

Jakub Kuja w a (*Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland*)

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6415-2984>

jakkuj2@amu.edu.pl

CRISES OF POWER AND SOCIAL UNREST IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND AND STATE HOUSING POLICY

Abstract: The article examines the impact of socio-economic crises during the communist era on the functioning of the housing system between 1956 and 1989. It analyses several key issues, such as the effects of changes in governance on housing policy implementation, the extent and influence of social protests on this policy, and the significance of housing for the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) during and after the crisis. The study's conclusions are diverse. First, shifts in government leadership led to adjustments in housing strategy. The most significant reforms in housing policy occurred in the late 1950s and the early 1970s. However, these changes did not alter the core of housing policy, which remained centralized until the end of the Polish People's Republic. Second, the ruling communists often used housing issues for their own gain, usually approaching them instrumentally. Third, housing was never a source of serious conflict or division within the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Fourth, housing was not the main cause of conflict between society and authorities; social protests primarily targeted economic policies like pricing and wages. Nevertheless, housing demands appeared in strikes and protests. This ongoing issue, coupled with ineffective state reforms, made housing a factor contributing to conflict and increased the risk of social unrest against the authorities of the Polish People's Republic. Fifth, during periods of socio-economic crisis, social groups also attempted to develop their own solutions to prevent housing construction collapse. This was evident at the start and end of the 1980s, when Solidarity was active. However, the corrective plans they proposed were not implemented during the communist era, and after 1989, their potential largely remained unexploited.

Keywords: Polish People's Republic (PRL), crises of power, strikes and social unrest, housing policy, housing demands.

<https://doi.org/10.14746/sho.2025.43.2.007>



"To sum up, comrades,
we have failed in both urban and rural construction."

(Wiesław Wiktorowicz,

delegate to the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party,

July 14–20, 1981)

INTRODUCTION

The housing problem in communist Poland was one of the main manifestations of poverty, understood as permanent deprivation and failure to meet basic needs. The shortage of housing, its poor quality, and overcrowding implied that part of the Polish population lived in conditions far from decent standards. Substandard housing, which often dated back to the interwar period, was an inseparable part of this phenomenon. Due to their terrible technical conditions, makeshift housing spaces were referred to as "poor houses," and entire clusters of them were called "poor housing estates." The post-war, exceptionally acute housing shortage illustrated the weaknesses of the centralized socialist economy, in which scarcity affected not only living conditions but also access to services and urban infrastructure.

In this article, the housing issue will be examined in the context of the groundbreaking political and social events that occurred in People's Poland. In which case, reference is here made as touching crises of power and social unrest that historians have most often presented in a political and martyrdom context during the period under study. Several studies have also been published analysing these events from a socio-economic perspective (Grala, 2005; Baltowski, 2009; Dworaczeck and Głowiński, 2021). However, these publications are usually synthetic in nature and do not devote sufficient attention to the impact of socio-economic crises in communist Poland on the functioning of the housing system (Jarosz, 2010). In response to this research gap, the author of this article has decided to examine, in more detail, their impact on the state's housing policy in the years 1956–1989.

The analysis of the subject matter focuses on explaining specific issues that also define the research objective of the article. The first of these issues concerns determining to what extent the reshuffles at the summits of power have affected housing policy and which elements of it have changed af-

ter the end of the political conflict. Given that these conflicts often were preceded by popular uprisings against State authorities, it was also decided to examine the scope and strength of the impact of social protests on the state's housing strategy. In addition, the importance of the housing issue for the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) was taken into account, as it faced problems of stabilizing and legitimizing its power following each crisis.

The following "Polish months" were taken into account, as they symbolize political and social turning points in the People's Republic of Poland: June '56, October '56, December '70, June '76, August '80, and the period of the "Solidarity carnival," June '89. The protests of March '68 were not included in the above list due to the nature of the event.

1956 – BETWEEN THE POZNAŃ JUNE AND THE (POST-)OCTOBER POLITICAL THAW, THAT IS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW HOUSING POLICY

As Paweł Machcewicz rightly pointed out, the political crisis of 1956 had rich and complex origins and developments (Machcewicz, 1993: 12). Gomułka's return to power in October 1956 and his announcement of limited liberalization and democratization of social and economic life were of key importance. Likely, the rotation in the ranks of the party leadership would not have taken place had it not been for the earlier rebellion of the inhabitants of Poznań, who rose against the progressive degeneration of the Stalinist system.

Let's start from the beginning. As a result of the shortcomings of the centralized housing construction system (Workers' Housing Authority [Zakład Osiedli Robotniczych, ZOR], a state body responsible for investments in multi-family housing construction between 1948 and 1956), the communist authorities in Poland began to decentralize housing investment tasks during the implementation of the six-year plan, without undermining the basic principles of the command-and-distribution economy (Goryński, 1957: 76-77). As early as 1954, the Presidium of the Government adopted a resolution that enabled the establishment of construction and housing cooperatives and cooperative associations for the

construction of single-family houses, set up by investors for the duration of construction (Kasperski, 1963: 12). In the same year, by virtue of a decree of the Council of State, single-family houses and apartments that were built or renovated after the announcement of this decree were excluded from state control, provided that they consisted of no more than four rooms with a kitchen (in the case of apartments, three rooms with a kitchen were taken into account) (Dz.U. 1954, No. 31, item 120). In 1957, the regulations on public housing management ceased to apply to most privately or cooperatively owned apartments (Dz.U. 1957, No. 31, item 131). However, the housing situation in the country remained difficult, and the problem of housing shortages grew worse in many industrialized cities. These difficulties were particularly severe in Poznań, where housing development could not keep up with demographic changes, leading to overcrowding. According to official statistics, at the end of 1955, there were 1.83 people per room, but reality showed a higher figure of 2.22 people (APP, KW PZPR, 2183/323: 100). On the eve of the June demonstrations, employees of Poznań companies repeatedly reported to party representatives and trade union activists the urgent need to improve workers' housing conditions. This issue was widespread among the working class, and it was especially severe at the Józef Stalin Metal Works (ZISPO, formerly the H. Cegielski S.A. factory) and the Railway Rolling Stock Repair Works (ZNTK). By mid-1956, ZISPO employees had submitted 2,500 housing applications, and ZNTK employees filed 612 requests. Due to the ongoing housing shortage, most of these requests were rejected, which only heightened workers' frustration and anger, as they increasingly felt the decline in their living standards (APP, KW PZPR, 2183/1070: 349, 352). Nonetheless, the most concerning phenomenon was the decline in income at work. The greatest dissatisfaction in this area was expressed by ZISPO workers, who demanded wage increases, payment of outstanding bonuses, reimbursement for improperly calculated piece-work taxes, and a reduction in production quotas (Dudek and Zblewski, 2008: 134). Strike sentiment also grew among other large enterprises in Poznań. Ultimately, a general strike erupted on June 28, 1956, initiated by the ZISPO workforce, which was quickly joined by most other workplaces and some residents of Greater Poland's capital (Machcewicz, 1993: 77). During the street protest, housing issues took a backseat amid the dramatic course of events, which after a few hours turned into a social revolt against the state and party authorities. However, demands for improved housing conditions were voiced during the demonstration. A document-

ed case is that of a young locksmith from the Cegielski factory, Bogdan Marianowski, who, speaking through a megaphone to the crowd gathered, called for increased state investment in housing construction on behalf of the entire city community (AIPN Po, IPN/Po 570/1: 32–33).

Although radicalization of public sentiment pushed the housing issue into the background during the demonstration, following the events in Poznań, the issue took on a much broader dimension than a superficial assessment would suggest. Firstly, the fact that tens of thousands of people left their workplaces in protest against deteriorating living and working conditions had a mobilizing effect on society throughout the country. Following the example of the residents of Poznań and taking advantage of the political thaw that was then underway, as well as the emerging hope for the democratization of public life, Poles began to, more boldly, report their problems and grievances related to the hardships of life in the People's Republic of Poland to the communist authorities. One symptom of the changes that took place after 28 June was an increase in correspondence on housing issues addressed to various parties and state institutions. For example, in 1957, a record number of 28,270 letters with requests for apartment allocation and appeals against the decisions of the housing authorities were sent to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (Jarosz, 2019: 252). Faced with such a large influx of letters, after October, the party leadership had to recognize the scale of the housing problem and the increasing social pressure to find a quick and effective solution. Additionally, regardless of the state's actions, the events of June spurred construction activity among the inhabitants of Greater Poland itself, which had previously been suppressed by the Stalinist authorities. This is evidenced by data documenting construction activity during the five-year period 1956–1960. The rapid development of the housing sector was especially evident in rural areas, where individual construction financed mainly from local funds began to grow more intensively. During this period, 20,200 dwellings were built outside cities (compared to only 6,200 dwellings in 1950–1955), accounting for 67.4% of all dwellings completed. There was also a noticeable increase in the share of the Poznań Province in national housing construction. In the second half of the 1950s, 5.9% of all residential premises in the country were built in this region, with better construction results only in the provinces of Katowice (15%), Warsaw (7.8%), and Krakow (6.1%) (*Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1961: 169).

After the revolt in Poznań, one of the main demands was the return of Gomułka, a political prisoner during the Stalinist period, who was re-

garded by a significant part of society as a providential saviour capable of improving the lives of the “working class.” The hopes of Poles became more realistic on October 21, 1956, when Edward Ochab was forced to resign his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and Gomułka took his place. However, during the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, the new party leader did not present any concrete analysis of the housing crisis. He focused only on the poor performance of construction in rural areas and the low supply of building materials during the implementation of the six-year plan. By the fall of 1956, however, the Political Bureau had appointed a special commission whose task was to find new ways to solve the housing problem. The final outline of the expected changes was presented in 1957 and 1958 during the 10th and 11th Plenums of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party. Influenced by the speeches of Gomułka and Stefan Jędrychowski (from 1956 to 1968, he was Chairman of the Planning Commission at the Council of Ministers) at the 11th Plenum, the party leadership decided to reorganize how housing construction was planned and financed. For economic reasons, the state chose to stop fully subsidizing housing expenses. It was agreed that new investments would be made with the participation of the population’s own funds, meaning those interested had to contribute financially (AAN, PZPR KC, 2/1354/0/1.2/237.II.21: n. pag.; Gomułka, 1957: 49–53). At the same time, various forms of construction subsidies remained in place, providing easily accessible and inexpensive state loans on preferred terms for investors and future apartment residents (Dz.U. 1957, No. 22, item 157; M.P. 1958, No. 22, item 133; No. 26, item 153; item 156). The authorities also announced the return of full capacity for housing cooperatives to carry out investment activities (Kasperski, 1963: 16–17). In the case of single-family housing construction, government aid was much more limited, as the party considered the development of multi-family housing to be a priority. During the October thaw, Gomułka’s team decided not to introduce a universal rent increase in multi-family houses, but to postpone this decision. It was not until 1965 that the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland decided to increase rent rates. From that moment on, rents usually covered the basic costs of apartment maintenance and ongoing building repairs. Poorer tenants could receive housing allowances from the state. Despite this, the cost of rent still did not provide income for apartment owners (Dz.U. 1965, No. 35, item 224).

The decision not to implement this increase, which was obvious to the ruling communists for economic reasons, was largely due to political calculations and a desire to avoid social tensions. In order to stimulate social and private initiative in the housing sector, the authorities decided to allow the creation of various forms of cooperatives and tenant self-government. Unfortunately, the activities of these self-governing bodies were short-lived and ended with the end of the political thaw in public life.

For Gomułka and his party comrades, implementing housing reforms was a necessary measure aimed at meeting the current living needs of the working population. After returning to power, Gomułka agreed to tactical concessions and softened the centralist nature of the housing strategy. However, once his power was consolidated, he quickly withdrew from liberal measures, restoring full state control over the housing sector. What remained of the so-called new housing policy was to serve the plans for further industrialization of the country, which was the foundation for the development of the socialist economy. Therefore, Gomułka's team approached housing policy in an instrumental manner, treating the apartments put into use only as a by-product of the functioning of state industry. As a result, the party leadership at the time did not see the development of housing construction as a long-term strategic goal that would create an image of Gomułka as a "good host" in society. Gierek, who replaced Comrade "Wiesław" as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party at the end of 1970, had a completely different approach to this issue.

DECEMBER 1970 – THE END OF GOMUŁKA'S RULE AND GIEREK'S PROMISES

Workers striking in December 1970 over economic issues most often demanded the reversal of price increases for basic foodstuffs introduced on December 12, 1970, and the regulation of the wage system (Eisler, 2012: 465). The workers also formulated housing demands, covering a recurring set of issues. Workers from Szczecin and Gdańsk demanded a reduction in the waiting time for housing to five years, an increase in the number of apartments built in the country, and their fair distribution to the most needy workers without granting privileges to privi-

leged groups. They also demanded a freeze or reduction in housing fees and an improvement in housing conditions in workers' hotels (Chmiel and Kaczyńska, 1998). The new party leadership, although it did not ignore the workers' housing demands, had to, in the first weeks of its rule first, quell the strikes in workplaces that had broken out as a result of the price increases announced by the previous administration. Nevertheless, from the outset, Gierek treated the implementation of these demands as a key element of the planned social and economic "renewal" of the country, going beyond the standard activities of the state in the field of housing policy. These actions were aimed at strengthening the party's power and gaining public trust. Improving the party's image was particularly important in cities that had been the scene of the massacre of workers in December 1970. Therefore, by February 1971, the party leadership authorized the Government Presidium to decide on the allocation of an additional 600 apartments to employees of shipyards and ports in the Tri-City and Szczecin. In September 1971, the Government Presidium issued another housing decision providing for the construction of nine additional residential buildings in Gdańsk and Szczecin by 1973 for employees of local shipbuilding companies (Dwilewicz, 2007: 341).

The events of December 1970 created an opportunity to make significant changes to the state's housing policy, which was already severely damaged and enjoying increasingly less public support. Gierek's team decided to completely abandon the existing economic plans of housing construction in favour of raising the construction and utility standards of new apartments (Rolicki, 1990: 59, 75–76). It also intended to equip housing estates with more social infrastructure. The changes at the top of the government raised hopes among cooperative members (which later turned out to be unfulfilled) for the restoration of full self-government to the statutory bodies of housing cooperatives (Maliszewski, 1992: 110–111). During the 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in December 1971 and the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR in February 1972, solving the housing problem was considered as the party's priority. The new housing policy guidelines were laid down in a resolution of the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, which took place on May 10–11, 1972. Based on this resolution, in October 1972, the Sejm approved a long-term housing program for the years 1971–1990, which formed the basis for the government to issue a series of executive orders enabling the implementation of new measures to improve the housing conditions of the popu-

lation (M.P. 1972, No. 48, item 258). The housing program optimistically assumed that by the mid-1980s, every Polish family would have access to their own, independent apartment, surpassing in size and standard of construction of the residential premises in use during the austere dictatorship of Gomułka. The slogan "Poland, a country where every family has a home," coined by Gierek, quickly became part of the loud propaganda of success, intensively practiced in the 1970s. It was part of a broader ideological concept of building a "second Poland," which emphasized the advantages and effectiveness of the housing policy implemented during that period. Gierek's housing reform continued the direction of financing housing investments established after the October thaw, mainly relying on the population's own funds. The share of these funds increased steadily in subsequent years, from 20% to around 30%-40% of the value of a flat or house under construction. Nevertheless, people buying a flat or building a house could still count on preferential loans granted by the government and financial assistance from their employers. The new housing strategy envisaged that, as the country's prosperity grew, the population should have the right to own their own homes. This solution was quite revolutionary, as it supported the construction of owner-occupier housing in a socialist country. Access to these apartments was to be systematically increased in new private and cooperative construction (M.P. 1972, No. 30, item 166), which was intended to encourage citizens to invest more funds in housing. At the same time, the system of renting premises and buildings, allocated based on an administrative decision by the competent body of the national council, was maintained in its basic form (Fermus-Bobowiec, 2015: 59-61). However, the institution of accommodating tenants in underpopulated apartments was abolished. From the outset, access to new premises was unequal, as the housing needs of the population were divided into immediate (priority) and long-term needs. Immediate needs took precedence because they resulted from meeting the demand for housing by employees of industries considered key to the national economy. Long-term needs, on the other hand, could be postponed, even until 1990, if they were not related to areas of economic or social life that were supported by the state at the time (Kujawa, 2020: 290).

JUNE 1976 – THE HOUSING ISSUE OVERSHADOWED BY SOCIAL UNREST AGAINST GOVERNMENT PRICE INCREASES

During the events of June 1976, public discontent focused on the government's price increases for basic food products, which were to be accompanied by inadequate compensation for the lowest earners. The protests escalated most intensely in Radom, Ursus, and Płock, but strikes and street demonstrations of varying intensity also broke out in other parts of the country, affecting a total of 24 provinces. During work stoppages and demonstrations, workers demanded not only the reversal of price increases but also a better supply of meat and meat products to the domestic market. At the same time, in various situations, offensive and vulgar epithets were hurled at the party and the government (Pawłowicz and Sasanka, 2003: 35–154; Sasanka and Stępień, 2006: 17–40). Workers spontaneously gathering in workplaces and on the streets also expressed their dissatisfaction with the generally poor and deteriorating living and working conditions. In this context, it is worth asking the following questions: what was the general housing situation of the inhabitants of Radom, Ursus, and Płock at the time of the outbreak of strikes in June 1976? And did the deprivation of housing needs of state-owned enterprise workers have any impact on the outbreak of street strikes in these cities?

In the case of Ursus, located near Warsaw, the available statistical data from the Central Statistical Office (GUS) on housing construction do not indicate excessive overcrowding of apartments, despite the steady population growth in this city, nor do they indicate a construction slump in the housing sector. In the ill-fated year of 1976, the average number of people per room was 1.05, while in the entire Warsaw province it was 1.07, and in cities with a population similar to that of Ursus it was over 1.25. During this period, 1,132 apartments were completed, mainly as part of cooperative housing construction. Except for Warsaw, only Legionowo (1,506) saw more residential units built. It should be noted that the above data may not fully reflect the actual living conditions in Ursus, where some of the newcomers may have faced temporary or permanent housing difficulties. Nevertheless, the housing situation in this city was better than in Radom, which was on strike at the time. Compared to most cities in the Warsaw region, Ursus residents also had better access to municipal infrastructure: the percentage of people using water supply systems was 77.1% (the aver-

age for cities in the Warsaw province was 77.7%, with this indicator being inflated by the city of Warsaw), and 68.4% of residents had access to sewage systems (the average for cities in the Warsaw Province was 71.9%, also inflated by Warsaw). By the standards of the Polish People's Republic, the gas network was very well developed, connecting as much as 85.8% of the city's population. In this situation, only people living in old housing stock, poorly equipped with municipal infrastructure, could express dissatisfaction. The growing shortage of consumer goods on the local market at that time, especially meat and certain types of cold cuts, had a direct impact on the deterioration of the mood among the residents of Ursus. The market situation is indirectly reflected in statistical data on the sale of goods in the national retail sector and services in catering establishments. Per capita turnover in these consumption sectors was lower than in neighbouring districts of Warsaw and in some larger urban centres in the Warsaw province. As a result of the acute imbalance in the internal market, the population of Ursus was unable to fully satisfy their basic consumption needs. In this situation, the price increase for scarce food announced by the government at the end of June 1976 was the last straw, directly leading to the outbreak of a workers' strike at the Ursus Mechanical Works (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Stołecznego Warszawskiego*, 1977: 49, 274, 290). As far as Płock is concerned, the quality of life in this city on the Vistula River was lowered by the underdevelopment of urban infrastructure typical of the Polish People's Republic, resulting from the excessive concentration of investment in local central industry. According to official statistics, apartments in Płock were not overly crowded compared to the overall situation in the country, with an average of 1.17 people per room. The construction industry tried to make up for the backlog from previous years, for instance, in 1976, as many as 1,544 apartments were completed for every 1,000 marriages. However, the data published by the Central Statistical Office did not fully reflect the actual housing conditions in the city. Overcrowding was particularly evident in the old working-class districts, and the long waiting time for the allocation of a flat from a cooperative was an additional problem (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Płockiego*, 1978: 215–216). Young families also faced difficulties related to record overcrowding in nurseries and kindergartens (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa*, 1977: 327, 331). However, the key problem was the market imbalance that had been growing since January 1976, causing a shortage of basic foodstuffs, which, when the government announced price increases for these items, sparked public anger and street protests by workers at the Płock refinery and petrochemical plants.

Table 1. Selected indicators of residential construction and municipal infrastructure development in Radom, Ursus, and Płock. 1976

City	Number of persons per room	Number of members waiting for housing allocation in the cooperative (thousands)	Population using (in %)		
			water supply system	sewage system	gas
Radom	1.35	8814	87.9	75.4	62.7
Ursus	1.05	.	77.1	68.4	85.8
Płock	1.17	4423	88.5	84.5	5.7

Source: *Rocznik Statystyczny Województw* (1977: 321); *Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Płockiego* (1978: 206, 216); *Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Radomskiego* (1977: 272, 395, 264–265); *Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Stołecznego Warszawskiego* (1977: 49, 274).

Housing conditions in Radom were significantly worse than in Płock and Ursus (see Table 1). The capital of the newly created Radom Province had the most overcrowded apartments in the country. According to available statistics, in 1976 there were on average of 1.35 people per room, while in Poland as a whole this figure was 1.18 (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województw*, 1977: 217). Despite increased investment in housing construction in 1971–1975, when 8,100 new dwellings were added, there was still a shortage of housing. At the end of 1976, 8,800 members of Radom housing cooperatives were waiting in line for an apartment (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Radomskiego*, 1977: 264–265). As a result of many years of neglect, the old housing stock was in a terrible technical condition (Prokopiak, 2001; Morgan, 2004; Sasanka, 2006; Opoka, 2019). Radom struggled not only with a housing shortage, but also with an underdeveloped social infrastructure, which was the result of long-standing problems with the development of the entire functional layout of the city. The lack of nurseries and kindergartens, which were constantly overcrowded due to the high birth rate, was particularly acute (*Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Radomskiego*, 1977: 398, 400). According to statistics, in the 1975/1976 school year, 2,606 children attended kindergartens in Radom, even though these facilities only had 2,376 places available. In the 1974/1975 school year, as many as 3,337 children attended kindergartens with a capacity of 2,095 places. Local nurseries were particularly overcrowded, with 1,328 children in the “crisis” year of 1976, while only 600 places were available.

Access to doctors and beds in municipal hospitals was also limited. In such circumstances, the level of social discontent in Radom could have grown faster than in other places, and all it took to spark the conflict was the proverbial spark in the form of another misguided economic decision by the party leadership, which hit the workers hard financially. However, in this case, it was only an indirect factor influencing the course of events, as the direct trigger for social unrest in Radom, Ursus, and Płock was the draconian price increase for many basic necessities as announced by Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz on June 24, 1976.

The events of June 1976 exposed the limitations of the command-and-control economy, which was unable to respond effectively to societal needs. In an attempt to ease social tensions, the authorities implemented a so-called economic maneuver at the end of 1976. The plan included, among other things, increasing spending on improving living conditions, such as the expansion of housing estates (Kaliński, 2021: 8). As a result, a record number of 557,000 apartments were built between 1977 and 1978. However, the economic crash of 1979 put an end to this short period of rapid development in housing construction.

In summary, Gierek's team made a serious mistake at the outset, which undermined the stability of their power in the future: it made promises to improve the standard of living of Poles, including better housing conditions, which it was unable to deliver due to misguided economic policies. Although the increase in housing construction reduced the number of people per room from 1.37 in 1970 to 1.10 in 1981, the rapid growth in the number of marriages meant that a high percentage of apartments were occupied by more than one family – in 1978, this figure was almost 30%. This situation created a contradiction between the high hopes for a quick and effective solution to the housing problem and the actual results achieved in this area. The failure to fulfill the promises made during the economic boom undermined the authority of the party leadership, which Poles had finally lost confidence in. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the housing situation indirectly in 1976, but directly and en masse in 1980, when Solidarity was formed. The Commission of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, which in the early 1980s investigated the sources and course of social conflicts in the Polish People's Republic, confirmed that the economic causes of the rebellions during the twilight years of Gomułka's rule and the Gierek decade stemmed from the discrepancy between the expectations and aspirations of a developing society and the real possibilities of fulfilling them

by the state's social and economic institutions. One such disappointment was the effects of the development of state and cooperative housing construction (Wroński, 1983: 50–51, 74–75).

AUGUST 1980 AND THE “SOLIDARITY CARNIVAL” – UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE HOUSING CRISIS

The path to the creation of Solidarity was largely paved by the strikes and protests of July 1980. They were triggered by the government's announcement on July 1 of price increases for certain types of meat and cold cuts. The strikes swept across almost the entire country, reaching their greatest scale in the Lublin region (the so-called Lublin July and Świdnik July). In the Lublin region, striking workers not only demanded better supplies of basic necessities in shops and lower food prices, but also clamoured for improved housing conditions. The high priority of housing issues in the hierarchy of the workers' demands should come as no surprise for at least two reasons. Firstly, for many years, the central authorities had allocated insufficient investment funds for the development of housing construction in the Lublin province. This was painfully evident to members of local housing cooperatives, who waited in long queues for apartments to be allocated (at the beginning of January 1980, as many as 45,800 people were waiting for a cooperative apartment in the Lublin region) (Dąbrowski, 2006: 57). Secondly, housing was increasingly viewed in economic terms as a consumer good that should be widely available and marketable. Its lack caused frustration and anger among the public, who had been misled by Gierek's earlier promises of providing housing. In July 1980, the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) decided not to use force against the protesting workers and opted for negotiations instead. To this end, for the first time in the history of the Polish People's Republic, a Government Commission was set up to consider the workers' demands. Gierek's weakening team, wanting to quell the wave of strikes in the Lublin region as quickly as possible, compromised and accepted most of the workers' demands, including those concerning housing. At WSK PZL in Świdnik and FSC in Lublin, the protests ended with the signing of an agreement between the striking workers and representa-

tives of the state authorities. Unfortunately, the tragic economic situation of the country meant that following the end of the July strikes, the authorities were unable to fulfil most of their commitments.

The political upheaval in September 1980 brought some hope for changes in housing policy. Stanisław Kania took over as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, replacing the discredited Gierek. It seemed that the changes at the top would create space for nationwide discussions on improving the housing situation. However, the new party leadership focused primarily on maintaining power and suppressing demonstrations and strikes that were breaking out across the country. As a result, Kania's team faced strong opposition from the public, organized around the then newly formed Solidarity movement, which demanded economic reforms from the government and the party. The proposals for changes in the housing policy took on a social dimension, independent of the intentions and orders of the authorities. They were based on the demands and requests made by striking workers throughout Poland, on which basis Solidarity experts and activists formulated their first program concepts.

The housing issue was addressed in the August 1980 agreements. The Gdańsk Agreement, signed on August 31, 1980, referenced the demand of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee in Gdańsk to reduce the waiting time for housing allocation. It was stated that by the end of 1980, provincial governors in each province would prepare a program to improve the housing situation, which would be reviewed with public, experts from TUP, SARP, NOT, and other organizations before execution. Responsibility for new projects was to rest with existing integrated works (housing factories, although this view was later changed). At the same time, emphasis was placed on developing the building materials industry ('Nr 4. 1980 sierpień 31...'. 2008: 85). However, in the Szczecin agreement signed a day earlier, it was agreed that "the government will present a program to solve the housing issue, guaranteeing that the waiting period [for housing - author's note] will not exceed five years" (Nr 3. 1980 sierpień 30...', 2008: 76). Dariusz Jarosz notes that until September 1981, the Solidarity opposition paid relatively little attention to housing issues in trade union and expert forums (Jarosz, 2010: 148). During this period, the issue was discussed in greater detail only in the context of a document prepared by experts from the Social and Professional Center at the National Coordinating Commission (KKP) of NSZZ Solidarność, which described the origins, causes, and course of the economic crisis in the country ('Nr 111. 1981 maj...', 2008: 392). However, it should be remem-

bered that on October 29, 1980, an agreement was concluded between the Construction Coordination Committee at the KKP NSZZ Solidarność and the Committee of the Ministry of Construction and Building Materials Industry concerning the improvement of the situation in the construction industry. In the agreement, both parties agreed that the housing sector required fundamental financial, organizational, and technological changes. The planned reforms were to include, among other things, the wage system, working conditions in the construction industry, and the allocation of building materials. Representatives of free trade unions from the construction section had high hopes for this agreement, considering it one of the best industry agreements Solidarity had signed to date. Unfortunately, they were soon disappointed, as the state construction authorities failed to implement the provisions of the agreement within the next few months (Stańczyk, 1981).

Solidarity activists presented their specific position on the housing issue for the first time during the First National Congress of Delegates, which took place on September 5–10 and September 26–October 7, 1981. The program resolution contained several general demands and proposals for corrective measures aimed at improving the dramatic housing situation in the country. The key point was Thesis 17 of the resolution, which formed its foundation and stated that “the union demands respect for the fundamental human right to one’s own home and participates in shaping housing policy” (Lewandowska, 2021: 129). Never before or since, with the exception of the Round Table talks, has the anti-communist opposition so clearly emphasized its role in housing development planning as it did during the “Solidarity carnival.” Proposals included shifting some of the unused capacity of industrial construction companies to the housing sector, accelerating the development of land for construction, increasing funds for infrastructure investments in cities and rural areas, repealing all regulations hindering the possibility of exchanging apartments regardless of their nature and type, and standardizing rents in order to protect housing resources. Activists and experts associated with Solidarity also emphasized the need to introduce changes in the functioning of housing cooperatives, which had been a key form of housing construction organization since the second half of the 1960s. The reform of housing policy was to be carried out under the social control of regional Solidarity boards that demonstrated the opposition’s distrust of the government, which had so far failed to implement the agreements and arrangements that had been made (Lewandowska, 2021). However, this condition was impossible for

the ruling camp to meet, as it would mean losing its monopoly in the construction and housing sector.

As early as the fall of 1980, under pressure from society, the communist authorities restored the role of direct investor to cooperatives. Nevertheless, problems of growing irregularities in the allocation of apartments continued to be widespread. Solidarity demanded an increase in the share of so-called universal apartment allocation through cooperative self-government, which could limit the practice of granting apartments to people outside the designated order and allocating them to people who were not members of the cooperative. It proposed that housing cooperatives throughout the country verify the eligibility of members for apartments and prepare lists of the most urgent needs. Activists and experts on the trade union forum and in the opposition press called for the democratization of the life of the cooperative, as well as the creation of a social construction movement, which, in the face of the crisis in the state (cooperative) housing sector, would support the development of individual construction (Klewin, 1981). In reality, this was a utopian program requiring significant institutional and financial support from the state. Nevertheless, on the wave of grassroots social initiatives, so-called small cooperatives (young cooperatives) began to emerge throughout the country, supporting the construction of small single-family houses and apartments in smaller multi-family buildings (Witakowski, 1981: 6). In April 1981, the activities of these small cooperatives became legalized by the central cooperative authorities. The first period of change was to culminate in the 8th National Congress of Delegates of Cooperative Housing Construction, which, however, was interrupted by the imposition of martial law (Jarosz, 2010: 70). Despite the short duration of the congress, it was possible to establish working committees and discuss issues related to the development of such small social cooperatives. The opposition's efforts aimed at separating the cooperative movement from the centralist policies of the state and restoring the autonomy of housing cooperatives. The introduction of martial law by the authorities of the Polish People's Republic on December 13, 1981, halted further preparations for reforms and, in the long term, ruined any chances for the renewal of the entire housing policy.

Solidarity experts also demanded that the state authorities restrict or completely withdraw harmful materials and preparations commonly used in residential construction and the furniture industry that produce utility equipment for residential interiors. The problem of poisoning of dwellings with toxic volatile substances was subject to censorship before

1980, and periodically even to a ban on statistical and epidemiological research aimed at determining the extent of these hazards. It seemed that a breakthrough in this matter came in March 1981, when Solidarity activists reached a preliminary agreement with representatives of the health and environmental protection ministries on the identification and prevention of contamination of dwellings with toxic organic compounds evaporating from construction and consumer products. At that time, some substances were considered particularly harmful to Polish homes including: carcinogenic formaldehyde, used throughout the communist era as a component of furniture glue in wood-based panels, which were then used to make furniture; this compound was also found in the toxic chemically hardened varnish Chemosil; the toxic impregnating agent Xylamit, used since the mid-1960s to preserve chipboard and fiberboard in ceilings and floors, as well as various wooden elements; Subit cold-lay parquet adhesive that emits highly carcinogenic benzene. Despite the lack of relevant research, independent experts assumed that Siwelit flooring was also harmful to human and animal health, as were adhesives for artificial flooring: Osakryl and Pronaktyl B, used for glueing the popular Lentex flooring¹. However, cooperation between independent trade unionists, specialists and government representatives did not bring any measurable results, despite public warnings about toxic emissions and related cases of illness (Remiszewska, 1981). In this situation, the reported problem remained unresolved due to the sluggish actions of Solidarity itself and the wait-and-see attitude of the government, being fully aware of the lack of real possibilities to introduce less harmful products to the construction and housing market. As a result, after the union was outlawed, the issue took a back seat. More serious changes did not come until the end of the 1980s, when the production of products such as Xylamit was completely discontinued.

What was the party's view on housing issues during this period? Much information on this subject can be found in the work on the program resolution prepared by delegates to the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, which took place on July 14–20, 1981. At the congress, party activists unanimously supported housing reform, putting forward several comments and proposals. The majority were in favour of continuing Gierek's 1972 commitment to provide every family with their own home, even though there was incomplete unanimity among party

¹ The issue of the use of asbestos, which is harmful to human health, in construction in the People's Republic of Poland requires a separate research.

members on this issue. Most of the participants at the congress respected the point in the social agreement of August 1980 concerning reducing the waiting time for housing to five years. However, in order to achieve this goal, the state would have to commission approximately 300,000 apartments annually, which was not feasible in the face of the deepening economic crisis and the collapse of the construction industry. Despite the nation's difficult economic situation, the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party decided that, in the coming years, the share of expenditure on housing construction (together with the accompanying infrastructure and social construction) in global investment expenditure would amount to a minimum of 30%. During the debate, delegates raised many other issues related to housing, including making housing fees more realistic for current and future tenants (this proposal was not implemented because, despite the amendment of the housing law in December 1982, the regulatory nature of rent policy was maintained), restoring the national councils of the building industry (this demand was implemented) and the removal of formal and legal barriers to single-family housing construction (this problem remains unresolved). Critical voices were also raised regarding the functioning of house factories and the large-panel technology used throughout the country, which was considered too material-intensive. The Congress Forum also became an arena for political reckoning between Jaruzelski's government team and the previous party leadership, accused of abuses related to, among other things, the construction of private real estate. In connection with this, some delegates demanded the confiscation of villas, dachas, and holiday homes built in the 1970s by activists of the Gierek faction (AAN, PZPR KC, 2/1354/0/2.1.1/I/368: 12, 28, 49 et seq.).

At the 9th Congress, a decision was made to reorganize the rules for accepting members and allocating and exchanging apartments in housing cooperatives (*IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd...*, 1981: 132–133). Apartments were to be allocated exclusively to members of the cooperative, in accordance with the order established by its self-governing bodies. In 1982, the Sejm passed a new cooperative law, which specified the rules for the distribution of apartments in housing cooperatives (Dz.U. 1982, No 30, item 210). After the introduction of the new cooperative law, irregularities related to the allocation of premises to unauthorized persons decreased slightly compared to the period of Gierek's rule. However, the distribution of apartments outside the queue continued, and this practice persisted until the end of the Polish People's Republic.

Unfortunately, this did not eliminate the queues in cooperatives, nor did it solve the structural housing deficit, as the state authorities failed to secure the necessary investment funds for the further development of the housing sector. In this situation, the housing policy model has retained its regulatory and discretionary character to the end. Also until the end of the communist period, there was a strong stereotype in society that "housing belongs" to everyone and that "one gets" it from the state (usually from the cooperative) (Jarosz, 2010: 71). The reality, however, was different – despite earlier promises, the state was unable to meet these expectations.

THE TURNING POINT OF 1989 – THE HOUSING ISSUE DURING AND AFTER THE ROUND TABLE TALKS

In the 1980s, housing issues consistently ranked high in the hierarchy of basic social needs, especially among young people (Wnuk-Lipiński, 1989: 43–45, 50–52). However, there was a noticeable apathy and fatigue in society, resulting from the conviction that there was no way to improve one's financial situation and that it would be impossible to break the deadlock in construction in the long term. The growing housing deficit was the result of a decade-long decline in housing investment, while the percentage of people entering marriageable age remained high (in 1988, the statistical housing deficit amounted to 1.3 million dwellings. The independence of residence index was 111.7, which means that almost 24% of households did not live in their own homes). The only effective solution to this crisis could have been a well-thought-out and consistent state housing policy, developed through political and social agreement, taking into account the housing needs of all interested parties. However, party decision-makers were unable to carry out any effective reforms within the existing economic system. The corrective measures taken were unsuccessful, as exemplified by the government's 1988 housing development program (the so-called Ferensztajn program - the program was developed by the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Construction headed by Bogumił Ferensztajn), which failed to halt the decline in housing construction across the country.

Despite the huge shortage of housing, the authorities of the Polish People's Republic continued to maintain an extensive system of housing privileges for senior party and state officials. Resolution No. 93 of the

Council of State, dated December 18, 1987, listed as many as 101 categories of positions, the holders of which were entitled to official housing. Most of these premises were occupied indefinitely not only by people holding important state and social functions but also by their families, which led to informal privatization and the nomenclature's appropriation of the communist housing stock during the period of systemic change. To avoid social discontent, the rulers decided not to announce this resolution publicly – its provisions were only repealed at the end of December 1989 by the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who limited the number of state positions and functions entitling their holders to the allocation of official housing (M.P. 1989, No. 44, item 352; Bochwic, 1989; Dudek, 2019: 183–184).

At the end of the Polish People's Republic, a significant part of the opposition advocated reforming the existing housing policy model, considering it too paternalistic. Trade union activists and experts differed in their assessment of the extent of democratic government participation in the restoration and revival of domestic construction. Key changes only came about during the Round Table talks, when a negotiating subcommittee on housing policy was established. It held four meetings in February and March 1989. Most of the issues raised at the "housing table" were not new and largely coincided with the demands previously put forward by the social side and some PZPR activists. For the first time, however, there was a chance to implement them in a situation of real political change, which was to lead to significant systemic transformations. Representatives of the government and the opposition unanimously agreed to move away from the existing housing policy model, to marketize the construction and housing sector, and to make rents more realistic.

The participants of the 1989 round table discussion on housing were, on the part of the government and coalition: Adam Andrzejewski, Janusz Bielak, Jerzy Gruchalski, Ryszard Jajszczyk, Zbigniew Janowski – chairman (OPZZ), Bolesław Kierski, Bogdan Łukasiewicz, Lucjan S. Mieczkowski – undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Construction, Tadeusz Mrzygłód, Ryszard Niwiński, Roman Nowicki, Jerzy Olszowski, Wiktor Piwkowski, Lech Radke, Stefan Rutkowski, Mieczysław Serwiński – chairman, Wacław Tuszyński, Czesław Uhma, Barbara Wolnicka-Szałek, Marian Wysocki. The solidarity and opposition side was represented by: Jerzy Dłużniewski, Andrzej Dobrucki, Władysław Dominiak, Mieczysław Gil, Andrzej Grudziński, Hanna Kulesza, Witold Mieszkowski, Aleksander Paszyński – chairman, later Minister of Spatial Planning and Construction in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, Janusz Sanocki, Zbigniew Zawistowski (Dubiński, 1999: 535).

Among the negotiators, the opposition journalist as well as politician Aleksander Paszyński, author of the so-called alternative construction program, stood out in particular. During the discussion, he argued for the need to create decentralized credit and financial institutions that would support the development of the real estate market. Finally, in their conclusions, experts from both sides indicated that the main objective of a housing policy should be to create conditions that would enable every family, through their own efforts and with state support, to obtain independent housing of a socially acceptable standard (Dubiński, 1999: 535). This position was consistent with the views of Paszyński, who was to later become Minister of Spatial Planning and Construction. The fall of the communist regime meant that responsibility for implementing the decisions of the Round Table housing subcommittee falls to the next government of the Third Republic of Poland. Although the opposition and Solidarity were convinced of the need to implement pro-market changes in the housing sector, under the conditions of high inflation and a decline in the real value of wages, rapid economization of this sector would have meant shifting a significant part of the costs of the reforms onto society. Consequently, a compromise was reached, which meant temporarily maintaining state grants for housing construction and keeping rents low. The grants were used, among other things, for the cancellation of part of loans granted before 1990, the indexation of contributions to housing books and assistance in the repayment of interest rates on loans (BS, Stenogramy..., 1990: 25). The lack of sufficient budgetary resources for further development of housing construction meant that in the early 1990s, the state withdrew from its active investment policy in this segment, limiting its assistance mainly to indirect forms of financing. This, in turn, led to a significant decline in the growth of new housing construction. It was not until 1992 that the government adopted the so-called new housing order, which regulated further development of housing at the organizational, legal, and financial levels. A key element of the planned reforms was a social housing policy, modelled on the French HLM system [Habitations à loyer modéré – a French housing system offering affordable rental apartments, launched in 1950], and aimed at increasing access to rental housing (at moderate rates) for low-income earners who had no chance of obtaining a commercial mortgage. In Poland, a low-cost housing system modelled on HLM solutions was developed in 1992 by a French-Polish team of experts working with the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Construction. This collaboration resulted in the launch of a social housing association program in the mid-

-1990s. However, it turned out that the social rental housing programs implemented in the second half of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century only improved the housing situation in the country to a limited extent. This situation was influenced both by the small scale of construction and by the fact that it was mainly the wealthier part of society that participated in the housing programs (Cesarski, 2016: 161–164). Local authorities also created conditions for meeting the housing needs of their community to a limited extent, systematically reducing their stock of municipal housing after 1989. This led to the failure of the concept of mass social housing development, which aimed to combine economic and social goals within a new housing framework. In this context, progress in housing policy in the 21st century was chiefly measured by the quantitative increase in owner-occupier housing, driven by private sector investment, especially the real estate development market. However, basing this policy on neoliberal economic principles did not guarantee access to housing for those who needed it most. Instead, it mostly benefited those who were better off financially, more resourceful, and more entrepreneurial. This situation marked a significant departure from the programmatic principles of Solidarity in the 1980s that advocated for fair and inclusive housing policies to serve all citizens of the Republic of Poland.

CONCLUSION

Crises of power in the People's Republic of Poland influenced modifications to housing strategy. The nature and scope of the changes introduced varied depending on how open the new party leadership was to the housing needs reported by the public. Throughout the period under study, the most important reforms took place in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1970s and concerned the establishment of new regulations for financing housing construction, the size and standard of new apartments, and regulations concerning ownership rights to residential premises. The positive effects of these measures were, however, only short-lived. Throughout the entire period analysed, this policy was characterized by centralism, voluntarism, and bureaucracy, which rendered it ineffective in every aspect of its functioning. Despite the state's increased investment in housing, the problem of housing shortages remained unresolved, and instead of decreasing, its scale grew exponentially as a result of the coun-

try's accelerated industrialization. It was this excessive industrial development that became one of the main sources of the housing crisis in the Polish People's Republic.

Party leaders were aware that fulfilling housing demands had strategic significance and stabilized the government. Skillful use of the "housing card" (for a certain period of time) strengthened the government's power, while wrong decisions undermined it and, sooner or later, created a flashpoint in relations between the state/party and society. Each ruling team understood this issue and the purpose of housing reform in its own way. Gomułka, referring to citizens' demands for improvements in housing construction, subordinated them solely to the goal of continuing the strategy of forced industrialization from the six-year plan period, essentially objectifying the issue. Gierek, on the other hand, intended to overcome the housing crisis through accelerated construction investments, developing the so-called housing industry based on house factories. These were presented by PZPR propagandists as a key element of the state's new, pro-social and pro-consumer activities. The failure to fulfil demagogic housing promises, caused by the collapse of the party's economic policy, clearly undermined public confidence in Gierek's government. Jaruzelski, in turn, tried to continue the housing commitments of the previous party authorities, but until 1988, he rejected the possibility of real co-operation with the democratic opposition in this area.

The housing issue within the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) never constituted a source of deeper conflicts or a cause of political division within the party. Nor was it the main point of contention between the public and the authorities, as social protests in the economic sphere were most often directed against the state's pricing and wage policies. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the housing shortage was an insignificant issue in the everyday life of the inhabitants of the Polish People's Republic. The high level of deprivation in terms of housing needs and growing inequalities in access to one's own "M" led to a sense of entitlement and undermined the principle of social justice, which the party and state authorities often referred to in their official communications. As a result, during subsequent speeches, this problem was increasingly raised by striking social groups, who demanded more effective action from the state in the housing sector. Due to its prevalence and scope, this issue has become one of the factors contributing to conflict, hence increasing the risk of rebellion against the existing paradoxes of reality. During times of change, society also sought to develop its own solutions towards pre-

venting a collapse in housing construction. This was the case in the 1980s, when Solidarity was active. However, the plan of corrective measures in housing and municipal construction developed by Solidarity was not seriously implemented during the communist era. The opportunities to improve the housing situation in the country, which arose after the end of the Round Table talks, were also not fully exploited. The partial failure of the reform measures was mainly due to the state's financial problems resulting from the change in the economic model and the chaotic and inconsistent manner in which the reforms were implemented by successive governments of the Third Republic of Poland. The consequences of the mistakes and omissions made in housing policy and housing economy after 1989 proved so serious that they are still felt by part of Polish society to date. The low availability of housing for those most in need has not improved, despite government housing programs offering subsidies from the state budget for mortgage interest rates and the purchase of apartments and houses. Their ad hoc and superficial nature prevents an effective solution to the housing problem.

Jakub Kujawa, PhD, historian and archivist, assistant professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań. His research interests revolve around industry-related issues and their influence on social life and the state of the environment.

REFERENCES

Archival materials

AAN, PZPR KC - Archiwum Akt Nowych, Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza. Komitet Centralny, sygn. 2/1354/0/1.2/237.II.21; 2/1354/0/2.1.1/I/368.

AIPN Po - Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. Oddział w Poznaniu, Kolekcja Poznański Czerwiec, sygn. IPN/Po 570/1.

APP, KW PZPR - Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Komitet Wojewódzki Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej w Poznaniu, sygn. 2183/323; 2183/1070.

BS, Stenogramy - Biblioteka Sejmowa, Okrągły Stół. Podzespoł do Spraw Polityki Mieszkaniowej. Stenogramy z posiedzeń Podzespołu do Spraw Polityki Mieszkaniowej (1989). Warszawa 1990. https://bs.sejm.gov.pl/F/?func=find-acc&acc_sequence=000444601&local_base=bis01. Accessed: 1 April 2025.

Printed sources

'Nr 3. 1980 sierpień 30, Szczecin - Protokół ustaleń w sprawie wniosków i postulatów Międzyzakładowego Komitetu Strajkowego w Szczecinie przed Komisją Rządową (fragmenty)' (2008) in Luszniewicz, J. and Zawistowski, A. (eds) *Sprawy gospodarcze w dokumentach pierwszej Solidarności*. Vol. 1: 16 sierpnia 1980–30 czerwca 1981. Warszawa:

Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, pp. 74–77.

‘Nr 4. 1980 sierpień 31, Gdańsk – Protokół porozumienia zawartego przez Komisję Rządową i Miedzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy 31 sierpnia 1980 r. w Stoczni Gdańskiej (fragmenty)’ (2008) in Luszniewicz, J. and Zawistowski, A. (eds) *Sprawy gospodarcze w dokumentach pierwszej Solidarności*. Vol. 1: 16 sierpnia 1980–30 czerwca 1981. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, pp. 78–87.

‘Nr 111. 1981 maj, Warszawa – Kryzys gospodarki polskiej. Przyczynki do analizy – opracowanie ekspertów Ośrodka Prac Społeczno-Zawodowych przy Krajowej Komisji Porozumiewawczej NSZZ „Solidarność”: Włodzimierza Bojarskiego, Ryszarda Bugaja, Jerzego Eysymontta, Wiktora Herera, Cezarego Józefiaka, Waldemara Kuczyńskiego, Antoniego Leopolda, Władysława Sadowskiego, Andrzeja Topińskiego, Witolda Trzeciakowskiego’ (2008) in Luszniewicz, J. and Zawistowski, A. (eds) *Sprawy gospodarcze w dokumentach pierwszej Solidarności*. Vol. 1: 16 sierpnia 1980–30 czerwca 1981. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, pp. 368–396.

Chmiel, B. and Kaczyńska, E. (eds) (1998) *Postulaty 1970–71 i 1980. Materiały źródłowe do dziejów wystąpień pracowniczych w latach 1970–1971 i 1980 (Gdańsk i Szczecin)*. Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza Nowa.

Dubiński, K. (ed.) (1999) *Okrągły stół*. Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Promocyjna.

IX Nadzwyczajny Zjazd Polskiej Partii Robotniczej 14–20 lipca 1981 r. *Podstawowe dokumenty i materiały* (1981) Warszawa: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, Książka i Wiedza.

Lewandowska, J. (ed.) (2021) ‘Uchwała programowa I Krajowego Zjazdu Delegatów Niezależnego Samorządnego Związku Zawodowego „Solidarność”, Myśl Polityczna, 10(4), pp. 87–160.

Wroński, S. (ed.) (1983) *Sprawozdanie z prac Komisji KC PZPR powołanej dla wyjaśnienia przyczyn i przebiegu konfliktów społecznych w dziejach Polski Ludowej*. Warszawa: Nowe Drogi, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej.

Legal Acts

Dz.U. 1954, No 31, item 120 – *Dziennik Ustaw, Dekret z 25 czerwca 1954 r. o lokalach w domach spółdzielni mieszkaniowych i w domach jednorodzinnych*.

Dz.U. 1957, No 22, item 157 – *Dziennik Ustaw, Uchwała Nr 81 Rady Ministrów z 15 marca 1957 r. w sprawie pomocy Państwa dla budownictwa mieszkaniowego ze środków własnych ludności*.

Dz.U. 1957, No 31, item 131 – *Dziennik Ustaw, Ustawa z 28 maja 1957 r. o wyłączeniu spod publicznej gospodarki lokalami domów jednorodzinnych oraz lokali w domach spółdzielni mieszkaniowych*.

Dz.U. 1965, No 35, item 224 – *Dziennik Ustaw, Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 20 lipca 1965 r. w sprawie czynszów najmu za lokale mieszkalne*.

Dz.U. 1982, No 30, item 210 – *Dziennik Ustaw, Uchwała Sejmu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej z dnia 16 września 1982 r. Prawo spółdzielcze*.

M.P. 1958, No 22, item 133 – *Monitor Polski, Uchwała Nr 59 Rady Ministrów z 15 marca 1958 r. w sprawie dodatkowej pomocy państwa dla spółdzielczego budownictwa mieszkaniowego*.

M.P. 1958, No 26, item 153 – *Monitor Polski, Uchwała Nr 60 Rady Ministrów z 15 marca 1958 r. w sprawie zakładowych funduszy mieszkaniowych*.

M.P. 1958, No 26, item 156 – Monitor Polski, *Uchwała Nr 65 Rady Ministrów z 15 marca 1958 r. w sprawie zapewnienia realnej wartości wkładu na mieszkaniowych książeczkach oszczędnościowych Powszechniej Kasy Oszczędności.*

M.P. 1972, No. 30, item 166 – Monitor Polski, *Uchwała Nr 135 Rady Ministrów z 22 maja 1972 r. w sprawie nabyciania uprawnień własnościowych do mieszkań spółdzielczych.*

M.P. 1972, No 48, item 258 – Monitor Polski, *Uchwała Sejmu Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej z dnia 19 października 1972 r. o perspektywicznym programie mieszkaniowym.*

M.P. 1989, No 44, item 352 – Monitor Polski, *Uchwała Nr 185 Rady Ministrów z dnia 30 grudnia 1989 r. w sprawie warunków i trybu zajmowania oraz zwalniania mieszkań przez osoby zajmujące kierownicze stanowiska oraz pełniące odpowiedzialne funkcje państwowie.*

Statistical sources

Rocznik Statystyczny (1961) Warszawa: GUS.

Rocznik Statystyczny Województw (1977) Warszawa: GUS.

Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Płockiego (1978?) Płock: WUS w Płocku.

Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Radomskiego (1977) Radom: WUS w Radomiu.

Rocznik Statystyczny Województwa Stołecznego Warszawskiego (1977) Warszawa: WUS w m. st. Warszawie.

Literature

Baltowski, M. (2009) *Gospodarka socjalistyczna w Polsce. Geneza, rozwój, upadek*. Warszawa: PWN.

Bochwić, T. (1989) 'Lokal od państwa', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 25, p. 7.

Cesarski, M. (2016) 'Koncepcja społecznej polityki mieszkaniowej w Polsce i jej realizacja po 1989 r.', in Furmańska-Maruszak, A. and Wójtewicz, A. (eds) *Polityka społeczna wobec wyzwań demograficznych i przemian społecznych*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne Akapit, pp. 155–170.

Dąbrowski, M. (2006) *Lubelski Lipiec 1980*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Norbertinum.

Dudek, A. (2019) *Od Mazowieckiego do Suchockiej. Pierwsze rządy wolnej Polski*. Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak.

Dudek, A. and Zblewski, Z. (2008) *Utopia nad Wisłą. Historia Peerelu*. Warszawa-Bielsko-Biała: Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, Wydawnictwo Park.

Dwilewicz, Ł. (2007) 'Polityka gospodarcza a spokój społeczny. Posunięcia władz partyjnych i państwowych od grudnia 1970 r. do grudnia 1971 r.', in Kościk, E. and Główiański, T. (eds) *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo w czasach PRL-u (1944–1989)*. Wrocław: Gajt Wydawnictwo, pp. 333–353.

Dworaczek, K. and Główiański, T. (eds) (2021) „Tej walki nie możemy przegrać!”. *Strajki, protesty i bunt w drugiej połowie XX i w XXI wieku – perspektywa gospodarcza i społeczna*. Wrocław: Gajt Wydawnictwo.

Eisler, J. (2012) *Grudzień 1970. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje*. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu.

Fermus-Bobowiec, A. (2015) 'Problem „kwarterunku” lokali mieszkalnych w ustawodawstwie i nauce Polski Ludowej', *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach*, Administracja Zarządzanie (31), 104, pp. 49–70.

Gomułka, W. (1957) *Sytuacja w partii i państwie. Referat wygłoszony na X Plenum KC PZPR w dniu 24 X 1957 r.* Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

Goryński, J. (1957) 'Aktualne zagadnienia budownictwa mieszkaniowego w Polsce', *Nowe Drogi*, 7, pp. 68–84.

Grala, D. (2005) *Reformy gospodarcze w PRL (1982–1989). Próba ratowania socjalizmu*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio.

Jarosz, D. (2010) *Mieszkanie się należy... Studium z peerelowskich praktyk społecznych*. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Aspra-JR.

Jarosz, D. (2019) 'Pisanie do władzy: próba uogólnienia', in Adamus, A.M., Gajewski, Is-pan, A.L., K., Jarosz, D., Kovacs, C., Miernik, G., Szpak, E., *Listy do władz 1945–1989. Studia przypadków*. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Aspra, pp. 239–268.

Kaliński, J. (2021) 'Kryzys gospodarczy w latach 1979–1982 zwiastunem upadku PRL', *Optimum. Economic. Studies*, 103(1), pp. 3–23.

Kasperski, W. (1963) *Spółdzielcość mieszkaniowa w Polsce 1957–1961*. Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Centrali Rolniczej Spółdzielni.

Klewin, J. (1981) 'Mieszkania w sferze marzeń czy rzeczywistości', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 25, p. 15.

Kujawa, J. (2020) *Przestrzeń miasta w gospodarce socjalistycznej. Industrializacja i budownictwo mieszkaniowe w latach 1950–1980 w Bydgoszczy, Toruniu i Włocławku*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM.

Machcewicz, P. (1993) *Polski rok 1956*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Mówią Wieki.

Maliszewski, A. (1992) *Ewolucja myśli i społeczno-ekonomiczna rola spółdzielczości mieszkaniowej w Polsce*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Spółdzielcze.

Morgan, D. (2004) *Konflikt pamięci. Narracje radomskiego czerwca 1976*. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu.

Opoka, T.E. (2019) *Na ścieżkach zdrowia*. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu.

Pawłowicz, J. and Sasanka, P. (2003) *Czerwiec 1976 w Płocku i województwie płockim*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Prokopiak, J. (2001) *Radomski Czerwiec '76. Wspomnienia partyjnego sekretarza*. Warszawa–Radom: nakładem własnym.

Remiszewska, T. (1981) 'Wróg w domu', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 33, pp. 10, 14.

Rolicki, J. (1990) *Edward Gierek – przerwana dekada. Wywiad rzeka*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Fakt.

Sasanka, P. (2006) *Czerwiec 1976. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje*. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu.

Sasanka, P. and Stępień, S. (2006) *Czerwiec 1976. Radom, Ursus, Płock*. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej.

Stańczyk, P. (1981) 'Nie tylko dla siebie', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 36, p. 7.

Witakowski, P. (1981) 'Stowarzyszenie Budownictwa Mieszkaniowego', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 33, p. 6.

Wnuk-Lipiński, E. (1989) 'Nierówności, deprywacje i przywileje jako podłożę konfliktu społecznego', in Adamski, W., Kolarska-Bobińska, L., Rychard, A. and Wnuk-Lipiński, E., (eds) *Polacy '88. Dynamika konfliktu a szanse reform. Raport z badania Sprawy Polaków '87*. Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, pp. 18–80.