Słowa kluczowe
cognition
trust
choice
Jak cytować
Liczba wyświetleń: 7
Liczba pobrań: 5
Abstrakt
Esteem can be seen among basic goods every individual seeks in life, yet its philosophical status has not been satisfactorily explored. There is, in particular, a problem vital to the notion’s practical viability: whether esteem can be a matter of deliberate choice. This study argues that despite some problems exposed by critical studies on cognitive phenomena, esteem - as a complex cognitive, emotional, and social notion - is not beyond our intentional and rational control. In fact, it is founded on numerous choices and decisions to be made, especially while choosing the criteria of our judgments and deciding how to interact with people we might possibly build, give, and gain esteem. Importantly, esteem has to be viewed as a continuous cognitive process, hence we can even recognize some systematic ways of educating and cultivating it. It is a promising conclusion, suggesting that some positive forms of interpersonal relations - esteem and trust among them - can be generated and developed among people.
Bibliografia
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Haara, Heikki, and Aino Lahdenranta. 2018. “Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and Moral Conduct,” The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16, 1: 19-37.
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Zagzebski, Linda. 2017. Exemplarist Moral Theory, Oxford University Press.
Licencja
Prawa autorskie (c) 2021 Waldemar Hanasz
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne 4.0 Międzynarodowe.