Słowa kluczowe
autonomy
subject
ethics
the Other
Jak cytować
Liczba wyświetleń: 47
Liczba pobrań: 103
Abstrakt
The aim of this article is to compare and contrast the conception of heteronomy in the works of Emmanuel Lévinas and John D. Caputo. I am going to examine the historical connections between those authors. The notion of heteronomy will be analyzed in the framework of the idea of autonomy that has gained its most developed form in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Critical analysis of the use of the philosophy of Lévinas and Caputo will enable me to raise the question about the limitations of the heteronymous approach in ethics. According to my thesis, it is not possible to create a purely heteronomous concept; yet, neither should pure autonomous ethics be pursued. These two attitudes must coexist with each other for the establishment of the possibility of a real moral response to the Other.
Finansowanie
Academic work financed with the Polish science budget resources in the years 2020‒2024, as a research project within the framework of the “Diamentowy Grant” [Diamond Grant] programme
Bibliografia
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Kant I. (1998B), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans.M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Lévinas E. (1956), La philosophie et l’idée de l’Infini,in: “Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,” vol. 62 (3), pp. 241-54.
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Olthuis, James H. (ed.) (2002), Religion with/out Religion, New York: Routledge.Roish G. (2018), The Contested History of Autonomy: Interpreting European Modernity, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Schneewind J.B. (1998), The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288
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Licencja
Prawa autorskie (c) 2023 Sensus Historiae
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne 4.0 Międzynarodowe.