

Stanisław Jankowiak (*Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland*)

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0900-8685>

jans@amu.edu.pl

SOCIALIST EXPLOITATION OF THE WORKER IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1950S: A CASE STUDY OF THE H. CEGIELSKI INDUSTRY PLANT IN POZNAŃ

Abstract: Building the “foundations of the socialist system” meant intensive industrialization in the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry, which was to be achieved mainly at the expense of the standard of living and working conditions of workers. By adopting unrealistic indicators, political and administrative methods were used to force employees to make more effort, without compensating it with the amount of earnings. Various methods were used: one of the elements of exploitation was low wages, or even the so-called “starvation wages” for some of the workers. The authorities suggested the possibility of increasing them through additional work. In this case, labor competition or long-term production commitments were initiated. On the other hand, the working time needed to produce specific products was administratively shortened, standards were constantly raised, etc. As a result of these activities, the living conditions of employees not only did not improve but even deteriorated. It turned out that the socialist employer is not at all different from the capitalist, and sometimes is even worse than him, because he has a greater range of possibilities of pressure and, in case they resist, of repression. By paying starvation wages, the system kept the rest of the profit earned for its own needs. He was also blind in looking at the real problems, most often looking for a mythical “enemy” or activist party members. Exploited beyond measure, the workers tried in every way to limit this exploitation, hence the abysmal quality of production, huge consumption of materials, widespread waste or simply avoiding work. The party’s methods of activation proved ineffective, which the Poznań workers reminded the authorities of on 28 June 1956 by taking to the streets.

Keywords: competition of work, shock worker, production standards, shirking

<https://doi.org/10.14746/sho.2024.42.2.007>



INTRODUCTION

Exploitation, especially of the so-called “working class” was associated with capitalism, and in the popular consciousness probably still is. It was them, the “bloodsuckers,” who were supposed to maximize their profit at the expense of the hard work and low wages of the workers. In contrast, socialism was supposed to create the best conditions for workers to work and live, maintaining its high standard. As it was written in the manifesto of the Polish Committee for National Liberation, “Workers’ and laborers’ wages, forcibly maintained by the Germans at the pre-war level, will be raised by law to norms ensuring the minimum of existence” (Dz.U. 1944, No. 1, item 1). Although, for the sake of completeness, it should be noted that even more fantastic, in this regard, was the declaration of the Council of National Unity, announcing that the goal of the state’s actions would be the “full liberation of the working man” and that “labor will not be a commodity, the working man will obtain his due dignity, he will be freed from the yoke of mercenaryism, [labor] will cease to be a manifestation of man’s power over man” (*‘Deklaracja Rady...’, 1989*).

After the liberation, a new system began to be built on the premise that it was better than the previous one. In practice, however, things turned out to be different, and the exploitation of workers did not disappear. The official justification for such a policy was the vision of current hard work to build a future system of happiness and prosperity for all.

The purpose of this article is not to discuss the assumptions of the communist authorities that were aimed at maximizing the exploitation of the “working class.” The article rather wants to show how the assumptions of the central authorities in the policy towards the workers translated into the operation of one of the country’s key and largest industrial plants in Greater Poland: The Hipolit Cegielski Industrial Plant called the J. Stalin Poznań Metal Industry Plant (Polish Acronym: ZISPO) since 1949. It is a topic already with its own rather rich literature (cf. Frużyński, 2008; Tracz, 2008; Wilk, 2011; Chumiński, 2008; 2015). To what extent were the directives implemented and what the consequences of these actions were in the clash with the Greater Poland tradition of good work, not to mention good pay? This tradition distinguished the Cegielski Industrial Plant from the rest of the country, al-

though many elements of the policy were universal. It is also important to ask to what extent the management and crew themselves tried to adapt to existing realities, and how far they tried to defend themselves against exploitation. Finally, whether these measures had the effect expected by the authorities or whether they turned out to be an illusion. The system created by the communist authorities, in the most varied but reasonably consistent ways, fostered the comprehensive exploitation of workers.

The elimination of political opposition in 1947, coupled with the international situation precluding the shifting of the boundaries of socialism to Western Europe, allowed the communists to begin work on charting a new perspective for socialist construction in Poland. When embarking on the development of a new perennial, this time a 6-year plan to build the foundations of socialism in Poland, Hilary Minc declared that its implementation would lead to a 60% increase in the living standards of the population and a 40% increase in workers' wages. Such a vision was to encourage workers to work, as the plan called for a significant 66% increase in industrial productivity. At the same time, Minc pointed out that these were minimum figures since the experience of the USSR teaches that higher rates will be achievable in practice (Minc, 1950: 64).

Ambitious goals, though one should say unrealistic from the beginning, were attempted in various ways. It was obvious that the enthusiasm of the reconstruction period could not be sustained in the long run (cf. Ślabek, 2004: 220 et seq.), and therefore the commitment of workers to work, without appropriate incentives, would diminish. All the more so because postwar labor productivity differed significantly from prewar productivity. The plan was, therefore, to reach for unconventional methods of activating, or rather exploiting, workers. To this end, an entire, interconnected system was created. The main elements for accomplishing this task were very low wages, insufficient to survive a month, which was supposed to force people to seek additional earnings and also constantly updated labor standards. Another form of activation was the labor race.

LABOR COMPETITION IN THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The widely promoted labor competition became an important element in mobilizing crews to increase their efforts. The classics of Marxism, headed by Stalin, of course, considered it a lever "through which the working class is called upon to bring about a revolution in the entire economic and cultural life of the country based on socialism" (Lenin and Stalin, 1951: 71). Labor in socialism, played, at least in theory, a huge role beyond the economic framework. It was supposed to develop feelings of satisfaction at participating in the process of production and the joy of creativity. These feelings were expected to build new social bonds (Szczzerba, 1961: 12). Many statements by political activists in particular, although previously also by historians, glorified labor competition. It was pointed out that the movement was created immediately after "liberation" and "was the result of creative enthusiasm from the recovery of independence and an unwavering will to build a new, socialist Poland" (Gałęczka, 1970: 7). Of course, the idea itself did not originate in Poland, but in the USSR (Wilk, 2011: 19-26; Leśniewski, 1970). In an attempt to define the concept itself, it was pointed out that "socialist labor competition links the individual's ambitions with the general social goals and the satisfaction of one's contribution to the general social-economic process" (*'Współzawodnictwo pracy'*, 1962). Of course, an essential element of this process was, or ought to have been, the growth of the worker's consciousness, conditioning his commitment to his work, or, as the ideologists wanted, "the formation of a new socialist attitude to work." It was in this task that the important role of labor competition was seen (Kotlarz, 1970). Extremely pathetically, Eugeniusz Szyr wrote about competition, claiming that thanks to it "the ordinary worker, the manual worker, ceases to be, as in the capitalist system, an accessory to the machine, a blind performer of the production task, but becomes a revolutionary of labor, a guide, a pioneer of progress, and labor competition itself became one of the essential elements of socialist, state planning of the national economy" (Szyr, 1949).

In the first post-war period, the authors distinguished two phases in the functioning of labor competition. The first lasted from 1946 to 1947, when it was not yet included in a strict organizational framework. During this period, competition was nationwide for individual plants. At that stage, it was difficult to imagine the introduction of such rules throughout the economy. Political opposition was still strong, and the domestic

situation aroused public discontent. (Chumiński, 1999: 258 et seq.; Wilk, 2011: 51). On a broader scale, a form of competition was the Youth Labor Race, which was initiated in this period (for more details, see Wilk, 2011: 52–66). Competition took on a new dimension after the initiative of a miner Wincenty Pstrowski, who, having achieved 260% of the norm in July 1947, called on other miners to compete (Roszko, 1975; Frużyński, 2008: 14; Wilk, 2011: 67; Chumiński, 2023, et seq.). Official propaganda disseminated images of “labor leaders” as an example of a socialist approach to work. Despite this, the movement developed relatively slowly, but over time, as a result of top-down pressure, individual factories and, of necessity, entire industries joined the movement. In the opinion of H. Wilk, the very idea of competition was rather rooted in pragmatism, since the Polish economy in the postwar period required a significant increase in labor productivity (Wilk, 2011: 77). However, the apparent spontaneity in this regard was short-lived. In the following period, the movement was put into a meticulous organizational framework. As H. Minc stated, “Our Party matured in time the initiative of the irreverent memory of the late Wincenty Pstrowski, sustained it, and helped the socialist labor competition movement to develop more rapidly in its first stage” (Minc, 1951a: 3). Until 1954, the issue of competition, obviously dictated by the PZPR, was dealt with by the trade unions and the Union of Polish Youth. Legal regulations appeared in 1954, when the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on competition, based on collective agreements (Nicki, 1968: 12; Wilk, 2011: 12).

The beginnings of a full-scale movement can be sought at the end of 1948, for at that time, to commemorate the unification congress of the Polish Workers’ Party and the Polish Socialist Party, plant crews were mobilized to make production commitments. In subsequent years, such initiatives appeared on various occasions. Another form, though with the same goal, was the so-called pre-convention relay before the Second Congress of the PZPR. Here, too, the aim was to encourage/force workers to declare additional work, while it should be stressed that these tasks completely disregarded the realities. Beginning in 1955, a new phenomenon emerged – competition between plants, ministries, and industries for the passing banner. This period was relatively short-lived because, after the changes that took place in Poland in 1956, the movement of competition declined significantly.

The authorities, however, tried to mobilize workers in various ways. In 1949, the Council of Ministers established the badge of Labor Conductor

and Meritorious Labor Conductor (M.P. 1949, No. 46, item 626). A Library of Workers' Conductors was even established to raise awareness among the crews.

Heavy industry played a special role in the Polish economy at the time. The title problems will be discussed using the example of the largest industrial plant in Greater Poland – the Hipolit Cegielski Plant, called the J. Stalin Poznań Metal Industry Plant (ZISPO) since 1949.

LABOR COMPETITION AT THE CEGIELSKI INDUSTRY PLANT

At the Cegielski Plant, labor competition on a wider scale appeared following the earlier mentioned Pstrowski's appeal in late 1947. The turner Mieczysław Łykowski was its initiator. His goal was to exceed the standard set out by Pstrowski. In April 1948, he worked out 708% of the norm, setting a new record in Poland. However, the record was quickly broken by another worker from Cegielski – Czesław Michałek – in December 1948, who earned 769% of the norm to celebrate the unification of the working class. (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Protocol No. 14). At this stage, however, it was not a mass movement. From the beginning of 1948, only 29 workers from the Machine Tool Factory joined the action, then, afterward, others joined from individual plants. The campaign was conducted monthly in stages. A Labor Competition Committee was established to coordinate and promote competition at the plant. Political pressure caused the number of participants to grow slowly, despite some resistance. By 1949 it had already exceeded 3,000 people, and by 1950 the move had already covered a large part of the workforce. However, these were mainly pieceworkers, for whom greater production meant higher wages. In the second half of 1949, the KWP drew up regulations for competition. On this occasion, standards were revised top-down and a new wage system was introduced. In the third quarter of 1950, 6251 out of 13,276 workers joined the competition, including 1,029 day laborers and even 958 white-collar workers. The average achievement of norms increased significantly in the second half of 1950, although individual factories had already exceeded them by 20 to 50% at the start. This was due to the difficult material situation of the employees, and exceeding the norms meant a slight improvement in material conditions. In individual quarters of 1950, rewards totaling PLN

1.2 million per quarter were paid out on this account. The winners also received bicycles, payments on PKO books, vouchers for goods to about 8 to 20 thousand zlotys, and 7 employees received Tesla radios. On May 1, two employees received sets of books, and 1 leading woman received a voucher of material for a costume, three employees received an allocation of holidays in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A form of encouragement was the widely promoted concern for shock workers, who, in the official propaganda, received special rewards, housing allocations, sanatorium treatment, priority in the admission of children to special schools or professional promotions. In cooperation with "Polish Film," even a propaganda program was filmed with the participation of the shock workers, which was then screened in Poznań cinemas. In 1950, pictures of shock workers were placed in company display cases. In this way, efforts were made to widely promote the idea of competition by encouraging other workers. To this end, the plant cooperated with *Gazeta Poznańska* – the organ of the Provincial Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party – and *Ekspres Poznański*. Both newspapers promoted the idea of competition almost daily. The plant newspaper *Stalinowska Warta* (later *Na Stalinowskiej Warcie*) also came out at HCP. Banners, slogans and charts were ubiquitous throughout the plant.

After some spontaneity in the movement, there were changes toward the introduction of permanent competition. In 1950, the process of making long-term commitments began at the plant. Initially, only a few workers decided to do so (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 1 I 1950). During the period of total centralization of activity, official structures were created to initiate and control workers' activity. Chairmen of individual competition sections were appointed in the plants, but they were not very active. Even information dissemination about the action was poor. To make matters worse, even members of the competition committees did not show much initiative and did not attend the organized meetings. This was partly the result of the selection rule. There were not many people willing to participate, so those already involved in the functioning of various other bodies were selected. Interest in the crews themselves was weak, hence the work of the committees, as the report said, was "campaign-like," becoming active only on occasions of important events. There were also cases where the committee chairman did not want to accept declarations from those willing to do so, because in the opinion of the rest of the crew they were making too high a percentage of the norm, which would reflect on the performance evaluation of the others.

There were also new ideas to broaden the scope of competition. In March 1950, the crew of the "Ursus" Mechanical Plant in Gorzów proposed a ZISPO competition under the slogan "one day without shortages." The relevant agreement was signed on April 6. It was to last until the end of September. Interestingly, it was already realized at the onset that the slogan could not be fully implemented, as it was "adopted from a theoretical premise, which, however, could not be applied in practice. The competing factories understand that in every factory or plant such shortages arise and bring enormous losses to the Plants and the People's State" (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950).

After a period of campaigning, party authorities tried to give the movement a more organized character. Hence the emergence of the idea of long-term competition. The goal of such activities was to shorten the implementation of the 6-year plan to 5 years, accelerate the construction of socialism, and achieve general prosperity as soon as possible. Thus, it was decided to prepare specific production tasks for each worker for longer periods (even 6 years). Accordingly, it was postulated that "the entire production life should be geared towards long-term competition." (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950). Of course, serious formal difficulties arose in accounting for effects, since different products with different labor input were made in different factories, so it was impossible to compare results in pieces. Thus, normo-hours were introduced (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950). The movement itself continued to function in an action-oriented manner, and there were no guidelines for accounting for results or instructions on how to conduct competition (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 48/51).

From April 1, 1951, a new competition regulation was introduced at ZISPO, involving the acceptance of production commitments. The occasion was the acceptance of pledges for the May 1 holiday. However, the change caused a decline in interest in this form of competition. This was because workers were afraid of accepting them (which they signed), wondering what would happen if they did not perform them. They also feared that optimistic assumptions might fail due to objective factors (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 5/51). As it was stated during the deliberations of the Executive Committee of the KW PZPR, "the Union's District Board did not grasp the transition from regulation competition to obligation competition in the right period" (APP, KW PZPR, 279: Protocol No. 12). At ZISPO, the situation was worst at the Steam Locomotive Factory, where the lists of co-competitions sent out to be filled out with

declarations came back empty, as none of the workers wanted to accept the commitments. The campaign began on March 10 and by April 1 they had managed to get 169 workers, which meant a drop of 89% from the previous period (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 1 I 1950). Even the leadership of the company's party organization admitted to certain patterns of action on the issue. Even the union representatives took a weak interest in the matter. There was a shortage of funds for visual propaganda, but, worse, also for rewarding outstanding employees, making high standards in competition (APP, KW PZPR, 279: Protocol No. 12). There were also widespread complaints about the new rules. Even regulations to explain them to workers were missing for several months. This was all the more important as six months had already passed since their introduction. Methods to solve the problem were traditionally sought in meetings, guidelines, inspections, and political mobilization. "It is necessary to gather all the union assets, foremen, and masters. The councilmen at their groups must discuss more and give guidelines, pay more attention to the women's section, take more care of them, as you can see that they have enthusiasm for their work" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 7/51). Twice a month, briefings were held for competition instructors, at which they were acquainted with party guidelines. A special role fell, of course, to the company's party organization, which was to mobilize its assets and, through party groups, agitators, and speakers, in "the right way to rock the work in this section." Speaking of salaries, it was emphasized, by the way, that this should be done "without any cronyism" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 7/51). This confirmed that such phenomena were present at the plant, which certainly did not encourage involvement in the movement. Despite the efforts made at ZISPO, only 23% of the workforce participated in the competition. (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol 7 IV 1951). Thus, it was decided that the Competition Committee was working poorly and should be changed. The new one was to consist of the chairman of the Branch Council, a POP representative, a representative of the Technology and Rationalization Club, a shock worker, a member of the ZMP, and a member of the Women's Council (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 1 I 1950).

The beginning of 1951 brought unexpected changes in economic policy. H. Minc, assessing the execution of the first year of the plan, considered that success had been achieved, exceeding the accepted indicators. In his opinion, this confirmed the validity of the criticism of the so-called "fading curve theory", which proclaims that a rapid pace of

development is possible only during the initial period of reconstruction. As he stressed, "Life has mercilessly smashed these erroneous and harmful views alien to our party." He therefore drew the conclusion that the methods of "cautious" planning must be ended. For "only with taut tasks, taut and mobilizing plans, is it possible to achieve the results and pace of development needed by our economy on its path toward socialism" (Minc, 1951b: 77-78). This did not herald a brighter future for workers, production rates were being increased, so the pressure for greater productivity increased.

The changes combined with top-down pressure gradually bore fruit, and in the first quarter of 1951 40% of the workforce was already participating in the competition, and a year later up to 90%. Official reports attributed this significant increase to greater awareness and, consequently, greater involvement of the crew (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 40: Report 14 I 1953; APP, KW PZPR, 279: Evaluation). This was, of course, the propaganda version. The practice was somewhat different, and the competition was lame. A serious reason for the irregularity in competition, among others, was anniversary acumen and "storminess." At ZISPO, a labor competition was called for to celebrate the 60th birthday of B. Bierut (a production value of 8240 thousand zlotys was declared). On the occasion of May 1, 1950, the crew declared to work out an additional 42 million zlotys. Similar commitments were made on the anniversary of the establishment of the PKWN (8.6 million zlotys), the anniversary of the October Revolution (58 million zlotys) (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Bulletin 21 III 1952), the Constitutional Relay (4,183 thousand), the 19th Congress of the CPSU (37 million zlotys.), elections to the Sejm, the Second Congress of Defenders of Peace, etc. Even on March 8, women were to celebrate their holiday with intensified efforts (Jankowiak, 1992: 75). The approaching 34th anniversary of the October Revolution was an opportunity to implement the arrangements made. Thus, the Branch Councils held meetings to formulate the rules for carrying out the tasks. Committees were set up in the departments to monitor the implementation of the commitments. The first declarations appeared as early as the beginning of October. In the following days, mass meetings were held at the various departments where pledges were made. (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Report 7 XI 1951). In 1952 alone, liabilities at ZISPO totaled more than 57 million zlotys (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 40: Report 1952). In 1952, the party mobilized the workforce as many as nine times. This ensured a relative continuity of pledges, which was treated politically as a sign of competition. This made itself

known to both parties during a meeting of the PZPR factory executive in February 1954. The relay issue was raised at the meeting. The present representative of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party proposed activating the crew, especially the W-3, hinting that here there were the greatest opportunities, and therefore if 15 wagons were made in February then more, e.g. thirty, should be given in March. This was surprising since in early 1954 it was the W-3 that was not executing production plans. Despite this, 60% of the crew made commitments at this department (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 42: Protocol 9 II 1954).

Officially, at the request of the Cegielski crew, competition with other factories was also undertaken. In 1948, the "Wagmo" plant from Zielona Góra became their partner. The rivalry was won by Zielona Góra. The following year, the idea came up again. This time, to commemorate the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution competing with the Wrocław "Pafawag". Unfortunately for Cegielski, this competition also ended in defeat (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Protocol No. 14).

Another attempt to increase the effort of the staff was the competition between plants for production quality. In this category, Cegielski competed with "Fablok" from Chrzanów and "Konstal" from Chorzów. A special section was established for this purpose, headed by Director Pawlikowski. The effect was poor. As written in the report, "The above section, apart from the dead report sent to 'Tasko', did not show any viability. It did not work on any propaganda in this direction, did not hold monthly meetings", its members did not even show up to tally the results. Officially, ZISPO came second in this competition (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Report 1 I 1950). From 31 March 1950, it competed with "Huta Zygmunt" (a smelter plant).

Life quickly verified the megalomania of the central planner, and, thus, the forms of crew activation. In 1951, ZISPO had problems with the implementation of the production plan, nevertheless, the causes of the crisis were not understood. In the party's recipe, one of the elements of improving the situation was, of course, the intensification of competition. As it was loudly declared during the meeting of the executive of the KW PZPR, "On the basis of competition, the reserves that are still hidden until then should be revealed to us" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Protocol No. 46/52).

The party, therefore, obliged its activists to introduce competition even among engineering and technical personnel to make technical progress (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Resolution 27 XI 1952). The functioning of the

plant took place in a kind of matrix. On the one hand, optimistic reporting flourished. Formally, at the beginning of 1952, more than half of the staff declared production commitments in writing. However, the audit showed that a large part of this was illegible, it was difficult to determine who declared what liabilities (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Bulletin 21 III 1952).

Despite political motivations and the involvement of party authorities in this movement, the reality differed from the official image that was realized in the KW PZPR. During the discussion on this topic, it was emphasized that "the competition of work at J. Stalin Plant was at the very end with other factories. There was an artificial, deliberate inhibition of competition" (APP, KW PZPR, 258: Protocol No. 22). The workers also tried to defend themselves against this form of exploitation of the crew (APP, KW PZPR, 279: Protocol No 12). Competition weakened significantly in the period after Stalin's death and the emergence of a certain thaw after the Second Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1954. As a result, until 1956, this subject no longer appeared during provincial and factory meetings of party bodies. This was the result of poor outcomes with a huge involvement of party structures. The competition was not popular among the crew. Organizing record-breaking could only be annoying, because such "volunteers" were organized to work, ensuring an uninterrupted supply of raw materials and resources, while the rest of the crew waited for the delivery of parts and semi-finished products. In addition, their performance was becoming the basis for raising standards, which had the effect of lowering wages.

The competition had many negative sides, likewise for the functioning of the company. By focusing on quantity, quality became lost. Already in 1950, the authorities were aware of this. As it was written in the report, "Unfortunately, it must be stated that most of our products are far from the drawing board in terms of workmanship. And the objects after the final grinding treatment, although they have dimensions within the tolerances given in the drawing, their surface does not correspond to the marks of machining, as a result of which the service life of such parts [...] is very limited" (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950; Jankowiak, 1992: 75).

Summing up the effects of the competition as early as 1950, it was pointed out that the staff treated them as exploitation of the workers. However, the recipe was only ideological. It was decided to "increase the revolutionary vigilance of party members against hostile propaganda".

However, even then it was also recognized that delays in the delivery of raw materials and production materials made competition a fiction. In addition, some of the materials provided did not meet the prescribed standards (APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950).

After an initial period of enthusiasm, the competition was sharply criticized by the workers themselves, who quickly understood that it was one of the forms of exploitation and that it did not yield the expected results. For the authorities, the reward for the additional effort was to be, above all, the satisfaction of the workers who were themselves working for the common good in the new system. Meanwhile, the difficult financial situation meant that they expected specific benefits to improve their lives. The authorities treated this as “whispers of the enemy, or sabotage aimed at the collapse of the movement, inspired, of course, by the imperialists” (Chumiński, 2008: 38 ff.).

Initially, the ideas of the headquarters did not arouse active counteraction among the workforce, which was the result of the rampant terror. The authorities treated each failure as sabotage and looked for the guilty ones. It was only during the thaw that elements of resistance appeared. In 1955, the crew refused to accept the production plan for that year. Interestingly, a committee came to the plant from the headquarters and agreed with the chief engineer of ZISPO, who confirmed that the plan could not be carried out, because it would not be possible to provide sufficient material for production (APP, KW PZPR, 311: Protocol No. 4). In the following months, the actions of the authorities were criticized more and more boldly. This was evident during the discussion on the assumptions of the new long-term plan (1956–1960). The ZISPO crew submitted several thousand corrections and comments on it. At this stage, however, no one initiated the idea of activating workers through competition.

LABOR NORMS

Another form of exploitation of workers was the cyclical updating of norms. Attempts to introduce work standards in the post-war period encountered serious obstacles. In the ideological analysis of this phenomenon, it was emphasized that „the action of normalizing work took place in a fierce struggle against capitalist traditions and the opportunism of part

of the industrial administration and the backwardness of some sections of the working class" (APP, KW PZPR, 266: Protocol No. 11). The transition to the stage of „building socialism" changed the situation and, in the party's opinion, the old norms began to inhibit the growth of productivity. Therefore, at the expense of the implementation of the 6-year plan, a revision of labor standards is planned. Such a task was already mentioned by H. Minc in his speech when the plan was adopted. He then argued with those who advocated against taking such actions. He emphasized that some comrades „treat the revision of norms as an unpleasant operation that should be avoided as much as possible, which should be postponed and delayed, and which can only be undertaken when there is no other way out." In his opinion, the increase in productivity was to be achieved through a systematic revision of the norms (Minc, 1950: 69). In 1950, standards in the metal industry were revised, which, in the opinion of the authorities, contributed to the disclosure of existing reserves. This was followed by an update of the standards in ZISPO in October 1950, which in practice meant an increase of 15 to 30%, where 19.5% was the average indicator for the entire plant. The reaction of the crew was different. Employees of the Casting Factory protested against the update. Its director stated directly that the changes are not made by the management of the plant, but by „top-down factors", and the adopted indicators are too high, taking into account the difficult working conditions in the factory. It was obvious that the authorities would not analyze the factual arguments. However, it was considered that the „non-political" speech of the director of the Pelczarski Casting Factory leaves „much to be desired" and more attention should be paid to him. On the other hand, the political assessment of such an attitude was harsh. Of course, during the discussion, some employees approached the problem „with understanding", recognizing that the existing standards were outdated. Nevertheless, there were also critical voices. It was emphasized that the new standards are an invention of those masters who earn less per month and do not want workers to earn more than them. However, to convince the staff, it was postulated that an appropriate propaganda action should be taken by selected agitators, justifying the rightness of the changes made (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Protocol 13 X 1950). At the same time, it was not considered that, depending on the employee's talents, some people exceeded the standards, and others could not meet them. Besides, party prescriptions were deeply rooted in the system. "In a ward where we have strict standards that are difficult to implement, organizational and technical measures can be applied that make the

standards easy to implement. In a ward where they are weak – they can always be exacerbated” (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Protocol 13 X 1950).

Meanwhile, the execution of the plan, especially with the standards raised, was, for various reasons, unrealistic from the beginning, as was realized. The production plan at ZISPO was developed based on incomplete data. For example, the standards for producing wagons were established without analyzing drawings and technical documentation. The design of the export wagons was unknown (it was assumed that 15,000 hours per unit to make a wagon, when, in fact, the first wagon consumed 40,000 hours, for the next 10 – 31 thousand hours each. Only in the second series did the number drop to 25 thousand; APP, KW PZPR, 258: Protocol No. 22).

Another change in the standards occurred in 1953. Interestingly, even the party authorities were aware from the very beginning that their implementation would not be easy (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 41, Protocol No. 73, 26 June 1953). The prescription was simple, rooted in the logic of the system: it was suggested that the attitude of reluctant people should be overcome. Interestingly, there were also critical voices. It was said that 60% of the staff was not familiar with the new standards. Even some masters considered the new standards as “additional torment”. The Soviet experience was, particularly, criticized (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 41: Protocol No. 73).

Raising the standards caused additional problems. Some employees were not able to perform them for various reasons. In addition, there have been suggestions that employees who exceed 130% of the standards will have their results cut. Therefore, falsification of data was common. Even the factory authorities understood that the workers lied in their reports declaring higher earnings than it was. The situation was even worse in the middle of the year. For instance, the situation on W-2 and W-3 was the worst, because there was a shortage of materials for production, so even with the involvement of the entire crew it was still difficult to meet the new standards. As a result, not fewer than half of the staff lost at least 25% of their salaries. At the locksmith shop, the decline exceeded 46% hence the decrease in execution. Before the update, the workers made 300% of the norm, but after the update, 20% of the workforce made 110% (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 41: Protocol No. 76). It is not difficult to understand how such a situation affected the crew’s morale.

Another way to intensify the crew’s effort was to reduce the work time necessary to perform individual activities. In September 1950, some of the labor leaders, inspired by the party, initiated such activities. At ZISPO, a

9th-time foreman initiated a reduction of the time duration for making a product from 480 to 260 minutes. His example was followed by other workers (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Report 1 I 1950). This form of "savings" has brought disastrous effects. Employees looking for time savings removed the protections from the machines to protect them from injuries. As a result, the accident rate increased rapidly (Jankowiak, 1992: 76).

LOW WAGES AS A MOTIVATION TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY

The wage system was the most important element of the systematic exploitation of workers. In this case, wages were already supposed to be low. Their amount was the result of the principles adopted in the system. As the activists of the Polish United Workers' Party explained, the goal of the factory owner, in capitalism, was to maximize profit. The worker, thus, received only a part of the value of his work. In contrast, socialism emphasizes that the worker receives the full value of the production performed. This was, of course, simply a theory, because he received only part of this amount in cash, while the rest, as argued, was in the form of various social benefits. The remaining portion under socialist accumulation was for investment purposes. Officially, the views that a man's salary should be enough to support his family were also ridiculed. In this case, it was not only about forcing a greater productive effort but also about forcing women to work, to weaken the influence of the family on the education of the youth. Improved income did not bring better work either. It was argued that the erroneous notion that an increase in the productivity of labor must always be accompanied by an equal or greater increase in wages must be put to an end, as this contradicted the "fundamental laws of socialist accumulation". Slower wage growth was essential for reducing personal costs, which would allow for an increase in accumulation for investment needs. The planned results of the reduction of personal costs throughout the 6-year plan in the entire economy were calculated at PLN 3 trillion, which accounted for half of the costs of the planned investments (Minc, 1950: 70).

The significant increase in production and labor productivity officially planned by the communists was, therefore, not intended to be compen-

sated by a rise in real wages. The first wage "regulations" appeared at the beginning of 1949 in the form of a new collective agreement. In January of the following year, this did not raise any serious objections, because "the grading campaign is still taking place, so the workers do not yet know exactly how much they will earn". Wage increases of 20% were widely expected (APP, KW PZPR, 248: Protocol 19 I 1949). In this spirit, the new system was discussed by the management of the factories. The action of familiarizing the staff with the new wage system encountered serious obstacles. In practice, it turned out that it meant significant salary reductions for a large part of the staff. Even in party reports, it was admitted that the mood in the factories was not very good, and there were even "demagogic speeches such as: how can I bring up five children on this salary" (APP, KW PZPR, 248: Protocol 19 I 1949). In addition, the money exchange carried out in 1950, combined with new wage regulations, caused a lot of chaos in factories. The pursuit of quantitative production indicators completely ignored production costs. One of the elements of this process was a huge number of overtime hours with constant non-use of statutory working time (APP, KW PZPR, 266: Protocol No. 10, 21 III 1951.).

Not all workers were paid according to the number of products made. "A group of so-called standardized employees received remuneration depending on the rigid classification to a given group" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 20 IV 1951). In addition, the relatively high liquidity of staff meant that newly hired employees did not receive the same hourly rates as in previous plants. What is more, it was realized that this was also due to the reluctance of the management of individual ZISPO wards. The result was large differences in salaries, e.g. in 1951 an employee of the Steam Locomotive Factory earned 650 zlotys and a foreman 1200 zlotys (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 3/51). The situation of the workers was partially salvaged by numerous overtime. This phenomenon took on such proportions that it was considered a plague. At the same time, however, overtime was treated as a form of equalizing wages. The workers were also accustomed to the fact that, due to the arrhythmicity of production, deliveries of materials and parts appeared in the third decade of the month, and the plan had to be carried out "at all costs", hence the consent to enormous overtime (APP, KW PZPR, 311: Protocol No. 4). Despite the real commitment and increase in productivity, wages in ZISPO did not increase. Workers' wages even began to decrease from the second half of 1955, because the progressive bonus was abolished. This especially affected those who significantly exceeded the norms. It was to be, accord-

ing to political assumptions, a bottom-up initiative of the workers themselves. However, under the conditions of the time, such actions did not bring the expected results, and the bonus was withdrawn administratively (Makowski, 2000: 29). For this reason, 4646 workers in ZISPO, which is 75% of piecework workers, at some time lost a significant part of their salary. Additionally, as a result of incorrect tax calculation, about 5 thousand ZISPO employees lost over PLN 11 million. Wages were particularly low in W-3, where 312 workers earned 500 zlotys and as many as 2386 workers earned less than 900 zlotys (Makowski, 2000: 29; APP, KW PZPR, 324: Protocol No. 17). The phenomenon of "starvation wages" accompanied the workers throughout the entire period of the implementation of the 6-year plan and was one of the reasons for the revolt in 1956.

ATTEMPTS AT DEFENSE

One of the forms of defense against exploitation was the resistance of the staff, which translated into the functioning of the plant. Despite formally strict rigors and frequent inspections in the plant, work discipline was failing (Chumiński, 2015: 247 ff.). A kind of norm was the falsification of clock cards, documents justifying absent employees were falsified, and latenesses were not recorded. In 1950, the number of unjustified hours decreased, but only from 15,000 to 12,000. The number of sick leaves was also growing alarmingly, and the management of the plant was aware that many of them were unauthorized. Respect for work was rapidly declining and the workers tried in every way to save their strength. This was reflected in the quality of production, but even foremen and masters tolerated the shirking. The situation was to be improved by the introduction of the Act of 19 April 1950 on socialist labor discipline (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol 7 IV 1951). Therefore, the party and the trade unions faced new tasks (APP, KW PZPR, 262: Protocol No. 46). In the guidelines addressed to individual plants, the KW emphasized that various variants should be used in the fight for improvement. One of them was the "repressive element" – the prosecutor's office was granted the right to inspect the plants. It was also necessary to conduct awareness work. Strict supervision was to be the key to improvement. In 1950 alone, four control actions were carried out in ZISPO: in June, August,

September, and October. The recommendations formulated by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party also multiplied. However, the adoption of the assumptions did not translate into the reality of the company. Once a month, briefings were organized, during which they were instructed on how to fight for the improvement of the situation. However, this was just theory; in practice, such meetings were not held regularly. Neglect of duties was still quite common. There were cases of employees being caught sleeping on duty. Falsification of clock cards and medical certificates was still a constant problem. This mainly concerned women. The reason was not always illness, because people on sick leave were often seen in the city. Therefore, repressions were formally tightened. In cases of repeated misconduct, the case was taken to court. However, even the party authorities observed that it was pointless to refer these cases to court. The courts decided that women were needed in the plant, and those punished would be fired from work. The staff employed in the control unit was also poorly interested in the activities. According to members of the executive of the HCP PAC, "the staff employed in this section are people who are only concerned with dealing with purely paperwork matters, without looking into and analyzing the increase or decrease in lost hours. They look indifferently at all this, satisfied that the working hours are flowing quickly" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Protocol No. 24/51). The methods of stigmatizing those who evade work were also not effective. When creating visual propaganda, it was limited to placing a few photographs of "notorious shirkers" in showcases. However, this was a weak punishment since at the same time those who did not miss a single day of work for the entire year were not rewarded (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Protocol No. 24/51).

In 1951, an unconventional form of stigmatizing shirkers appeared. They were paid salaries at a specially marked table. However, even this did not bring the expected results. Some workers even complained that shirkers were paid salaries at decorated tables, making heroes out of them, and good employees were not recognized. Therefore, it was suggested that such tables should be called the shirkers' cash register and painted black (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Protocol No. 43/52). Party activists explained the phenomenon by the legacy of the past. They stressed that despite the many years of building socialism, "we still have many remnants and trappings of the old bourgeois system and the legacy of the occupation times" (APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Report 8 XII 1952). Alcohol abuse was also a common problem. The fight was difficult in this area as well. Although

several people were dismissed from work for drunkenness, a dozen or so people were reprimanded or transferred to another position. This, however, did not reduce the scale of drunkenness. The employees knew they would be needed to implement the plan, therefore, the repressions could not be too severe. Nevertheless, drinking alcohol was common. Cases of theft were also quite common.

During the first half of the 1950s, the system was focused on various forms of forcing workers to make extra effort, without compensating for this with an increase in wages and hence an increase in their standard of living (Chumiński, 2015: 216–223). From the onset, the tasks scheduled were unrealistic and focused only on multiplying production at the lowest possible cost. Possible benefits that were declared on this account turned out to be fictitious. The form of reward was symbolic, because several people from plants that employ several thousand employees, were qualified for the awards. The allocation of domestic or foreign holidays for several people is symbolic here. It is also difficult to imagine that the workers were happy with the book awards they received for their work. Workers in Poznań who were exploited in this way became less and less involved in production activities and used all opportunities to protect themselves from further exploitation. When all forms of legal struggle for the improvement of life ended, they decided to rebel and take to the streets. The summary of the whole period was a meeting of the executive of the KW PZPR after the Poznań June. In looking for reasons for the outbreak of the revolt, many elements of faulty policy were pointed to. Plans at ZISPO, as at other plants, increased annually. "Enthralled by the growth of production and its execution, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that this growth is being carried out in many workplaces predominantly through the efforts of workers," that is, through the 1953 revision of standards in 1953, the 1954 revision of standards and the 1955 revision of positions. Revision of the standards was also scheduled for early 1956 but was abandoned as a result of the already evident dissatisfaction of the workforce (APP, KW PZPR, 324: Protocol No. 17).

During the Poznań revolt, the workers wrote slogans on their banners: "Bread" and "freedom," commenting most fully on the economic and social policies of the past five years. At the same time, the situation at ZISPO was no different from other plants in the country. Large workplaces and their crews, subjected to top-down party pressure, reached for various forms of defense. However, only the ZISPO crew decided to go on strike, followed by other Poznań workplaces.

Stanisław Jankowiak, full professor, employed at the Faculty of History of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, head of the Department of Contemporary History, President of the board of Societas Archivi Posnaniensis. Area of interest: contemporary history of Poland, with particular emphasis on the "Polish months", Poznań June, March 68, Stalinism, Polish-German relations, state-Church relations in the Polish People's Republic, and national minorities after World War II.

REFERENCES

Archival materials

- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Protocol 13 X 1950 – Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Komitet Zakładowy Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Hipolit Cegielski Poznań, sygn. 36: *Protokół z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR ZISPO z dnia 13 X 1950 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 36: Report 1 I 1950 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 36: *Sprawozdanie z działalności Komitetu zakładowego Współzawodnictwa Pracy przy Radzie Zakładowej Przemysłu Metalowego im. J. Stalina w Poznaniu od 1 stycznia 1950 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 3/51 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Protokół nr 3/51 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR „ZISPO” z dnia 15 V 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 5/51 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Protokół nr 5/51 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR „ZISPO” z dnia 25 V 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 7/51 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Protokół nr 7/51 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR „ZISPO” z dnia 8 VI 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol No. 48/51 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Protokół nr 48/51 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Komitetu zakładowego PZPR ZISPO w dniu 30 III 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Protocol 7 IV 1951 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Protokół z posiedzenia egzekutywy Komitetu Zakładowego PZPR ZISPO z dnia 7 IV 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 20 VI 1951 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Sprawozdanie z posiedzenia KZ PZPR HCP z dnia 20 VI 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 1 I 1950 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Sprawozdanie z działalności Komitetu Zakładowego Współzawodnictwa Pracy przy Radzie Zakładowej Przemysłu Metalowego im. J. Stalina w Poznaniu od 1 stycznia 1950 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 37: Report 6 VI 1951 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 37: *Sprawozdanie Przewodniczącego Komitetu Zakładowego Współzawodnictwa Pracy przy Radzie Zakładowej, 6 VI 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Report 7 XI 1951 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 38: *Sprawozdanie Przewodniczącego Komisji Współzawodnictwa Pracy przy Radzie Zakładowej z podjętych i wykonanych zobowiązań 34 rocznicy Wielkiej Rewolucji Październikowej, 7 XI 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Protocol No. 24/51 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 38: *Protokół nr 24/51 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR „ZISPO” z dnia 19 X 1951 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 38: Resolution 27 XI 1952 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 38: *Uchwała z zebrania poszerzonego Komitetu Zakładowego PZPR w dniu 27 XI 1952 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Protocol No. 43/52 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 39: *Protokół nr 43/52 z posiedzenia egzekutywy Kom. Zakł. PZPR przy zakładach Przemysłu Metalowego im. J. Stalina z dnia 29 II 1952 r.*

- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Protocol No. 46/52 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 39: *Protokół nr 46/52 z posiedzenia egzekutywy K.Z. PZPR z dnia 21 III 1952 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Report 8 XII 1952 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 39: *Sprawozdanie z walki z bumelantstwem, marnotrawstwem, kradzieżą i pijaństwem na terenie W-7. 8.XII 1952 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 39: Bulletin 21 III 1952 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 39: *Biuletyn z dnia 21 III 1952 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 40: Report 14 I 1953 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 40: *Sprawozdanie ze współzawodnictwa pracy Zakładów Przemysłu Metalowego im. J. Stalina w Poznaniu za rok 1952, 14 I 1953 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 40: Report 1952 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 40: *Sprawozdanie z realizacji podjętych zobowiązań przez załogę Zakładów Przemysłu Metalowego im. J. Stalina w Poznaniu za rok 1952.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 41: Protocol No. 73 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 41: *Protokół nr 73 z posiedzenia egzekutywy K.Z. PZPR ZISPO z dnia 26 VI 1953 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 41: Protocol No. 76 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 41: *Protokół nr 76 z posiedzenia egzekutywy K.Z. PZPR z dnia 24 VII 1953 r.*
- APP, KZ PZPR HCP, 42: Protocol 9 II 1954 – APP, KZ PZPR HCP, sygn. 42: *Protokół z posiedzenia egzekutywy KZ PZPR „ZISPO” z dnia 9 II 1954 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 248: Protocol 19 I 1949 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 248: *Protokół z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 19 I 1949 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 255: Protocol No. 14 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 255: *Protokół nr 14 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 12 IV 1950 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 255: Report 7 IV 1950 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 255: *Sprawozdanie Kom. Dzielnicowego PZPR Zakładów Metalowych im. J. Stalina w Poznaniu ze współzawodnictwa pracy, 7 IV 1950 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 258: Protocol No. 22 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 258: *Protokół nr 22 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 12 VII 1950 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 262: Protocol No. 46 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 262: *Protokół nr 46 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 8 XI 1950 r. Sprawozdanie z wykonania ustawy o socjalistycznej dyscyplinie pracy na zakładach województwa poznańskiego na dzień 1 XI 1950 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 266: Protocol No. 10 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 266: *Protokół nr 10 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 14 III 1951.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 266: Protocol No. 11 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 266: *Protokół nr 11 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 21 III 1951 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 279: Evaluation – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 279: *Ocena z przebiegu podejmowania i realizacji zobowiązań dla uczczenia 60-rocznicy urodzin tow. Bieruta i święta solidarności międzynarodowej klasy robotniczej 1-maja na terenie województwa poznańskiego.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 279: Protocol No. 12 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 279: *Protokół nr 12 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR z dnia 19 III 1952 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 311: Protocol No. 4 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 311: *Protokół nr 4 z posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW PZPR – Poznań z dnia 26 I 1955 r.*
- APP, KW PZPR, 324: Protocol No. 17 – APP, KW PZPR, sygn. 324: *Protokół nr 17 ze wspólnego posiedzenia Egzekutywy KW i KM PZPR z dnia 3 VII 1956 r.; Protokół z narady KC PZPR dotyczącej efektów pracy tzw. Komisji Gierka, 7 VII 1956 r.*

Legal acts

- Dz.U. 1944, No. 1, item 1 – Dziennik Urzędowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej nr 1 z 15 VIII 1944 r. Ustawa z dnia 21 lipca 1944 r. o utworzeniu Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego, Załącznik.

M.P. 1949, No. 46, item 626 – Uchwała Rady Ministrów z dnia 30 czerwca 1949 r. w sprawie ustanowienia odznaki „Przodownika Pracy” oraz odznaki i dyplomu „Zasłużonego Przodownika Pracy”.

Literature

- ‘Deklaracja Rady Jedności Narodowej z 15 III 1944 r.’ (1989) *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*. T. 3: kwiecień 1943 – lipiec 1944. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Errata, p. 367.
- ‘Współzawodnictwo pracy’ (1962) *Mała encyklopedia ekonomiczna*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, p. 735.
- Chumiński, J. (1999) *Ruch zawodowy w Polsce w warunkach kształtującego się systemu totalitarnego 1944–1956*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej im. Oskara Langego we Wrocławiu.
- Chumiński, J. (2008) ‘Wpływ socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy na stosunek środowiska robotniczego do obowiązków pracowniczych 1945–1956’ in Tracz, B. (ed.) *Współzawodnictwo pracy w życiu gospodarczym, społeczno-politycznym i propagandzie PRL*, Katowice: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, pp. 35–51.
- Chumiński, J. (2014) ‘The Material Situation of Polish Workers Between 1945 and 1956’, *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae*, 32, pp. 25–47.
- Chumiński, J. (2015) *Robotnicy polscy 1945–1956: „stary” i „nowy” ośrodek przemysłowy na przykładzie Krakowa i Wrocławia*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu.
- Chumiński, J. (2023) ‘Principles of Shaping and Composition of the Management Staff of Polish Industry (1945–1956)’, *Studia Historiae Oeconomicae*, 41(1), pp. 79–120.
- Frużyński, A. (2008) ‘Powstanie i rozwój socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy w polskim przemyśle węglowym w latach 1947–1956’, in Tracz, B. (ed.) *Współzawodnictwo pracy w życiu gospodarczym, społeczno-politycznym i propagandzie PRL*. Katowice: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Oddział Katowice, pp. 9–35.
- Gałęczka, H. (1970) ‘Otwarcie sesji’, in Pietrucha, J. (ed.) *Společne i organizacyjne przeobrażenia socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy: materiały z sesji*. Katowice: Śląski Instytut Naukowy, pp. 7.
- Jankowiak, S. (1992) *Wielkopolska w okresie stalinizmu 1948–1956*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
- Kotlarz, D. (1970) ‘Istota i założenia socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy’, in Pietrucha, J. (ed.) *Společne i organizacyjne przeobrażenia socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy: materiały z sesji*. Katowice: Śląski Instytut Naukowy, pp. 30–47.
- Lenin, W. and Stalin, J. (1951) *O współzawodnictwie pracy*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
- Leśniewski, L. (1970) ‘Niektóre problemy ekonomiczne socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa w przemyśle ZSRR’, in Pietrucha, J. (ed.) *Společne i organizacyjne przeobrażenia socjalistycznego współzawodnictwa pracy: materiały z sesji*. Katowice: Śląski Instytut Naukowy, pp. 9–29.
- Makowski, E. (2000) *Poznański Czerwiec 1956 roku. Pierwszy bunt społeczeństwa w PRL*, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
- Minc, H. (1950) ‘Plan sześcioletni rozwoju gospodarczego i budowy podstaw socjalizmu w Polsce’, in Bierut, B. and Minc, H. *Plan sześcioletni*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, pp. 22–83.
- Minc, H. (1951a) ‘Nowe momenty w socjalistycznym współzawodnictwie pracy’, in Wańkowicz, J. and Minc, H. *O nowych metodach pracy w przemyśle*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, pp. 3.
- Minc, H. (1951b) *Zadania gospodarcze na 1951 rok*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

- Nicki, H. (1968) *Socjalistyczne współzawodnictwo pracy a wydajność i społeczne środowisko pracy*. Warszawa: Instytut Pracy.
- Roszek, J. (1975) *Prawda o górniku Pstrowskim*. Warszawa: Iskry.
- Słabek, H. (2004) *Obraz robotników polskich w świetle ich świadectw własnych i statystyki 1945–1989*. Warszawa, Kutno: Instytut Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Krajowej w Kutnie.
- Szczerba, W. (1961) *O wychowaniu przez pracę*. Warszawa: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych.
- Szyr, E. (1949) 'Współzawodnictwo pracy i walka o wyższy poziom planowania', *Nowe Drogi*, 3(15), V–VI, p. 15.
- Tracz, B. (ed.) (2008) *Współzawodnictwo pracy w życiu gospodarczym, społeczno-politycznym i propagandzie PRL*. Katowice: Przedsiębiorstwo Produkcyjno-Handlowo-Usługowe „Drukpol”.
- Wilk, H. (2011) *Kto wyrąba więcej ode mnie? Współzawodnictwo pracy robotników w Polsce w latach 1947–1955*. Warszawa: Trio, Instytut Historii PAN.