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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE IN TIMES DETERMINED BY KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT: This article is a selective introduction to the description and characterization of the changes that have occurred in the sociology of knowledge since the publication of Max Scheler's book in 1924 to contemporary times, most often conceptualized by the term knowledge society. A brief review of the main threads in the field of sociology of knowledge was intended to draw attention to the theoretical and practical advantages of particular approaches, as well as their disadvantages, resulting in a trivial study of the phenomenon of knowledge in question. The descriptive character of this article also allowed for a number of systematizations within specific approaches (e.g. Michel Foucault) and within a broad perspective of the knowledge phenomenon.

KEYWORDS: sociology of knowledge, knowledge society, social existence, social consciousness, Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim

INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this article is to attempt an – unavoidably selective – description and characterisation of the changes happening within the sociology of knowledge, which happened between the publication of Max Scheler's *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens* in 1924 and the contemporary studies on the society of knowledge or the knowledge-based society. The philosophical reflections on the epistemological foundations of science, and the legitimacy of: (a) imaginations of the world as conceptualised in ontological categories, (b) knowledge, understood as a form of cognition of objective reality, (c) the ethical and (d) aesthetic cognition, will only serve as the background to considerations focused on the sociological determinants of knowledge. Bearing in mind that the concept of knowledge is in itself broader than the concept of science, as,

besides scientific knowledge, it also encompasses common, speculative and irrational knowledge, or artistic and literary knowledge, the sociological perspective allows the investigation to reach beyond the institutional dimension of science. Furthermore, as was pointed out by the aforementioned Max Scheler, the concept of knowledge is more heuristically productive than cognition or consciousness (Scheler 1976: 189). But above all, we should add that both knowledge and cognition together with consciousness are determined by the social context of both the “consciousness” itself, and the epistemological research.

According to Karl Mannheim, “[e]very individual is therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact of growing up in a society: on the one hand he finds a ready-made situation and on the other he finds in that situation preformed patterns of thought and of conduct” (Mannheim 1998: 3). This means that the social conditions of the functioning of an individual precede all the products of their actions, despite the numerous assurances of “objectivity” or “freedom from valuation” of the subjects’ or social groups’ actions. This characteristic, and often unconscious, rooting of human thinking in found structures of, broadly understood, knowledge and experience, shed light on these very processes, as well as undermine the speculative theses about the objectivity of the cognition processes (regardless of whether they pertain to the cognitive subject or the object being studied).

The position taken by the sociology of knowledge – that is, the mode of analysis of the surrounding reality from the perspective of the social determinants of cognition – has a relatively long tradition. Not only the purely social determinants are being applied in explaining and describing the functioning mechanisms of society and its parts. At least since the times of Marx and Engels, the class determinants have played a key role in a number of research traditions. Today, we would point out, on the one hand, the subjective factors – for example related to Alfred Schutz’s research tradition and aspects of the sociology of everyday life – and on the other hand, the ideological, for example nationalist, factors, which are important elements in characterising the relationships between the conditions of knowledge creation and their content. Regardless of the detail of the social factors taken into account by the sociology of knowledge, it has to be noted that this research perspective is historically grounded, which means it rejects all forms of ahistorical explanations.

Studies of the social conditions of (creating and transforming) knowledge have been vividly articulated – although one should bear in mind the time when they were written (XVII century) – by Francis Bacon in his four illusions of the mind, called the idols of the mind. The English philosopher distinguished between the idols of the tribe, idols of the cave, idols of the marketplace, and idols of the theatre (see Zagorin 2001). It is a remarkably insightful analysis of the specificities of social conditions, which takes into account the human nature, the pressure of the social surrounding, language structures, and tradition. However, we will be most interested in the writings of Max Scheler (*Wissenssoziologie*) and Karl Mannheim, as the pioneers of methodically applied sociology of knowledge. The former, with strong ties to phenomenology (although, according to Roman Ingarden, the German thinker abandoned this approach already in 1925), assumed, that knowledge co-constitutes social bonds, and is the *de*

facto building blocks of society. This happens because social cohesion is warranted by group identity, in turn stemming from complex social relations. Scheler's works on the social conditions of knowledge bear visible traces of philosophical reasoning, although we'll also find there the theory of cognitive illusions, operationalised through the categories of: class, stratum, nation, or – on the lower level of analysis – occupational groups.

Mannheim's approach demonstrates intentional consideration of the social conditioning of knowledge, thus "the sociology of knowledge has set itself the task of solving the problem of the social conditioning of knowledge by boldly recognizing these relations and drawing them into the horizon of science itself and using them as checks on the conclusions of our research" (Mannheim 1998: 237). The historical conditions of influence on thought construction and consciousness have – also – been addressed in the context of studies of ideologies and utopias (cf. Swidler and Arditi 1994: 305-306). However, from the perspective adopted in this article, it is more important to include the issues of the social structure and its elements into the analyses of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim, aware of the potential tensions between the aspects of knowledge (sociology of knowledge) and ideology (studies of ideology), clearly stated that "[i]n the realm of the sociology of knowledge, we shall then, as far as possible, avoid the use of the term »ideology«, because of its moral connotation, and shall instead speak of the »perspective« of a thinker. By this term we mean the subject's whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and social setting" (Mannheim 1998: 239).

Marxist influences on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge become visible in these deliberations, with particular emphasis being placed on the problem of social existence and the dialectics of theory and practice (see Mannheim 1998: 97-171).

THE MARX AND ENGEL'S VIEW

The aforementioned frame of historicity of the sociology of knowledge brings to mind the way Marx and Engels approached social development, under the name of historical materialism (see Goff 1980). Attempting to answer the question about the objective sources of the conscious human desires and motives, or facing the determinants of human moods and actions, Marx and Engels focused on the material conditions of social life. Let us read through the well-known paragraph from *The German Ideology*, which touches upon this very issue.


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing

the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx, Engels 1974: 64-65)

One can hardly find a more suggestive paragraph that would clarify the relationships between the class aspect of human material actions as a whole, and – let us use the classic concept of historical materialism – “the ruling ideas”, that is knowledge in the broadest sense of the term. It was in the writings of Marx and Engels that the relation between “social existence” and “social consciousness”, that is the leitmotif of the established sociology of knowledge, has been appreciated as a fundamental problem (see Fig. 1). Karl Mannheim developed that relation in his works, adding to it his musings on valuation in social sciences, monopolistic mode of thinking, ideology, or class consciousness. It was Marx, however, who *expressis verbis* made this co-dependence the strategic focus of the broadly understood social sciences, emphasising that:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or – what is but a legal expression for the same thing – with the property relations within which they had been at work before. (Marx 1904: 11-12)

Figure 1. Social existence and social consciousness



Source: own elaboration based on works of Marx and Mannheim.

In the figure, we see the relation of the impact of social existence on social consciousness, which is a development of the well-known Marxist constation, that social existence determines the consciousness. This relation exemplifies the onto-

logical, conceptual, and functional dependence, with the assumption that social consciousness also impacts social existence. The latter is, first and foremost, conditioned by socioeconomic factors, which have been conventionally included in the sphere of the economy. The economy, in turn, is part of an overarching social system, which at the same time forms the connection with consciousness, which in turn is the domain of culture (particularly with regard to ideas, opinions, imaginaries, but also religious beliefs etc. [see Eagleton 2000]).

When it comes to the role historicity played in Marx's studies, with regard to the conditions of the objects' material existence, the issue is equally simple and explicitly expressed in his works. As the thinker from Trier remarks, "[m]an makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living" (Marx 1852: 1). This issue, developed further towards class tensions and revolutionary struggles, sends us towards ideological and utopian concepts, that is – again – the leading motifs of Karl Mannheim's works. The very model of how historical processes are formed in the consciousness of the subject of historical action, seems to be a monumental research problem for the sociology of knowledge, particularly because of the materialist perspective on the social relations that influence the conditioning of cognition.

Taking into consideration the materialist take on social relations, it is important to remember the relatively obvious constataion, that knowledge gives power and serves "becoming something else", as Max Scheler noted. The issues of ownership and knowledge are crucial elements of sociology as such (i.e. not only the sociology of knowledge) since it began functioning institutionally.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

It would be impossible, even within a preliminary draft on the transformation of approaches within the sociology of knowledge, to omit "the social construction of reality", that is Peter L. Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's sociology of the everyday life. With reference to phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz (1967), who in turn took inspiration from Edmund Husserl, particularly with regard to the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*), Berger and Luckmann described their research goals as "a sociological analysis of the reality of everyday life, more precisely, of knowledge that guides conduct in every life, and we are only tangentially interested in how this reality may appear in various theoretical perspectives to intellectuals" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 33). Referencing the works of Emil Durkheim and Max Weber, they formulated – what they called – the central question that the theoretical sociology needs to ask itself, that is "How is it possible that subjective meanings »become« objective facticities?" (p. 30).

Remembering that Alfred Schutz's primary concern was to re-formulate Weber's interpretive sociology in such a way to identify the basic elements of social action (Schutz 1967: 7), it is important to appreciate the contribution Berger and Luckmann made to the development of the reflection on the conditions and limitations of social

creation of reality. Furthermore, the broad impact their approach had on social theory as a whole, should also be considered a direct consequence of their uniquely understood sociology of knowledge. As they themselves said:

The analyses of objectivation, institutionalization and legitimation are directly applicable to the problems of the sociology of language, the theory of social action and institutions, and the sociology of religion. Our understanding of the sociology of knowledge leads to the conclusion that the sociologies of language and religion cannot be considered peripheral specialities of little interest to sociological theory as such, but have essential contributions to make to it. (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 207)

The sociology of knowledge project, which looks at reality as socially produced, constitutes an important input into the development of sociology as a social science (that is why the aforementioned book, which was first published in 1966 [edition used in this text is from 1991], is one of the most important texts for the entire discipline). Particularly the issues pertaining to the foundations of knowledge of everyday life, as well as their objectivising roles, constituted, and still constitute, incredibly heuristically productive tools, both for theoretically and empirically oriented researchers.

POWER AND DOMINATION

The sociology of knowledge, encompassing the entirety of reflection on the social conditions of knowledge creation and development (in the aforementioned broad understanding) and the social references within its products, is connected with the problem of power. The writings of Michel Foucault clearly connect the issues of power and knowledge, although it should be noted that the French intellectual placed his approach between archaeology and the historical method (historical archaeology) (see Lemert, Gillan 1982: 29-56). However, the problems he devoted his time to not only belong the domain of the sociology of knowledge, but they also go beyond the narrow confines of sub-disciplines of social sciences and humanities, looking at the relations of economic production, social reproduction, symbolic exchange, ludic production, discourse analysis, etc.

As was noted by Thomas Popkewitz, Foucault's "consideration of change as ruptures and breaks, related to French philosophical and history schools, has thrown into sharp relief our conceptions of history and of the conventions of progress that underlie social and educational sciences. The pragmatism of Foucault's scholarship raises important questions about the relations of intellectual production to social practices, questions that are taken up as well within the work of Pierre Bourdieu, among others" (Popkewitz 1998: 47). We will be particularly interested in this relation in the context of power-knowledge, described by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*, where he wrote:

We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relations without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge

that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relations to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. (Foucault 1991: 27-28)

This particular political economy of power-knowledge suggests a complex nature of the relations between power and knowledge, particularly in the context of the prison system, as an important institution of control and part of the state apparatus. Foucault does not mean a simple system of stigmatising those who break the law and separating them from the rest of the society, because within a certain understanding of the state power structure they play a positive role.

In his analysis of the historical material on the prison institutions, Michel Foucault treated the punishment itself as “a complex social function” (Foucault 1991: 23), going beyond the standard formulations of the social sciences. The French thinker took into account the broad perspective of studied phenomena, in this case of the prison system, with the focus on exploration of historical facts, and this places him within the sociology of knowledge tradition. Let us take a look at Table 1, which shows three technologies of power described by Foucault, presenting at the same time the fluctuations of the perception of punishment and the institutional approaches to it.

Table 1. Three technologies of power

Old monarchical law project	Project for reforming jurists	Project for prison institution
the sovereign and his force	the social body	the administrative apparatus
mark	sign	trace
ceremony	representation	exercise
the vanquished enemy	the juridical subject in the process of requalification	the individual subjected to immediate coercion
the tortured body	the soul with its manipulated representations	the body subjected to training

Source: Baranowski 2009: 40 based on Foucault 1991: 130-131.

The old monarchical law project, based on the monarch’s authority and power, used the stigma as a mechanism of punishment and prevention. The punishment itself happened to the body, which underwent painful physical practices, and in the case of attempted regicides were particularly severe. The punishment was publicly celebrated, to demonstrate the justice and inevitability, and to show the convict as broken and defeated. The technology of power project of the lawyers-reformists was the emanation of the social body and applied the sign. It was not about punishing the body of the convict, but aimed and their soul. The procedure itself was a spectacle, but preserving the subjectivity and legal rights of the person being resocialised. The prison institution project, which we know from the contemporary experience, is based on the administrative apparatus, the perfect bureaucratic machine. The penal process

itself, which Foucault wrote about, is based on an entire army of specialists, deciding about the guilt and innocence of the accused. The responsibility of the so-called justice system becomes dispersed, because the verdict is based on expert knowledge, i.e. expert witnesses, and the technologies they use to verify evidence material. Technology registers those who break the law, places them in databases, preserving the traces of their criminal activity. The direct punishment is applied to the body, although differently than in the monarchical law project, as in prison it undergoes training and not the practices of inflicting pain.

It doesn't need to be added that each of the methods of organising the technology of power is related to particular interests of certain social subjects and realises their orders. An excellent illustration of the intentionality of the power apparatuses is the phenomenon of popular illegalities, described by Foucault. They also exemplify the transition from the monarchical law project to the lawyers-reformists project. Hence,

(...) under the Ancien Régime each of the different social strata had its margin of tolerated illegality: the non-application of the rule, the non-observance of the innumerable edicts or ordinances were a condition of the political and economic functioning of society. (Foucault 1991: 82)

These illegalities constituted the survival possibility for the weakest social categories, which, without alternative sources of income, would not be able to survive without a certain specific level of "breaking the law". Specific, because in reality upholding the existing social order, and not only easing the uneven distribution of goods within the community, but also allowing the existence of a broader group of the so-called social outcasts. However, in the 18th century, a shift occurred in the approach to these illegalities, and previously tolerated practices started being prosecuted. Foucault saw the source of this shift in the transformation of the institution of property, as land property which used to belong to the monarch, was transferred to the privileged parts of the society, i.e. the bourgeoisie. These "new owners", whose particular interests were in the protection of what became their "estates", became pushing for changes in the law that would introduce direct punishment for such transgressions against property, which had not been within the interest of the legal system before.

A detailed analysis of the crisis of popular illegality, as Foucault phrased it (1991: 84), shows a complicated context of the foundation of the changes in the law and punishment for certain types of behaviour, which were rooted in particular realities of articulated class interests. Even the changes in the law are determined by – let us phrase it indifferently – the social being, expressing certain social interests. However, to be able to illustrate this and explain using rich historical material, it was necessary to be able to use the notion of power-knowledge, which, for the scope of this article was included in the sociology of knowledge. As we can see, for Foucault, "knowledge" was dispersed within the mechanism of power-knowledge, which influenced not only the shape of social relations, but also state institutions, formulating and modelling the social reality.

In his work *The birth of biopolitics*, the French thinker (Foucault 2008) repeats Benjamin Franklin's constatation that "a virtuous and laborious people could always be

»cheaply governed« in a republican system (...)” (McCoy 1978:617). This remark can serve as an inspiration for the studies of the new forms on knowledge and the consequences they have on the shape of social relations. In this context, we should not forget the interest in the body in Michel Foucault’s works, which brings to mind the issues addressed by feminism, for which the issue of knowledge is also vital (Byczkowska-Owczarek and Jakubowska 2018, Jakubowska 2017, Singleton 1996).

We should not forget about Pierre Bourdieu’s momentous input into the debate on knowledge and power, particularly through the prism of the concepts of habitus, symbolic violence, field, or forms of capital. The reflexive sociology perspective of the French thinker changed the way sociologists approached various aspects of social reality, including the education system, class structure, and aesthetics preferences and tastes (Jenkins 1982, Maton 2003).

Let us look at the following quotation:

(...) there are benefits (symbolic and sometimes material) in subjecting oneself to the universal, in projecting (at least) an appearance of virtue, and adhering externally to an official rule. In other words, the recognition that is universally accorded official rules assures that respect (formal or fictitious) for the rule brings about the profits of regularity (it is always easier and more comfortable to act according to rules), or »regularization« (in bureaucratic realism, the term »regularization of a situation« is sometimes used). (Bourdieu 1998: 142)

The issue of legitimacy of not only the law, but also knowledge or informal behaviours, which are discussed by the French sociologist, focus the attention on the subtle mechanism of universalisation. This observation allows on the one hand to explain the complex processes of social coherence and conformity, and on the other the need for universal rules (Graeber 2015), which social scientists should be aware of.

NEW TIMES AND NEW CHALLENGES

The stylistic figure of the “society of knowledge”, which functions in the academic and journalist discourse, undergoes various operationalisations, which means that it really does not have a precise meaning. Nevertheless, the changes caused by the broad access to teleinformatic technologies are both noticeable and important for a number of perspectives, including the sociology of knowledge (Young and Muller 2010). Wide access to the Internet and – relatively cheap – devices that connect to it (even in the less developed economies, see Davison et al. 2000, Wolf 2001) has a visible impact on social relations (cf. Heath, Knoblauch and Luff 2000), including the modes of (a) communication, (b) economising, (c) information sourcing, (d) cultural participation and (e) political and civic participation, to name a few. These conditions, where old and new media converge (Jenkins 2006, Jenkins and Deuze 2008) give rise to new modes of social formation (like the Chinese social ranking system, the so-called “social credit” (Raphael and Xi 2019) or more broadly – surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019)). This, in turn, requires new methods of investigating the social reality (Rogowski 2013: 54-68), which becomes increasingly entangled in the said technologies and manifested in

vast amounts of information (big data), collected nonstop by sophisticated software (Morozov 2019, Peters 2019, Scribano 2019).

In the context of the previous, historic approaches to the sociology of knowledge, in which macro-, micro- and mezzo-structural perspectives intertwine, we see that the theoretical apparatus of this subdiscipline will need to be used in its full scope in the contemporary studies. It requires a “re-formatting”, adaptation to the new social reality, and the latter seems gloomy. Let us take a look at the Chinese project of introducing “social order”, which resembles a dark science fiction film:

The system is being tested until 2020 by 43 municipalities, each with its own criteria, system of letters or points, and name: in Suzhou it is called Plum Blossom Social Credit; in Xiamen, Jasmine. Nearly all use data from social networks or smartphone apps, besides sophisticated video surveillance. By 2020 most major Chinese urban public spaces will be equipped with facial recognition cameras under the Skynet system. In many rural areas, the Sharp Eyes project enables people to connect their television sets or smartphones to surveillance cameras at the entrance to their villages. (Raphael and Xi 2019)

This Kafkaian scenario, wrapped in “a growing panoply of public and private mechanisms that assess individuals, officials, businesses and professional sectors, reward the good and punish the bad” (Raphael and Xi 2019), directs an advanced system of social control of an unprecedented scale, with the simultaneous lack of organised, mass social protests (see Baranowski 2013, Baranowski 2016, Baranowski 2017). This system not only deeply interferes with the lives of the individuals or entire communities, but it also systematically re-shapes the society, effectively becoming technologically advanced social engineering. These shifts are influencing knowledge, or, rather, its perception in the contemporary societies, increasingly addicted to technologies. The scale of the impact these technologies have on globally important issues is not hard to predict (Beck 1992), as it has been recently pointed out by Michael T. Klare, “it may prove impossible to prevent the creeping automatization of even nuclear-launch decision-making” (Klare 2018).

The new reality also requires tidying up the neologisms, so characteristic of the contemporary contexts, in which we use concepts such as “sharing economy”, “gig economy”, platform capitalism or “cognitive capitalism” (see Mika 2019, Wong and Cantor 2019). These terms are not only not precisely defined, but they often mislead the readers, like in the case of sharing economy, which has nothing to do with “sharing”, but it has a lot to do with commodification (in this introduction we will not look into the socioeconomic specification of the difference between ownership and property, cf. Baranowski 2011a, Baranowski 2011b). When dealing with modern sociology of knowledge, one should bear in mind David F. Noble’s warning about “a collective fantasy of technological transcendence” (2011: xi).

CONCLUSIONS

Looking at the sociology of knowledge in the times determined by heterogeneously understood information and its influence on shaping the behaviours and opinions of large masses of people, it is worth looking back at the “classic” analyses of the social institutionalisation of the ideology critique. This critique seems particularly important in the times of media domination, including the so-called new media, both in the context of the formation of worldviews of individual groups (e.g. politically motivated), and the broader social structures (e.g. multidimensional and opaque ideologies which are not perceived as ideologies). The objective aspect of the surrounding social reality seems to be “calling” for such an analysis, aimed at unpacking (or, rather, unmasking [see Polanyi 2009]) the foundations of the current waves of exclusionary, populist, racist and fascist tendencies appearing in various places around the world. Demystifying the “manufactured” social conflicts can be successful, as long as it acknowledges the entirety of the human action interests and their consequences for the social order. Thus partial projects, like the one proposed by Luckmann and Berger, which reduce the sociology of knowledge to analyses of chosen aspects of everyday consciousness, have a very limited application in “dismantling” the existing, ideologically determined, relations of dominance and dependence (although the impact of these authors on the sociology of knowledge is unquestionable).

A number of similarities can be observed in sociological (clearly or less articulated) approaches to social phenomena (cf. Table 2).

Table 2. Two dimensions of social phenomena

Author	Dimension I	Dimension II
Karl Marx	base (<i>Unterbau</i>); social existence; ideology	superstructure (<i>Überbau</i>); consciousness; false consciousness
Max Scheler	real factors (<i>Realfaktoren</i>)	ideal conditions (<i>Idealfaktoren</i>)
Karl Mannheim	ideology	utopia
Vilfredo Pareto	derivatives	residues
Robert K. Merton	public functions	hidden functions
Michael Polanyi	explicite knowledge	tacit knowledge
Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann	society as objective reality	society as subjective reality
Pierre Bourdieu	forms of capital	habitus
knowledge management	<i>know-what, know-why, know-who</i>	<i>know-how</i>

Source: own elaboration based on literature review.

Although these approaches stem from different theoretical and methodological traditions, it is hard to deny that they have a common denominator in the structuring of social reality. The subtlety of each approach may be used in different degrees to study particular dimensions of the surrounding social life, with its visible and hidden mechanisms.

Considering the theoretical issues within the sociology of knowledge, we should

bear in mind two things: (a) our entanglement in the structures we are trying to describe (we are not an exception and our views and postulates are bound by the same limitations as the ones we are criticising) and (b) the public character of the sociological knowledge *in toto*. Bearing in mind the latter issue, let us consider the warning Ryszard Kapuściński issued in his book *Imperium* (1995: 569-570):

Three plagues, three contagions, threaten the world.

The first is the plague of nationalism.

The second is the plague of racism.

The third is the plague of religious fundamentalism.

All three share one trait, a common denominator – an aggressive, all-powerful, total irrationality. Anyone stricken with one of these plagues is beyond reason. In his head burns a sacred pyre that awaits only its sacrificial victims. Every attempt at calm conversation will fail. He doesn't want a conversation, but a declaration that you agree with him, admit that he is right, join the cause. Otherwise you have no significance in his eyes, you do not exist, for you count only if you are a tool, an instrument, a weapon. There are no people – there is only the cause.

Reflection on the threats facing our societies needs to take into account the Marxian-Mannheimian reminder, that “no human thought (...) is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context” (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 21). Particularly within the contemporary abundance of news media, the constatation that “mass media do not carry ideology with them, they themselves are ideology” (Eco 1999: 158), should be extended to include all types of media and the so-called new media. The illusion of freedom and emancipation brought by new technologies and forms of communication based on them edges on intellectual short-sightedness or even blindness (which is particularly well-visible in the case of the Chinese rating system, the “social credit”). The need for “critical” – which does not mean free from ideology, as it is unfeasible – knowledge, which could blow up the foundations of the “powdered” society based on knowledge, with its cognitive, platform, or teleinformatic tentacles. Umberto Eco proposed a form of cultural guerrilla warfare (communication), which would be a “Culture complementary to the culture of Technological communication, a persistent correction of perspective, verification of codes, ever-new interpretation of mass communication. The world of technological communication would be traversed by groups of guerrilla fighters, who would thus contribute to the re-introduction of critique into the passive reception” (Eco 1999: 167). This idea by the Italian semiologist is reminiscent of Mannheim's “socially unattached intelligentsia” (*freischwebende Intelligenz*), although the term itself was borrowed from Alfred Weber (see Berger, Luckmann 1991: 22).

It is not only the new media that require a critical analysis of their form and (ideological) content, but also the institutionalised state narratives, which can take the shape of, for example the “official”, public and formal history (Althusser 2014). The best example that comes to my mind is Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States* (1980), which is the emanation of hidden and falsified knowledge. A similar enterprise was undertaken by the research director of the School for Advanced Studies

in the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, Gérard Noiriel, in his book *Une histoire populaire de la France. De la guerre de Cent Ans à nos jours* (2018). In the times of “common availability” of information, we should make sure that that information represents plurality in the broadest sense possible. Pluralism, which is capable of denouncing the existing worldviews, in the historical, social, political, economic and cultural aspects. The sociology of knowledge is more important today than it ever was in the past.

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THE COMMUNICATIVE TURN IN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I want to start with a short sketch on the development of the German sociology of knowledge which has been quite successful in the last decade. Thus success is very much due to its orientation to the “Social Construction of Reality”. Its reception led first to research on language and then to a turn from language to communication which led into what came to be called communicative constructivism. This turn took very much an empirical form, so that we shall sketch the programme implicit in the empirical movement leading to communicative constructivism. Before we address the general sociological background for this movement, i.e. communication society and refiguration, we shall outline its major theoretical features which distinguish communicative constructivism from its predecessor, social constructivism.
KEYWORDS: social theory, social constructivism, communicative constructivism, sociology of knowledge, refiguration

INTRODUCTION

The Sociology of Knowledge can be traced back to many origins. Even within sociology, we find many authors who have stressed the social role of knowledge, starting from Comte to Pareto and, of course, Durkheim. The very notion ‘sociology of knowledge’ however has been decisively coined almost simultaneously by Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim in the early 1920. Particularly Mannheim’s writing caused a lively debate across academic disciplines about the relativity of knowledge, so that the sociology of knowledge became a topic in international sociology. The Third Reich and the Second World War however did mean a rupture to this new movement. Despite the efforts of such scholars as Werner Stark or Georges Gurwitsch, the sociology of knowledge seemed to move into the background of academic and even sociological inter-

est. It was only in the 1960s when it was re-animated in a book by the young Austrian-American sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966). Their “Social Construction of Reality was subtitled “A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”. And in fact they drew strongly on the theories of Alfred Schutz (1967) who had attempted to refound the sociology of knowledge on the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology. The book became an international academic success story which lasts until today. Its reception in the US however and in the anglosaxon language area in general had been mainly focused on the title “social construction”. In fact, it can be said that various academic movements labelled “social constructivism” and even ‘constructivism’ had been inspired and initiated by this book (Hacking 1999) which turned out to become a classic in sociological theory and social theory (Knoblauch/Wilke 2016). Despite its success, anglosaxon approaches to the sociology of knowledge quite frequently ignored the book as well as the approaches inspired by it. Thus, John Law’s book on the “new sociology of knowledge” from 1987 only in bypassing mentions the outstanding analysis of Berger and Luckmann will not be discussed in his paper without any further reason. The same holds for Ann Swidler’s and Jorge Adritis “The New Sociology of Knowledge” from 1994, or, MacCarthy’s Knowledge as Culture, the new sociology of knowledge from 1998, the last monograph on the sociology of knowledge in English. In France, the reception of the book suffered from the fact that it had been translated only in the late 1980s.

While the anglosaxon reception of the book as part of the sociology of knowledge almost failed, it had massive effects in the German-speaking countries. Very much linked to the return of Luckmann to Germany in the late 1960s, an English/German journal started to be published entitled “International Yearbook for Sociology of Knowledge and Religion”, edited by Günter Dux and Thomas Luckmann which has been published until 1978.¹ In the late 1990s, a research network on the “sociology of knowledge” became established in the German Sociological Association which has been blooming in the German speaking countries so much that it constitutes nowadays one of the largest networks with a many subgroups, a biannual conference and a number of books series in German as well as in English.

While the success of the Sociology of Knowledge in Germany may appear striking, it is related to the success of its empirical research program which is quite exceptional, too. Topics known from the international debate, such as scientific knowledge, expert knowledge, or knowledge society have been taken up in the German speaking sociology of knowledge, it is characterized by a peculiar focus on communication. The turn to communication will therefore also be in the focus of this article. This is not to claim that all sociology of knowledge in Germany has turned to communication. But the turn to communication, is, as I want to argue, one of the most peculiar, original and innovative contributions of the sociology of knowledge in Germany.

In fact, German sociology lived to see two other spectacular turns towards communication already in the 1980s: In 1981 Habermas published his “Theory of Commu-

¹ The role of the sociology of knowledge to religion had been indicated already by Berger and Luckmann in an essay anticipating the “Social Construction of Reality” in 1963.

nicative Action” in which he founded critical social theory on communicative action, and in 1984 Luhmann reinvented himself by founding the ‘autopoietic” theory of social systems on the basic process of communication. Yet, while these two ‘communicative turns’ had been performed in social theory only, German sociology of knowledge turn to communication took a decidedly empirical turn. Drawing mainly on qualitative data, these studies made contributed importantly to the foundation, growth and elaboration of interpretive social research methods. Based on the writings of Schutz, one could say that the sociology has performed the “interpretive turn” well before it was received in anthropology and other disciplines (Knoblauch 2013). The analysis of communicative genres, ethnosemantics, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, the sociology of knowledge discourse analysis, life-worldly ethnography, videography are but a few of these innovations in qualitative methods which constituted the turn towards the “interpretive paradigm” in the social sciences (Wilson 1970).²

As much as the communicative turn in the German sociology of knowledge was empirical, the need to relate to Habermas and Luhmann’s communicative turn triggered some theoretical response. In this context, the notion of communicative construction got more and more widely used and entered into a number of studies. By the mid-nineties, various attempts to theorize communicative construction were made even by Luckmann himself. In the 2000s we lived to see the rise of ‘communicative constructivism’ as a movement in the German sociology of knowledge.

In this paper, I want to focus on this branch of the German sociology of knowledge which has been so much inspired by the “Social Construction of Reality”. Leaving aside other approaches, communicative constructivism is probably the most innovative approach in German sociology of knowledge both, theoretically as well as empirically. In this paper, I want to focus only on the innovations in qualitative methodology which have been inspired by the “Social Construction of Reality”. This theory first motivated studies in the sociology of language. Quite early, as we shall see in the following part, these studies also focused on interaction and communication. Gradually, methods have been developed which more and more related to what came to be called communicative action. In fact, as shall be argued in the next part, this empirical studies corresponding to the methods may be said to imply a program which, gradually, was labelled communicative constructivism. Recently, there have been some theoretical attempts to adumbrate what is meant communicative constructivism. The theory of communicative constructivism is elaborated elsewhere (Knoblauch, in print). In this paper, we can only sketch how it is related to the sociology of knowledge (as it has been framed by Social Constructivism as framed by Berger and Luckmann³) and its attempt to look for language as the major objectivation of social knowledge. The turn towards language in action, the empirical research on the context of communicative action and the impact of discourse, practice and actor-network theories led to reformulations of the theoretical programme in terms of communicative constructivism. In the final

² Henceforth I will refer to this as *The Social Construction* in short.

³ On the role of Berger and Luckmann’s book in the rise of “Social Constructivism” cf. Knoblauch & Wilke 2016.

outlook, we want to at least mention some aspects of the sociological background for this movement, i.e. communication society and refiguration.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE

The success of Berger and Luckmann's approach in Germany is very much indebted to the role of Weber's sociology in their book. Although they also stress the equivalent relevance of Durkheim, Weber's theory of action is quite decisive for their notion of knowledge. Action, to Weber, is essentially defined by meaning. Following Schutz who analysed the notion of meaning phenomenologically, we can take knowledge as socially mediated meaning (Knoblauch 2014). As a consequence and in accordance with the famous 'Thomas' theorem, action is dependent on and defined by knowledge. In reverse, the relevance of knowledge is due to the fact that it is or can be "realized" in social action.

The idea that (most) knowledge is socially mediated by others has been formulated in the sociology of knowledge by Schutz, who was the teacher of both, Berger and Luckmann. Therefore the subsequent studies that built on this theory have focused particularly on language. This is due to the assumption that language characterizes meanings, guiding both actions and social actions. Language is considered to be the best empirically accessible core of the social stock of knowledge, essentially defining the world view. In addition, language, as a historical sign system, is the most important resource of typifications, abstractions and generalization, by which mutual understanding is ensured for all practical purposes, for language contains the knowledge that is socially acknowledged within a community (Schutz 1962).

Following Schutz, also Berger and Luckmann regard language as the central mediator between individual consciousness and society. Language is the major "objectivation" by which externalized meaning becomes fixed, by which it is mediated and by which it is internalized. Berger and Luckmann's shift towards language was by no means idiosyncratic, for, at this time, most humanities and social science disciplines were going through a profound 'linguistic turn'. Encouraged by the works of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, by structuralism and speech act theory, language became more and more central, not only in the social and cultural sciences, but also within sociology. It is only during this period that a significant sociology of languages was developed – initially in the Anglo-Saxon world (Fishman, 1968). Habermas also turned to language, after Berger and Luckmann had declared language to be a central research area. Berger, for example, considered language to be the "first" social institution (Berger & Berger, 1972) and Luckmann even contributed significantly to the establishment of the sociology of language (Luckmann 1975).

It is important to note that, in contrast to structuralist approaches, the phenomenology of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann maintained that typification and action is not determined by the meaning objectified in language or, as to that, in any structures. Nor did they share the relativism inducted by the famous Whorf-thesis. According to this theory, different languages exhibit almost unbridgeable differences with respect to basic temporal and spatial orientations, as argued by Whorf (1956) using the

example of the Hopi language of North America. To phenomenology, there is also a prelinguistic (“prepredicative”) meaning which constitutes much of the “life-world” of human actors. This life-world thesis got very much support by the then current anthropological knowledge on pre-linguistic experiences. One example was the famous investigation by Berlin and Kay (1969), which dealt with the basic words for colors in different cultures. Among other things, they were able to show that members of different cultures could distinguish colors for which they did not have categories. While this could be seen as evidence of what Husserl called “pre-predicative experiences” and what Schutz called “typification”, Berlin and Kay also demonstrated that there are, so to speak, basic universal categories for colors (black and white), even if they are culturally and linguistically differentiated. Luckmann took such universals as an indication and proof of common structures within the lifeworld.

In contrast to Habermas, Luckmann’s interest in language was not restricted to theory. He also contributed to the rapid development of empirical research into language. This was not limited to the sociological study of quantifiable correlations between linguistic and social characteristics, but extended to the increase in qualitative empirical analyses of speech.⁴ At the beginning of the 1970s, various methods emerged to study language use in its natural context, such as sociolinguistics (Labov), linguistic anthropology (Basso), ethnography of speech (Hymes, Gumperz), conversational analysis (Jefferson, Sacks, Schegloff) and interaction and context analysis (Goffman, Kendon).

FROM LANGUAGE TO THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION

These empirical approaches, which spread worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s, have been characterized by a change of interest from language as an objective, abstract sign system to speech as action, and later to communication. In contrast to the speech act theory preferred by Habermas, which mainly analyzed language on the basis of examples invented by the analysts, and in contrast to Luhmann’s purely theoretical approach to communication, these approaches took a decidedly empirical stance on language. Language was not to be examined simply as an abstract system, or a merely solitary performance, but as social action.

We have mentioned above that the spread of interest in language as social action went hand in hand with the rise of qualitative social research methods, such as various hermeneutic methods, conversational analysis, genre analysis, the ethnography of communication and the like. Many new qualitative methods have their origin in the study of language in use. One of the reasons for the important contribution of studying talk in action to the development of qualitative research is certainly the fact that it regarded spoken texts as a direct objectification of social action, as well as an expression of cultural interpretations or social structures. However, the successes of qualitative research, which have now become omnipresent in all social sciences, had a paradoxical effect on the study of language use that nurtured its success: In the course

⁴ This approach was initiated by a conference held early in the 1960s, attended, amongst others, by Garfinkel, Goffman, Gumperz, Hymes, Luckmann and Sacks (Gumperz & Hymes 1964).

of the rise of qualitative methods, new methods increasingly distanced themselves from the concept of language that had dominated early studies on language use. Language had been considered as a phenomenon on its own (which could be correlated with socio-economic variables, for example), however attention was increasingly paid to the relevance of language as part of more encompassing processes which slowly came to be called *communicative action*.⁵

The analysis of linguistic interactions remains, of course, an important subject of sociolinguistic research. Linguistics, for example, has begun to deal with conversational analysis from sociology, and linguistic pragmatics has increasingly turned to sociologically informed, interactional research methods and developed its own style of conversation analysis (Brinker et al. 2001, Deppermann 2000). This rather linguistic orientation is also characterized by interactional sociolinguistics, which was founded by John Gumperz and has been applied to various areas, such as gender (Günthner/Kotthoff 1991).

While the linguistics of verbal interaction turned towards conversation analysis, sociology lost interest in natural conversation, as well as in language as a whole. Thus, at the turn of the millennium, we witnessed the “end of the linguistic turn” – at least in sociology and many other areas of the social sciences (Knoblauch 2000). Instead of a sociological study of language, qualitative methods turned towards meaning, knowledge and categories mediated by communication. Discourse analysis, based on Foucault, has been widely disseminated. Starting from the ‘utterance’, it regards linguistic phenomena as socially processed discourses. There is also an important branch of discourse analysis dedicated to the social constructivist approach (Keller et al. 2005).

As already mentioned, research initiated by Luckmann in the early 1980s was particularly influenced by ethnomethodological conversational analysis (Bergmann 1981).⁶ On the basis of recordings of ‘natural’ conversations, conversation analysts examined the order of turns at talk as produced by actors. One of the methodical innovations of this approach includes the analysis of communicative genres. With a naturalistic orientation to real-time interactions, this method searches for ‘fixed’ forms of communication, which it takes as expressions of routinized, socially relevant action problems. It thus directly links up to the sociological study of the ‘institutionalization’ of knowledge (Luckmann 1985). Inasmuch as genre analysis emphasizes the linguistic and para-linguistic ‘internal’ features of communicative genres, conversation analysis also links up to linguistics (Knoblauch & Günthner 1995). In addition, it addresses sociological questions, for example, in the analysis of gossip (Bergmann 1987), conversions (Ulmer 1988) or arguments (Keppler 1994). Keppler has already dealt with the analysis of visual aspects of media communication from the perspectives of genre analysis (Keppler, 1985). As Ayaß’ (1997) investigations of television sermons show, such analysis has also been applied to the mass media and their reception in action situations. With the spread of video technologies, amateur videos have increasingly

⁵ The notion of communicative action has been in use before Habermas’s “Theory of Communicative Action” already by Schutz and Luckmann. Cf. Knoblauch 2013a).

⁶ Luckmann (2013) explains this in his personal reminiscences.

been analyzed, including internet videos (Traue & Schünzel 2014).

The exploration of communicative processes in various social contexts is one of the central themes of the ethnography of communication. However, this approach has been increasingly neglected, so that today there are only a few works that explicitly and exclusively focus on the ethnography of communication. On the other hand, the question of the specific nature of linguistic and non-verbal communication in formal organizations has met with keen interest. Soeffner, Reichertz, Schröer and others have studied the communication processes involved in police work (Reichertz & Schröer 1992). Luckmann, Bergmann and their working group (Luckmann & Bergmann 1999) have dealt with the problem of whether and how different social organizations are characterized by the use of special communicative forms, patterns and genres, such as sexual counseling institutions, psychiatric institutions or ecology groups (Christmann 1997). The growing role of the non-verbal, visual aspects of communication have been accounted for by an increasing number of studies supported by video recordings. On these grounds, Tuma, Schnettler and Knoblauch (2013) have developed videography as an ethnographically oriented method of qualitative video analysis.

THE IMPLICIT EMPIRICAL PROGRAM OF COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM

The above-mentioned methods are only indicative of the range of empirical research within German Sociology of Knowledge inspired by *The Social Construction*. Since Luckmann, who later taught at the University of Constance, had been the center of a series of naturalistic studies on communicative processes, these studies have sometimes come to be referred to as the “Constance school”. In addition to *The Social Construction*, such empirical studies have also drawn on Schutz, Garfinkel and Goffman. In the 1990s, “social-scientific hermeneutics” (Hitzler & Honer 1997) and the “hermeneutic sociology of knowledge” emerged as a methodological frame for a new series of such studies (Reichertz et al., 1999, Schröer 1994 Soeffner 1997, which build primarily on Schutz’s concept of the lifeworld.

As mentioned, in the Constance group of Luckmann, already in the 1980s the word ‘communicative construction’ gradually became a label for this naturalistic empirical research. Due to the strong inductive character of their methodology, however, the concept of “communicative construction” was hardly specified in theoretical terms. Yet, the empirical studies and the methods related to this label exhibit, indeed, some common traits that allow us to speak of an ‘implicit program of communicative constructivism’.

The mostly qualitative and interpretive empirical analysis of social action in *natural social situations* on the basis of audio (and later audiovisual) records is paradigmatic for these studies. Until the 1980s, recordings were often made in laboratory-like situations.⁷ With the emergence of small audio cassette recorders, speech could be more

⁷ This holds true for the large University of Konstanz project on a systematic take on the multimodality of face-to-face interaction, which was, however, never published in English.

easily and increasingly better recorded in natural situations. With new technologies and the ensuing new possibilities of recording and reproducing, speech as a social activity could be studied empirically in ways which must be considered methodologically as highly valid. The question of how actions are performed by speech was no longer left to the imagination of the researchers, who invented speech acts at their desks while writing. Rather, speaking could now be easily recorded in its temporal sequence and in the context of social interactions, and thus became available as data for the most scrutinizing analyses. While data collection of linguistic interactions increasingly focused on these natural situations, methods were also developed to analyze the collected data in social scientific settings. For example, in conversation analysis as well as in hermeneutics, new forms of ‘data sessions’ and ‘interpretation groups’ emerged (Reichertz 2013).

Conversation analysis was initially interested in linguistic interactions, yet with the spread of video, it turned towards audiovisual recordings of *interactions*. Until the advent of video analysis, CA could not focus attention on visual aspects, thus excluding the body, objects related to it and spaces. Video analysis, on the other hand, was no longer restricted to simply linguistic actions and interactions, but was able to focus on what, in empirical studies, has increasingly come to be called ‘communicative action’.

While the empirical program of communicative constructivism is oriented towards the ethnomethodological notion of “processual reality” (Bergmann, 1981), it differs from ethnomethodology by also considering the *institutional aspects* of action. This stress on institutions is particularly evident in the concept of “communicative genres”, which Luckmann (1985) compares to the “institutions” of communicative action. For Luckmann, institutions, technologies and social milieus form the “external structure” that is the context for interaction. The external structure includes the ethnographic context, social structures and other macrosocial aspects. This tendency to institutionalism is not shared by ethnomethodology, but derives from the social-constructivist background of this research.

Next to this naturalism, the empirical program of communicative constructivism also integrates subjectivity. The *subjectivism* of this research is due to its phenomenological roots (Eberle 2012). With regard to empirical research, phenomenology enters into lifeworld ethnography, but also into ethnophenomenological investigations of religious experiences and in videography, which also emphasizes the relevance of the subjective perspective, both to researchers as well as the researched (Knoblauch & Schnettler 2015a).

The empirical research program of communicative constructivism is characterized by a strong level of *inductionism*. Instead of making assumptions about a specific society, the analysis of communicative genres, for example, should allow to reconstruct the ‘communicative budget’ applicable to different societies. This concept is so general that it can refer to the culture of the Mexican Chamula Indios as well as to Germans or Indians (Luckmann 1985). The method is inductive, because empirical evidence should indicate the particular structure of the ‘communicative budget’, its elements and their relevance. Although the specificity of society is left open, an overriding social-theoretical framework is assumed. However, this framework – apart from its con-

certed parallels to grounded theory – has not been elaborated, and the same holds for the basic notion of communicative action.

If we look to other approaches for further theoretical support in order to elaborate this concept, we find reference to the theoretical role of ‘social construction’ in hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is not only used for the understanding of others, but also serves to “reconstruct the reconstruction (Soeffner 1997. The impact of *The Social Construction* is also recognized in the sociology of knowledge discourse analysis, which uses the term “discursive construction” to refer to Berger and Luckmann subject-oriented concept of action, rather than Foucault’s idea of discourse, which considers subjectivity only as an effect of discourse (Keller 2013).

MAJOR MODIFICATIONS FROM “SOCIAL” TO COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION

Communicative constructivism, thus, appears to be an implicit program of these empirical studies. It supports the shift towards communication both empirically and methodically. As mentioned, by the end of the 1990s the turn to communicative constructivism slowly became theorized (Knoblauch 1995; 2001; Luckmann 2013). As it will not be possible to give an outline of the whole theoretical model of communicative constructivism which has been elaborated elsewhere (Knoblauch 2017; Knoblauch in press), here we want to restrict ourselves to the major aspects by which communicative constructivism can be seen to differ from its predecessor, the ‘social construction of reality’ by Berger and Luckmann.

One should stress that the corresponding theoretical changes are not deduced from the empirical program. The empirical program, rather, substantiated the view that empirically, social action can only be studied as communicative action. If sociology depends, first and foremost, on understanding others then we need to presuppose something which allows understanding – and that is communication. And this kind of understanding is required for any actor on the social scene. As relevant as communication may be, understanding also presupposes some form of subjectivity. However, as opposed to classical Husserlian phenomenology, it is not the subject that is the exclusive reference point of analysis, of understanding or of action. The starting point of communicative construction is not the individual subject as distinct from other individuals, but subjects as related to other subjects, as well as to their objectivations. Relationality in this sense is one of the major assumptions of communicative constructivism. Against the background of the social constructionist rejection of the subject (as expressed most explicitly by Gergen 1985) we should emphasize, however, that this does not mean getting rid of the subject. Rather it means that the subject is not the sole center of the social; it is decentered by the relation. Yet, as we shall see, this relation cannot be understood without some formal notion of subjectivity. Formally presupposing subjectivity, subjects as entities are the result of communicative action, which contributes to various forms of the subjectivation.

The modified role of subjectivity is directly connected to a modification of the aspect of objectivity that has been addressed by ‘new materialism’. In this vein, Latour

(2005) criticizes the lack of consideration of materiality. Social constructivism, he complains, has neglected the role of objects, things and materials. As with his critique of objectivity, Latour's (2010). argument ignores a basic understanding of *The Social Construction*. In fact, Berger and Luckmann repeatedly stressed the materialism of social construction in their retrospective commentaries on *The Social Construction*. Berger, for example, emphasized that there is "a robust reality beyond our desires" (Berger 2011: 95) and Luckmann (1999) explicitly calls social construction materialistic and sketched in 1970 how 'non-humans' or things can be conceived of within the theory of the life-world (Luckmann 1970). However, even though Berger and Luckmann expressly refer to Marx, it must be admitted that neither they nor their successors have explained what this materialism means in detail.

Yet if we look for a connection to materiality in *The Social Construction*, the crucial concept of 'objectivations' provides a helpful starting point. If we search for more detail, however, we realize that neither Berger nor Luckmann actively elaborated on the concept of objectivation.⁸ In their later writings they only focused on specific kinds of objectivation, particularly on linguistic objectifications. The reason for such focus is that they take language to determine the meaningful orientation of an action and since language itself represents a social institution, it is the medium by which subjects are being socialized. Luckmann in particular shifted his attention to linguistic action; the same holds for Habermas, whose "theory of communicative action" is based on speech act theory. Moreover, Foucault's discourse theory also takes the use of language (*énoncé*) as constitutive of discourse and, thence, to any understanding of social reality.

As relevant as language may be, however, it can hardly provide the basis for social theory for a simple reason: unless we assume that language is given by God, it presupposes others, their intercourse and, thence, sociality. If we want to explain sociality, we cannot, therefore, start with language. And if we want to explain the sociality of language, the notion of objectivation is quite apt – we take it to include non-linguistic objectivation. For Berger and Luckmann, objectivation includes physical "expressive motions" or objects (Berger & Luckmann 1966 37). If we avoid restricting objectivations to simply linguistic sounds or characters, we can take them to include anything else carrying meaning: things, technologies, media and materialities. It is only by looking at physical and material processes and things that we can explain the social construction of reality without having to presuppose language or discourse.

Next to the clarification of relationality, a theoretical elaboration of the concept of objectification and its materiality is, therefore, a second feature of communicative action and, as a consequence of the shift from 'social' to 'communicative construction'.

The third central modification of social construction is a consequence of the two prior arguments: If we move from subjectivity to relationality, we must also reformu-

⁸ "The very concept of objectivation implies that there are social facts as well, with a robust reality that can be discovered regardless of our wishes" (Berger 2011: 95); however, Berger distinguishes 'social facts' from 'physical facts', and his examples of physical facts are not really compelling, for example "[...] that a particular massacre took place or by car was stolen" (ibid.).

late the notion of action or, since relationality already implies at least two subjects, social action. And if we associate social action with objectivations, then the question arises as to how (at least two) subjects and objectification are connected with each other. While Berger and Luckmann conceive this connection as dialectical, it leaves open the question as to what constitutes sociality. Since we start from relationality, we will account for this connection by a triadic model of subjects and objectivation. Moreover, we will assume that objectivation is what makes sense in the relation between subjects. This ‘making sense by objectivation’ we will call ‘communicative’, and since it requires subjects related to one another reciprocally, we will refer to it as *communicative action*.⁹

When we refer to an action between two subjects oriented towards objectivations as ‘communicative’, ‘communicative’ also seems to cover the everyday meaning of the word. Nevertheless, the extension of the term communicative beyond language to objectivations may sound strange to many ears, particularly as it substitutes notions such as action, social action, practice and communication. Therefore, proposing the concept of communicative action requires an explanation, legitimation and justification. We shall do so in the following chapter on social theory. This social-theoretical treatise goes into some detail, because it fulfills the task of reformulating the ‘social’ as ‘*communicative construction*’. It is also extensive and detailed because it attempts to redefine the subject matter of the social sciences and the humanities. Sociality, here, is no longer understood as an addition to the subject, neither is the subject sacrificed in favor of a theory of sociality or culture. Sociality cannot be understood without subjectivity. That is why we focus on communicative action. It emphasizes the sociality of the objectivation processes, whilst maintaining the subjective standpoint in the concept of action.

OUTLOOK: COMMUNICATION SOCIETY AND THE REFIGURATION OF MODERNITY

The changes in the sociology of knowledge indicated so far mostly relate to basic categories in social theory and methodology. As sociology always needs to reflect changes in society, the turn to communication and communicative constructivism also attempts to diagnose the contemporary transformation (Knoblauch 2016). In fact, the move from knowledge to communication mirrors the idea that the knowledge society of the last decade of the twentieth century have become communicative in a quite dramatic way. The dissemination of communication technology allows to transform anything into digital signs; as digital signs themselves become the medium not only for the storage of knowledge as information but also as the medium for action, we witness an excessive digital mediatisation (Knoblauch 2013): communication media allow to perform communication work in a way which increasingly includes industrial production (“industry 4.0) as well as the new digitalized agriculture. Admittedly, this

⁹ Reciprocity does not imply agreement, as the notion of and exclude conflicts, as one reviewer feared. Even fights depend on reciprocity, and conflict can be, as we see below, considered as one of the driving forces of contemporary society.

form of digitization is not identical with the broad notion of communicative action which lies at the core of communicative constructivism. Rather, it is a cybernetic notion which is being implemented into software, materialized in infrastructures and, by increasingly self-generating knowledge about humans and nature and intra-acting autonomously, transforming knowledge society into a communication society.

This transformation is not seen as a linear process. As much as digital mediatization is characterized by the two opposing principles of centralization, monopolization and hierarchization of “communication power” on the one hand and the networking, democratization and heterarchization, recent societal development can be seen as resulting from the principles of modern bounded nation states on the one hand and transgressive, global- and glocalization. Refiguration means that these principles are not sequences in a historical development of or from modernity to late or postmodernity but rather resulting from the conflict which arise wherever these principles meet in more or less clear forms (as e.g. in the conflict between right wing populism and cosmopolitanism or state nations or nationalism and transnationalism (Knoblauch/Löw 2017)). This conflict between different figurations is the driving force of the refiguration. It is one of the major theses of communicative constructivism that this refiguration crosses all scales of society and therefore requires the reformulation of the basic categories in social theory, such as social action. Communicative constructivism is, therefore, conceived as a movement which responds to this task in an empirically sensitive, yet theoretically constructive manner.¹⁰

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¹⁰ The empirical study of as well as the analytical specification of how societies are refigured in spatially constitutes the task of a concerted research program (SFB) headed by Martina Löw and Hubert Knoblauch at the TU Berlin (“Re-Figuration of Space”) and supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG).

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SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION PROCESSES OF A DISCIPLINE

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ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the dissemination of sociological knowledge in the social sciences and humanities (SSH) and other fields of cultural production in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), from the early postwar period to German reunification. In this regard, I investigate the relationships between sociology and politics, taking into account the specific contexts of the GDR-State and the institutionalization processes of these disciplines. To prevent a deterministic understanding of political power on academic and scientific systems, I adopt the Bourdieusian concept of field (cf. Bourdieu 1966; 1984; 1985; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu and Boltanski 2008). This concept allows me to highlight how the relationship between the academic and political fields changed over time by simultaneously looking at the influences of political, cultural, social and economic transformations of GDR society on the political goals of the GDR-State and the strategies of sociologists within the broader field of production of sociological knowledge.

KEYWORDS: ideology; academic field; GDR; sociological knowledge; field of cultural production; political culture

INTRODUCTION

The core of this work is an exploration of the production, reception and circulation of sociological knowledge in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in light of the institutionalization processes (cf. on the topic: Whitley 1974; Stölting 1990; Brown 1993; Fleck, Karadi and Düller 2018) of sociology from the early postwar phase (1946) until the collapse of the GDR-State in 1990.

This perspective entails two interlaced levels of analysis. The first level concerns the inception and institutionalization of sociology as a scientific discipline in parallel to the genesis and development of the GDR-State. This means, in turn, taking into ac-

count: (1) the political, cultural and symbolic functions of the academic and scientific systems over time; (2) the position sociology occupied within the hierarchy of social science and humanities (SSH) disciplines; (3) the criteria adopted for evaluating sociological works and their influences on the academic and intellectual trajectories of sociologists. The second level involves more broadly investigating how sociological knowledge was produced, standardized, applied, evaluated and legitimized over time, not only within the sociological field, but also in other fields of cultural production and the political field (cf. Baert and Shipman, 2011; Bourdieu, 1966, 1975, 1984, 2001; Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968; Bourdieu and Boltanski 2008; Camic 1992; Camic, Gross and Lamont 2002; Chapoulie 2001, 2009; Collins, 2011; Gross, 2008; Heilbron 1995; Ringer, 1990; Santoro 2013; Steinmetz 2017).

As I will discuss below, this perspective enables me to avoid a deterministic understanding of the influence of ideology on the production of sociological knowledge. Hence, after illustrating the research methods used, I will first reframe the question of the relationship between ideology and sociological knowledge by considering the social conditions of its production, reception and circulation (cf. Bourdieu 2002). As a second step, I will try to sketch the field of production of sociological knowledge on the basis of different forms of political, academic and scientific capitals (cf. Bourdieu 1984; 2000). I will then relate the distribution of the positions of the different collective and individual actors which structure the social space of the field to the distribution of the different forms of sociological knowledge which, instead, structure its symbolic space (cf. Bourdieu 1994). Finally, I will present an overview of the different institutionalization processes of sociology and sociological knowledge in the GDR, in light of the broader political, cultural and economic changes which affected institutional and cultural life in the GDR-State and which, in turn, had an impact on the organization and hierarchization of knowledge within the academic and scientific fields.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper is based on the secondary literature on sociology, the social sciences and the academic system in the GDR (cf. Adler and Reißig 1991; Bafoil 1991; Begemann 1974; Bertram 1997; Burrichter and Diesener 2002; Friedrich and Griese 1991; Friedrich, Förster and Starke 1999; Greenfeld 1988; Hechler and Pasternack 2015; Koch 1976; Koch 1997; Ludz 1971; 1972; Pasternack 2016; Peter 1991; Schäfers 1995; Schmickl 1973; Sparschuh and Koch 1997; Sparschuh and Simon 1992; Timmermann 1990; Wagner 1989; Weidig 1997; Weymann 1972)¹ as well as on empirical research

¹ The secondary literature on the GDR-social sciences can be divided into two main historical phases: in the early 1970s, thanks to the attention of some sociologists of the German Federal Republic, and in the 1990s as a result of the Reunification processes. Whereas in the 1970s the attention was mostly drawn to the contents and topics of the 'marxist sociology', in the 1990s it was mostly drawn to the relationship between ideology, politics and sociology. We can identify here two main research streams: the first one focuses on the question of whether and to what extent sociology in the GDR was a scientific discipline (see in particular: Peter 1991); the second one pays closer attention to individual and collective academic trajectories of sociologists and social scientists in the disciplinary field (see in particular:

carried out in 2017. Part of the secondary literature and some of the documentary analysis of sociological works and works involving sociological concepts were collected in 2016. The empirical investigation was based on archival research methodology and semi-structured in-depth interviews. The archival research was carried out at the Bundesarchiv and the Humboldt-Universitätsarchiv in Berlin. The research materials included more than 300 documents produced by the Ministry for Universities, The Akademie der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, The Akademie der Wissenschaften, Directors of academic and scientific institutes, as well as professors who were either involved in political decision-making for university and academic evaluation processes or in reporting research findings. The documents included materials of very different types: legislative proposals for the foundation of new institutes; exchanges of letters; curricula reforms; proposals for central research plans; research reports, conference reports; evaluations of academic dissertations; curricula of professors and research assistants, etc. As I point out in the following sections, the analysis of the archival materials allowed me to detect the primary changes in the institutionalization processes of sociology and sociological knowledge, especially by: (1) identifying, over time, the chain of actors, rules and criteria defining the decision-making procedures for the institutionalization of sociology as a discipline and the production and circulation of sociological knowledge; (2) pinpointing different career patterns of sociologists (and social science scholars) over time; (3) tracing cultural and linguistic changes in the content of sociological programs, research projects and curricula.

Furthermore, between October 2015 and November 2017,² seven in-depth interviews were carried out with social and cultural science scholars who were born in the 1940s and early 1950s. For various reasons, it was difficult to retrace the sociologists of the ‘first generation’. In any case, the choice of interviewing both social and cultural science scholars enabled me to explore how sociological concepts and theories circulated even outside of the ‘institutionalized’ sociological field (cf. Santoro, Gallelli and Grüning 2018). More generally, the analysis of the interviews highlighted a two-fold structure of formal and informal power relationships in the field of sociological knowledge production, which also affected the ways of teaching, organizing and doing research.

SOME GENERAL IDEAS REGARDING THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND BOUNDARIES OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE GDR

Before exploring the different phases and processes of the institutionalization of sociology in the GDR and their implications for the production, reception and dissemination of sociological knowledge, let me first make this point: the fact that sociological production was controlled by the GDR-State does not inherently mean that it mirrored the state ideology. Indeed, to claim otherwise would risk leading to tauto-

Sparschuh and Koch 1997).

² Irene Dölling (October 2015); Dieter Wiedemann (September 2016); Peter Wicke (March 2017); Thomas Edeling (October 2017); Jutte Begenau (November 2017); Hildegard Nickel (November 2017); Vera Sparschuh (November 2017).

logical conclusions, without bringing anything new. Thus, to better understand the entanglement between sociological knowledge and ideology in the German socialist state, three crucial aspects need to be taken into account.

First, politics played a pivotal role in defining what ‘sociology’ was and what it should investigate, mostly according to its political goals rather than its ideology. This aspect regarded the functioning of GDR cultural politics more generally (cf. Wehling 1989). Thus, while Marxist-Leninist ideology was the main legitimation source for the German Socialist State, the translation of ideological principles into political guidelines for governing society was primarily a pragmatic political matter as well as a difficult task. Furthermore, the pragmatic interpretation of ideological principles changed over time, depending on the broader social, economic and cultural (national and international) transformations affecting GDR society. It follows that ‘Marxist-Leninist ideology’ cannot be interpreted as a ‘granite block’ as its influence on the making of sociology was always mediated by the current political objectives. This perspective also allows us to better understand how the influence of ideology on sociological production changed over time, and why, as I will better argue later, in the 1950s sociology almost ‘disappeared’ only to ‘reappear’ later in the 1960s.

Second, the processing and publication of sociological work involved a chain of individual and collective actors working in different social fields (political, academic, scientific), holding different social positions, fitting different social roles and participating in different formal and informal networks.³ Thus, while it is true that the bureaucratic functioning of both the scientific and political systems followed standardized procedures, at the same time, every related decision, for example, regarding publication (what might be published), depended on the co-existing informal network of relationships which enabled a certain degree of ‘negotiation’ by sociologists.⁴ As a result, it is difficult to understand in general terms whether and when ideological statements played a role in the decision-making chain for preventing the dissemination of individual sociological texts and, vice versa, when sociologists and social science scholars were able to apply certain strategies for avoiding censorship.⁵

Third, the understanding of what should be considered a ‘sociological work’ varied over time. Following Bourdieu’s understanding of the academic field, its own logics and internal structure (1984), we can identify three interwoven factors: (a) the changing political situation of GDR society, that is, the changing political goals of the state; (b) the different academic socialization of sociologists according to their generation; (c) the orientation of individual scholars and (networks of scholars) towards either orthodox or heterodox criteria, depending on their specific scientific trajectories, research topics, intellectual/scientific networks and experiences (in the workplace, in the GDR and even abroad).

The latter point entails, however, a further sticking point. Indeed, most GDR so-

³ See on the importance of networks in the academic and scientific fields: Bourdieu 1994; Crossley 2010; Moody 2004.

⁴ Interviews with: Peter Wicke; Irene Dölling; Hildegard Nickel.

⁵ Interviews with: Dieter Wiedemann; Peter Wicke; Thomas Edeling.

ciological texts did not circulate in the public sphere, but were either *vertraulich* or *vertrauliche Dienstsache*, that is, for ‘secret’ uses.⁶ Then, by comparing the ‘secret’ and ‘public’ sociological texts, two important differences can be observed which regard: 1. the symbolic and/or social-academic capital of the author; 2. the kind of content proposed in the work (theory, methodology, empirical findings). Sociological texts published in the GDR were mainly preparatory textbooks for studying the discipline. They had, therefore, either a methodological or a theoretical character, even though theories were strongly shaped by the GDR ideology (or imported by the official sociology of the Soviet Union). Conversely, *vertraulich* sociological texts mainly concerned research findings. The applied character of these texts for social-political functions was stressed by the adjective *concrete*.

Nevertheless, as three interviewees pointed out,⁷ since empirical research was mainly addressed to politicians and was ‘secret’ precisely for this reason, making their ideological structure and semantics explicit was not required, whereas a certain level of theorization was, in some ways, practicable. Of course, theorizing was possible only by adopting specific stylistic strategies of writing whereby, for example, ‘foreign’ (i.e., Western) sociological concepts needed to be adapted to the linguistic utterances which were politically acceptable. In other words, in the GDR, sociology was politicized in two different ways. On the one hand, sociological research was useful for pragmatic political goals. However, in order not to publicly counter the representation of social reality propagated by the political elite, the findings of this research could not be published. On the other hand, the public sociological texts were strongly ideologized as they were intended to contribute to the formal education of students.

Summing up, by focusing on the social conditions of the production, reception and circulation of sociological knowledge, a complex entanglement between the political and academic/scientific fields and the actors operating in them emerges. This entanglement is especially evident if we consider, for example: the mixed scientific-political character of various institutions, the fact that academic curricula also included participation in political activities (even if the importance of this participation diminished over time), and the fact that it was even possible to obtain a PhD or a qualification from political institutions.⁸ Thus, as my interview partners stated,⁹ the space of academic autonomy for sociologists changed according to where they worked. Furthermore, the *cognitive and cultural* identity of sociology (cf. Lepenies 1981) was primarily

⁶ Source: ‘Merkblatt zum Umgang mit den Ergebnissen der zentralen soziologischen Forschungen’, Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim Zentralkomitee der SED, March 23rd, 1965 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin).

⁷ Interviews with: Peter Wicke; Dieter Wiedemann; Hildegard Nickel.

⁸ The observation is based on the curricula of and/or documentation about: Alfred Vierkandt (1867-1953); Heinz Maus (1911-1978); Herman Scheler (1911-?); Kurt Brauentheuer (1913-1975); Arthur Meier (1932-); Günther Mielke (1935 - ?); Dieter Dohnke (1938 -); Helmut Rabe (?); Günter Gütsche (1939-); Wulfram Speigner (1940-1991); Holger Michaelis (1942-); Manfred Lindtner (1944-); Marianne Schulz (1946-); Jutta Begenau (1949-); Ralph Elmar Lungwitz (1951 -); Klaus Klinzing (?) (Humboldt-Archiv Berlin).

⁹ Interviews with: Vera Sparschuh; Hildegard Nickel; Jutta Begenau; Peter Wicke; Dieter Wiedemann.

defined by the *political instrumentalization* of ‘concrete sociological research’ rather than its ideologization. Nevertheless, in the first phase of the discipline’s inception, most of the founders and initiators of sociology in the GDR, who also contributed to its re-institutionalization in the 1960s, were convinced that sociology also had a political mission. Conversely, the sociologists of the next generation preferred to keep their distance from the political sphere. While this allowed them to preserve a certain degree of freedom in their research activities, it also prevented advancement in their academic careers (cf. Sparschuh and Koch 1997).¹⁰ Not least, the separation between a pragmatic political goal and an ‘ideology of facade’, as we will better see in the following sections, entailed that sociology always occupied a low position in the hierarchy of SS-disciplines.

Hence, in what follows, in order to highlight how ideology and contemporary political goals contributed over time to the definition of the hierarchy of both SS-disciplines and sociological issues, I will first take into account how they affected the positioning and practices of institutions, organizations, research groups and individual actors in the field of producing sociological knowledge. This perspective ensures a closer examination of the different institutionalization processes of sociology rather than a holistic view of the influence and control of the GDR-State on the whole academic system, and not least on the institutionalization of sociology.

A SKETCH OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL FIELD IN THE GDR

Before illustrating the different institutionalization phases of sociology in the GDR, it is important to identify which actors played a role in these processes and what kind of ‘sociological knowledge’ they produced.

Scholars interested in the development of sociology in the GDR have mainly focused on the institutionalization of the official GDR sociology and, thereby, on the construction of a specific corpus of knowledge close to the interests and ideology of the state within specific social science academic and political structures.¹¹

This perspective presents, however, two sticking points. First, little attention has been paid until now to the production and dissemination of sociological knowledge outside the core disciplines of the social science field. Second, the entanglement between political, scientific and academic actors in the process of making sociological knowledge risks being reduced to a deterministic relationship between the political elite and scholars in which the former played the role of decision-makers and social controllers, whereas the latter were performers of teaching and research programs, whose topics, theories and methodologies were established by the ‘top’. What is puzzling is that the ‘political elite’ and the ‘scholars’ seem to be juxtaposed in terms of ‘structure’ and ‘action’. In this regard, even changes concerning the organization and contents of sociological knowledge may be interpreted as only deriving, in Luhmann’s

¹⁰ Interviews with: Vera Sparschuh (November 2018); Thomas Edeling (October 2018); Hildegard Nickel (November 2018); Jutte Begenau (November 2018); Peter Wicke (March 2017).

¹¹ In the GDR, as we will see later, the social sciences were renamed as *Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, in order to differentiate them from the Western [bourgeois] tradition of the social sciences.

terms (1997), from the interaction between the political structure (or system) and the environment.

The frame I propose does not underestimate the importance of structural constraints on individual actions, but offers a better reading of the structure-agency interplay. Hence, by using the Bourdieusian concept of 'field' (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) as an analytic category, I will consider the processes of the production, reception and circulation of sociological knowledge in light of the interdependence between the social space of the actors involved in making 'sociology' and the symbolic space defined by the distribution of the different sociological outputs.

By starting from the latter, we can identify three main groups of 'objectified' forms of sociological knowledge. The main corpus in terms of political and academic prestige was constituted by texts recognizable as belonging to the canon of 'GDR sociology'. Thus, these texts represented the official political viewpoint of the discipline and presented a high level of ideologization, although a large part of the official sociological corpus was also devoted to methodological questions and techniques. The second and most conspicuous group of works consists of unpublished research projects and papers which, in turn, can be divided into two subgroups: those produced for internal scientific/academic research groups, and those produced for politicians. The third group is constituted by works produced by academic scholars who did not work in (scientific, academic or political) institutes where sociology was officially taught. What distinguishes this body of work are not only the sociological concepts and theories that were used within other disciplinary frameworks but also that they were partially 'alternative' to the canonical concepts and theories used by GDR sociology and also borrowed from international (Western) sociologists. Hence, we can recognize in this corpus of works closer attention to the cultural aspects and phenomena of society.¹² More importantly, parts of these texts were also published.


To graphically depict the symbolic space of GDR sociological works (embedding different forms of sociological knowledge), we can imagine it as being formed by two perpendicular graduated axes of political and academic capitals.¹³ Along the horizontal axis we find different degrees of academic capital as a result of two criteria: the relevance of the corpus of works for the institutionalization of sociology in the GDR and the international prestige of the authors, that is, the (international) recognition of their scientific value. Instead, along the vertical axis, we find different degrees of

¹² Two of my interview partners correspond to this profile: Peter Wicke, who was already well-known at an international level during the GDR for his studies on popular music; and Irene Dölling, who first imported Bourdieu into the GDR.

¹³ The reconstruction is based on the interviews carried out with my interview-partners; on the content and stylistic analysis of some of the main published works of the GDR [AA.VV. 1981; AA.VV. 1988; Adler, Jetzschmann and Kretzschmar 1977; Autorenkollektiv 1975; Autorenkollekti 1985; Bisky 1980; Bohring and Taubert 1970; Bohring and Braunreuther 1965; Bollhagen 1966a; 1966b; Bradter 1966; Braunreuther 1962; Dölling 1986; Eichhorn et al. 1969; Friedrich and Hoffmann 1986; Kuczynski 1987; Meier 1974; Nolepa and Steitz 1975; Petzoldt 1988; Weissel 1980; Wicke 1987; Wiedemann 1983; Wiedemann and Griebel 1980; Zentralhaus für Kulturarbeit der DDR 1978] and of the non published research reports filed in the Bundesarchiv Berlin(period: 1964 -1989).

political capital related to the distance of a work from GDR ideology. In this regard, we can pinpoint four main benchmarks (in order, from more to less ideologized): works mirroring GDR ideology; works related to GDR political goals; works contrasting (explicitly or implicitly) with the GDR representation of social reality; works contrasting with the ideological positioning of the GDR in the international space of the Cold War (i.e., ‘socialist’ vs ‘bourgeois’ sociology). In Figure 1, we can see a sketch of how the three groups of sociological works can be distributed along the two axes.

Figure 1. The field of production of sociological knowledge: the symbolic space



Source: own elaboration

The social space was constituted by the power relationships among the individual and collective actors involved in the production, circulation and reception of sociology. In terms of collective actors, I consider those institutions and organizations in which scholars acted and which not only formally ruled and defined the contents and understanding of sociology, but also influenced the space of possibility for individual actors to deploy ‘innovative’ practices and build informal networks through which to accumulate other forms of capital (especially symbolic capital).


As a first step, I will consider the collective actors according to their ‘political’ relevance by starting from those with the highest degree of *political capital* (cf. Bourdieu 2000): (1) the political office of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Politbüros des Zentralkomitee der SED);¹⁴ (2) the Ministry for Universities (until the 1960s, the Ministry for National Education); (3) trade unions and political organizations (i.e., FDJ);¹⁵ (4) scientific institutions of social sciences directly ruled

¹⁴ Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED).

¹⁵ The Freie deutsche Jugend, that is, the ‘Free German Youth’ association, was an official political orga-

by the Party (i.e., Die Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, that is, the Academy for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the Party); (5) universities and high schools; (6) 'nonpolitical' and non academic research institutes (i.e., Die Akademie der Wissenschaften; Das Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung); (7) factories; (8) further social collective public organizations/institutions (i.e., the 'Radio'). Nevertheless, in considering the positioning of the different collective actors, we should further consider their academic/scientific capitals, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The field of production of sociological Knowledge in the GDR: the social space



Source: own elaboration

The main aspect to stress is that the different degrees of closeness to the 'political elite' entailed different degrees of scientific and academic autonomy. However, as mentioned above, distinguishing between ideological and political constraints is fundamental not only in order to understand the different kinds of sociological knowledge produced in the GDR, but also to define the space of actions of both the collective and individual actors.

Let me start from the scientific institutes. The fact that they were more distant than universities from the core of the political sphere meant, first, less ideological pressure and, vice versa, greater autonomy in deciding their own research fields, structuring their own scientific work, and forming informal networks.¹⁶ On the other hand, because of their scientific values, their research was especially desired by the political elite to understand the cultural and social transformations of GDR society. As a result,

nization for the young people of the GDR.

¹⁶ This aspect has been stressed by all my interview-partners.

most of the scientific works were not issued publicly. Furthermore, as the case of the Leipzig Central Institute for Youth Research highlights, in Leipzig a mutual mistrust between the representatives of the Ministry for National Education and the directors and researchers working at the institute existed. A further important factor in determining the degree of autonomy of the scientific institutes was the geographical distance from Berlin as Berlin was the political bureaucratic centre of the GDR; being physically distant from the capital corresponded to being more distant from political control.¹⁷

Universities, then, had less political autonomy than research institutes, also because of their educative role. In any case, the space of autonomy for academic sociologists could change according to where they worked. As for the scientific institutes, the geographic distance of universities from Berlin (i.e., from the 'political centre') was crucial, especially for the older universities, such as the University of Jena, which tried to maintain their academic traditions in terms of programs, practices and habitus, as emerged from political reports.¹⁸ Furthermore, research/teaching autonomy also depended on the institute/faculty with which sociologists were affiliated, according to the hierarchy of disciplines defined by the State. For what concerns the macro-area of the social sciences, it is important to stress how the university reforms carried out after 1951 aimed at consolidating the leading position of the new *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* (science of society) in the academic system. In *Gesellschaftswissenschaften*, the core and more ideological disciplines were 'dialectical materialism', 'historical materialism', political economy, 'history of the workers' movement' (with some variations in the name over time) and scientific communism, which were compulsory for each degree course (also in the natural sciences). Philosophy was considered a 'social science discipline', and until the mid-1960s was 'reduced' to dialectical and historical materialism (see after the sociological curricula). Both philosophy and economics, then, accomplished an ideological function. The fact that academic sociology initially developed within the faculties of philosophy and economics highlights its subordination to these two more ideologized disciplines, even if sociology was mainly (and politically) considered only an applied SS-discipline. On the other hand, from the mid-1960s, sociology began to also be taught in other institutes and degree courses, for example *Kulturwissenschaften* or medicine, where the ideological pressure was lower than in philosophical institutes.¹⁹

Factories and radio were two further important spaces where sociological knowledge was produced. Nevertheless, they presented a different internal structure of political control and different research areas with different symbolic relevance. Indeed, over time, the sociology of work became a pivotal research current for the discipline, whereas research related to cultural issues, tastes and lifestyles gained increasing at-

¹⁷ See, in this regard, the interview with Walter Friedrich, founder and Director of the Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung from 1966 to 1990 (in: Sparschuh and Koch 1997).

¹⁸ Source: 'Bericht über den Besuch der Universität Jena von 16. bis 17. Mai 1950', Mai 27th, 1950 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin).

¹⁹ Interviews with: Irene Dölling and Hildegard Nickel.

tention only after the end of the 1960s, in parallel to the cultural-social transformations of society which especially affected the youth.²⁰ A third factor to consider is that researchers working for the radio institution were more responsive to international (Western) influences (cf. Polgers 2000).

Last, but not least, on account of their closer relationship to the Party, political science institutes actually presented more spaces for freedom than universities. Thus, sociologists working, for example, in the Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften covered a double power position within the political and academic fields and were more able to act autonomously not least, as recounted one of my interviewees,²¹ because as ‘controllers’ they were not subjected to political control.²² Furthermore, by hedging a twofold power position, they were also able to support people belonging to their informal networks in publishing their research output and to advance reform projects at higher political decision levels. Equally important for their political capital was, in some cases, their international scientific prestige (see, for example, the case of Lothar Bisky), which also entailed belonging to meaningful international networks and, in turn, especially beginning from the 1970s, giving prestige to the GDR (cf.). In this way, individual international recognition (symbolic power) could be converted into political capital for the country. This allowed them to act more freely than other scholars in organizing their scientific work (in terms of projects, publications, seminars, and so on) as long as the symbolic and political legitimation of the GDR State was not questioned.

In short, looking at the development of sociology from the lens of the Bourdieusian field offers a more complex perspective on the transformation of both the social and symbolic space of the discipline and their relationship. In this regard, by considering together both political and academic/scientific capitals, it is evident how the political control of the development of the discipline was diversified according to the subfield, institutions and specific actors towards which political control was addressed. Finally, as we will see in the next section, this gateway provides a better understanding of the various institutionalization processes of sociology in the GDR from the second half of the 1940s to the 1990s.

THE (DE)INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE GDR: 1946-1990

In the following, I illustrate the (de)institutionalization processes of sociology in the GDR through three examples. The first one concerns the identification of the main

²⁰ Interviews with: Peter Wicke; Jutta Begenau and Hildegard Nickel.

²¹ Interview with Peter Wicke (Spring 2017).

²² In the interview, Wicke referred especially to Lothar Bisky. Bisky was a sociologist of culture who never taught in a social science institute. From 1966 to 1980, he worked as an assistant and later as Department Head at the Institut für Jugendforschung in Leipzig. In 1979, he became *Honorary professor* at the Humboldt University in the Faculty of *Kulturwissenschaften* (and not *Gesellschaftswissenschaften*). From 1980 to 1986, he was also *Dozent* at the Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften and, from 1986, full Professor at the High School for Film and Television in Potsdam (from 1986 to 1990, he was also Rector of the school).

academic, scientific and political institutional stages of this process. The second relates to the dissemination of sociological knowledge through conferences, journals and book-series. The third involves the transformation of sociological curricula from 1975 to 1988. The aim, as pointed out above, is to understand the different processes of the institutionalization of sociological knowledge in different (political, scientific, cultural) subfields of GDR society in order to better frame the relationship between sociological knowledge, ideology and politics.

1. Let me start from a general reconstruction of the (de)institutionalization processes of sociology from the end of WWII until German reunification.²³

In the first postwar phase (1945-1951), the main political goal of the Soviet occupation forces before, and the GDR government later, was the denazification of the universities, that is, the expulsion of professors suspected of having been politically involved with National Socialism (cf. Burrichter and Diesener 2002). Thus, little attention was paid to reforming the university system and academic curricula. For what concerns the situation of sociology, as sketched in Table 1, the discipline had barely survived during the Nazi regime and the war. An ‘anti-sociological attitude’ emerged during National Socialism against the dominant ‘bourgeois’ sociological currents in the Weimar Republic, leading to a decrease in academic sociological teaching and positions at the university in favour, however, of a dissemination of sociological knowledge in the applied social sciences (i.e., demography, spatial studies, etc., cf. Klingemann 1996). Even the following denazification process in the second half of the 1950s contributed to reducing the number of ‘available’ sociologists, as the case of Hans Freyer, who lost his Chair in Sociology at the University of Leipzig, well highlights.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Deans of the universities were, in this transitional phase, still interested in maintaining the teaching of sociology. This is clear if we look at the case of the Humboldt Universität, where two well-known sociologists (who are now recognized as pivotal figures in the history of the discipline in Germany) were called to teach sociology: Heinz Maus, who came from West Germany, was hired as *Ober-assistent* (Lecturer) in 1949 at the Institute for Political and Social Problems of the Present Time (Institut für politische und soziale Probleme der Gegenwart), and Alfred

²³ Sources: ‘Einrichtung und Arbeitsweise der Pädagogischen Fakultäten’, Pädagogische Fakultät der Universität Leipzig, June 1946; ‘Vorlesungsplan Pädagogische Fakultät Dresden’, April 9th, 1946, ‘Studienplan der Universität Berlin’, February 1st, 1946; ‘Vorschlag zur Struktur und Arbeitsweise des Wissenschaftlichen Rates für soziologische Forschung’, Abteilung für soziologische Forschung, Berlin, 28th June 1965; ‘Direktive zur Weiterführung der 3. Hochschulreform im Studienjahr 1970/1971’, Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen, October 14th, 1970; ‘Begründung zur Bildung eines Instituts für Soziologie an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin’, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, March 13th, 1979, ‘Antrag auf Gründung eines Instituts für Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin’, Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen, March 11th, 1979; ‘Gründung des Wiss. Beirates “Marx.- len. Soziologie”, November 23rd, 1982, (in Bundesarchiv Berlin); ‘Entwicklungskonzeption Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie im Hoch- und Fachschulwesen bis 1990’, Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen, April 8th, 1988 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin).

²⁴ It is interesting to notice how the denomination ‘Sociology’ was also initially refused by the Nazi regime for the same reason it was refused by the GDR-State, that is because it referred to a ‘bourgeois’ approach to and tradition of studying society (cf. Rammstedt 1986).

Vierkandt, who had retired before the end of WWII, was asked to resume the Chair in 1946. Then, in 1951, Heinz Maus's position was eliminated, and Vierkandt died in 1953 at the age of 86 years old, teaching almost until the end of his life.²⁵

A turning point in the (de)institutionalization process of the discipline came with the university reform of 1951 which introduced a centralized academic system, limiting the autonomy of single universities and regional power by, conversely, increasing central political control. Furthermore, the reform introduced a new classification of the disciplines and a new system for evaluating them through political and ideological criteria. The newly established SS-disciplines—scientific communism, dialectical Marxism, historical Marxism and history of the workers' movement—'satisfied' the contemporary political need for social science knowledge. In other words, in this new phase in which the main political goal of the GDR-State was to build a political community (cf. Wehling 1989), social science disciplines were exclusively conceived as having an ideological function. In this regard, sociology was unnecessary but, above all, according to the Soviet interpretation, it was a 'bourgeois discipline' and therefore ideologically inappropriate. Thus, until 1956 when the Soviet Communist Party ushered in the de-Stalinization process, 'sociology' was *officially* a taboo. Nonetheless, from the mid-1950s onward, some scholars (i.e., Braunreuther) constituted informal sociological research groups and published essays on sociological issues, mostly of a theoretical nature.

An important step for the inception of sociology in East German universities was the introduction of a new economic system (NÖS). Indeed, the NÖS marked a shift in the political understanding and goals of the GDR towards a *technocratic socialism*, increasing the need for social techniques and social analysis, especially regarding the transformations of, and fluctuations in, the economic sphere (Timmermann 1990; Burrichter and Diesener 2002).²⁶ From 1964, the institutionalization of sociology was mainly guided from the top at two levels: within the university, by introducing 'sociological sections' in the faculties of Political Economy and Philosophy, and within the apparatus, by establishing a scientific council for sociological research in the Akademie der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, with the goal of leading and controlling the genesis and development of the sociological field within and outside the academic system (Weidig 1997). However, we can pinpoint three further institutional events which gave new and different impulses to the larger growth of sociological knowledge in the GDR: the foundation of the Institut für Jugendforschung in Leipzig in 1966, thanks to the initiative of the psychologist Walter Friedrich; the creation of a sociological section within the Akademie der Wissenschaften in 1967; and the institution of two degree courses in *Kulturwissenschaften* in Berlin and Leipzig in 1964. Whereas the first two events underline a parallel institutionalization of the discipline within nonacademic

²⁵ Source: see the documentation on Vierkandt filed in the Universitätsarchiv of the Humboldt university of Berlin.

²⁶ Sources: 'Entwurf: Konzeption für eine Ordnung der soziologischen Forschung in der DDR', Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim Zentralkomitee der SED, February 9th, 1965 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin). Each university should also draw up an annual report of the research activities and publications, that came under the control of the political bodies.

and political institutes, the latter stressed a parallel academic institutionalization of sociology in less ideologized and politicized academic institutes and disciplinary areas, more sensitive to their 'original' disciplinary canons and/or to international scientific trends (cf. Ludz 1971; Steiner 1997).

In the 1970s, the institutionalization process of sociology was marked by the third university reform aimed at reinforcing the supremacy of the *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* disciplines in the hierarchy of SS-disciplines,²⁷ and the processing of a new economic model, which redefined the social-political interest of the GDR-State towards the material and cultural life of the GDR population. These two events had a threefold effect on the institutionalization of sociology. First, they led to a reorientation of the main topics and goals of the discipline. New attention was now paid to drawing up social indicators for solving problems related to the social conditions of GDR citizens and studying their ways of life. Second, they pushed a further professionalization and technicalization of the discipline which especially affected the academic socialization of the new generation of sociologists (who began to study sociology at the end of the 1960s). This meant, above all, the development of a more pragmatic and less ideologized attitude towards the discipline. Third, through the redefinition of its political tasks, sociology increased its autonomy from the other SS-disciplines, for what concerns the definition of a specific set of knowledge (mostly related to research techniques and methods) despite the fact that it continued to be considered an 'auxiliary social science'. In this regard, we can recall the creation of an autonomous degree course in Sociology in three universities (Berlin, Halle and Leipzig) in 1975 and the foundation of an Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology in Berlin in 1979. On the other hand, the autonomy of sociology also increased outside the academic sphere in two different directions, one more politicized, with the creation of an autonomous Institute for Sociology at the Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften in 1975, and the other more scientifically oriented, with the creation of an Institute for Sociology and Social Politics at the Akademie der Wissenschaften in 1978.

The last step in the institutionalization process of sociology was the reform of curricula in 1981/1982. As we will see later, the reform opened a short phase of experimentation within some academic institutes which was interrupted by German reunification. It can be assumed that this experimental phase was favoured by the establishment of a scientific council for Marxist-Leninist Sociology by the Ministry of Universities, which marked a formal separation between the party and institutional university politics.

Table 1 (see APPENDIX)

2. As a second step, in order to better frame the kind and degree of scientific autonomy of sociologists over time, I considered as further parameters: the organization of

²⁷ Sources: 'Entwicklungskonzeption der Aus- und Weiterbildung auf dem Gebiet der Marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie im Hochschulwesen der DDR, 1970; 'Zentraler Forschungsplan Gesellschaftswissenschaften', January 16th, 1984, 'Zentraler Forschungsplan Gesellschaftswissenschaften', November 9th, 1984 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin).

conferences²⁸ and the existence of sociological associations, journals and book-series. These data are indeed indicative of the ways sociological knowledge circulated across the broader (national and international) intellectual field.

With respect to the organization of conferences [tab. 2], I distinguished between: 1) conferences organized at a local level, 2) conferences organized at a national level and ruled from the top, and 3) international conferences in the GDR, as well as the participation of GDR social scientists in international conferences.

From 1956 to 1965, when sociology was no longer considered a 'taboo' nor really an object of (political) interest, conferences were mainly organized at the local level by informal research groups acting within academic and scientific institutions. However, the third conference of the research group 'Soziologie und Gesellschaft' associated with Kurt Braunreuther, which took place in 1964, and the conference on the Sociology of Religion organized in Jena in 1965 were also open to international scholars (cf. Steiner 2010).²⁹ In 1956, GDR scholars were also invited for the first time to the international conference organized by the International Sociological Association (ISA) in Amsterdam, albeit the choice of who could participate was not merely a sociological matter. Indeed, participating in the ISA conferences primarily had an international political meaning. This clearly emerged from the political effort made so that SS-scholars could participate in the ISA conference in Washington in 1962 (one year after the building of the Berlin Wall), whereas at this stage the interest of the political elite in developing sociology within the GDR scientific system was still very low. After 1969, the scientific council began to organize national sociological congresses whose topics mainly mirrored the political goals of the sociological research plan defined by the scientific council, Wissenschaftlicher Rat, which was part of the Academy of Social Sciences then under the control of the Central Committee of the Unitary Socialist Party.³⁰ Only in February 1990, after the fall of the Wall, was the GDR sociological congress

²⁸ 'Entsendung einer Delegation der DDR zum IV internationalen Soziologenkongress', addressed to the section 'Science' of the central committee of the SED-party, March 31st, 1959; 'Zielsetzung des Auftretens einer DDR-Delegation auf dem V. Weltkongress der ISA', Genosse Heinze, March 19th, 1962, 'Bemerkung zu einer Arbeitstagung', Soziologie und Gesellschaft, September 18th, 1962; 'Abschrift', Association internationale de Sociologie - Comité exécutif, February 25 1963; 'Über die Tagung des soziologischen Rates am 8.7.1965', in Aktennotiz, Berlin, Juli 9th, 1965; 'Entsendung einer Delegation zum VI. Weltkongress für Soziologie in Evian', Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, April 20th, 1966, 'Entwurf: Außenpolitische Direktive für die Teilnahme der Soziologen der DDR am Soziologen Kongress in Evian', August 4th, 1966; 'Bericht über die Teilnahme der DDR-Delegation am VI. Weltkongress für Soziologie', September 19th, 1966 (Bundesarchiv in Berlin). For what concerns the international conferences of the ISA I mentioned here the main documents. Nevertheless, from the end of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s the political-symbolical relevance for the GDR-state in participating to the ISA-conferences is especially witnessed proved by the intense exchange of letters between political representatives of the GDr-sociology and representatives of the ISA, as well as internal exchange of letters between political representatives and scholars of sociology about the main (political) differences of the GDR-sociology from the Western sociology.

²⁹ In this phase, international participation was still limited to sociologists of socialist countries.

³⁰ This aspect has also been pointed out by my interview partners: my interview-partners: Thomas Edeling; Hildegard Nickel.

co-organized by the Initiative group for the foundation of a Sociological Association, which also redefined the topics of the conference with respect to those programmed by the Wissenschaftlicher Rat.

After 1969, however, two important changes can be observed in the ways of participating in the ISA conference. First, the increasing professionalization of sociology also entailed less ideological pressure. Second, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the international scientific recognition of GDR sociologists increased. So, for example, Lothar Bisky was elected member of the Research Committee for the 'Sociology of Culture and Knowledge' in 1978, and Arthur Meier was elected member of the Executive Committee in 1982 and Vice-President of the ISA in 1986. A step towards internationalization was also evident at a local level. With the growth of the discipline's international scientific prestige (and the increasing political relevance of this scientific prestige) and its progressive autonomy from the more ideologized SS-disciplines, it became easier for sociologists to invite Western sociologists as guests at their institutes, even if this was only at a half-formal level, in the form of internal seminars and workshops. In any case, informal international networks were mainly constructed by sociologists outside of the official sociological academic institutes or by scholars of other disciplines.

Turning to the scientific sociological journals, they existed either at a local level (i.e., the 'Religionssoziologische Bulletin der Universität Jena', das Periodikum 'Jugendforschung', which for political reasons had a short life, the 'Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik' edited by the Akademie der Wissenschaften, etc.), or at a national level under direct political control and used only for internal communications (i.e., 'Informationen zur soziologischen Forschung in der DDR', published by the Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED' and 'Soziologische Bulletin', published by the Wissenschaftlicher Rat). Until 1990, sociologists were politically prevented from establishing their own disciplinary journal (Sparschuh and Koch 1997). They achieved this task only one month before German reunification ('Berliner Journal für Soziologie'). As a result, until the end of the GDR, the main channel for disseminating sociological knowledge was the 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie' which regularly hosted papers from national and international conferences, underlining the minor scientific importance of sociology with respect to philosophy. The overall data highlight a general poverty of sociological output in the public sphere. This fact, however, demonstrates not only a lack of scientific autonomy (from other disciplines and from politics) but also a scant regard for sociology as an ideological SS-discipline.

Table 2 (see APPENDIX)

3. The last set of data concerns the transformation of sociological curricula from the institution of the first sociological degree-courses until the end of the GDR.³¹

³¹ Sources: Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen: 'Studienplan für die Richtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', Berlin 1975; 'Lehrprogramm zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie' (differentiated for more sociological and SS-teachings), 1977; 'Bezeichnung der Vorschläge: Entwicklungskonzeption Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie im Hochschulwesen bis 1990', Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen, with attached 'Lehrprogramm für das Lehrgebiet. Informationsverarbe-

In 1975, there were two different curricula for sociological degree-courses at the Faculties of Philosophy and Economics. In the curricula of sociology within philosophy programs [tab. 3a], sociological subjects were, on the whole, less represented than the more 'ideologized' disciplines of the *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* and the more specific philosophical disciplines (history of philosophy, logic, aesthetics and ethics). Furthermore, according to the curricula plan, sociological subjects were taught only in the last two years. If we look, then, at their internal division, we can still observe a certain indefiniteness about the sociological topics, with the exception of the sociology of work.

With the curricula reform in 1981-82, we find some important novelties [tab. 3b]. First, sociological curricula were divided into three profiles: philosophy, economics and scientific communism. Second, new sociological subjects were introduced. Some of these teachings were already present in other degree-courses of the *Kulturwissenschaften*, such as sociology of culture and sociology of education. Other subjects were, instead, entirely new and related to the political and social changes that occurred in the 1980s: an increasing interest in urban sociology was related to the urban plan promoted by the GDR-State in these years, and the teaching of military sociology followed the new wave of militarization of GDR society in the same period. Finally, the time devoted to sociological matters now surpassed the time devoted to philosophy and the *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* disciplines. Nevertheless, the first two years continued to be spent studying philosophical subjects and those related to the *Gesellschaftswissenschaften*.

The curricula reform of 1987 regarded only the University of Berlin. The crucial point of this reform was that the proposal came from the Director of the Institut für ML-Soziologie, Arthur Meier. Two aspects are important to highlight. First, the existence of an autonomous Institute of Sociology at the HUB was a crucial condition not only for advancing a reform project of the curricula but also for building a professional consciousness as sociologists. This entailed not only claiming greater decisional autonomy with respect to the political sphere, but also greater scientific autonomy with respect to the other SS-disciplines. Second, this reform was also possible thanks to the prestige and charisma of Arthur Meier. In the 1970s, Meier had already founded an Institute for the Sociology of Education within the Akademie der Wissenschaften. Furthermore, his works had also been published for West German publishers and, finally, as mentioned above, in 1986 he had become Vice-President of the ISA. According to his collaborators,³² Meier managed to create a collaborative atmosphere in the Institute by orienting its research activities towards more scientific and international parameters.

itung zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', in *Archiv*, 17th March 1982; 'Leitlinien dem 1. Studienjahr 1987/1988 einsetzenden Studienplanexperimente für die Fachrichtung Soziologie an der HUB, Institute für marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', Berlin, May 28th, 1987; 'Lehrprogramm für das Lehrgebiet Geschichte der Soziologie zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', 'Lehrprogramm für das Lehrgebiet Theorie der Soziologie zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', 1082/88 (in Bundesarchiv Berlin).

³² Interviews with Nickel, Edeling and Begenau.

The first suggestion presented in Meier's proposal to the Ministry of Universities was to introduce the teaching of sociological subjects from the first semester. We may further notice a substitution of the denomination of the *Gesellschaftswissenschaften* disciplines with 'Marxist-Leninist disciplines', which also included philosophy. This renaming is meaningful because it underlines an epistemological and symbolic separation of the more scientific SS-disciplines from those disciplines more shaped by State ideology. Secondly, Meier proposed a twofold internal specialization, between a field of sociological subjects closer to the cultural sciences and a field of topics oriented towards the crucial questions of GDR social politics. Not least, in the proposal he increased the hours students had to devote to practical seminars, in this way reinforcing the 'praxis-oriented' character of sociology, even though it had gained more scientific legitimation than in the past.

Table 3a, 3b, 3c (see APPENDIX)

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to reflect upon the production, circulation and reception of sociological knowledge in the GDR by looking at how the state politically conditioned the inception and institutionalization of sociology from the early postwar phase to German reunification. In this regard, I adopted the Bourdieusian concept of field as an analytical category for better framing the interdependence between the political and sociological fields, taking into account different collective and individual actors, their structural constraints and spaces of action in the construction of sociological knowledge. Departing from this viewpoint, I first questioned the possibility of interpreting the relationships between politics and sociology by a textual analysis. I argued, therefore, how this kind of reading may lead to 'tautological results' if separated from a broader analysis of the social structures of the sociological field and of the wider field of SSH-disciplines. I then claimed that a textual analysis may encourage an erroneous perception of the relationship between sociologists and the political apparatus, focusing mostly on ideological influences. What I instead argued is that the fact that processing sociological work was a political matter meant first that it required a set of routinized practices and a large number of people interrelated with each other through different formal and informal (hierarchical) social structures crossing both the political and the academic/scientific fields.

Following these considerations was also pivotal for reworking a further central question in studying the institutional, social, cultural and epistemic development of sociology in a dictatorial context, namely the question of its scientific autonomy. In this regard, the detection and analysis of the different institutionalization processes of sociological knowledge highlighted how the inception and development of the discipline were not only consequences of political decisions driven from the top. A further crucial aspect to take into account was the continuous rebuilding of a hierarchy of SS-disciplines which followed both pragmatic and ideological criteria. As a result, if on the one hand, scientific autonomy in the GDR was limited by its subordination

to new ideological SS-disciplines, on the other hand it was partially relieved of (re) producing ideological statements. In this regard, sociology developed mainly as an applied SS-discipline, devoted to providing empirical findings.

Furthermore, if we take into account the complex and dynamic relationships between sociologists and the political apparatus as mediated by organizations, institutions and more or less formalized research groups, we can see how the degree of the politicization of sociological knowledge changed according to variables such as: the type of research institutes (scientific, academic or political), geographical closeness to Berlin (i.e., to the political centre of decision-making), the academic position and scientific (international) reputation of a sociologist within both the political and academic/scientific fields.

A final important point that I have only partially addressed concerns the development of sociological theories. As my interview partners emphasized, 'sociological theory' remained, de facto, 'à la carte'. Thus, their main difficulty in researching was to connect their empirical findings with the required ideological principles in the absence of theories and sociological concepts which could at least mediate between ideological values and empirical findings. Nevertheless, one of the more common strategies adopted by sociologists was to reformulate Western sociological concepts (the 'Western' concepts of 'role' or 'everyday life') in a language which could be politically accepted.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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1954								
1955	HU Berlin	A						S e m i - nar Sozi- ologie u. Ökonomie
1956	De-Stalinization process							
1957								
1958								
1959								
1960								
1961	Vereinigung der Phil. Instit.	A				Soziolo- gie		
	HU Berlin						Arbeits- gruppe	
1962								
1963	Introduction of a new economic plan							
	Institut für Ge- sellschaftswiss	P				Soziol. Forsch.		
	AdW						Soziolo- gie u. Ge-	
	HU Berlin, Phil. and Pol. Ök. Fac- ulties							more socio- logical sem- inars
	Kulturwiss. insti- tuten	A						Soziologie
	KMU Leipzig, I. für Psychologie	A						Soziologie u. Kiberne- tik
	Greifswald	A						Kritik der modernen bürg. Phil. u. Soziol.
1964	Introduction by law of 'sociological sections' within the faculties of Political Economy and Philosophy							
	ZK der SED	P	Meinungsf.					
	Degree-courses Phil.	A						S o z i o l . Forschung; Soziologie u. Phil.
	HU, I. für Agrar- ökon.	A				Agrar- soziolo- gie		
	HU, I. für Pol. Ökon.	A				I n d u s - triesozi- ologie		

	HU, Fakultät Wirtschaftsw.	A			post-degree certificate			
	MLU, Halle, I. für Staatsbürgerkunde	A						Sociologische Forschung
	KMU, D.c. Kulturwissenschaften	A						Soziologie
	HU, I. für Musikwiss.	A						Soziologie; Musiksoziologie
	AdW	S		Die Frau				
	AdW	S					Die Frau	
1965	Introduction by law of a central program for sociological research							
	Institut für Gesellschaftswiss	P		wiss. Rat für soziol. Forsch.				
	Institut für Gesellschaftswiss/ Fachr. Kultur	P					Kultursoziologie	
	KMU, Phil. Fakultät	A				Soziologie		
	Deutsch Päd. Institute	S				Soziol. d. Bildungswesens		
1966	Leipzig	S	Jugendforschung					
1967	MLU Halle	A				Soziologie		
	AdW	S					Soziol.	
	Hochschule KMS	A				Soziologie		
1968	degree-courses Phil. & Pol. Ök	A						secondary sub.
1969								
1970	The third university reform reinforced the position of the 'Gesellschaftswissenschaften' within the academic system and the hierarchy of academic disciplines, according to the decision of Politbüros (1968)							
	AdW	S		Nationalkomitee				
1971	New economic model 'Unity of economic and social politics' -> social politics becomes a central instrument for increasing the material and cultural life of the GDR population							

	HU, KMU; MLU	A			Fachausbildung/specialization			
1972								
1973								
1974	Reform of the curricula, planned bis 1980							
	ZK der SED	P		wiss. Rat für Sozialpolitik				
1975	* Institut für Gesellschaftswiss	P	I. für ML - Soziologie					
	Institut für Gesellschaftswiss	P	I. für Sozialpolitik					
	HU, KMU; MLU	A			aut. d.c.			
1976								
1977								
1978	AdW	S	I. für Soziologie u. Sozialpolitik					
1979	ZK der SED	P	+ I. für Meinungsforschung					
	HU	A	I. für ML - Soziologie					
1980	HU, Kulturwiss.	A						Kultursoziologie
	HU, Ber. Medizin							Soziologie
1981	Reform of the curricula, planned 1990 -> it followed the new central research plan (1980) for the ML studies of society, established by the ZK of the SED							
1982	Ministerium f. Hoch- u. Fachschulwesen	P		wiss. Beirat für ML Soziologie				

Source: Documents collected by the Bundesarchiv and the Humboldt-Universitätsarchiv in Berlin (see footnotes in the last paragraph).

Table 2. Sociology conferences and sociological journals in the GDR

YEAR	CONFERENCES			JOURNALS/ Bookseries
	LOCAL	NATIONAL	INTERNATIONAL	
1956			ISA (invited)	
1959			ISA (invited)	
1962	Prieros, Research group 'Soziologie u. Gesellschaft'			
1963	Berlin, Research group 'Soziologie u. Gesellschaft'			Religionssoziologische Bulletin der Universität Jena
1964	Merseburg, Research group 'Soziologie u. Gesellschaft'			Informationen zur soziologischen Forschung in der DDR (Akademie der Ges.Wiss.)
1965	Halle, I. of literary studies 'Literatursoziologie'		Jena, Int. conf. sociology of religion in the socialist countries	Dietz Verlag bookseries 'Soziologie'
				Soziologische Bulletin (Wiss. Rat)
	Leipzig, workshop 'youth and technology'			
1966	Leipzig, JFZ, workshop 'youth and technology'		ISA (14 participants)	internationale Berichte über Religionssoziologie
			Int. Colloquium on workers' movement (K: raunreuther)	
1967	Leipzig, JFZ, workshop 'youth and technology'	Dresden, organized by the scientific council for sociological r.		Periodikum Jugendforschung
1969		GDR- sociological congress		
1970			ISA (54 participants)	
1972				+ Periodikum Jugendforschung
1974		GDR- sociological congress	ISA (12 participants)	
1978			ISA (15 participants)	

In the 1980s, international/Western sociologists and social scientists were invited by individual research group, among them: Paul Willis, Niklas Luhmann and Pierre Bourdieu

1980		GDR- sociological congress		Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, AdW
1982			ISA (4 participants)	Book series (AdW): Soziologie und Sozialpolitik
1985		GDR- sociological congress		
1986			ISA (9 participants)	
1987				Book-series (AdW): Symposien und Kolloquien
1989	Seminar at the HU with Bourdieu			
1990		GDR- sociological congress co-organized by the initiative group for the foundation of a Sociological Assoc.		Berliner Journal für Soziologie (Fall)

Source: Documents collected by the Bundesarchiv, the Humboldt-Universitätsarchiv and the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin (see footnotes in the last paragraph).

Table 3a. Philosophical curriculum with specialization in sociology, 1975

SUBJECT		HOURS
Introduction to ML Sociology		32
Dialectical Materialism		128
Historical Materialism		128
Political Economy of Capitalism		128
Political Economy of Socialism		128
Scientific Communism		90
Seminar on the Classics of ML		128
History of the German Labour Movement and of the German Nation (Volk)		64
History of the Soviet Communist Party		64
History of Philosophy	Ancient Phil.	96
	Modern Phil.	144
	ML Philosophy	208
	Modern Bourgeois Phil. and Sociol.	152
Seminar (advanced) on Dialectical Materialism		30
ML Ethics		90
ML Aesthetics		30
Logic		160
Seminar (advanced) on Problems of Socialism		356
Mathematics and Statistics		188
Psychology		60
Theory of ML Sociology		120
History of Sociology		114
Special Topics in Sociology		286
Sociology of Work and Industry		92
Methodology of Sociological Research		136
Specialization		380
Russian		192
2nd Foreign Language		80
Sport		316
Propagandistic Activities		64
Gesellschaftswiss. Disciplines		888
Philosophy		880
Sociology		780
Specialization		380
Other disciplines		520
Sport		316
Propagandistic Activities		64

Source: Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen: 'Studienplan für die Richtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', Berlin 1975

Table 3b. Philosophical curriculum with specialization in sociology, 1982

SUBJECT		HOURS
Introduction to ML Sociology		30
Dialectical Materialism		120
Historical Materialism		120
Political Economy	of Capitalism	90
	of Socialism	90
	Seminar on the Classics of ML	90
Scientific Communism		90
History of the SED and of the International Labour Movement		120
History of Philosophy		375
Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics	Mathematics	60
	Statistics	105
	Informatics	30
Theory of Sociology		90
	Special Seminars	30
History of Sociology		90
	Critique of the Current Bourgeois Sociology	30
Methodology and Methods of Sociology		180
	Special Seminars	30
Secondary Sociological Topics (obligatory)	Sociology of Work, Industry and Corporations (<i>Sociology of Organizations</i>)	120
	Special Seminars	30
	Urban Sociology	30
	ML Military Sociology	15
Secondary Sociological Topics (choice)		120
	Sociology of Family	
	Cultural Sociology	
	Sociology of Education	
	Sociology of Youth	
	Sociology of Agriculture	
	others	
Research Seminars		150
Specialization		60
General Psychology		30
	Social Psychology	30
	Work Psychology	30
Social Politics		30
Demography		30
Logic		60
Activities Devoted to the Section		120
Russian		180

2nd Foreign Language		75
Sport		286
Gesellschaftsdisziplinen		720
Philosophical Studies		435
Sociological Studies		1205
Specialization		60
Other Disciplines		600
Activities Devoted to the Section		120
Sport		286

Source: Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen, with attached 'Lehrprogramm für das Lehrgebiet. Informationsverarbeitung zur Ausbildung in der Fachrichtung Marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', in Archiv, 17th March 1982

Table 3c. Sociological curriculum, HUB, 1987

Disciplinary Areas	Disciplines/Subdisciplines	hours
Marxismus-Leninismus	Philosophy	150
	Political Economy	180
	Scientific Communism	90
	History of the SED	60
Tot		480
Further Basic Studies	Mathematics	50
	Statistics	120
	Informatics	60
	Optional	60
Tot		290
Sociological Disciplines	Theory of Sociology	180
	Methodology and Methods of Sociology	170
	History Of Sociology	120
	Critique of Current Bourgeois Sociology	60
	Seminar: 'Sociological Classics'	45
	Sociology of Work, Industry and Management	120
	Urban Sociology	60
	ML Military Sociology	15
	1 Package To Choose	120
(1)	Sociology of Science	
	Sociology of Education	
	Sociology of Technology	
	AIBS Seminar (Work, Industry, Management)	
(2)	Sociology of Leisure	
	Sociology of Youth	
	Sociology of Family	
	Sociology of Health	
	Stage/Seminars	30
	Application Seminars	150
Tot		1070
Economics	Socialist National Economics	75
	Socialist Business Management	120
Tot		195
Further Obligatory Subjects	Russian	120
	English	120
	Sport	270
	Data Protection (* Geheimnisschutz)	15
Tot		525
Further Subjects	Foundations of Technology	60
	Logic	30
	Demography	30
	Psychology	60

Tot		180
Optional Subjects		
	History of Philosophy	
	History of Economics	

Source: 'Leitlinien dem 1. Studienjahr 1987/1988 einsetzenden Studienplanexperiments für die Fachrichtung Soziologie an der HUB, Institute für marxistisch-leninistische Soziologie', Berlin, May 28th, 1987

KNOWLEDGE AS IDENTITY: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY

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ABSTRACT: In this research, we analyze the nexus between knowledge and identity as a problem of ‘sociology of knowledge’. Our aim is to present a genealogical framework with the hypothesis that if we accept that knowledge is a multi-discursive phenomenon, then one way of justifying and stabilizing knowledge in social practices is, through the concept of identity. We single out the problem of locality of discourses and practices and present the “genealogical paths” through which knowledge and identity are intertwined. Furthermore, our attempt is to identify the specific historical relations of knowledge and identity – through the discursive practices and especially in the context of Enlightenment and the claims for “universal knowledge”. We recognize these relations within the process of formation of the European identity.

KEYWORDS: Genealogy, identity, knowledge, Enlightenment, Europe, Sociology of knowledge

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt of the genealogical analysis of the terms knowledge and identity – terms and concepts that are multi-discursive, diffuse and not easy to define. The main aim of this paper is to situate these terms in the methodological framework of the genealogy and disciplinary framework of the sociology of knowledge. The aim is also to test the hypothesis that – if knowledge is to be approached as a multi-discursive phenomenon, as we do, then it is possible to analyze it as an important part of the (collective) identity formation processes. Furthermore, we claim that this is the process of formation of the European identity – not as an “identity of subjects”, but as an “identity of heritage”. That is, identity of different cultural, political and other social practices of the creation of knowledge that became the crucial part of the “common

identity” and history of the Continent – without “measuring” contributions. In this paper, we rely much on the Nietzschean and Foucauldian notion of genealogy. It denotes the critic of the meta-narrative of history in the social sciences and humanities, critique of what Foucault termed “*histoire totalisante*” – and proposes the analysis of the “history of locality”. That is genealogy.

This kind of “localization” of the subject – to the interconnectedness of knowledge and identity – through the research of their “archeological layers”, their genealogical paths and practices in the modern history of Europe, also points to the “locality” of the formation of the nexus of identity and knowledge and the social processes of divisions, repressions, exclusions, surveillance, normalization, etc.

Finally, in this paper, we try to explain how the “mangle of discursive practices”, knowledge and space, formed the specific historical relations that generated the claims for “universal knowledge”. At the same time, at least since the age of Enlightenment, that was part of the processes of formation of the European identity: hence – knowledge as identity.

“Europe” in this paper is not treated as the homogenous space, but more as the “geography of scatteredness” – with the heterogeneous sources. Identity of “the multitudes of Europe” is formed – if we follow the traces of Jacques Le Goff (Le Goff 2005), throughout the Middle Ages. That is, among other things, due to the specific “spatialisation of rationality” and articulation of anonymous and rational knowledge or “universal knowledge”.

KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY NEXUS

Depending on the “registers” in which it is defined, knowledge is intertwined with binary oppositions: subjective and objective, individual and collective, ideology and science, legitimate and forbidden, private and public, truth and sense, etc. In the spaces of various binary divisions, knowledge represents a source of doubts as much as of certainties, of truths as much as deceptions, of immanence as much as transcendence, of aposteriority as much as transcendentality. Each register, in which knowledge is “multiplied”, indicates its semantic stratification. Hence, we say that knowledge is a multi-discursive phenomenon that is to be found in different discursive practices. Foucault’s claim that discourse should not be analyzed with respect to who says what, but in terms of conditions under such statements could have a certain truthful value (Foucault 1981) indicates not only the different sources of discourse as knowledge and power, but also opens the question of the legitimacy of knowledge (as discursive phenomenon) and identity nexus.

Researchers define knowledge in different ways. In sociological terms, it is always a “product”, or a consequence of historical and social circumstances in which it was produced. Hence, *knowledge as*: representations (Durkheim 1995), human interest (Habermas 1972), discourse (Foucault 1981), political knowledge (Said 1979), language (Shotter 1993), identity (Berger 1966), technology (Layton 1974), social imagery (Bloor 1976), culture (McCarthy 1996), political ecology (Weiler 2009), social legitimation (Innerarity 2013), to name a few among many other concepts. All these definitions of

knowledge indicate what Foucault (1994a: 389) had already noticed – that no knowledge is shaped without a system of communication, registers, accumulation, shifting. Hence, the recognition of the fact that knowledge and power are closely related is nothing new and it can be found in the works from Marx to Foucault (Weiler 2009).

“Knowledge as...” refers to the relational character of knowledge, i.e. to the fact that the changes in the processes of its legitimization “cannot be explained – at least not exclusively – in terms of the content of knowledge itself” (Weiler 2009: 3; Berger and Luckmann 1991). Knowledge in itself is never autonomous and independent of time, space, institutions and practices in which it is produced.

One of the genealogical lines of the regionalization of knowledge (especially scientific knowledge) is constituted in Europe partly because of the appearance and institutionalization of universities since the twelfth century. When it comes to the European continent, the task of the genealogy of knowledge is to show the historical trajectories of knowledge. That is – how knowledge was constructed throughout European history, although the very term “Europe” and “European identity” are complex (Rifkin 2004) and “are not immutable historical and geographical givens, but rather form a historically and spatially mobile matrix” (Wintle 2013: 10).

Genealogical research is important for us to be able to identify the practices that formed knowledge and identities. The “discursive nexus” of knowledge and identity in this paper does not point to the *knowing subject*, but rather to the *type of practices* that connect the terms, or to the practices in which knowledge is part of identity formation processes.

The nexus of knowledge and identity is possible to recognize if we accept the concept of identity that is not essentialist (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 53), but a strategic and positional one. Identity, like knowledge, is also implicated in the fields of binary oppositions. Despite many sets of problems occur when the issue of identity is at question, one of the most important is the problem of its irreducibility (Hall 1996: 2). Hence, identities are “constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions” (Hall 1996: 3-4). Identity, like knowledge, is a multi-discursive phenomenon. Identity is a question of sameness and continuity (*id, idem*), but also a matter of difference and exclusion. Processes of the formation of identities are established always through the signification and discursive practices that delineate the field of objects and define a *legitimate perspective* for the object of cognition to be identified, but also for the subjects of knowledge.

Nexus between knowledge and identity brings us the framework of the genealogical analysis, as “history of sense”, as well as the spatial or local and regional arrangements and variations of discursive practices. That is also why the geo-epistemic framework of analysis – as the cross-section of research about knowledge, identity and space – becomes important. We call this type of genealogical framework a geo-epistemology (Marinković and Ristić 2016) – that is not to say that geo-epistemology is a particular theory or method, but a theoretical and methodological framework in which knowledge is understood as a specificity of space and place where it “comes from”. In case of this paper, that is quite a vast space – European continent. Furthermore, this is approach that recognizes that knowledge and discourses are formed in spaces and vice

versa. In other words, knowledge always has its geo-epistemological function or its spatialized forms – spaces in which it is placed – from quite a “local” institutional level (schools, factories, hospitals, organizations or some other social institution), to the macro-social and macro-territorial levels. Knowledge is in a different way, through space, “distributed” in speeches, statements, institutions, utterances, books, documents or technologies.

We shall see that spatial aspects of the nexus knowledge as identity uncover particularly power infrastructure. If we analyze knowledge “in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition” – which are all spatial aspects, we can “capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power” (Foucault 1980: 69). Spatial dimensions of knowledge are particularly important when it comes to the aspect of identity, because it is never unified but increasingly fragmented, fractured, regionalized and fluid.

The geo-epistemology of identities identifies their anchorage in language, discourse and abstract concepts that have certain geo-locations, either physical or imaginary places of origin. Since identities are constructed within discourse and since “identities have a narrative dimension” (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 51), they could be analyzed through the specific “enunciative strategies”, “within the play of specific modalities of power”. Identities are “thus more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity” (Hall 1996: 4). Their *spatiality* should be understood through discursive practices and knowledge/power/space relations.

GENEALOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Opposite to historicist consciousness which strives to establish the “hegemony of universality” and necessity of the development of the world historical process or “totalizing history” of the advancement of the mind – like in Hegelian terms – genealogy is not only the “history” of *descent* (Foucault 1984a: 90). It has a resonance of the “provinciality”. Opposite to the light of the sun which shines on world history (Hegel 2001: 430-433), genealogy is *grey* (Foucault 1984a: 76). Opposite to the great path of necessity, genealogy offers understanding of the meanders or capillary polymorphous contingencies – events and aleatories – statements. Wasn’t Foucault’s (1988a: 10) archaeology and genealogy resented for this very “provinciality”, localism and “parochiality”? There seems to be a need for spatial distance, *another geography*, in order for the “provincial” history of Europe to be seen (Chakrabarty 2008). Opposite to the Hegelian mind that is objectivized in the state, genealogy offer the “paths” in which practices “move” and “paths” that “universalize” only local type of rationality and knowledge.

These are the Nietzschean genealogical paths of *Herkunft*, because genealogy is always about a “series of historical analyses” (Foucault 1978: 8). It leads to the materiality of local practices, to empirical insights that are stored in archaeological layers. Genealogy traces human practices that are mediated by power and knowledge. This is “the case of a society” (Foucault 1978: 8). This is simultaneously, in many cases,

a problem of constant intersection of genealogical paths in which discourses and knowledges move towards “their” practices.

Such a genealogy, for instance, could identify how medical perception was transformed into medical gaze and the new practices of power and knowledge (Foucault 2003); how psychiatric practices of “liberation” of mad were transformed into psychiatric power (Foucault 2006a; 2006b); how practices of surveillance and punishment over the body became a general panoptical and disciplinary model in the society (Foucault 1994a; 1995); how Victorian knowledge of sexuality became the form of discipline in medical and moral practices (Foucault 1978); how the growth of wealth became the subject of political economy and how the aleatory aspect of speech was regulated in discourse (Foucault 1981: 62). Finally, “locality of practices”, discourses and knowledge participate in the formation of what, at least since the age of Enlightenment, could be called “European knowledge” and “European identity”.

In the research of knowledge as identity, genealogy should follow the traces of the “local” regions – just as Foucault did in his research – by identifying the emergence of prisons, clinics, madhouses, asylums, schools, universities, factories. Even when the genealogy of “local paths” leads us to a certain epoch, to the Enlightenment – we can open the problem of “archaeological stratification” of knowledge and identity (Foucault 1978: 3-13). This kind of research does not “arrive” at the Hegelian “freedom of subjectivity”, but at the locally or regionally constructed subjectivities that are generalized, or attempted to be – with some “instruments” of power, like institutions.

One possible genealogical analysis of (scientific) knowledge should look carefully throughout the practices of development of universities across Europe – since the “public”, “anonymous” and “objectified” knowledge that we call science is constituted, at least in part, through the processes of *institutionalization* of the universities during the 12th century in Italy and later on in other countries of Europe. Ideal of “public knowledge” was, according to Peter Burke (2004: 83), visible in the early modern period in European history, but “the question of what kinds of knowledge ought to be made public was a controversial one and is answered in different ways in different generations and in different parts of Europe”.

The other genealogical aspect leads to the Enlightenment and the rise of the practices of *disciplining* knowledge in different social fields. The Enlightenment is in this sense the “infrastructure” of common European knowledge as identity. Though, “the *Aufklärung* has been a very important phase in our history and in the development of political technology, we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to understand how we have been trapped in our own history” (Foucault 1982: 210).

Knowledge has been firmly connected with science for many centuries, and science converted knowledge into the “regime of the truth” by different, “local” practices and institutions – in order to monopolize it, globalize it and universalize it. However, we should not forget that the term “knowledge” includes not just the scientific knowledge, but different types of knowledge in past and present societies (Berger and Luckmann 1991). Knowledge is not just the *knowledge of truth* in the scientific terms, but also the *knowledge of sense* – because it secures basic interpretative and symbolic schemes for what people call social reality (Ristić and Marinković 2016). Although this claim about

knowledge should ensure that we see knowledge “everywhere”, genealogy helps us to narrow down the means of its analysis. Genealogical method and the research of the “regionalization” of knowledge aims to explain how a certain *kind* of knowledge is constructed, what is *acceptable* way of getting at reality and how knowledge claims are justified and stabilized in social practices (Livingstone 2003: 88)

When this genealogical locality is placed in a wider historical context of the creation of a *unique space* of knowledge and identity, it leads us to the history of Europe. That is why French historians of the *Annales School* – these historians-geographers of Europe, had to relinquish the old history of dates, events and grand scales. Europe is many things, all of them with their own, peculiar histories: *An Aborted Europe; A Dream of Europe; Potential Europe; Feudal Europe; The ‘Fine’ Europe* (Le Goff 2005). That is why there is the Europe of wine and beer, the Europe of the Latin and Byzantine world, the Europe of land and sea, the Europe of olives and lavender and the Europe of salted cod fish and amber, the Europe of the inquisition and the Europe of science, the Europe of divided Christians, the Europe of Hungarians, Huns, Vikings, Muslims (Bloch 2004: 3) and the Europe of “Europeans” and Europe of “Others”, the Europe of towns and villages, the Europe of the antique and modern concept of the West, etc.

The Europe of myths and the Europe of logos have “matured” in the processes of anchoring its identity and knowledge in Enlightenment. The geography of the Enlightenment was primarily the geography of “microscopic” localities (Clark, Golinski, and Schaffer 1999: 26): scattered libraries, salons, observatories, archives, clubs, societies, universities, and schools. The important question is not only *Was ist Aufklärung?* (Kant 1784), but also *where* was the Enlightenment. The geographical and cultural span of the Enlightenment stretched from the Baltic Lutherans through French artillery engineers, English instrument makers, sentimental novelists, Dutch patricians and country girls, political arithmeticians to Prussian metaphysicians (Daston 1999: 495). When at the turn of the epochs – during the sixteenth century – process of “urban rooting” of scattered geographical localities was accelerated, that was at the same time part of the process of the formation of the future urban identity of Europe. Locating knowledge (Peter Burke 2004: 53) in towns – was actually the anchoring of local identities that had been “floating” until then: “The enlightened, whether resident in London or Königsberg, Paris or St. Petersburg... imagined themselves as comrades in a common undertaking, the material and moral improvement of the human estate” (Daston 1999: 499).

But an important genealogical question remains open: “In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984b: 45). Isn’t this the quest for the same genealogical paths of the modernity that Max Weber already “traveled” – as a representative of a whole Nietzschean generation (Loader 2001). That quest led Weber to the insight into unanticipated, yet global consequences of a “parochial” ethics and a local rationality – the Protestantism (Weber 2005). Weber’s question also opened the problem of “universal history” and universal significance and value (Weber 2005: xxviii).

Just like in Plato’s *allegory of the Cave*, Europeans could for a long time observe only

the shadows produced by the light that came from the “Islamic shores” of the Mediterranean: from Alexandria, Beirut and, further on, from Baghdad, Teheran and Damascus. It is what Marc Bloch (2004: 3) noted a long time ago: “For a long period neither Gaul nor Italy, among their poor cities, had anything to offer which approached the splendor of Baghdad or Córdoba” (but see: Le Goff 1993). However, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent a deep break, a cut, a geo-epistemological break. In this break, distancing, acceleration, “crack” – in that “spatial landscape that stretched from the end of the thirteenth to the dawn of the eighteenth century” (Delumeau 2007) – we search for the origins of Europe, its knowledge and identities.

It seems that Europe “made” its knowledge and identities from various kinds of accidents: from diseases, plague, leprosy, heresies, wars, banishments, invasions, intrusions. From wars it “made” technology, tactics, strategies, territories, *geography*, cartography and maps; from diseases it “made” medicine, hygiene, surveillance, discipline, body; from intrusions and invasions it “made” anthropology – knowledge of the Other; from heresy it “made” the inquisition, confessions and professions, measures, investigations, interrogations; from repentance it “made” the analysis of verbal confession (Foucault 1994d: 126); from punishment it “made” prisons and ghettos; from leprosy it “made” a binary division, separation; from the plague it “made” control, surveillance and practices of classification (Elden 2003); from the lack of hygiene it “made” population, politics, police: “It is not possible to see European history as the progressive embodiment of a great unifying idea since ideas are themselves product of history... The European idea has been more the product of conflict than consensus” (Delanty 1995: 2). We often forget that the (local) grandeur of Renaissance also emerged in the middle of a great disease – the plague. Hunger, deprivation and modesty were, at the time, a way of life for the whole Mediterranean (Braudel 1995: 57). The “body” of the Renaissance was thus deeply cut with a great mortality and lack of hygiene of individuals, whole families and towns, cut by diseases and still undeveloped medicine, cut by invasions from the east and south, political instabilities and local conflicts and wars.

For a long time identity has been nomadic, or “too local”. This is a long period of hamlets, remote and scattered villages. Until the eleventh, perhaps even the twelfth century, Europe was still a geography of wild forests, overgrown fields, dangerous rivers, even more dangerous seas, hardly passable mountains; this was still a geography of overgrown Roman roads, collapsed bridges, torn down theaters and amphitheaters. Wanderers, vagabonds, these are “typical representatives of the time” (Le Goff 2009: 61) – the time that only hinted at a demographic growth, more intensive agriculture, restoration of towns, crafts, skills and trade. The time when the majority of wandering would be stopped in order for people, nations and their cultures to be created along with new regional particularities, and finally, only when the pace of centennial migrations was stopped, an infrastructure would be created of a static mentality and identity. A “mindless load” wandered across Europe at the end of the middle ages on its “symbolic voyage” (Foucault 2006a: 8). Lepers wandered – they would be rooted by the asylum; the sick wandered – they would be rooted by the clinic and the gaze of medical knowledge, with the “birth of the clinic” (Foucault 2003). The exiled, outlaws, robbers

and beggars wandered – they would be rooted by the prison (Foucault 1995), through a new optics of surveillance and technology of punishment, before the new separations, classifications and spatializations (Foucault 2006a). First medieval “intellectuals” wandered, that roaming band that “severely criticized the society” (Le Goff 2009: 61) – they would be anchored by colleges and universities. Merchants and dealers wandered – they would be anchored by the first permanent fairs and markets. They would also be stopped at the gates of towns, anchored by the global market. Craftsmen with their skills wandered – they would be first anchored by guilds and later, along with all the others, the capitalist way of manufacturing – they would be anchored by the division of labor and social classes. They would be anchored by the ideologies of social classes (Bufton 2004) and spatialized by workers’ settlements and suburbias. Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* also wandered and then appeared as an ordinary man – Alonso Quixano – he was anchored by the first modern novel (Foucault 2002: 54) because his wanderings in vain “form the boundary: they mark the end of the old interplay between resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations” (Foucault 2002: 51). It is a paradigm of the common identity in Europe at the turn of the epochs. Don Quixote is the last attempt to attribute meaning to the world, knowledge that can no longer be understood in the matrix of “old” meanings of closeness – locality and parochiality. This is identity stretched between the “dying” knowledge of the sense and the “new-born” knowledge of the truth – a science. Don Quixote – he shows a dangerous play of identities. A danger of “liberated subjectivity” that is free to chose identities – but the epoch has already offered a new repertoire in which old identities can no longer play on the stage of the new public, except in psychiatry: “And every episode, every decision, every exploit will be yet another sign that Don Quixote is a true likeness of all the signs that he has traced from his book” (Foucault 2002: 52), not knowing that it is the end of an epoch, the end of the “interplay” of similarity in which identity is pre-given, fixed, without a visible change towards something different: “Don Quixote is not a man given to extravagance, but rather a diligent pilgrim breaking his journey before all the marks of similitude. He is the hero of the Same” (Foucault 2002: 51) – a hero of the space which does not cross borders of an Iberian parochiality.

Various strangers, foreigners and refugees wandered. They were stopped at the gates of new towns or were anchored by the borders of nation-states – people were anchored by citizenship, a new and until then unknown form of belonging. Finally, all these wanderers would be anchored by a new form of multiple belonging – identity. For a long time identity was located in the spaces of proximity and familiarity where social relationships of a certain and recognizable world were reproduced. The moment when an epoch of great distances and new borders was created, the man began his quest for the answer to the question *Who am I?* and “asking ‘who you are’ makes sense to you only once you believe that you can be someone other than you are” (Bauman 2004: 19).

For a long time *others’* knowledge wandered: first across vast Mediterranean peninsulas, then across the Continent. The geo-epistemology of these large peninsulas was at the same time the genealogy of increasing inter-dependencies between Europe and the wider world (Smith 2013), non-European or still non-European localities which

managed to become not only European, but universal. Across the Balkan Peninsula to its future continental center came the logos of Greek philosophy, but in the waves from the East across it also came distant mythologies. Across the Apennine Peninsula all the way to the “continent” arrived art and ancient technologies that were later transformed into Renaissance. Across the Iberian Peninsula came Arabic translations of Greek philosophy and medicine. But also the Arabic cartography, technology and navigational instruments without which it would not be possible to discover the New World: “Baghdad played an important part in cultural transmission through the translation and diffusion of Greek medical and scientific works. The mathematical writings of Archimedes, the astronomical and geographical treatises of Ptolemy, and various Aristotelian philosophical texts in translation all spread west from Baghdad to Córdoba” (Livingstone 2003: 91).

Genealogy of European knowledge, whose paths move across the scattered European geography, reveals that knowledge is made of polymorphous genealogy. The sources of knowledge are more heterogeneous than it is believed. The provenances of European knowledge came from “far away”. Through its epochs, from Renaissance to Enlightenment, the geography of Europe managed to transform this polymorphous knowledge that arrived from the depths of history and from distance into anonymous and universal knowledge available to everyone – science. This was its great “offer” to all kinds of parochiality: “The universal communication of knowledge and the infinite free exchange of discourses in Europe, against the monopolized and secret knowledge of Oriental tyranny” (Foucault 1981: 62).

Throughout history of its knowledge, Europe shaped a representation of itself. Only through history and a universal type of knowledge – science – the product of its politics of universal rationality and practices, it looked at its own and Others’ identity. This was a gaze that transformed, long after the fall of the Roman Empire, overgrown fields and forests into Europe. The gaze that went over old Roman borders and turned spaces beyond them into something “European”.

CONCLUSION

Although they encounter in many fields, knowledge and identity primarily “meet” in the field of sense. Just like knowledge, identity is about attribution of meaning and “description” of experience. However, regardless of whether we are talking about the *truth* or *sense*, both knowledge and identity were “born” in a struggle: in the strategies of imposing what is considered to be the truth and sense, in the tactics of resistance to that imposition, in practices, in games of exclusion/inclusion of identity and knowledge in the fields of legitimacy, politics and power. Because: “Whatever is known has always seemed systematic, proven, applicable, and evident to the knower. Every alien system of knowledge has likewise seemed contradictory, unproven, inapplicable, fanciful, or mystical” (Fleck 1979: 22). How else can we interpret Foucault’s (1984a: 88) claim: “This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” – to separate, distribute, classify – to produce the identity in the opposites of this “cutting”. It is made as a mechanism for dividing practices (Foucault 1982: 208)

– through which truth and sense, but also identities could be produced.

Therefore, to “overstep” the locality of genealogical paths mean to go beyond the problem of the identity of subjects into the long history of the pre-subjective identity, which is still “trapped” in the “age-old dependencies” (Habermas 1987: 83). Or, to “move forward”, to the post-subjective identity of contemporary global societies. Genealogical paths should lead us to all those scattered and unconnected, still non-European and still non-universalized, but local practices that would shape knowledge and identities.

Even within the geographically firm Europe, in its West, neither identity nor knowledge were anchored for a long time in a common concept: “When he crossed the English Channel, Voltaire sensed that he had entered a different intellectual world. All that was solid in Paris melted into air in London” (Livingstone 2003, 91). Simultaneously, something completely different was happening – the *Republic of Letters*. Thus it was possible for an Italian, a Catholic, a Jesuit, a Sinologist, who did not speak Arabic, and a Dutchman, a protestant, an Arabist who did not speak Chinese to understand each other in 1665 in Leiden: “When the two men translated their texts into their common language, Latin, the links between Islam and China became apparent” (Burke 2004: 53).

For many paths of contingencies poured into one great “river of necessity” – with Enlightenment – with the concept of autonomy of knowledge and identity. Before that, genealogy could easily “get lost” in the bundle of parochial paths, just as happened to Averroes when he strove to translate Aristotle into Arabic: “Bounded within the circle of Islam” and thus “trying to imagine what a play is without ever having suspected what a theatre is”, Averroes “could never know the meaning of *tragedy* and *comedy*” (Bauman 2004: 20).

Genealogy does not seek to discover a country, a language or a law – an origin or cause of identity. If genealogy in its own right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogeneous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity (Foucault 1984a: 95).

Our knowledge, just like our identities, was born in struggles and resistance. There is a constant dialectic tension between knowledge and identity, between the European and non-European, between people in Europe and outside of Europe, between a common history and our “local” histories: “The European space has grown to the extent that it is no longer possible to say what is national and what is European” (Delanty 2005: 53).

Odysseus – this great wanderer – is so “deeply cut” into the body of European identity, because he brings the story of a great transformation. He leaves as a warrior but his return is a paradigm of a research adventure of knowledge creation. Is this matrix repeated by Alexander who leaves as a warrior and turns his quest into an expedition? “Alexander is a researcher par excellence... His thirst for knowledge, they say, made him go on his journeys and conquests” (Le Goff 2009: 93-94).

Today, the “old” questions remain open: What is Europe? Who are we, the People of Europe? (Balibar 2004). Where are we Now? Through the answers to these, we could

see that identity and knowledge intertwine – maybe in those places where we least expect them – in the field of our historical knowledge and in genealogical analysis.

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INTERPRETIVE SUBJECTIVATION ANALYSIS – A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DISCURSIVE SITUATEDNESS OF HUMAN SUBJECTIVITIES

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ABSTRACT: One of the developments based on the approach of Berger and Luckmann focuses on the analysis of discourses and subjectivation processes. The Interpretive Subjectivation Analysis (ISA) takes up these developments in order to establish a research perspective on the decentered subject that combines the theories of the Interpretive Paradigm of Sociology and the post-structuralist concepts of subjectivation as established in Judith Butler's and Michel Foucault's work. This paper outlines a qualitative methodological framework to analyze processes of subjectivation by including and relating empirical data on different levels. In order to show how this type of research can broaden the perspective on human subjectivities, the article discusses different empirical studies that focus on questions of inequality and marginalization. **KEYWORDS:** Interpretive Paradigm, Sociology of Knowledge, subjectification/ subjectivation, discourses, subjectivities, qualitative methods, decentered subject

INTERPRETIVE SUBJECTIVATION ANALYSIS – A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DISCURSIVE SITUATEDNESS OF HUMAN SUBJECTIVITIES

The Sociology of Knowledge in the tradition of Berger and Luckmann (1991 [1966]) has inspired and stimulated various theoretical and methodological developments and numerous empirical studies of the *Social Construction of Reality* (Pfadenhauer and Knoblauch 2019). Based on this tradition, the Interpretive Subjectivation Analysis (Bosančić 2017, 2018a, 2018b) links social constructivist and post-structuralist thinking in order to analyze how the embodied, living and speaking individual is constituted by and situated in symbolic and material orders. This research program addresses the classical sociological question of the interconnectedness of society and individuals or, as it has been reframed in different approaches, as the interrelatedness of subjective

and objective realities, structure and agency, micro- and macro-level, system and life-world and so on. In post-Marxist and post-structuralist thinking, Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault had a major impact on conceptualizing subjectivation in a similar way as Max Weber for instance. Weber's (2002 [1904/1905]) early sociological study on the 'Spirit of Capitalism' showed how people's everyday practices were influenced by religious salvation messages and how this entanglement of cultural and discursive 'callings' on the one hand and people's self-relations and practices on the other hand pushed forward a capitalist formation of society. Althusser (2001 [1971]) also refers to a kind of entanglement as his concept of *interpellation* shows how ideological state apparatuses call upon subjects and shape them as individuals with coherent identities. In his historical and empirical studies, Foucault takes up these thoughts and analyzes the way subjects are constituted by powerful discourses and dispositifs.

Following all these traditions, subjectivation (sometimes also referred to as subjectification) can be understood as an interrelatedness or entanglement of normative subject orders and subjective self-relations, or, as Foucault puts it,

What are the games of truth by which man proposes to think his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, laboring being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? (Foucault 1990b: 7)

The Foucauldian concept of subjectivation had a strong impact on the debates about the *decentered subject* in Cultural, Postcolonial or Gender Studies as well as various other research fields. On the one hand, theoretical debates were initiated in these contexts, for instance in Spivak's (1998) or Butler's (1997) works. On the other hand, the Governmentality Studies continued Foucault's empirical work that he outlined in his lectures on the genealogy of the neoliberal formation of society and the entrepreneurial self.¹ Theoretically and empirically, both perspectives on subjectivation hardly refer to the sociological tradition on the duality of structures (Giddens 1984) or the concept of the Self (Mead 1972 [1934]). Also, these traditions neither have an elaborate methodological standpoint for instructing empirical studies, nor do they adopt qualitative research methods. Therefore, most of the empirical work somehow follows Butler's or Foucault's ideas without (explicitly) specifying how the theoretical framework was implemented in concrete research practices. The other way around, sociological tradition hardly takes into consideration the debates about subjectivation. Instead, sociologists for the most part continue to speak about selves and subjectivities, individuals and actions. However, if they do include the Foucauldian concepts of power relations and subjects,² their heuristic concepts for doing empirical research are more focused on the constitution of symbolic orders than on the intertwining of normative subject positions and subjective self-relations.

In this paper, the Interpretive Subjectivation Analysis (ISA) will be discussed as a

¹ Cf. Foucault (2007, 2008), Bröckling (2015), Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991), Dean (1999), Lemke (2001) and Rose (2007).

² E.g. Adele Clarke's *Situational Analyses* (2005) or Reiner Keller's *Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse* (Keller 2011, 2013; Keller, Hordnidge and Schünemann 2018).

possible link between elaborate methodologies and methods of the Interpretive Paradigm of Sociology on the one hand and post-structuralist approaches of subjectivation that do not reflect their methodological groundings and methods on the other hand. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss how Foucault's and Butler's most influential works on subjectivation can be integrated in an interpretive sociological tradition. The first chapter therefore focuses on the questions of agency and structure in order to lay the methodological foundation of the ISA. The second chapter takes up these theoretical assumptions and develops heuristic tools to instruct empirical research on subjectivation processes. Finally, the third section presents two empirical case studies to show how ISA is used in the implementation of empirical research projects.

1. THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISA

Foucault deals with questions of how subjects are aligned with discursively constituted orders of knowledge and how individuals are normalized in the contested and powerful 'games of truth' (Foucault 1990a, 1990b). However, the individuals addressed that are interpellated by normative symbolic orders are not determined by themselves but they are more or less free, as Foucault often emphasizes (in his work). For example, Foucault argues that there would be no need for *technologies of power* if people were not able to act differently than the governmental, disciplinary or biopolitical power mechanisms are pushing them to act: "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 'free'" (Foucault 1994: 342). Foucault is therefore often misunderstood as having proclaimed the 'death of the subject' like Jaques Lacan and other post-structural thinkers. On the contrary, Foucault's concepts were closer to the Interpretive Paradigm of Sociology than to (post-)structuralist 'theories without a subject'. As Keller (2018) shows, Foucault analyzed discourses as regulated statement practices that deal with objects and co-constitute the objects of which they speak. In his historical and empirical studies, Foucault analyzed the 'games of truth' in which differently situated actors struggled about the legitimate interpretation of reality, e.g. by discursively constructing the differentiation between criminal and conform subjects (Foucault 1995), rational and insane subjects (Foucault 2003) or subjects with a normal or a deviant sexuality (Foucault 1990a). According to Keller (2018: 16), this is very similar to the pragmatist and symbolic-interactionist tradition of analyzing the *definition of the situation*, a starting point of sociological thinking as defined by William I. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas in the 1920s. Thus, both traditions focus on how reality is constructed in powerful 'games of truth' by actors who are co-constituted by these games of truth. As Keller puts it:

Conflicts over the definition of situations likewise occur in quite different areas and arenas. In fact, they are a basic feature of the collective human struggle with the world, its existence and resistances, with unfolding events, catastrophes, action choices, evaluations and all kinds of corresponding ways of problem solving. Events, problematisations and their actors who are engaged in the politics of knowledge and knowing, that is, in meaning making/world making: these are the core drivers of discursive struggles (and social transformations). (Keller 2018:

17)

Despite these similarities, Foucault was not concerned with (the) questions of agency in his genealogical perspective on the normative formation of subjects. I.e., in contrast to the interpretive sociological tradition, he refuses to make any anthropological statements on the 'human condition' and to elaborate his concept of a subject beyond the assumption that subjects are always shaped by symbolic orders and mechanisms of power in specific historical contexts. Judith Butler takes up Foucault's thoughts on power, discourses and subjectivation, but just as in the sociological tradition, she is also not only interested in the genesis of the 'Technologies of the Self' (Foucault 1988, 1991b) and the changing regimes of subject formation. Butler also wants to know how power works and enfolds on the 'inside' of the subject. Butler therefore criticizes Foucault and argues that the explanation of subject formation would need a psychoanalytical framework. She argues that "the formation of the subject cannot fully be thought (...) without recourse to a paradoxically enabling set of grounding constraints" (Butler 1997: 87). These grounding constraints consist of two processes of foreclosure: first, the necessity to repress the fact that love is constituted in relations of dependence; second, the enforced foreclosure of homosexuality (ibid.: 135). These losses constitute the psyche of the subject and as they take place in a pre-reflexive phase of childhood, the individual is not aware of these losses and therefore unable to grieve. According to Butler (1997: 167), these unconscious foreclosures constitute a *melancholic subject* that is "haunted by an inassimilable remainder" (ibid.: 29) and hence, subjects are bound to seek recognition. This concept of psyche as the 'inner space' of a subject is problematic for various reasons.

First, psychoanalytical concepts like melancholia are highly speculative terms and, from a Foucauldian perspective, such terms should rather be subject to a discourse analysis than be used as explanations for the basic formation of subjects. Or, as Charles W. Mills already pointed out in his analysis of *vocabularies of motive*, "There is no need to invoke 'psychological' terms like 'desire' or 'wish' as explanatory since they themselves must be explained socially" (Mills 1940: 905).

Second, from a genealogical perspective, it is unclear whether the melancholic subject is only a way of forming the subjects in a specific historic (period) and spatial context or whether Butler somehow assumes that this way of constituting the/a subject is universal. Third, from the pragmatist perspective of William James (2003 [1907]), it could be asked if certain theoretical assumptions make a difference while doing empirical research. If one thinks of a researcher who conducts qualitative interviews for instance and his findings show three or more different ways of how people react in a certain situation or his/her findings reveal different ways of how people narrate their identities and relate to different discourses while positioning themselves. Since individuals are not determined by symbolic orders, these kinds of differences will always appear in empirical data and the theoretical assumption of a basic desire for recognition cannot explain the various empirical differences because all subjects share this desire. In other words, the desire for recognition may explain why people want to adopt specific subject positions and identities in general, but it cannot explain why

people choose specific subject positions over others, for instance, why some people adopt right-wing and others adopt left-wing identities. Further, it cannot be explained either why the adoption of a certain subject position is performed in a more or less broad variety.

So even if Butler's criticism of Foucault's concept of a subject that does not elaborate human agency is justified, I am arguing in favor of a more careful use of explanatory concepts of how subject are shaped. In order to conduct empirical research on subjectivation processes and regarding the pitfalls of Butler's concepts, I suggest that instead of invoking psychological or psychoanalytical terms it is more useful to adopt Butler's (2011: 60) concepts of performativity and iterability she conceptualizes following and criticizing Austin, Searle and Derrida. In this respect, performativity means that subject norms need to be repeated in order to exist, but every repetition or citation is not only a rearticulation of a norm but always a resignification as every citation of a norm inevitably comes along with a deferral (ibid.: 70). In other words, norms need to be repeated, but every repetition takes place under different temporal and spatial conditions, and therefore, every repetition is a *resignification*, i.e. a – however slight – shift or deferral of the norm. Moreover, norms do not have an origin but exist only as a practice of repeating, which is another reason why repetition is always resignification. In contrast to post-structural theories that assume that norms or structures change *on the long run* without the agency of social actors, but because of inevitable deferrals, Butler adheres to a concept of human agency. She puts forward that the necessity of repetition of subject norms opens up possibilities for resignification(s). Still, living and embodied individuals have to occupy these spaces opened up due to necessary repetition. In her examples, Butler (2011: 84) demonstrates for instance that gender norms are not only changed through iterability processes without a subject, but through the performances of Drag-Kings or Drag-Queens who actively challenge the heterosexual matrix and generate other subject norms and positions.

This concept of agency is compatible with Foucault on the one hand who also assumes that the subject is formed in submission but still has the agency to resignify norms or to resist interpellations. On the other hand, Butler's concept of agency is also highly compatible with the tradition of the Interpretative Paradigm of Sociology. George Herbert Mead (1972: 174-175), for instance, conceptualizes the Self as consisting of the two inseparable instances of the I and the Me. The Me is constituted through the internalization of norms, and the I is the present part of our Self we are only aware of when we act. However, when we start to think about our Self, the I can only be accessed through the Me, i.e. we are never fully aware of our Self since we always depend on symbolic orders like discourses and vocabularies of motive in these self-reflexive processes. So the I is a kind of (a) 'black box' similar to the 'inassimilable remainder' in Butler's concept. In contrast to Butler, the I is not conceptualized as a psyche with certain desires but as the active part of the organism that forces and enables us to act more or less freely in the context of symbolic orders that are not created freely. Berger and Luckmann (1991), who refer to George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schütz, also conceptualize the subject as not being determined but situated and socialised within historically and socially developed *universes of discourses* (Mead 1972) or *stocks*

of knowledge (Schütz and Luckmann 1973) which have to be interpreted. Hence, the basic assumption of the ISA is that human individuals are able to interpret symbolic orders as Butler is assuming with the concept of resignification on the one hand. On the other hand, human actors are forced to interpret symbolic orders because these orders do not speak for themselves but need to be constantly performed by actors and therefore make interpretations necessary (Reichertz 2013). According to Butler, this necessity results from the need of repetition; in the interpretive sociological tradition it is assumed that symbolic orders can be understood as some kind of ‘instructions’ (Giddens 1984) that have to be specified in concrete historical and spatial situations. Ultimately, and despite all the differences, Mead’s, Butler’s and Foucault’s perspectives on subjects and subjectivation processes are to the extent that they assume that human individuals and this kind of subjective ‘inner space’ are instances of (partly communicatively structured) self-reflexivity which is situated in and constituted by ‘outer’ symbolic orders, materialities as well as time and space relations. Therefore, the methodological standpoint of the ISA refers to these traditions and conceptualizes subjectivation as a process during which subject norms are constructed and human individuals are addressed by these normative symbolic orders. The two key questions of the ISA is how these non-determining processes of being addressed and of shaping (or not shaping) one’s self according to the discursive interpellations and instructions are taking place and how they can be investigated empirically. To this end, the ISA proposes heuristic tools that will be discussed in the next chapter.

2. THE ANALYTIC TOOLKIT OF THE ISA

First of all, the emergence and transformation of subject norms as well as their processing and circulation must be clarified. One way to do so is to analyze which actors get into positions where they can legitimately speak and are thus involved in the discursive struggles about the definitions of reality. It is also important to ask which actors are excluded and which voices are silenced or not heard at all. For this purpose, the ISA encompasses the concept of *speaker positions* which is developed in the *Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse* following Foucault. Speaker positions are “depict positions of legitimate speech acts within discourses which can be taken on and interpreted by social actors under specific conditions (...) as role players.” (Keller 2011: 55). How do they become speakers though?

This might happen by their being socialised within a particular universe of discourse (such as mathematics or psychological expertise) for example through university education and careers and institutional role taking. This might happen also by just starting to engage for organisational or private reasons with an issue of public concern (like poverty, human rights, or ecological transformation). (Keller 2018: 35)

(The) speaker positions are contested, and different speakers struggle to authorize themselves to participate in the ‘games of truth’. In these struggles, they use different vocabularies of motive, story lines or interpretive schemes and frames to establish

their “politics of knowledge” (ibid., pp. 32-34). In these discursive struggles, *subject positions* are constructed as well:

Subject positions/Identity offerings depict positioning processes and ‘patterns of subjectivation’ which are generated in discourses and which refer to (fields of) addressees. Technologies of the self are understood as exemplary elaborate, applicable and available instructions for subjectivation. (Keller 2011: 55)

Such discursively constructed subject positions unfold their power effects by making certain self-relations appear desirable on the one hand and, often simultaneously, by constituting negative examples that are stigmatized or denied recognition. A well known subject position is the ‘entrepreneurial self’ which comes along with the stigmatized and marginalized negative subject position of ‘the unemployed person’. These negative subject positions often unfold instructions of how the deviant subjects should be educated, disciplined, punished or excluded (Keller 2018: 36). However, these discursively constructed subject positions and the interpretive schemes, frames, storylines and dispositifs which accompany them or in which they are situated should not be confused with how the living, speaking and embodied human individuals are reacting to them. This can manifest itself in the entire spectrum of possible forms of human reaction: from the attempt to take up the subject positions affirmatively, to misinterpret them, to appropriate them partially, to subvert them and so on. In order to analyze these processes, the ISA develops the concept of *self-positioning* (Bosančić 2014, 2017). Self-positioning is a permanent, precarious, tentative, changeable, dynamic and ongoing process that takes place when people are addressed and identified with subject positions and other ‘truths’ circulating in discourses and within dispositifs. The foundations for this concept of self-positioning are derived from Mead’s (1972), Goffman’s (1961, 1971, 1974, 1986, 2013) and Strauss’ (1959) works on the Self and on the non-essentialist concept of identity. According to their theoretical conceptions and especially following Goffman, people are permanently positioned and identified according to socially constructed facts, such as race, class and gender, or to personal facts, such as their looks or the stories they tell about themselves. These processes take place in life-world contexts, in organizational settings and dispositive arrangements and they are often mediated through discourses. Therefore, people are constantly confronted with normative expectations and thus, self-positioning is to be understood as a process inevitably running along due to the nature of social contexts and situations, without requiring reflected attention to the subject positions and norms. It is possible, for instance, that an unemployed person is ‘activated’ by public employment agencies by more or less forcing him/her to be self-responsible and to subject his/her personal goals to the demands of the labor market. During this process, neither the unemployed person nor the public representative profiling the unemployed person has to be aware that he or she is being addressed with the subject position of the entrepreneurial self. By being profiled and treated according to the neoliberal labor market regime, the subject position of the entrepreneurial self is implemented even if none of the actors is aware of that. Nevertheless, in such a context of subjectivation, the researcher can make plausible that, on the one hand,

certain subject positions can be implemented through the dispositive arrangement and by tools of activation that are applied. On the other hand, self-positioning processes of the unemployed person can only be explained adequately if the researcher analyzes them as reactions to the interpellation by the subject position. In contrast, it is also possible that processes of self-positioning are highly reflexive, for instance, when people decide to challenge the demands of the subject position as a 'consumer'. In the minimalist movement, for instance, people are highly aware of being positioned in a certain way and they try out new ways of self-positioning, e.g. by living in relatively self-sufficient communities or by moving into tiny homes. By doing so, they may also even generate new subject positions through their collective activities on the internet or through political activism. Besides clarifying that self-positioning can take place on a continuum between highly reflective and non-reflective processes, the latter example also shows that speaking positions, subject positions and self-positioning are intertwined. People are not necessarily only addressed by subject positions that other actors in speaking positions have constructed and legitimized. Rather, people addressed in certain ways can subvert this way of being addressed and contest the dominant subject positions by creating new ones through their collective effort to gain a speaker position.

To sum it up, subject positions do not determine the self-positioning processes. Thus, self-positioning is more or less reflexive and more or less creative engagement with subject positions. As Goffman (1961, 2013) has shown, self-positioning is always accompanied by processes of distance-making and deviation. These deviations inevitably unfold as a result of the aforementioned necessity to interpret the subject positions and to specify them in concrete situations as subject positions are complex, overstraining, ambiguous and even contradictory. As Berger and Luckmann (1991) as well as Schütz and Luckmann (1973) have shown, people are situated in different positions within the social structure as well as in different life-world contexts where they are confronted with various subject positions and other 'truths' constructed discursively. They have developed various biographical relevancies and act upon situational demands in changing institutional and organizational settings. For this reason, self-positioning is always a process of resignification, and creative deviation processes are consequently not a unusual, but rather the regular way of self-positioning. In turn, this does not mean that these processes of deviation and resignification inevitably result in transformations of the subject positions. In other words, although each adaptation and appropriation of a subject position means deviation, not every single resignification results in a change of hegemonic subject positions and discourses, as implied by the assumptions of iterability and performativity (cf. chapter 2). There may be similar deviations in self-positioning processes of different individuals, but only if these typical ways of self-positioning stimulate collective actions and people try to get in speaking positions, transformations of subject positions or the emergence of new ones may take place.

The ISA thus uses various analytic actor categories as *sensitizing concepts* (Blumer 1954) to empirically examine how power relations unfold, i.e. who is able to participate in what way in the discursive 'truth production' by gaining a speaking position

and what kinds of effects on the self-positioning processes unfold. The questions of agency are understood as empirical questions by using qualitative methods to investigate how power relations are affecting people in specific subjectivation contexts. The ISA thus focuses on asking which resources are available to the people addressed by normative symbolic orders and which situations of interpellation are perceived and felt to be restrictive as well as to what extent. This methodological framework necessarily needs to take into account two levels of empirical data. On one side, researchers need to examine the context of the interpellation, i.e. the subject positions and the specific contexts of subjectivation, with methods of discourse analysis or ethnographic research designs for instance. On the other side, data about self-positioning processes must be collected, e.g. by conducting qualitative interviews or through a participant observation. Finally, these two levels of data have to be related to each other to analyze if and how the subject positions, discourses or dispositifs unfold power effects on the self-positioning processes. The following chapter will demonstrate how these conceptual strategies of the ISA are implemented.

3. CASE STUDIES WITH ISA

In order to analyze the relationship between speaker positions, subject positions and self-positioning processes, it is necessary to investigate empirically both the symbolic orders and ‘games of truth’ with their subject norms as well as the ways these normative orders are adopted by living, acting and embodied human beings. Only through this methodological basic principle can it be ensured that researchers do not deductively conclude that certain discursive positions have an effect on the interview narratives or that certain observations in the field are power effects of subject positions and vice versa. The methodological rule therefore says that both the self-positioning processes and the respective subject norms as well as their circulation and the contexts of subjectivation should be examined, because only the knowledge of both levels can give a plausible explanation about the relations between subject positions and modes of self-positioning. This will be illustrated by two empirical studies in this chapter. The first one is a study by (Bosančić 2014) that deals with low-skilled working-class men, while the second study by Lisa Pfahl (2011) is on the self-positioning processes of students with ‘learning difficulties’ in the context of ‘special needs schools’.

3.1 Low-skilled workers

Bosančić (2014) conducted a study on low-skilled workers,³ i.e. workers who are marginalized due to the neoliberal transformation of the labor market when jobs in the industrial sector were ‘outsourced’ to low-wage countries or eliminated due to technological developments. Mostly male working-class members have lost their previous social status with the start of globalization processes. Not only did they lose their

³ By ‘semi-skilled’ it is meant that it just takes a few hours or days to learn the necessary job skills. The category was used as an analytical category in Goffman’s (2013: 83) sense for the purpose of the study and did not intend to qualify the worker’s qualifications in any way.

more or less secure employment positions, they were also marginalized due to the loss of power of the unions which had been able to provide positive and proud subject positions for the workers. These marginalization processes were accompanied by a new hegemonic discourse of the *knowledge-based society* in which only high skilled workers are valuable. By a meta-analysis of discourse based studies on work and economy,⁴ three subject positions were reconstructed: the entrepreneurial self, the creative self and the flexible self. These dominant subject positions do not provide any opportunities for semi-skilled workers to relate to themselves in a positive way since they are not able to fulfill the requirements constituted by the subject positions. The question guiding the qualitative interviews with low-skilled male workers was about how the economic and discursive marginalization influenced their self-positioning processes.

One outcome from the interviews was that some of workers could still adapt the subject position of the flexible self. The kind of impact or influence that is referred to can be seen in the following statement:

I can do almost everything that's needed. I am responsible for the incoming goods as well as for the outgoing goods. I check what is needed for the production department and do many more things. And if one of my colleagues is ill, I'll just jump in and take his place – that's no problem at all. For me it's normal, I can work everywhere in the warehouse. Most of my colleagues have their own sector – I mean, that is also a lot of work, too. But for me, there is not just one thing, I can work anywhere in the logistics department. Ingoing goods, outgoing goods, processing orders, packaging, just everything. (Lothar, 48 years old, in: Bosančić 2014)

Lothar, who has been working in the same company in the industrial sector for 15 years, and the other workers interviewed spoke about their special ability to do all the jobs in their working section. They also pointed out that they could adapt to new tasks quickly and this was the reason why 'the boss' or the company needed them. This way of self-positioning implies that the workers see themselves as capable of doing many different jobs, of quickly adapting to new demands, of working extra hours and so on – and these are the skills that are highlighted in the discourses about the flexible self. This interpretation becomes more evident when taking into account the statements of workers who did the same jobs and explained how boring their job was or that no special skills were needed to fulfil the tasks. Hence, it is clear that the workers' explanations are not just reactions to the actual conditions of the workplace, but they are mediated through discourses. The findings show that one group of workers only focused on their family lives, their house and their backyard garden and led a secluded life without any interests other than their close social environment. Their interpretation of the workplace is more or less indifferent. The other group of workers who regard themselves as flexible is more open to the demands of the world at large, e.g. these workers are active in unions or follow the news. Therefore, this group has more resources to adopt to dominant discourses and to position themselves as flexible

⁴ For instance Bröckling (2015) or Boltanski and Chiapello (2005).

(weather or not they had the skills they were attributing to themselves). Taking into account that all the workers have seen many workmates lose their jobs or be replaced by temporary workers with lower wages, this way of self-positioning could be interpreted as a *fictional security strategy*, meaning that the self-attribution to be flexible empowers them to some degree so they can feel more secure not to lose their job(s).

3.2 Students with ‘learning disabilities’

Lisa Pfahl (2011) examines modes of subjectivation in so-called ‘special needs schools’ in Germany, a type of school that focuses on the idea of ‘healing’ emerging at the interface of education and health care and that trains children and adolescents with behavioral problems or learning difficulties. The term ‘special needs’ is ascribed to certain pupils who require special support and are therefore taught separately from pupils from regular schools. In a first step, Pfahl uses the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (Keller 2013) to investigate the knowledge production of the ‘special needs pedagogy’, a subdiscipline of educational science. Pfahl examines the most important scientific journal of the professional association of special needs teachers.⁵ Pfahl’s findings show that the segregation of pupils is the result of constructing knowledge in the field of special education, and the symbolic construction of ‘special pupils’ is a result of these powerful knowledge practices. The typical diagnosis of ‘learning disability’ is not identified as a constraint, but as a power technique seeking to generate acceptance by parents and children about the need for special educational support. Thus, separation and the symbolic positioning at the lower end of the educational hierarchy are legitimized with allegedly objective testing procedures. While at the beginning of the 20th century, the subject position of morally neglected ‘poverty-sick’ children appeared in discourses, this (subject position) has changed especially since the 1970s, when special education started to increasingly incorporate medical, biological and psychological knowledge in the course of the professionalization of the field. Since then, the subject position of ‘students with learning disabilities’ has become dominant. The development of learning difficulties is regarded as a disability and as a permanent impairment. Therefore, the ‘special needs school’ is conceived as a ‘protected place’ where students with learning disabilities are not confronted with labor market needs seeing the students’ limited autonomy and learning abilities.

After analyzing the discursively constructed subject positions implemented in everyday teaching practices in special needs schools, Pfahl conducted qualitative interviews with pupils of these schools. Pfahl questions pupils that have been offered an apprenticeship because she wants to analyze how the ‘successful ones’ (very few pupils of special needs schools can be integrated into the job market to this extent) manage the transition from the ‘protected place’ to the labor market. One of the interviewees is 21-year-old Barbara who started school at the age of seven and attended a special needs school for ten years. After her time at the special needs school and a subsequent rehabilitation program, she completed an inter-company training course

⁵ See also Pfahl and Powell (2011).

to become a housekeeper. She states in the interview:

I want to start working after my apprenticeship. And I hope they won't think: 'Oh, she's from a special needs school, she can't make it here' or something like that. If the employers are normal and reasonable they won't care about that. And I did an internship so I have proven that I can do it – that's what should matter. But even if they accept me I'll still think to myself 'Do they really accept me?' Or do they just think 'ok, we'll take her because she's from a special needs school'. You know, like they just accept me in order not to hurt me or something. (Interview with Barbara, Pfahl 2011: 178)

The passage as well as the entire interview illustrate Barbara's contradictory self-positioning which can be interpreted as a precarious distinction from the subject position of the special pupil with learning disabilities. On the one hand, Barbara repeatedly distinguishes herself from the 'protective space', i.e. the special educational measures; she contrasts this with the unprotected 'normality' of a 'real' workplace. Her self-normalization is thus achieved by rejecting the label 'special pupil' or 'being learning disabled'. On the other hand, these subject positions still make her feel insecure during the transition from a training place to a regular employment. She is not sure whether she will be accepted because of her vocational skills and competences or if work will still be a 'protected place'. Barbara clearly shows her fear of discrimination ("because I come from such a school") and her hope to escape it (those who are "normal and reasonable" will "not care"). She fears, however, that the employers will assume that she is not able to perform adequately due to her low qualification and her having attended a special needs school. For Barbara, successful integration into the labor market is ultimately no proof of her skills. On the contrary, the risk of being recognized only in a socially deprived position and not as a competent person ultimately means that the subject position of the 'pupil with learning disabilities' continues to have an effect on her self-relations despite her attempted rejection of the subject position.

The relationship between subject positions and self-positioning in the interview with Jenny is similar to Barbara's with regard to the restrictions and fears of discrimination. Jenny is also 21 years old and she attended a special school starting at the age of nine. After having finished school, she completed a job-coaching project and a two-year training as an infant care assistant. However, she did not find a job and had been unemployed for 18 months at the time of the interview. Prior to the following interview passage, she talks in detail about the testing procedures of the doctors and psychologists who identified her 'learning disability' and then continues with the following story:

This was so typical, I have to go to a special needs school and that was it for me. Ok, then, I thought I'll just have to make the best of it. And I never had to repeat a year in school! I think I was even allowed to skip some courses, at an earlier stage. But I am not sure. Yes. But I never repeated a year. That would have been really, really terrible for me. Repeating a year in special needs school? No way. And I always had the best grades, I have to admit, honestly. (Interview with Jen-

ny, Pfahl 2011: 141)

In contrast to Barbara, Jenny's self-positioning can be interpreted as an ambivalent adaptation of the subject position of the 'special pupil with learning disabilities'. On the one hand, she accepts the transfer to the special needs school and does not in any way question the testing methods she previously talked about. Since Jenny is aware of the discriminatory attributions by the subject position of a special needs pupil, however, she applies different normalization strategies in the sense of Goffman's stigma management. Her self-positioning could be specified as *different but equal*, i.e. her normalization works through accepting the label 'learning disability', and at the same time, she is regaining autonomy by affirmatively adopting the meritocratic principle. Jenny distinguishes herself from the other special pupils by highlighting her special abilities, while at the same time being afraid of the comparison with persons of a higher status. However, Jenny's willingness to perform does not lead to an integration into the labor market. She accepts this failure by legitimizing the meritocratic principle and argues that her special school certificate is inferior. The acceptance of the subject position of the 'learning-disabled pupil' ultimately makes her lower her own ambitions, by which she also wants to protect herself from further disappointments in searching for a job.

The third way of self-positioning shows that there is a wide range of possible reactions when being addressed with a certain subject position. At the time of the interview, Nico was 19 years old and one of very few special needs school pupils who could start a regular vocational training immediately after having finished school. In the following interview passage, Nico describes his experiences in the vocational school:

First year apprentice, we had English lessons. And if I would have gotten a grade for it, I would have become a bad grade and failed. Because I didn't know anything before. And they practically started right away on a the level of super intelligent. Not like with the special needs students, but with super intelligent. They couldn't take any consideration for me. The others were in grammar school, comprehensive school, secondary school, whatever. And I came just now from the totally low special school. And we did not have real English lessons. And then I found a way, a small gap (...). I went to my English teacher and said: I come from a special needs school, please take that into account and she immediately took it into account. She immediately understood and said 'You won't get a grade, we will just note that you have successfully attended English lessons.' (Interview with Nico, Pfahl 2011: 187)

In this as well as other passages of the interview, it becomes apparent that Nico more or less subverts the subject position of the special needs student to his own advantage. He is able to ask for special treatment for himself, but he does not justify it with a special need for support but with his lack of education and knowledge he is not responsible for. Altogether, Nico, just like the other special needs pupils, is aware of his discreditable stigma as a result of having attended a special needs school. He is engaged in impression management (Goffman) to the extent that he largely conceals his school background, but then does reveal it with regard to certain performance

expectations of teachers in order to compensate for the disadvantages experienced. Ultimately, Nico rejects the classification as 'learning disabled' and criticizes the disadvantages associated with special schooling.

Finally, Pfahl's empirical study impressively proves the power effects of the subject position of the 'learning disabled student', because even in Nico's subversion of the subject position the effectiveness of the subject position becomes evident. The students question themselves continually about their 'disability', and they remain permanently imprisoned in their attempt to normalize themselves. Moreover, they are affectively bound to the label 'learning disabled'. As the empirical data also shows, the subject position is nevertheless not determining, even if the scope of adaption and subversion is very limited and the special pupils only have few resources to reject the discriminatory subject positions. This is partly due to the economic marginalization of the group of special needs students which is assigned an inferior social status.

4. CONCLUSION

The research perspective of the Interpretive Subjectivation Analysis (ISA) is combining social constructivist and post-structuralist theories of the decentered subject to develop a methodological framework for analyzing subjectivation processes. The main argument in this paper is that such a methodological framework requires examining the relations between normative subject positions *and* the self-positioning processes of human actors. Otherwise, it is not possible to analyze discursive power effects on the one hand, or which technologies of the self are effectively opposing which mechanisms of power and how normative symbolic orders can be transformed collectively on the other hand. If, for example, only self-positioning processes in interview data are analyzed, it remains unclear whether and how specific subject positions were appropriated or undermined, if the researcher cannot account for the respective normative orders that unfold the assumed effects of power. Conversely, the analysis of discourses and governmental strategies does not provide any information as to whether these interpellations do have any power effects on the living and embodied subjects. Therefore, subject norms and human self-relations must both be examined empirically, whereby it must be made clear which in which contexts the addressing, appropriation and subversion takes place: why, for example, should certain subject norms at all unfold power effects on certain addressees? It is therefore necessary to clarify whether there are specific institutional, organizational or life-world contexts in which subject positions are processed and specific individuals or collectives are addressed. In the empirical studies presented in the third chapter, subject positions were mediated in school or in the context of the work place, but it not always known at the beginning of the research process which subject positions are imposed by whom or which subject positions people relate to. These relations of subject positions and self-positioning therefore cannot be presupposed. Instead, they have to be analyzed in a tentative and circular research process using qualitative methods. Hence, the ISA approach requires combining discursive or ethnographic data with methods of focus groups, biographical interviews or methods of qualitative interviews.

The focus on discourses and the subject positions in the ISA takes into account the fact that in the present almost all aspects of human life are 'surrounded' by discourses (Clarke 2005, p. 145). Considering the increasing medialization of society, the numerous 'experts' who distribute their politics of knowledge in an endlessly growing number of guidebooks and self-help literature, video tutorials on social media platforms and various internet blogs on health, partnership, sexuality, beauty etc. and considering the numerous movies and TV productions in which e.g. gender stereotypes and narratives of idealized partnerships circulate and so on, analyzing discourses and subject positions becomes a crucial factor because of their omnipresence in contemporary life. However, people are not only shaped and influenced by discourses but also by biographical events, neighborhoods, social classes, professional roles and socially constructed categories like ethnicity, political convictions or sexual preferences that are adopted or experienced in the context of the life-world. Therefore the ISA's concept of self-positioning is a heuristic tool to examine if and how life-world or organizational contexts are mediated through discursively constructed subject positions and if and how they are adapted, opposed, ignored, enforced or re-signified.

This methodological perspective based on Butler, Foucault and the Interpretative Paradigm integrates the decentered subject into empirical research and adopts qualitative methods in order to establish a broader perspective on the *discursive situatedness of human subjectivity*. This kind of subjectivation research does not understand the human individual as the center of meaning making and an absolutely free individual in an empathic sense nor does it imply a fully determined actor. Instead, the goal of the ISA is to examine power relations and agency empirically and to analyze how people are addressed in specific contexts and if they are able *to act and think differently*. Therefore, the ISA is a critical research program that reveals the contingency of normative orders and the restrictions that people experience in specific situations.

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COMMON-SENSE LEGITIMATION OF INFORMAL PRACTICES IN PRESENT-DAY SERBIA

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ABSTRACT: As a part of a larger research within the Horizon 2020 project *Closing the Gap Between Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans*, 38 semi-structured interviews with citizens of Serbia have been conducted in the period July – October 2017. These comprise the database used for analysis of “narratives of informality” – stories of how the research participants legitimize (or rationalize) informal practices (using connections and acquaintances to “get things done”, giving/receiving bribe, exchange of favors, etc.), supplemented by the analysis of participants’ attitudes towards informal practices, particularly when using them themselves. An insight into the respondents’ ideas of informality was gained through describing and understanding *doxa* – beliefs of an individual as “a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (with which) the natural and social world appear as self-evident” (Bourdieu) or *senso comune* (Gramsci) – “naturalized”, unreflected, practical knowledge taking the form of self-explanatory content of common sense, that which is taken for granted, what “everybody knows“, the knowledge of the world that is undisputed – “just the way it is”, the domain of indefinite beliefs and incoherent views of the world, the knowledge which “legitimizes with the absence of legitimizing”. The assumption is that the “quality” of *doxa*, in the sense of its positive or negative orientation, has a large impact on the possibility of changes in formal practices and procedures – in some cases serving as a stimulus for change, and as an obstacle to changes in others – situations in which the new/imported rules remain “empty shells” with little influence in social life.

KEYWORDS: Serbia, informality, legitimation, common sense, doxa

INTRODUCTION

This paper is produced as a part of the project *Closing the Gap Between Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans (INFORM)*, which brought together teams from nine European countries to conduct multidisciplinary social science research on formal and informal institutions in the Balkans. The three-year research project, launched in March 2016, was carried out in the framework of the Horizon 2020 programme. The project was set to study interactions between formal and informal institutions in the Western Balkan societies in the fields of politics, economics and everyday life, as well as to track the influence of these institutions on the implementation of EU rules and regulations¹.

The starting point of the project was the insight that as Western Balkan countries move closer to the EU, paradoxically, the gap between formal and informal institutions does not get smaller, but, in fact, grows ever wider. On the one hand, this originates from the increasing need of these countries to harmonize their own legislation with the EU *acquis communautaire* and to adapt themselves to the way the EU functions. On the other hand, it derives from the inability of the governments of these countries to actually apply legal, political and economic solutions imposed by the process of joining the EU, under the conditions of a devastating economic crisis and still not quite reduced political and post-conflict tensions.

The key research question of the project was: to what extent the harmonization and transposition of EU rules and regulations within the national legal, political and economic systems leads to substantive changes in practices and procedures, or alternatively: to what extent the imported rules remain “empty shells” (Dimitrova 2010) with little influence in social life.

Research data was collected through: an F2F survey on the multi-stage, national proportional, probabilistic sample of 6,040 respondents² (1127 from Serbia), 36 months of ethnographic work (6 months in each country), 220 semi-structured interviews with survey respondents (chosen on the maps of social space of these societies by *SPAD 9.0* software) and “informality insiders” (22 + 16 in Serbia), 30 interviews with policy makers (6 from EU and 4 from each of the 6 WB countries), a number of case studies using both quantitative and qualitative methods, and content and discourse analysis of legal documents and media reports (related to the informal practices and interplay between formal and informal institutions).

Analysis of quantitative data showed that informality was omnipresent and ambiguous in all surveyed countries. When presented with the statement: “In our society, if you want to get the job done, you always have to have your own people in important places and to have connections”, in all of the analyzed societies more than 70% of the

¹ More information regarding the project can be found on the site: <http://www.formal-informal.eu>.

² The survey was conducted in the period May – June 2017 by the IPSOS ADRIA group in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The sampling universe was based on the data from the Census and estimated population dynamics and a stratified three-stage random representative sample was used. In all the countries, CAPI (Computer-assisted personal interviewing) was performed in conducting face-to-face interviews.

respondents agreed with the proposition (74% in Serbia).

The respondents also considered informal practices to be present as various forms of social solidarity among family members, relatives and friends, and as a safety net in cases of life-threatening accidents. Between 60% and 70% (Serbia has the highest score of 72%) of the respondents thought that people can rely on their parents, cousins or friends to help them take care of their children and care for the elderly and ill. Further, 50% to 60% of the respondents (57.3% in Serbia) considered that, in cases of great life misfortunes (death, illness, permanent loss of employment), they could count on the help of their family, cousins, friends, and neighbors. So, omnipresence goes for “good informality”, too.

At the same time, a great number of respondents thought that in their societies informal channels (using connections and acquaintances to “get things done”, giving/receiving bribe, exchanging of favors) are used to gain employment, get better health-care, influence court decisions, etc. (88.4% in Serbia). A significant number of them knew people from their immediate surroundings who achieved their goals through these means (39.1% in Serbia). On the other hand, the respondents themselves rarely admitted to participating in such transactions (4.5% in Serbia), and the majority strongly condemned all forms of informal practices (64.5% in Serbia). A strong ambivalence toward informal practices is evident, as people perceived them as ubiquitous, yet at the same time disapproved of them.

This prompted us to try to find out how the participants legitimized these practices, or, to put it another way – gave “self-explanatory” reasons for their existence.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

An insight into the respondents’ ideas and legitimizations of informality was gained through attempts at catching sights of *doxa* – one modality of existence of common sense³ (Holton 1997: 42), “*sense of limits*, commonly called the *sense of reality*” (Bourdieu 2013: 164)⁴. Bourdieu designates *doxa*⁵ as “lived” experience of a primary relationship of familiarity with the familiar environment, which remains “perfectly certain, *qua* experience”, the pre-verbal apprehension of the social world as self-evident, “taken for granted” (Bourdieu 1990: 23) and describes it as the effect of a coincidence of the objective structures and the internalized structures which provides the illusion

³ “[C]ommon sense is frequently given as the translation for Plato’s term *doxa* [δόξα], the common opinion of the ordinary man. It means, in Platonic philosophy, hearsay or illusory knowledge built upon fleeting sense impressions. Its opposite is *episteme* [ἐπιστήμη], firm knowledge grounded in the forms and grasped through dialectical reasoning” (Schaeffer 1990: 2).

⁴ “Common sense is a stock of self-evidences shared by all, which, within the limits of a social universe, ensures a primordial consensus on the meaning of the world, a set of tacitly accepted commonplaces which make confrontation, dialogue, competition and even conflict possible, and among which a special place must be reserved for the principles of classification, such as the major oppositions structuring the perception of the world” (Bourdieu 2000: 98).

⁵ Susen (2016: 35 n133) compiled an exhaustive list of Bourdieu’s, as well as others’, references where the (rather cryptic) concept of *doxa* is elaborated upon. See especially: Atkinson 2010; 2016; 2018; Bourdieu 1990; 2013; Eagleton and Bourdieu 1992; Holton 1997; Myles 2004; Throop and Murphy 2002.

of immediate understanding, characteristic of practical experience of the familiar universe, and which at the same time excludes from that experience any inquiry as to its own conditions of possibility (Bourdieu 1990: 26)⁶.

“Doxa implies a knowledge, a practical knowledge” (Eagleton and Bourdieu 1992: 118)⁷, that remains undiscussed (Bourdieu 1991: 277 n5). Common sense is “a knowledge of practice formed through practice” (Prodanović 2017: 47; our translation), whose main function is naturalizing (Eagleton and Bourdieu 1992: 113), thus establishing “an attitude that demands conformity with what seems to be obvious” (Herzfeld 2015: 258).

[N]aturalness, is perhaps the most fundamental. Common sense represents matters – that is, certain matters and not others – as being what they are in the simple nature of the case. An air of “of-courseness,” a sense of “it figures” is cast over things – again, some selected, underscored things. They are depicted as inherent in the situation, intrinsic aspects or reality, the way things go. (Geertz 1983: 85)

However, what primarily characterizes common sense is the pragmatic motive, as the “initial purpose is not so much the interpretation or understanding of the world but the effecting of changes within it; we seek to dominate before we endeavor to comprehend” (Nathanson 1962, xxvii). Common sense “may not stand up to a transcendental critique of knowledge, but it passes the pragmatic test of ordinary experience” (Luckmann 1983: 71). Schütz thus writes of “epoché of the natural attitude”⁸:

man within the natural attitude also uses a specific *epoché*, of course quite another one than the phenomenologist. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him (Schütz 1962: 229).

Alfred Schütz theorized the sphere of unquestioned and “certain” knowledge as the level of “world-taken-for-granted”. The Lynds had something similar in mind, in their follow-up to the famous study on Middletown, when they wrote of “patterns of customary acceptance and rejection”, which were labeled as “of-course-statements”:

points of view so familiar and so commonly taken for granted that they represent the intellectual and emotional shorthands of understanding and agreement

⁶ “One of the most important effects of the correspondence between real divisions and practical principles of division, between social structures and mental structures, is undoubtedly the fact that primary experience of the social world is that of doxa, an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident” (Bourdieu 1996: 471).

⁷ “Common-sense wisdom is shamelessly and unapologetically ad hoc” (Geertz 1983: 90).

⁸ In his sociology of knowledge Scheler introduced the expression “Relativ natürliche Weltanschauung”, which can literally be translated as: “relatively natural worldview”, but it is argued that it should be translated as “common sense” (Caminada 2015). Mannheim wrote of “a-theoretical” knowledge rooted and acquired in a certain “conjunctive experiential space” (“konjunktiver Erfahrungsraum”) (Mannheim 1997: 191-271).

among a large share of the people. These are the things one does and feels and says so naturally that mentioning them in Middletown implies an “of course” (Lynd and Lynd 1937: 402).

The “doxic experience” is also depicted by Marx in an ideology-critical remark concerning the self-evident “feeling at home” in estranged forms:

[T]he reconciliation of irrational forms in which certain economic relations appear and assert themselves in practice does not concern the active agents of these relations in their everyday life. And since they are accustomed to move about in such relations, they find nothing strange therein. A complete contradiction offers not the least mystery to them. They feel as much at home as a fish in water among manifestations which are separated from their internal connections and absurd when isolated by themselves. What Hegel says with reference to certain mathematical formulas applies here: that which seems irrational to ordinary common sense is rational, and that which seems rational to it is itself irrational (Marx 1984: 765-766).

Antoni Gramsci described “common sense”⁹ as “conceptual realization of hegemony” (Herzfeld 2015: 259).

Senso comune (...) is that accumulation of taken-for-granted “knowledge” to be found in every human community. In any given time and place, this accumulation provides a heterogeneous bundle of assumed certainties that structure the basic landscapes within which individuals are socialized and chart their individual life courses (Crehan 2016: 3).

According to Gramsci, common sense is inherently unsystematic¹⁰ – “disjointed, incoherent, and inconsequential conception of the world” (Liguori 2009: 129) – with the parts that are “too multiple and various to constitute a coherent system. This incoherence, for Gramsci always a negative quality, reflects the condition of subalternity itself” (Crehan 2016: 46). Common sense is “something that is the opposite of a developed and coherent world view” (Liguori 2009: 122), as indeed its tenets “themselves often point in conflicting directions and reinforce conflicting views” (Rosenfeld 2011: 15).

Finally, Geertz understood common sense as always self-referential as it legitimizes with the absence of legitimizing:

Religion rests its case on revelation, science on method, ideology on moral passion; but common sense rests its on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just

⁹ A mistranslation of his *senso comune*: “For the English-speaker, common sense came to denote, in the words of the *OED*, ‘good sound practical sense; combined tact and readiness in dealing with the everyday affairs of life; general sagacity.’ *Senso comune*, by contrast, is a more neutral term that lacks these strong positive connotations, referring rather to the beliefs and opinions held in common, or thought to be held in common, by the mass of the population; all those heterogeneous narratives and accepted ‘facts’ that structure so much of what we take to be no more than simple reality.” (Crehan 2016: 44).

¹⁰ Compare to Geertz’s contention that common sense is a “cultural system, though not usually a very tightly integrated one” (Geertz 1983: 76).

life in a nutshell. The world is its authority. (...) Common sense seems to us what is left over when all these more articulated sorts of symbol systems have exhausted their tasks, what remains of reason when its more sophisticated achievements are all set aside (Geertz 1983: 75, 92).

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

The data for our analysis comprised 38 verbatim interview transcripts from Serbia. Twenty-two of these were follow-up interviews with respondents to the survey. The selection of survey respondents was carried out using *SPAD 9.0* software, to assure that interviews would be conducted with respondents from different social classes, i.e. occupying different positions in the social space. In the process of conducting the survey, the respondents were asked whether they would consent, six months after the completion of the survey, to be contacted by our researchers for interviews. In the interview phase 60 respondents were identified among those who had consented to follow-up interviews.

Sixteen interviews were conducted with “insiders”/“informality experts” – people who were well acquainted with informal practices, as being exposed to them in particular fields: local administration, government agencies, politics, healthcare, education, and media. “Insiders” were identified either by personal knowledge on the part of the researchers or by having been named by the interview respondents.

Figure 1: Sample structure

Gender	M	F			
	21	17			
Settlement	Urban	Rural			
	34	4			
Education	Secondary	Tertiary	Post-grad		
	16	17	5		
Age	20-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
	4	10	5	12	7

Source: own elaboration.

The overall purpose of the interviews was to develop in-depth knowledge of elements of formal and informal practice that were indicated in the responses to the survey. Themes for exploration – the set of questions or topics – included the following:

- How things are done, in what areas, why, how does everyday practice affect formal institutions?
- Legitimacy of formal institutions and people’s expectations towards them (how it should be)
 - Who benefits from formal institutions?
 - Dynamics of informal practices and institutions (which are disappearing and new practices that are emerging)
 - Who are the brokers/intermediaries in informal dealings?

- Who is protecting who and from what?
- How does ethnicity/gender/religion shape formal and informal practices?
- Who benefits from informal institutions?

QDAMiner software was used for coding and analyzing interviews, with a set of “project codes”, which were elaborated and agreed upon by the project team – corresponding to exploration themes/topics present in the research design. A number of “researcher codes” were added later in line with the new research issues that emerged. So, a new code, labeled “doxa”, was introduced to mark the parts of the interviews in which the research participants gave common-sense legitimations of informal practices through “narratives of informality” – stories of how the research participants understand/rationalize and legitimize informal practices, their attitudes towards informal practices, particularly when using them themselves.

Indications of “doxa” included “apodictic” statements that were presented as necessarily or demonstrably true, incontrovertible, indisputable, incontestable, unquestionable, undoubtable, claims that went without saying, also: proverbs, adages, sayings, maxims, dictums; expressions of popular religion of belief (astrology, superstition, ...), “sage’s stories” (“I-know-and-I’m-gonna-tell-you-how-things-really-are/work...” types of narratives), “guts reactions” of bewilderment/puzzlement/awkwardness/unease at an “unintelligible” question/comment/sentence, strengthened by potential fury, shock, loathing or cynicism – reactions similar to those in Garfinkel’s “breaching experiments”. All in all, 133 instances of these were found.

RESEARCH RESULTS

When all of the (textual) segments coded as “doxa” were retrieved, an attempt was made at classifying them based on the function that these utterances performed. Thus, four groups of common-sensical statements could be ascertained:

- 1) Legitimization narratives that provide “ethical” grounding for:
 - a) immoral informal practices
 - b) formal institutions/rules
- 2) Quasi explanations (“it is because of ...”) referring to categories such as “mentality” or “tradition”
- 3) Giving solace (finding comfort in “eternal truths”)
- 4) Recognition of a “new reality” in which people became egoistic, in contrast to the one of the socialist system and its collectivist ideology, permeated with altruism and solidarity.

Legitimization of informal practices

Informal practices are considered as default ones, almost automatic, as if it were a reflex action without meaning – at least not on a conscious level. This is interesting and in keeping with Bourdieu’s emphasis on embodying of the social. It also implies automatic reciprocity and emphasizes the internal moral sanction if a favor is not returned. This “raises” a customary practice to the level of a moral one. At the same

time, naturalization is at work, where, again in accordance with Bourdieu's insights, arbitrary and contingent is transformed into unavoidable and inevitable – common sense “has no *theory of freedom*” (Smith 1995: 408).

Some unwritten rule, some automatism that you need to do it is so widespread. Even when it's absurd!

(female, physician, 50-60, post-grad ed., urban)

Yes, I think, it's expected, if you have helped me, I have to help you, I think, probably I would feel bad, I have to give this back to you, or you have to give it back to me, when I need help, and that's that.

(female, student, 20-30, secondary ed., urban)

Well naturally. Everything else being equal, how else can a man get a job other than through a friend?

Laws are always there either to be used or bypassed. So every law has good and bad sides.

(male, economist, 60-70, tertiary ed., urban)

Legitimization of formal practices

At the same time, the social order governed by formal institutions and procedures is normalized, sanctions for deviating from these procedures are positively evaluated, with hasty reactions to the very question as to whether certain social spheres should be formally regulated. This brings forth a crucial mark of common sense – its inability to “draw conclusions from abnormal experiences which would lend it to reject its own central principles” (Smith 1995: 408).

Interviewer: Well, so you think that education is important for getting a job?

Participant: Naturally.

(male, economist, 60-70, tertiary ed., urban)

Interviewer: And do you think that the market needs to be regulated by the state?

Participant: Naturally. Well, wait, please, now, let's say...

(male, carpenter, 40-50, secondary ed., urban)

Well, maybe these laws, if they are already fighting against something that is not good, need to intensify their penalties. Because when you see the general practice of law ripping someone off – by the way, only go for a Serb's cash – and when you see that the law hit someone who has made this criminal or non-criminal act on the wallet I think that such things will be happening much less often in the

future.

(male, medical technician, 20-30, secondary ed., urban)

Quasi explanations

Explanations and instructions based on the proverbial wisdom, which reverberate with conviction that is emphasized to the highest degree precisely because it is stated so casually, without the slightest need of further elaboration or reflection. Giving an “explanation” of this kind actually legitimizes informal practices through which people meet their needs, as these practices are presented as completely appropriate “to the way we are”.

It is very important who you are, who you know, it was always important and it is so today.

But one needs to have a skill, and not knowledge.

(female, retired accountant, 50-60, secondary ed., urban)

Oh well, there always has to be some sympathy, but the system works in that way that you have persons on duty to be on the right side and to always have some privileges, so... They are stimulated by the system, to be the people that... Wind-mills, they turn just the way they are supposed to.

(male, neurologist, 40-50, post-grad ed., urban)

Participant: I was just telling that to my brother – why did you give? – ‘How can I not give?’

Interviewer: What do you think is the cause of all that? Where is the essential problem?

Participant: Well, we are the problem.

(male, retired agronomer, 60-70, tertiary ed., urban)

Giving solace

When a particular social arrangement appears to be realistically unattainable, due to ubiquitous corruption and anomy, people cope with the situation by turning to and accepting certain beliefs in an unquestioned mode – as if they are common sense. Convictions of this kind “may be just adjustments to a situation inescapable at the present time” (Misgeld 1983: 133), as common sense “is the human way to maintain life in the face of obstacles which cannot be wished away” (Luckmann 1983: 61).

I believe in justice and say – in the end, love, good will prevail. Love will win, justice will win.

(female, cleaning lady, 60-70, secondary ed., urban)

Recognition of a “new reality”

Harry Collins wrote that “grounds of our certainties should be looked for in the histories of the social groups in which we are embedded” (2001: 119). The transition from socialism was particularly traumatic in Serbia, since it was simultaneous with the violent breakup of the common state of Yugoslavia and economic collapse, followed by general impoverishment (Golubović 2007; 2012; Lazić 1994; 2012; Milić 2004). The socialist past is, not rarely, idealized as “the golden age”, and the anomic and insecure present is denigrated in an offhand manner. In this situation doxa or common sense is “foregrounded and made explicit through the interrelation of divergent, novel or competing discourses and practices” (Throop and Murphy 2002: 189). Past certainties come to be questioned and “suspended practically” with the new way of living brought about by the political and economic crisis (see: Bourdieu 2013: 168). Those that feel degraded have a vested interest in exposing the “obviously” morally problematic and heartless new reality, which is, at the same time, confirmed with resignation.

Here, I don’t know if I can explain it to myself. I would say that people realized they are alone all of a sudden. That they are alone, that they have to fight for their existence alone. So, there’s no more party, like the League of Communists once, no state, no committees and the rest...

(male, retired agronome, 60-70, tertiary ed., urban)

Many people are getting estranged, and relatives, brother and sister almost do not consort any more (...) It is all nothing, it comes down to the state giving you nothing if you don’t earn it yourself, obviously.

(female, manual worker, 50-60, secondary ed., urban)

Contacts among people are getting lost... And to ask someone for help... You don’t have, it’s very rare, you can count them on your fingers. Or to have a true friend. ‘Cause everyone is afraid, whether you going to give it back, or you now have it, and I don’t. So, jealousy of some kind got inside people, envy.

(male, retired medical technician, 60-70, secondary ed., urban)

Legitimization of informal practices + Quasi explanation

In some instances, the research participants’ commonsensical statements fitted within the legitimizing of informal and quasi explanation, with a characteristic recasting of problematic practices, such as bribes, into morally acceptable, often desirable, and

sometimes unavoidable ones – being perceived as a corollary of “mentality” or some other all-explaining master concept (e.g. “tradition”, “custom”, “style/mode of thinking”, “natural” way of doing things).

Well yes, that became a habit, something, I don’t know, that you go and bring coffee or some candy, fruit juice, to treat someone, it’s not some kind of bribe, but gratitude.

(female, manual worker, 50-60, secondary ed., urban)

It’s not a bribe. It’s your good will, that you consider, you are pleased with what they’ve done and coffee is nothing. It’s purely your good will.

(female, cleaning lady, 60-70, secondary ed., urban)

No, No – it’s a token of appreciation. It’s not a bribe. Well, who would bribe someone with one chicken or 10 eggs? It is the way the custom is. (...) No, there are different cases. Sometimes a man in panic, to get well, he gives money – that’s natural, so be it.

(male, machinist, 50-60, secondary ed., urban)

Well, there would always be someone who would do it, probably, no, no, we cannot be brought to order. (...) I think it’s the mentality, no way it’s something else, you come to that, here, I’m giving an example, god forbid, something happens to a child, and a man, god forbid, as they say, he would probably sell the house to give bribe to this or that, isn’t that right? And this is that our brain thinks like that and that’s that.

(female, manual worker, 50-60, secondary ed., urban)

CONCLUSION

Our assumption is that the “quality” of common sense or doxa in Serbia, meaning its consonance or dissonance with the norms coming from the EU, has a large impact on the possibility of changes in (in)formal practices and procedures.

If the EU imposed laws (*acquis communautaire*) are perceived as being in concordance with “our ways” of doing things, or at least not hindering or interfering with them, they stand a good chance of actually regulating social relations, since “we may consider common sense to be a structured and coherent set of orientations whose main function is to guide human action” (Luckmann 1983: 59).

However, what seems to be more likely is that the European laws will be “adapted to” by finding a way to “cleverly” circumvent them, so “we can continue with our ways” which have already been proven effective in satisfying our needs. In this situation the new or imported rules would remain “empty shells” with little of the intended, and much of the unintended and unwanted, influence in social life.

Common sense, thus, has an important role in political life, as democratic order needs it as a type of base on which value systems and legal and other kind of norms are built on¹¹.

At the same time, common sense, as both an informal regulatory system and a political authority, also always threatens to undermine the democratic ideal: blocking out truly new ideas, cutting of debate, convincing us that simple, kitchen-table solutions formulated by everyday people are necessarily better than complex or specialized or scientific ones. (Rosenfeld 2011: 256)

Laws and regulations that are at odds with common sense, that clash with the culture-specific intuitions and pre-reflexive assumptions, are “pure of any *doxa*” i.e. paradoxical.

When we are confronted with beliefs or assertions that seem counter to common sense we are skeptical about them. Common sense acts as a point of reference with which other beliefs and assertions are compared and tested for plausibility. (Lindenberg 1987: 202)

So, to paraphrase Mary Douglas¹²: the more inconvenient EU rules seem and the more pervasive their effect, the more weight should be attached to the beliefs invoked to uphold them. How to make these beliefs plausible is a problem that seeks attention.

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¹¹ “[S]ocial laws are neither immutable nor transhistorical. They operate within the framework of a given *sensus communis* and are dependent on that common sense for their continued existence” (Holton 1997: 46).

¹² “The more inconvenient the rules of behaviour and the more pervasive their alleged effect, the more weight should be attached to the beliefs invoked to uphold them” (Douglas 2001: 262).

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SENSORY KNOWLEDGE: ITS UNDERSTANDING, CONSTRUCTION AND ACQUISITION

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ABSTRACT: The aim of this article, based on the literature review, is to explore the senses within the context of knowledge. The article begins with a description of embodied (i.e., also sensory) knowledge's marginalisation within the social sciences and the reasons for this. After indicating the most popular fields of research, the article explores three main understandings of sensory knowledge: (1) senses as a source of knowledge, (2) senses as acquired skills and (3) sensory knowledge as a result of (collective) activity. In the next part, sensory knowledge is discussed as tacit knowledge, taking into account the problem of its verbalisation and the nature of its acquisition. The last part explores the social construction of sensory knowledge and its relation to subjective experiences, referring to the concepts of intersubjectivity, objectification and legitimisation.

KEYWORDS: senses, sensory knowledge, tacit knowledge, skills, objectification, social constructionism

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, several turns occurred in the social sciences. One of them, the focus of this article, was the “sensory turn” (Howes 2006; Lahne 2018), which is marked by the questioning of optocentrism, accompanied by a growing interest in the other senses and an increasing number of studies and publications in this area. The sensory turn should be perceived within a wider context of changes within the social sciences, indicated by, among others, a high level of interest in the body (embodiment), emotions and space. There is no doubt that embodiment has a sensual nature as, due to the body, one can hear, touch and smell. Moreover, the perception of the environment and everyday spaces (e.g., home, shops, restaurants) has a multi-sensual nature that has been already noted by Edward T. Hall (1966). The author emphasized that our spatial experience is multisensory and

information about the environment is received through senses. Moreover, he stated that people from different cultures organise and perceive space in different ways, they 'inhabit different sensory worlds.' (p. 2)

The aim of this article is to explore the senses within the context of knowledge. As noted by Maslen (2015), "the senses can be examined in terms of their contexts, acquisition processes, and applications, like any other knowledge source" (p. 52). Therefore, it is possible to speak about sensory knowledge, i.e., knowledge based on sensual experiences. The article is based on the literature review, which has highlighted the main fields of research, the main meanings of sensory knowledge that have been used so far and the process of sensory knowledge construction.

The article begins with a description of embodied (sensory) knowledge's marginalisation within the social sciences and the reasons for this. Then, the most popular areas of research are indicated. The following part provides the three meanings of sensory knowledge: (1) senses as a source of knowledge, (2) senses as acquired skills and (3) sensory knowledge as a result of (collective) activity. Next, sensory knowledge is presented as tacit knowledge, and, in the last part, the issues of sensory knowledge's intersubjectivity, objectivation and legitimisation are discussed. At the end of the article, a significant number of references are listed, which should be helpful for readers who are interested in developing their understanding of the analysed concept.

MARGINALISATION OF EMBODIED KNOWLEDGE

Sensory knowledge can be perceived as a part of embodied knowledge. Ethnographer Steven Feld (1996) stated that the ways of sensing and hearing the world are "internalized as bodily knowledge, part of the everyday 'body hexis' (Bourdieu 1977: 8), naturalized regime of 'body techniques'" (Mauss 1979 [1935]) (p. 100, cited after Rice 2010). Embodied knowledge can be understood as knowledge acquired through the body, the embodiment of particular skills that are learned due to practice, experience, observation and imitation. For a long time, this kind of knowledge has remained on the margins of sociological considerations and research, although knowledge itself has been an important topic in sociology. To a large extent, embodied knowledge has a tacit nature (Polanyi 1966), which could be one of the reasons for its omission.

The social sciences have been dominated by a paradigm of social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Constructivists assume that phenomena and objects do not exist until they appear in culture and manifest themselves through cultural products, including, above all, language. In this paradigm, knowledge is also a social construct, and the main role in its production and transmission is performed by acts of communication. Language itself is an object of transmission, but it is also a tool used to convey information about the reality around us (Schütz 1974 [1932]; Luckmann 1975; Knoblauch 2011). The status of nonverbal knowledge can be also influenced by the significance attributed to discourse, which is perceived as a basic tool for creating reality and a tool of power (e.g., the notion of knowledge-power proposed by Foucault 1975, 1976). The concepts related to the transmission and reproduction of knowledge often refer to its discursive dimension, which can be illustrated by the theory of repro-

duction in education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) and the theory of language codes proposed by Basil Bernstein (1990)¹.

In the last decade, one can observe, mainly in German social science, a communicative turn in the sociology of knowledge (Keller, Knoblauch, and Reichertz 2013), i.e., that “it started to focus on the forms, genres and patterns of communication in which knowledge is objectified, transmitted and appropriated” (Knoblauch, Jacobs, and Tuma 2014). This turn seems to emphasise the role of language and marginalise the role of the body in knowledge transmission. Indeed, initially, embodiment was neglected in the considerations of communication acts, as illustrated in Berger and Luckmann (1966), Habermans (1991) and (Knoblauch 2013). However, in the current analysis, the embodied character of communicative action has been taken into account. It is assumed that a communicative action not only has a verbal nature but also is incorporated and performed in a particular space and time; moreover, the performed action and its reception is related to the different senses (Knoblauch 2011, 2013; Knoblauch, Jacobs, and Tuma 2014).

Therefore, the role of the body has been included in the analysis of knowledge transmission to some extent; however, very few publications focus on it (Jakubowska 2017). It is even more difficult to find research on the role of the senses carried out in the field of sociology of knowledge. However, as noted at the beginning of the article, scientific interest in the senses is growing, also in the context of knowledge, which can be observed mainly in anthropology and, to a lesser extent, in sociology. Nonetheless, it seems that the worlds of the anthropology/sociology of the senses and the sociology of knowledge remain separated, although sensory studies could provide new insight into the sociological analysis of knowledge. The following parts, based on the literature review, will present the main fields of sensory knowledge research and the main understanding of sensory knowledge.

THE FIELDS OF SENSORY KNOWLEDGE RESEARCH

The literature review has indicated the main fields in which the senses are analysed within the context of knowledge. It is worth noting that, although a significant number of authors (Serres 1985; Rodaway 1997; Howes 1991, 2005) emphasise the meaning of multi-sensual analysis, the vast majority of publications are focused on one sense only. Taking into account the long tradition of visual studies and a large number of publications within this area, the focus in this article is on studies related to the other senses.

The first sense considered is taste. One of the main topics related to this sense is knowledge about the taste of wine (Teil 2001; Bach 2004; Hennion and Teil 2004; Parr et al. 2010). In 2012, the issue of *Rivista di Estetica* was devoted to this topic, and one of the contributors was Steven Shapin, the author of several publications on the taste

¹ A description of the reasons for embodied knowledge’s marginalisation has a superficial nature because this article does not aim to precisely analyse particular cognitive models or theoretical approaches. It is only a starting point for further considerations on sensory knowledge.

of wine (e.g., Shapin 2012, 2016) Another interesting article titled “Knowledge, Wine, and Taste: What good is knowledge (in enjoying wine)?” was provided by Kent Bach a few years earlier (2004). Besides wine, knowledge about the taste of coffee has also been an analysed topic, although much rarer than wine. The chapter “Phenomenology of Coffee Tasting: Lessons in Practical Objectivity” from Kenneth Liberman’s book (2013) is a good example. The taste of food (not beverages) has been nearly omitted in the analysis of sensory knowledge, with the exception of the articles written about French cheeses (Teil 1996; Rétiveau, Chambers, and Esteve 2005).

The second sense which has been widely analysed in the context of knowledge is hearing. The recently published book, *Sonic Skills. Listening for Knowledge in Science, Medicine and Engineering (1920s–Present)*, by Karin Bijsterveld, provides not only a discussion on sonic skills but also a significant number of references on this topic. Hearing as a source of knowledge has been analysed with reference to the medical field, specifically in relation to the stethoscope (e.g., Rice and Coltart 2006; Rice 2013; Gardner and Williams 2015; Maslen 2016), but also with reference to sound engineers’ (Porcello 2004) and car mechanics’ work (Krebs 2014).

The publications on the sense of smell seem to be fewer and concern mainly perfumes and cooking (Teil 1998, Latour 2004, Wathelet 2013). Finally, although one can observe a growing interest in the sense of touch in the social sciences (Montagu 1986; Classen 2005; Paterson 2007), it is rarely analysed as a source of knowledge. If it appears in this context, it is focused on medical diagnosis (e.g., Harris 2016).

Although, as mentioned above, the vast majority of publications are focused on one sense, there are also examples of articles based on a study of two interrelated senses in one activity – for example, touch and hearing in medicine (Harris 2016) or taste and smell in the wine industry (Parr et al. 2010). However, one can presume that the focus on isolated senses in research results more from empirical reasoning or the authors’ scientific interests than the possibility of separating the senses in everyday practices.

The publications on sensory knowledge are concerned with several topics, regardless of which sense is their focus. The first topic is the role of the senses in diagnosis, in which sensory knowledge is analysed mainly in the medical context, but also with reference to other professions. In this context, the role of hearing and touching seems to be particularly important. The second topic is expert knowledge, which is obviously related to the previous one (only an expert can make a correct diagnosis); however, in this context, the attention is given mainly to such issues as the “intersubjectivity,” “objectivity” or “standardisation” of taste, that is, how subjective and personal taste becomes recognisable knowledge. The third topic, also partially related to the first one, is the focus on the learning process – in other words, how a novice learns to hear, see or touch supported by an expert in a field. Unfortunately, a significant number of these publications have only a theoretical character and are based on a limited number of concepts. Finally, one can distinguish the autoethnographies, in which the authors analyse their own sensory experiences.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SENSES AND KNOWLEDGE

What is probably more important than the fields of research is an understanding of the senses within the context of knowledge. The literature review has highlighted three main conceptions; however, it should be noted that their distinction has an artificial nature and is used for the analytical purpose.

Senses as a Source of Knowledge

The first meaning of the senses relates to their perception as a source of knowledge. Initially, “seeing has been considered the dominant mode of knowledge acquisition” (Maslen 2015). After a critical approach towards the hierarchy of senses and the domination of sight (Classen 2005; Howes 2006), other senses, such as hearing and touch, also started to be considered as sources of knowledge. Therefore, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling and tasting have been perceived as a way of knowledge acquisition used both by laypersons and experts. For example, there is medical hearing (Rice and Coltart 2006; Rice 2013; Gardner and Williams 2015), diagnostic touching (Harris 2016) and coffee or wine tasting (Lieberman 2013; Shapin 2012, 2016). Although, for example, in a medical context, “technologies are viewed as replacing the senses” (Harris 2016), their role is still important in many fields of social life, including medicine.

Besides the general term, “sensory knowledge,” that is, knowledge acquired by the senses, one can find terms related to the particular senses. Some examples are “aural knowledge” (Maslen 2015) or “auditory knowledge” (Powis 2018), “seeing knowledge” (Collins and Evans 2007) and “haptic knowledge,” which is divided into “proximal” and “distal” knowledge (Paterson 2009). David Howes, one of the key authors in the field of sensory studies, stated that “all of our organs of perception might be said to possess some form of knowledge” (2005: 28). Writing on the Cashinahua (ethnic group in Peru), he distinguished skin knowledge, hand knowledge, eye knowledge and ear knowledge. This means that knowledge is not only provided by verbal communication but also by sensual experiences, which are difficult to verbalise. By the sense of smell, one can know if the food is still fresh; by touch, one can discover some alarming changes in the body (e.g., breast tumour); while hearing can warn one of danger (e.g., an approaching train).

The senses are perceived not only as a source of knowledge about the environment and the world around us (Brulé and Bailly 2018) but also as a source of self-knowledge and self-perception (Maslen 2015; Harris 2016). The studies focused on this kind of knowledge are found especially in the field of sport. It is not surprising that researchers have drawn their attention to the role of the senses in sports practices since “sports participants hear, smell, see, touch and move within their particular sporting environments, whether hockey pitch, mountain face, ice rink or squash court” (Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007: 123). The analysis of self-knowledge is based on autoethnographic studies, during which the researcher’s body becomes the main “instrument” of sensual data collection (Sparkes 2016: 46). Other examples include the research of Hockey (2006), Allen-Collinson and Hockey (2011) and Sparkes (2009).

Senses as Acquired Skills

The second understanding of the senses within the context of knowledge is their perception as acquired skills (more rarely, as competencies or abilities). Skills perceived in terms of knowledge are usually described as having a few particular features. First, they are learnt. Even if skills have, to some extent, a biological basis, they are developed through the process of learning. Second, the skills are related to achievements and goals. Third, skills development requires practice, which is the only way to become more proficient in them; however, practice alone cannot guarantee success. Fourth, bodily skills are not completely separate from intellectual and cognitive skills. Finally, one can talk about the history of a skill's life and its development over time; as a consequence, it is quite easy to distinguish a novice from an expert (Jakubowska 2017).

This perception of senses suggests that, although the vast majority of people can use all the senses in everyday life, their use can be developed to enable a person to hear, smell or see something that is unnoticed by a layperson. As noted by Carpenter (1973), "any sensory experience is partly skill and any skill can be cultivated" (p. 20). Olivier Wathelet, in his article, "Apprendre à voir" (Learn to see) (2012), described the process of skills learning using the example of seeing. As the author stated, one can *learn* to see and, as a consequence, transform vision into skilled vision and/or achieve virtuosity of vision. In this context, the term "vis-ability" is also relevant, as used by Schindler (2009: 135) to speak about the ability to analyse video recordings of the process of knowledge transmission during judo training sessions. A person who has experience in practising and/or learning this sport is able to see more than a person who is unfamiliar with it. The same ability can apply to the other senses as well.

Sensory skills allow a person not only to register a sound, a taste or a smell that is unrecognised by others, i.e., to notice hard-to-detect features, but also to distinguish similar qualities and discriminate more and more subtle differences. Some authors (e.g., Sutton 2006), in describing the different skills that are learnt, make reference to the concept of "education of attention" proposed by Ingold (2000). These learned skills have been analysed in the example of wine and perfumes (Teil 1998; Latour 2004; Bach 2004).

Skills transfer and acquisition are realised through body practices, in and through the body (Marchand 2008). Due to training and experience, skills become incorporated (Leder 1990; Ingold 2000: 5). Considering the acquisition of olfactory skills, Latour (2004) described the body as "learning to be affected" (p. 213), that is, the body is trained to sense and to be sensible. With practice, the senses become incorporated and perceived as embodied skills (e.g., taste as an embodied skill – Perullo 2012). An embodiment of sensory skills is also emphasised by the terms which refer to the experts in particular fields of social life. For example, a "nose" or an "expert nose" is used to describe perfume specialists (Latour 2004), and the terms "expert eye" and "expert ear" appear in the analysis of the work of car mechanics (Krebs 2014).

The sensory skills can be also analysed using Marcel Mauss' concept of "body techniques" (1973 [1935]). Mauss defined body techniques as "ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies" (1973 [1935]: 70). According to Howes

(1990), education related to the senses should be perceived as part of a process of body techniques transmission; therefore, it is possible to speak about “sensory techniques” or “perceptual techniques.” This approach was used, for example, by Jonathan Sterne (2003, cited after Bijsterveld 2019), who wrote on the “audible technique.”

The researchers are unanimous that the acquisition of sensory knowledge (skills) can be made only in practice, through a long training conducted by an expert (Ingold 2000; Harris and van Drie 2015; Bijsterveld 2019). This has been already noted by Michael Polanyi, the author of the concept of tacit knowledge:

Connoisseurship, like skill, can be communicated only by example, not by percept. To become an expert wine-taster, to acquire a knowledge of innumerable different blends of tea or to be trained as a medical diagnostician, you must go through along course of experience under the guidance of a master. (Polanyi 1958: 56)

Sensory Knowledge as a Result of (Collective) Activity

The third, less common perception of sensory knowledge refers to the process through which knowledge is acquired and constructed in the performance of activities. This approach has a lot in common with the perception of knowledge as communicative action, which was mentioned in the first part of the article. It also partly relates to understanding the senses as embodied skills, the acquisition of which requires practice, i.e., engaging in the same activities over a long time.

Gardner and Williams (2015), in their research on medical diagnosis, used the expressions “embodied sensing and acting” and “sensing and acting habits” to describe the physicians’ bodies and their knowledge. This knowledge is acquired by activities but is also expressed by them; moreover, the senses play a significant role in these activities. Therefore, it is possible to analyse medical knowledge by the analysis of embodied actions and/or habits, which have a sensory nature.

What is specific in this approach is its focus on collective knowledge. The creation of knowledge by collective practices has been presented mainly within the context of taste. As noted by Hennion (2005):

Taste as an activity is accomplished through a collective which provides a frame, the relevance of the effort, and which guarantees results, accompanies, guides, puts into words. (p. 135)

The collective process of sensory knowledge creation takes place, for example, during the culinary contests of wine or coffee, which have been analysed (Teil and Hennion 2004; Shapin 2012; Liberman 2013). Although everyone can have a different taste and perceive a particular drink in a different, subjective way, there is also a process during which the notes have to be assigned and the best taste has to be chosen. This process usually has a collective character (e.g., when the experts in a field engage in discussions towards making a common decision) and is related to sensory knowledge objectification, which will be discussed later.

SENSORY KNOWLEDGE AS TACIT KNOWLEDGE

Although sensory feelings play an important role in the different areas of everyday life, their verbalisation remains a challenge, both for the person who wants to express these feelings and for the researchers who are interested in studying sensual feelings and experiences. In this regard, one can say that sensory knowledge remains, at least to some extent, tacit (Polanyi 1966).

The concept of tacit knowledge was introduced by Michael Polanyi, who stated that “we can know more than we can tell” (1966: 4). According to the author, one has the ability to perform a practical task, e.g., ride a bike or hammer a nail, but, at the same time, has difficulty in precisely defining and verbalising this “know how.” Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton (2013) discussed Polanyi’s statement that “tacit knowledge is untellable” and claimed that tacit knowledge can be expressed verbally; however, it will be understood only in a particular situation or context².

Tacit knowledge is seen as practical knowledge related to skills and abilities which are developed through exercises and practice. Harry Collins (2010) delineated three kinds of tacit knowledge: (1) relational, (2) somatic and (3) collective. Relational tacit knowledge can be made explicit to the largest extent; however, it remains deliberately tacit in certain situations, such as when a group of experts do not want to share specialist knowledge. Somatic tacit knowledge can be understood in terms of Polanyi’s concept. Collective tacit knowledge is related to the social community and “the way society is constituted” (Collins 2010, p. 85), and it is acquired via the interactions in the framework of a particular community.

The tacit character of sensory knowledge has been emphasised by a number of authors (e.g., Harris and van Drie 2015; Bijsterveld 2019). Two aspects seem to be pivotal here: the way of acquiring sensory knowledge and the problem of verbalising this knowledge. Sensory knowledge is transmitted in practice, within an apprenticeship context, due to the interactions between an expert (a master) and a novice. At the same time, this process of professional development can be seen as collective tacit knowledge, as distinguished by Collins (2010). On the one hand, it is based on the interactions, while, on the other hand, it obliges the novice to adapt to the existing knowledge within a particular community. For example, a person who has learnt cooking alone at home, but starts to cook in a restaurant, could be obliged to learn different ways of cooking which are the norms of this particular setting.

The second feature of sensory knowledge perceived as tacit knowledge is the problem of its articulation or verbalisation, which has been raised by several authors (e.g., Teil 1998; Bach 2004). It seems relatively easy to tell someone about what one has seen in order to be understood by the other person. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to describe smells, sounds or tactile sensations. In particular, tactile or taste experiences, contrary to visual experiences, seem to be more subjective. Geneviève Teil (1998), in her writings about smell, emphasised that smelling is an individualised experience, based largely on individual and collective memory and physiology. Acous-

² For different re/interpretations of Polanyi’s concept see: reference to the article’s author.

tic or scented impressions cannot be “seen” and, as a result, it is very difficult to talk about them and convey their essence.

Therefore, everyday sensory knowledge remains tacit to a large extent. For this reason, becoming an expert requires not only particular sensual skills but also the acquisition of “sensory language.” A wine enthusiast can evaluate a particular wine as good (or bad), strong, etc., while a wine expert should be able to classify wine and describe it according to the established categories (Teil 1998). The same applies to other sensory experts, such as flavourists, perfumers (Agapakis and Tolaas, 2012: 570) and physicians. As noted by Harris (2016), “medical students need to be trained to match sensations to words and types” (p. 44).

The difference between a novice and an expert can be observed to the extent to which their knowledge remains tacit. An expert will be able to verbalise more sensory experiences than a layperson. Moreover, proficiency in a specialised language and association within a narrow circle of experts can contribute to a growing content of relational tacit knowledge, which will remain, to a large extent, inaccessible to laypersons.

SENSORY PERCEPTION: FROM SUBJECTIVITY TO OBJECTIFICATION

The verbalisation of sensory knowledge is considered not only in relation to tacit knowledge but also in the context of knowledge objectification. Language, as the main tool of communicative objectification (Schutz 1974 [1932]; Habermas 1981), allows the transforming of subjective sensual experiences and meanings into “objective” knowledge. However, as noted by Knoublauch (2013), not only language but also things, such as the flavour of wine or the tactile perceptions of a deaf and blind person, can be considered as objectification. From this perspective, sensory knowledge is a part of socially constructed knowledge and reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

This has been emphasised by Kenneth Liberman (2013), who, in his writing about coffee tasting, distinguished two kinds of objectivity:

The first is the real objectivity that is the actually existing taste of some coffee; this is the objectivity that always has some subjectivity attached to it. There is another sense of objectivity that is a socially constituted objectivity, more abstract and less immanent, and which seeks to remove all traces of subjective experience. This objectivity doesn’t just happen—it is socially constructed and therefore is an artefact. (p. 222)

The main terms used to speak about this process are objectification, mentioned above, and intersubjectivity, the understanding of which is provided, for example, by Steven Shapin (2012), in his article on the taste of wine. According to the author, intersubjectivity can be understood as:

The ability of a group of people reliably to assign the same word to the same private olfactory or gustatory experience, and, therefore, to agree that they share subjective states. (p. 82)

It seems that both terms, objectification and intersubjectivity, are used as synonyms by the authors writing on the senses and knowledge. Both notions emphasise

the collective nature of the practice, the attempt to eliminate individual subjective experiences and the crucial role of language.

Shapin (2012) indicated two main ways of making sensory knowledge objective. The first is “the vast expansion of putatively referential descriptors (peach skin, wet stones, fig paste)” (p. 75). The second is based on quantitative systems of evaluation. Using the first method, people refer to the taste, smell or sound that they have already known, and they also reach out to metaphors and/or onomatopoeia (Bijsterveld 2019). In the case of sound, the same linguistic tools have been also observed in the acquisition of sports skills (Jakubowska 2017). This practice partially results, as one can suppose, from the tacit nature of sensory knowledge. It is difficult to precisely explain gustatory, olfactory or tactile feelings; therefore, different linguistic tools are helpful to express these experiences and construct common knowledge.

The second method, quantitative evaluation, is used by professionals and experts, mainly in gastronomy, e.g., in the case of wine, coffee and restaurants (Shapin 2012; Liberman 2013). The different types of wine evaluations and their history can be found in Shapin’s article (2012). Quantitative evaluation is based on numerical scores or stars, which are used, for example, in the case of restaurant reviews, and the author called this process “scoring subjectivity.”

Maybard Amerine (1983 [1976]) proposed the term “the sensory evaluation of wines” as distinguished from “the sensory enjoyment of wines.” During the latter practice, shared by wine enthusiasts, subjective experiences (may) play an important role in sensory evaluation, and subjectivity should be disciplined or eliminated (Shapin 2012: 78). It is also worth mentioning the distinction between the descriptive and normative nature of wine, identified by Nicola Perullo (2012). As the author explained, “the first approach describes things *as they are*, the second as they *should be*” (p. 7).

There are a number of similarities between the sensory evaluations of wine and coffee. In describing the coffee market, Kenneth Liberman (2013) stated that there is no doubt that drinking coffee is a subjective experience; however, also objective knowledge, including standard terminologies, on “the perfect cup of coffee” have been created to satisfy clients and consumers.

In addition, both in the process of sensory skills acquisition and sensory evaluation, different tools are used. For example, there are perfume (odour) kits (Latour 2004) and the “wine aroma wheel” (Todd 2012; Shapin 2016). Their aim is to allow a person to name their own sensual experiences by using already existing terminology and to communicate with others; that is, they simplify the objectification of sensory knowledge.

Although the analysis of sensory knowledge objectification is mainly focused on taste and smell, the same process can be observed with reference to the other senses. For example, listening to music at home or during a concert can be perceived as “sensory enjoyment.” However, during music contests, such as for piano or violin, the sound becomes an object of sensory evaluation. Touch also can be an enjoyment (e.g., a massage given by a partner or by a specialist), but in physiotherapy, it will be evaluated in terms of its technical value.

Therefore, on the one hand, one can talk about the perception of senses and, on the

other hand, about the judgement of senses. In the first approach, sense can, but does not have to be, considered in the context of knowledge. One can enjoy wine or coffee without having knowledge of what should be the taste of a particular type of wine or coffee. However, due to experience in tasting, one can become familiar with these products and their features and thereby gain more knowledge of them. The judgement of senses is perceived in a different way. Its aim is to create objective knowledge of the senses, in other words, to define what a good taste or appropriate smell is. These judgements are made by experts and professionals in a particular field, who establish “standards,” which are later adopted by laypersons as objective knowledge. Individual experiences and judgements are not made in a “social vacuum,” as noted by Perullo (2012), who stated, “[...] taste as knowledge is based on pre-existing social and inter-subjective codes that constitute the context in which we operate” (p. 18). The learning process, at least in the beginning, requires the acceptance of some suggestions and recommendations provided by experts, perceiving them as authorities whose knowledge is reliable.

The issue of the reliability of knowledge is particularly important in the areas of social life, where the role of the senses is crucial in decision-making that influences our health and even our life. For example, medical diagnosis and treatment based on the senses should be indicated. Although, as mentioned earlier, the human senses are, to a large extent, being supported or replaced by technologies, their meaning in medicine still remains crucial. The physicians listen to the heart beating or the lungs breathing, touch a stomach, look at the results of ultrasonography, and so on. Using the senses as a source of knowledge in this way, they make decisions as to a patient’s treatment. Therefore, one can observe here professional jurisdiction about sensory knowledge (Bijsterveld 2019) and, at the same time, the legitimacy of the senses as (a source of) knowledge.

CONCLUSION

This article aimed to explore the sociological (and anthropological) analysis of senses within the context of knowledge. Due to limited space, the article could only indicate the main issues related to sensory knowledge that have appeared in the conducted literature review. There is no doubt that these issues can and should be developed much further. Therefore, the article should be treated as a short review of what has been done so far and a starting point for further exploration.

The division of sociology into multiple subdisciplines has led to a situation where scientific knowledge remains limited to the particular fields and does not exceed their boundaries. Meanwhile, the sensory studies can provide new and interesting insight into the sociological analysis of knowledge. The focus on different senses and embodiment can challenge, at least to some extent, the domination of verbocentrism and ocularcentrism and will be important in taking into account the multi-sensual nature of human experience.

Considering sensory knowledge as tacit knowledge, it should also be noted that deriving the appropriate methodology for this type of research still remains a challenge

for sociologists and other researchers in the social sciences. Nevertheless, it is important to take up the challenge of delineating the meaning and significance of sensory knowledge in everyday life. This will require the further development of the social sciences and the collaboration between the different subdisciplines.

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VERNACULAR VIDEO ANALYSIS – COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN POLICE WORK

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ABSTRACT: The use of video recordings for the production of knowledge has spread all over society. This paper presents an empirical study of the processes of interpretation of audio-visual recordings. It draws on an example in the context of police work, including the investigation of recordings of police violence. With a theoretical background in communicative constructivism, special attention is given to situated bodily forms of “making things visible” performed by the participants. Interpretation is not understood as purely cognitive but rather as a communicative process. It is elaborated on presenting results of (reflexive) videography of practices of video-interpretation. However, the specifics of the work are not only brought upon situatively, but are embedded in an institutional and organizational context. This paper draws on the concept of work arcs, that allow to highlight the trans-situative linkage.

KEYWORDS: Vernacular Video Analysis, Visual Knowledge, Police Work, Communicative Action

VERNACULAR VIDEO ANALYSIS¹

During the linguistic turn in the 1960s and 1970 the focus was especially on language, the Iconic Turn followed in the 1990s and 1990 and added the question of what role visual communication plays and whether the “visual” must be interpreted in a special way.² Against this background, my research addresses the latter questions, but does

¹ The study presented here is part of a wider study on video analytical practices published in Tuma (2017).

² The specific role of the visual material, compared to language is extensively discussed in a variety of disciplines and a separate field of visual studies has developed. One of the key texts can be found by W.J.T. Mitchell (2002), who maps out some of the main issues. Also in sociology the visual has been discussed extensively, here I focus on the aspect of visual knowledge (cf. Lucht, Schmidt, and Tuma 2013).

not provide a mere methodological or abstract “pictorial-philosophical” approach, but embeds those topics into a framework of sociological-empirical or communicative-constructivism. This research approach has been developed on the basis of social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1966), presenting an enhanced concept of communicative action and especially taking objectivities (this means also technologies etc.) into consideration (cf. Knoblauch in this issue 2019a; Knoblauch 2019b). Following this concept, which starts with analyzing “first order constructions” (Schutz 1962) I do address the questions as a participant or ethno³-problem and investigate how those are dealt with. The practices of “seeing” and importantly “showing” are central to sociality. Knoblauch (2019b) discusses this in detail on the basic example of finger pointing, partly with reference to Tomasello (2010). A very specific, technologically enhanced form of seeing and showing, which is currently becoming more and more present, is the use of video in everyday working contexts. It became increasingly clear to me that the medium “video”, which many sociologists themselves use to explore interactions (Knoblauch, Schnettler, and Tuma 2014), is not exclusive to our profession, but is constantly used by various practitioners in their respective fields. Society observes itself, much more “concretely” than expressed with Luhmanns abstract concept of observation (1997). Therefore, during the early stages of my research, I looked for experts in video analysis and found them nearly everywhere: From market researchers, sports coaches, police officers to doctors, communication trainers, etc. In all those fields analysts scrutinize videos with varying intensity and frequency: from time to time as part of other activities or even as a full-time job. I therefore describe the dissemination of the systematic evaluation of video data in various social fields with the term Vernacular Video Analysis. “Vernacular” in its original meaning aims at the language spoken in local contexts and/or by specific groups, but has already been transferred by the pioneer of pictorial gymnastics, W.J.T. Mitchell, to the forms of everyday seeing that art historians have ignored (as “vernacular seeing” - Mitchell 2005: 365). I have chosen this term for the paraphrase of the research object because it encompasses three important aspects of vernacular video analysis:

- the specificity for the respective application context,
- the ‘pragmatic’ functionality and
- the everydayness.

I use the term Vernacular Video Analysis to describe a certain group of practices, namely the systematic evaluation of videos in the respective professional everyday life (There are similar uses of the concept, e.g. Mair et al. Smith 2018 and with a slightly different connotation Schmidt and Wiese 2019). The actions they consist of are not purely situational, but are specifically embedded into specific domains, which I refer to as ‘fields’. I am focusing, firstly, on the analyses of videos in which the actors have specifically produced or at least collected the video data in the context of their professional activities in order to evaluate which analysis refer to the ‘actions in front of the camera’ (see Reichertz and Englert 2011: 28). Watching a film, be it on the couch in the evening or in a film analysis seminar, does not fall within my

³ In the sense of ethnomethodology.

scope, because participants here do not interpret the ‘natural’ actions of people in front of the camera⁴, but rather follow the crafted programme for entertainment. In such cases, where produced video is in focus of research, we would therefore usually speak of film analysis rather than video analysis. Secondly, it is an activity in which the video is used to produce knowledge. While this is certainly embedded in broader contexts of action, in an analysing or interpreting activity the focus is on the interpretation of the video material, rather than on its processing and production. This allows some further forms of the use of video to be distinguished, such as the production of live television footage in sports (Perry, Juhlin, and Engström 2014) or the editing and production of films (Laurier, Strelbel, and Brown 2008). These activities also include aspects of the analysis activity, but do not aim at gaining knowledge, but at the film or the transmission as a product. Thirdly, video analysis, as understood here, must be distinguished from surveillance activities, in which CCTV systems are used to keep a live eye on rooms outside of the field of vision, where the boundaries are fluid. These use of video technology, which is often also embedded in coordination tasks, e.g. in control centres, have already been investigated by the Workplace Studies (Heath and Luff 2000; Heath et al. 2002; Luff, Heath, and Svensson 2008). Those differ because the video technology is used there in a similar way to “binoculars” or “periscopes” and not as a “time machine”. From my broader research, which includes video analyses in sports coaching and market research (cf. Tuma 2017), the following will examine the communicative construction of interpretation with several using the examples of the analyses by the police and their “counterparts”.

EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE: VIDEO ANALYSIS IN POLICE WORK

Video footage is mainly used in police work in the following areas: firstly, by the traffic police for the detection of traffic offences; secondly, in the investigation of criminal offences, in particular when recordings from surveillance cameras are available; thirdly, in the area of operational law enforcement, e.g. in the targeted observation of organised crime; and lastly, in the observation and surveillance of major events (e.g. football, demonstrations). After a brief look at the history of video recording and a short review of the literature, I will turn empirically to the latter case.

Since around 1960, video cameras have played a role in the form of permanently installed surveillance systems. Video technology, which was initially used for traffic monitoring, was used early on to monitor crowds. As early as 1960, cameras borrowed from the entertainment company EMI were used to observe onlookers visiting the Thai royal family in London’s Trafalgar Square (Fay 1998; Kammerer 2008a: 35; 2008b). In Germany, cameras with recording functions were used sporadically as early as the early 1960s at the demonstrations on May, the first, in Hanover and at other events in Frankfurt and Munich (Kammerer 2008a: 48). From the 1970s onwards, in addition to use of traffic surveillance by the police, there was also a massive increase in privately

⁴The camera’s actions, which represent the institutionalized view of a professional group (see Reichertz and Englert 2011: 28-30), also play a role in some cases, but are not the focus of attention; rather, they are dealt with in the context of “problems”.

operated video surveillance systems owned by retailers. In the beginning, they were mainly used for real-time monitoring, but in the following years, they were increasingly equipped with recording devices.⁵ Particularly with regard to demonstrations and major events, the targeted use of video recording in Germany was legally regulated in 1989 with the amendment or introduction of the ban on the wearing of masks (§§ 12a, 19a Versammlungsgesetz). In recent years, the use of video recording has increased due to the availability of everyday, affordable and robust video equipment. In addition to legal issues, current discussions are increasingly revolving around the use of camera drones, which can also film from the air, without the need for expensive helicopters (see also Ullrich and Wollinger 2011), and the permanent use of individual body cams. Usually, for example, crowd and riot control units of police forces, have their own teams for the preservation of evidence and documentation, and are supported by technical support teams. They are equipped with video cameras, live transmission facilities and additional tools.⁶

In addition to evaluating research, the use of video by law enforcement agencies today is mostly negotiated within the framework of surveillance studies, which primarily deal with questions concerning the effect of surveillance technologies. The central and frequently cited reference and starting point of the research are mostly Foucault's studies on panoptism (1977), based on the control potential of new technologies, especially in an urban context. The further development of these reflections about the consequences and power effects of surveillance, led to a discourse that produced its own journals and a whole series of anthologies and introductory volumes (Ball, Haggerty, and Lyon 2014; Hempel and Metelmann 2005; Lyon 2007; Zurawski 2007). In this area, questions are usually negotiated concerning the dissemination, acceptance and enforcement of surveillance technologies; their involvement in the generation of suspicious facts and the normalisation and classification of populations; and the consequences and power effects of surveillance, especially with regard to exclusion and discrimination processes. Rarely do the studies in this area focus on surveillance

⁵ As Zielinski (2010) shows, the technological development of film and video equipment is also oriented towards surveillance purposes at an early stage, so that, in terms of innovation theory, at least a co-evolution must be assumed here, in which the new practices are not only a consequence of the technology, but were specifically designed to implement certain control visions.

⁶ These supra-regional units, which are closely coordinated with operation planning, are often also equipped with special documentation vehicles with extendable mast cameras and several workstations, which are used in large-scale situations where criminal offences are expected from a crowd of people (stone throwing, etc.). According to practical literature, these vehicles are equipped with recording equipment, editing suites, Internet connection and printers (Timmermanns in *Polizeispiegel*, Dec. 2010). The application scenario is described as opportunity to print out short sequences from the video or still pictures ("for better recognizability with an image processing program edited") already during events, which are filmed by the roof camera or by an official with a hand camera. These will then be handed over to the emergency officers, so that they can identify the accused on the spot, compare their appearance with these 'profiles' and seize them ("by means of burdock tactics" *op. cit.* means: individual offenders are deliberately pulled out of crowds by small troops). In the usage vision, the video sequence is also "edited simultaneously with a video editing program (e.g. by inserting circles or arrows) in order to make the accused better recognizable".

practices in detail. Perhaps because of the partial overemphasis of the new technologies (technology determinism), possibly because of problems with access to the field or because of the orientation towards a theoretical, abstract perspective. Although there are some exceptions, such as the studies on CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) surveillance in Great Britain in the 1990s (Norris and Armstrong 1999). As is usual in the field of Surveillance Studies, these also deal with permanent CCTV surveillance, which is less about systematic evaluation and analysis of individual cases but about permanent monitoring with punitive consequences.

The practices that are at my research focus, happen when recordings are precisely analysed, i.e. the analyst seeks traces of action (also see Ginzburg 2011; Krämer, Kogge, and Grube 2007; Reichertz 2007). This is often referred to as part of video forensics. Digital video forensics, however, highlight the improvement of the recording, such as the improvement of the image quality or the acquisition of data from various technical video systems (analogue, digital, tape, server, etc.). Alternatively, the term often refers to the purely technical analysis of physical, technical or biological processes using video, such as the reconstruction of a trajectory of a grenade or a drone bomb (cf. Weizmann et al. 2014). Video forensics has rarely been the subject of sociological research so far. Gates does pioneering work here with an STS perspective (Gates 2013: 244). She shows how images are produced, data is archived, and the data processed for presentation in court or in other settings, as part of the subsequent evaluation of criminal cases. In particular, it focuses on the digital transformation of images using video and image processing software, i.e. the production of evidence from a “chaotic field” of recordings and finally describes the result as “computational objectivity” in accordance with the concepts of Daston and Gallison (2010). Daston and Gallison use scientific illustrations to illustrate how the “notion of objectivity” changes historically. Extended to videos, the term emphasizes not only the application of algorithms for image optimization, but also the management of large data archives (Gates 2013: 248), on the basis of which videos can only act as evidence. The work of the video forensic experts is to make decisions about which visual information to focus on and which can be ignored. Gates’ perspective is very enlightening, but it neglects the communicative character of these activities. After all, this is not just a solitary activity, but rather the result of ongoing communication between different participants and also the negotiation of relevancies and standards (cf. also Reichertz 2009).

This becomes clear, considering the work by Charles Goodwin on Professional Vision (1994), which has meanwhile become a classic of ethnomethodological video analysis. His study is based on the first Rodney King trial. It deals with⁷ racist acts of

⁷ The role of the moving image in court at Schwartz (2009), which traces the judicial use of film and video in the last hundred years, is depicted more broadly historically. He first describes the introduction of the first film footage, which for a long time could not gain a foothold in court, but was merely viewed by witnesses who then reported on it. Films, at least in the USA of the 1940s and 1950s, were occasionally framed as physical evidence or as pictorial communication of witness statements. It was only with the introduction of the smaller handheld video devices that the moving image found its way into the courtrooms, always accompanied by intense arguments about the status of the recordings as evidence in comparison to other types of evidence. In the 1980s, lawyers considered videos to be the

violence committed by police officers during the arrest of a car driver in Los Angeles in the 1990s, which were filmed by passers-by. Together with Major Harness Goodwin, he emphasizes (Goodwin and Goodwin 1997) that the discursive-practical aspects of seeing and showing can thus explain how in the first trial, the video could be presented and interpreted by the defence attorneys, with a certain interpretation scheme of the policemen, as evidence for the justified use of violence, against the ‘rebellious’ Rodney King. Not, as initially expected, as a clear documentation of an ‘excess of police violence’ against a person lying on the ground. Goodwin shows the communicative process in which the video could be interpreted in court by the defence counsel, with the help of a series of small practices (such as breaking it down into short segments, emphasizing certain aspects, prescribing an “Escalation - De-escalation” coding scheme for the police professional view).

Even if this is a solid starting point, there are massive sociological gaps in research on the concrete use of videos and their analysis in police work itself (i.e. before it goes to court; even practitioner’s literature is thin on the ground and is often passed on as grey literature in training courses. The little empirical research that deals with the analysis of videos in the context of police work, therefore bears subtitles such as “an orphaned field of research” (Ullrich and Wollinger 2011b) and deals primarily with questions of the effect of the camera on demonstrations. Suggestions for the specificity of police investigative work, can be drawn from the broader literature on police research, which, however, usually deals with ‘broader’ aspects of police culture (Behr 2006) and also frequently takes a historical approach (Wilson 2000). In the context of this work, however, more relevant are studies on police work presented by some researchers, in particular the research group ‘Empirical Police Research’ (Ute Donk, Ronald Kurt, Jo Reichertz, Norbert Schröder), which deal specifically with investigative activities. Practices such as the examination of witnesses and the recording of records at the crime scene come into focus (Reichertz 2003; Schröder 1996: 199). Reichertz has dealt intensively with the criminal police’s search for traces within the framework of a six-month ethnography (Reichertz 1991; 1996). He describes trace reading as an active construction activity:

And also another fact should be clear now: traces are not simply read (...), but they are constructed. The forensic man’s gaze examines all perceptible phenomena at the scene of the crime and only with the help of a pronounced imagination does he enchant some of these phenomena into traces. The metaphor that often appears, according to which traces conceal a secret message that could be deciphered with the right key, is fundamentally misleading. (1991: 18)

Even if the video data did not yet play a role in his research, or at least are not explicitly negotiated and emerged (video devices already existed at the end of the 1980s), this perspective represents a good starting point in the context of this work to look at

most reliable form of evidence (p. 106) until their evidence character became fragile again as a result of cases such as that around Rodney King (whose outcome Schwartz tries to explain with the difference between subjective and subjectless seeing). Today, videos are used in court, but they have lost their sole claim to objectivity and are now only accepted embedded in a comprehensive chain of evidence.

video analysis with the police. Since Reichertz dealt with the criminal investigation department in particular with cases in which the events were ‘completely unclear’ to the officers, there are, of course, a number of differences in identifying perpetrators at demonstrations and proving the facts on the basis of video recordings of the events. Since video does not provide clear or even an unambiguous image of a situation, but only a document of the event that can be questioned and interpreted in different ways, the course must also be constructed as a trace and transformed into evidence.

EMPIRICAL: ANALYSIS OF VIDEOS IN POLICE WORK

This paper presents part of a comparative study, where I compared practices of vernacular video analysis in three fields: market research, sport training (football) and police work (Tuma 2017). The research design and applied methods follow the concept of videography, that combines ethnographic research with in-details sequential analysis of relevant sequences⁸ as it is presented in our introduction to the method (Knoblauch et al. 2014). The research question is focused on how the visual practices of different fields are related to their contextual specifics. For this case, I have studied the context empirically and then focused on concrete analysis of video data in police work. The aim was to observe the analysts, while they are working with video data. In this case, I focus on video analyses of violence in the context of major events and demonstrations, as the use of the video camera in such cases was a regular and systematized practice. However, the degree of professionalism and intensity is strongly dependent on specific local conditions. For example, in the context of larger investigations or media-effective events such as the events on New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, special video analysis units are gathered, as there are broad alternative information resources here due to the great public interest.

In concrete research practice, field access proved to be quite difficult, since sociologists do not have (any longer) an easy access, nor a permission to film the “backstage” of investigative work. Nevertheless, through interviews, exemplary demonstrations of the procedure and comparison with other sources, I was able to develop an understanding of the forms of video analysis in criminal investigation work.⁹ In the follow-

⁸ The specific selected sequences are chosen based on extensive theoretical and comparative sampling within the field and the data corpus (cf. Knoblauch et al. 2014:71f). My research shows the widely spread communicative forms, but also embeds them in specific situated context. The empirical research is based on data from 2010-2014, however the general practices have not changed, new technologies such as better video quality, new forms of recording (body cams, drones) are not dramatically changing the work practices. Currently automatized forms of computer based video analysis (facial recognition) etc. are being deployed, but do not replace the need to interpret the visual results, but rather help speeding up parts of the work process (scanning large sources of data, focussing attention). I have discussed the concepts in the broader study (Tuma 2017: 151ff)

⁹ It is therefore not ethnography in a broader sense that claims to document “police culture” or the like, but my research is clearly focused on the forms of analysis. The comparison with other research fields with similar activities was helpful. This study is based on ethnographic research in the different fields, whereas prolonged stays in the context of police was not possible. The specific case is based on three interviews with experts in a local police unit in a german metropolitan city, the documentation of a

ing discussion I will trace the path of the video footage, from the recording in use to the analysis and production of evidence. I also refer to this process as work ark (Gerson 1983 in reference to Strauss).¹⁰

THE RECORDING OF THE VIDEOS BY THE POLICE

An important reason for the use of video technology by police units in the field, results from the necessity to fix the identification features of perpetrators. The aim is to make the identities communicatively accessible to other members of the police and juridical institution. The image or description of the perpetrators must be enabled to be passed on, which would be a complicated task if performed only in words. Therefore, visual methods of identification and preservation of evidence are used (criminal photography has a long history, as a look at criminal historians shows, cf. Messner 2013; Messner, Gruber, and Musik 2012; Tagg 1988). On one hand, this identification has the aim of being transferred to other members of the crowd and riot control units during the action; on the other, the records are subsequently evaluated, archived and later brought into the court hearing as visual evidence and therefore, as part of the respective case file.

My interviewees have¹¹ reported the recording procedure as a problematic task, as it is accompanied by concrete practical issues of filming and by legal demands at the same time. As a rule, the documentation teams are confronted with confusing situations in the field. They usually don't know beforehand where the 'trouble spots' will be, are in motion in 'mobile locations', are often confronted with multitude of 'disturbers', who have developed countermeasures to 'being filmed' (so called "black block", exchange of clothes, banners in front of the body, obfuscation by fireworks, etc.), they have to struggle with poor visibility conditions and usually have to film during movement. For this reason, the camera operators in the units receive specific training to prepare them for dealing with such tactical problems. In the area of major events, the basic approach is not to document the entire event, but to record the most serious individual acts in as much detail as possible. At the same time, however, overview shots are also produced, from which an overview of the situation and the mood of the event is to emerge.

The use of the video camera by the police (here in relation to demonstrations and meetings in public space) is formally and legally strongly regulated in Germany, where my study took place.¹² The observance and breaking of these rules is again and again

demonstration of video analytic work and because of the limited access also the in detail analysis of the contrast case based on one hour conference recording (which I also attended). However, this specific case is part of a larger set of data and analysis, for which months in the two other research fields, over 50 hours of video recordings and twelve expert interviews as well are the empirical basis.

¹⁰ The work sheet is a counter term to the trajectory that Strauss used above all to emerge from external compulsion. In contrast, the work arc emphasises the active production of a project by various expert groups (cf. Strübing 2005: 213).

¹¹ Interview with a second police director of a big city and two "video experts" from police units.

¹² It is regulated above all by §12a of the Assembly Act (VersG). However, the abstract rules must be

the subject of legal disputes. This is crucial for the police units, because they cannot simply record the ongoing action without providing a specific reason. Recording of citizens is a justifiable violation of the fundamental rights of the recorded. Police officers are therefore under constant pressure to justify their actions, as they may have to justify why the event was filmed. Thus, the recording may only begin when a crime (for example a stone is thrown) has already taken place. Especially with such very short actions, it can be assumed that the camera cannot capture any criminal activity during the course of the action, or execution, because the first steps are already over when the recording button is pressed. However, it usually does not stop at a single crime, so the camera can be switched on from the first event so that the images can then be used to identify the perpetrators. Also persons who are standing by (who could possibly commit the later act) may then be recorded. Tactically, it makes sense for the police to be able to start filming as early as possible in order to obtain the best possible footage of the following events for the comprehensive technical preservation of evidence. In the training documents, documentation-relevant events are listed which should ideally be recorded:

The officers of the evidence corps are making technical evidence about the:

- predicate phase
- perpetration
- perpetrators and accomplices
- arrest including search of the person and his or her property (however, the search of persons may only be filmed for the purpose of securing evidence, but not for the purpose of proving the legality of the exercise of official authority)
- means of committing an offence (if possible, save the original)
- consequences (injuries, damages)

They shall immediately produce immediate photographic material about the arrested person, as well as further photographic material about the objects that can serve as evidence. The instant picture is handed over to the arresting officer, who accompanies the arrested person to the station. The footage is attached to the 'Report on Deprivation of liberty/restriction' and given a sticker number.

(Anonymous 2004: Police Workbook Tactics [at Demonstrations])

This list is based on an ideal-typical action progression model, which starts from individual perpetrators (and accomplices) and followed by concrete, observable actions, which can already be taped in action. Such process models conceive these actions in such a way that they have a "predicate offence phase" and can (usually) already be recognised or at least expected there, when the perpetrators carry out preparatory actions. In fact, certain means are used that have relevance as evidence (thus, a distinction is also made between different types of evidence, such as fact based evidence, personal evidence, etc.).

interpreted. I cannot and will not judge what this practice is because I have not researched it.

The preservation of evidence serves not only as a 'subjective' understanding of the deed, but is also intended to document, prove and make visible to third parties, certain forms of action that have already been classified as relevant. As already mentioned, the aim of the documentation teams is to produce recordings, which serve for arrest and detention and, in the further course of proceedings, for the unequivocal proof of the acts of any suspects. The gaze of the police - which assumes a constant threat situation - is already produced by means of the camera actions (cf. for the term: Reichertz and Englert 2011). The accusation is to be made plausible and presentable in its course, the perpetrator identifiable. The documentation teams themselves also attach importance to the accompanying spoken commentary by the filming police officers, which is also recorded - and is intended to simplify the later evaluation, since the relevant settings are recorded. The police officers on duty usually describe the observed in an already "coding" and police typical tone of voice that is intended to be 'factual' and objective, therefore somewhat choppy. This recorded sound on the camera, which was recorded during the event, not only serves the practical purpose of highlighting and explaining what was shown, but also contributes to a "Liveness" preserved in the video (Auslander 1999). There is some awareness that the video can also have an emotional effect. It also reflects on whether the viewers are aware of the perspective and whether any video is to be doubted, because it often happens that accusations of selectivity or manipulation are made against the video. Therefore, they attach great importance to handling the video data in such a way that these doubts do not arise in the first place and accusations are invalidated. The video material thus does not speak for itself, but only as a process-legitimated document. The video recordings are archived on a hard disk server, where they should be kept in the original file structure of the camera, log data sheets should be filled in as already in use, the time codes of the camera should be checked (which often leads to problems, e.g. if the batteries were empty), etc. This means that the video production anticipates its later use as evidence and there are procedures in place to ensure the legitimacy of the recordings, for example by excluding subsequent alteration or editing by individual officials.

SUBSEQUENT RECONSTRUCTION OF A 'RIOT'

Documentation is a routine activity embedded in the execution of action in the field: first, perpetrators are identified and, if possible, arrested; second, evidence for prosecution is documented by means of the videos. The evaluation of the recordings serves the protocol-like representation of the events, to which often stills, sometimes also recorded material are attached. This requires a selection of the sequences from the body of recordings. The file consists of a standardised presentation of the course of the criminal act with the necessary information such as place, time, means of committing an offence, etc., which is passed on to the subsequent case handler and then used in court. This handling of the video material on which the documentation is based usually only becomes more apparent in more complicated cases. I was told about an event as an example of a case, where the police could not arrest the 'perpetrators' directly on the spot, but tried to find them afterwards, via video recordings. This is a

major event with political explosiveness, at which the police units initially only had the task of securing the site and therefore did not expect further police-relevant incidents. On the basis of a small dispute, however, the situation escalated and the police units were attacked and stones and other objects were thrown at them. Due to various circumstances, the perpetrators could not be detained on the spot and therefore only the video material produced at the time could be used for criminal prosecution. For this reason, a special commission (SoKo) was formed, as the head of the police authority told me:

K: And, uh, a special commission sat over it for a relatively long time, viewed, uh, hundreds of hours of video footage and related sequences again and again. We have also added records of parking surveillance cams that have given an completely different perspective? Those and surveillance cameras from the nearby tram stop, which is actually there to make sure that no one jumps around in the track when the tram arrives, you know? Things like that. But the recordings are also available to us in such a case and then all this will be put together ... (Interview with a police director in May 2013)

Large quantities of video materials had to be evaluated. First, hundreds of hours had to be viewed, sorted, processed and made accessible. This activity is carried out by trained personnel - although in this case the training was initially referred to as “television studio work”. This term refers to the initial technical component of this activity, which consists in bringing the available video data into a uniform format, organising it, providing it with titles and making it easily accessible. According to my interview partners, these activities could in principle be done by any “technically competent” personnel with knowledge of a common video editing software and few other tools, but there are some limitations that are discussed below.

First, I turn to the methods and settings of analysis. The process of video analysis forms an overarching work arc embedded in the general police activities, which contains the selection, the classifying interpretation of the offence and its preliminary course, the identification of perpetrators, the collection and consolidation of evidence as well as the comprehensive presentation with the help of the video material. It also includes the production of meaningful still images and a standardised description of the course of crime, with necessary information such as place, time, means used, etc. The results are then passed on to the case worker responsible and used later in court, when the case is brought to trial. The underlying methods of action for the evaluation are particularly evident in more complex cases.

When asked to what extent this knowledge of the analysts require a specific *pool of police experience*, the statements of the interviewed experts are to a certain extent ambivalent. Parts of the ‘technical’ activity are apparently perceived by some officials as simple, monotonous and under-demanding, while others, seeking traces and interpreting, were perceived as very demanding and interesting. Above all, however, the interpretations with consequences have a high degree of responsibility, so that the decision as to whether or not a crime has been committed can only be taken by trained police officers. On one hand my interview partners agree on this, the appro-

priate training is necessary for legal security. On the other hand, reference is made to the daily experience of policemen and women who have worked on the street in many years of training and work. Various anecdotes and reports of their special intuition are presented in interviews to prove this aspect. My interviewees also emphasize that the evaluation is typically not carried out by one person alone, but is itself a communicative process between several people working on the material, in which the observations are mutually checked and supplemented. The processing of the cases is also organized according to the division of labour: the sequences are cut out, documented, provided with screenshots, progress and location descriptions and then handed over to the case worker who initially had nothing to do with the actual video evaluation. The case worker is then responsible for bringing charges, prosecuting the perpetrators and initiating legal proceedings.

From the previous remarks it becomes clearer, how the pure identification and classification activity becomes a social and communicative construction of evidence.¹⁵ The officials select a series of typified actions and place them in a mental context that can be described as a “trace”. Reichertz summarizes this on the basis of his research on forensics: “Objects do not become traces by themselves, this statement shows, but only on the basis of intellectual work which juggles with far-reaching assumptions and insinuations” (Reichertz 1996: 15). However, the trace is not simply read, but interpreted together and communicatively in this way ‘created’ from various individual observations, which do not necessarily have to be completely and continuously visible on a videotape alone, but which move across various places (videotapes that record the course of time; photos on which faces are recognizable; other clues or testimonies) must be ‘assembled’ into a meaningful and in this case convincing, process in a communicative counter- and togetherness. At this point the reference to special police knowledge becomes clear again: the practitioners and theorists of the field themselves emphasize that specific investigator qualities are necessary for this: “The discovery of traces is largely dependent on the inner attitude, the resourcefulness and the power of observation of the searching officials” (cf. Clages and Steinke 2002; cited after Reichertz 1996). It must be emphasized that the reflexive documentation of the procedure is already built into this activity, since the officials are aware that the described trace only has a convincing evidential effect as when in an interaction with other data.

In the presentation of the results, the videos are not the primary means used, but the files also contain still images, photos and process descriptions, as explained in the example above. All these materials can be understood as *material representations*, as Goodwin (1994) described them. They serve as evidence by picking out key images from the action that clearly focus on specific visible movements (we see an example below), i.e. function as *objectified pointing* and, in conjunction with the documenting descriptions of the crime, reduce the process to central key moments and selected courses of action. Only then the relevant actions are displayed, i.e. made visible.

¹⁵ This phenomenon could also be described with the concept of “circulating reference” (Latour 1999).

CONTRAST CASE COUNTER ANALYSIS: COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE OR POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST A CYCLIST

At this point I change the perspective for the reasons of access to data, already mentioned above, but remain with records of major events. Nowadays, video analysis for evidence purposes, is not only carried out by the police, but also in a variety of contexts (football, shopping centres, malls, etc.). Even if there are other actors in a different context, they act in a very similar way to police. For the development of a narration (similar to a trace to follow) on the basis of ‘chaotic recordings’, which they put together on the basis of the various videos.

For this kind of data analysis, I have video recordings of the presentation of the results that are to be used in order to be able to represent the performatively physical side of the interpretation activity.

On this “other side”, video is used to prove police violence. It is well known that allegations are often made that acts of violence were part of police strategy or carried out by individual officers, often causing a great deal of public attention. One can speak here of a counter analysis or counter monitoring (Ullrich and Wollinger 2011a; Wilson and Serisier 2010). If these cases are also considered, it becomes clear that the same video data can be used to interpret different circumstances and that there are different possibilities for interpretation. The point here is to direct the video cameras and today in particular the ubiquitous smartphone cameras of the demonstrators towards the police units in action, in order to document unjustified and/or excessive use of force and missteps; and later make them accessible to the public.

A particularly clear case of such counter-analysis was presented at a conference of a German hacker group. At a demonstration a few months earlier, a person “the cyclist in the blue T-shirt” had been attacked and injured by a number of police officers after he had inquired about the service number of one of the officers on duty. This case of police violence against a cyclist was widely discussed at a number of Internet forums and by a hacker’s club, immediately after the event. A number of participants and interested activists had collected videos of the event, documented from different perspectives, in order to enable a reconstruction of the event and its prehistory. These videos caused a great public response and a press response: there was a statement by the Berlin police, who first gave a disregarded reprimand as justification for the action and finally announced a criminal case against two police officers “for bodily injury in office”. At the conference, a detailed analysis of the events of the respective day was presented, on the basis of various recordings, in particular the main event, namely the police assault, was examined in detail with the help of the video. Police records created by documentation teams were also used. These were accessible, because they were part of the case file, to which the concerned parties and their lawyers had access. For the purpose of the exact evaluation of the events, the presenters had different videos cut together: The video, on the basis of which the evidence is communicatively constructed, has a special characteristic: it is not just a recording, but a time-synchronized compilation (a fourfold split screen) that produces a kaleidoscope-like diversity of perspectives (see the first video image below in Fragment D2). The individual shots

stand side by side as ‘visual witnesses’ of the event and synchronously show the same event from different angles. It should be noted that the individual cameras in the video are mostly in quite fast motion, which leads to great irritation when viewing. The video only becomes comprehensible over time, after repeated viewing and focusing on individual sections.

This multi-perspective representation is interesting because, on one hand, it represents an objectified form of compiling and interrelating different documents, a procedure which is also used by police officers in a similar form to produce evidence. This cut shows when the expressiveness of an individual video is questioned and often it does not seem to function as pure evidence itself. No perspective can show the whole of the ongoing action and the shots are blurred in different places or the perspective hides parts of the event. The presenters trust in the persuasiveness of this multi-perspectivity, which exceeds that of an original video - and also that of the police cameras. They create a new vision with the help of technology and also communicatively. Combined with the commentary, they make the video “speak” convincingly. The claims to validity are, at least this is how it is presented, higher in this case than in other forms of evidence. Already, through the specific video construction, in which a certain assumption is inscribed, the speakers show the point of view by multiplying it in such a way that their interpretation has a higher visibility and thus also a higher validity. This creates a more convincing representation than just a single shot. Other modalities of evidence, such as sound stored with the recordings (which are neglected in the analysis) or testimonies, are not used in this context. This evidence seems to be objectified within the video compilation, which itself produces the impression of overview and thus neutrality through its multi-perspectivity, which a single video is unable to achieve due to its solo-perspectivity.

However, even in this case the video does not stand alone. It will be presented in detail in the above-mentioned presentation; two speakers will first explain a series of background information and previous events on stage and then present their video analysis. So, they show what they see in the video. The video is not simply played but interpreted by commentary. The two speakers on stage (here anonymously called Joscha and Otto) have obviously prepared the material and reproduce their acquired knowledge in front of an audience of about 200.¹⁴ The analysis is thus a communicative construction in the double sense (Keller, Knoblauch and Reichertz 2013). On one hand, they reconstruct the action on a screen; on the other hand, they also demonstrate how one (and thus the audience is addressed) can read it, from the traces visible in the video. The speakers are thus faced with the communicative problem of developing a convincing interpretation from the blurred images, or more precisely: of making their own, pre-prepared construction of events understandable and convincingly comprehensible, by means of the video image projected onto the wall. They have to make the audience “see”. To this end, they apply a series of “small performative forms

¹⁴ It is also a lecture that “reconstructs” an analysis and not an analysis itself. This has to be taken into account, but these data “satisfy” the requirements to be able to deduce the approach of the analysis activity.

of visualization”, which can be regarded as typical for video interpretations:


- use the video as a pointing tool (pause, enlarge, split screen)
- pointing with hand or pointer, speaking, gesticulating, posture, body, drawing on a video image
- development of a narrative, naming, typification of actors

The video image or also: the remote control of the “video recorder” itself, is used as a pointing instrument when, as becomes clearer below in the transcript, it is stopped exactly one moment before something happens or while something becomes visible. The very fine control of the display (forwards, backwards, faster, slower) by means of digital video technology allows Otto, synchronously and precisely coordinated with his or Joscha’s statements, to lead the image to a still image in which individual persons can be shown and identified. The video device is therefore not only used for re-playing the recording, but rather for isolating and highlighting moments, individual elements and is used deictically.

A short example should illustrate this. The presentation begins in the tenth minute of the presentation on the police assault. Since a short recording of the concrete *unjustified police violence against a peaceful demonstrator to be proven*, it is assumed to be already known to the spectators in the hall because the topic was already widely circulated in the corresponding political ‘scene’ in advance. The edited recordings here serve, on one hand, for the already discussed expansion of perspectives, on the other hand, the more exact reconstruction of the relevant events, directly before the act of violence. Otto has just explained how the data comes about and controls the video presentation from his notebook on the lectern in front of him. Joscha is currently at the edge of the action and watches. The video now shows several people (in this case only on one camera, top left of the picture; the rest is black, except for the timecode) running through the camera image. Otto already stops the video image after a few seconds when a person to be identified as a policeman steps into the middle of the image. With some additional remarks, he identifies a certain policeman, as an important offender, who is to be observed in the later course of the video. It is interesting to note that the visual instructions also refer to the non-verbal forms of communication (glances, turns and turns), which are later to be read as part of a command structure and as evidence for action planning.

Fragment D1; Timecode 9:25

01 O also hier sieht man, das ist
 02 wie gesagt die da abgeführt
 03 wird, hier im bild übrigens
 04 gut zu erkennen ist der
 05 ZUGFÜHRER der einzigste mit ner
 06 deutschlandflagge ähm auf dem
 07 revers das ist aber keine (.) wir
 08 haben uns da sachkundig gemacht
 09 (.) das ist offenbar keine (.) äh
 10 private veranstaltung dass der
 11 irgendwie seinen nationalstolz
 12 so ausdrücken muss sondern (der)
 13 war wenn ichs irgendwie richtig
 14 verstanden habe mal im kosovo
 15 oder irgendwas und darf das dann
 16 dienstlich tragen ähm ich würd
 17 euch trotzdem empfehlen [Zeigt
 18 auf Notebook-Bildschirm] den mann
 19 zu beobachten weil dem seine
 20 körperhaltung und insbesondere
 21 auch seine blickrichtung quasi
 22 gleichbedeutend mit stillen
 23 kommandos an seine beamten sind
 24 was man insbesondere bei der
 25 prügelszene sehr deutlich sieht
 26 dass also in dem moment wo er
 27 sein gesicht abwendet setzen die
 28 beamten auch äh hören sie mit dem
 29 prügeln auf und führen den mann
 30 ab



so here you can see, that is
 as said which is led away there,
 here in the picture by the way
 well to recognize the SQUAD-
 LEADER is the only one with a
 german flag er on the lapel
 that is not a (.) we have
 acquired expertise on that topic
 (.) that is obviously not a(.))
 uh private sign that somehow
 he has to express his national
 pride that way but (he was) if I
 understood it somehow correctly
 somewhen in kosovo or something
 and because of this he may
 wear it officially uhm I would
 recommend you anyway [points onto
 notebook-screen] to observe this
 man because his body posture
 and especially his direction of
 vision are quasi synonymous with
 silent commands to his officials
 what one sees especially in the
 beating scene very clearly that
 at the moment he turns his face
 away the officials also uh they
 stop beating and lead the man
 away

O=Otto / J=Joscha



By means of his communicative actions, Otto thus gives visual instructions in advance for the analysis, which are intended to permit the comprehension of a more complex event. The video is then played further and Joscha explains once again the synchronous cut and the relevance of the timecode. The video is continued until, according to Otto, it comes to a “not quite insignificant scene”. At this point Otto stops the video again and begins to explain the situation, whereupon Joscha steps in and points to individual actors within the video (fragment D2).

Fragment D2; Timecode 14:15

01 O bei dem unten links video sieht man at the bottom left video you can see
 02 jetzt, wie sie quasi so haben wir now, we have interpreted that this
 03 das interpretiert sich zu der (.) way how they conspire to (.) the
 04 im folgenden zu sehenden straftat criminal offence which is to be
 05 verabreden (-) ähm (-) wir haben ja seen in the following (-) um (-) we
 06 zwei=äh ja hauptbeamte die sozusagen have two=uhm yes main civil servants
 07 an dem beteiligt sind who are so to speak in involved



08 J (Ah) des des muss man zeigen, warte (Ah) that's what you gotta show, wait
 09 O mal a minute.
 10 J ja yes
 11 also Da ist jetzt sozusagen der (-) so there is now so to speak the one
 12 den wir immer (..) SCHLÄGER nennen(.) (-) that we always (..) call a STRIKER
 13 [Lachen und anschließend Klatschen] (..) [Laughing and then clapping in
 14 im Publikum] the audience]
 15 das ist auch der.. that's also the one..
 16 [Klatschen] [Clapping]
 17 das ist auch der (ls) Ne hört mal that's also the (ls) No stop it,
 18 auf, das ist ja nicht schön was dann that's not nice what happens then
 19 passiert
 20 [O startet das Video, kurz Geräusche [O starts the video, short sounds from
 21 aus diesem, ca 2s] this, about 2s]
 22 O halt doch mal an stop it please
 23 J mhm hmm
 24 das ist der der später (.) SCHLÄGT that's the one who later IS STRIKING
 25 und dann gibt es noch einen den wir (.) and then there's another one we
 26 REISSER nennen. der schläger ist aber call RIPPER. but the striker is also
 27 auch der den ihr gesehen habt, wie er the one you saw pushing the cyclist
 28 den fahrradfahrer nach vorne gestoßen forward, the striker is also the one
 29 hat, der schläger ist auch der der who pushed the cyclist forward in the
 30 den fahrradfahrer in der scene davor earlier sequence =or guided him in
 31 nach vorne geleitet=oder vor sich her front of him and then pushed gunit
 32 schiebt und dann nach vorne schiebt forward

This fragment shows that Joscha clarifies the observations by pointing into the video, using his body as a hinge to connect the video images thrown onto the wall with the typification of the actors (cf. also Knoblauch on showing, 2008). He first points to the canvas (fragment D1 line 8-9) and turns his gaze to the audience. The highlighting of a person is turned into irony by the exaggerated depiction of a policeman as a “thug”. It is acknowledged as understood by the audience with a clap and laughter. This reaction is to be understood as a communicative action of the audience - which shows that in this case, too, the presenters and the audience create something to-

gether and communicatively - namely the shared interpretation of the video sequence shown.

This passage in the video is of central importance, as the typification of individuals develops a narrative that is brought together from a series of attributions of roles, such as the perpetrator and the victim in a systematic description of the execution of the act of violence. The action cannot yet be seen, but the typifications in the picture are preparing the audience through the direction of the gaze. According to that, viewers pay attention to specific details and share the same interpretation relevance. Previously shown sequences are put into context by the speakers (lines 18-23) and thus interwoven into an interpretation as a planned crime (lines 3-4).

Not only the pure emphasis of individual actors plays a role, but in particular the physical displacement and comprehension of relevant movements in space. As already written above, it is difficult for the audience without prior knowledge to recognize anything on screen. Also, the description of the individual persons on the basis of verbal representations is problematic, due to their uniforms. However, distinctive body movements are easy to recognize, which can be used to identify the relevant ones. At the same time, the movements are related to the situation in which the video was recorded. This becomes particularly clear (in this case) in the relevant spatial organization during the event (in front; behind the policemen; areas that can be entered by demonstrators and those that are guarded by the police; etc.). It is very difficult for viewers to comprehend these aspects based on the moving cameras, without precise local knowledge. Joscha's "Re-Enactment" offers a solution to this problem (for the term see below). Joscha plays the reconstructed event in the space created on stage, taking on the role of the perpetrators, re-enacting typical movements of the policeman, such as pushing and escorting (underlined in lines 21 - 23) - and thereby manages, through his body orientation, to define the interpretation space and connect it with the actors.

This example shows that the reconstruction of past events by means of video is a physical communicative activity that requires a series of small performative methods for understanding and 'making comprehensible' the visual information here on stage, quite similar to what has already been discussed in the literature on the interpretation of data sessions as re-enactments (Tutt and Hindmarsh 2011; Meyer and Meier zu Verl 2013; Reichertz 2013). These methods are not limited to a mere replay of individual gestures, but are integrated into the communicative construction of evidence. It refers to the sequence that can be precisely located in time and space, which I have already referred to here as a narrative. The viewer is not simply shown the events to be seen, but events are made communicatively visible step by step: they are demonstrated.

So far, I have shown that this demonstration takes place, on one hand, through the identification and visualization of narrative-relevant actors and on the other, through their visualization using postures and gestures in space. This location in space is further developed in the lecture by Joscha and Otto. Joscha then explains his suspicions about the motive of the policemen, or rather: he suggests that on the basis of the prehistory of the event, namely the inquiring and writing down by the cyclist, there is a plausible motive of the policemen for their action against the cyclist, because this

cyclist had taken notes and asked for the service number, he was seen by the policemen - and this is here to a certain degree speculation - either as a troublemaker or a threat. This interpretation is then based on a reconstruction of the course of crime, in which the movements in space, pointing gestures and glances of the police officers at each other are interpreted as evidence of a planned action.

The arguments leading to this interpretation that had already begun before are finally taken up again. Thus Otto, after the two have discussed some other points and have advanced the video further up to the actual core event, shows an important detail at a very prominent place. The still image of the scene had already circulated as the concise key image on the internet and in media. Otto is less concerned here with the already familiar, but very clearly visible blows of the policeman in front of the picture, but rather with the fine gestures of the riot control units' leader, turning towards them and then looking away. Otto clearly emphasizes his actions and presents them as evidence for the previous thesis.

Fragment D4 „Vorbereitung der Aktion 2“; Timecode 20:04-20:45)

<p>01 J also ich will jetzt ganz kurz 02 auf die Sache mit unserem 03 zugführer nochmal eingehen 04 wie gesagt der mann mit der 05 deutschlandfahne (..) in diesem 06 video sieht man das ganz gut 07 (3s) na (1s) also ihr seht den 08 hier stehen in dem video unten 09 rechts (..) ihn hier genau und 10 man beachte sozusagen den ablauf 11 was die beamten mit dem da unten 12 machen und wie er sich dazu von 13 der körpersprache her verhält 14 (.) er kuckt also sehr deutlich 15 zu was übrigens in seiner 16 aussage nicht so deutlich äh 17 von ihm äh zu protokoll gegeben 18 wurde (husten) und in dem moment 19 wo er dann (1s) sich wegdreht 20 gehen auch die beamten mit 21 dem (2) mittlerweile am boden liegenden wieder nach oben</p>		<p>so i want to go into the matter with our squat leader very briefly again as said the man with the german flag ...) in this video you can see it quite good (3s) na (1s) so you see him standing here in the video down right (..) you can spot him exactly here and now please pay attention to this procedure how the civil servants do deal with him down there and how he behaves towards that with his body language (.) so he observes it very clearlyl, that is not clearly part of his statement that was protocolled (cough) and in the exact moment where he then (1s) turns away also the officials with the guy (2) now lying on the ground come up again</p>
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O=Otto / J=Joscha

This interpretation of the video is therefore not only about a pure typification of individual actions, but about detailed demonstration, intended to clarify a more complex argument, namely that the use of force against the cyclist, in this case, was not only a singular assault of an individual policeman, but the result of a coordinated agreement within the unit. In order to be able to put forward this argument, indications of a longer, embedded reconstruction of the event are systematically related to each other, then finally condensed into evidence by the finely coordinated emphasis of the police leader's body movement (which could be substantiated as a random one, without the embedding).

The interpretation of the video is thus an exemplary case for a common commu-

nically constructing trace-seeking and contextualizing evaluation. However, it is not subject to the strict requirements of evidence in a court case, since it was 'only' presented at a conference and can thus at most have an indirect effect or a mass media effect. This is a single case of an analysis carried out with great effort and availability of a great deal of video material, which goes beyond the limits of the activities of everyday video analysis in police units. In principle, however, the procedure is comparable, as it also ranges from a procurement, selection of videos, context description, the search for relevant, categorizable actions, the synopsis of different perspectives to the plausibilisation of the evidence of actions of concrete actors and underlying patterns (which can be understood as command structure here).

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The reconstruction of interpretive work with video data by police (or in my example the counter analysis taking up the practices) is an established practice within the framework of organization. The carrying out of such tasks typical for the field of policework. It consists of routine tasks of the police officers, who routinely cut out key events in the recordings for the communication of visual identification features or for documentation purposes, highlighting the course of criminal acts, by means of still images and hand over the video data in edited form to some clerks and finally to courts. This course of interrelated activities can also be described as work arc. As shown, communicative explanations are given at each 'transfer point' to make the data material speak and to make the analysis appear plausible. The video analyses are thus embedded in the work of the police via the organisational structure and the typical activities of the field.

The analysts develop a very special view of the video material, by restricting it to the existing recordings and at the same time allowing them to be viewed as often as they like, slowed down, etc. This view is expressed in their practical handling of video materials. Goodwin (1994) described this view with the concept of *Professional Vision*: An object of knowledge is created within the framework of specific activity¹⁵ in which professional actors involved relate a series of discursive practices to a visual field (domain of scrutiny). The establishment of this relation is, as the terms suggest, a practical-communicative activity. Typical discursive elements, such as coding schemes, emphasis or the use of material representations are central components of visual practices shared by professionals.

Police officers use special knowledge, typical of their profession, which is codified

¹⁵ The term activity describes the systematic, longer context of action typical for the respective field, in which discursive practices are integrated. The concept of activity, which is very similar to that of George Herbert Mead's "social act", plays a role above all within the framework of the theory of activity (cf. Engeström, Miettinen., and Punamäki 1999), which was developed on the basis of the Marxist cultural-historical psychology of Vygotsky and Leontiev (among others). Conceptually, the activity can be located between a situational course of action and a work sheet and also has similarities with the concept of work at Strauss.

in different categories of typical criminal acts and more precise definitions of them. The shared, standardised sign system and the resulting archive of individual observations serve to establish a joint observation project, by means of which a number of perpetrators are to be identified over a longer period of time and from which evidence can be quickly extracted.

However, this is only one part of the activity, because each individual case consists of the linking of a series of different individual proofs, to a comprehensible trace. The activity of assembling consists of the linking of existing objectifications of human action to a convincing and clearly communicable overall reconstruction of a course of action. This activity constitutes the search for traces. It is important to emphasise that this is not usually a solitary exercise, but that teams collect the various pieces of evidence and coordinate their activities, in line with the joint work project - the organised work arc. Using the example of counter-analyses, I have presented less about this organizational perspective, but rather the local, situational reconstruction of the event as a physically communicative activity of emphasizing, clarifying and embedding it in the context of precisely such a track, for which the concept of narration offers itself here (because a story is really being told). The reconstruction, in this field, the search for traces, thus takes place situatively, but the actors always refer in their organized activities to future steps and goals that are linked to the specific characteristics of the field.

CONCLUSION ON COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION

The special focus of this empirical case study relies not only on the empirical recording of the empirical phenomenon (i.e. the video work in police work), but also on the theoretical embedding of the research design in the study itself. The strength of communicative constructivism relies on placing the phenomena, that are often the focus of interest in studies of social situations, the individual courses of action and sequences, the bodies and objects and the practices, forms and communicative genres, that can be identified from them in a broader context. Through the processes of institutionalizing work activities (here the formation of work sheets), the establishment of new knowledge based on concrete actions and communicative work practices by self-establish experts, organizations are founded, and fields are established. Material objectifications also ensure durability but must be constantly reinterpreted. This view guides the study to enable more precise, processual understanding of the communicative processes of the communicative construction of reality. Thus, my study is not only designed to learn something about an esoteric special field of knowledge - the world of video analysts - but it is more comprehensively about an understanding of the communicative processes of interpreting audiovisual data in general. Showing and interpreting are - as I have explained - communicative actions, where interpretation is much more than purely cognitive process of individuals. Furthermore, my study is reflexive because it deals with the communicative interpretation of videos, i.e. what I have done myself for research purposes. A more precise, in a narrow sense, reflexive empirical investigation of social science methods, is still in its infancy, but my work on "Vernacular Video

Analyses” is a foil with which other sociological video analyses can be contrasted.

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**HISTORICAL POLITICS, MELTED CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION
ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST
INTERVIEW WITH JOLANTA AMBROSEWICZ-JACOBS**

Interview conducted by Anna Odrowąż-Coates

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(AOC): Dear Professor Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, you are an icon for education about the Holocaust in Poland, you are very well regarded abroad and well known for that reason. I will start with some simple questions to get our conversation going. First question:

Would you say that there are challenges in the preservation of memory about the Holocaust and challenges for the preservation of historic objectivity?

(JA-J): Yes, do you mean the determinants, the factors that may have an impact on objectivity? If so, this question can be approached from various angles. In my opinion not only someone who is researching empirically, memory of the Holocaust in Poland in context of course and in comparative perspective, but also in my opinion, the key persons to work with are the teachers, educators and non-governmental activists, the human resources so to say, who are the carriers of memory. It is not enough to produce historiography only, books, but also it is very important to disseminate research and have impartial academic dialogue and as we know, my colleagues from the Polish Centre for Holocaust Research at the Polish Academy of Warsaw are under a major attack right now for their very credible and valid research. The main factors are social actors involved in carrying on the memory of the Holocaust and knowledge of the Holocaust. I am speaking on the basis of my 14-year experience of organizing Summer Insti-

tutes teaching about the Holocaust for Polish and also Ukrainian educators. Teachers from Moscow and Azerbaijan also attended the institute twice. We now work only with graduates, because of the demand among our graduates to have more opportunities to develop not only knowledge, but skills and competences. The key factor, especially when we think about the accuracy of transmitting knowledge and carrying knowledge, the key factors are people, educators who care. Very often they do it from the need of their heart and they are not supported by educational systems. Often, not always, but often, they are not supported by the administration of the schools, parents, and governmental agencies. Therefore, educators need support, they need very clear message that the work that they are doing is important for future generations. The second factor is the quality of the research and this is very important because it is currently challenged in Poland and is being manipulated by historical politics.

Even the facts, if they are present in a textbook for example, facts related to the historiography of the Holocaust, they can be presented in a certain context that is very misleading for students. Therefore, accuracy is essential. The third is the interconnection of various social actors in school systems, civil society and self-government. Often, they work in isolation. Public schools seldom cooperate with local governments, ministries or units responsible for memorial sites. There is not enough connection between users of memorial sites, schools and non-governmental organizations. So this is an obstacle to carry the memory of the Holocaust. Because, if those social actors work in isolation, then obviously they are weaker. Of course, I'm expressing a very general opinion, because there are exceptions and the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum is certainly one example, or the State Museum at Majdanek. Just to mention two of them, two of the former concentration and death camps in Poland. These two are connected with schools and non-governmental organizations, but in Poland we have many more memorial sites and there is definitely not enough cooperation and mutual support. Those are major determinants, factors, which are crucial for historiographical accuracy and carrying memory of the Holocaust.

(AOC): Are you familiar with the term 'public history'?

(JA-J): Public history – yes.

(AOC): So, you think that perhaps because the new generation did not have direct contact with the events of WW2, public history may be a means or the way to carry the memory of what happened during the Holocaust.

(JA-J): Yes, but also it has its limitations. The limitations depend on how the media represent the history. They can represent the history in public spaces in very distorted ways. This is what we experience currently in Poland and in other countries. There is an issue in the Baltic states for example, in Ukraine and in Hungary as well. Therefore,

Poland is not an isolated case amongst countries of Central and Eastern Europe. What has been happening right now, I would call it major distortions of history in public space. Public history is also connected to post-memory. This is a term used by Marianne Hirsch, which I think is worth mentioning, because this is the memory of events that we do not have direct contact with, which is transmitted through family and historical narratives, also transmitted through textbooks and what teachers have to say in a class. It has really affected the debate and so many other various factors. Distortions to memory are the biggest dangers. Conflicts of memory as well. The public space has many conflicts of memory, which are not perceived as such; as conflicts. They are perceived as narratives that are right or wrong and that clash with one another.

(AOC): If you were to reflect on who stands behind this kind of unsettling distortions and conflicts, would you be able to identify any kind of social force or a lobby?

(JA-J): I think politicians, mainly politicians, because they instrumentalise public opinion. Trying to gain votes in a very cynical way. I would say this is a very soft and easy ground to be manipulated in Poland, because of the past and the conflicts that occurred in the past, directly related to the memory of the Holocaust. Poland as it turned out, did not work this through. I am using a Freudian term, which was adapted by Dominick LaCapra. Poland didn't work through the very difficult facts, related to the past, related to the Holocaust, namely the involvement of some individuals and groups in collaborations. New historiography revealing these facts causes very uncomfortable feelings, because we do not know how our great grandparents or other ancestors might have behaved. Questions were never asked of our ancestors when they lived, because there is fear and I think everybody has this fear. Therefore, even if we do remember the family narratives, sometimes they are also distorted because it was too difficult to admit fear. For example, to admit fear of helping Jews. Our ancestors also witnessed some very cruel behaviour of some of our neighbours or some partisans and even the rescuers. These facts are very well documented actually and also young historians, young PhD students work on these issues. Their methodology is correct and despite this very good methodology, the facts that they discovered are denied. Because their research cause conflicts and many people are afraid in general of conflicts revealed by new historiography, between official narratives of being a nation of martyrs, rescuers and heroes contradicted by new discoveries of microhistory. They do not know how to deal with emerging conflicts of memory of the Holocaust and only a few people are prepared to admit that yes – someone in my family was a *shmaltsownik* (SZMALCOWNIK), not a rescuer, but someone who denounced Jews. It is very seldom that someone is able to admit to this. However, there are few examples, very rare ones and I think that our society does not want to think about this. Another problem is rejecting; rejecting reflection and dealing with the past of the Holocaust. So many people think that it is too much. Too much talking about the genocide of Jews and we also experience secondary antisemitism, being tired of thinking, speaking

and reading about the Holocaust. Coming back to your first question, I think that we need to work on several levels to counteract these conflicts or even to fight the wars of memories. This has to be done first as individuals, then at a group level, national level and intergovernmental level. There should be cooperation or even connection between those levels. I do not see these connections actually. Often what is apparent at an intergovernmental level, is not reflected at the national level. What I mean is, the commitment of Poland and another states of Central-Eastern Europe, political commitments to support research, education and commemoration of the Holocaust, that were expressed in the Stockholm Declaration in 2000. Poland is the member country of the political organization IHRA - The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance since 1999. But the political commitments resulting from the membership in the IHRA are not transmitted to the national level, through ministry of education. There is not enough state support for education about the Holocaust. On the contrary, teachers are afraid to teach about the collaboration of individual Poles and groups (for examples partisans) in the Holocaust, because they may be denounced, they can have problems. Therefore, the whole picture is very complicated.

(AOC): Do you think that there is some mediating factor in the fact that the Jewish population of Poland were actually Polish citizens? So, for example, regarding statistics about mass murders and ghettoization, they refer to both the Polish citizens and the Polish citizens of Jewish faith at the same time? It strikes some people as a bit strange that we make this distinction all the time, of course a distinction made by Hitler, who based his campaign on the extermination of minorities, but Jews were still people of Poland, they had Polish citizenship, they lived and worked in Poland, they had rights guaranteed by the constitution etc.

(JA-J): Absolutely, but this view is not incorporated. This is the whole problem. The Holocaust, even if it is taught in schools and is mandated, it still depends on teachers, how much they want to teach about it. How much they talk about these historical facts, whether they silence it or use interesting projects in their teaching to discuss it. Therefore, the quality of Holocaust education is up to teachers. Even when it is taught, it is not taught in a proper way, that the suffering of Polish Jews was the suffering of Polish citizens. And not all non-Jewish Polish citizens were condemned to death. There are many exceptions, but the dominant view is that 'this is something that happened to 'Them' not to 'Us'. The Holocaust has happened to Jews and the concept of citizenship in this view is dismantled and disappears. Poles in general have a problem with the concept of citizenship. They think in national or ethnic terms, through an individual level to group mentality. So, the concept is that this is something that happened to 'Them'. We Poles, we have different historical narrative about what happened to 'Us' during WW2. Therefore, the Holocaust is not really a part of the history of our country - Poland. And this is a paradox, because it is in the history of Poland, but it is not viewed and not represented as such.

Thinking about resources, I think it is down to the school system and very early education, as there is a growing tendency, a growing trend to speak about us as a national group and about minorities as 'Them'. These divisions create a very exclusive vision of history which has impact on historical consciousness and collective memory of the Holocaust. It is still something that happened to 'Them' not to our co-citizens.

(AOC): Thank you for sharing your insightful knowledge and experience with our readers.

(JA-J): My pleasure, these were very good questions.

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ZIÓŁKOWSKA, BEATA AND JOWITA WYCISK. 2019. *SELF-DESTRUCTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH [AUTODESTRUKTYWNOŚĆ DZIECI I MŁODZIEŻY]*. WARSZAWA: DIFIN, ISBN: 978-83-8085-783-4, 300 PP. (PAPERBACK)

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Anyone who works with the youth knows that the period of adolescence is a specific life-phase for young students. “Socio- cultural changes, changing family patterns, too many incentives and the social pressure in many areas of human’s life” (p. 252) can cause problems, and teenagers often don’t deal appropriately with their feelings, emotions, and expressions. Also during this time, we have come to expect different and often rebellious, as well as undesirable behaviour from the young boys and girls. Every teacher, educator or someone who takes care of such young people, is inclined to support them effectively and when the functional disorders start to appear, they want to react positively towards them and work together to solve their problems. For those people, I would highly recommend the book “Self-destruction children and youth” written by Beata Ziółkowska and Jowita Wycisk.

The theme of this book is an issue that has been always really important for educationists, academics, mental health practitioners, and for society at large. Teenagers often display behavioural patterns that are closely related to self-destructive tendencies, especially during puberty. In spite of the fact that most of these attitudes have developmental meaning and have different purposes – gratification of psychological functions, reduction of anxiety facing challenges or problems – may have negative health consequences and effects on somatic development (p. 11). Additionally, something that may have minimized the source of stress, according to young people, appears to be the cause of their limitations, enslaving and addiction.

Ziółkowska i Wycisk concentrate on four phenomena in their book: eating disorders, self-mutilation, excessive alcohol and energy drink abuse, and drug addiction.

This dissertation includes six chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to the topic of a youth in the modern world. Authors focus on answering the question ‘what is the process of growing up’, and thereby analyse opportunities and risks among young peo-

ple. They write about teenagers' needs and developmental tasks. In the first chapter we can read how young people view themselves and their *bodies*. Writers also present problems of crisis amongst the youth: its essence and process. Readers are able to become familiar with the mechanism of identity-formation. Identity statuses, their consequences and the relevance of support systems are discussed in detail in this part of the book. Identity development in the context of family, peer group and culture is also outlined herein. Readers are familiarised with a detailed concept of connection between self-destruction, problematic behaviour and adolescence crisis. Problems of contemporary youth are also presented in the research: in the physiology of nervous system, self-esteem – assessing the body, young people and media and teenagers' mental health.

The second chapter deals with eating and malnutrition: detailed explanations, classification, diagnosis, disseminating, and a description of the treatment allows the readers to explore and understand adolescent eating disorders. Some conditions and mechanisms of the disorder are discussed through bio physiological and social factors, *cognitive recognition* skills and cultural aspects. The second chapter ends with the Polish and foreign reports on the subject. Authors indicate the importance of a balanced diet during a period of intense growth and somatic development. They emphasize the sensitivity of the sphere of eating where problems with functioning of the body, mental and social status can be seen. Threats, which may have, negative effects on perception of people, reality, especially in a virtual world and media are also articulated.

The third chapter is dedicated to the formation of tendencies connected with self-harming and the psychobiological characteristics of individuals who undertake such steps. This part takes into account "emotionality, cognitive processes, mental defences, ways of dealing with stress, an image of *self*, functioning of interpersonal relationships and neurophysiological reactions." (p. 147) The chapter begins with the terminology used in these cases, classifications, diagnosis and the popularity of self-harming behaviour. The process of disseminating these was based on a survey carried out in a number of countries. This research is a source of important information, which should be treated selectively. First, we ought to analyse the situation of a person, keeping in mind their life-story and individual psychological construction.

In the fourth part alcohol abuse is presented in detail. This problem is very significant, and I agree with the authors that alcohol abuse by adolescents is a risky behaviour, "...this substance does not have negative associations in the society". (p. 185) At the beginning readers are familiarised with the terminology and research on the use and abuse of alcohol and energy drinks. Then the diagnosis and different drinking patterns are presented. Authors describe circumstances and mechanism of using alcohol. Moreover, they characterize how people with such problems function in society. In my opinion a crucial part is the description of treating and psychotherapy for people who have alcohol abuse disorders along with their families. At the end of this chapter some research reports about the abuse of alcohol carried out between 2001 and 2008 are summarised.

The fifth chapter deals with problematic use of psychoactive substances. There has been a steady increase in supply of synthetic psychotropic drugs in the market which

have vague source-compositions, and are not known widely – as a result, medics and first responders often cannot apply correct rescue/resuscitation procedures after an accident or overdose. Therefore, preventive treatment is truly important. This chapter might be useful especially for practitioners in the area of education and caregiving – teachers, educators, psychologists, parents and many more people. Like the other parts of the book, the fifth chapter begins with the terminology and detailed description of some narcotic drugs and their usages. We can also read about the alarming results of research on the coverage of using such drugs and enhancers by teenagers and information about new psychoactive substances. The authors describe conditions, the mechanism and the stages of drug addiction.

Furthermore, the consequences of using such substances in the area of mental, social and somatic symptoms are presented. In the part devoted to treatment and psychotherapy, readers can get to know about the new models of working with people suffering from addiction and substance abuse problems. The need for individual therapy is highlighted. This chapter ends with studies into psychoactive substances, where different attitudes to the problem, areas and research done in many countries are introduced and discussed.

The last part of the book is entitled “The prevention of destructive behaviour” (p. 227). In my point of view this chapter is important and useful for the prevention of inadequate and risky behaviour among the youth. Schools can use many proposals, rules and solutions offered by practitioners, writers and other establishments, taking into account their specificity. Different ways to counteract and deal with self-destructive behaviours have been discussed based on foreign literature, mostly from the USA. The authors argue that the methods applied in other educational institutions may be an inspiration and a source of knowledge to develop action in specialist teams at our facilities. This chapter contains some elements of preventative system within the institution and on inter-institutional basis. The role of adult guardians of children, teachers, and other school staff, and the role of an emergency contact is also described in details. In this chapter we can find guidelines for procedures at school: beginning with monitoring the warning signals and ending with the intervention; how employees find out about the problem; how to talk to a teenager – basic principles of communication; intervention outside of school groups; cooperation with parents or legal guardians. Procedural issues are discussed based on the discourse developed by B. Walsh. This procedure tends to take notice of teacher-student relations, attitudes towards a teenager who has self-destructive behaviours and emphasises personal approach of an adult guardian. This book is a collection providing useful information about self-destructive behaviours. It helps to organize and enrich our knowledge through reading and interpreting test results and referring to relevant literature. This book is written in a language that is fluid, accessible and reader-friendly. The opinions of experts included in this edition where they share their expertise, experiences, and clinical practice are of crucial significance. In this book, every reader will find schematics and models showing mechanisms, system and structures, which may help understand dependency and relationships. The statistical information referenced in this book is often depicted in tables, so the data discussed is transparent and well organized. At the end of the

book supporting materials are included: the procedures how to deal with self-destructive behaviours, tests for guardians of young individuals who take risky actions, tips for legal guardians about warning signals connected with self-mutilation, along with drug and alcohol abuse. There is also a test AUDIT - Recognizing Alcohol Problems and a test devoted to the diagnosis of addiction for families. These research tools may be used in diagnostic work.

Overall, in this book, the authors succeeded in presenting the phenomenon of self-destruction from multiple perspectives: psychological, sociological, medical and neuropsychological. However, most important of all – the presented information and facts are organized both in practical and theoretical terms. As a teacher I highly recommend this book to all representatives of learning environments, students of pedagogy and people who participate in the process of raising young people. Teenagers' parents should also read this publication. As a PhD student- I recommend this text to theorists and researchers in the fields of social sciences and health science.

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