SOCIOLOGICAL PRAGMATICS FROM A HARD-SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE: A SIDE-NOTE TO THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN LINGUISTICS

ELŻBIETA WĄSIK

0. Logical and Physical Domains in the Study of Verbal Communication

The subject matter of our discussion constitutes the investigative consequences in the study of verbal communication that might result from a rigorous application of the hard science perspective postulating at the same time to discard the validity of the statements that derive their substantiation from the fields investigated by soft sciences. Against the background of the distinctions between the physical and logical domains proposed in so-called human linguistics, which include both observable and concluded facts as extraorganismic and intraorganismic properties of communicating individuals, it is emphasized that the philosophical foundations of pragmalinguistics are indispensable for human-centered pragmatics considering the self-awareness of communicators not only as intellectual and emotional activities of mind but also as chemical-electrical and motional-kinetic activities of body. Having rejected the distinctions provided by soft-sciences, both scientists and ordinary human beings would be unable, due to the lack of theoretical constructs forming a base of solipsistic experiences of observers, to communicate about the nature of things and states of affair that are remote in time and space. The only thing they could state about the real world of communicating people is that there are observable links between individuals forming parts of a dynamic linguistic community with open boundaries. These interindividual links constitute inter alia energy flows

exchanged through verbal expressions. Hence, linguistic expressions are not to be equated with cultural or natural goods being transferred or exchanged, or shared as commodities. Commodities leave their source location and arrive at a target location, whereas verbal means transmitted from a source to a target location represent only the physical part of the domain of human communication. While remaining in the logical domain of a source agent, the material shape of verbal expressions, as particle and wave duality, is received or not received by a target agent. As such, the logical domain of communicating people exists in the knowledge of both the source and the target agents separately as a mental relationship between the two associated domains, namely the domain of expression and the domain of reference. As a result, individuals communicating about the same domain of reference are supposed to be endowed with the same knowledge with respect to how to interpret the domain of expression of a given language in a relatively similar way.

1.   How to Do Things with "Sound Waves" or with "Words"?

To begin with, the point of our departure will be human linguistics which has been specified by Victor H. Yngve as "the linguistics of people" in opposition to "the linguistics of language". In the investigative field of human linguistics, the subject of a scientist's interest encompasses those linguistic properties of communicating individuals that are relevant for the realization of their communicational tasks considered on the one level as real persons, and on the other as participants of social communication. From such a viewpoint linguistic phenomena are located as observable properties of people within the physical domain. Therefore, human linguistics is assumed to be a scientific discipline which focuses on concrete people, and not on an abstract language. Following Yngve's (4) opinion: "We find in nature only the physical waves; their interpretation is entirely in the heads of the speakers and hearers. A scientific analysis must include, besides the study of the physical sound themselves, a careful and detailed study of the people who produce and interpret the sounds and what they are doing at the time. As scientists we would also like to understand the source of the compelling illusion that utterances and the parts of utterances do exist in nature." Only the physical domain (including, apart from people and sound waves, also the context, that is other physical objects) can be testified by "hard science" and therefore constitutes an exclusive source of knowledge about interpersonal communication. The concept of the physical domain is counterpoised to that of the logical domain. In Yngve's view, the logical domain, examined by "soft science", belongs to the interest of philosophy, logic and linguistics. As he claims, traditionally inclined linguists

dealing with language in semiotic and grammatical terms place their object of study in the logical domain, which is not testable by experimental methods. Accepting the hard-science tenet that the only accessible objects of scientific study, understood in terms of physics, chemistry and biology, are linguistic properties of human individuals communicating with other individuals in temporary and long-lasting linkages, we might agree with the opinion that "[t]here is no such thing in nature as an utterance that carries with it a linguistic segmentation or structure of any sort, whether in terms of phonemes, syllables, words, sentences, or any other of the constructs usually invoked to describe them" (9). However, we cannot say the same about the next statement: "Instead we have in nature only the physical sound waves themselves and the people producing, sensing, and interpreting them" (9). In fact, only the first phrase pertaining to observable channels and referring behavior of communicators is true. Without a doubt, "interpreting" activity has to be included into the logical domain because it is based on inferences and conditional reasoning, in the same way as "competence", which is seen by the author himself as "not a part of the real world" (Yngve 341, cf. also 97). Moreover, Yngve (189ff) has introduced into his theory the term *task* to "understand" the aim of people's communicative behavior. He speaks even about the *task hierarchies* and *subtasks* that are executed by the participants of communication being members of different groups. The notion of "task", connected rather with the investigative area of psychology, along with notions of "knowledge", "concepts", and the like, deviates also, in our opinion, from the terminological and methodological assumptions of human linguistics as a hard science.

Distinguishing the two domains – the physical domain and the logical domain – within the investigative field of pragmatics of linguistic communication, one should state that the communication takes place when people talk and understand each other while producing verbal means. The occurrence of mutual understanding, however, which is based on concluded reality, belongs, as a mental fact, to the logical domain. Considering the constituents of a concrete speech act, the physical domain unites, firstly, the people who communicate, and secondly, the physical sound waves as phenomena uniting the speaker(s) and the hearer(s), and thirdly, all those physical objects and other parts of the surroundings that are relevant for the realization of the tasks of communication participants. In other words, one could say that only these three elements: communication participants, material bearers of human intent, and the situational context constitute what can be empirically ascertained and proved, what forms a concrete observable whole. Nothing can be said with certainty, without logical reasoning, about the meaning or force of utterances, about the referential value of what the people mean, whether their communication is successful or not.

According to the assumptions of human linguistics, one observes the linguistic properties of particular persons, relevant for these persons communicative behavior. Such properties are, e.g., being bilingual, having a certain regional accent, knowing how to refer to different people in different contexts, knowing which referring contexts are current, knowing how to ask a question, producing the sound of the word *why*, being on the spot to answer a question (or not) or being engaged in the task of answering a question (cf. Yngve 123-124), but only some of them are adequate in a particular situation. In the interaction, there are always more persons than one who are involved, so that people are doing things through conversation (like buying and selling, haggling over a price, arguing, convincing, discussing, reaching an agreement, coordinating work on a common task, asking and explaining, teaching and learning, disagreeing) usually cooperatively (cf. Yngve 84). They interact in groups (such as family, work, sports groups, school classes, committees, in groups coordinated by telephone calls, exchange of written communication, in groups involving publication, radio, television, readers for some selected writings. As members of such groups, people develop certain common properties by virtue of reading, hearing, or viewing the same materials (cf. Yngve 85).

Observable from a hard science perspective group members, as real persons involved in the interaction with their environments, constitute only physical objects of assemblages which exist together with the relevant sound and light energy flow (of speech sounds and the light energy associated with gestures) as well as other (non-personal) objects and places of communicative relevance. However, on the theoretical level, they are considered as communicating individuals playing the role of *participants* in (communicative) *linkages* together with other linkage constituents, called in human linguistics, respectively, as *channels*, *props* and *setting*. The linkages, as assumed constructs, can be adjusted by each researcher arbitrarily, being as such delimited in space and time (cf. Yngve 126ff and 231ff). There are different types of linkages, such as, small, large, brief, long-lasting, broad or narrow. According to Yngve, one can prove that interacting individuals are linked with each other and with their environment as parts of observable reality. Among observable data one can find also, e.g., composite linkages that can be directly or indirectly coupled (if they are interacting with each other without requiring any third linkage or through one or more other linkages (cf. Yngve 203). The linkages can be coupled in some cases through their arrangement (cf. Yngve 214). One can distinguish also focused linkages, which include only the limited range of the observable phenomena, and complete linkages, which include the full involvement of the participating individuals (cf. Yngve 180). One may study the linkages being in contact situations (through covered or overlapped participants), as well as

linkages interacting through channels, props and settings, which trigger communicative behavior in the linkage. In any case, one can notice that there are some linkages, which form a hierarchy of stable couples of communicating individuals, and that there are also groupings of linkages, being mutually concatenated, which always change, so that the picture of linguistic community appears to be dynamic and not static, as it was traditionally depicted.

In linguistic pragmatics, developed after the proposals of philosophers of language, inter alia John Langshaw Austin, John R. Searle, Stephen C. Levinson and Geoffrey Neil Leech, the performative function of speech acts are ascribed to utterances the function of which is to achieve certain communicative goals of individuals indirectly or directly. However, bearing in mind the assumptions of human linguistics: "It is sound waves, spoken and understood that the people [...] are doing things with" (Yngve 85), and not words, as it was stated by John Austin in the famous title of his series of lectures, *How to do Things with Words*, which, in consequence, should be rather understood as "how to do things with sound waves". Analyzing the example: *I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow*, Victor H. Yngve explains that what people are doing with sound waves (and not with words, as misleadingly claimed by John L. Austin), "involves significant changes in the properties of both the speaker and the hearer: the properties of the speaker change to reflect that he has made a bet and the properties of the hearer change to reflect that a bet has been made." As Yngve claims, "[w]e can test that these changes have actually taken place by correlating the observed presence or absence of rain on the next day with the observed passing of sixpence from one to the other. Since the bet requires two people, it can be seen as a property of the group; and it is a property of this particular group for this particular stretch of time" (85).

As a matter of fact, pragmatics, as a discipline dealing with the practice of verbal communication, is interested in discovering general schemes of linguistic behavior of people, which govern the conversational rules of speaking and understanding processes in interpersonal communication. While speaking constitutes an activity of senders who transmit messages oriented towards achieving determined goals, their comprehension belongs to receivers. Without a doubt, understanding the goals, intentions or tasks of senders appears to be possible for receivers, as communication participants or practitioners of linguistic pragmatics, only through the interpretation of observable facts on the basis of their subjective insights achieved through solipsistic introspection. In the latter case, it is sometimes intuition, which plays an important role. In principle, one assumes that the domain of linguistic pragmatics comprises the search for the meaning of language utterances in relation to their authors by considering the

role of their situational context, or more broadly – their social-cultural context.[1] To be precise, while studying the pragmatics of speech, a linguist has to take into account, firstly, that the speaker may express through his utterance the facts, which stand in conformity with a certain state of the reality communicated in a word-for-word manner, i.e., presenting a literal semantic content of what he utters in a phonetic "locutionary act"[2]. And secondly, – he has to be aware that the speaker may act intentionally realizing a certain aim in view, communicative goal or task (considered also in terms of conversational implicature), providing his utterances a certain pragmatic value, or illocutionary force.[3] Depending on cultural and environmental factors, from conversational situations as well as from pragmatic factors, such as types of interpersonal relationships between interlocutors, their age, gender, the degree of intimacy, the purpose of polite exchange, the speaker chooses different communicational strategies hoping that they might be appropriate and effective (cf. pragmatic distinctions discussed in the context of lie and lying by Jolanta Antas (250 ff). Apart from this, the effectiveness of communication may be influenced by nonverbal and verbal

---

1   The boundaries between pragmatics and semantics were specified by Leech (*Principles of Pragmatics* 5) as follows: (i) pragmatic interpretation of a sentence is distinct from its semantic representation; (ii) pragmatics is principle-controlled and not rule-governed; (iii) the principles of pragmatics are non-conventional, i.e. motivated in terms of conversational goals; (iv) pragmatics relates the sense of an utterance to its pragmatic (or illocutionary) force; (v) pragmatic correspondences are defined by problems and their solutions (not by mappings as the grammatical correspondences); (vi) pragmatic explanations are primarily functional (not formal as the grammatical explanations); (vii) pragmatics is interpersonal and textual (not ideational as grammar); (viii) pragmatics is describable in terms of continuous and indeterminate values and not in terms of discrete and determinate categories.

2   In the theory of speech acts, the distinction between locutionary acts illocutionary (and perlocutionary acts has been made following to John L. Austin (*How to Do Things with Words*). The notion *illocutionary force* introduced by Austin along with *conversational implicature* developed by H. Paul Grice ("Logic and Conversation") have challenged the understanding of the term *meaning* coming from structural-systemic linguistics. A further contribution to the discussion about what the meaning of an utterance is and what the speaker means through uttering a certain sequence of words has been made through the introduction of the distinction between implicit and explicit ways of communicating the meaning conducted within the relevance theory framework of Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson (*Relevance*) by Robyn Carston (*Thoughts and Utterances*).

3   The pragmatic value of an utterance or, in other words, its pragmatic force, constitutes a product of the principles of textual rhetoric and the principles of interpersonal rhetoric (cf. especially Leech 15–17). In particular we assume that the speaker acts basing on the principle of cooperation; and expressing his communicative goals in a clear and compact manner, observing the maxims of quantity, quality, manner and relevance, he is guided by sincerity and considers in conversations not only the principles of textual organization, but also the principles of interpersonal contact. This means, the speaker bears in mind the principle of cooperation with the four mentioned maxims and the politeness principle with the six maxims: (Tact Maxim, Generosity Maxim, Approbation Maxim, Modesty Maxim, Agreement Maxim, and Sympathy Maxim). It is to be remembered that the importance of these maxims is different in different cultures; hence, some researchers devote their attention to comparative studies of the cultural style of politeness phenomena (cf., e.g., Antas 251).

behavior of interactants (such as gestures, face mimics, tone of the voice).[4] The effect of the communicational act, achieved in a perlocutionary way, can be evaluated on account of verbal or nonverbal reactions of addressees.

Based on the assertions of cognitive linguists, we may agree that there are no clear cut boundaries between semantic and pragmatic approaches with respect to the referential value of sentences that people use and learn in communication. When, for example, a Pole hears: *Czy nie masz drzwi w domu?* [Don't you have any doors at home?], in the situation where he has entered the room without closing the door, then he habitually recognizes this statements based on his knowledge of its earlier usages not as a question 'whether someone possesses the door at home', but as an impolite demand, expressing irritation, 'to close the door'. He is not supposed to interpret the semantic meaning of the utterance indirectly through a paraphrase but might directly react to its communicative impact as a global message.[5] A similar interpretational problem arises as far as the impact of the question formulated among close acquaintances in a Polish context: *Czy pani sama uszyła tę sukienkę?* [Did you sow this dress by yourself?]. This utterance having a syntactic form of an interrogative sentence may be understood by a Polish lady in pragmatic terms either as a critical remark about her dress or as a compliment. Its interpretation depends upon the evaluation of the relationship between the sender and receiver. The sender must be very well known by the receiver as a sincere or envious malicious person. The propositional content included in the logical semantic structure of the utterance: "Did you sow this dress by yourself?", expecting *Yes* or *No* answer, allows the receiver to draw at least two if not three conclusions. In the first case, it may mean: 'one can see that the dress was not sewn by a professional tailor'. In the second – 'the dress is absolutely perfect; you are a very gifted person, indeed'. The third interpretation may depend upon the intimacy between interlocutors and their common knowledge about the situation in the market. For example – 'what is done by hand is better then what the factory produces' or vice versa.

When we take into account two other, often cited, examples of the same kind, e.g.: *Why don't you sit down?* and/or: *Do you always make your own pastry at home?*, we may come to the conclusion that pragmatics is to be considered from the side of a sender who is the author of an utterance. It is, namely, the

---

4   Repetition, replacement, stressing of the spoken text, turn-taking rules and camouflage as exemplary kinds of nonverbal behavior are revealed by Jolanta Antas (213ff) on the basis of works on nonverbal communication by Mark L. Knapp.

5   Jerrold M. Sadock (1974) maintains, as Olga Sokołowska points out "that in the case of some indirect speech acts the illocutionary force is semantic in character, and that it is encoded in the sentences accomplishing them from the very beginning of their derivation." (61)

sender who endows his utterance with a certain pragmatic value.[6] The understanding of linguistic utterances in accordance with the intentions of a sender by their receiver depends, among the other things, upon the fact, whether the context (of the domain of reference), in which a given utterance appears, is the same for both participants of communication.

2. Between philosophical and hard-science pragmatics

What scientists are able to observe in the pragmatics of linguistic communication is the verbal behavior of people and their relevant nonverbal behavior under the influence of verbal stimuli. From the viewpoint of physics, only the energy flow that comes into being as connections between the communicators may be evaluated as constituting a measurable phenomenon. When the communication takes place, there is always a certain amount of energy expended by the individuals who produce and receive intentional semantic stimuli. The content of intentional speaking, however, cannot be directly tested. It may be inferred through the intersubjective knowledge of communication participants. What can be documented with certainty is the fact that communicating individuals unite into groups forming dynamic and steadily changing linguistic linkages of a collective character thanks to the interaction through the vocal-auditory channel. Considering the duration of these interacting groups, the question arises: to what extent do they exist as real entities describable in the role of communicational[7] or discursive communities, or are they only assumable as theoretical constructs?

In the domain of nonverbal behavior, the most elementary activities of the human body: the electrochemical activities, self-moving activities, connected with the biological nature of the men, can be registered by testing, because they belong to the physical domain of investigation. It is undeniable, therefore, that the more unique properties of human nature such as the activities of feeling and thinking, are those connected with the self-awareness of communicating individuals, couldn't do without physiological activities and without the unconscious activities of bodily organs, as well as the consciously controlled

---

6   While "[c]riticising the Performative Theory of speech acts, which postulated the deleted-performative-clause explanation", Dennis W. Stampe, "proposes that more heed should be paid to the speaker's intention, instead of attempting to explain illocutionary force solely in terms of convention – linguistic or social.", as quoted by Sokołowska (50).

7   It might be important to recall the views of Andrzej Gawroński or, inter alia, Norbert Reiter assuming that the language of collectivity does not exist or that the communicational community is a fiction. (Cf. Wąsik, Z. 29)

movements of the hands, legs, head, in the process of personal communication etc.[8] These remain, however, beyond the interest sphere of linguistics proper.

Most of the work conducted hitherto in the domain of linguistic pragmatics, which aim at understanding the nature of verbal communication, the effectiveness of speech acts in dependence of environmental conditionings, is based on philosophical foundations. The focus of pragmalinguistic or sociopragmatic studies dealing with the issues of language communication is concentrated mainly around the search for aims, intentions or tasks of the participants of interpersonal communication. And what the communicators intend or have in view, what tasks they want to achieve are indeed those facts that can not be observed directly. Unquestionably, the dispositional properties of communicating individuals can only be deduced from the introspective knowledge of receivers, who assume one another as having similar experiences as they impute to senders.

Examining the way how people exchange a few words, one can only state in terms of the communication theory that the only fact which is observable are the ways people enter into interactions. However, as regards the kinds of transactions that occur between them, it is the interlocutors and no-one else, who can deduce, preview, their outcomes or who can elicit or adapt to changeable conditionings of interpersonal relationships.[9] The communication participants, we are interested in from a human-centered perspective, actualize the relationships between the domain of expression and the domain of reference each time when they interact verbally. Nevertheless, observable only are the links, as sound waves, exchanged between the speaker and the listener and not how they

---

8   The distinction of the four types of human activities is derived from the theory of communication where the human being is analyzed as the Self. It is worthwhile, therefore, to be familiar with the model of the Self as a "Semantic Reactor" adapted from J. Samuel Bois (1973. *The Art of Awareness: A Text on General Semantics and Epistemics.* 2nd ed., Dubuque, Iowa: Brown, p. 20) in DeVito 1976: 63ff. Referring to the studies on the determinants of the Self, one can notice that the feeling operations as, for example, needs and drives, wants and fears, hopes and ambitions, as well as love and hate, commitment and indifference, trust and distrust, happiness and sorrow, contentment and frustration, as well as thinking operations, for example, adding and subtracting, conceptualizing and abstracting, decision making and strategy formulations, and the like, are connected with the symbolic activities of senders and require interpretative activities of receivers. They depend, undoubtedly, on the electrochemical and self-moving activities of the Self and his awareness of both interacting individuals in the communicational context.

9   Even Victor H. Yngve, though a trained physicist, deriving his conceptions from a hard science perspective is convinced that the interpretations of linguistic utterances are in the heads of the speakers and hearers. Cf. his stipulations (Yngve 13): "Is there any merit to the view that in nature we find only the physical sound waves, their interpretation being in the heads of the speakers and hearers? And does it not then follow that a scientific analysis must include the study of physical sounds themselves and a careful and detailed study of the people who produce and interpret the sounds? I think there is merit to this suggestion, but it needs further study."

interpret the meaning bearers, called sign-vehicles in semiotics. Similarly, while appealing to sign-and-meaning-related terms, one may observe the extra-semiotic reality to which the sign is referred by its user, but the referential value of the sign-vehicle is to be deduced from the linguistic or social and cultural context. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the observable and the concluded reality of the domain of reference, called in terms of linguistics also as extra-linguistic reality.

It seems obvious that in the investigative field of human-centered linguistics, scientists are not in a position to study the linguistic proprieties of people solely from a hard-science perspective. The logical domain appears to be indispensable as a counterpart of the physical domain. In this context, it might be relevant to recall the ideas of the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) who argued that the nature of man cannot be discovered in some way, in which we approach the nature of physical objects. It means, that only physical objects can be described in terms of their objective properties. Man, in Cassirer's view (41), can be described and defined only in terms of his consciousness. As Cassirer also claimed, only immediate contacts with people enables us to gain insight into the characteristic properties of man. In this, Cassirer showed his adherence to Socrates (469?-399 B.C.), Athenian philosopher, thanks to whom, from early antiquity, philosophical reasoning switched from cosmological thought to anthropological thought. In turn, one should also mention Adam Schaff (born 1913), the Polish philosopher of critical-Marxist orientation, who expressed his conviction that we are not able to cognize human nature unless we approach it through the dialogical or dialectic reflection (cf. Schaff 126-127). Above all, Schaff spoke against any attempts to change the philosophical interpretation of the reality of humans to the manner of the so-called "exact" or "hard" sciences. In particular, Schaff criticized the neo-positivist hypothesis, which assumed the unification of science through their reduction to physics advocated by Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1924) and Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), and according to which there is no difference between natural and psychical domains of subjects as organisms. Following Schaff's view we have to reject physicalism, which postulates that every scientific statement, other than the necessary statements of logic and mathematics, is to be translated into the language related to physical bodies, for example the statements from psychology into statements speaking about the state of organisms (cf. also Podsiad *Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych*). As one may gather from Schaff's conclusions, the neo-positivist approaches postulated by the representatives of the Vienna Circle – concerned with positive facts and phenomena while excluding speculation upon ultimate causes or origin – assumed, in the end, the form of a simplified behaviorism. Behaviorists

maintained that human psychology just as animal psychology can be accurately explained through the examination and analysis of objectively observable and quantifiable behavioral events, in contrast with subjective mental states.

The followers or opponents of the two different ways of thinking, physicalism or mentalism, ascribed to Galileo[10] and Descartes[11] whose ideas played an important role in the formation of the philosophy of modern science, should bear in mind the opinions about their heritage today. Even though both Galileo and Descartes represented initially the same conviction that the whole universe is composed of a uniform matter, which underlies universal laws of physics, "the followers of these two found themselves parting ways", as John Deely (15-16), the contemporary American philosopher working in the domain of semiotics, rightly stated. On the one hand is situated "the line of Galileans leading to Newton, Einstein, and Mission Control in Houston and placing men on the moon and ships bound for the stars"[12], and on the other "the line of Cartesians leading to Hume and Kant and a reluctant conviction that the universe of reality prejacent to and independent of the human mind is forever unknowable".[13] Instigated by the Cartesian dualism asserting that the thinking substance is independent of the universe of matter, the latter line contributed to the speculative understanding of the world in the philosophy. Even so, one can agree, in the end, explorations in the body-and-mind related pragmatics of human communication have enormously enriched our knowledge concerning the properties of communicating individuals and groups studied in the domain of contemporary psychology and sociology.

Works Cited

Adamska-Sałaciak, Arleta. *Language Change in the Works of Kruszewski, Baudouin de Courtenay and Rozwadowski.* Poznań: Motivex, 1996.

Antas, Jolanta. *O kłamstwie i kłamaniu. Studium semantyczno-pragmatyczne* [On the lie and lying. A semantic pragmatic-study]. 2nd ed. Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas, 1999, 2000.

---

10 Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Italian physicist and astronomer.
11 René Descartes, alias Cartesius (1596–1650), French philosopher and mathematician.
12 Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), English physicist and mathematician; Albert Einstein (1879–1955), German physicist, and U.S. citizen from 1940.
13 David Hume (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher and historian; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher.

Austin, John L[angshaw]. *How to Do Things with Words*. New York: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Bloomfield, Leonard. *Language*. New York: Holt; [Reprint] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933, 1984.

Bühler, Karl. *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*. Jena/2nd ed. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1934, 1965.

Carston, Robyn. *Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

Cassirer, Ernst. [*An Essay on Man: An introduction to the Philosophy of Human Culture*, New Haven, Yale University Press; London, H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1944] *Esej o człowieku. Wstęp do filozofii kultury*. Trans. Anna Staniewska. 3rd ed. Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1971, 1998.

Deely, John. "Semiotics as a Postmodern Recovery of the Cultural Unconscious." *Sign Systems Studies* 28 (2000): 15-48.

DeVito, Joseph A. *The Interpersonal Communication Book*. New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco and London: Harper & Row, 1976.

Gawroński, Andrzej. "La langue, sa nature et son origin". *Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawczego* 1 (1927): 3-93 (Polish trans. "O istocie i rozwoju języka [On the nature and development of language]." *Szkice językoznawcze* [Linguistic sketches] by Andrzej Gawroński, Warszawa, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Wilno and Zakopane: Gebethner & Wolff, 1928: 1-37).

Grice, H. Paul. "Logic and Conversation." *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 3: *Speech Acts*. Eds. Cole, Peter, and Jerry L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press, 1975: 41-58.

Knapp, Mark L. *Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction*. 2nd edition, New York: Holt-Rinehart and Winston, 1978.

Leech, Geoffrrey [Neil]. *Principles of Pragmatics*. First published: New York: Longman/Seventh impression: London and New York: Longman, 1983, 1990.

Levinson, Stephen C. *Pragmatics*. Fifteenth printing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Podsiad, Antoni. *Słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych* [A dictionary of philosophical terms and notions]. Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 2000.

Reiter, Norbert. "Die Irrtümer um den Idiolekt." *Incontri Linguistici* 11 (1986): 137-151.

Sadock, Jerrold M. *Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Cours de linguistique générale*. Publié par Charles Bally et Albert Sechehaye. Avec la collaboration de Albert Riedlinger. Lausanne & Paris/2nd ed. Paris: Payot, 1916, 1922. (English ed. *Course in General Linguistics*. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, [1916] 1959; Trans. & annotated by Roy Harris. London: Duckworth, [1916, 1972] 1983.

Schaff, Adam. *Wstęp do semantyki*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1960 [Introduction to Semantics. Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1962].

Searle, John R. *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Sokołowska, Olga. *A Cognitive Study of Speech Acts*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2001.

Sperber, Dan, Deirdre Wilson. *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986, 1995.

Stampe, Dennis W. "Meaning and Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts." *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 3: *Speech Acts*. Eds. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press, 1975: 1-39.

Wąsik, Zdzisław. "The Development of General linguistics in the History of the Language Sciences in Poland. Late 1860s – Late 1960s." *Towards a History of Linguistics in Poland. From the early beginnings to the end of the twentieth century*. Eds. E. F. K. Koerner and Aleksander Szwedek, Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins (Series III – Studies in the History of the Language Sciences. Volume 102), 2001: 3-51.

Yngve, Victor H. *From Grammar to Science. New Foundations for General Linguistics*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1996.