CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL OTHER IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARAB SPRING

ALEXANDER BOGOMOLOV

1. Introduction

From the onset of the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011 a single strand of discourse reflecting the rapidly changing political scene has emerged and prevailed in the local media through the entire period of political turmoil up until now. This discourse is built around a set of key concepts such as, TUWĀR (REVOLUTIONARIES), ŠABĀB (YOUTH) featuring as the vanguard of the revolution, IRĀDA(t) AṢ-ṢA‘B (PEOPLE’s WILL) – as its driving force, reason and justification, and, notably, the subject of the present study – FULŪL – enemies of the REVOLUTIONARIES associated with the Ancien Régime. Participants of this discourse regardless of their political affiliation, while arguing for their respective views and statuses, and reshaping their identities in the context of an emerging new social order, have all accepted these concepts as terms of reference in public debate. These concepts make up a mega-frame of the REVOLUTION, just as characters, settings, scenes and plot elements combine into a movie. Not any revolution but a very specific one, whose key events happened at sites and settings that are known to all, protagonists could be often named or classified based on a set of social markers and key themes are still a matter of vivid emotional argument. Unlike a movie, however, this show is still going on, events keep adding up, and there is neither a single privileged viewpoint nor a ‘true’ story, the villains are villains and heroes are heroes only in as much as one party in the debate is able to lead the discussion by controlling the key sites of discursive deliberation such as media.
At its inception, the story’s key protagonists were the broadly defined PEOPLE (ŠA’B) against the narrowly defined REGIME (NIẒĀM), as reflected in the popular revolutionary slogan aš-ša’b yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām (people want the downfall of the regime), with JAYŠ (the Egyptian Armed Forces) on the backdrop as a politically neutral patriotic force. When the Ancien Régime collapsed the military effectively took power renouncing their ostensible neutrality, which prompted some revolutionaries to rephrase their slogan as yasqūt asqūt ḥukm al-‘askar (let the rule of the military fall). The military were then succeeded by a democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president. That led to the Muslim Brotherhood laying claim to the legacy of the revolution and the bearded traditionally dressed Muslims featuring increasingly as the prototypical revolutionaries sidelinining in that capacity the young secular (often leftist) activists, who took credit for their role in triggering the large-scale anti-Mubarak protests. Before the ousting of president Mursi on July 3, 2013, the word revolution had only one referent in the media discussion – the revolution of January 25, often described as ṭawrat al-karāma (the revolution of dignity). Later, there were already two such events, as the participants of anti-Mursi protests started referring to their rallies that led to the overthrow of President Mursi by the Egyptian military, as another revolution, while the Muslim Brotherhood called it a coup. The REVOLUTION and the status of a (true) REVOLUTIONARY have obviously come to be associated with high moral authority and even political power, thus making it an asset worth contesting for. This has contributed to a strongly polemical nature of the discourse, which affected the semantic structure of concepts from the ‘traditional’ political discourse inventory and stimulated the invention of new nominations with a stronger illocutionary force and more specific range of reference.

Our overall methodological approach in this study is grounded in George Lakoff’s theory of conceptual metaphor. For a finer analysis of the semantic contexts featuring the concept of FULŪL, we use elements of Charles J. Fillmore’s frame semantics, particularly, some specific frame descriptions available on the FrameNet. The FrameNet frames have been identified and described on the basis of English language material, yet the situations these frames refer to

---

1 On the significance of this slogan and its derivative concept IRĀDA(t) AŠ-ŠA’B see ours Kontsept IRĀDA(t) AŠ-ŠA’B (volya naroda) v diskurse ‘arabskoj vesny’. Skhodoznavstvo 6-4, Kyiv 2013, pp. 15–28.
3 FrameNet is a web-based corpus that contains description of the internal structure of various semantic frames that refer to situations, actions, events – cf. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home
appear to be so basic that their respective descriptions seem to be almost universally applicable. At least, the very idea that semantic structures of Arabic could be presented and analyzed as frames in the same manner as it is done on the FrameNet, appears to present no difficulties. We, however, use the FrameNet descriptions with a certain degree of caution, as a kind of guidance but also as a comparative case rather than a ready-made model, as differences and inconsistencies between our material and the FrameNet descriptions may be accounted for by a mix of different factors, such as the presumable shortcomings of the FrameNet or idiosyncrasies of either the Arabic language or the Egyptian political discourse. It is the idiosyncratic part of the frame-semantic structures that we are primarily concerned with in this study. Leonard Talmy’s force dynamics is another theoretical framework that we found particularly useful for the analysis of modal aspects of acts ascribed to FULUL. As the material for this study we use a collection of recent Egyptian media texts available on the web pre-selected on the basis of their relevance to the subject of the recent Egyptian revolution.

In the discourse of the January 25 Egyptian revolution the word fulūl (pl. of fallun – break, or notch, in the edge of a sword, or of anything) has rapidly gained enormous popularity and become a key instrument for othering political opponents, initially used mainly in reference to the government officials and clients of the Ancien Régime, but later expanding its meaning and the range of reference.

In modern standard Arabic the word fulūl has featured mainly if not exclusively in reference to debries of a defeated army, cf.:

fa-tāḥawwalat ‘alā āydihim fulūl al-jayš al-mīṣrī al-maksūra al-ğayr qādira ‘alā ḥaml silāḥihim min al-ḥawf ilā usūd jā’i’a ilā naṣr wa šahāda

… and in their hands (i.e. under their command) the debries of the defeated (lit. broken) Egyptian army not capable of carrying their weapons out of fear have transformed into lions hungry for victory and martyrdom.

A similar metaphorical meaning features already in the classical Arabic dictionaries. The late 13th century Lisān al-‘Arab, for instance, assigns the meaning ‘defeat’ to the verb falla and ‘defeated people’ to fall (sing.) and fulūl (pl.).

---

5 With very few exceptions google search for the word fulūl will return an enormous amount of texts related to the recent Egyptian revolution(s) or Arab Spring countries; we see it as a compelling evidence of both the salience and the newness of the concept.
Alexander Bogomolov

while citing ‘breaking’ and ‘notching of the sword’ as the original meaning (aṣl) of the root⁸. The old meaning ‘defeated people’ as well as modern one – ‘debris of the defeated army’ – reflect a series of metonymical shifts: material (iron) for weapon (sword), weapon for a party in a fight, hence, broken weapon stands for a defeated combatant. Entailment of the same metaphor underlies a popular proverb lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd (only iron notches the iron), which conveys a meaning similar to that of the English proverb one nail drives out another⁹. In the early revolutionary discourse, the proverb has been extensively used in arguing for a more decisive or violent action against the Ancien Régime, which contributed to the salience of FULŪL.

To be sure, there have been other competitive nominations also used in reference to remnants of the Ancien Régime – such as baqāyā (remainders, remnants), ǧulūl an-nizām as-sābiq (tails of the Ancien Régime), abnā’ an-nizām as-sābiq (sons of the Ancien Régime) and rumūz an-nizām as-sābiq (symbols of the Ancien Régime). The latter two terms are devoid of negative connotation, while rumūz an-nizām is simply a standard Arabic expression referring to important political figures and public officials. It is only baqāyā and ǧulūl an-nizām as-sābiq that are linked to the actual scenario of the REVOLUTION – i.e. the loss by their respective referents of prominent positions and it is only the latter term that assigns an evaluative (pejorative) connotation to this event. Both terms provide no clue in their semantic structures (the frames that they evoke) as regards the manner, in which their referents have been removed from the political scene in contrast to fulūl, which portrays them as those, who have been defeated in a battle. Unlike the other nominations, fulūl has provided a basis for derivation – cf. a totally new coinage fulūlī, which functions as a relative adjective or a singular form of fulūl¹⁰. Nomination fulūl not only occurs far more frequently compared to other coreferential terms in the verbal discourse of the Egyptian revolution, but graphic representations in print media and posters of the enemies of revolution¹¹, are most usually (if not exclusively) tagged as fulūl.

---

¹⁰ In the same manner as the word ‘arabī means both ‘an Arab’ and ‘Arabic’; by contrast classical Arabic dictionaries describe fulūl as the plural form of fall (a notch), which is out of use in modern language attesting to the opaqueness of the grammatical structure of fulūl for the modern speakers of Arabic.
2. FULŪL as wrongdoers

When referring to the pre-revolutionary past, the Egyptian revolutionary discourse portrays FULŪL as systematically engaged in wrongdoings, cf.:

al-fulūl hum man ʾistāʿḍū wa ṭarabbahū wa kasabū min ḥarām amwāl hāḍā aš-šaʿb al-miskīn, al-fulūl hum man ʿašfaw min nawmihim wa-ktāṣafū anna dawlat az-ẓulm qad saqātāt ilā ġayr rujʿa wa kānū yataʿayyūna ʿalā az-ẓulm 12

FULŪL are [those] who have sought returns and made profit and gained and robbed the forbidden property of this poor people, FULŪL are [those] who woke up from their sleep to find that the state of injustice had fallen with no [possibility of] return, while they had been feeding on injustice…

This description includes almost all the key words used for decades in the criticism of the Ancien Régime by all colors of the Egyptian political opposition. Aside from key words, the paragraph also cites the most basic underlying relational frame, still widely used to explain local politics, i.e. poor people vs. the unjust ruler. While NIZĀM (regime), with which FULŪL were associated, has disappeared and is now often described as bāʾid (the one that vanished, perished), essential qualities attributed to it have persisted in the form of core meaning components of the newly coined concept. They have been projected on or transferred to FULŪL together with the implied binary opposition as described above, albeit the modality of the binary relationship and the perceived relative strength of its two constituents have changed.

In the aftermath of the January 25, 2011 revolution, FULŪL are ascribed a tendency to ‘return’ or regain ‘centrality’ (ṣadāra) on the [political] scene, which is seen as major threat to the REVOLUTION. Cf. ʿaḥšā min ʿawdatihim ilā ṣadārat al-mašhad natījat ḍuʿf tanẓīm al-qiwā aṯ-ṭawriya (I fear their return to the centrality of the scene) 13. This is a clear case of orientational metaphor 14 which could be specified as CENTER is POWER. The presupposition of such statements is that presently FULŪL are peripheral and hence weak. Return to centrality is seen as FULŪL’s essential tendency, a goal they strive to achieve through a set of specific acts. They are seen as engaged in buying votes (šīrāʾ al-aṣwāṭ), deception and attempting to re-write the history of January 25 revolution (yuḡāliṭūna wa yuḥāwilūna iʿādat kitābat tārīḫ ʿawrat yanāʾīr) 15, assembling their supporters and dragging the masses to go out against authorities (ḥaṣd

---

12 http://www.masser.com/almessa/29168
13 http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/233400.aspx
15 http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/233400.aspx
violent acts against revolutionaries (qāma al-fulūl bi-ḍarb an-nāʾib as-sābiq ‘an ḥizb al-hurriya wa al-‘adāla... wa kād al-fulūl an yaftakā bihi – FULŪL have beaten a former deputy from Freedom and Justice Party ... almost came down on him), insulting the president and revolution (isā’ā li-r-raʾis wa aṭ-ṭawra)18, penetrating the political life (tawaqqūl fī al-ḥayā as-siyāsiya)19, and corrupting the political work (ifsād al-‘amal as-siyāsī). Such wrongdoings are often cited as reasons that justify specific acts of persecution against FULŪL by good guys, cf.:

ahālī al-iskandariya yuṭāridūna al-fulūl li-isā’ātihim li-r-raʾis wa aṭ-ṭawra

Locals of Alexandria are chasing FULŪL for their insulting of the president and revolution.

The texts that do not explicitly refer to any such counter-FULŪL activities are still designed to leave the reader with an impression that ‘something needs to be done’.

FULŪL are also attributed symbolic acts of derogatory nature, meaning to humiliate them, which may be expressed by idioms, cf.:

idrab bi-quwwa yā mursī fa-l-fulūl yataqayya’ūna dam li-nijāḥātika ad-duwaliya wa irjā’ amwāl al-arāḍī20

Beat strongly, Mursi, for FULŪL are vomiting blood because of your international successes and the return of land money.

The paragraph conveys the message of encouragement to President Mursi by referring to demoralizing effect of his success upon his political opponents. Pragmatically, as we see from the above examples various acts are attributed to FULŪL not for the sake of providing an accurate description of their activities, but rather to stimulate or justify certain proactive moves on the part of the other party – the good guys, described as ‘Egyptian people’, concerned ‘locals’, the ‘revolutionary’ president, Army etc. ‘Taking the central position on the scene’ appears to be the key, if not the only, euphemism of power that could be attributed to FULŪL. In the paragraph below, it appears that FULŪL although having acquired some sort of ‘centrality’ (i.e. POWER) have done so somehow very locally, and the author seems to be

16 http://www.masress.com/almashhad/22247
19 http://ikhwanonline.net/new/print.aspx?ArtID=95570&SecID=0
referring to this fact in a manner of warning rather than asserting that FULÛL have finally fulfilled their goal:


There continue violations related to the referendum in the governorate of Kafr el-Shaikh through the occupation of the central position (taṣaddur) on the scene on the part of FULÛL of the dissolved National [Democratic] Party and the call of the people to vote ‘yes’ on the Constitution and assembling the voters for voting ‘yes’ by deploying all possible methods, and FULÛL and the supporters of the coup have used loudspeakers of the mosques for calling for coming out and voting ‘yes’ on the Constitution as happened in the village of Kum al-Ahmar in Baltem …

The manner in which FULÛL intend to achieve their purposes is, however, indirect. Cf.:

wa ayyan kān naw‘ min al-matā’ib fa-sa-tajid al-kaftīr min an-nās yakṣif ‘an wujūd ‘umalā‘ qāma al-fulūl bi-taḥrīḍihim li-yubītū anna miṣr bidūna mubārak tusāwī al-fawḍa

And whatever the type of troubles, you will find a lot of people [who] expose agents, [who] FULÛL have incited in order to prove that Egypt without Mubarak equates disorder. They are not seen as going headlong to their aspired ultimate goal of regaining power, but do it by trying to weaken their opponents. The subversive actions as listed above are meant to contribute to the creation of a state of disorder in the society described as FITNA (an intraethnic or intraconfessional strife) or FAWḌA (anarchy, disorder), sometimes specified more technically as ḥarb aḥliya (civil war). This list of nominations refers to the same social reality of a profound disaster with FITNA as a native and also a Sharia term appearing as the most self-evident and capturing the very essence of threat posed by FULÛL.

3. Either us or them: the force dynamics aspects

Importantly, semantics of FULÛL and their opponents, the good guys, who may be described as revolutionaries or simply us, are paired, particularly, as

\[\text{http://www.shhabalnil.com/?p=38588}\]

\[\text{http://www.horytna.net/Articles/Printdetails.aspx?AID=79647&ZID=}\]

\[\text{Texts foregrounding FULÛL quite often do not explicitly name the other party, whose presence is however an essential part of the presupposed background.}\]
regards their evaluative component. The mechanism of this pairing is based on an asymmetry of qualities. Any statement regarding relative power of FULŪL will imply weakness of us, the good guys. Same asymmetry is observed in the implied moral evaluation of physical acts ascribed to both parties. For instance, FULŪL could be attributed openly aggressive behaviors, which they may espouse in response to a justified rejection of them on the part of the people, cf.:

amām rafḍ al-ahālī wujūd al-fulūl amām al-minṭaqa aš-šimāliya qām al-fulūl bi-rašq al-ahālī bi-l-ḥijāra wa az-zuğājāt al-fārīga wa al-mulutuṭ wa al-asliḥa an-nāriya wa al-bayḍā’ immā maṭṭara al-‘aḏīd min ašhāb al-maḥālīl at-tijāriya bi-sāri’ būr sa’īd ilā ḍīliq maḥāllihim taḥawwufan min ḥudūṭ ayy i’tidād ‘alayhim24

In the face of the rejection of the presence of FULŪL in front of the Northern District, FULŪL have showered the [local] residents with stones, empty bottles, Molotov [cocktails], fire and cold arms, which forced many owners of trading outlets on Port Said Street to close their shops in fear of an assault against them.

Obviously, the local residents must have tried to force FULŪL out of their district, which could have sparked the violent reaction. The text, however, does not explicitly attribute any such violent acts to the party enjoying empathy of the author, substituting them with a vague moral concept of rejection, which is presupposed to be self-evident and self-justified.

When it comes to FULŪL engagement in acts that could potentially be a game changer with regard to power balance, if even at a local level, these are often presented as attempts. Cf.:

fī madīnat baḷqās ijtama’a 30 min fulūl al-ḥizb al-wataḥānī bi-muḥāfaẓat ad-daqahliya mu’ẓamuhum min a’ḍā’ maṣlis aš-ša’b as-sabīq fī muḥāwaḷa minhum lamm aš-šaml ba’ād mā aṣhāb al-ḥizb min inhiyār wa ḍiyā’ba’ād ẓawrat 25 yanāyīr allatī āṯāḥat bi-n-nizām al-ba’ād al-fāṣid allaḏī ḥaymana ‘alā al-hayā bi-sīyāṣati akṭar min rub’ qarn25

In the city of Belqas, 30 FULŪL of the National [Democratic] Party in the Daqahlia governorate have gathered, most of them members of the former people’s council, in an attempt on their part to re-unite after collapse and loss that had afflicted the Party in the aftermath of the January 25 revolution, which had brought down the defunct corrupt regime that dominated political life for more than quarter century.

The Arabic verb ḥāwal just as its English match try ‘involves focus at the initial phase without knowledge of its outcome’26. The act, in which FULŪL features as Agent, ijtama’a (gathered) is, hence, presented as an initial phase of the

25 http://www.masress.com/alzaman/1492
act of lamm aš-šaml (reunion). The latter idiomatic expression is composed of lamm (gather) and šaml (entirety, integrity), which in this context implies that FULŪL were trying to bring all their forces together again. The paragraph, however, implies that for some reasons this purpose has not been fully achieved.

Here is one more example:

wa aḍāfa al-‘ādlī annahu yatawaqqā’ qiyām ṯawra ša’biya lā taqill ‘an ṯawrat yūnūḏ mā ḥāwaša fulūl al-muštall aw baqāyā jamā’at al-ḥiwwān al-muslimiṇ al-maḥżūra al-wusūl lā maṣīs aš-ša’ b

And el-Adli added that [he] is expecting the rise of popular revolution no less [strong] than June Revolution if FULŪL of the dissolved National [Democratic] Party or the left-overs of the prohibited Society of the Muslim Brothers would try to enter the People’s Assembly...

Here the act, where FULŪL features as the Agent, is part of a conditional clause, which implies that the act has not actually occurred, but has a degree of probability, FULŪL are ascribed a tendency to perform the act and may engage on its initial phase (try to enter the Parliament), but will hardly succeed as they stand to face resistance on the part of a stronger counter-force (the rise of the popular revolution).

In the example below the REVOLUTION is represented as an ongoing purposeful movement, while FULŪL are portrayed as those who are trying to impede it:

al-fulūl tuṭlaq ‘alā man yuḥāwil i’āqat aṯ-ṯawra ‘an taḥqīq ahdāfihā li-l-qaḍā’ ‘alā aẓ-ẓulm wa aṭ-ṭuġyān. al-fulūl hum man yarfaḍūna ši’ārāt aṯ-ṯawra allatī rafaḍat (sic., probably, the author meant to say rufi’at) wa tuṭālib bi-l-ḥurriya wa al-‘adāla al-ijtimā’iya

[the term] FULŪL applies to whoever is trying to obstruct the revolution from the fulfillment of its goals of eliminating injustice and tyranny. FULŪL are [those] who reject the slogans of the revolution that were raised and demand freedom, dignity and social justice.

The three above examples reflect a force-dynamic pattern, where FULŪL is a relatively weak Antagonist, and REVOLUTION (or any sentient entity representing it, such as REVOLUTIONARIES, PEOPLE’s WILL or simply us) is an Agonist. All the above reviewed acts that FULŪL perform on the public scene

---

27 http://www.el-balad.com/638921
28 Sayyid el-Adli, Egyptian journalist, founder of the Egyptian Independence Party.
29 http://www.mastress.com/almessa/29168
(buying votes, forging elections, trying to penetrate public offices, instigating public disorder etc.) also fall into the same pattern as they affectively substantiate their presumed natural tendency to obstruct the REVOLUTION.

To complete our brief analysis of the phase aspects of acts ascribed to FULŪL we will now review examples containing another phase verb najah (succeed) – a pair to hāwal (try). While the verb hāwal (try) ‘involves focus at the initial phase without knowledge of its outcome’, the verb najah (succeed) shifts the focus ‘on a known occurrent or non-occurrent outcome’31. Examples containing the collocations of FULŪL and najah in their various forms – najah (perf.), yanjah (imperf.), al-fulūl (def.), fulūl + genitive attribute (e.g. fulūl an-nizām as-sābiq – FULŪL of former regime) – feature persistent pragmatic patterns of threat or warning. Syntactic patterns include emphatic negation (lan yanjah al-fulūl – FULŪL will never succeed), negative part. lam + imperfect (lam yanjah al-fulūl – FULŪL have not succeeded), question (hal yanjah al-fulūl – will FULŪL succeed?). Success of FULŪL is also often presented as a hypothetical situation, syntactically expressed either as unreal conditional clause (law najaḥ fulūl – were FULŪL to succeed) or, less frequently, a simple conditional clause (iḏā najaḥ fulūl – if FULŪL succeeded). Cf.:

a) lan yanjah fulūl an-nizām al-bād fi ayy šay wa ‘alayhim an yanjāzū ilā al-ḥaqq wa yaṭafaḥu hāwla at-ṭawra wa yatūbū ‘ammā iqṭarafat aydīhim
FULŪL of the defunct regime will never succeed in anything and they have to align with truth and rally around the revolution and repent for what their hands have committed

b) hal yanjah fulūl al-munḥall fi ǧārat al-fitān wa al-azamāt li-iḥrāj ar-raṣīs?
Will FULŪL of the dissolved [National Democratic Party] succeed in exciting FITAN (pl. of FITNA – intraethnic strives) and crises [in order] to discomfit the president?

c) wa law najah al-fulūl la-‘āda aš-šarr wa ‘āda al-fasād li-yulqū bi-misra fi širā‘āt wa mahālik lā ya’limuhā illā aḷḷāh
And if FULŪL were to succeed, the evil would come back and corruption would come back [in order] to throw Egypt into conflicts and perils that only Allah knows.

In some instances, however, collocations of FULŪL and derivatives of najah (succeed) could be interpreted as indicating successful completion of various

---

32 http://goo.gl/434KIL
33 http://www.rassd.com/7-21602.htm
34 http://goo.gl/UkHsu3
acts. As these cases appear to be few, and contradicting the previously reviewed abundant material that tends to ascribe to FULŪL mainly incomplete acts or those of limited affect, they merit a closer look. Here are two typical contexts:

d) wa qāla muḥammad as-sattār amīn ‘āmīn an-niqābā al-‘āmma al-mustaqqilla li-l-‘āmilīn bi-hay’at an-naqṣ al-‘ām: ‘inqsamat al-garājīfī ‘alā qirār faḍḍ al-īdrāb wa ḍālika ba’d an najaḥ fulūl an-niqām as-sābiq min ḥilāl al-asālib al-multawiya fī at-ta’līf ‘alā ba’d ‘ummāl al-hay’a allaḏīna qarrarū ta’līq al-īdrāb.35

And Muhammad as-Sattar, Secretary General of the independent General Trade Union of the workers of the Department of General Transport, said: ‘the garages have divided over the decision to call off the strike, which [happened] after FULŪL of the former regime have succeeded by way of devious methods in influencing some workers of the Department who decided to suspend the strike.

e) iḏān fa-qad najaḥ al-fulūl fī-ṣṭyād at-tawra wa tarwīd al-kutla at-tawriya min ḥayt arādat hāḏīhi al-kutla insti’nās al-fulūl wa damjahum fiḥā wa an-natījā: gāba at-ṭuwār wa haḍar al-fulūl… ša’adat at-ṭawra al-muḍāddda wa habatat at-tawra al-ḥaqiqa ila’ ad-darāk allaḏī al-qarrat fī-ḥuqūqahum bi-l-la’b fī al-awrāq wa al-adilla wa ṣana’at minhum rumūzan li-l-istiqlāl wa an-nidāl.36

So FULŪL have succeeded in hunting [down] the revolution and taming the revolutionary block as this block wished to domesticate FULŪL and integrate them with itself, the result [was that] the revolutionaries have disappeared and FULŪL appeared [instead]… the counter-revolution has risen and the true revolution has subsided to the extent that it threw down images (lit. pictures) of martyrs on the ground and raised images of fake martyrs and glorified those [who] have wasted their rights by playing with cards and evidence and made out of them symbols of independence and struggle.

In both (d) and (e) FULŪL are ascribed acts from the familiar list of wrongdoings (deception). Paragraph (d) refers to a situation where FULŪL have achieved some low level success – a merely tactical one in fact. Paragraph (e) represents quite an opposite situation, where FULŪL have produced a complete disaster, have almost defeated the ‘true revolution’.37 These two contexts are

36 http://goo.gl/M0owH
37 The article, from which the cited paragraph was borrowed, carries a characteristic title ‘Taṯwīr al-fulūl am taflīl aṯ-ṯawra (turning FULŪL into revolutionaries or FULŪLizing the revolution) and is dated 17 April 2013, the time of deepening political crisis, when a mass protest...
very typical: it is either a minor tactical victory or a political apocalypse with nothing in between, no ‘ordinary’ acts or events that characterize normal everyday human experience.

Ostensibly defeatist messages such as (e) can usually be traced back to peaks of political crises in Egypt. Their illocutionary point is to rally support for the ‘true revolutionaries’ in the face of an imminent threat that they describe. Paragraph (e) claims that FULŪL have afflicted major losses on the revolutionaries, which, notably, appear to be mainly of moral and symbolic nature. The Hunting metaphor portrays REVOLUTION as a prey and FULŪL as a beast of prey or a human hunter. Such account of FULŪL’s acts as provided in (e), or even more so in (c), is far removed from the language of everyday human activity, it is almost an epic, considering, particularly, the reference to the superhuman forces – the eternal Evil and God’s wisdom.

4. Who is behind it? Conspiracy theories and moral judgment

While FULŪL mostly do not function as an active Agent, one specific construction featuring FULŪL in association with events and actions merits a special analysis. The illocutionary point of utterances based on this construction in most cases is to accuse FULŪL of being somehow instrumental in causing a certain event, while still, as we shall see downplaying their active role in it. The construction may be schematically represented as X is warā’ (behind) E, where X stands for a sentient entity responsible for E, an event of mostly negative nature, cf.:

a) al-fulūl warā’ tarākum mašākil al-ḥayy – FULŪL [are] behind the accumulation of the neighborhood’s problems38;

b) al-fulūl warā’ aḥdāṭ masbīrū – FULŪL [are] behind the events of Maspero39;

c) al-fulūl warā’ ḥarq al-mujamma’ al-‘ilmī – FULŪL [are] behind the burning of the scientific complex40;

d) al-fulūl warā’ aḥdāṭ al-‘abbasiya li-ta’jīl al-intiḥāb ar-ri’āsiya – FULŪL [are] behind the events of al-Abbasiya (official spelling el-Abaseya) [in order] to delay the presidential elections41;

movement broke out against Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president Muhammad Mursi, who was then overthrown by the military in less then three months.

38 http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?secid=0&vid=0&newsId=234446
39 http://www.masress.com/shabab/7193
40 http://goo.gl/ox0lCU
e) al-fulūl warā‘ ‘uzūf aš-šabāb ‘an il-mušāraka fī-l-intiḥābāt – FULŪL [are] behind the reluctance of the youth to participate in the elections42;

f) al-fulūl warā‘ rafid al-badawī al-indažmān li-taḥāluf mūsā – FULŪL [are] behind the refusal of el-Badawi to join [Amr] Musa’s Alliance43;

h) al-fulūl warā‘ insiḥābī min ijtimā‘ as-silmī – FULŪL [are] behind my withdrawal from the meeting [organized by] Silmi44;

g) fulūl warā‘ fitnat al-islāmiyīna wa al-libraliyīn – FULŪL [are] behind the conflict (fitna – strife between coreligionists or compatriots) of Islamists and Liberals45.

The warā‘ construction implies a type of causative relationship between X and E, while rendering this relationship totally opaque as regards to the manner in which such causation could have occurred. Phrase (c) contains a substantivated form (maṣdar) of a transitive verb ḥaraqa (burn), which implies an Agent, but the warā‘ construction instead of saying that FULŪL have actually burned the place transforms their role to that of Cause of the event of burning, not necessarily a direct one. But the segment certainly presents FULŪL as an entity that has provided the necessary conditions for the negative event to happen, and should, therefore, take the blame. Case (b) demonstrates an even weaker implication of Agency, while (a) simply excludes it: the FULŪL could hardly be seen as consciously accumulating problems, rather they have probably let them accumulate. Case (d) appears to be somewhat peculiar: it features a Purpose of the event. It all but reconstitutes the Agency back from implicature, as the phrase could easily be reformulated as FULŪL have organized the events of al-Abaseya [in order] to delay the presidential elections46. Case (g) appears to imply an agency only in translation, indeed Conflict must have at least two sides involved in it, but the Islamic concept of FITNA describes social conflict in a manner that does not foreground any ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, but rather a split ‘us’, which refers to the entire community, that experiences a state of division. Cases (e, f, h) feature an explicitly expressed Agent, but completely distinct from FULŪL. Let us review the text that follows phrase (h) in order to establish the type of relationship binding FULŪL and the Agent of the act featuring in the segment (withdrawal) together:

http://www.vetogate.com/1037408
http://goo.gl/Rw71PH
http://goo.gl/M3y83H
http://www.dostor.org/164785

42 Case (d) is a news article title and it does not appear to us as a normally constructed phrase, rather it is a shorthand summary of the article that follows enumerating a long series of various negative public events, which, according to the author, all represent evidence of FULŪL’s intention to delay the elections (niyatuhum fī ta’jīl al-intiḥābāt).

The Engineer Abu-l-Ala Madi, chairman of the Wasat Party, justified the reason for his withdrawal from the meeting that Dr. Ali as-Silmi, Deputy Prime-Minister for political affairs and democratic transition, called for, by that it occurred in protest to the presence of a number of FULŪL of the former National Democratic Party and also the presence of puppet (lit. cardboard) parties created by the former regime.

The paragraph reveals a sociosemiotic pattern proscribing someone, who is not FULŪL, from attending an event where FULŪL are present to avoid being associated with them. FULŪL have thus affected a certain symbolic act on the part of the Agent (declining to attend a meeting in protest) without taking any action at all, merely by providing grounds for a certain reading of a social setting.

A key concept that the warā‘ construction evokes is Responsibility. The Framenet\(^{48}\) provides the following definition of the Responsibility frame: ‘[a]n Agent is responsible for having intentionally performed an Act or for being a primary instigator behind the Act’. The material that we have reviewed in this section falls rather under the second part of this definition as it mostly excludes or obscures any direct engagement of FULŪL in the Act. English illustrative material on the Framenet for the lexical unit behind, on the contrary, mainly refers to ‘intentionally performed acts’ such as ‘attacks’, ‘bombing’, and ‘killing’, evoking frames\(^{49}\) with clearly definable agents and patients in contrast to events like ‘reluctance to participate in elections’, ‘withdrawal from a meeting’, ‘accumulation of problems’, or FITNA (intragroup strife).

The revolution has set the whole political scene in motion and much of what has been going on so far in the public discourse, for REVOLUTIONARIES and for their opponents, FULŪL, could be described as negotiating new boundaries between these two imaginary communities. In three subsections below we shall take a close look at the communicative and pragmatic aspects of the concept: actions that REVOLUTIONARIES propose to take toward FULŪL, messages they address to them, and what FULŪL say when they argue back.

\(^{47}\) http://goo.gl/M3y83H

\(^{48}\) Cf. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex

5. What should good guys do to FULŪL?

FULŪL features frequently in the position of a direct object with the verb aqṣā (remove, displace) or a genitive complement to its substantivated form iqṣā’, cf.: as-sīsī yuqṣī fulūl al-waṭanī al-munharr min ḥamlatih al-intiḥābiya (Sisi removes FULŪL of the disbanded National [Democratic Party] from his electoral campaign).30

The 4th form causative Arabic verb aqṣā (remove, displace) reflects an orientational metaphor, grounded in the spatial source semantic of the stem (cf. the 1st forms qasā or qasṭīya – be far, be removed). Comp./superlat. adj. aqṣā is used in reference to remote destinations and spatial limits, cf. aš-šarq al-aqṣā (the Far East), min aqṣāhā ilā aqṣāhā (from one extreme to the other of a country or the world in general). Although the original meaning of the root seems to suggest near-far spatial orientation, the actual application of aqṣā in the political discourse appears to suggest in-out and central-peripheral orientation.31 For the in-out reading consider the following example: naqīb al-muhandisin min munāfiya: lā iqṣā’ li-ayy faṣīl wa an-niqāba maftūha li-l-jamī’ (head of engineers from Menufia: no removal/displacement for any faction and the trade union is open to all).32 Consider also a frequent usage in the context of sporting competitions: arsenal aqwā al-ān wa qādir ‘alā iqṣā baršilūna (Arsenal is stronger now and capable of displacing Barcelona).33 Here is a somewhat more complicated case:

naqīb ḥalaf az-zannāti naqīb al-mu’allimin mà taraddada fī al-āwina al-ajla bi-anna hunākā iqṣā’ ‘li-ba’d a’dā’ maṣlīs niqāba al-mihan at-ta’līmīyya mušīrān ilā anna al-jamī’ ‘alā qalb rajul wāḥid ya’malūna bi-rūḥ al-fārīq al-wāḥid

Khalaf al-Zannati, [trade union] leader of teachers, denied what was repeatedly [said] as of late that there is a displacement of some members of the trade union council of educational professions, having pointed out that all as one man are working in the spirit of one team.

Although Council members apparently are not formally excluded from the Council, they are still alleged to be excluded from important activities of this entity, which fact is denied by the trade union leader by saying that ‘all as one

30 http://goo.gl/bHeaW9
31 The full list of orientational metaphors according to Lakoff and Johnson includes the following categories: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral, and near-far, cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 15, 26.
32 A media article title: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUeVDCtDhdk
33 A media article title: goo.gl/uQxKHJ
man are working in the spirit of one team’, i.e. they are participating in the union’s activities on an equal footing with the other members. Here activity is understood on the basis of ACTIVITY is a CONTAINER metaphor. Staying inside a container is not simply an existential fact, it enables one to engage in actions, enjoy opportunities including being rewarded, all of which are only available to those inside the CONTAINER. The removal from the CONTAINER, or displacement within it, hence also means deprivation.

When it comes to the public offices, it is often suggested that they should be cleaned of FULŪL, cf.:

wa ḥīb al-iskandariya tālabat amānat ḥizb al-miṣriyīn al-ahmār bi-tuhīr hay`āt al-miḥān` minman sammathum fulūl an-nizām al-ihwānī allaḏīna tamta ta`yūnumum ḥīb al-hay`ā waqta ḥukm al-jamā`a\(^{54}\)

And in Alexandria, the Secretariat of the Free Egyptians Party has demanded to clean the Port Administration of FULŪL of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, who were appointed to the Administration during the rule of the Brotherhood…

Metaphorical representation of enemies as unclean substances or creatures is a common place for a whole family of conservative and right-wing discourses\(^{55}\). Graphic representations of FULŪL as pests, or even snakes, are common in the Egyptian media\(^{56}\). The entailment of the metaphor ENEMY is a PEST has motivated a nation-wide political campaign under the heading *imsāk fulūl* (catch FULŪL) organized by young revolutionaries with the purpose of preventing FULŪL from occupying public offices. Compiling lists of FULŪL of specific localities has become a common practice\(^{57}\). The logic behind this practice is consistent with the entailments of the ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor. Pests may become rife in a certain enclosed space\(^{58}\), if they are not taken care of. One way to clean the space of them could be by picking them out one by one. The orientational metaphor as discussed above in relation to the concept of IQṢĀ’ is


\(^{57}\) A Google search for *qā’ima bi-asmā’ fulūl…* (the list with the names of FULŪL [of]…) has returned 5490 references. For one of earlier lists dated 9 Nov. 2011 see an article with characteristic title *Bawwābat 25 yanā’ir tufāḍḍiḥ asmā’ fulūl al-waṭanī wa al-muwālīn lahum fi rubū’ miṣr baynahum iḥwān* (the 25 January gateway debunks names of FULŪL of the National [Democratic Party] and their loyalists throughout Egypt, among them a member of Muslim Brotherhood) – [http://january-25.org/post.aspx?k=47056](http://january-25.org/post.aspx?k=47056)

\(^{58}\) Here the CONTAINER metaphor is applied, a good match for both public offices and geographic localities.
fully coherent with the ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor as they share a common entailment. They both ascribe to FULŪL the tendency to occupy enclosed spaces (CONTAINERS) and justify effectively similar tactics toward FULŪL – displacing them to the periphery or removing out of the CONTAINER. The ENEMIES are PESTS metaphor enriches the purely spatial model by adding a moral evaluation component, providing thereby a stronger moral justification for the exclusion of FULŪL from the public space. With the help of its ongoing listing, the Catch FULūl campaign was turning those who just had been in the position of authority into objects of public disgrace and symbolic elimination. For less prominent figures, finding their names on the list meant the end to the comforts of relative obscurity and exposure to an intense public scrutiny.

The concept of LIST merits a special remark. Lists are compiled by a simple procedure of adding more names. There is nothing in the conception of the LIST as such that presupposes a method of ending the process of adding, unless a narrowly defined set of criteria is adopted that may limit the scope of selection. In mathematical terms, it is a countably infinite set. Although the actual lists of FULŪL as published on the web, such as the one cited in footnote 57, appear to have a finite number of entries at the moment we look at them, the idea that the list can be continued is obvious for any lay speaker and does not require a thorough background in mathematics. Compiling ‘black lists’ is a deliberate political pressure tactic meant to produce this very impression that the list will continue until it captures each and everyone in the enemy ranks. Moreover, the power of an infinite set is not reduced if any number of members would be detracted from it. If anyone would succeed in eliminating one’s name from the list, the list will still potentially go on forever. Political reality of a divided nation that this logic inevitably entailed struck many by surprise in the aftermath of the first free Egyptian presidential election. Here is a characteristic comment by an apparent Revolutionary, probably a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood, which collected 4,554,665 likes on the Facebook:

ba’d kull al-ašwāt ills ḥaṣal ‘alayhā aḥmad šafīq hiya maṣr kullhā fulūl??!!

After all the votes that Ahmad Shafiq has received is all [of] Egypt FULŪL??!!

---

59 Cf. the following definition: ‘Any set which can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers (or integers) so that a prescription can be given for identifying its members one at a time is called a countably infinite (or denumerable infinite) set’ at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CountablyInfinite.html

60 http://www.nmisr.com/vb/showthread.php?t=410251

61 Ahmad Shafiq, the last prime minister of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, won 12,347,380 votes in the 2012 presidential elections against 13,230,131 votes given to Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidate Muhammad Mursi.
Here is another comment by someone from a different political camp:

alḫā an tuṣbiḥa al-umma al-miṣriya ṣa’ban min al-fulūl fa- qa’d i’tabara al-iḥwān ba’d fawzīḥim ḍī ar-ri’āsa bi-nāḥwa 13 mīlyūn ṣawt anna man manaḥū ašwātahum li-ṣaḥīq bi-akṭar min 12 mīlyūnan min al-miṣriyīn min fulūl62

I am afraid that the Egyptian nation becomes a FULŪL people as the [Muslim] Brothers after their winning of the presidency at about 13 million votes considered [those] who granted their votes to Shafiq of 12 million Egyptians as [being] FULŪL.

While INFINITY, in any form, is a concept psychologically hard to put up with, particularly scary should be the notion of a personified INFINITY in the form of a ‘black list’. Cf. the following observation by an activist of the Catch Fulūl campaign:


It is remarkable on the [web] page that FULŪL of the National [Democratic] Party are following the page and whenever any news [item] is published, [they] respond to it [in order] to fend off accusations…

6. Talking to FULŪL

Print media genres hardly allow for full-featured conversational segments. Yet, some elements of conversational speech acts featuring FULŪL as an addressee, used primarily as a rhetorical devise, could still be found. These mainly include threats, warnings, and invectives of various kinds both direct and indirect, cf.:  

a) ayyuhā al-fulūl iḥḏarū min ḍagbat hāḏā aš-ṣa’b – [o] FULŪL, beware of the wrath of this people64.

b) ayyuhā al-fulūl lā taẓūnū annanā nādimūna ‘alā ṭawratinā wa ḥāwalū anna taḥfū šamātatakum fa-lā majāla lakum fī ḥayātinā marratan uẖrā65

O (voc. part.) FULŪL, don’t think that we are regretting over our revolution, and try to hide your malevolence for there is no space for you in our life anymore (lit. once more).

62 http://goo.gl/lnlnVf
63 http://goo.gl/59yZ9b
64 http://www.vetogate.com/423764
65 http://www.ekhbary.com/mqal1028.html
c) ayyuhā al-fulūl izamū ḥuṭurakum — o (voc. part.) FULŪL, stay in your [animal] holes.66

Characteristically, many examples reflect an underlying orientational center-periphery metaphor suggesting that FULŪL should stay removed from the center; (c) combines the orientational metaphor with ENEMY is an ANIMAL as described above. We have found only one example of non-exclusive rhetoric directed at FULŪL, calling them to cooperate for the sake of common national values, cf.:

ayyuhā al-muṭaṣāri’ūna ‘alā al-kursī, ayyuhā al-muṭaṣimūna, ayyuhā aṭ-ṭuwār, ayyuhā al-fūlūl, ayyuhā al-‘ilmānīyīna wa al-lībrāliyīna wa al-iḥwān wa as-salafīyīn, ilā kull al-harākāt wa al-aḥzāb wa al-‘ilāmīyīn wa al-đīlīyīn, ḥuṇa waqt in-qaḍ ḥuḍūdihā ḥuṇa lanā an nata’āwan ma’a a‘ṣ-ṣuṣṭa wa al-jayš li-t-tasaddī li-jamī‘ anwā‘ al-baṭaja, yajib an naḥmī ḥuḍūd miṣr min jamī‘ al-jihāt wa kaḥa al-fītīn baynanā67

O (voc. part.) [those] fighting for a chair, o (voc. part.) [those engaged in] sit-down strike, o (voc. part.) revolutionaries, o (voc. part.) FULŪL, o (voc. part.) secularists, o (voc. part.) liberals and [Muslim] Brotherhood, and Salafis, to all movements and parties and blocks, o (voc. part.) Egyptians, Egypt is first and foremost. Time has come to save our borders, time for us to cooperate with the police and the army to oppose all kinds of subversion. [It is incumbent] that we protect the border of Egypt from all sides. And enough FITNA (civic strife) between us…

The Arabic conciliatory rhetoric, when addressed to fellow-countrymen, often invokes the concept of FITNA (intraconfessional or intraethnic strife), in this paragraph it is cited as a final argument after an emphatic and somewhat repetitive description of shared security threats.

Speakers of Islamist political persuasion often address FULŪL with standard religious formulae and quotations from the holy texts directed to infidels calling them effectively to (re)convert to Islam, cf.:

ḥāyīfīn ley min taṭbīq šar‘ allah, wa man lam yuḥkam bimā anzala allah fa-ulā’ka hum al-fāsiqūn wa aẓ-ẓālimūn wa al-kāfirūn ittaqū allaha ayyuhā al-fulūl.68

Why [are you] afraid of implementing the law of Allah? And whoever was not judged by what Allah had sent down, those are the nefarious and unjust and infidel, fear Allah ye FULŪL.

Such rhetoric have probably stimulated some clients of the Ancien Régime to try and win social acceptance by looking like true Muslims, only to be mocked again by the revolutionaries, as reflected in the Image 1.

---

66 https://www.facebook.com/ikhwangi/posts/279510655484975
The powerful verbal offensive on FULŪL provoked a defensive discourse on the part of the actual and potential victims of the listing campaign. Two most usual discursive strategies used to undermine the illocutionary power of the concept are: 1) defensive strategy based on reference to external circumstances, without directly questioning the concept’s validity, cf.:

...ḥaytu qāma al-muraššaḥ at-tābi’ li-l-ḥizb al-munḥall sayyid ‘id bi-d-difā’ ‘an nafsihi zā’iman an kāna yuwājāḥ ḍuğṭān min an-nizām as-sābiq fa-kāna yanzil ka-mustaqill wa lākin ‘alā mabādī’ al-ḥizb al-waṭanī

...as a candidate affiliated with the dissolved Party Seyyid Id defended himself claiming that he was facing pressure from the former regime and was running as independent but on the principles of the National [Democratic] Party.

and 2) a more general counteroffensive strategy based on undermining the validity of the concept as such, either by inflating its scope to make it meaningless, cf.:

__________________

69 This is the continuation of the previously cited paragraph – ibid.

70 Here we see a typical instance of what in social psychology is described as actor-observer bias – a common tendency to explain one’s own behavior mainly by reference to the external circumstances, while overemphasizing inherent qualities of the subject in explaining someone else’s behavior (the latter tendency is also referred to as fundamental attribution error); FULŪL appears to be a concept structured in line with the fundamental attribution error, as FULŪL’s actions or impact are seen as resulting from their inherent negative qualities. Serious examination of the psychological foundations of this and other political concepts would of course call for a more thorough research, which is outside of the scope of this study.
Constructing political *other* in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring

wa radda ‘alā man yattahamānu bi-anānu fulūl bi-qawlihi: miṣr kulluhā fulūl, mušīran ilā anna jamī’ aš-ṣa’b bi-mā fihim al-iḥwān al-muslimīn kānū yata’āmalūna ma’a nizām mubārak71

And [he] answered to [those] who were accusing him of [being] FULŪL by saying: “all [of] Egypt is FULŪL”, pointing out that the entire Egyptian people including the Muslim Brotherhood were dealing with Mubarak’s regime.

– or by questioning the negative evaluation embedded in the semantic structure of the concept, e.g. by representing FULŪL as worthy members of the society, cf.:

‘indamā qāmat ūjrat 23 yūlū lam tasta’īd kull ḥiibrāt an-nizām as-sābiq bal abqat ‘alā al-‘adīd minhum li-idārat šu’un al-bilād wa minhum ‘alī māhir allātī kān ra’īsān li-l-wuzarā’ akṭar min marra qābla aṯ-tawra wa šağalā mashāb ad-dīwān al-malākī fī ‘ahd al-malik fu’ād wa ‘urifa bi-ḥunkatihi as-siyāsīya wa dahā’īhi fī mu’ālajat al-muhimmāt as-ṣa’ba .. wa rağma ġālika ‘ayyanathu aṯ-tawra fī 24 yūlū 1952 ra’īsān li-l-wuzarā’ …72

When the July 23 revolution occurred, [it] did not exclude all the expertise of the former regime, but kept a number of them for the administration of the affairs of the country, and among them Ali Maher who was prime-minister more than once before the revolution and occupied the post at the Royal Court during the rule of King Fuad and was known for his political prowess and sagacity in tackling the difficult issues .. and in spite of that the revolution has appointed him prime-minister on July 24, 1952 …

Aside from the utility of shared background knowledge for establishing a sense of rapport with the opponent, the historic narrative also helps refocus the discussion on less emotionally charged dimensions of the situation that are often omitted in the standard revolutionary discourse. Departure from the usual temporal context is also designed to overcome its attending semantic constraints – the prohibition on assigning any positive qualities to FULŪL.

The logic of open-ended listing on the basis of loose criteria has ultimately backfired on the revolutionaries themselves. The strongest argument of anti-Mursi protests in spring – summer of 2013, which culminated in a military coup that brought down the first Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president, was his alleged desire to Brotherhoodize the country (aḥwanat al-balad), by which not so much the imposition of strict Sharia norms was meant as the creeping replacement at every level of public administration of old cadre with members and loyalists of the Muslim Brotherhood. In adopting this policy, President Mursi followed not so much the Sharia as the logic embedded in the concept of FULŪL. When military came back to power on June 30, 2013 they launched an

71 http://goo.gl/8L4Ybt
72 http://goo.gl/pxNw5r
arrest and summary death sentencing campaign against Muslim Brotherhood that followed basically the same logic, although this time no public campaign for identifying political opponents was needed to round up Brotherhood members and participants of anti-coup rallies as their lists were readily available to the police. Continuity of essentially the same logic vis-à-vis Muslim Brotherhood by their opponents is reflected in the use of the same concept FULūL in reference to Muslim Brotherhood loyalists in the context of anti-Mursi protests of June 30, 2013, cf.:

\[\text{FULūL}\]

In Alexandria, the Secretariat of the Free Egyptians Party has demanded to clear the Administration of the Port of the FULūL of the Brotherhood regime who had been appointed to the Administration during the rule of the Society [of the Muslim Brothers]…

Was it inevitable, the way the Egyptian revolutionaries have conceptualized their opponents as FULūL, that their effort to change the country after decades of authoritarian rule should lead to indiscriminate exclusion, symbolic and ultimately physical? From a cognitive semantics perspective, there certainly could be other, less polarizing, models of conceptualizing the political or social other that would allow for a more balanced view of the political scene and help achieve a broader social consensus. European languages, for instance, have a vast list of counter concepts allowing victims of blacklisting campaigns to mount a powerful resistance. The English language, for instance, has such concepts as *witch hunt*, *smear campaign*, *scaremongering*, which portray broad scale blacklisting practices as politically incorrect, immoral or even illegal. Such counter concepts, however, would never become part of a common political vocabulary without a long experience of tense but open political competition that the European nations had to go through. Black lists, as common as they are in the situations of civil conflict, may also be less indiscriminate if they adopt more narrowly defined selection criteria. During the Orange revolution of 2004, and anti-government rallies of 2013 in Ukraine, the practice of blacklisting also was quite common. While it served a similar purpose of demoralizing political opponents, the blacklisting targeted only a relatively narrow group of officials implicated in election fraud and judges, who issued what was seen as unjust verdicts against political activists, while the blacklisting of a particular individual was based on ostensibly well-documented evidence of his or her engagement in such

---

73 Publication date 4 Sept 2013 – i.e. two months after the toppling of president Mursi
acts. Catch FULŪL campaign lists, by contrast, only comprised names of individuals without reference to any incriminating evidence against them. Conceptual systems are linked to the way we experience and understand reality. Political concepts are both a reflection and means of reproduction of social realities that we live in. For the Egyptian society that emerged from decades of highly repressive political regimes, the January 25 revolution offered its first experience of a large scale open political debate and competition for power pitting against each other a host of political actors. It is not surprising, therefore, that a polarizing discourse with FULŪL as its key concept would emerge in a divided society that had never had enough chance even to discuss its differences.

8. Conclusions

Acts ascribed to FULŪL represent a narrow set of politically subversive, unjust, immoral and illegal activities that could be summarized as wrongdoings. Even the mere presence of FULŪL on the scene of whatever scale may cause a negative outcome. FULŪL’s acts represent a manifestation of their natural tendency to obstruct the REVOLUTION, while the latter is conceptualized as a positive purposeful forward going movement of the Egyptian PEOPLE. Actions of FULŪL are directional – they are aimed at impeding the REVOLUTION and occupying a central part of the scene, metaphorically associated with POWER.

Acts of FULŪL are essential part of a larger frame of REVOLUTION and their relative strength and effectiveness cannot be independently assessed outside of a single force-dynamics pattern embedded in this larger frame. If a particular speaker sees REVOLUTION as making progress, which is the main tendency in the revolutionary discourse, FULŪL will be presented as trying to perform wrongdoings, or even accomplishing single acts in a presumed series ultimately intended to bring FULŪL to the aspired central position and prevent the REVOLUTION from going forward, but never actually reaching these goals. Yet if things go wrong to whatever extent, it is FULŪL who will be held responsible as someone who was behind such a negative outcome. On the contrary, should the speaker for whatever reason, including a merely rhetorical one, hy-

74 Cf. “...truth is relative to understanding, which means that there is no absolute standpoint from which to obtain absolute objective truths about the world. This does not mean that there are no truths; it means only that truth is relative to our conceptual system, which is grounded in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other members of our culture in our daily interactions with other people and with our physical and cultural environments” (emphasis added. – A. B. – George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2003, p. 193).
pothesize the defeat of the Revolution, or assert that it is already actually happening, the FULŪL will be held accountable for accomplished socially harmful acts of larger, almost, an epic scale.

One way of downplaying an active role of FULŪL is by expressing the relationship between FULŪL and the events at the focus of discussion with the help of non-core elements of the respective semantic frames, substituting the semantic role of Agent by a more general one of Cause, which downplays or hides a potentially more active engagement of FULŪL in producing the event in question. It the paired relationship between FULŪL and us, the good guys that appears to motivate such preferences: to assign an active role to FULŪL would imply presenting the revolutionaries as a weaker party. Such discursive strategies may, hence, be seen as a verbal expression of otherwise material political struggle, which still continues.

At the face of it, the ideas that FULŪL are (a) almost denied the capacity to act or at least act effectively and that (b) they still represent a threat – may appear logically inconsistent, but they are not incoherent. Both fit into the idea that FULŪL should not be occupying the central position or rather should not be present on the scene at all. They only are safe when they are off the sight; their mere presence may trigger off a negative course of events, anyone who shares the space with them is either in peril or morally compromised.

As a grammatical construction foregrounding the Cause, while precluding explicit representation of the type of agency involved, X behind E is not merely an economical grammatical device. Neither is it uniquely Arabic, as parallel constructions exist in other languages, including English. In both cases, such constructions represent a convenient way of expressing specific ideological beliefs. The implied question ‘who stands behind it’, to which this construction answers, appears to be a universal mantra of conspiracy theorists. To be behind something implies being removed from the field of vision, while being still present on the scene. X effectively may represent an invisible malevolent force, the ultimate cause of every disaster, whose identity the idiom claims to reveal. From

---

75 Cf. Lakoff’s discussion of consistency vs. coherence in the case of the metaphorical representations of time in George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2003, pp. 44–45. According to Lakoff, although the two metaphors TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT ‘are not consistent (that is, they form no single image), they nonetheless “fit together,” by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a major common entailment’, namely, that ‘from our point of view, time goes past us from front to back’.

76 The discussion of the source of this obvious parallelism, for instance, whether or not the Arabic construction is a syntactic calque from English, French or both, as colonial languages widely spoken in the Arab countries, does not seem to be particularly relevant for the purposes of this research.
the conspiracy theory perspective, it is not relevant to know exactly how a particular event could have come to pass. Moreover, the assumption that details regarding how the Agent of a conspiracy is manipulating other parties may never be known is an essential part of this worldview. It is, therefore, sufficient to reveal the name of the wrongdoer, whose interests the negative event in question supposedly serves and who, therefore, stands to be accused.

FULŪL is yet another term, among many that the human languages continue to generate for othering various out-groups. Such concepts are used to establish and reinforce social boundaries, mark out spaces and create social no-go zones. In the case of FULŪL, the latter include primarily the perceived sites of public authority. By following the concept wherever it leads in discourse, one may effectively map out the entire landscape of what modern Egyptians perceive as the sites of power and prestige.