Obviousness (7.6%; defined by e.g. *in all certainty, with deep conviction, obvious, everyone, all, completely*) evinces that very trait of his speeches during the Smolensk marches. Considering – in addition – the categories of Metaphor of Fight and Defence (1.4%), What the Lie is Like (1.1%) and What the Truth is Like (7.5%), which in total account for 18.5% of words which constitute categories, it would be warranted to claim that a personalized system was being constructed, characterized by the uniformity of views and headed by a leader who is privy to the truth. It may also be noted that in his recollections, Jarosław Kaczyński describes his relationships with other politicians as infused with distrust, resentment,

³⁷ See <<https://www.tvp.info/36747581/jaroslaw-kaczynski-to-jest-ostatni-marsz-zwyciezylismy>> [accessed 10 March 2019].

³⁸ Turska-Kawa (2014): 173.

³⁹ Merton (2002).

⁴⁰ Turska-Kawa (2014); Zamana (2016).

and volatile.⁴¹ In a study of perceived traits of politicians,⁴² researchers distinguished four groups (factors) of the attributes which describe them: Competence (intelligence, goal-orientation, realism), Non-Conciliatoriness (belligerence, uncompromising attitude, Machiavellism), Extraversion (openness to others, energy) and Righteousness (integrity, patriotism). Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński scored similarly for Extraversion (low) and Righteousness (high). However, with respect to Competence and – particularly – Non-Conciliatoriness, Jarosław Kaczyński ranked much higher than Lech Kaczyński (places 9 and 5, respectively, in a group of 24 analysed politicians).

III. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The monthly Smolensk speeches delivered by Jarosław Kaczyński were relatively short, from several to under 20 minutes. However, in view of the significance they were attributed in the media and the emotions they provoked, both among the adherents and the opponents of the Smolensk myth, they remained an exceedingly important element of the public discourse for a number of years. A distinctive formal characteristic of the speeches was the use of repetitions, thanks to which key words such as ‘Poland’, ‘truth’ or ‘independence’ were highlighted. Repetitions are one of the major elements in a political rhetoric which aims to elicit and consolidate specific attitudes to the propagated values in the audience. Periphrases, euphemisms, allusions or presuppositions were also characteristic of the speaker, who addressed them to listeners whose capacity to decode them was predicated on the fact that they subscribed to the vision of reality those speeches endorsed. Such equivocal wording hinders the ‘victims’ of implicit accusations and insinuations from engaging in a polemic, defending themselves, or taking legal action. Simultaneously, the approach is typical of the kind of political propaganda and ‘newspeak’ which was employed by the propagandists of socialist Poland at times of social conflicts, especially in 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980–1983.⁴³ Moreover, linguistic means which contribute to community-building, such as frequent pronouns ‘we/us’, tend to predominate in Kaczyński’s speeches. The community is also built around values, the foremost of which is ‘truth’. The identity of ‘us’ is constructed in opposition to anti-values that the adversaries hold onto and which are epitomized by ‘lie’. Hence, ‘truth’ is a moral and political category in the addresses delivered by Kaczyński. The idiom ‘getting at the truth’ or ‘approaching the truth’, which can be seen to recur on multiple occasions, performs a mobilizing role. First, it mobilizes others to undertake action aimed at taking power, and then at holding and consolidating it. After all, commemoration of the victims of the air disaster is not the sole purpose of

⁴¹ Kwiatkowski (2017).

⁴² Gorbaniuk (2009).

⁴³ E.g. Bralczyk (2004); Głowiński (1990).

the mensiversary speeches. After the initial period of mourning, their nature became increasingly instrumental. Their 'latent function'⁴⁴ was to exploit the Smolensk myth in order to forge a political faction, and subsequently to foster its inner strength.

Władysław J. Paluchowski
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
paluchja@amu.edu.pl
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5305-6102>

Krzysztof Podemski
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
podemski@amu.edu.pl
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3449-8698>

- Bralczyk, J. (2004). *O języku polskiej propagandy lat siedemdziesiątych*. Warsaw.
- Bujak-Mikołajczyk, M. (2010). *Analiza treści – kodowanie wspomaganie komputerowo*. (Niepublikowana praca magisterska, Instytut Psychologii, UAM). Poznań.
- CBOS (2010). *Ocena prezydenta Lecha Kaczyńskiego*. Komunikat z badań BS/82/2010. Warsaw.
- Chwin, S., Karaś, D. (2010). Narodowy melodramat. *Przegląd Polityczny* 100: 31–33.
- Dziekan, J. (2018). *Od rytuału do konfliktu. Mediatyzacja żałoby posmoleskiej*. Gdańsk.
- Filipowicz, S. (1988). *Mit i spektakl władzy*. Warsaw: PWN.
- Gorbaniuk, O. (2009). Wymiary dyferencjacji profili spostrzeganych cech osobowości polskich polityków: analiza danych zagregowanych. *Psychologia Społeczna* 4(1/2): 88–105.
- Głowiński, M. (1990). *Nowomowa po polsku*. Warsaw.
- Grabowska, M., Pankowski, K. (ed.) (2015). *Opinie i diagnozy no. 33: Wybory 2015 w badaniach CBOS*. Warsaw: 42–56.
- Jakubowska, A. (2011). Język wypowiedzi publicznych Jarosława Kaczyńskiego w latach 2007–2011. *Refleksje* 3: 127–140.
- Jaskułowski, K. (2010). Mity narodowej żałoby. *Przegląd Polityczny* 100: 35–42.
- Kochanowicz, J. (2006). *Pożegnanie z nowoczesnością*. [in:] P. Kosiewski (ed.), *Jaka Polska? Czyż Polska?* Warsaw: 107–116.
- Kołodziejczak, M. (2015). Rocznicowe rytuały smoleńskie w perspektywie neodurkheimizmu. *Przegląd Politologiczny* 2: 177–159.
- Kamasa, V. (2014). Techniki językoznawstwa korpusowego wykorzystywane w krytycznej analizie dyskursu: przegląd. *Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej* 10(2): 100–117.
- Kosewski, M. (2008). *Wartości, godność i władza. Dlaczego porządni ludzie czasem kradną, a złodzieje ujmują się honorem*. Warsaw.
- Kosiński, D. (2013). *Teatra polskie. Rok katastrofy*. Kraków.
- Kowalski, S. (1990). *Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu*. Warsaw.
- Krzemiński, I. (2017). *Narodowo-katolicka mowa o Polsce. obrońcy krzyża przed Pałacem Prezydenckim*. *Czas Kultury* 33(4): 50–64.
- Kwiatkowski, M. (2017). *Polityk w przestrzeni międzyludzkiej. Przypadek Jarosława Kaczyńskiego*. *Relacje. Studia z Nauk Społecznych* 3: 157–163.
- Linnarud, M. (1976). *Lexical density and lexical variation – an analysis of the lexical texture of Swedish students' written work*. *Studia Anglica Posnaniensia* 7: 45–52.
- Merton, R.K. (2002). *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna*. Transl. by E. Morawska, J. Werstein-Zuławski. 2nd edn. Warsaw.
- Niewiara, A. (2014). *Od polskich słów do polskich zdań. W poszukiwaniu słów kluczy do polskiej kultury*. *Forum Lingwistyczne* 1: 65–75.

⁴⁴ Merton (2002).

- Paluchowski, W.J. (2000). Metodologiczne problemy analizy treści a wykorzystanie komputerów w badaniach jakościowych, [in:] M. Straś-Romanowska (ed.), *Metody jakościowe w psychologii współczesnej*. Wrocław: 53–64.
- Pisarek, W. (2002). *Polskie słowa sztandarowe i ich publiczność*. Kraków.
- Podemski, K. (2013). Badania polskiego dyskursu publicznego II RP, PRL i III RP. *Przegląd zagadnień. Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 2: 27–66.
- Puzynina J. (1997). *Słowo – wartość – kultura*. Lublin.
- Siewierska-Chmaj, A. (2005). *Język polskiej polityki. Politologiczno-semantyczna analiza exposé premierów Polski w latach 1919–2004*. Rzeszów.
- Sobkowiak, B. (1999). Public Relations jako forma komunikowania masowego, [in:] B. Dobek-Ostrowska (ed.), *Studia z teorii komunikowania masowego*. Wrocław: 61–81.
- Stubblebine, T. (2008). *Wyrażenia regularne. Leksykon kieszonkowy*. 2nd edn. Gliwice.
- Turska-Kawa, A. (2014). Fenomen przywództwa Jarosława Kaczyńskiego w kontekście specyfiki elektoratu Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, [in:] D. Plecka (ed.), *Demokracja w Polsce po 2007 roku*. Katowice: 157–176.
- Ure, J. (1971). Lexical density and register differentiation, [in:] G. Perren, J.L.M. Trim (eds.), *Applications of Linguistics*. London: 443–452.
- Zamana, J. (2016). Styl przywództwa Jarosława Kaczyńskiego. Analiza retrospektywna. *Studia Krytyczne/Critical Studies* 2: 201–213.

JAROSŁAW KACZYŃSKI'S 'MONTHLY SPEECHES' AS A SPECTACLE OF POWER

Summary

The article is an analysis of 91 speeches given in the years 2010–2018 by Jarosław Kaczyński, during the so-called monthly speeches or mensiversaries, commemorating the Polish plane crash in Smolensk on 10 April 2010. The basis of the analysis is the transcription of these speeches from the published television video. The quantitative and qualitative analysis was carried out using two computer programs (STADT and AntConc). The authors focus on the formal features of these speeches, on the main threads appearing in them, and on the functions that these speeches fulfilled in the process of acquiring and consolidating power by a political group headed by the main actor of these public performances.

Keywords: public discourse; power; Smolensk disaster; monthly speech; mensiversaries; Jarosław Kaczyński