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PRINCIPLES OF SHAPING AND COMPOSITION OF THE MANAGEMENT STAFF OF POLISH INDUSTRY (1945–1956)

Abstract: Numerous studies on the economies of socialist countries indicate that one of the main sources of their weakness was the attitudes and behavior of “socialist managers”. Contrary to the predictions (e.g. by Joseph Schumpeter), they were not characterized by entrepreneurship, innovation, the ability to lead changes or the ability to formulate strategies. This was due to the nomenclature system existing in all countries of the Soviet bloc. Nominations, promotions, but also dismissals were at the discretion of party bodies. It was the main source of the communist party’s dominance in the country and the fundamental factor guaranteeing control over all spheres of social and economic life. Determining why the nomenclature system turned out to be dysfunctional requires considering three issues: what were the goals of the communist personnel policy, what methods were used to implement it, and finally who were the people appointed to perform managerial functions in the economy. We will focus our analysis on the management of Polish industry in the years 1945–1956. This is because it was the most important sector of the economy of the People’s Republic of Poland, and the personnel policy mechanisms developed at that time remained valid until the end of the “real socialism” system.

Keywords: socialist economy, nomenclature, managers, personnel policy

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INTRODUCTION

According to Joseph Schumpeter, the essential factor in the development of the capitalist economy was the ability of entrepreneurs to “creatively demolish”, which is constantly taking place in the economic environment. This concept emphasizes the importance of destruction in order to build something new and better. Innovation and innovativeness, creativity and

entrepreneurship play an important role in this process. The competitiveness of economic systems is therefore determined by the ability to introduce "new goods", "new methods of production", "opening a new market", "conquering a new source of raw materials" and "conducting a new organization of some industry" (Schumpeter, 1995: 102–104; Stępnicka, 2013: 28–30). Entrepreneurs play a key role in this process. They are the "demiurges of economic development" and their special feature is the implementation of "new combinations" that lead to "development", understood by Schumpeter as "an imbalance that permanently modifies and knocks out of its former bearing, the previously existing state of equilibrium". This ability, however, was the privilege of only "a certain type of people, much less numerous than those who have the 'objective' ability to do so." Therefore, entrepreneurs are a special type, and their behavior is "the driving force of a whole series of momentous phenomena" (Schumpeter, 1960: XIII, 101, 128–130; Wechta, 1997: 123–124). The motivation of entrepreneurs went beyond the pursuit of profit, the "joy of creating", "the desire to conquer" and the desire to create one's own "private kingdom", understood as "a sense of power and independence" were equally important (Glapiński, 2012: 10).

Schumpeter's conclusions have been confirmed by empirical research. Stanisław Gomułka pointed out that the fastest economic development over the last 300 years was recorded in countries that most effectively used "probably the most important natural resources, which are the research and invention talents of the world's population" (Gomułka, 2016: 38). The role of these people resulted from the fact that there were relatively few of them, which is why countries in which democratization processes enabled promotion of representatives of various social groups gained an advantage. To put it simply, economic development concerned those countries where, to use the terminology of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, there were "inclusive economic institutions" that allowed people to "use their talents and skills, and make free choices" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2014: 90; Dzionek-Kozłowska and Matera, 2016: 15–20). Gomułka wrote: "Experience shows that about 3% of working people have talents that allow them to be considered potential inventors. This percentage determines the talent pool, the final size of intellectual resources or the upper limit of employment in the invention sector" (Gomułka, 2016: 38). Paradoxically, one of the greatest eulogists of the achievements of capitalist entrepreneurs were, perhaps unintentionally, the authors of the "Communist Manifesto" Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. There are few texts in the history that

would appreciate the achievements of this social group to such an extent (Marks and Engels, 2007: 6).

Thus, while Schumpeter's thesis on the special role of entrepreneurs in economic development does not raise any major doubts today, the second of his predictions about the "inevitability of the disintegration of capitalist society" and the "inevitable" emergence of a "socialist form of society" has not been confirmed in the social and economic reality (Schumpeter, 1995: XXIII). It should be emphasized that Schumpeter was not happy with the prospect of replacing capitalism with socialism, on the contrary, he believed that it would be the result of the degeneration of the market economy. Entrepreneurs who pushed economic development forward with their "creativity" will be replaced by the bureaucratic apparatus of large corporations. As a consequence, as noted by Urszula Zagóra-Jonszta, there will be no need to use their "above-average abilities", as innovations will be more and more often made by "a team of professionals from various industries employed by large corporations" (Zagóra-Jonszta, 2018: 330).

In the dispute between Ludwig Mises and Oskar Lang, the fundamental question "Can Socialism Work?" Schumpeter replied firmly, "Of course it can." This opinion was based on the erroneous, as it turned out, belief in the higher rationality of the "socialist plan", because "In the socialist system, each improvement can, theoretically speaking, be disseminated 'by decree', which will allow for the quick elimination of practices that do not meet modern requirements of efficiency" (Schumpeter, 1995: 207, 246). In this view, socialist managers were not only supposed to be on par with their capitalist counterparts in terms of competence, but they should even outperform them in terms of rationality of decisions.

In fact, as evidenced by numerous studies on the management of socialist economies in various countries, "The Role of the Communist Manager" did not include "at all the four elements considered to be key factors in market economies: entrepreneurship, strategy, innovation and the ability to lead change. The essence of the role of communist managers was a passive, defensive response to pressures from the outside causing tension within enterprises" (Kozłowski, 1998: 172).

This was reflected in the widespread use of inefficient production methods, obsolete technologies and production according to old patterns in socialist economies. The best illustration of this phenomenon is the minimal participation of the socialist bloc countries in the production of new revolutionary products. Of the 51 most important inventions made after

1945 (apart from military production) in the field of information technology and communications, nuclear energy, medicine, new materials and machine industry products, only in 2 cases of satellite (1957) and geostationary satellite (1976) they were an independent work of Soviet scientists and designers. The predominance of the United States was overwhelming, over 2/3 of inventions (38) were used for the first time in the American economy (incidentally, this advantage increased after 1945; before World War II, out of 84 new inventions, 42 were implemented in the American economy) (Kornai, 1995: 334–337; 1977: 357–363).

Leszek Balcerowicz's analysis of the causes of low innovation in socialist economies is instructive. He drew attention to the systemic conditions that effectively discouraged the management of socialist enterprises from taking risks related to the search for new ways of reducing production costs and introducing product innovations (Balcerowicz, 1997: 69–100). In turn, Kazimierz Poznański, studying the Polish industry in the 1970s, established that while product innovations dominated in capitalist economies, i.e. focused on the production of new products, in shortage economies the majority were process innovations focused on implementing new manufacturing methods. This was due to "bottlenecks" and supply difficulties that hindered the production process (Poznański, 1982: 156–159). In this context, Sławomir Kamosiński's studies on the long-term effects of the atrophy of entrepreneurship from the times of the People's Republic of Poland, already in the conditions of the Third Republic of Poland, are very interesting (Kamosiński, 2020; 2021).

In this context, **it can be hypothesized that one of the main sources of weakness of the socialist economy were the attitudes and behavior of its management staff.** Determining why Schumpeter's expectations of "socialist managers" failed to materialize requires consideration of three questions: what were the goals of the communist personnel policy, how it was implemented, and finally who were the people appointed to perform managerial functions in the economy. We will limit our analysis to the management of Polish industry in the years 1945–1956. This was because it was the most important sector of the economy of the People's Republic of Poland, and the personnel policy mechanisms developed at that time remained valid until the end of the "real socialism" system.

OBJECTIVES OF PERSONNEL POLICY IN INDUSTRY

According to Andrzej Koźmiński, one of the fundamental features of the work culture in socialist countries was the perception of people “as incapable of fully understanding the nature of economic and social processes. Therefore, they had to be guided, inspired, directed, controlled and, if necessary, forced by higher political and administrative authorities” (Koźmiński, 1998: 162). This resulted from the specific feature of autocratic regimes, especially those with the ambition of totalizing social life, refusing to trust the governed (Chumiński, 2021: 52). Piotr Sztompka pointed out that they treat their citizens with “suspicion, constantly accusing them of disloyalty, disobedience and misdemeanors”. As a means of ensuring loyalty, unlike in the case of democratic systems where trust is born as a result of the institutionalization of distrust, these regimes sought to “institutionalize trust” (Sztompka, 2007: 356–357). This meant the need to expand the system of supervision and control, to which a huge army of officials had to be engaged at various levels of social and economic life. In the case of communist countries, however, it was a special system where everyone was subject to supervision. It is worth referring to the well-known poem of Eugene Yevtushenko “Bracka hydroelectric power plant”. Directed as part of “re-education” at the “great construction of socialism”, the poet quickly noticed that “the only lever of progress” is “supervision”, and in the poem “Song of overseers employed in the construction of the Egyptian pyramid” he wrote: “Overseers footstools of thrones – we serve faithfully and willingly [...]. And why are we to blame? After all, we, janitors are guarded by others! And over all of us – Full of vigilance and care – Pharaoh – God’s slave, Overseer of overseers” (Jewtuszenko, 1967; Piskozub, 2012).

The lack of trust particularly concerned people born and brought up in the “old” system. Paradoxically, despite the fact that communist ideologues referred to environmentalist theories, assuming that external conditions are able to shape a “new type of man” (this conviction found its fullest expression in the doctrine of Trofim Lysenko approved by Stalin), the practice was far from these theoretical assumptions (Kołodowski, 2001: 123–124, 164–165). It turned out that the belief that “only the newborn is without blemish” was much more common. As Steven Pinker noted, “In post-revolutionary totalitarian states, the descendants of landowners and ‘rich peasants’ were marked and persecuted as fiercely as if bourgeois ori-

gin were a genetic trait" (Pinker, 2005: 29, 229). As a consequence, both totalitarian systems, communism and fascism, committed, as Zygmunt Bauman put it, "modern genocide". The victims were persecuted not because they wanted to achieve some specific goal, but because these people did not fit into the vision of the ideal "communist world" or "pure Aryan world". People "contained by the taints of past or origin" had to be killed because "their nature could not be changed any more than the nature of the weeds could be changed. They were beyond repair or re-education. They had to be eliminated because of their genetic or ideological past" (Bauman, 1992: 137-138).

Distrust and suspicion in an intensified form occurred in the case of industrial workers. This resulted from the importance that the communist regimes attached to this sector of the economy. Supervision over it meant not only the possibility of distributing a huge amount of goods, but also the control of millions of employees employed in it. It is worth recalling the well-known saying of Leon Trotsky: "In a country where the only employer is the state, opposition means slow starvation. The old principle: he who does not work, does not eat, has been replaced by a new one: he who does not obey, does not eat" (Hayek, 2007: 145).

In Poland, as part of the "salami tactics" used by the communist authorities, it was recognized from the beginning that supervision over the industry was a priority. This was clearly signaled by Władysław Gomułka at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (KC PPR) in February 1945, which outlined the basic guidelines for organizing industry, saying "the sooner we are able to master, capture and manage economic issues, the faster and stronger we will influence the processes taking place in Poland (...) We absolutely must occupy all key positions in our national economy" (Chumiński, 1997: 61; AAN, KC PPR, 295/II/1). More important for the leadership of the Polish Workers' Party was only the creation of its own security apparatus and military personnel. Authoritative in this regard is the opinion of Edward Ochab, who at the meeting in December 1949 admitted that in "probably the most difficult period in 1944-45, when we had to build a new apparatus almost from scratch, when the party itself was numerically thin", it was necessary to focus attention "on the problem of cadres in the army and the security apparatus". However, already then, the "importance of the economic sector, which was of great importance even in the first years and months of our rule, was appreciated" (AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V/35).

As a consequence, trust was denied to all those who showed even minimal restraint towards the installing regime. In December 1945, Gomułka segmented society, distinguishing, among others, "people's forces, consistently democratic" and "liberal-people's and liberal-bourgeois", which had a chance to enter the so-called democratic front. However, "reactionary-fascist forces" were to be excluded from cooperation. In practice, the latter group included parties and people, regardless of their actual views, who did not want to accept the hegemony of the Soviet Union and showed any criticism towards the Polish Workers' Party's conduct (Chumiński, 1997: 63; AAN, KC PPR, 295/I/23).

With such criteria formulated, almost the entire Polish intelligentsia qualified for the "reactionary-fascist" group. At a meeting of party engineers and technicians organized in March 1946 in the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party, Jakub Berman declared: "We never had the illusion that we could take over the majority of the intelligentsia." At most, because of the terror, "it seemed to become silent, as if it crouched down in fear." Mikołajczyk's return caused, however, that "these elements appeared, became active and began to exert a certain influence on political life. We can observe it in factories and the thread leading to many strikes is now from offices, from the center where there are white-collar workers" (AAN, KC PPR, 295/VII/40: 8). The then deputy head of the Heavy Industry Department of the PPR [Polish Workers' Party] Central Committee, Franciszek Blinowski, stated that

the attitude of the vast majority of the intelligentsia is indecisive, wavering, characterized by distrust towards the democratic camp and a whole range of internal resistances. These resistances cannot be underestimated, because in many cases they are accompanied by emotional overtones of very strong tension (AAN, KC PPR, 295/VII/40: 10-22).

It should be emphasized that the majority of the pre-war engineering and technical staff, even not accepting the way the PPR (Polish Worker's Party) was governed, was ready to cooperate with the new authorities in rebuilding the country. Some, in order to be able to act, were also ready to join the party of the so-called Democratic Bloc (AAN, MPiH, 2). However, even those who wanted to work for the common good could not feel safe. The case of Kazimierz Szpotański, one of the most outstanding Polish engineers and a pioneer of the electrotechnical industry, is significant. In November 1947, he was dismissed by order of Minister

Hilary Minc. In party documents, however, already in 1945, his activities were characterized in this way:

It might still be premature to say about the decisive and conscious harmfulness of director Szpotański in the State Economy, but the fact, which Szpotański himself does not conceal, of his negative attitude to the very principle of state-owned industry, and his reluctance to any orders of the Ministry of Industry, is enough to believe that director Szpotański is completely inappropriate in his position.

In the Stalinist era, Szpotański was repressed, he could not take a job in state-owned companies, he was also deprived of his own home, displaced with his family to a one-room apartment (AAN, KC PPR, 295/XI/469; Chumiński, 2021: 146–147).

Thus, in communist countries, and Poland is a good example, distrust, supervision and persecution of the “old intelligentsia” had to be accompanied by an attempt to “produce” a new “worker class and peasant class” intelligentsia “uncontaminated” by the past (Chałasiński, 1958: 30–31). The main instrument of this policy was putting people in managerial positions in various areas of social and economic life who did not have the appropriate professional qualifications, but who have the right “origin” and who were completely politically loyal. These activities were particularly intensive in industry, where due to bureaucratization, centralization and the communists’ desire to fully control this sector of the economy, tens of thousands of white-collar jobs appeared to be filled.

PERSONNEL POLICY METHODS

The key feature of all socialist countries was the existence of a nomenclature system (Kornai, 1995: 39–40). Nominations, promotions, but also dismissals were at the discretion of party bodies. It was the main source of the communist party’s dominance in the country and the fundamental factor guaranteeing control over all spheres of social and economic life. The importance of personnel policy for communist regimes is reflected in Stalin’s well-known slogan “cadres decide everything” (Stalin, 1949: 493). At the same time, the Soviet dictator treated it as an axiom that “the higher was the political level and Marxist-Leninist awareness” of the nominated apparatus, the better and more fruitful its work was. Qualifications and professional experience were of little importance because running

the country was primarily a "political task" and required ideological and political rather than professional competences (Glaessner, 1977: 76-77; Chumiński, 2021: 139).

The instrument enabling the implementation of the goals of the nomenclature policy in Poland was the creation of a personnel apparatus completely controlled by the communist party. According to the authorities of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MPiH), from the very beginning, personnel cells were branches of the Polish Workers' Party in the structure of industry, whose task was, among other things, to create party circles, eliminate people recognized as political opponents and accelerate nationalization. Virtually no one except members of the PPR could count on taking the position of personnel manager, because, as it was written, "From the lowest to the highest links, the personnel apparatus consists almost exclusively of members of our party. Thanks to this, it greatly facilitated our party's insight into the entire industrial apparatus, into the deployment of cadres, ensured its sufficient vigilance and enabled a significant democratization of industrial cadres" (AAN, KC PPR, 295/XI/147). Even the appointment of chief directors was not given such importance, and in the case of the largest plants such as Pafawag, Cegielski, Baildon Ironworks, etc. "personnelists" were included in the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (Paczkowski, 2000: 48).

A kind of "personnel clan" was created in the factories. Even in the opinion of the activists of the "reborn" PPS [Polish Socialist Party], which together with the communists was in the so-called Democratic Bloc, a "self-willed and self-mastery", "of a strange breeding of dignitaries", a "clan of personnelists" was created in the plants. Their main task was the political selection of employees, because, as Adam Kuryłowicz, a prominent PPS activist, wrote in June 1947 in "Robotnik", "They discovered that professional qualifications are influenced, even determined by party membership." As a result,

An employee who takes identity cards not as a result of his own political awareness, but does it for "encouragement" from above, to get a job, does not, as we see in practice, maintain proper discipline at work. He believes that the identity card, not the results of work, will decide his fate, and therefore he often disregards his work, not encountering a proper reaction from his superiors (Kuryłowicz, 1947).

The scale of communist dominance in the personnel apparatus is illustrated by data from July 1948. In 17 Central Industrial Boards, all personnel managers were members of the Polish Workers' Party (Table 1). Out of

237 managers in unions and separate enterprises (i.e. the largest and most important) PPR members included 226, i.e. 95.4%, PPS members 10 (4.2%) and 1 independent (0.4%). In as many as 11 industries (out of 17), there was not a single manager who was not a member of the Communist Party. In the remaining 1,655 establishments for which we have data, there were 1,482 communists (89.5%), 140 socialists (8.5%), 13 members of other parties (0.8%) and 20 independents (1.2%). In total, out of 1,910 positions, PPR members held 1,726 (90.4%), there were 150 socialists (7.8%), 13 members of other parties (0.7%) and 21 independents (1.1%). These data indicate that the higher the level of industry management and the more important branches, the greater the dominance of PPR members. It is significant that relatively the largest number of people from outside the communist party were in the mineral industry (out of 184 managers 40 did not belong to the PPR; AAN, KC PPR, 295/XI/327).

Already in the second half of the 1940s, omnipotent personnel units were mainly concerned with tracking down dissenting employees and pursuing party interests in the economic sphere. When recruiting employees, they were required to fill in a detailed personal questionnaire, which included questions not only about the level of education or professional experience, but also about party affiliation before, during and after the war, and about belonging to pro-independence organizations during the occupation (they asked including nicknames). In the 1950s, questions were also asked about the past of family members and relatives staying abroad after the war. It was also common practice to ask employees to submit detailed CVs multiple times in the hope of finding some contradictions in them. When accepting an employee, the personnel apparatus also demanded an opinion from the previous employer, in which the characteristics of his political attitude was a particularly important part. People who were assessed as hostile to the regime had practically no chance of getting a job, being promoted or even keeping a job.

The figure of "personnelist" became a symbol of the nomenclature state, which was of fundamental importance for the opportunization and conformation of society in the times of the People's Republic of Poland. Opinions of human resources departments in the 1940s and 1950s (as well as later) determined the possibility of getting a job, keeping it, chances of promotion or demotion. However, while the human resources apparatus had a significant impact on the professional careers of people in Poland, the interest of the security apparatus decided about personal security, and sometimes even the lives of industry employees (Chumiński, 2021: 177).

The scale of control of the economy by the security apparatus in the first decade of the so-called People's Poland was unprecedented. As early as 1945, a division dealing with the economy was established within the structures of the Ministry of Public Security. Within Department I, Division IV for the Protection of the National Economy was established. The tasks of the economic sector were specified in a letter of February 16, 1945, which recommended, among others,

to carry out work against all anti-state elements operating in industry and trying to organize sabotage, subversion, espionage and damage in state-owned industry, and against private industrialists who knowingly prevent economic tasks from being carried out. It recruits the agents, educates them and maintains contact with them in order to work out this element (*Aparat bezpieczeństwa...*, 2005: 26–27).

In September 1945, on the basis of the existing Division IV, Department IV was created, consisting of 8 Divisions, within which 33 sections functioned.

In reports submitted to the communist authorities as early as 1945, threats in industrial plants related to the activities of political opponents were highlighted. In the report for October and November 1945, the MBP alerted the government that "sabotage is becoming more and more evident in important facilities of our economy, especially in the key industry, coal, metallurgy, power industry and partly in the textile industry" (AIPN, BU, 1572/1467). This was to justify the expansion of the employee surveillance system and numerous arrests, especially of people suspected of belonging to pro-independence organizations. The politically insecure were dismissed en masse. Produced in factories security units kept records of blue-collar and white-collar workers, issued service cards, and conducted confidentiality activities (Chumiński, 2015: 337–338).

At that time, the activities of the security apparatus in the economy were based on three pillars: surveillance, intimidation and terror. The first relatively complete data on the number of informers in industry come from the second half of 1947. At the end of August 1947, 9,343 people (including 228 residents, 583 agents and 8,532 informants) cooperated with the Security Office (UB) in all sectors of the economy. A few months later, in March 1948, the number of informers increased to 15,262 (406 residents, 561 agents and 14,295 informants). In industry alone, out of 919,741 employed registered UB collaborators, there were 5,776 people (including 269 residents, 127 agents and 5,380 informants). This means that over 0.6% of employees reported on their co-workers. The largest number of delators

was in the mining industry – 1038 people, metal industry – 889, textile industry – 858, mineral industry – 456 and food industry – 346. The security authorities were particularly interested in engaging people holding managerial positions with sufficient knowledge that could be useful for operational work. Of the 5,771 industry employees of whom we have information, 527 belonged to plant management, 1,130 held lower office positions, 75 were engineers, 256 technicians, 804 foremen, 2009 skilled workers and 970 unskilled workers (Chumiński, 2015: 579–581).

The apogee of surveillance falls on the first years of the Stalinist period. In 1953, the total number of informers in the country was 85,333. Economic departments had the largest share in this (there were even attempts to define the desired “indicators of saturation” with agents, e.g. in the circle of industrial workers it was supposed to be 1 informant per 100 employed, in the rural one 1 per 500, etc.). Growth was particularly dynamic in the years 1950–1953. While in December 1949 the number of residents, agents, informants and confidential contacts amounted to 26,093 people, in October 1951 it was already 47,807 people. In industry, 21,875 people reported on their colleagues in October 1951 (including 778 residents, 96 agents, 10,028 informants and 10,973 confidential contacts), i.e. about 1% of employees (data without associates on Department IV contact). 4,082 people cooperated with the UB in mining, in textile and clothing industry 3914, metal industry 2820, metallurgy 1963, energy industry 1903, chemical industry 1374, etc. This means that in the state-owned industry there was 1 informer for every 88 employees, and in some industries the degree of saturation was even much higher, e.g. in the energy industry 1 informer per 30 employees, mining 65, metallurgy 69 (Table 2) (Chumiński, 2015: 380, 582–583; AIPN, BU, 1572/1455). A significant percentage of the informers were representatives of the plant administration. In the segment of Department IX (heavy and special industry) in March 1953, out of 10,802 informers (without confidential contacts), technical and administrative staff and medium technical supervision accounted for 45% (respectively: 2,430 and 2,424 people), workers 49% (5,306) and “others” 6% (642 persons) (AIPN, BU, 1572/1586).

The information provided by the delators was the basis for the selection by the security apparatus of the so-called hostile element. People deemed hostile were under constant surveillance and usually eliminated from the establishments. The systematic study of the past of employees began after the great wave of strikes that took place in the autumn of 1947 in Łódź. As part of a special action code-named E. W., carried out at the beginning of

1948, 25,000 people were initially under surveillance. white-collar workers in the textile industry, out of which, after the initial selection, 1,759 people, i.e. 8%, were considered potential enemies. The largest group was the so-called WRN element (618 people), former Anders army officers and soldiers (respectively: 58 and 320), pre-war officials (348), former members of pre-war parties (127), revealed during the amnesty (192), pre-war officers (29), etc. (AIPN BU, 77/3a: 435).

The search for a hostile element continued in the following months. In 1949, in some industrial plants, associations and central industrial administrations, the security authorities classified a significant part of the employees as "hostile elements". Particularly high percentages were identified in the case of white-collar staff of economic administration institutions, e.g. in the Central Board of the Coal Industry out of 828 employees, 576 people were suspected (69.5%), in Central Board of Metallurgy Industry: 480 and 183 (38.1%), respectively, Central Board of Chemical Industry 492 and 130 (26.4%), in Zabrze Association of Coal Industry 814 and 534 (65.6%), in the Management of Metal Products Industry 293 and 59 (20.1%) (AAN, KC PZPR 237/ XXXI/197: 45–48).

In 1949, the list of enemies with 23 items (in 1954 the list was extended to 43 categories) automatically included, among others pre-war corporate officials, officers, shareholders, owners of private enterprises, policemen, members and sympathizers of pre-WWII parties, soldiers and officers of the army of W. Anders, Home Army, NSZ [National Armed Forces], WiN [Freedom and Independence Association], people who accepted the Volkslist, post-war repatriates, re-emigrants, natives, excluded members of the Polish Socialist Party and Polish Workers' Party, WRN (Polish Socialist Party - Freedom, Equality, Independence) members, PSL (Polish Peasants Party) members, exposed during the amnesty, clergymen, rural rich people and their families, citizens of foreign countries, etc. (Dominiczak, 1997: 49).

In the light of this, it is not surprising that in the fall of 1951 the security apparatus had at least 114,861 employees registered in all sectors of the national economy (except transport) (Table 3). However, these data are certainly not complete, as the list includes only 16 categories of "hostile element", while the list does not include people usually classified as opponents of the regime (including those expelled from the Polish Socialist Party, Polish Workers' Party and Polish United Workers' Party, natives, re-emigrants from France, repatriates from the USSR, people who accepted the Volkslist, representatives of national minorities, Greeks

settled in Poland in the 1950s, members of Catholic organizations and the so-called clerics (it is worth adding that, for example, at the beginning of 1953, 70,000 people "supporting and financing the Catholic University in Lublin" were discovered). The largest group consisted of former soldiers of the Union of Armed Struggle (ZWZ) and the Home Army (AK) (25,573 people) and members of pre-war "reactionary organizations" (25,904), followed by former members of Mikołajczyk's Polish People's Party (19,575), pre-war officers and soldiers of the army of W. Anders (16,143) and pre-war senior officials (4,268), etc. In industry, the recorded "hostile element" numbered a total of 38,205 people, including 7,036 employees in the mining industry, 6,984 in the textile industry, 5,875 in the metal industry, 3764 in metallurgical industry, 3020 in energy industry, 2930 in chemical industry, etc. Most were former ZWZ and Home Army soldiers (8,490), pre-war officers and soldiers of Anders (8,048), WRN members (2,968), members of pre-war parties and organizations (11,705). It can be assumed that these people were closely supervised and under surveillance, because the security authorities were able to tell how many people left the industrial plants in one month, and how many "hostile elements" were employed in them. In the months that followed, the numbers of the "hostile elements" recorded increased significantly. Suffice it to say that only in plants under the responsibility of Department IX, it numbered in January 1954 76,224 people. This means that almost every tenth employee of the plants it supervised was included in this category (Chumiński, 2015: 383–384).

People deemed "hostile" were dismissed en masse, thousands of them were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms and even the death penalty. It is very difficult to answer the question of how many white-collar workers fell victim to repression during the Stalinist period. We only have data for 1952. According to them, the economic division arrested 69 directors, 125 engineers and other employees with higher education, 556 technicians, foremen, foremen and foremen, and 831 officials. In the years 1951–1954, the UB arrested 49,373 people, including 8,951 white-collar workers, 5,512 craftsmen, 2,847 representatives of liberal professions and 624 private initiative, taking into account the social composition. However, more than half of the detainees were workers – 13,812 (28%) and peasants – 13,152 (26.6%). In turn, according to data for the years 1950–1954, the economic department arrested 12,015 people, including 1,478 for sabotage, 395 for sabotage, 4,922 for hostile propaganda and anti-state speeches, 1,891 for abuse and damage, 915 for neglecting official duties, 894 for belonging to hostile organizations, etc. Let us em-

phasize that the arrests made by the economic department constituted only a part of the arrests made by the security apparatus. According to a list from the 1970s, UB officers arrested 243,000 in the years 1944–1956. (including for diversion, sabotage and economic damage 15,919) (tab. 4) (AIPN, BU, 0326/431; Chumiński, 2015: 577–594). Almost all these people were employed in various sectors of the national economy. For industrial workers, it was not important whether a work colleague was detained by a division of the Department I, III, IV, V, VIII or IX. It was important that he disappeared from work for even the smallest reasons, and later it was learned that he had been sentenced to a long prison sentence.

Penalties meted out to white-collar workers were drastic, long-term prison sentences were the norm, and death sentences were not uncommon. The case of Henryk Szwejcer, arrested at the end of 1948, sentenced to death by the district military court in Wrocław in May of the following year, and executed on July 14, 1949, can be considered a symbol of those times. The co-defendants in the case, 28-year-old Władysław Czarnecki and 29-year-old Henryk Gerlicki, were shot together with him. The reason for the UB investigation was the failure to send correspondence to the Lower Silesian Coal Industry Association in Wałbrzych, of which Szwejcer was one of the directors. He was born in 1886 and at the time of execution he was already a sick and elderly man. The reason for the accusation of sabotage was that Gerlicki, who was employed at the Union's registry office, did not send 3,000 letters. He spent the money intended to finance correspondence on alcohol. All the accused were tortured during the investigation. As a consequence, during the brutal beating, Gerlicki accused H. Szwejcer and his colleague W. Czarnecki, with whom he was employed in the registry office, of complicity in sabotage, the purpose of which was, as stated in the UB report, "introducing chaos in the coal economy". The press of the time reported: "A Sanacja dignitary, a National Armed Forces member and a member of the NSDAP disorganized the work of the coal industry in a joint sabotage operation." Since Bierut did not use the right of clemency against any of the convicts, the price for several thousand unsent letters was the lives of three people, two of whom had nothing to do with this practice (Chumiński, 2021: 189).

The third pillar of the personnel policy was appointing people to managerial positions who meet primarily political criteria. The first actions of this type were taken at the beginning of 1945. In the instruction of the Central Committee of the PPR on "Selection and training of managerial staff in industry" of March 17, 1945, it was declared that if the director was

a specialist engineer, the deputy had to be a trusted worker, or vice versa, if the director was a “hard-willed” worker, the deputy was a professional. One of the main criteria “when selecting specialists for senior administrative and technical positions” was “attitude to government policy” (AAN, KC PPR 295/X/11).

The first action taken at the central level to deploy cadres was the implementation of H. Minc’s decision to promote 500 workers to managerial positions in industry in June 1945. It will not be an exaggeration to say that in the first years after the war, the PPR instances performed the functions of employment offices, sending their members en masse to managerial positions in various institutions and indicating who should be fired. Only by the end of 1945, according to incomplete data, 3,426 people were put forward, including 1,398 people in mining, 96 in power industry, 484 in heavy industry and 1,448 in light industry. 87 persons were qualified to category I, category II 154, III 504 and IV 2681 (AAN, KC PZPR sign. 237/V-1a/38, pp. 40–41, 44).¹ At the end of 1948, the number of promoted women increased to 13,791, including the largest number of people in the textile industry – 3,206, coal industry – 2,925, metal industry – 3,206 and metallurgy – 1,185. The minimum percentage of advanced women is surprising, as there were only 393 of them, i.e. 2.8% of those promoted. Compared to all white-collar workers, the promoted accounted for 0.8%. In the case of men, these percentages were much higher, because more than one in ten white-collar workers belonged to the advanced category. By far the largest group belonged to category IV 9,712 people, i.e. over 70% of all, there were 313 people in category I (2.3%), II 482 (3.5%) and III 3,284 (23.8%) (Chumiński, 2021: 209).

On the other hand, according to data from May 1950, 16,008 people, i.e. 19% of the total number of industry managers, were sent to four industrial departments. Of the 1,777 people belonging to the strict economic

¹ Category I included persons appointed to managerial positions in independent industrial enterprises (general, technical and administrative directors). Category II included “advanced persons who do not have the management of the entire enterprise, occupy positions lower than the above-mentioned ones, but whose scope of work is equal to them. They will be deputy directors, heads of production and administration in larger enterprises. Group III included “those appointed to all other managerial positions, i.e. heads of departments, branches and departments. When categorizing the above-mentioned groups, the size of the enterprise should be taken into account, which affects the level of requirements that are imposed on the relevant managers. In group IV, “the lowest managerial position, which can be considered as the lower limit of advancement, is the position of foreman, master”.

elite (category I – including directors and v-directors of departments of ministries, directors of associations and heads of the largest enterprises employing over 1,000 employees), every tenth (186 people, 10.5%). Out of the remaining 82,332 managers (category II, which included middle staff of ministries, central management boards and associations, directors of enterprises with less than 1,000 employees, heads of production, administration employees in enterprises: clerks, advisers, inspectors and technical staff: masters, foremen), 19.2% (15,822 people) were put forward. As before, men were much more likely to be promoted than women. Only 37.6% of those promoted were trained, another 8% were in training, but as many as 54.4% took up new positions without any preparation (Table 5). If director positions are taken into account, the percentage of ousted directors was 16.3% (out of 2,305 directors about whom we have information, 376 were ousted). However, in the case of large enterprises with more than 1,000 employees, this percentage was 12.4% (respectively: 418 and 52), and in enterprises with up to 1,000 employees it was 17.2% (1,887 and 324). In this case, too, the majority were promoted without any previous training (52.9%, i.e. 199 people out of 376). Surprisingly, this applies even to the directors of the largest plants. Before taking the position, 15 were trained, 12 were trained during work, but as many as 25 did not undergo any training at all (Chumiński, 2021: 211–212).

In the light of these data, it can probably be assumed that the percentage of forwards accounted for about 20% of industry executives. However, regardless of whether the percentage of those mentioned was actually slightly higher or lower, there is no doubt that it was not this group that was the main problem of the management staff of the Polish industry. The main weakness of the then personnel policy was not so much the preference for people from previously disadvantaged backgrounds (which was reflected in the promotion of representatives of the working and peasant classes to managerial positions), but the recruitment almost exclusively of people who met political conditions, regardless of their substantive background.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE MANAGEMENT STAFF OF THE POLISH INDUSTRY

One of the popular sayings in the People's Republic of Poland was that only "passive, mediocre but faithful" people had a chance for promotion. This was reflected primarily in the low level of qualifications and the degree of party-belonging of people holding managerial positions. The most complete information on the composition of the industry management staff is provided by extensive studies balancing the staffing situation after the three-year plan in 4 industrial ministries established on February 10, 1949: the Ministry of Heavy Industry (MPC), the Ministry of Mining (MG), the Ministry of Light Industry (MPL) and the Ministry of Agricultural Industry and Food (MPRiS) (AAN, KC PZPR 237/V-1-a/22; 237/V-1a/38; 237/V-1a/40) (Table 6). They show that at the beginning of 1950, out of 1,777 people (category I) holding the most important managerial positions in the industry, half did not have completed higher education (888 people), including as much as 13.4% (238) with education below secondary. Only 31.4% (558) graduated from higher technical studies. Out of 635 people (35.7%) with secondary education, 214 people (12%) had technical education. Among plant directors employing over 1,000 employees in two key ministries of mining and heavy industry, less than half of 47.7% (189) had higher technical education (258 people, i.e. 65.2%). Over 1/3 (34.8% - 138 people) had only secondary education, of which 7.8% (31) did not even graduate from high school. It is significant that even in the group of directors and vice-directors of ministerial departments, out of 96 people, more than one in five did not have higher education (21 people), and out of 157 heads of departments, as many as 82 people had secondary education or even below this level. Thus, almost every third of the highest ministerial officials (32.4%) did not graduate from higher school. Of these 253, 129 people, i.e. 51%, graduated from technical studies. This means that among the strict economic elite of the country, numbering 1,777 people, on whom the burden of managing the Polish industry rested, only one in three had completed technical studies, one in two had education below higher education, and almost one in eight did not even graduate from high school.

The level of education of white-collar workers classified in category II was even worse (data for 82,332 people). In this case, only 9.4% (7,755) people had completed higher technical studies (11,086 people had higher

education, i.e. 13.5%). 35,010 people (42.5%) had secondary education, of which only 14,931 (18.1%) had technical secondary education. However, the largest group among employees in this category were people who did not even finish secondary school – 42.7% (35,180 people). If we take into account persons holding directorships in plants with less than 1,000 employees, then in 3 ministries: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Light Industry, out of 1,895 people, 29.2% (554) graduated from technical studies, 5.2% (98) from economic and commercial studies, and 2.3% from other studies (44 – mainly law). Secondary school was completed by 37.7% (714 people, including 307 technical). More than 1/5 (21.6% – 409 people) of factory directors at that time had education below secondary. To this number, we should also add 76 graduates of technical secondary schools established since 1946, schools in which new managerial staff were educated in an accelerated mode (Chumiński, 2021: 58–59, 268).

The situation at the end of the six-year plan did not improve. In 1956, even official assessments stated that “The low level of education of the management staff and their high fluidity is one of the main reasons for the number of shortages in the work of our plants and the slow pace of technical progress. Improving the qualifications of managerial staff is of fundamental importance” (AAN, PKPG, 663). However, these opinions are hardly surprising given the results of the Central Statistical Office survey on the education of Polish industry managers in 1956. Out of 81,835 people, 14.8% (12,073 people) had higher education, 37.9% (30,994) graduated from high school, but most people had lower education – 43.6% (35,677). It must be surprising that out of 3,276 chief executives, only 23.3% had higher education and 20.3% lower education. The situation among technical directors was not much better, because in this group 30.1% had higher education and 22.7% had lower education. If all 6,537 persons held directorships were taken into account, 24.6% (1,605 persons) graduated from higher education, 51.7% (3,378) completed secondary education, and 22.2% (1,454) had lower education. Even in positions that seemed to require high qualifications, e.g. production chief, chief mechanic, head of the planning department, chief accountant, the percentage of people with lower education was higher than that of graduates (AAN, PKPG, 633: table 15).

The low level of education of industry executives was accompanied by increased party-belonging. Unfortunately, we have full source data on PZPR membership only for 1950 (Table 7) For the subsequent years of the Six-Year Plan, it was not possible to find aggregate information, although

certainly the unfavorable phenomena of eliminating non-partisan people from the management staff and replacing them with PZPR members must have been further intensified (let's note that until the end of the People's Republic of Poland, we do not have such detailed summaries).

For 1950, we have information on 84,109 people, from the level of foreman in factories to the director of a department in the ministry. They show that over 46% of these people (38,890 people) were PZPR members. The higher the level of industry management, the greater the dominance of party members. In the group of the strict management elite of 1,777 people (qualified to category I), PZPR members accounted for as much as 73.2% (1,301 people). Affiliation to other parties was declared by 3% (54), which means that only 23.8% (442) of employees were non-partisan. It is worth emphasizing that already at that time, more than half of 54.5% had worker-peasant origin, from the so-called 31.6% of the working intelligentsia came from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois origins - 13.9%. They were also relatively young people, as over 37% were up to 40 years old.

The percentage analysis of the degree of party-belonging, although meaningful, does not reflect the actual scale of dominance of PZPR members in the management of the industry. It can be seen more clearly if we use the *odds ratio* indicator, illustrating the extent to which party membership privileges its members over other groups of employees (Domański, 2007: 202–204).² The data obtained for 1950 are telling, already then the members of the Polish United Workers' Party had over 11 times more chances of taking the highest positions in industry than other employees.

The situation was slightly better at the lower levels of industry management. In category II, from the level of foremen to directors of plants with fewer than 1,000 employees, out of 82,332 persons PZPR members were 37,589, i.e. 45.7%. There were 1,874 (2.3%) members of other parties and 42,869 (52%) of non-partisan. In this case, as indicated by the *odds*

² The odds ratio is used in the study of social mobility. In our case, it is a function of four components. We compare two quotients. The first of them expresses the ratio of party members in managerial positions to the number of PPR/PZPR members who do not hold managerial positions in industry, the second - the number of non-partisan persons in managerial positions in relation to employees who are not members of the PZPR and do not hold managerial functions. In order to obtain the odds ratio, we compare the size of the first and second quotient. We calculated the indicator according to the formula presented in the work: Domański (2007: 202–204).

ratio analysis, party members were about 3.6 times more likely to take up a managerial position than other employees. Worker-peasant background was 75% and 54% were aged up to 40%.

If we included only directors, then in the largest plants with more than 1,000 employees, PZPR members accounted for 71.8%, and in smaller plants 65.2%. There were 26.5% and 31.2% of non-partisan people, respectively. At that time, 60% of the directors already had the “correct” worker-peasant social background.

The relationship between the deterioration of the level of education and the increase in the party-belonging of factory directors is illustrated by Halina Najduchowska’s research (graph 1) (Najduchowska, 1974: 252, 256, 258). We note significant correlations. Over time, the percentage of PPR/PZPR members in this group increased and their education deteriorated at the same time. In 1945, there were 24% of the members of the communist party among the directors, in 1948 it was already 54%, but a sharp increase was recorded in 1949. The percentage of party directors among the directors increased to 77%. At the end of the Six-Year Plan in 1955, as much as 95% belonged to the party. Parallel to the increase in party-belonging, the process of deterioration of their qualifications was occurring. While in 1945 84% of directors had higher education, in 1949 36%, in 1952 19% and 1955 27%. On the other hand, the percentage of people with primary and vocational education was growing. In 1945 there were no such people, in 1949 already 26%, in 1951 32%, and in 1955 it fell to 25% (basic 15%, professional 10%). Over time, the percentage of people of worker-peasant origin also increased. In 1955, they constituted 83% (workers 68%, peasants 15%), and only 5% were of intelligentsia origin.

CONCLUSIONS

The social system formed in the first decade of the so-called People’s Republic of Poland, was described by Wincenty Styś, an outstanding Polish economist and economic historian, as “semi-feudal”. It was a country in which the social position of citizens depended mainly on having a party card, which, as he put it, was “proof of a nobleman” (*Księga...*, 2007: 97). It was a permanent feature of the system because it remained closed until the end, eliminating from the possibility of promotion people who did not meet the political criterion. At the end of the People’s Republic of

Poland, the degree of domination of state structures by members of the Polish United Workers' Party was enormous. In 1986, party members accounted for 72.1% of industry executives, and as much as 89.8% of state administration (Kozak, 1987: 118). Despite repeated declarations about the need to admit more non-partisan people to managerial positions, 3/4 were held by party members, despite the fact that their share among the employed in the national economy was about 15% (out of 1.2 million positions, PZPR members held 900,000). This means that almost every second member of the Polish United Workers' Party was a manager (from the level of foreman to prime minister), and among non-partisan people only one employee in twenty-five employed had a chance for promotion (Erazmus, 1988: 1, 12).

The dominance of the political criterion and the methods used to select managerial staff resulted in the formation of a specific mental type. Even in the face of the extreme irrationality of the system, the basic motto that people followed was "keep your head down", blurring responsibility for decisions and preferring political rather than economic goals. Every attempt to change was associated with the risk of failure – and this could be interpreted by the political factor or the security apparatus as a hostile political act. Already at the beginning of the 1970s, Witold Kula pointed out that in the communist system the managerial staff had a double consciousness, because they "know what should be done – and do something else". Any insubordination could result in being accused of, for example, "revisionism" or "Trotskyism", which played the role of the "medieval accusation of relations with the devil." As a consequence, the personnel policy model implemented at that time "stiffens and eliminates the flexibility of the society, ensures the dominance of conservative tendencies, immobilism, incapacity for modern management" (Kula, 1996: 260). In this context, it is hardly surprising that the personnel policy pursued in the Polish People's Republic period (these practices can be considered a universal feature of all the countries of the Soviet bloc) could not meet Schumpeter's expectations towards "socialist managers".

Table 1. Personnel managers by party affiliation in central industrial boards, associations, centrals, divisional plants and plants (July 1, 1948)

The name of the Central Industry Board (CZP)	Number of subordinate associations, centrals and divisional plants	Number of subordinate plants	Managers of personnel departments of Central Industry Boards				Managers of personnel divisions, associations, centrals and divisional plants				Managers of personnel divisions of plants				Total				
			PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	Total
Central Chemical Industry Board	14	202	2	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	196	20	-	-	212	20	-	-	232
Central Sugar Industry Board	10	93	1	-	-	-	9	1	-	-	73	10	-	-	83	11	-	-	94
Central Wood Industry Board	8	112	1	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	93	9	1	-	101	9	1	-	111
Central Electro-technical Industry Board	10	117	1	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	76	-	-	-	87	-	-	-	87
Central Energy Industry Board	15	123	1	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	82	8	1	2	95	8	1	3	107

Table 1. Personnel managers by party affiliation in central industrial boards...

The name of the Central Industry Board (CZP)	Number of subordinate associations, centrals and divisional plants	Number of subordinate plants	Managers of personnel departments of Central Industry Boards				Managers of personnel divisions, associations, centrals and divisional plants				Managers of personnel divisions of plants				Total			
			PPR	Other parties	Non-partisan		PPR	Other parties	Non-partisan		PPR	Other parties	Non-partisan		PPR	Other parties	Non-partisan	Total
Central Fermentative Industry Board	7	134	1	-	-	6	-	-	-	28	2	-	-	35	2	-	-	37
Central Metallurgic Industry Board	15	66	1	-	-	9	2	-	-	60	3	-	-	70	5	-	-	75
Central Canning Industry Board	32	-	1	-	-	30	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	31
Central Mineral Industry Board	19	304	1	-	-	16	3	-	-	160	30	1	6	177	33	1	6	217
Central Metal Industry Board	33	265	1	-	-	33	-	-	-	224	12	8	6	258	12	8	6	284
Central Oil Industry Board	7	56	1	-	-	7	-	-	-	25	5	-	-	33	5	-	-	38
Central Paper Industry Board	18	124	1	-	-	17	1	-	-	82	5	-	-	100	6	-	-	106

The name of the Central Industry Board (CZP)	Number of subordinate associations, centrals and divisional plants	Number of subordinate plants	Managers of personnel departments of Central Industry Boards				Managers of personnel divisions, associations, centrals and divisional plants				Managers of personnel divisions of plants				Total				
			PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	PPR	PPS	Other parties	Non-partisan	Total
Central Leather Industry Board	17	140	1	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	80	9	2	4	98	9	2	4	113
Central Food Industry Board	5	92	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	53	2	-	-	59	2	-	-	61
Central Coal Industry Board	19	191	1	-	-	-	15	2	-	-	58	15	-	-	74	17	-	-	91
Central Textile Industry Board	15	217	1	-	-	-	14	1	-	-	192	10	-	2	207	11	-	2	220
Central Industrial Building Industry Board	8	-	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6
Total	252	2236	18	-	-	-	226	10	-	1	1482	140	13	20	1726	150	13	21	1910
Percentage			100	0	0	0	95,4	4,2	-	0,4	89,5	8,5	0,8	1,2	90,4	7,8	0,7	1,1	100

Source: AAN, KC PPR sign. 295/XI/327, Wykaz statystyczny kierowniczej obsady przemysłu (1 lipca 1948 r.), no pagination. Numerous errors in the summary in the source.

Table 2. Collaborators of the security authorities at the contact between Divisions IV of the WUBP and Sections IV of PUBP (October 25–November 25, 1951)

Industry branch	Collaborating with the security apparatus						Security Sections			Security Divisions	
	Residents	Agents	Informers	Confidential contacts	Total	Number of SS	Number of employees	Number of SD	Number of employees		
Coal	135	24	2049	1874	4082	89	303	27	48		
Metallurgic	68	13	890	992	1963	44	157	7	17		
Metal	112	15	1409	1284	2820	68	187	11	14		
Chemistry	48	7	637	682	1374	40	89	4	10		
Energy	68	6	903	926	1903	32	74	8	13		
Oil	16	6	182	116	320	5	12	2	2		
Electro-technical	36	2	320	405	763	30	63	-	-		
Textile	128	10	1311	1885	3334	95	249	9	15		
Clothing	24	-	233	323	580	17	42	2	3		
Rubber	3	-	99	88	190	5	11	-	-		
Paper	13	-	187	277	477	12	24	2	3		
Graphics	2	-	22	86	110	1	2	-	-		
Leather	14	1	178	208	401	6	13	3	4		

Industry branch	Collaborating with the security apparatus						Security Sections		Security Divisions	
	Residents	Agents	Informers	Confidential contacts	Total	Number of SS	Number of employees	Number of SD	Number of employees	
Wood	19	1	243	312	575	4	9	3	4	
Mineral	22	4	273	249	548	11	29	-	-	
Ceramic	6	1	170	227	404	5	12	2	2	
Alcoholic	8	1	129	153	291	14	26	1	1	
Sugar	17	-	206	281	504	2	3	4	3	
Food	15	-	208	196	419	3	5	1	1	
Fermentative	7	-	92	142	241	1	3	1	1	
Canning	4	-	70	51	125	-	-	4	2	
Local	13	5	217	216	451	-	-	9	8	
Total	778	96	10028	10973	21875	484	1313	100	151	
All branches of national economy	1745	184	22933	21826	46688	509	1375	210	305	

Source: author's compilation based on: AIPN, BU 1752/1455, *Tablica statystyczna B, Wydziaty IV WUBP i Referaty IV PUBP (25 października-25 listopada 1951 r.)* p. 210.

Table 3. The "hostile element" in industry revealed by Departments IV of WUBP, Sections IV of PUBP and Department IV of MBP (October 25–November 25, 1951)

Branch of industry	The "hostile element" revealed by Divisions IV of WUBP and Sections IV of PUBP according to industry sectors																Gone from structures	Entered structures	
	Pre-war party members			Pre-war clerks and military					Members of "reactionary" organizations during the occupation and after liberation										Total
	BBWR	ND, OWP, ONR	Other	Higher officials	Enterprise owners	Officers of the 2nd troop	Police-men	Government Delegation	ZWZ, AK	NSZ	WiN	WRN	SCh, OP, SN	Mikołajczyk's PSL	Nazi officers and informers				
Coal	504	167	1629	230	33	907	11	286	4	745	42	8	1041	124	116	992	6839	204	319
Metal-lurgic	280	24	776	247	21	691	13	133	4	759	94	59	473	42	60	88	3764	14	388
Metal	293	27	759	243	78	1593	31	205	14	1481	143	31	572	24	140	114	5748	11	211
Chemical	295	12	522	114	28	881	19	84	-	671	10	9	154	24	15	92	2930	9	69
Energy	259	20	384	151	40	671	30	117	7	867	39	19	130	34	130	122	320	50	94
Oil	48	3	205	45	5	118	3	20	-	251	17	6	115	5	45	-	886	-	-
Electro-technical	61	1	213	47	25	295	5	44	-	338	10	10	23	3	20	7	1102	127	2
Textile	193	215	3181	283	141	885	21	204	12	1003	101	58	103	206	215	163	6984	67	262
Clothing	27	16	89	20	5	127	4	19	-	99	13	2	15	-	16	35	487	5	11
Rubber	10	7	65	4	5	184	-	7	-	70	-	-	36	-	-	3	391	-	4
Paper	34	9	92	38	7	175	3	30	1	387	17	5	91	-	33	5	927	8	22
Graphics	5	10	76	11	8	44	-	8	-	60	-	-	-	2	4	29	257	-	-
Leather	12	5	63	14	8	96	-	20	-	181	16	5	12	-	54	15	501	3	51
Wood	23	12	71	26	12	349	7	42	3	184	9	4	6	3	37	14	802	2	20
Mineral	82	11	216	59	84	214	8	45	3	305	18	16	68	1	62	73	1265	26	12
Ceramic	8	-	10	17	15	118	5	15	-	158	39	4	24	3	18	33	467	16	30

The "hostile element" revealed by Divisions IV of WUBP and Sections IV of PUBP according to industry sectors																			
Branch of industry	Pre-war party members			Pre-war clerks and military				Members of "reactionary" organizations during the occupation and after liberation						Nazi officers and informers	Total	Gone from structures	Entered structures		
	BBWR	ND, OWP, ONR	Other	Higher officials	Enterprise owners	Officers of the 2nd troop	Po-lice-men	Govern-ment Delegation	ZWZ, AK	NSZ	WIN	WRN	SCH, OP, SN					Miko-lajczyk's PSL	
Alco-holic	29	12	36	58	1	52	3	19	-	140	5	4	45	4	42	-	450	4	14
Sugar	73	58	83	88	11	190	3	32	-	212	9	11	7	6	29	6	818	47	9
Food	61	21	109	78	17	185	5	24	1	256	17	13	31	1	47	18	884	17	29
Ferment-ative	11	4	51	27	7	67	3	15	-	164	5	1	3	5	15	17	395	8	8
Canning	4	12	19	1	1	74	1	4	-	19	-	-	-	3	7	2	147	-	8
Local	12	2	84	20	23	132	6	30	3	140	3	11	19	-	41	27	553	1	11
Total	2324	648	8733	1821	575	8048	181	1403	52	8490	607	276	2968	490	1146	1855	36917	619	1574
All branches of national economy	5494	1553	18280	3917	1762	15586	461	3437	212	24230	4535	4197	3581	1309	19441	3205	111200	1418	2808
In the regis-tered of Department IV MBP	96	42	439	351	237	557	94	84	66	1343	85	29	39	18	134	47	3661	-	-
Total	5590	1595	18719	4268	1999	16143	555	3521	278	25573	4620	4226	3620	1327	19575	3252	114861	1418	2808

Source: see as in table 2. We have not included in the table the "hostile element" by industry as disclosed by Department IV officers. There were 197 people in the mining industry, 127 in the metal industry, 206 in the chemical industry, 36 in the energy industry, 49 in the oil industry, 95 in the electrotechnical industry and 578 in the light industry. In total, there were 1,288 people.

Table 4. People arrested by the security apparatus in 1944–1956 by crime category

Crime category	Years													Total
	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	
Espionage	34	90	229	289	709	654	872	294	494	378	277	141	41	4502
Members of illegal organizations	5498	10641	14869	6616	4242	4457	4210	1975	4015	1251	627	311	113	58825
Collaboration with members of illegal organizations	174	538	1668	2118	1968	1502	843	274	522	68	37	44	37	9793
Terror, political banditry, murders	200	2174	6443	4974	3119	2409	1605	960	1226	663	614	300	114	24801
Diversion, sabotage and economic damage	159	541	1248	1798	2099	2519	1831	1429	2313	1200	525	129	128	15919
Anti-state speeches	-	114	489*	22	23	262**	22	11	27	6	11	-	382***	1369
Hostile propaganda (distribution of leaflets, anonymous letters, threatening letters)	33	366	1117	1178	710	1073	3588	1348	3166	2192	799	236	175	15981
Jehovah's Witnesses	-	-	-	-	-	6	121	36	67	5	34	15	10	294
State secret betrayal	-	-	1	-	4	8	9	15	29	8	3	2	4	83
Illegal border crossing and smuggling of people abroad	7	134	421	1221	1030	869	1010	953	1323	660	447	562	331	8968
Illegal possession of weapons	307	2413	6581	3909	5067	3257	2103	709	930	527	397	121	102	26423
Fascist activity until 1939	13	475	409	242	35	20	43	92	115	105	43	6	1	1599

Crime category	Years													Total
	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	
Occupation crimes (war crimes, collaboration with the occupier)	2740	20812	5204	3141	2021	2143	2026	468	426	329	207	59	27	39603
Desertion	800	1366	990	432	173	132	94	61	137	78	42	8	3	4316
Office crimes of UB officers	-	69	113	258	227	265	274	281	241	163	110	-	-	2001
Other	1098	5415	4629	4323	3016	3272	2076	1168	1754	1135	487	134	82	28589
Total	11063	45148	44411	30521	24443	22848	20727	10074	16785	8768	4660	2068	1550	243066

Source: author's compilation based on: AIPN Warsaw, BU sign. 0326/431, pp. 82-84.

* - including 145 people arrested for anti-Semitic actions in Kielce

** - including 250 people arrested for their participation in the "Miracle of Lublin".

*** - including 377 arrested in Poznań events

Table 5. Employees promoted...

Industrial ministries	Total employed			Management		
	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men	Total
Ministry of Heavy Industry	94403	434512	528915	1036	26065	27101
Category I				6	711	717
Category II				1030	25354	26384
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees				-	309	309
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees				4	746	750
Ministry of Mining	33228	301790	335018	3335	26225	29560
Category I				1	121	122
Category II				3334	26104	29438
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees				-	87	87
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees				-	521	521
Ministry of Light Industry	259087	342009	601096	2736	21375	24111
Category I				11	812	823
Category II				2725	20563	23288
Ministry of Agricultural and Food Industry	27469	60144	87613	198	3139	3337
Category I				2	113	115
Category II				196	3026	3222
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees				-	22	22
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees				15	601	616
Total	414187	1138455	1552642	7305	76804	84109
Category I				20	1757	1777
Category II				7285	75047	82332
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees				-	418	418
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees				19	1868	1887

Source: author's compilation based on: AAN, KC PZPR sign. 237/V-1a/22: 71; AAN, KC PZPR sign. 237/V-1a/38: 25; AAN, KC PZPR: sign. 237/V-1a/22: 17; AAN, KC PZPR: sign. 237/V-1a/40.

...in industrial ministries (May 1950)

Promoted						Training status						
Women	%	Men	%	Total	%	Trained	%	In training	%	Not in training	%	Total
73	7,0	3549	13,6	3622	13,4	535	18,4	247	8,5	2129	73,1	2911
-	-	60	8,4	60	8,4	15	25,9	16	27,6	27	46,6	58
73	7,1	3489	13,8	3562	13,5	520	18,2	231	8,1	2102	73,7	2853
-	-	43	13,9	43	13,9	11	25,6	12	27,9	20	46,5	43
1	25,0	139	18,6	140	18,7	20	14,3	28	20,0	92	65,7	140
160	4,8	5007	19,1	5167	17,5	2718	52,6	274	5,3	2175	42,1	5167
-	0,0	9	7,4	9	7,4	4	44,4	0	0,0	5	55,6	9
160	4,8	4998	19,1	5158	17,5	2714	52,6	274	5,3	2170	42,1	5158
-	-	9	10,3	9	10,3	4	44,4	0	0,0	5	55,6	9
-	-	98	18,8	98	18,8	46	46,9	17	17,3	35	35,7	98
2	0,1	115	0,5	7014	29,1	2212	34,8	619	9,7	3521	55,4	6352
2	18,2	115	14,2	117	14,2	33	28,2	13	11,1	71	60,7	117
-	-	-	-	6897*	29,6	2179	34,9	606	9,7	3450	55,3	6235
7	3,5	198	6,3	205	6,1	45	22,0	27	13,2	133	64,9	205
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	3,6	198	6,5	205	6,4	45	22,0	27	13,2	133	64,9	205
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	20,0	83	13,8	86	14,0	18	20,9	21	24,4	47	54,7	86
242	3,3	8869	40	16008*	19	5510	37,6	1167	8	7958	54,4	14635
2	10,0	184	30	186	10,5	52	28,2	29	15,8	103	56	184
240	3,3	8685	39	15822*	19,2	5458	37,8	1138	7,9	7855	54,3	14451
-	-	52	12,4	52	12,4	15	28,8	12	23,1	25	48,1	52
4	21,1	320	17,1	324	17,2	84	25,9	66	20,4	174	53,7	324

In individual categories, the data do not add up to the total number of employees in individual ministries. Numerous errors in the summaries in the sources.

* In the case of those promoted in the Ministry of Light Industry, there is no data on the number of promoted women and men in category II. Therefore, the figures do not add up.

Table 6. Level of education of the management staff of the Polish industry (1950)

Management staff of Polish industry in ministries	Higher level of education				Secondary level of education				Below secondary	%	Graduates of technical secondary school	%	Total		
	Technical	Economic and commercial	Other	Total	%	Technical	Economic and commercial	General						Total	%
Ministry of Mining	1415	389	434	2238	7,6	3672	1886	7417	12975	43,9	13801	46,7	546	29560	
Category I	62	12	15	89	73,0	2	7	19	28	23,0	4	3,3	1	122	
Category II	1353	377	419	2149	7,3	3670	1879	7398	12947	44,0	13797	46,9	545	29438	
Ministry of Heavy Industry	5289	763	449	6501	24,0	7869	1448	2538	11855	43,7	8247	30,4	498	27101	
Category I	331	67	28	426	59,4	73	56	69	198	27,6	79	11,0	14	717	
Category II	4958	696	421	6075	23,0	7796	1392	2469	11657	44,2	8168	31,0	484	26384	
Ministry of Light Industry	1161	567	627	2355	9,8	3206	1383	4639	9228	38,3	12501	51,8	27	24111	
Category I	124	98	66	288	35,0	135	107	138	380	46,2	155	18,8	0	823	
Category II	1037	469	561	2067	8,9	3071	1276	4501	8848	38,0	12346	53,0	27	23288	

Management staff of Polish industry in ministries	Higher level of education				Secondary level of education				Below secondary	%	Graduates of technical secondary school	%	Total	
	Technical	Economic and commercial	Other	Total	%	Technical	Economic and commercial	General						Total
Ministry of Agricultural and Food Industry	448	180	253	881	26,4	398	239	950	1587	47,6	869	26,0	0	3337
Category I	41	32	13	86	74,8	4	12	13	29	25,2	0	0,0	0	115
Category II	407	148	240	795	24,7	394	227	937	1558	48,4	869	27,0	0	3222
Total	8313	1899	1763	11975	14,2	15145	4956	15544	35645	42,4	35418	42,1	1071	84109
Category I	558	209	122	889	50,0	214	182	239	635	35,7	238	13,4	15	1777
Category II	7755	1690	1641	11086	13,5	14931	4774	15305	35010	42,5	35180	42,7	1056	82332

Source: see as in table 5.

The first category included: directors and vice directors of departments of ministries, directors of associations and heads of the largest enterprises employing over 1,000 employees. The second category included those employed from the position of foreman to directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees and middle staff in ministries and associations, e.g. heads of departments, inspectors, counsellors. Data in individual categories do not add up to the total number of employees in individual ministries. Numerous errors in summaries in the sources.

Table 7. Party affiliation, social background and age...


Industry ministries	Management staff	Party affiliation								Social	
		PZPR	%	ZSL	%	Other parties	%	Non-partisan	%	Workers	%
Ministry of Heavy Industry	27101	11899	43,9	109	0,4	485	1,8	14608	53,9	15014	55,4
Category I	717	510	71,1	1	0,1	10	1,4	196	27,3	291	40,6
Category II	26384	11389	43,2	108	0,4	475	1,8	14412	54,6	14723	55,8
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees	309	229	74,1	0	0,0	2	0,6	78	25,2	160	51,8
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees	750	478	63,7	5	0,7	12	1,6	255	34,0	363	48,4
Ministry of Mining	29560	13496	45,7	65	0,2	538	1,8	15461	52,3	19592	66,3
Category I	122	83	68,0	2	1,6	2	1,6	35	28,7	40	32,8
Category II	29438	13413	45,6	63	0,2	536	1,8	15426	52,4	19552	66,4
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees	87	56	64,4	2	2,3	2	2,3	27	31,0	27	31,0
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees	521	339	65,1	0	0,0	6	1,2	176	33,8	268	51,4
Ministry of Light Industry	24111	11812	49,0	125	0,5	413	1,7	11761	48,8	15273	63,3
Category I	823	636	77,3	4	0,5	21	2,6	162	19,7	435	52,9
Category II	23288	11176	48,0	121	0,5	392	1,7	11599	49,8	14838	63,7
Ministry of Agricultural and Food Industry	3337	1683	50,4	47	1,4	146	4,4	1461	43,8	1365	40,9
Category I	115	72	62,6	4	3,5	10	8,7	29	25,2	30	26,1
Category II	3222	1611	50,0	43	1,3	136	4,2	1432	44,4	1335	41,4
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees	22	15	68,2	0	0,0	1	4,5	6	27,3	5	22,7
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees	616	414	67,2	7	1,1	38	6,2	157	25,5	244	39,6
Total	84109	38890	46,2	346	0,4	1582	1,9	43291	51,5	51244	60,9
Category I	1777	1301	73,2	11	0,6	43	2,4	422	23,8	796	44,8
Category II	82332	37589	45,7	335	0,4	1539	1,9	42869	52	50448	61,3
Directors of plants with more than 1,000 employees	418	300	71,8	2	0,5	5	1,2	111	26,5	192	45,9
Directors of plants with less than 1,000 employees	1887	1231	65,2	12	0,6	56	3,0	588	31,2	875	46,4

Source: see as in table 5.

...of Polish industry management staff (May 1950)

background						Age									
Peasants	%	Intelligentsia	%	bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie	%	Below 25	%	25-40	%	40-50	%	50-60	%	Above 60	%
3475	12,8	5861	21,6	2751	10,2	2017	7,4	13034	48,1	7269	26,8	3507	12,9	1274	4,7
73	10,2	226	31,5	127	17,7	3	0,4	254	35,4	321	44,8	116	16,2	23	3,2
3402	12,9	5635	21,4	2624	9,9	2014	7,6	12710	48,2	6948	26,3	3391	12,9	1251	4,7
39	12,6	63	20,4	47	15,2	1	0,3	121	39,2	128	41,4	49	15,9	10	3,2
82	10,9	189	25,2	116	15,5	2	0,3	342	45,6	285	38,0	97	12,9	24	3,2
4120	13,9	4982	16,9	866	2,9	2942	10,0	12197	41,3	8953	30,3	4191	14,2	1277	4,3
15	12,3	50	41,0	17	13,9	0	0,0	29	23,8	63	51,6	25	20,5	5	4,1
4105	13,9	4932	16,8	849	2,9	2942	10,0	12168	41,3	8890	30,2	4166	14,2	1272	4,3
8	9,2	40	46,0	12	13,8	0	0,0	16	18,4	46	52,9	21	24,1	4	4,6
98	18,8	127	24,4	28	5,4	0	0,0	134	25,7	251	48,2	106	20,3	30	5,8
3420	14,2	4203	17,4	1215	5,0	2436	10,1	11167	46,3	6656	27,6	2840	11,8	1012	4,2
74	9,0	223	27,1	91	11,1	23	2,8	329	40,0	351	42,6	97	11,8	23	2,8
3346	14,4	3980	17,1	1124	4,8	2413	10,4	10838	46,5	6305	27,1	2743	11,8	989	4,2
478	14,3	1199	35,9	294	8,8	83	2,5	1302	39,0	1110	33,3	608	18,2	234	7,0
10	8,7	62	53,9	13	11,3	0	0,0	26	22,6	59	51,3	26	22,6	4	3,5
468	14,5	1137	35,3	281	8,7	83	2,6	1276	39,6	1051	32,6	582	18,1	230	7,1
2	9,1	11	50,0	4	18,2	0	0,0	5	22,7	13	59,1	3	13,6	1	4,5
87	14,1	199	32,3	86	14,0	5	0,8	231	37,5	234	38,0	107	17,4	39	6,3
11493	13,7	16245	19,3	5126	6,1	7478	8,9	37700	44,8	23988	28,5	11146	13,3	3797	4,5
172	9,7	561	31,6	248	13,9	26	1,5	638	35,9	794	44,7	264	14,9	55	3,1
11321	13,8	15684	19,0	4878	5,9	7452	9,1	36992	44,9	23194	28,2	10882	13,2	3742	4,5
49	11,7	114	27,3	63	15,1	1	0,2	142	34,0	187	44,7	73	17,5	15	3,6
267	14,1	515	27,3	230	12,2	7	0,4	707	37,5	770	40,8	310	16,4	93	4,9

Graph 1. Changes in the composition of directors in the years 1945-1955 (in percent)



Source: Najduchowska, 1974: 252, 256, 258.

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