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EDITED BY MAREK NOWAK

CONTENTS

SOCIETY REGISTER 2020 / 4(4): 7-48
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THE 'RIGHT TO THE CITY' ON VARIOUS SCALES

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ABSTRACT: The introduction to this volume pursues two aims. On the one hand, it refers to the problem of distinguishing between 'right to the city' initiatives and 'urban city movements' as phenomena embedded in different structural moments of society. On the other hand, it attempts to propose a supplement to the discussion about the aforementioned phenomena. This supplement addresses the need to take into account different scales by which the phenomena of self-organisation in the city are analysed. The article offers an example of such analysis referring to the Central European and the Polish perspectives, treating the two stories as separate to a certain extent. As it turns out, each of them offers a slightly different reasoning and different contexts for understanding the evolution of phenomena as well as separate decisive factors shaping the empowerment processes. The reader finds here references to research analysis in sociology, urban and economic history, supplementing the existing knowledge. The proposed interpretation is intended to lead to a discussion on the need to comprehend local and regional specifics in universalising studies.
KEYWORDS: self-organisation, Central Europe experience, Polish self-organisation, urban city movements in Poland

INTRODUCTION

This volume of the *Society Register* contains a meta-theoretical reflection as an introduction, supplemented by a sketch of the historical analysis, as well as five texts on

social self-organization in the cities. These articles are as follows: Barbara Lewenstein "Urban movements in the process of the legitimation of liberal democracy: analysis of the activities of alternative groups and civil organizations at a time of European crisis"; Fabio Corbisiero and Salvatore Monaco "The right to a rainbow city: the Italian gay social movements"; Paweł Kubicki "Inventing urbanity: urban movements in Poland"; Przemysław Pluciński "'Meeting of waters?' reconstructing the landscape of the polish right to the city activism." Finally, the last text in this volume is an attempt to expand the field of reflection on the subject of the 'right to the city' in a practical way by including discursive and spatial topics to the analysis: Renata Putkowska-Smoter and Jan Frankowski, "Right to the map? Counter-mapping practices of smog alerts and urban greenery movements in Poland."

The introduction is divided into two parts: a preface containing a reference to the existing state of knowledge brought together around two problematic domains of 'urban social movements' and 'right to the city,' and a specific analysis inspired by the dissimilarity of the scales used in the descriptions of two phenomena converging with each other.

The key to the concept of the volume was to identify the premises of the distinction between 'urban social movements' and 'right to the city' and to analyse its sources not only on theoretical basis but with reference to historical analysis. This idea served the proposal to open a discussion that is more responsive to regional and 'local' conditions of individual societies. The presentation of the problem results from the empirical observation on the coexistence of at least three scales of analysis in scientific discourse that draw the reader's interest to slightly different stories, depending on the author's position and the scale to which they refer. The essence of the distinction here is partly the spatial context (the introduction will be often referring to Central Europe) however, to a greater extent it is a record of the understanding of the historical process rooted in space, allowing for conclusions about certain phenomena from the point of view of their causes and social consequences. This interpretation performs a paraphrase of 'scales' by referring to research in the field of social geography. (Marston 2000) In the meaning presented in this paper, a scale can be both size, specific level, and relation. A scale is primarily "a device by which to measure biophysical and social phenomena. Traditionally two scales are discerned: spatial and temporal." (Padt & Arts 2014) Following this definition, a similar strategy will be proved when it is possible in research practice to reach or measure modalities and establish that, in relation to individual areas (considered in the geographical and historical sense), people actually tell slightly different stories. The answer to the question 'why' (they would do it), apart from a cognitive reflection *par excellence*, includes also the aspect of self-knowledge and thus the postulate of expanding one's scientific worldview with perspectives that elude universalizing or 'meliorative' theoretical approach.

The so-called 'urban social movements' and 'right to the city' initiatives are becoming an increasingly important subject for researchers representing various disciplines: sociologists, social geographers, urban planners. Existing analysis suggest the universal character of both phenomena, although the authors often point out their local focus that suggests some sort of 'glocal' specificity. Levi-Strauss, and eventually

Ernesto Laclau, propose categories of 'empty signifier' or 'floating signifier,' that can mean different things to different people. There is no doubt that in Europe, particularly in the southern and eastern part of the continent, both of them have become one of the key flagship-actors of social change (Jacobsson 2016; Pixova 2018; Jezierska & Polańska 2018; Domaradzka 2018; Dolenec, Doolan, & Tmmasevic 2017). As this volume discusses common elements and relations between different forms and subjects of urban self-organization, it is set out around a wide range of conceptualizations (for further references, see the volume of *Voluntas* from March 2018).

The main distinction between 'urban social movements' and 'right to a city' initiatives is sometimes perceived as artificial (Domaradzka 2018; Pluciński 2018) in the context of theoretical literary studies. Nevertheless, in the theoretical perspective proposed by the editor of the volume, it reflects the division that is 'real' (it concerns the ontology of social life). It can be seen in the conditions of Central and Eastern Europe, being the ones that are more familiar for the authors of the present volume. The evolution of Manuel Castells' position from his works *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach* and *The City and the Grassroots 1983* constitute an inspiration to emphasize the division into 'urban social movements' and 'right to the city' initiatives. It has also been inspired by Mark Purcell's view of rights to the city when he undertakes a description of Lefebvre's opinion on the subject (Purcell 2013), as well as Margit Mayer's position in the article *The 'Right to the City' in the context of shifting mottos of urban social movements.* (Mayer 2009) The latter (referring to Castells' opinion as well) does not however see a fundamental difference at the level of operationalisation of the concept of urban activism; it points more to a historical transition that took place in the second half of the 1970s, which is related to the evolution of capitalism:

> as not only articulating the structural contradictions of late-capitalist societies but also as capable of bringing about, together with labour unions and political parties, fundamental change in politics and society. (Mayer 2009: 364)

The change that takes place a decade later is associated with progressive domination of neoliberalism (against the earlier dominance of Keynesian-welfarists) and the return of classical issues of class conflict. As she says:

> this neo-liberalisation of policies brought the so-called 'old' social issues back on to the agenda of urban movements: increasing unemployment and poverty, a 'new' housing need, riots in housing estates and new waves of squattings changed the make-up of the urban movements, while local governments—confronted with intensifying fiscal constraints while expenditures were growing—became interested in innovative ways to solve their problems. (Mayer 2009: 364)

The result of this reconfiguration is a change of the recipient of the protest and a change of strategies used by city movements 'from opposition to cooperation.' In a way, the essence of this transformation is the recognition of the subsidiarity principle, which is accompanied by a more or less universal tendency towards decentralization, also described as a 'subsidiarity policy' (Kazepov 2008). According to Mayer, a similar situation, or more precisely the ambiguity of the change:

> created a bifurcation between the more and more professionalized development and service delivery organizations on the one hand and groups, whose needs were not addressed by these arrangements and who in turn radicalized. (Mayer 2009: 364)

This process, due to political and social conditions, showed a tendency to different dynamics in various areas of Europe but as a result, the destiny of urban activism follows at least two paths. The first one leads towards contesting the changes introduced by deregulation; the other towards institutionalization and claims of having an influence on the whole process. Both refer to the strategy of the so-called new social movements, focusing not only on living issues or issues of collective consumption, but reaching spheres of self-realization and subjectivity in a cultural or universal meaning (such as ecological movements, fight against climate change or fight for the empowerment of sexual minorities, etc.). The strategies aiming the realisation of the objectives and the radicalism of the claims were, of course, definitely divergent for different environments included in this division, which resulted in disparate diagnoses and forecasts regarding the significance and evolution of the phenomenon. According to the author of the text, the above-mentioned rupture (as we mentioned before: the division into 'urban social movements' and 'right to a city' initiatives) is not only related to the recent history of the evolution of urban regimes towards professionalization and deregulation but has deeper historical sources. The aforementioned question 'why' is therefore crucial here.

The indicated axis of differentiation or tension is illustrated in this volume by a statement made by two Polish sociologists: Przemysław Pluciński and Paweł Kubicki. They were the direct inspiration for the proposed conceptualization. What is also important is the fact that the sources of this distinction are satisfactorily described by the researchers, although they tend to go in cognitively opposite directions. The proposed introduction is a form of supplement and thus filling in the research gap, which means proposing a broader integration ground for both positions. This idea goes beyond the interpretation of empirical conclusions. A researcher of the phenomenon of social self-organization has a sense (to which they succumb to or not) of the need to abstract from the accumulated state of knowledge about a specific phenomenon – on the scale of 'local' or 'regional' knowledge, which is often of fundamental importance for understanding the dynamics of a specific social process in a specific city. To avoid this discomfort and its cognitive consequences, the description of 'Right to the city movements' or 'Urban social city movements' should be: (a) multi-scaled (referring to the classical, 'universal' literature on social dynamics in the city but at the same time detached from it), (b) systemic (taking interdependencies into account) and, in a certain scope, (c) asynchronous (perceiving the internal 'historiosophical' dynamics of long-lasting processes). In the practice of constructing a scientific statement and constructing generalizations, this means establishing a distinction between scales of analysis. According to one of them, we analyse European phenomena as a basis for grasping the dynamics of a more or less universal process. One can find a perfect example of this attitude in Barbara Lewenstein's text from this volume: "Urban move-

ments in the process of the legitimation of liberal democracy: analysis of the activities of alternative groups and civil organizations at a time of European crisis" which, being part of a wider European research project, places Polish experiences directly in the context of the consequences of the 2008-09 crisis and the crisis of democracy in Europe. (Lewenstein 2020) The second example is presented in the text by Fabio Corbisiero and Salvatore Monaco: "The right to a rainbow city: the Italian gay social movements" describing the evolution of the LGBT movement in Italy, compared to the processes that took place on a European scale. Accordingly to those articles, we have to analyse regional specificities on a different scale. Thus, in relation to Central and Southern Europe, we need to include references to the history of regions, the tradition of self-government or departure from authoritarian ruling over the last 50 years (Sava & Pleyers 2016), as well as any other consequences of the systemic transformation from socialism to capitalism. Consequently, this attitude concerns a specifically defined area in the context of specific political events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of Yugoslavia. The last scale is defined in relation to e.g. specific 'local' experiences; here we can find Polish narratives like the phenomenon of the Solidarity social movement. (Staniszkis 1984; Kubow 2013) In this volume, the study by Paweł Kubicki: "Inventing urbanity: urban movements in Poland" is a perfect example of a text constructed around this scale; it describes the process of the birth of urban movements in Poland over the last ten years or more, with reference to empirical data. (Kubicki 2020) Interestingly, the phenomena and processes from different scales clearly interact with each other, which is probably the most visible while noticing tendencies towards the Europeanization of scientific discourse, which directly affects public policies. It also allows for the phenomena occurring at the local level to be presented on a larger scale, as an expression of universal tendencies. An example of such approach is presented in the article by Przemysław Pluciński – available in this volume – which presents a different interpretation than Paweł Kubicki's study, concentrating on the sources of 'a right to the city' in Poland based on radical contexts.

Comparative references to the sociology of individual societies on a historical and systemic background were not often used in social self-organization analysis. A certain increase in interest in this problem *en bloc* occurred in the 1970s to 1990s due to the sociology of world-systems created by Immanuel Walerstein and his team; this problem was also present in the previous interpretations of the Fernand Braudel's school (Braudel 1970) and, for example, in Polish economic historians' works from the 1950s. (Bogucka 1981) Later, we can find this phenomenon in *border studies* – contemporary European borders and identity analysis.[1] In the further part of the introduction, we attempt to describe the 'right to the city' on various scales, as well as to ask the question about differences concerning the Central European experience.

[1] There are two axes that define Europe's identity: the north-south axis and the east-west axis. The east-west axis is not referred to as the central axis, although both the south and the east are treated as a kind of periphery. (cf. Eder 2006; Brzechczyn 2020: 41-56) Therefore, the interpretative perspective relates more to social geography than to historical sociology.

THE 'RIGHT TO THE CITY' ON VARIOUS SCALES. A QUESTION ABOUT THE DIVERGENCE OF THE POLISH EXPERIENCE

The issues of description scales and the interpretative consequences resulting from the use of specific research tools can be best analysed by referring to particular phenomena and propositions of a certain narrative. In this case, we propose to focus on the problem of factors influencing the dynamics of class-profiled social self-organisation, the latter being treated synonymously with the concept of 'right to the city.' Firstly, we refer to the universalizing European scale with reference to the 'meeting of the waters' metaphor. Then, we point out selected historical foundations for differentiating the 'right to the city' on the Central-European scale, in order to complete our analysis with the *longue durée* perspectives – on the scale of a specific society (referring here to Polish experiences).

The starting point for this last part will be to indicate the genetic context of self-organisation in the territories of the First Republic of Poland, in the form of four generalisations having the analytical status of research hypotheses. They are as follows: (1) the hypothesis of late articulation of individual liberal rights; (2) the hypothesis of aversion to cities, inscribed in the elite's ways of thinking; (3) the hypothesis of the ambiguous social status of the bourgeoisie; (4) the hypothesis of the dialectical weakness of the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the common people.

The last 120 years will be subject to a separate reflection. This period is most often analysed in the context of the evolution of the 'right to the city.' In this paper, based on different analysis, we identify five factors that make the Polish experiences of class self-organization different, according to the editor of the volume:

(i) the first factor: **a 'shadow' of the national issue**, referring directly to the specificity of the nation-building process (as a consequence of the collapse of the states of the region, subordinated to the regional hegemonies, Wandycz 1993) that took place in this part of Europe. It reflected in the case of Poland deeper conditions related to the model of power shaped under the influence of the republican ethos of the 'republic of the noble' from the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This influenced the social status of the common people, resulting directly from political decisions maintaining the so-called secondary serfdom of the peasants up to the 19th century, as well as the weakness of people's rebellions in the lands of the First Republic of Poland which, in turn, directly impacted on the dynamics of urban development;

(ii) the second factor: **the curse of starting over**, concerning the consequences of very profound population changes that took place in Central Europe over the 20th century. In this particular variant of Polish destiny analysed here it meant, for example, an almost complete exchange of urban populations, population losses in the context of the extermination and warfare victims in the World War II and also substantial waves of resettlements that followed the post-war political decisions;

(iii) the third factor: **the progressive republicanism of 'Solidarity'** shows that the specificity of the impact of individual historical phenomena, such as the emergence of a mass social movement that imposes narratives and dominates public discourse, can change the course of history. This very rare occurrence has become an axiological and 'instrumental' point of reference for later phenomena of self-organization, shaping the ways of thinking about activism, its meaning and the framework for undertaken activities;

(iv) the fourth factor: **the radical anarchist alternative without capitalism** illustrates another phenomenon no longer on the scale of the state community but on the scale of specific cities like the Tri-City (Trójmiasto) where, under the real socialism terms, a utopian vision of radical urban democracy was being built since 1983. This concept, later incorporated into the anarchist and neo-anarchist perspective, became the basis for generating a tradition that, several decades later, became a counterpoint to the Congress of Urban Movements in Poland;

(v) the fifth factor: **the meliorative trend of 'concrete narrative'** indicates the limitations inherent in the concepts of local self-organization and the broadening interpretation of the 'right to the city' in the conditions of the umbrella structures of urban movements. The broad formula, combining very different positions and ideological tones, requires the use of a set of silent assumptions that allow the implementation of a certain range of obvious goals (most often inspired by experiences from outside the home towns) but at the same time are not able to propose a coherent, original overlook that would serve the 'universalisation' of social movement and would allow it a certain range of autonomous expression.

Analysing the factors differentiating the specificity of the 'right to the city' drawn from the scientific discourse in relation to the Polish experience, one comes to the conclusion that the way of perceiving social self-organization is the result of a cumulative process. A process that can be described as a continuity, even if there are clear turning points and strong interactions between successive historical 'contingencies' imposed in it. Moreover, this image fits in a way into a cause-and-effect pattern, parallel to the dominant approaches. A template that, without the initial elements of specific 'remnants' (such as the motive of state sovereignty or aversion to cities) and their 'derivatives,' cannot be entirely clear. To some extent, this indicates the autonomy of reflection on the local scale which probably does not facilitate its integration with knowledge frames from other scales: regional and universal European.

MEETING OF THE WATERS – EUROPEAN SCALE

It would seem that the most primary research concept, historically conceptualizing urban activism, is the 'right to the city.' (Engels 1969; Lefebvre 1996; Harvey 2008; Pluciński 2012) It is related to the concept that can be anchored in the articulation of the class social movement and the emancipating social movement in the cities under

capitalism, mainly amongst the working class, that used urban space as field or sometimes subject of their activity. In other words, in reference to Lefebvre's position: "its goal was to search for and extract the suppressed potentiality of the city, following the tradition of intellectual and practical resistance to instrumentalised capitalist relations." (Pluciński 2012: 104) This attitude allows finding basic connections between the meaning of 'right to the city' and the concept of 'social self-organization' oriented, however, at specific class positions. At the same time, the aforementioned class movement seems to legitimately refer not only to workers but more broadly to the perspective of 'people's interests' (more precisely: the articulated claim of the people to participate in the management of the urban community). The reference to the 'people' allows the cognitive perspective to be broadened to include other class positions and, in a way, modernises the historical approach known from Frederick Engels' works. Wiktor Marzec, describing the process of social emancipation and self-organization at the turn of the 20th century in Central Europe, starts his reflection by presenting the specificity of the pre-political reality of the masses that

> did have historical subjectivity also when they simply aroused fear. At that time, the process of political communication that would change both sides had not yet been started. Domination was ensured by excluding the 'mob' from outside the political community of thinking people. The plebeians were deprived of the legitimacy based on the elementary equality of human beings. A plebeian claim could not be articulated as a political voice, a discourse attesting to being spoken by thinking people. In the eyes of the mighty, it was not a political voice, but a noise, an animal sound of misfortune and sufferance, but not a discursive expression of thought. (Marzec 2016: 16)

Thus, 'the interests of the common people' gained an understandable meaning only as a consequence of the social process. This was primarily done by means of 'communication by action,' (Nowak 2015) understood as a form of emotional reaction (rebellion) to specific economic, political or environmental contingencies which, as a result, changed all sides of the social conflict. Such an approach indicates the action-oriented, radical and often extra-linguistic nature of articulating the plebeian 'right to the city.' Margit Mayer, referring to the contemporary perspective, prescinds from the form of protest (whether it is a presence, a voice or an action in space) and points out the significance of "moral claim founded on fundamental principles of justice, of ethics, of virtue, of the good — not as a legal claim enforceable through a judicial process today." (Mayer 2009: 367) Referring to Lefebvre, ">the right to the city< is less a juridical right, but rather an oppositional demand, which challenges the claims of the rich and powerful." (Mayer 2009: 367) Lefebvre plays an important role here, offering a different approach in comparison to the economic vision of the city attributed to Castells in his publication from the early 1970s. Let us add that, as Mark Purcell suggests:

> Lefebvre does not see the right to the city as an incremental addition to existing liberal-democratic rights. He sees it as an essential element of a wider political struggle for revolution. (Purcell 2013: 142)

Importantly, in the adopted understanding, the "right to the city" includes not only a potential for class resistance – and therefore for assumptions proper to Marxist-Engels orthodoxy (Purcell 2013: 145), but also an opportunity for grassroots self-organisation, the sources of which lie in the understanding of justice and not necessarily only in a redistributive way. This way of thinking about the right to the city is well commented by Mayer in the reference to the 2008 crisis, treated as:

> the window of opportunity for the Lefebvrian right to the city demand, which is not about inclusion in a structurally unequal and exploitative system, but about democratizing cities and their decision-making processes. (Mayer 2009: 371)

Thus, it is a chance to complete formal recognition of marginalised groups with real self-organization and co-decision, contesting the existing regime founded on the economic domination of the holders. Therefore, the right to the city remains under a certain tension both in relation to classical Marxism (with its focus on the economy and the universal class context)[2] and with regard to the merely formal and functional recognition of individual rights as well as the equality of individuals, which is usually attributed to the philosophical sources of the Enlightenment and furthermore the legal norms of modernity or directly to liberal ideology. The shape of this ideology is perfectly internalised by the middle segments of the modern societies structure, the interests of which, at least on the doctrine level, this ideology defends. Mark Purcell describes the peculiarities of this thinking in relation to economic values and the conservative concept of freedom:

> they protect it by establishing a strong distinction between the public and private spheres, and by granting individuals numerous rights designed to prevent limitations to their liberty either by fellow citizens or by the state. In this political imagination, rights are enduring legal protections that are granted to individual citizens by the liberal-democratic state. (Purcell 2013: 142)

This tension, conventionally illustrated by the axis: common people – middle and upper segments of the social structure, can also be exemplified by the opposition of the postulates the access to the catalogue of resources or rights (example: *World Charter for the Human Right to the City*, but also many other documents created at the international level and at the level of individual cities [Purcell 2013: 143-145]) and demands for real (co)-management present in the anarchist and neo-anarchist tradition. It is worth emphasizing that this division, visible in the basis of Lefebvre's concept as interpreted by Mayer and Purcell, maintains to some extent its relevance in the perspective of Central Europe with its cultural and social specificity. However, there are separate ways leading to this coincidence/consistency that are worth at least being looked at. Przemysław Pluciński illustrates it suggestively in this volume, using the metaphor 'the meeting of the waters.' (Pluciński 2020)

[2] Purcell describes Lefebvre's position pointing out that "we can read Lefebvre's attention to space and the urban as a way to break open the limits of an economistic approach, to theorize actors beyond class actors, political sites beyond the workplace (cf. Lefebvre 1991/1974: 386), and historical forces beyond economic production." (Purcell 2013: 145)

HISTORICAL BASES FOR DIFFERENTIATING THE 'RIGHT TO THE CITY.' THE CENTRAL EUROPE SCALE

It seems that the change in the scale of description changes its content quite significantly. Needless to say, the choice of the research paradigm is the essential corollary to defined criteria used by the researcher. In the adopted perspective, at the Central Europe level of analysis, we will study the perspective of political decisions and events (conflicts, wars), taking into account positions which are less known in the field of urban studies, positions analysing development processes from the historical sociology or historical-comparative sociology perspectives. (Brzechczyn 2020) Obviously, the very choice of 'historiosophy' requires an explanation. What seems decisive here is the conviction that the scope of the phenomena divergence, that will be discussed later, is relevant for the attempts to explain the phenomena of contestation, especially to explain references to the importance of culture and long-term social processes.[3] In this context, in sociological studies we often use terms that have the status of meta-narrative, 'social modernisation,' or we point out universal emancipation tendencies. In a sense, in Central Europe, these meta-narratives play a more significant role, so much so that Central Europe itself is sometimes perceived as an element of the analytical context used to describe, for example, the process of systemic transformation proving the ultimate domination of capitalism over socialism, democracy over authoritarianism or pointing out the behaviour of emancipation processes as factors defining the dynamics of social movements. The proposed analysis is not finalistic, unlike the proposal of Francis Fukuyama (1992), and the processes of social change are conditioned by many factors, approached differently by particular concepts that also indicate specific patterns of impact: 'paths' (Stark 1992) or 'cascades.' (Brzechczyn 2020) It results from the belief that the use of a universal, one (linear and deterministic) scheme of inference about the dynamics of social self-organization can be negotiable. This does not mean that different stories modify the dominant pattern of social change, but only that they introduce a conditional mode into the study. Therefore, instead of analysing relationships, it is worth to consider coincidences and systemic dependencies or exogamous relationships (analysed, for example, in the postcolonial perspective language: Zarycki 2005, Costa 2007, Owczarzak 2009, Mayblin, Piekut, & Valentine 2016, Zarycki 2016).

From the point of view of the idealisation strategy, crucial for our perspective, (and the concretisation that follows it), the 'core' factors that differentiate or even modify the entire social process in various geographical areas are particularly interesting. Krzysztof Brzechczyn, describing the core historical premise of the European duality (in the context of its long duration), writes:

> The process was accompanied by growth in obligations imposed by the lords over the peasantry, and by the introduction of the so-called second serfdom. Ad-

[3] However, this list may be longer: we can mention here influences of the dominant ideology (that we find hard to avoid in practice), such as neoliberalism, diachronic changes of the tools used by social movements, their goals as elements of the social process, and some sort of framework for meta-narratives.

> ditionally, the economic domination of the nobility was strengthened in political life – in all Central European societies, burghers exerted an insubstantial impact on public life as compared to Western Europe, whereas the state was subordinated to the interests of the nobility. (Brzechczyn 2019: 6)

Robert Brenner, whose work is also referred to by Brzechczyn, indicates the theme of interdependence or feedback, traces of which can already be found in Adam Smith's work. (Smith 2007: 10) Robert Brenner describes them as follows:

> the case of Eastern Europe, where during the late medieval and early modern period the powerful impact of the world market for grain gave a major impetus to the tightening of peasant bondage at the same time as it was stimulating the development of capitalism in the West. (Brenner 1976: 43)

The premises of duality mentioned by this researcher become an element of the description of the dynamics of capitalistic development and, more precisely, growing differences in its centre. These differences are:

> (I) the decline versus the persistence of serfdom and its effects; (2) the emergence and predominance of secure small peasant property versus the rise of landlord-large tenant farmer relations on the land. (Brenner 1976: 47)

Of course, historically speaking more similar factors and complex interdependencies can be found, some of them supporting the tendency to increase differences over time.[4] What is crucial here is the fact that social phenomena, including manifestations of contestation, may have their own dynamics (or lack thereof), which results in determining another configuration of influencing factors (some would call them secondary) that had a chance to play a role in a specific context. (Topolski 1996; Małowist 2006; Sosnowska 2018; Brzechczyn 2020) These conditions will be a little more understandable when the interpretations indicate specific consequences which, in the author's opinion, it is difficult to disregard. These will be, for example:

> – relative weakness of the cities, related to peasant serfdom, and the resulting weakness of the bourgeoisie as a social state (which applies to Poland and Hungary, but less to the Czech Republic) and as the origin of the middle class in the 20th century;
>
> – nation-creating phenomena in the absence of statehood (typical of the region in the 19th century);
>
> – the significant migratory movements that started the numerous and influential diasporas in the USA and Latin America, but also in the countries that dominated central Europe before they regained independence as a consequence of World War I;

[4] Such concept was also present in the institutionalists research from the 1990s (North 1990), in the sociological studies (Wallerstein 1992), but also in studies of the present when we ask ourselves "why"? It is the basis for understanding the evolution of societies, whether in accordance with cultural imaginaries, or with perspectives that are sometimes described as macro-social.

– forms of self-organization based on community and social class: we can give as an example the revisionist contestation of real socialism related to the emergence of the so-called the democratic opposition in the late 1960s in Central Europe, recruited from people whose cultural origin can be attributed to the Central European *intelligentsia* (classes with very particular regional specificity, non-existent elsewhere, Chałasiński & Szczepański 1962, Zarycki 2009);

– contemporary processes of states' (de)composition: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the division of Czechoslovakia, the collapse of Yugoslavia or the reunification of Germany (through the incorporation of the DDR);

– different ways of departing from the so-called real socialism, based on more or less radical co-modification strategies (Hamilton, Dimitrovska Andrews, Pichler-Milanovi 2005);

– remnants of real socialism that can also be treated as a differentiating factor (Segert 3013);

– different consequences and different strategies of reaction to the economic crisis of 2008 (Dijkstra, Garcilazo, & McCann 2015);

– references to the contemporary phenomenon of populism. (Muler 2017; Lovec 2019)

LONGUE DURÉE – HISTORICAL CONDITIONS. THE SCALE OF ONE SOCIETY

We find yet another depiction of the factors describing this phenomenon when the subject of analysis is a specific society with its historical and cultural particularities. In the case of Poland, one needs to go back relatively far into the past, to the late Middle Ages. In this context, the origin of the 'right to the city' movements is part of the discussion about the so-called noble democracy and the systemic status of the nobility in the 17th and 18th centuries. This approach is justified by the complexity of the emergence of class subjectivity and, more precisely, by the public absence of the peasants and the marginal presence of the bourgeoisie in this area. Reaching back to the 19th century, as it is usually done in relation to the works of Karl Marx or more precisely to the works of Frederick Engels in relation to the city (Pluciński 2012), is in this case unjustified as it is generally impossible to consider the question of class subjectivity throughout the 19th century (in the accepted meaning of the right to a city) in cities in this part of Europe. Firstly, this situation is due to the outcome of civil rights that, in the lands between imperial Prussia and Russia, were inscribed in the colonial context caused by the loss of state sovereignty by the First Republic of Poland (at the end of the 18th century). Secondly, it derived from a specific regional variant that shaped social relations blocking the development of cities as autonomous centres on the economic, social and awareness levels.

(1) This remark suggests that the liberal concept of citizenship was unknown and

seriously limited for a relatively long time, at least if we assume that the basis for the meaning of this concept is the acceptance (recognition) of universal negative rights of all, as defined by Thomas H. Marshall in his concept of *civil citizenship*. (Marshall 1950) The situation changed under the influence of the evolution of absolutist partitioning states that had long been the periphery of Europe; it also changed in line with the emancipatory trends in metropolises. In the case of the area of Central Europe occupied by the Russian Empire, the change took place after yet another national-liberation uprising of the sympathizers of the First Republic of Poland (1863); as a result, the tsar decided to abandon the anachronistic second serfdom model.[5]

At this point, it is necessary to evoke one of the widespread explanations of the specificity of the Polish cultural contestation (to a significant extent national and liberating) in the later historical period. It is attributed to the strength of the patriarchal nobility culture or, a little more symbolically, to the archetype of the 'noble manor' – the abode of an extended noble family, considered as the axiological centre of the community[6] – in opposition to the tenement house or the agonistic form of the market square in the city space. The status of the nobility requires a few words of clarification below, due to their attitude to cities.

(2) Our review here is that the nobility's ambivalent attitude towards urban life (also present in the following post-noble ages) was one of the major elements of the 17th-century noble elite's cultural specificity, referring to the knighthood ethos of the First Republic of Poland. As Maria Bogucka says:

> Old Polish aversion to cities arose for two kinds of reasons: aesthetic and ethical. The living conditions in an early-modern city: crowded, cramped, narrow space, dirt and stench everywhere, all of this was a daunting and abhorring perspective for a nobleman who was used to living close to nature, among vast fields, in clean air, filled with the smell of meadows and forests. The nobility regarded with reluctance staying in cities longer than strictly necessary. (Bogucka 2009: 10)

This phenomenon of cultural distance towards the city and, what is equally important, the durability of its influence can be explained by: 1) the dynamics of political decisions in the First Republic of Poland and the acquisition of political domination in the form of noble democracy (the so-called golden freedom) in the 16th century; 2) by the economic atrophy of the state that followed. In the literature on the subject appears the concept of 'Sarmacy' (Maciejewski 1974; Orzeł 2010; Niedźwiedź 2015), although less frequently in the historical sociology studies. This concept holds a somewhat blurred meaning and can be interpreted as lifestyle, ideology or a kind of self-identification. Nevertheless, it indicates cultural attractiveness of the vision of the Commonwealth of many nations and the attractiveness of the nobility's position as beneficiaries of the First Republic's model of power. To quote Janusz Maciejewski

[5] They insurrectionists gained a range of negative freedom. Importantly, this emancipatory gesture was not so much aimed at modernizing social relations as at undermining the direct and indirect dependence of the peasants on the local noble elites involved in the uprising.

[6] Which for a relatively long time, and in the architectural context even today, has marked the imagination of the Polish middle class.

from the 1970s:

> the Sarmatian nobility was deeply convinced that they were an exception, an island of freedom in a sea of despotism (which they were very proud of). This view has remained a common belief to this day, even among historians. (Maciejewski 1974: 22)

The impoverishment of the nobility, initiated under the influence of the development of capitalism (in the 18th and 19th centuries), but also the aftermath of successive national-liberation uprisings (1830-31, 1863-64), launched the process of creating a specific social layer: intelligentsia, while maintaining the social status of the noble elite. It should be noted that:

> the intelligentsia consisted of elements from the manor and from the serfdom farm. The shaping of the Polish intelligentsia is inseparable on the one hand with the history of the fall of the farm and the manor house, and on the other hand with the history of the development of cities and industry, urbanisation and industrialisation. Polish intelligentsia is a product - unfortunately [...] it is a by-product of the transformation of pre-capitalist noble, agricultural and rural Poland, based on a countryside manor and serfdom farms, into a capitalist, urban and industrial country. (Chałasiński 2020: 2)

Also:

> The core of the urban intelligentsia that determined its social and spiritual aspect was not created through social advancement of the emancipating masses of the people, but through migrants from the countryside manor and the serf farm. (Chałasiński 2020: 5)

As a result, a cultural model of the elite strongly encouraging freedom, tradition and the agrarian community were shaped. It referred to the image of a sovereign, multi-ethnic state and drew attention to the problem of regaining state independence. In other words: it referred to the petrification of the traditional vision of social structure, in opposition to the Marschall research regarding *political citizenship,* at least until the beginning of the 20th century and the turning point marked by the 20th-century revolutions.

(3) One can risk another generalisation: that the loss of the state independence of the First Republic, which was a failure of the systemic project unique in Europe at that time: democracy of the mighty ('noble's democracy'), created a traumatic experience. Citizens lost their 'paradise,' which generated a permanent axis of a dispute of a sentimental nature. The 'paradise' consisted of a multicultural city, space not entirely 'homely,' whereas its inhabitants: townsmen, *bourgeois* were perceived ambiguously in public life. Let us add that the axis of social division did not have a class character (in the Marxist sense of this category), but rather referred to divisions into what is familiar and what is foreign (in relation to specific groups or classes) and pointed out the premises of state and functional differentiation that did not define the world in terms of conflict. At the same time, these categories limited the problem of recognition (using the contemporary concept) to the whole community with the deep ine-

qualities that it contained and the characteristic paternalism of upper-class towards the commoners.

It is also not a coincidence that the genetic description includes the issue of ethnic affiliation (referred to in the context of the description of the bourgeoisie status, distant from the vision of the 'Sarmatian' state community) because, probably paradoxically, the ethnically dominant representatives of the nations co-creating the First Republic (Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians) did not constitute the majority of the city inhabitants (cities which were co-created by numerous minorities, including to a large extent the German and Jewish minorities) and the proportions of the population changed over time, not necessarily in favour of the ethnic domination of Poles. It seems that this had significant consequences for urban social dynamics.

In a way, the bourgeoisie never acquired the status of 'governor of souls' in the lands of the First Republic (*hegemon*, to use Gramsci's concept, understood as "a form of intellectual and moral leadership in general" – Riley 2011), which can be considered as a distinctive feature of cultural specificity, influencing the evolution of cities in this part of Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.[7] One of the consequences of the aversion to urban life was also an ambivalent attitude towards the market economy. This economy, based on the specialised work, trade and accumulation as described by Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, marked the birth of the modern bourgeois class. Interestingly, in the texts from that period, there was also an ethical aspect that usually accompanied the emergence of stereotypes and prejudices toward city inhabitants. As Bogucka emphasizes: "it was a widespread and growing belief that every townsperson was an enemy and a scammer, a speculating parasite ruining the country." (Bogucka 2009: 11) Of course, it is difficult to estimate the durability of this perception but its influence, including inclinations to a certain separateness, undoubtedly impacted on building tension between the vision of the state of the First Republic and the city, the latter being perceived as a kind of 'necessary evil' one tries to escape from whenever it is possible.[8] Historically, even in the period of the First Republic of Poland, the image of Gdańsk (17th century) was particularly ambivalent as a place where grain, an important export commodity of Polish lands, was exported. Attribution of monopolistic practices and non-compliance to the law was a source of constant disputes between the Crown and the city regarding the status of local government. Later, the city of Warsaw, rising to the level of a metropolis, became the subject of resentments undermining the status of the 'golden noble freedom.' Bogucka writes: "in the eyes of the provincial nobility and conservative magnates [Warsaw became – *M.N.*] the incarnation of all evil, the embodiment of forces allegedly striving to introduce *absolutum dominium* in the noble Republic and erase freedom of

[7] This influence was due to factors related to the variable dynamics of migration, ethnic diversity, self-identity problems related to living in a city and city life as well as multilingualism and communication problems of city residents.

[8] This specificity can also be observed nowadays within the emerging middle class in this part of Europe in the modern sub-urbanisation dynamics occurring despite the efforts of municipal authorities, sometimes even evoking an image of the exodus to the countryside, along with the progressive improvement of middle class' material situation.

'highborns.'" (Bogucka 2009: 12) This does not mean that the lands of the First Republic were subject to different development trends in the 15th century than other areas of Europe, but it means that the process of progressive urbanisation (an increase in the number of urban centres) and the demographic development of the largest cities was marked by an ambivalent attitude of the culturally and politically dominant noble elites (we already mentioned the concept of *sarmatia*), an attitude that became more pronounced along with the political state crisis, right until its total collapse. Its traces can be analysed by juxtaposing two models of urban development: polycentric and monocentric, as well as the notion of 'centrality,' which is key to Walter Christaller's concept (the completeness of the role of supplier and consumer of goods and services, Nowosielska 1992: 9; Bogucka 2009: 16). The former was typical of autocracy with a clearly defined centre of power (widespread in Western Europe); the latter reflected better the decentralised First Republic's model of power, where the position of the nobility and the need to build many administration and service centres shaped the image of urbanisation dominated by small, although relatively numerous, urban centres with limited autonomy, interconnected in a way that evokes a network.

(4) As a result, the bourgeoisie, considered as a reference group (Bogucka 2009: 10) and as an outpost of capitalist relations, was less attractive. The weak voice of the 'people' in the Polish historical narrative (few personal documents) was similarly symptomatic; this situation can be attributed to their lower position, but it was rather the way of seeing social reality dominated by the traditional image of functional dependence and subordination. We can propose at this point our third general these. Using the Marxist optics, the weaker townspeople and the bourgeoisie deriving partly from it (partly, because the bourgeois class was also created by the nobility, impoverished and deprived of wealth) created less effectively their *alter ego* in the form of an organised working class (which, probably longer than anywhere else, was culturally influenced by state relations inherited from the past). It is a widespread belief among researchers of the subject that the weakness of class revolts forms a distinctive factor in Poland; this conviction may have significant consequences for the analysis of contemporary manifestations of social dynamics. The key issue of spatial mobility was thus marked by barriers created by the First Republic culture and the consequences of the state's political collapse. Therefore, the phenomenon of escaping the 'idiocy of countryside life' (a paraphrase taken from the *Communist Party manifesto*) and then migrations from the countryside to the cities, took on the attributes of postponed urban socialisation of the people. Following this reasoning, in the Central European variant, it is probably more legitimate to write about the postulates of 'the right to the countryside' (and not the 'right to the city') as emancipation claims and factors of social change. However, this emancipation process was never completed to a degree that would justify a historiosophical correction of the concept, the source of which can be attributed to Engels. (Kuligowski 2015: 70)

The process of urban 'socialisation' of countryside migrants was tentative and, in the absence of other analysis, we will refer here to a work examining the reality of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. According to William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958) the process went from the atrophy of tradi-

tional (neighbourly, family) ties towards integration within new life conditions. As it seems, in the local conditions of Central European cities, both concepts would also have their application, making up the specificity of building an urban society from below, without a clear social and axiological point of reference that urban *patriciate,* autonomous in the political sense, used to be elsewhere. If the proposed course of reasoning and cultural argumentation has a chance to defend itself, the model of urban development in this part of Europe has to gain a certain distinctiveness, the consequences of which can be followed by pointing out the importance of the state context, attitudes of the elites, ethnic diversity and relations that come from outside the perception of the (autonomous) city as an independent vehicle for modernisation. Obviously, such a conclusion encounters certain limitations and it is more appropriate to write not about the multi-linearity of the 'right to the city' development, but about the extension of the evolution towards modern relations, which had its original milestones in Central Europe, milestones related to the consequences of the state subjectivity loss. These milestones might be, in the areas dominated by the tradition of the First Republic, subsequent national liberation uprisings (which the 'people' knew about and often distanced themselves from) and workers' riots directed not only against factory owners but against local administration that, inevitably, starting from the 19th century was an administration that was culturally more foreign.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the phenomena of urban revolts, although not spectacular in numbers, accompanied the fall of the First Republic of Poland. We can find an example of this circumstance in the "spontaneous rebellion in Rehan's cloth factory in 1794 where – apart from paid workers – prisoners were also employed." (Kuligowski 2015: 71) We can also mention strikes preceding the January Uprising (1824-27) in Zgierz, Aleksandrów, Tomaszów, Łódź and Turek or gatherings that took place in Wielkopolska during the Spring of Nations. "On April 28 1847, due to poor harvest, hunger riots broke out in Poznań. 140 unemployed people demanded jobs from the local authorities. On April 30 1847, armed clashes took place in Chwaliszewo and Trzemeszno." (Kuligowski 2005: 71) Similarly, on the eve of the next insurrection, there were workers' riots as well, as Kuligowski writes: "workers from Łódź were in the lead of the social struggles of that time. As a result of the April 1861 rebellion of the so-called machine destroyers, the two-headed tsarist eagle was thrown from the town hall and patriotic songs were sung." (Kuligowski 2015: 72) The beginning of the 20th century is probably when the key events that mark the claims of the masses in terms of identity occurred.

It is no coincidence that the history of the 1905 revolution in Poland occupies an important place in the description of the dynamics of articulation of the theoretical 'right to the city.' Wiktor Marzec, in the introduction to his book on revolutionary events, states:

> The sense that the world 'has gone out of shape' was more and more common in the years of economic crisis, increased conscription to the army and growing national problems on the outskirts of the tsarist state. Initially, it was not specified, it had no specific means of expression. For the workers and the intelligentsia

> party members the moment when, in January 1905, the Kingdom of Poland was embraced by massive, if not general, strikes was therefore a surprise. Something 'was floating in the air.' Workers and peasants began to feel that their situation might be different, that perhaps the world they knew was not the only form of life they deserved as human beings. The next day, even if it was still the same as the present day, would be the result of the battle. (Marzec 2016: 13)

The main training ground for this emancipation movement development was the 'young' city that experienced an extraordinary demographic boom over the course of around 100 years, emerging from a small village and taking advantage of the growing demand for light industry products in the Russian metropolis.

DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS – CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

It seems useful to approach the issue of the contemporary specificity of the Polish 'right to the city' in a manner similar to the description of 'historical' conditions, with the difference that in the case of the latest historical events it is reasonable to refer to selected documents, including specific activists' statements, statistics and sociographic studies and the surprisingly poorly analysed 'Program of NSZZ Solidarność' from 1981. Such analysis allows for the reconstruction of specific conditions in terms of factors differentiating the process of constructing the 'right to the city' in a contemporary perspective. As an introduction, we will recall historical data from the beginning of the 20th century and demographic data about Łódź, today a 700,000 metropolis falling into a de-industrial crisis. While we do realise that other examples are also available, let this date be used as a real case study.

THE FIRST FACTOR: THE 'SHADOW' OF THE NATIONAL ISSUE ON THE EXAMPLE OF ŁÓDŹ HISTORY

Łódź is a city which growing dynamics was comparable, for example, to the American Chicago in the same period of time (during the 19th century).[9] In the first period of industrialisation, recruitment for the emerging craft plants was based on the population of towns and cities. Along with the expansion of manufactories, an increasing share was gained by peasants, whose availability to employers was increased by the policy

[9] It is interesting to compare both cases, mainly due to the dynamics of urban formation and parallels related to the first half of the nineteenth century. In the case of Łódź in 1820, based on regulation signed by prince governor Józef Zajączek, the government of the Kingdom of Poland recognized Łódź as an industrial settlement within Kalisz-Masovian industrial district and assigned its role as a weaving centre. Based on data from 1830, Łódź was inhabited by 539 weaving families; in 1914, i.e. after 84 years, the city already had 500,000. residents (based on: Łódź 1820–1914 – city and its inhabitants, online document: https://histmag.org/Lodz-1820-1914-miasto-i-jego-mieszkancy-11187, Winter 2019). Chicago was incorporated as a town in 1833 and became a city in 1837, which launched investments related to connecting the telegraph and railway line. In 1910, after about 80 years, it reached 2.2 million inhabitants (based on: on-line material: Chicago, https://www.history.com/topics/us-states/chicago, Winter 2019). Although the intensity of the increase in the number of Chicago residents was about 4 times higher than Łódź, development logistics in both cities seem to be part of a similar process.

of the Russian administration aimed at weakening the social and economic position of the nobility and the lower-class landlords, thus forcing social mobility caused by the deteriorating material situation.

The first workers' demonstrations that can be attributed to the dynamics of the 'right to the city' occurred at the end of the 19th century (1892) when the instruments of protests and workers' contestation began to take shape. (Marzec 2016) In a sense, the 'right to the city' notion of that time can be seen as the primary right to be visible – to proclaim slogans in public, and therefore to an expressive (in opposition to discursive) presence in public space.[10] The dynamics of the development of capitalism, more precisely tensions related to working and social conditions at the beginning of the 20th century, led to further protests against employers and confrontations with the Russian administration. Marzec reconstructs the events of the budding revolution in this manner: "The first clashes with the police and the army took place in Warsaw in the fall of 1904. Accumulated discontent erupted in January 1905. Influenced by the news of 'Bloody Sunday' (a brutal pacification of a peaceful demonstration against the Tsar) in St. Petersburg, a mass strike broke out in Łódź." (Marzec 2016) The January strike revealed some aspects of the fight for the 'right to the city' – forcing workshops and manufactories to participate in a strike and taking over semi-public spaces, e.g. asking the public to leave cafes and theatres. In a way, these events were acts of protest revealing the expectation of recognition, a development of the instruments of rebellion known from earlier speeches which, by the way, did not cause social resistance. In June, riots broke out in Łódź, barricades were erected. These events were a direct, somewhat provoked, spontaneous reaction to the army's attack on workers' demonstrations. The proceedings of the first half of 1905 were a prelude to long-lasting workers' demonstrations (1905-07), disorganized at first, then increasingly becoming a form of a fight for specific goals of popular political parties, with different ideological colours. (Piskała & Marzec 2013; Marzec 2016)

It is worth mentioning here the progressive differentiation of the workers' self-organisation environment where three currents competed with each other: *Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania* (SDKPiL), offering a class program "exceeding and even invalidating national identification"; *Polish Socialist Party* (PPS) linking the vision of socialism with the people's involvement in the cause of regaining independence, and the conservative *National Workers' Union* (NZR) referring to the concept of the nation. (Marzec 2016) Differences in positions regarding the need to fight for independence and the forms of this warfare (e.g. using terrorism) formed the axis of dispute, which in the case of the PPS (divided early into the so-called 'young' and 'old' ones) led to a deep separation in the following decades, influencing the shape

[10] Let us add that this particular event ended with pacification and the speaker's detention. The process of self-organisation and building the political awareness of the workers progressed, but faced basic problems related to the low level of enrolment rate. Leaflets and brochures published at the beginning of the 20th century illustrated the scope of the challenges faced by the workers. The content of these documents became the main material analysed in the above-mentioned work by Wiktor Marzec (2015). Their content can also be found in the published 'Political Critique Guide' entitled *Rewolucja 1905*. (Piskała & Marzec 2013)

of Polish left-wing parties even when Poland regained state independence in 1918. (Piskała 2013)

What seems to be important for the next changes within workers' self-organisation structures, is that they are the consequence of the revolutionary events and implementation of specific demands and changes forced on the Tsar aimed, among others, at extending the electoral law to workers and peasants. In practice, however, they were not accompanied by an increase in the political subjectivity of the working class. Thus, the post-revolutionary changes did not turn out to be deep and permanent (especially when analysed in terms of class emancipation or class consciousness).[11] However, they triggered the process of empowerment and laid the foundations for the development of urban self-organisation that we know from liberal societies. We can summarise this process by saying that:

> it was of great importance for the formation of the seeds of civil society, the practical learning of self-governance and cooperation. These experiences turned out to be extremely important when, in 1918, it was time to rebuild an independent state. It is also difficult to overestimate the importance of the long-term effects of the activities of many educational and cultural institutions established at that time. (Piskała 2013: 43)

At the same time, we can postulate the extinction of class forms of contestation which is not only a consequence of the repressions on the part of the Russian Empire administration (which was regaining control over the revolted cities precisely through these repressions), but also the formation of the expression of subjectivity. In the case of Poland, the victorious option (a derivative of the 'nobility *topos*') was: regaining state subjectivity. Nowadays, we would call it right-wing, as it places at the centre the traditional community identity with its 'functional' ethnic diversity. The consequences of this fact are crucial for the history of the reborn Polish state as an ethnically diverse state with a strong role of state nationalism. It is worth emphasizing that the workers' demonstrations were a response to outside events,[12] more precisely they were an eruption of discontent towards the authoritarian system on the periphery of the Empire,[13] during which revisionist tendencies prevailed. In a way, they were in

[11] However, as Piskała points out, "In the course of several revolutionary months, the political empowerment of the people took place on an unbelievable scale. The way that led to this was a spontaneous rebellion, not a top-down, previously planned reform." (Piskała 2013)

[12] The inspiration for the uprising, later called the Łódź Uprising or the Revolution of 1905, was the aftermath of the economic crisis in the Russian Empire and a direct consequence of the political crisis related to Russia's defeat in the war with Japan. The anti-war and social protests covered industrial centres in Russia and, in this sense, the events in Łódź were part of a wider movement of Tsar's progressive delegitimisation. For the Polish lands, however, they had a special meaning precisely because of their popular and 'formative' character.

[13] Moreover, this peripherality introduces original threads to the story of the becoming of class subjectivity in Poland. As Robert Blobaum notes: "The revolutionary processes in Poland in 1905 were in many respects much more advanced and radical than in Russia itself. I found the dynamics of the revolution extremely interesting, much more interesting than in the case of St. Petersburg or Moscow. So I started with an analysis of the Russian perspective, and then in my research on the social democratic

competition with social or class postulates formulated in the metropolis. The pressure aimed at regaining the political subjectivity of societies and, consequently, state subjectivity, was a widespread phenomenon in Central Europe; it could result from its peripheral position in relation to the centre of the continent and the dramatic political consequences of World War I. This 'peripherality,' as opposed to the metropolis, was of significant importance both for the course of events and for the social and political consequences of events in this part of Europe. Undoubtedly, it also defined the way of understanding and valuing the 'right to the city.'

The critical test of the evolution of the mass consciousness among the inhabitants of the lands of the former Polish Republic was the universal commitment to defend the newly regained state sovereignty in 1918. The young state was defended against the Soviet troops in the 1920 War,[14] despite the indisputable presence of the pressure of internationalist movements workers directed against the Second Republic of Poland (as a national and nationalist state). The mobilisation occurred in a very short time and on a mass scale as the value of maintaining independence turned out to be more important. As it seems, the aforementioned situation lasted at least until the end of World War II. However, the tragic consequences of the latter forced another radical re-evaluation, this time towards communism and the so-called 'real socialism' in Central Europe. Again, the causative factor was the external context and the result was a second peripheralisation.

THE SECOND FACTOR: 'THE CURSE OF STARTING OVER'

The consequences of intense political and social changes, apart from the catalogue of other modifications, strengthened the urbanisation of Polish society. It is worth emphasizing that this phenomenon happened even if the Polish people in the 19th century did not constitute the overwhelming majority in the cities of the First Republic of Poland.[15] The consequences of the extermination of the Jewish minority by the

movement I went west." (based on an interview with Robert Blobaum published in: Piskała & Marzec 2013: 69)

[14] Which otherwise blocked Soviet Russia's dream of launching a general revolution in Europe. With regard to the next 21 years (1918-1939), it is probably worth to notice the extremely efficient and conflict-free guarantee of women electoral rights (opening a short period of parliamentary democracy in 1918-1925) and the weakening of the municipal self-government under the influence of the increasing authoritarianism of Polish government. This short period of relatively stable urban development (like the city of Łódź, almost doubling the number of inhabitants over 21 years) was radically cut by the Second World War.

[15] Citing the example of Łódź, Arkadiusz Rzepkowski writes: "Along with the industrial development of the city in the 19th century, the ethnic structure of its inhabitants changed. While at the beginning of the 1820s, the Polish and Catholic population dominated in Łódź, the German and Protestant population started to dominate in the city at the beginning of the 1830s. It was the result of an influx of immigrants that had begun in 1823. The German element was definitely the dominant one among the craftsmen coming to the city. In the second half of the 19th century, there were migrants of mainly Polish and Jewish origin, the latter present in Łódź as early as in the 18th century. There were 6 thousand Poles (46.4%), 92.4 thousand Jews (29.4%), 67.3 thousand Germans (21.4%), 7.4 thousand Russians (2.4%), 1.3 thousand representatives of other nationalities (0.4%)," (Rzepkowski 2008: 88) the total

German Nazis after 1939 (Jewish community constituted a significant minority in the cities), as well as expulsions and the subsequent displacement of the German population after 1945, forced dynamic population movements.[16] The empty space left behind by the aforementioned minorities was occupied by other displaced people, including a significant number of villagers. The observation of sociologists studying this process seems very interesting; they talk about a peculiar 'ruralisation' of cities that took on the characteristics of its participants. This applies especially to industrial centres rebuilt and created from scratch. (Smagacz-Poziemska 2017) The process of ethnic change was so deep that it is legitimate to write about the ethnic and social homogenisation resulting from the exchange of population in cities from the late 1940s to the 1960s, which is especially relevant in terms of the so-called recovered lands. (examples: Wrocław, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Zielona Góra, Szczecin) The areas historically belonging to the Second Republic of Poland underwent fewer changes, but they struggled with a sudden drop in the number of inhabitants (supplemented by immigration and resettlement) and with a huge range of material losses, like the almost completely (in 80%) destroyed Warsaw. Therefore, writing about urban communities before and after World War II in terms of continuity or social evolution is in many cases simply an error of judgement.

The subsidised and state-managed industrialisation formed a special imprint on the social shape of urbanised areas after World War II. This phenomenon was the implementation of the industrialisation project of the Polish People's Republic (Peoples Republic of Poland), where workers were to play a special social and creative role. The urban 'right to the city' can therefore be found again relatively late, when the processes of social disintegration and reintegration had a chance to come into existence again, probably only in the 1970s. It could have happened in the class tension between the 'new working class' and 'the new bourgeoisie,' except that the aforementioned

number being almost exactly 500,000. residents. 17 years later (in 1914), there were not much more Poles, i.e. about 50.9%, Jews 32.5%, Germans 15%, and Russians 1.4%. Regaining independence as a consequence of World War I (1918) resulted in, on the one hand, reduction in the population (data from 1921), on the other hand, a proportional increase in the number of Poles to 61.9% and, for example, a significant reduction in the number of Germans living in Łódź (to 7%). (Rzepkowski 2008: 90) At the end of the Second Republic of Poland, public statistics recorded a proportional decrease in the number of Poles to 58.5%, an almost unchanged proportion of the Jewish minority of 31.1% and a slight increase in the number of Germans (to 8%). At the same time, the number of inhabitants increased dynamically over this period (341.8 thousand to 672.0 thousand). It is worth adding that in the interwar period, Łódź was a city with a dominant and growing quantitative position of workers as a professional group (55% in 1921 to 63.6% over the next 10 years) and a slightly decreasing share of representatives of the upper and middle classes (Dzieciuchowicz 2014: 53-54). It is worth mentioning that the statistics describing the demographics of Łódź still indicated a very significant share of migration as a development factor, despite the deep crisis that the city experienced at the beginning of the 1930s as a result of the global depression. (Dzieciuchowicz 2014: 41)

[16] Similarly, in the case of Łódź, the period of World War II brought radical demographic changes, and not exclusively because of the war. The city's population decreased from 680,000 inhabitants up to 250 thousand (63.2%) in 1945, including an estimated 170,000 Jews in the group of German occupation victims. As Jerzy Dzieciuchowicz says: "the pre-war Łódź, representing a melting pot of four cultures: Polish, German, Jewish and Russian, was erased from the history after the war." (Dzieciuchowicz 2014: 70)

classes came mostly from the same social trunk. The professional composition of the new bourgeois class or, to use the modern language, of the 'middle class' – city administration, representatives of the management segment of socialised enterprises, representatives of the educational system or other officials of the *welfare* state – was defined, like the workers, by a relationship of dependence towards the urban regime. For many years, the disagreement had been addressed to the hegemonic workers' party (the ruling party) or to institutions supporting it, such as the security services or the apparatus of preventive censorship. The social condition of the 'new workers' and the 'new townsman' was quite similar, both in terms of interests (resulting from the availability of resources, or rather their scarcity) and claims to subjectivity. Using the Marxist nomenclature, the class conflict was shifting towards the axis: the wage-worker class – the 'state capitalist,' which suggests that the distinction between classes was not justified in the socialist society (we are talking here about workers devoid of political subjectivity). This situation was also valid on a doctrinal basis, due to the claims of the ruling party to represent the interests and the voice of the working class. (Staniszkis 1992)

It seems important to highlight the fact that, as a consequence of the dramatic social history of cities, in Polish conditions not only it cannot be justified to write about social continuity but also about class continuity after World War II (with possible exceptions of Kraków or Poznań, two cities with long industrial and bourgeois traditions).

In the Polish context, it is similarly difficult to write about class rebellion in the classic Engelsian sense of the expression of 'right to the city,' as well as about youth rebellion from 1968. In these particular conditions, the potential equivalent of the latter was inspired by closing down the theatrical performance of Adam Mickiewicz's romantic poem *Dziady* in the National Theatre in Warsaw; the spectacle was judged as anti-Russian and therefore indirectly perceived as anti-Soviet. Thus, this revolt had not direct revisionist features, although it undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of the 'new-intelligentsia' opposition that rejected real socialism more and more firmly and explicitly.

THE THIRD FACTOR: THE PROGRESSIVE REPUBLICANISM OF 'SOLIDARITY'

As a result of the inability to articulate class interests and instead of a class conflict, a new conflict emerged between 'power' and society, sometimes referred to by sociologists as 'social schizophrenia' (Wnuk-Lipiński 1982) or 'social dimorphism.' (cf. Mocek 2016: 20)[17] In the conditions of a democratic society, it is difficult to understand its meaning. Thus, the fight for the 'right to the city' seems absurd on the theoretical ground and difficult on practical ground, due to the actions of the authoritarian state's extensive apparatus of repression. Moreover, lack of subjectivity (including urban sub-

[17] The concept of social dimorphism is described in the work *Half-decay. Sketches in the sociology of systemic transformation*, ISP PAN, Warsaw 1991, originally in *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 1989 3–4: 53–72. The English version was published in a collective work: J. Koralewicz, I. Białecki, M. Watson (ed.): *Crisis and Transition - Polish Society in the 1980's*, Berg Publishers, New York – Hamburg 1987: 159–176.

jectivity) brings the specificity of social self-organisation of the late Polish People's Republic closer to the models based on communal contestation, as we know from the period of the struggle for independence in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century. On the one hand, these were more or less mass social demonstrations in large factories, taking sometimes the shape of uprisings or riots (as in Poznań in 1956, or in Pomerania region in 1970). On the other hand, we can evoke here elite acts of civil disobedience undertaken by intellectuals who co-created a democratic opposition with a left-wing, and then left-liberal tinge.

The distinction between these phenomena (mass social demonstrations and civil disobedience) has got a deeper foundation on historical and class base, which can also be read in the 'dichotomy' between: 'right to the city' initiatives' and 'urban social movements.' In Poland after World War II, these second type of activity reached the level of public visibility in the mid-1970s. Success of this process caused by effective cooperation between the democratic opposition and workers and was possible on the basis of the ideology ennobling the working class, followings the ideological core of the 'people's democracy.' The act of fighting for subjectivity was accomplished by forcing the legalisation of independent workers unions, thus announcing the so-called 'Carnival of Solidarity' (1980-81). It is no coincidence that this circumstance occurred in the main industrial centres, located in the largest cities (although outside the capital). The main events of this period were the authorisation to legalise the independent self-governing workers' unions *Solidarność* (*NSZZ Solidarność*) following the wave of strikes on the Polish coast in August 1980. The unions became a platform for self-organisation of the social movement (around 10 million workers joined the newly legalised independent union, while the entire population of the country counted at the time 36 million). Combining into one social phenomenon the revisionist attitudes of the PRL intelligentsia with a class social rebellion brought a surprising result. It was a very special variation of self-organisation that can be called urban on the one hand and communal-national on the other. (Brzechczyn 2016) Krzysztof Brzechczyn, in reference to the atmosphere of 1980, writes:

> The involvement of the union at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 in constant conflicts with the government and local administrative authorities created the need to develop a general program that would liberate it from the pressure of ad hoc actions. This accelerated the evolution of the union manifesto: from a restitutions-and-claims organisation, limited to defending workers' interests in companies and supervising the implementation of agreements by the authorities to an organization proposing economic and political reforms and taking active responsibility for co-ruling the country. The dilemmas were hidden in the frequently asked question at the time: what is 'Solidarity' supposed to be – a workers union or a social movement. (Brzechczyn 2014: 124)

The outlined dilemma is perceived here in the context of the evolution of the organisation, forced to assume the role of a 'revolutionary force.' However, it is equally legitimate to try to place the class/community dichotomy in the context of historical experiences and constant elements of the Poles' contestation discourse. A similar

approach to the matter is justified by the ideological manifestos of the union. One of the first created ('Directions of the Union's activities in the present situation of the country. Theses for discussion') refers to values such as 'the best traditions of the nation,' ethical principles of Christianity, 'democracy's political calls' and socialist social conception. (Brzechczyn 2014: 124) The search for many foundations seems to be the consequence of understanding the relationship as an umbrella structure, the binder of which was the community tradition – also called republican – and not class identifications. The planned goal of the systemic change was to be a 'planning-market economy,' guaranteeing a higher level of rational functioning of enterprises, assuming less bureaucracy and management democratisation. (Brzechczyn 2014: 125) The forms of co-management of factories by workers were to play a large role in changing the model of managing the direction of democratisation. Workers' self-governments:

> were to be (...) equipped with the powers allowing them to decide on the company's operations, directions of production and sales, production methods, the scope of investments and the division of the company's income. (Brzechczyn 2014: 126)

The doctrine of 'Solidarity' became fully-fledged in the Program of the NSZZ 'Solidarity' adopted during the 1st National Delegates Congress (from the 5 to 10 September and from the 26 September to 7 October 1981). The change that took place there concerned the evolution of axiological references and the resignation from references to socialism; in its place appeared a reference to John Paul II's *Laborem Exercens*. This indicated the direction of the movement's evolution which, from the reformist vision of the workers' empowerment under the form of real socialism, evolved once again into a movement of community emancipation with a certain religious overtone. It was not, however, a complete retreat from the 'right to the city.' What seems to be crucial is the movement towards a vision of a state supported by workers' self-organisation in large workplaces, i.e. a form of multi-level, regional self-government and – largely forced by the intelligentsia involved in the union's work – a vision of decentralisation of power that provided the axiological foundations for the reform referring to the doctrine of subsidiarity that in itself had raised some controversy. (Cahill 2017) This reform took place 10 years later and derived from the social teaching of the Catholic Church. (Millon-Delsol 1992) The ideology of the union was therefore an interesting merger of workers' subjective and social demands, connected with the idea of self-government and constituting the meeting point of the intellectual and class-based vision of the workers' union and the social movement, with the additional claim of regaining the society's autonomy.

Let's quote the manifesto itself and refer chronologically to the 21 Gdańsk Postulates of the MKS. The first three include references to international documents ratified by the Polish People's Republic (Convention No. 87 of the International Labour Organisation), pledging the right to strike but also 'the safety of assistants' and referring to the constitution of the Polish People's Republic. The quoted legalism of the postulates indicates a specific, non-workers' context of the August 1980 revolt. Social demands do not appear in the document until the seventh manifesto (out of

21). (*Tygodnik Solidarność*, October 16, 1981) As the 'Solidarity Workers Union Program' says: "history has taught us that there is no bread without freedom. We also wanted justice, democracy, truth, the rule of law, human dignity, freedom of belief, the restoration of the Republic of Poland, and not only bread, milk and sausages." (*NSZZ Solidarność Program*, 1) What draws attention, on the one hand, is the universality of the demands. On the other hand, one can easily notice the inclusion in one crucial sentence of postulates originating from very different axiological orders: from the liberal order (democracy, the rule of law, freedom of belief), through references to the state community (republican vision), and finally a slightly sarcastic indication of living needs at the end. In the following sentence the protest itself is defined, also in a rather characteristic way indicating what was not previously put in the axiological order, proper for the conservative perspective. As the authors say: "An economic protest had to occur [in the case of Solidarity] at the same time as a social protest; the social protest had to be a moral protest as well." (NSZZ Solidarity Program, 1) What is more important, the vision of a social movement that explicitly presupposes *the Sanation* and moral postulates is directed against the authority that embodied the state power of the Polish People's Republic at the time. The subject of proceedings is obviously not the city as a form of territorial community organisation but the state structures seen from the regional perspective that in turn refers to the image of large workplaces as entities in the state management model. However, this is only a part of the concept of an evolving movement. The part that interests us the most at this point is entitled "The Self-governing Republic." The first sentence already mentions a 'comprehensive reform' that 'should lead to the permanent introduction of self-governance, democracy and pluralism.' The goals of the movement are, therefore, to "create and support independent and self-governing (autonomous) institutions in all spheres of social life, not only workers (*NSZZ Solidarność Program*, 1)." What is more interesting, the declaration of openness to various trade unions, students and industry organisations, is accompanied by the declaration of rejection of possibility to transform into a political party. In a way, this means rejecting the classic form of a class-interest organisation in favour of a universal (perhaps utopian) vision of radical pluralism in relation to the movement and empowerment of all organisations that follow very broadly defined *Sanation* goals. The core of the concept is the forms of employee self-government (in this context, however, the form of a cooperative is mainly referred to). For example, it is envisaged for workers' unions to have a legislation initiative and the possibility of passive participation in elections.

In thesis number 22, there is a more direct reference to local government as an instrument for empowering citizens in specific spatial communities. This empowerment is to take place through participation in elections and the far-reaching scope of the autonomy of local communities and their representation in the form of the 'Self-government Chamber' at the legislation level. Here, the aforementioned republicanism is probably the most visible due to the tradition of Polish society going back to the First Republic of Poland. This principle was present in the autonomist vision of trade unionists who, more than 'good (self-limiting) authorities,' expected direct representation of interests at the legislation level and influence on decisions at workplaces.

The document from the beginning of the 1980s is perhaps the most spectacular record of the workers' will at the turn of the 1980s but also, which is perhaps more important for our analysis, an example of local self-government and self-government in the area of judicial power. (Thesis 24, *NSZZ Solidarność Program*, 7) Autonomy is therefore not class-related, but rather related to the place of residence and work as well as to the activity profile. Anyway, the key importance of workers in the described document is rather decentralised and perceived not directly, but through the image of self-governing communities with the primacy of the state as a space for the realisation of subjectivity. This specificity provides the basis for drawing historical and cultural analogies and renders possible to move on to the sources of the distinction between 'right to the city' movements and 'urban' movements in Polish conditions, paradoxically inclining (because the document created a workers' union) towards the latter. In other words, we witness here the creation of a movement that was a far-gone form of the collective empowerment concept, a form that questioned the ideology founding the PRL ('freezing' class relations, offering a fiction of class empowerment) and the project of state sovereignty. (Brzechczyn 2018) This movement, according to the author of the introduction, became the central myth that constructed Poles' community-based thinking about themselves, at least until Poland joined the European Union in 2004. It can be argued that such interpretation diminishes the usefulness of the implementation used in the sociological analysis to describe the Marxist sources of social dynamics (which could have contributed to the inability to understand Central European phenomena by researchers of social movements from other regions). The core of the social dynamics of 'Solidarity' generated disputes among researchers (Mielczarek 2019) and became difficult to understand for people from outside the Polish cultural context. (cf. Wójcikowska 2013)

Successive manifestations of social dynamics can be treated directly as a continuation of the functioning of the 'Solidarity' social movement. An example is the formula of Civic Committees established in the late 1980s for the purposes of self-organisation of opposition groups, in connection with the organisation of the election campaign during the first democratic elections held on June the 4 and 18, 1989. (Słodkowska 2014) The chance for real democratisation was related to the form of an agreement between the authorities of the Polish People's Republic and selected circles of 'Solidarity.'

Forms of self-organization also emerged in opposition to 'Solidarity.' (Wierzbicki 2016) In the first half of the 1980s (in 1983) a current emerged (referring to the classically understood 'right to the city'), associated with the generation of children of activists of the so-called First Solidarity: The Alternative Society Movement – RSA. This association was situated not only in opposition to the Polish People's Republic but also to the mass, 'pre-political' form of the 'Solidarity' movement. The Polish environmental movement also had its origins at that time. (Gliński 1996)[18]

[18] Which, by the way, has never gained enough mass support in Poland to, for example, achieve its independent representation in parliament.

THE FOURTH FACTOR: THE RADICAL ANARCHIST ALTERNATIVE WITHOUT CAPITALISM

The phenomenon of the Alternative Society Movement (Kaźmierczak 2014; Grzelka & Kula 2014; Wierzbicki 2016; Pluciński 2016, 2018), from where it was inspired by the Paris student speeches of May 1968, can be reduced to an attempt to implement the democracy formula at the city level which was not a widespread or obvious vision at the end of the 1980s, although it referred to the phenomenon of 'Solidarity' as a form of autonomic subjectivity (included in the concept of decentralisation of the state) and introduced a transgressive, new, local, urban, non-professional context. The magazine *Homek*, published as a non-debit newspaper in 1983-1990 (Brendt, Brzechczyn, Stybel, & Waluszko 2013), is a perfect illustration of the philosophical profile of this milieu. However, it is worth taking a closer look at the social context of the RSA's emerging autonomy. As Przemysław Pluciński says:

> Initially, the activists of the burgeoning RSA were fascinated by 'Solidarity,' primarily by its original anti-systemic character. The key factor here was the positive feeling towards the program of the so-called First Solidarity entitled 'The Self-governing Republic of Poland,' containing clear syndicalist elements. (Pluciński 2016: 141)

The main premise for abandoning direct ties to 'Solidarity' was the formula (inscribed in the concept of the democratic opposition in Central Europe) related to 'self-limiting of revolution,' in other words, implementing the policy of self-limiting in terms of anti-systemic protests, with a purpose to reduce the social costs of open resistance. In the 1983 Manifesto, the creators of the movement write about this struggle:

> [We fight] with all kinds of power. The RSA denies the need for any leadership. It assumes that a human being is capable of making decisions in a rational and proper manner while maintaining respect for himself and other people. (Kaźmierczak 2014: 243)

In a way, the aforementioned division had the status of a generational rejection of the 'old' by the 'young' and, in part, it was also counter-cultural, as it was related to the rejection of the conservative and religious character of the 'late Solidarity.' (Wierzbicki 2016: 322) The intellectual exploration of the movement was heading towards classical syndicalism and Edward Abramowski's philosophy of ethical socialism. (Pluciński 2016: 141)

At the end of the 1980s in *Homek,* libertarian content appeared more often; in this period one can also find a radical vision of urban democracy. The anarchist provenance was a consequence of the evolution of the movement's intellectual leaders. Originally, the adjective 'anarchist' was the epithet that the members of the RSA used against Solidarity activists (criticising their 'action-oriented' attitude); then, it became the emblem under which the activists hid in the mid-1980s. Anarchism was therefore not an ideology that defined the movement; it was rather a consequence of its evolution, resulting from the search for adequate self-identification. One of the contexts of this

vision of democracy was:

> strong valorisation of localism as the basic horizon of human existence and also possibly effective social activity, research for direct democracy's conditions. RSA members openly emphasized the search for links between urban space and the experience of life. The reflection on urbanity arose from the sense of a bond with the local, 'natural' or, at least in the imagination of the RSA members, a 'naturalised' urban environment. (Pluciński 2016: 143)

One aspect of this vision was to question the modernist idea of zoning space which, in their opinion, led to breaking the ties between work and leisure. The area of social life was to be the district, the scale of which would be adjusted to the subject's perception. This creates the construction of a city for humans; it also means a vision of grassroots self-organisation, in opposition to the image of a modernist city – designed and constructed by the elite. The attitude towards public spaces, which the activists of the RSA were literally fighting for by organising the space for free expression of views as in May 1989, seems also very interesting. They would also try to regain the city for their own vision.[19] That phenomenon is also intriguing because of the historical perspective presented below:

A city for a man is a city in which the urbanisation process [...] is not rapid or advanced too far, and there is no development hypertrophy of the city. It is not a city that is too dense in terms of urban planning. (Pluciński 2016: 143)

In a way, this attitude may be the consequence of the specificity of the city, or rather the cities, where the movement operated (Three-city – existing together harbour cities: Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot). However, this is not true. As Wierzbicki points out:

> In the second half of the 1980s, new RSA cells were created across the country in Szczecin, Chełmno, Warszawa, Białystok, Zakopane and Sochaczew. Towards the end of the 1980s, RSA (already existing within MA / FA) together with a large part of political and counter-cultural formations and youth circles loudly protested against the policy of the 'Solidarity' trade union that opted for the agreement with the communist authorities. (Wierzbicki 2016: 323)

The organisation achieved nationwide representation, which does not mean that the scope of its influence reached the level of visibility in the public opinion. It was probably partly the consequence of the censorship still existing in the 80s and the necessity to operate within the informal circulation, and partly the rejection of the concept of 'alternative society' by the most influential opposition centres and then the main authorities.

It is hard to resist the impression that the image presented in *Homek* supplements the original vision of decentralisation we already know from the ideological document of 'Solidarity.' Nevertheless, it goes much further, giving far more prerogatives no longer to workers but to city dwellers, in opposition to the vision of people relying

[19] Pluciński refers to two articles: "Antifuturism, or a city for man by" Wojciech Mazur and Janusz Waluszko (issue 43 from 1989), and "City for man" by Klaudiusz Wesołek and Janusz Waluszko (no. 44 from 1990). (Pluciński 2016: 142)

on meritocracy – the competences of experts (typical of the 'paternalistic' concept of 'Solidarity'). The formula of the magazine itself was an attempt to undermine the classic asymmetry between the sender of printed content and the recipient of such content. The magazine was distributed through people- distributors, who also acted as intermediaries in sending materials for publication. (Grzelka & Kula 2014)

Strangely enough, the concept formulated by the 'young generation' of activists also covers the sphere of financing the neighbourhood community with the help of 'contributions' managed by local governments. Local self-governments (anticipating the existing auxiliary self-governments) were supposed to play an advisory role. The scope of financing from 'contributions' (forms of taxes) was broadly conceived, covering security issues as well. Unlike the concept of 'Solidarity,' the role of the state was to be visibly reduced to supervising the sphere of communication. The city, as a self-government unit, would offer a range of benefits including, for example, social housing aimed at less affluent people. What is worth summarising here, in relation to the formulated utopia, is its 'de-nationalisation' and thus, in fact, the treatment of the state as some sort of Leviathan, a treatment typical of a libertarian orientation. This utopia also implied the universalistic need to secure the rights of socially excluded people and decommodification (which is still present in the left-wing parties tradition: Ziółkowski, Drozdowski, & Baranowski 2020). The views of RSA activists did not create a fully coherent entity, but rather provided testimony of intuitive research (Pluciński 2018), located on the margins of the national public discourse or even trapped in local contexts. Therefore, it is impossible to recall directly any specific practical solutions taken from the concepts that arose in the 1980s in the RSA environment – apart from quite nebular analogies with the existing auxiliary self-governments ('neighbourhood council'). However, this is not the most important thing.

What seems crucial in this context is to notice the difference and the originality of their position in relation to the dominant narrative of 'Solidarity' and other phenomena of widespread youth self-organisation of those years. (Wierzbicki 2016: 318) On the one hand, it constitutes one of the identity pillars of the neo-anarchist movement in Poland, on the other hand, it may be almost entirely included in the pledges of 'urban democracy' written at least ten years later (Purcell 2008) and conscious of their limitations. (Purcell 2006, 2008) As Purcell suggests in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, the neoliberal city becomes: "the local trap, in which the local scale is assumed to be inherently more democratic than other scales." (Purcell 2006: 1921)

THE FIFTH FACTOR: THE MELIORATIVE TREND OF 'CONCRETE NARRATIVE'

The 1989 turning point is central to the recent history of the 'right to the city.' We are talking here about the consequences of the radical systemic change associated with the launch of the draconian process of marketisation (using the so-called 'shock doctrine'), to some extent reduced to mass privatisation of enterprises (previously socialised), as well as a deep crisis on the labour market. (Murell 1993; Sachs 1994) The shock doctrine has been a proving ground from the very beginning of the notion of the city, in which one of the aspects of restoring capitalism was the long-lasting deficit in

consumption and high unemployment. With time, probably starting from the end of the 1990s, Purcell's diagnoses (the impact of neoliberalism on the city) also began to be valid for Central European cities. (Jacobsson 2015; Węcłowicz 2016) Oddly enough, from the very beginning, the reforms did not generate any serious forms of self-organisation and resistance, which can be explained in two ways: the involvement of the 'Solidarity' circles (now the ruling elite) in the reforms defence (Ost 2005) and the situation of the persisting economic crisis. This does not mean that there were no residual forms of resistance continuation or the radical involvement *modus operandi*, as we can see in the example of selected neo-anarchists groups, including the Poznań squad 'Rozbrat' operating in Poznań since 1994, also referring to the tradition of RSA. (Rosochacka 2017)

In the late 1990s, sociologists began to analyse the end of the systemic transformation (Ziółkowski 1999, 2000), which meant the emergence of a distinctive model of capitalism (some researchers evoke its similarity to Latin American capitalisms, Ziółkowski 1999) and the phenomenon of 'social immobility' – understood as the domination of individual strategies combined with the weakening of the dynamics of collective action (including the dynamics of the NGO sector growth) and the weakening of forms of social resistance. (Nowak & Nowosielski 2005; 2006) It seems that a clear change in the social atmosphere took place in the second half of the first decade of the new millennium, with the emergence of activist organisations reflecting at first the so-called NIMBY syndrome (Staniszewska 2014), which coincided with the investment increase in Polish cities and the progressive improvement in the economic situation, the latter being attributed to the accession to the European Union. (Kubicki 2019) Once again, cities played the role of accelerators of investment processes – they became a training ground for conflicts and residents' resistance. (Jacobsson 2015; Pluciński & Nowak 2017; Kubicki 2019, 2020) Whereas the sources of this new phenomenon were genetically related to the concepts cultivated by the neo-anarchist movement (referring directly to the concept of the 'right to the city'), the reaction to these forms of activity was rather ambivalent; nevertheless, some elements of a common lineage arose on the basis of historical analysis. (Pluciński & Nowak 2017) This does not change the fact that the two perspectives quickly started contradicting one another. A good illustration of the essence of the dispute may be the discussion that accompanied the organisation of the First Congress of Urban Movements on June 18 and 19th, 2011[20] where:

> the concept of urban movement was treated very loosely by the organisers of the Congress. It was certainly not an instrument for a scientific description of reality, but rather a tool for building a political project and a common identity. (Kowalewski 2013)

[20] The meeting was attended by 100 representatives from several dozen organisations that considered the "trademark" of urban movements to be their potential representation. They came from a dozen, mostly large, Polish cities: Gdańsk, Sopot, Rumia, Gliwice, Lublin, Koszalin, Kraków, Łódź, Opole, Olsztyn, Szczecin, Warsaw, Wrocław, Sulechów, Gniezno, and Podkowa Leśna. The Congress was also attended by representatives of the Anarchist Federation, an umbrella organization representing the anarchist community.

One of the leaders of the neo-anarchist movement in Poznań, where the first Congress was held, commented the situation as follows: "It is difficult to anticipate the political significance of this meeting, although I am afraid that it will be less than the organisers expect." (Urbański 2011) The premise of this distanced assessment was the hierarchy of the city's problems, dominant in the anarchist milieu, in which the theses formulated by the participants of the Congress and the discussions within it did not fully fit. The activist specified:

> The proposed approach reduces the urban issue to the spatial and political level, whereas the social issues, once dominant in this approach, have been pushed to the background or not noticed at all. Housing issues, working conditions, unemployment, poverty, high rents, mass evictions, etc. were hardly noticed in principle. (Urbański 2011)

Therefore, he pointed out at least two issues: the evolution of the movement towards the elimination of specific content and going towards weakening the importance of the social issue, thus departing from the genetic, in the commentator's opinion, the perspective of 'right to the city.' However, his reproaches went even further: he accused the Congress of putting urban movements into the dominant discourse accepting systemic transformation, thus 'draining' the discussion about its consequences and not perceiving the real costs of neoliberal policy, which can be seen in the most emphatic example of Łódź:

> It was said, for example, that the problem of some cities (Łódź) is 'depopulation,' i.e. a decline in the number of inhabitants caused by the emigration movement (mainly due to work-related issues), however this was not associated with deindustrialisation, i.e. one of the most significant phenomena we have been dealing with for over 20 years in urban areas. This, of course, could 'push' the debate towards the assessment of the Polish transformation and capitalism and it seems that there was no room for such discussions during the Congress. (Urbański 2011)

As it seems, this diagnosis was not far from the assessments of what city movements in the Congress edition should deal with – which was reflected in the city theses formulated at that time.[21] Przemysław Pluciński, dealing with this issue in a systematic way, noticed a clear trend to depart from class-related orthodoxy inscribed in the concept of the 'right to the city,' a tendency to de-ideologise the concept itself and to attempt:

> the production, by the bourgeois movements, of the dominant interpretations of what the right to the city is (and what is less important: what it is not) and how it should be legitimately interpreted. This legitimacy is sought in this case by translating the idea of the right to the city into the language of the so-called concrete narratives, seeking the raison d'être of (a)ideological neutrality. (Pluciński 2016: 136)

[21] Their record is available on the existing Congress website: https://kongresruchowmiejskich.pl/tezy-miejskie-spis/urban-theses.

As a result, he suggested that neo-anarchist circles were excluded from urban discourse. The axis of the dispute was, therefore, a kind of pragmatism of the consolidating movement (its genesis is associated with the years 2007-08): focusing on the instance in opposition to postulating comprehensive changes with a clearly anti-systemic and anti-capitalist feature. However, this pragmatism had other far-reaching consequences. The 'right to the city' ideology analysed in this introduction achieved some consensus with the dominant model of local government (which is accused of some authoritarian tendencies but at least it did not undermine the ideology's legitimacy) and, to some extent, also approved private property. The communities associated with the Congress, as the researchers of the phenomenon claim, accept political commitment and participation in local elections.

The concept of 'concrete narrative,' introduced by the main activists of the movement (Mergler, Pobłocki, & Wudarski 2013), illustrates quite well the aforementioned pragmatism; it also portrays a kind of civic 'grassroots work' that can be described as intellectual, non-related to any political party and specifically pre-political. In their opinion, citizens implementing specific activities in the common space

> discover that they are united by a common space, they suddenly understand that they can (and want!) to act together precisely for the 'right to the city' as a kind of general 'umbrella' under which there is a number of particular postulates. (Mergler, Pobłocki, & Wudarski 2013: 37)

One of the ideological pillars of the movement, Lech Mergler, describes the specificity of the aforementioned pre-political nature by mentioning the fact that the 'concrete narrative' does not originate from general decisions about the world, human beings and society, but:

> refers to specific situations, facts, places, problems in the city that visually, intuitively require action, intervention (...) We use great narratives when it is productive for solving these measurable problems, e.g. liberal ideas can be helpful in economic problems, left-wing reflection in social matters, ecology concept in matters of sustainable development, etc. (Mergler 2018)

The problem that can be seen in this ideology relates to what Marc Purcell described fifteen years ago as 'the local trap.' Among others, it should be perceived as the inability to produce a further-reaching coherent project in the frame of specific local management. This notion is not clear in itself, but it can be understood in the historical context and in the perspective of inheriting the vision of self-organisation. Purcell evokes a series of tacit assumptions that, on the one hand, are necessary. On the other hand, different understandings of politics by different people can lead to completely different results. (Purcell 2006) He says:

> There is nothing inherently important about the urban scale in creating a more democratic society. Rather, any talk of reinvigorating urban democracy might be better expressed as reinvigorating democracy in cities. (Purcell 2006: 1936)

Thus, it is difficult to simply assume that, by choosing a specific type of grassroots action (the local scale on which we operate) without a clear picture of the whole, we

will achieve certain goals. Nowadays, it can be clearly visible when urban movements oriented at defending particular interests (for example acting against revitalisation projects) intervene in public space.

CONCLUSIONS

The introduced distinction between urban social movements and 'the right to the city' initiatives is of fundamental importance when we look at the profiles of different forms of collective self-organisation. What draws our attention here is the fact that the former has usually been a part of the process of building the middle-class identity (which is an expression of the 'regional scale' analysis of the social modernisation activity) over the past 30 years. The latter are located in the area of discourse closer to the classical language of radical, left-wing provenance circles, the dynamics of which was catalysed by the crisis of 2008-09 in western and southern Europe, therefore fitting into a more universal European scale.

To summarise the proposed theoretical framework, in the long-term perspective (200-300 years) presented at the beginning of the introduction and in the medium-term perspective (the last several dozen years), the author aimed at pointing out the possibility of interpreting development modalities and proposed a departure from one vision of urban modernisation. In specific Central European experiences, this vision invites us to look for analogies, to be more precise, to look for the delayed effect of civic subjectivity articulation by granting rights or obtaining political representation at the local level, usually observed elsewhere. In the given context, it is difficult to talk about the premises of understanding the phenomena that accompany the inclination towards cultural continuity and the breakpoints resulting in:

(i) devastating disappearance of entire social segments (that happened in Central Europe and has not happened elsewhere);

(ii) emergence of new players, whose existence is a 'product' of the political process (this is well illustrated by the status of the 'middle class' and questions about class conflict in a neoliberal society, cf. Domański 2017);

(iii) external influences, such as the consequences of peace treaties after the great wars, the logics of democratisation, the NGO sector financed by umbrella organisations (Chimiak 2018) or the pre-accession and post-accession support system implemented by the EU.

As we can see, social reproduction can take place not through 'development,' innovation or borrowing, but also through support, imitation, 'cultural co-optation' through institutions and organisations – as factors of 'transpersonal' continuity. However, each time the forms of social self-organisation – the struggle for the 'right to the city' – are a reaction to accidental (event-related) crisis conditions or system tensions. From a narrower, regional perspective however, this approach requires references to nuanced (particularistic) theoretical concepts that look for premises of 'separateness.' It is a foregone conclusion that the essence of the idea is not to distinguish the scales

of analysis for itself, but to adopt an appropriate scale where one can see the specificity that disappears at the level of broader generalisations, making social dynamics less understandable and causing simplification.

The proposed example of Polish and Central European experiences should not be treated as a manifestation of a belief in their uniqueness, it is rather about encouraging academic readers to look at social processes from a similar multi-scale historical perspective in order to be able to better understand each other, thus avoiding misunderstandings and stereotypical thinking.

As for the details of the contemporary phenomenon of urban movements and the 'right to the city' movements, we invite you to read individual texts from this volume that complement each other, exactly by using of different scales.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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URBAN MOVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF THE LEGITIMATION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF ALTERNATIVE GROUPS AND CIVIL ORGANISATIONS AT A TIME OF EUROPEAN CRISIS[1]

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ABSTRACT: This paper constitutes an analysis of urban movements, marked in the research as alternative groups and civil organisations, in terms of the new politics characteristic of new social movements. In particular it indicates that these movements, ostensibly urban, actually express demands towards the broader social system, delegitimating it in a twofold manner. Firstly, the acceptance of certain general principles in democratic values and rules is coupled with criticism of how the system functions in practice and of the political elites in Poland, via protest, lobbying, and watchdog activities. A separate type of delegitimation embraces organisations among which we may list cooperatives and squats, as well as organisations managing concrete spaces and withdrawing from participation in public life, shutting themselves away within autonomous spaces and realising a different cultural and democratic model. In both of these groups we are thus dealing with a strongly accentuated anti-systemic and anti-capitalist attitude towards the political reality of the period of transformation in Poland. The research delivered confirmation of the overall research hypothesis ad-

[1] The article is based on research conducted within the project Livewhat: 'Living with Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences.' Research was conducted in a team with M. Theiss, E. Zielińska and J. Petelczyk. This publication is based on an article written jointly with M. Theiss: 'Obywatele w polityce nieinstytucjonalnej. Analiza działań alternatywnych grup i organizacji społecznych w sytuacji kryzysu ekonomicznego' contained in the collective volume: M. Theiss, A. Kurowska, J. Petelczyk B. Lewenstein. 2017. *Obywatel na zielonej wyspie. Polityka społeczna o obywatelstwo społeczne w Polsce w dobie europejskiego kryzysu gospodarczego*. Warszawa: IFiS PAN.

opted in the Lifewhat project, according to which in response to economic crisis civil society responds with the emergence of alternative forms of resilience, not only alleviating the consequences of the crisis but which also, as time passes and the scale of their activities increases, may give rise to a new quality – including in a political sense. The research constitutes a part of the international Lifewhat project. It was conducted on a sample of eighteen purposefully selected civil groups and organisations operating in large cities in Poland, using the method of in-depth interviews.
KEYWORDS: urban movements, new social movements, politics, delegitimation of the political system

INTRODUCTION

The blossoming in urban movements tackling important social issues in various forms noticeable in recent years has most often been understood to date as them implementing the Lefebvrian demand for the 'right to the city', in which the addressees of their claims are urban politicians (Lefebvre 2012; Pobłocki, Mergler & Wudarski 2013; Harvery 2012). However, as certain writers have observed (Kowalewski 2019; Castells 2013), issues such as ignoring the voice of the citizens, the superficiality of democracy, the priority of capital over the interests of the residents, small shops being displaced by chains of discount stores, and cuts in council housing or underinvestment in culture are problems that are systemic in character, while simultaneously bearing a local dimension. The activity of these movements should therefore be understood in a broader sense: in relation to the entire social-political system, and not making do with placing them solely in urban contexts, even if that is where urban activists situate their demands. The question that therefore arises is whether urban movements are, in essence, movements characterised by some kind of urban marker, or can we treat them as an element of the broader landscape of activism embracing contemporary societies, especially following the economic crisis that Europe experienced, and which in literature are termed new social movements, or – as Manuel Castells would have it – networks of Hope and Outrage (Castells 2013). It would seem that a significant portion of urban movements may be treated in precisely such a manner, while the 'right to the city' that they express is, in many cases, essentially an expression of the civil right to question the broader social order, not limited exclusively to urban matters. The foundations of numerous claims regarding purely urban matters, such as for example the protection of green land in a city, or a protest aimed at curtailing large-format trade in specific city districts, essentially comprise assumptions stretching far beyond the urban context (though expressed in the language of one's right to the city), and resolving them also sometimes requires specific political decisions and changes to the political system. Then urban movements thus defined become political movements, even when the activists do not explicitly refer to politics. In a word, it is the interpretation of the researcher that ultimately positions them in the broader field of politics, and not the intentions of the actors, which may contradict this interpretation. Nevertheless, by considering the demands put forward, and analysing the

measures taken by the entities investigated along with their accompanying values, we can conclude to what extent they express acceptance for the existing broader political *status quo*, and to what degree they are an expression of opposition. We therefore treat such forms of urban activism as participation that can define the degree of legitimacy of the political system. In this paper we shall focus on those forms of participation in politics undertaken by urban groups and organisations that take place not solely via membership in political bodies or involvement in the formal procedures of creating politics (for example via consulting or lobbying for specific legislation), but through non-institutional activities, including outside of the traditional structures of the third sector. At the same time we anticipate that the actors themselves may not have any intention of 'politicality' in their activities, and that we may not discern anything steering us directly in the direction of politics in the missions they formulate.

In this paper, we argue that the above-mentioned political significance of activities undertaken by social urban movements in Poland embraces, among others, the delegitimation of the existing social-political-economic system, and the search for another, new formula by which it could function. The subject-matter of this paper therefore covers showing the character of this delegitimation, meaning in relation to which areas of life in society, which aspects of the political system or political practices, urban activists are protesting against, and what type of politics they represent. We put forward the hypothesis that the urban movements' representatives covered by our analysis are creating a new kind of politics, a kind characteristic of new social movements in the post-industrial era, movements becoming active especially following the turning point of the economic crisis of 2008–2012 that embraced most countries around the world; in literature, these movements are referred to as new politics (Kołtan 2016). Cities always have been the cradle of democracy and a melting pot of new ideas. This feature of new politics is evident above all in the case of alternative organisations and groups proposing methods for resolving social problems different to mainstream approaches (also prevalent in the non-governmental community), or undertaking innovative social practices – and such constituted the subject of the research. Where this is referred to later on, we focus on organisations and groups whose emergence was directly or indirectly connected to the economic and political situation that developed in Poland during Europe's economic crisis of 2008, and which were capable of expressing a specific stance towards the political system, delegitimating it on certain levels or expressing incomplete legitimacy (Mider 2014: 43).

MOVEMENTS OF OUTRAGE AND HOPE: A NEW DIMENSION OF POLITICS AMONG CIVIL ACTORS

Many researchers of contemporary urban movements draw attention to a fundamental change of character in how new social movements participate in politics, as well as to the factors evoking civil mobilisation (Touraine 1995; Offe 1995; Castells 2013; Koltan 2016). These researchers acknowledge that the conflict between social classes that characterised the mobilisation processes of the previous era is fading in its significance as an axis organising protest, giving way to all-embracing criticism of the cur-

rent social order along with demands for the right to be active citizens (Matynia 2016). According to Claus Offe, the new social movements are voicing their opposition to representative democracy and the political institutions functioning within it, and to the manner in which conventional politics – rooted in political parties – is practised, while calling for a more radical form of democracy based on direct participation rather than the intermediation of political parties (Della Porta & Diani 2009; Offe 1995). They are anti-modernist, and they express scepticism towards the idea of progress; they are in favour of solidarity and seek autonomous spaces for their self-fulfilment. Melucci in turn draws attention to the significance of identity issues as the determinant of new social movements, and the new actors' emphasis on the rights of the individual to define their own identity and resist the state and market encroaching upon their private sphere, as well as the protection of the individual's autonomy. Similarly to Offe, he believes that they are attempting to change the widespread definitions of politics and society. As such, they criticise the current social order in its entirety, while at the same time distancing themselves from politics. Castells had already noticed this ambiguity in regard to politics among urban movements in his excellent book *Networks of Outrage and Hope*, writing about their political dimension. He said that these movements want to change the state, but do not aspire to take power; they express feelings and aim for discussion, but do not want to form political parties and do not support governments, although they may become an object of political marketing. Apart from that, they are political in the fundamental meaning of that word (Castells 2013: 218).

The manner of protest is also different. The new social movements are not creating coherent political programmes; their place is taken by affects, above all anger and dignity (Castells 2013; Kołtan 2016). As Jacek Kołtan writes, 'Emotions are what make the new actors visible in the public realm (...) by managing the emotional sphere, social actors have made a return to politics' (Kołtan 2016:15).

There are various interpretations of the factors that cause the stimulation of social movements today, and the changes that follow in their manners of mobilisation and articulation. If it is no longer social conflict between the main social classes, in the economic sense, then what processes are energising today's civil agitation?

Many authors are of the opinion that we are living in a turning-point era, brought about by the processes of globalisation, the market's domination, and new technological possibilities – and manifested in, among other things, the economic crisis (Kołtan 2016, 2014; Castells 2013; Della Porta & Diani 2009; Touraine1995). As Jacek Kołtan writes, 'this wave forced a redefinition of the world in which we live; everything became different, everything called for reinterpretation from scratch, everything demanded rethinking' (Kołtan 2016: 8). Alain Touraine calls this state a post-social situation, while for Beck it is reflexive modernisation, caused by an uprooting of hitherto well-recognised forms of societal life as a consequence of economic crises and growing uncertainty evoked by new areas of risk (Kołtan 2016).

Although literature reveals a search for common characteristics behind new social movements and the global factors responsible for stimulating them, these movements also display a local specificity, and the degree, character, and area of delegitimation

of the economic system most certainly differs between specific countries, just as the area of uncertainty as well as the plane of outrage varies from one country to another.

DIMENSIONS OF THE SYSTEM'S LEGITIMACY AND URBAN MOVEMENTS

The relationship between the activity of new social movements and delegitimation of the social-political-economic system may be demonstrated on two levels. Firstly, on the microsocial level, it involves the motivations of social movement activists. In keeping with the hypothesis formulated by Puvergen (1966: 159), conventional forms of political participation, such as voting in elections or referendums, constitute an expression of support for the system, while unconventional forms, which include a broad range of civil activities, are a manifestation of delegitimation of the system and the search for ways to thoroughly transform it. This second form of political participation aims to exert political influence or to publicly express a position in regard to important social issues, and is a response to deficits in ways of articulating opinion and taking action in a conventional way (Mider 2014: 78).

Secondly, as shown above, on the macrosocial level an empirical relationship between such events as the economic crisis and activities expressing delegitimation of the system has been visible over the last decade. Positions speaking of the existence of a crisis in a broader sense, for example in Poland's case understood as the unfair and faulty model of the post-transformation liberal democracy based on capitalist relations of ownership (Pluciński 2014; Jacobsson 2015: 10-13; Herbst 2013), have similar functions to the experience of the economic crisis in western and southern Europe. They also fit the antiliberal turn visible in the activity of urban movements in other countries as well, and in particular in Eastern Europe, which does not have long traditions of a capitalist economy capable of softening perception of the consequences of adopting a sharp liberal direction where economics is concerned (Jacobsson 2015: 10-13; Polańska 2014).

The system's legitimacy, however, is not one-dimensional. Citizens can accept the general values and rules constituting the foundations of a particular political system, and in the case of the organisations investigated here this means the system of democracy, while voicing reservations regarding the way in which it functions, or in other words its social practice, meaning the way in which the said rules and values are realised by government in the life of society (Mider 2014; Beetham 1991; Easton 1965: 297), or – in more detail – withholding full support for institutions of the political system, such as parliament, the courts, or local government. Taking yet another angle, delegitimation of the system may mean focusing on some selected aspect of the political system, for example the unfavourable perception of the activities of politicians, while simultaneously accepting the other dimensions of social and political life (Mider 2014). We are therefore dealing with a certain continuum in how citizens relate to the system: from total legitimation, through partial legitimation, to complete delegitimation, characterised by a negative attitude towards all of the dimensions indicated above, with a consequence of such a situation being the refusal to take part in conventional forms of political participation, and frequently even withdrawal from the

political system and entering a state of apathy.

The intermediate form that connects the extreme points of this continuum is the situation of acceptance for certain general principles in the values and rules, along with a simultaneous strategy for remediating the system's practice through the intermediation of protest, lobbying, watchdog measures, and so forth. Mider calls such a form of social reaction critical legitimacy (Mider 2014: 46) and, as he writes, it is characteristic of Polish society. It is marked by an attitude of the active citizen, interested in politics and participating in it at the same time, coupled with simultaneous close scrutiny of the activities of politicians on a micro and macro scale. Such an attitude, as he writes, involves a 'highly critical disposition towards those in power, both individual political players and the functioning of such key institutions as parliament or the government' (Mider 2014b:46). He describes such a state as a democratic paradox, in which intense distrust towards the power elites is accompanied by strong belief in the ideals of democracy (Garlicki 2014).

In our opinion, the typology presented by Mider could be broadened to embrace the type defined by Merton with the term innovation, meaning the situation in which – with a defined degree of system delegitimation – alternative forms of practice are sought for expressing the fundamental and accepted principles on which the political system is founded. In this model participation would therefore mean partial withdrawal from mainstream social practices that would legitimate the political system, and the proposal of one's own forms capable of achieving the ideals of democracy to a greater degree. Where urban movements are concerned, an object of criticism could in particular be the practice of governance, specifically institutions whose goal it is to implement these democratic rules and values, as well as the power elites responsible for the said practice (Pluciński 2020; Herbst 2013).

In this text we assume that the activities of urban movements in question have a distinctly political meaning also in those areas which, in many researchers' opinion, are not directly connected to politics. The prevailing currents in source literature discern the politicality of social movements in activities related to the formulating of demands, advocacy, and protest (Kriesi 1996; Baglioni & Giugni 2014) or the occupying of places in the public realm. However, it is our firm belief that practices related to the provision of services for a community, the exchange of products, and the propagating of fair trade, and so on, also have a political significance. Among other things, it involves the questioning of the foundations of the political and economic system, and the grassroots creation of alternatives to it.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

In regard to the above positions, we pose research questions about the character of delegitimation measures undertaken by selected urban social movements functioning in Poland, and to what extent they are a reaction to the economic crisis of 2008–2012, which set in motion a new dimension of politics, represented by the new social movements. Civil organisations and informal groups, about which one could say in relation to the assumptions thus presented that they are delegitimating the social-political

and economic system in some way, were selected for the study. We strived in our research to determine, among other things, what the delegitimating actions they undertake actually involve, and which aspects of the social-political and economic system they are aimed at. Where referred to later in detail, we assume that a portion of the activities by the urban movements investigated are situated either within the type of critical legitimacy, or within the type of delegitimation through the creation of innovation proposed for the requirements of this paper.

We obtained data for the analysis from individual in-depth interviews conducted in 2016 with 18 representatives of urban non-governmental organisations and informal social groups meeting the criteria of alternative initiatives and social organisations adopted in the international Livewhat study.[2] In the countries where the project was carried out, the researchers' attention therefore focused on such organisations and information groups and communities proposing new ways for citizens to cope with everyday difficulties and challenges in economically difficult times. They were defined in the project as organisations promoting alternative ways of coping with the crisis situation. Because of this, state institutions and (in part) local government bodies, plus certain market organisations, were excluded from the research – firstly since they did not constitute an element of civil society, and secondly because the assumption was that such entities tend to function in a standard manner, while our goal was to identify activities extending beyond institutionalised ways of preventing a crisis or reacting to its consequences, and coming up with innovative ideas and methods of work. In the definition of alternative organisations adopted in the project, they were described as entities that had not been established or were not maintained entirely by mainstream political and economic organisations such as government, local government or market bodies. Initiatives were sought within the realms of culture, ecology, economics, social communication, alternative forms of consumption, self-governing spaces, and also politics. Examples given included cooperatives, second-hand goods exchanges, community kitchens, squats, community centres, food banks and time banks, although also of interest were long-term campaigns addressing protest against the consequences of the economic crisis. These alternative initiatives could feature formal organisation or remain informal communities, groups or social movements.

The alternative nature of the organisations covered by the research was identified through analysis of websites, and a coding form was drawn up for this purpose, on which the basic characteristics of an organisation under investigation were marked, including its structure, its main goals and missions, and its methods of activity.

We subjected the interview transcriptions to thematic analysis (Guest 2011), conducted inductively. In the section for the existing social-political and economic order in Poland as well as practical proposals regarding on what grounds an alternative order should be built were explicitly expressed by our interlocutors.

[2] The findings contained in this publication were obtained in the research project 'Living with Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences' (LIVEWHAT). This project was financed by the European Commission in the Seventh Framework Programme (contract no. 613237). Academic work financed with funds for science in the years 2014-2016 allocated for the realisation of an international project.

CRITICISM OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ANALYSIS OF REMARKS MADE BY URBAN SOCIAL ACTIVISTS

RESPONSES TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND DELEGITIMATION OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Despite the fact that the official economic indices used most often might prove that Poland has not experienced the economic crisis that embraced numerous countries of Europe after the year 2008, our interviewees frequently drew attention to links between the crisis and their activities. For a start, in general the economic crisis in Europe was, according to many, a circumstance that favoured the maintaining of the 'belt-tightening' austerity trend, including in Poland. Our respondents frequently pointed out that today's politicians in Poland, at a national and local level, are creating or exacerbating the crisis – and in this sense the crisis has a broader political meaning involving the intensifying of self-interested measures, the never-ending introducing of economising measures, and the ignoring of social needs.

A few of our interlocutors also drew attention to the fact that the macroeconomic indicators say nothing about the social reality. Despite official data showing that there was no crisis in Poland, they emphasised that many social groups in Polish society are experiencing poverty and social exclusion. Some organisations understood the economic crisis in broad terms – pointing out that the Polish crisis began together with the start of the transformations, when the introduction of the neoliberal reforms began. One organisation involved in social activity even stated outright that the goal of its operations was to respond to the crisis of the Polish economic and political transformation that began in the year 1989. According to a representative of the said organisation, the consequences of the transformations can still be felt in Poland, because the county's economy and society have to struggle with numerous problems, and the last 10 years have witnessed noticeable changes deepening social injustice.

Another organisation pointed out that the global economic crisis brought about the situation in which Poland is increasingly dependent on investors from countries where social and economic policy is linked to the violation of human rights. These interlocutors stressed, for example, that Chinese investments in Poland are leading to an exacerbation of social-economic problems that this organisation wants to fight.

Therefore, despite the absence of objective economic indices testifying to an economic slump in our country, the respondents perceived the context of their activity as a situation of permanent crisis – which is a general weakness of the capitalist economy. One of the features of the dominant economic model is, in their opinion, the uneven share of riches, imposing poverty on various social groups while also destroying social bonds, mutual relationships, the natural environment (especially urban space), and frequently leading to violations of fundamental human rights, in particular in the global South. As such, one of the main goals of some of the organisations covered by the study is to create an alternative formula for running the economy – based on social bonds and pro-ecological activity, potentially more resistant to the consequences

of an actual crisis. This is how the founding of a food cooperative was spoken about by its representative:

> this is precisely the answer to the sort of crisis that was, that capitalism is not everything, because this and also many people in the cooperative say let's get away altogether from this system that's built on profit, and let's move in the direction of cooperation, because that way we'll be able to survive future crises, and you can see simply that a group capable of organising itself and that's going to be in contact with farmers is simply in a position to survive in the city, you could say that, so it seems an important element to me, but it's also building bonds in general (I 12).

The above quote illustrates the attitudes presented by our interviewees delegitimating the economic system. Some respondents said outright that capitalism as such, and including the Polish version of post-transformational capitalism, is an unjust and socially damaging system. They therefore understood the actions they were taking either as reactions to the disfunctions of the economic system or as attempts towards creating a way of managing based on different principles than is the case in capitalism. Some writers speak openly of transformational trauma as the cause of the emergence and spread of informal movements in Poland, including in particular those aiming to promote a social economy (Herbst 2013). In their opinion, the answer to the blocking of opportunities for realising important goals in life caused by the transformation and, in its wake, the liberal economic politics, was for many social groups the adoption of innovative strategies or withdrawal, and in extreme cases – rebellion (Herbst 2013: 9-10). If we accept that the economic crisis in western countries reinforced the negative consequences of the economic breakthrough in Poland, then one should expect that the social reactions described above will manifest themselves, if not at the start of the transformation, then precisely in a period of crisis.

AGAINST DIVISIONS INTO US AND THEM IN POLITICS – A PERSPECTIVE OF POST-IDENTITY AND COOPERATION

One of the more prominent areas of criticism of the political system in the broader sense in our research was its manner of functioning, based on narrowly understood interests and self-centredness. Our interviewees deprecated approaches of such a nature, both by pointing to the values and principles of particular importance to them, and when talking about the practices applied in their organisations.

The respondents indicated explicitly that the organisations they represent aim to develop such principles as social solidarity, cooperation, integration, networks of connections and social capital. One could describe this group of values in general as related to cooperation. In the respondents' comments, they were frequently tied to democratisation, participation, and giving a say to those excluded. On the whole, our interlocutors presented cooperation as a value whose nature could be described as societal, pragmatic, and sometimes even technical. One of the respondents expressed this in the following manner:

> we are striving to build up social trust, to build not cliques but rather a network of cooperation, to show (…) cooperation, sharing, the inclusion of diverse people, (…) and well we're making use of that synergy effect (I 3).

In addition, the notion of cooperation as understood by the respondents was based on the assumption that social diversity should be respected; the more diverse and the greater the network of a particular organisation, the more beneficial. We were told:

> values (…) friendship I think, tolerance I guess… sort of tolerance understood as diversity, in the sense of a kind of respect for diversity and values, it's… I don't know, maybe you can find the word, because it's about it being a friendly neighbourhood, meaning, damn, that people feel good living in this city (I 8).

However, it would be a simplification to classify our respondents as left-wing. They frequently distanced themselves from being perceived in such a way, distinctly declaring themselves apolitical. Only some of the groups we surveyed described themselves as anarchistic. In general, however, our interviewees did not want to be perceived as representing a specific political option, and they emphasised that their goals were above political divisions. Their activities were therefore pragmatic – based on the assumption that the organisation's essence is the achievement of the goal, and not tribal group solidarity, or quarrels over imponderabilia. Cooperation as a value distinctly meant for them something that could be called a post-identity perspective: the rejection of narrow identities as outdated and excluding platforms capable of making the achievement of social goals impossible. Goal orientation can be seen, for example, in the comments quoted below:

> We strive very hard not to be attached for example to a single political party, and we also try to talk to everybody, particularly as the situation of the current government is such that we might not have anybody to talk to at all if we were to start setting various criteria, so we don't set them, we talk to those who want to listen to us, and who want to hear our arguments (I 15).

Another organisation:

> I don't think there are such organisations that wouldn't be able to function here, because as the name itself indicates (…), that one of the fundamental assumptions is openness to collaboration, and it might even be that we don't ordinarily agree with somebody, with what a particular organisation does, but if they have something to propose that fits into the context here, then sure, come along! (I 14).

A few groups and organisations therefore emphasised that the very creation of broad social and inter-organisational networks was their main value and area of activity. Among the other organisations, the networking of other groups and circles was frequently a method of obtaining support among followers and allies, or furthered the organising of resources, competences, and funds essential for carrying out their missions and goals. Openness towards broad-scale cooperation was acknowledged as both a pragmatic solution and a civil virtue standing in contradiction to the self-in-

terestedness of politicians. The representatives of the groups we talked to therefore provided numerous examples of activities favouring the formation of broad networks. They frequently embraced strategies that would not stand a chance in traditional organisational activities. These included joining many broad coalitions implementing varied goals, surrendering their own group's interests, or not revealing the identity or even the name of the group so as to accomplish goals together, and not applying self-promotional strategies.

The method of conduct our interlocutors spoke of was meant to break with the models dominating in political practice. The object of delegitimation here is therefore the practising of self-interested politics and economics. 'Politicking', a focus on affiliation (including to parties) characteristic of the political system, on the self-centred interests of a narrow group and the force-based resolving of disputes was contrasted in our interviewees' comments with pragmatic cooperation in which abandoning narrowly-understood interests contributes to a more effective resolving of group problems.

THE SEARCH FOR A BETTER FORMULA FOR DEMOCRACY

The third topic evident in our interviews concerned the delegitimation of the prevailing models of the functioning of non-governmental organisations. However, the changes demanded are the result – we believe – of the respondents' adoption of a broader vision of the processes in democratic management and the manner in which power is exercised, and are a reaction to how Polish democracy has been experienced. The measures of many of the organisations we investigated, and which were presented to us, resulted from the reflection that traditional formulae for managing third sector bodies are faulty: they do not give one a sense of agency, they are rigid, and they are based on hierarchical dependences. This was also why our respondents emphasised that the groups they represent are rather a 'collective', a 'coalition', a 'partnership', 'brand' or 'social movement'. In a few of these organisations, our respondents even spoke of themselves as an 'anarchistic structure', which from the very beginning had not wanted to be formalised. They emphasised their otherness in relation to traditional organisations, even if representing one of them:

> the story of (name of organisation) (...) began with a few people, who'd been working in other non-governmental organisations, deciding that they wanted to create a different kind of organisation that wouldn't make the same mistakes or model itself on those already existing (I 15).

In order to democratise the internal processes, the surveyed organisations developed, among other things, specific methods of management and decision taking. For some bodies, that meant functioning in the formula of a collective, in which the members take decisions jointly, including through deliberation over an online community forum. The leader was rotated in other organisations. In another, a local association that functioned as a social movement, it was indicated that the formal structure sometimes led to *unnecessary friction and a prestige-related power play*. Representatives of

an organisation with much experience in drawing up participative models emphasised in turn that a flat decision-taking structure had led to the *organisation displaying a reflective approach* and allowed it to adjust better to the changing conditions. Remarks indicating obstacles related to the rigid structure imposed by formalisation and NGO status were also voiced among organisations long functioning in this area. Respondents indicated the time-consuming necessity of *fundraising* and the related bureaucracy, the inflexibility of activities restricted by the requirements of working according to the project method, and also – which is important – the necessity of steering goals in a way approved of by the sponsors, which was sometimes described (as one says in non-governmental jargon) as *being at the sponsor's beck and call*.

In some of the groups investigated, and especially the squats and the food cooperative, formalisation – and sometimes professionalisation – is contrasted with *cordial interpersonal relations*. Attention was drawn to the affiliative character of the 'informality', emphasising that such a formula allows almost family-like bonds to be maintained. Its key aspects are the absence of hierarchy or unequal resources of power. This, according to our interlocutors, gives a greater sense of security and identification than occurs in classic NGO structures – many of which have transformed (as the respondents pointed out) in the direction of corporations. *You can't have a community and an hierarchy together – they are mutually exclusive states*, we were told. The bonds of community are supposed to provide not only support for the individuals, but also *empowerment* for the group as a whole, firstly due to the fact that they are formed by strong individuals, and secondly because the group's goals were internalised in the process of their democratic coordination. This mechanism was presented to us as another way of achieving effectiveness, not forced by procedures or the system of rewards and punishments characteristic of classic organisations.

The second group of values that our respondents talked about in relation to ways of exercising power may be classed under the category of civil activity. Apart from such activeness mentioned directly, the respondents also indicated related principles, such as the empowering of groups and persons, having a say, inclusion in decision-making processes, and cultural promotion. These values were emphasised both by groups oriented towards functioning within the sphere of public policy and by organisations focused on achieving concrete political goals (for example in a local government body), but also by the majority of organisations that understood their goal as supporting those who had become excluded, as well as newly-emerging civil groups. In this sense the groups investigated clearly accept democratic values – rejecting the hierarchical and paternalistic ways of exercising power practised by the governing elites.

MEASURES FAVOURING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GLOCALISATION

The fourth area of delegitimation of the system indicated in the interviews was related to the broadly understood influence of management on the environment. Our interlocutors distinctly emphasised the necessity for change in the relations between the economy and the natural environment. For most of the organisations investigated, the ecological aspect of their activities was very important. A picture emerges from

the interviews of the organisations having a very broad understanding of ecological goals. This embraces influence on urban spatial planning procedures, improvement in local city planning policy, combatting air pollution, promoting small-scale trade and local farmers in order to compete with the powerful enterprises, as well as activities towards justice in the world. We describe these political values and goals as the focusing of organisations on sustainable development in the broad sense. This specific attribute is particularly significant in our sample – with most of the organisations we surveyed working on some kind of redefining of the prevailing model of the economy, so as to create or promote a system that would ensure respect for social networks, interpersonal relationships, and the natural environment. Some of our respondents, and particularly from cooperatives and groups close to anarchism, expressed this attribute of their activity quite frankly, saying for example the following:

> Well, in regard to such let's say ideological values, meaning concerning what the particular group is to fight for, then I'd say that it's sustainable development in the cities, and good condi… better conditions of work for those working in commerce, and I think really that another such important value is simply a certain vision of commerce (…) it's about what happens on the part of the authorities, and a discussion of substance with them, and on the other hand an attempt towards constructing some kind of political front, a kind of general awareness (I 15).

As such, the goals related to sustainable development are closely tied to the ideal of the alternative economy – a combination of social justice and care for the environment. Apart from the directly expressed anti-capitalist and anti-systemic justification, the aspiration for sustainable development sometimes took on more 'moderate' forms presented by our respondents. This refers to care for public space in cities, collective self-defence against invasive developers, or social urban gardens, and so on.

The activities of social groups and organisations described by our respondents, aiming to implement values related to the environment, reveal a glocalisation orientation. The recipients of the measures we were told about were most often neighbours and residents of the neighbourhood or city in which the surveyed groups functioned. The above-mentioned ecological goals were connected to the organisations' strong attachment to neighbourhood and localness; measures undertaken took place above all among and for the local population. Even if residents did not participate in the activities, they were considered citizens who were obviously entitled to make use of the achievements of a particular organisation. In addition, the measures – including those for the environment – were undertaken by some organisations in specific spaces of influence, including such as squats, social gardens, food cooperatives or neighbourhood communities. Activity indicating care for the local community, for the nature in the region, for ecological farming, and so on, but also attention paid to honest trade or responsible consumption, was perceived by our respondents as a contribution to the change that should be happening on a global scale.

CONCLUSION

In the final section we refer to the research question, regarding the degree to which the activities of the alternative organisations we investigated can be treated as an expression of political protest, manifested in delegitimation of the political system, the character of this delegitimation, which areas of societal life are subjected to particular criticism, and to what extent they are a response to the turning point related to the worldwide economic crisis.

After all, an assumption in the Livewhat project was that civil society in the countries affected by the economic crisis would react with the emergence of alternative forms of resilience, which would not only mitigate the consequences of the crisis, but also – over the passage of time and with the growth in the scale of their activity – would be able to germinate a new quality, including in a political sense. The research does indeed seem to provide confirmation of the hypothesis that an economic crisis affects the character of the activity of alternative organisations, their goals, and the missions they adopt. This impact occurred to less of a degree through how the consequences of the worldwide economic crisis were felt in Poland, and to a greater extent through reflection related to observation of the changes taking place in countries particularly affected, and associating them with the process of economic transformation initiated in Poland in the 1990s. The organisations anticipated, as it were, the possible consequences of this process in the future, and clearly linked it to the adoption of a liberal direction in the country's economic growth. Such reflection stimulated both criticism of the method of exercising power, the institutions via which the systemic transformation was carried out, and the creation of an outline for an alternative social order, but – as needs pointing out – with distinct acceptance for the fundamental rules of democracy. As such in the case of our organisations covered by this research we are not dealing with total delegitimation, but only partial – applying to selected aspects of the political system.

The criticism aimed at the political system applied above all to ***how democracy was practised***, and especially its abandoning of respect for **civil empowerment**. However, it is important that this value is tied to another value of great importance to the respondents: democracy itself. Although the respondents did not mention this value directly, and it was not included in the catalogue of most important values, the activities of many of the organisations investigated derive from the reflection that the principles of democracy have not been implemented well in Poland, and in particular the development of forms and the practice of social involvement in decision-taking processes was given up on. The proposals formulated for improving the model of democracy tend to involve the rejection of representative democracy as not fulfilling its task, in favour of participative democracy involving broad-scale civil participation leading to co-governance in various areas of society. However, one could also say that it is leading to a different ethos of the citizen: as active, with agency, and responsible within the spatial boundaries set for oneself. We are therefore dealing with what Matynia, in relation to new social movements, calls the shifting of civil empowerment, or a 'revolution of rights' (Matynia 2016).

A different model of the practice of democracy has been called for. This would occur in realms of influence, meaning either within real limited spaces in which this influence is possible (such as squats, food cooperatives, and neighbourhood communities), or in online spaces. Hence the strong orientation in activity towards localness, which is treated as a realm that can be embraced by civil control, providing opportunities for realising civil empowerment. A different vision of democratic practices could be seen especially in the example of the forming of structures in the groups investigated, and in their method of managing the organisation, characterised by a departure from hierarchy and the classic one-person leadership in favour of group leadership, and – more importantly – the consensual taking of decisions. An attribute of practically all of the investigated groups was their experimenting with democratic practices, their search for a different, fairer model of power, a kind which empowers the individual to a greater degree, letting them feel influential. At the same time emphasis is placed very distinctly on cooperation, on inter-group solidarity, on self-help.

The political culture of the power elites, involving party favouritism, and the self-centred interests of groups and parties, as well as the adoption in public discourse of the principle of exclusion and tribal solidarity, not leading to a search for solutions to problems but only reinforcing ideological positions, became areas of delegitimation in almost all the organisations investigated. In their reaction to the behaviour of the political elites as described above, the respondents – both when commenting about them and when describing their own activities – adopted a *post-identity perspective* – which indicates an aversion in these organisations towards defining or justifying political goals, as well as in their defining of the beneficiaries in the sense of specific political identities or social categories. To give an example, left-wing or right-wing narratives were rare, as was the defining of groups in terms of poverty or age, since our respondents spoke rather of the need to work above divisions, of not supporting self-centred interests, of activity beneficial for all, and so on. Putting it more broadly, this desirable vision of democracy could be called *cooperative*. In some organisations, our respondents referred directly in this context to cooperative ideas from the turn of the twentieth century, and the vision of democracy that shaped them held by its creators (Błesznowski 2014).

Another dimension of the criticism and delegitimation of the political system concerned the direction taken by economic changes and the adoption of a sharply liberal course for the economy by successive governments in the early years of the systemic transformation, plus the intensification of its consequences at the time of the worldwide economic crisis. Respondents frequently indicated its effects in Poland, such as the destructive character of commerce based on large-scale shops, the contamination and degradation of the environment, reprivatisation and housing policy causing exclusion, and the alienation of local bonds. They also delegitimated liberalism as a general rule for economic growth adopted by many countries around the world.

The aspiration for change, as well as the intended scope of its impact, differs within the set of groups and organisations that we investigated. A significant portion of the organisations could be classified under the **type of critical legitimacy**, which we recall could be described as follows: a critical attitude towards the system, coupled

with simultaneous acceptance for its fundamental principles, as well as involvement in lobbying for change. This portion of the organisations is active in the public sphere. Another type is that of those organisations among which we can class cooperatives and squats, as well as organisations managing specific spaces, enclosed within spaces of autonomy, while the change called for should occur – as was presented to us – slowly, through an 'osmosis' of their practised lifestyle, based on principles other than those of the prevailing culture. This portion of organisations is close in this respect to the model of 'setting oneself up' in an unfavourable and frequently hostile social and cultural environment. This hostility is perceived as an effect of the domination of market forces over the good of society as a whole, and is manifested in the alienation of individuals, the self-interestedness of social groups (and politicians in particular), and the lack of respect for the environment, and so on.

This group of organisations covered by the study delegitimates the political system to the greatest degree, and the cultural system which is a consequence of it, while simultaneously expressing disbelief in the possibility of changing it. This is a response of withdrawal from the system, which Piotr Sztompka wrote about as a possible reaction to transformational trauma (cf. Herbst 2013). A risk for such groups is becoming shut away and functioning according to the model described by Jerzy Szacki in his book *Spotkania z utopią* as the 'utopia of the monastery'. It signifies a kind of group escapism, resigning from social change on a broader scale, loss of belief in the possibility of social transformations in exchange for the creation of a monastery: 'a monastery does not change the world, it forms an island on it', writes Szacki (1980: 60-62).

In regard to the theoretical deliberations presented above, we accept that a portion of the forms of urban movements observed, including part of our research sample, even if expressing their aspirations in the language of 'the right to the city', is situated decidedly in the area of new politics characteristic of the forms of protest of new social movements representing the type of critical delegitimation discussed here, or in the type proposed for the requirements of this article, of legitimation through the proposing of innovation. The vast majority of these organisations are tied to the ideal of democracy, while at the same time criticising various forms in which the idea has been implemented in Poland by successive governing elites. The practice of governance is an object of particular criticism, its blade directed both towards institutions of the democratic order, whose purpose it is to implement these principles and values, and towards the power elites who are responsible for this practice (Pluciński 2019; Herbst 2013; Korolczuk 2015) as well as the model of liberal democracy based on capitalist ownership relations adopted at the beginnings of the transformation. We are therefore dealing with an anti-systemic and anti-capitalist stance towards the political reality of the period of transformation in Poland, strongly accentuated by the greater part of the research sample, but also by a significant portion of urban movements. We are of course aware of the restricted nature of the material we have available. Nevertheless, many of our observations made on a purposely selected group of 18 organisations are confirmed in other research studies conducted on civil groups similar to our organisations, and described in Polish literature as urban social movements (Herbst 2013; Kurnicki 2013; Bilewicz & Potkańska 2013; Bilewicz 2015; Polańska 2015; Chimiak &

Iwińska 2015; Pluciński 2014; Pluciński & Nowak 2017; Zielińska & Wilczyńska 2019).

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THE RIGHT TO A RAINBOW CITY: THE ITALIAN HOMOSEXUAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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ABSTRACT: Nowadays, the legal status of homosexual people varies widely from one country to another (ILGA 2019). In many contexts, the homosexual social movement has played a central role in fighting heterosexism and homophobia (Weinberg 1983). Especially in the democratic world, the homosexual social movement has been capable of spreading solidarity and inclusion and also of leading changes in regulatory terms, with different results context by context (Adam, Duyvendak, Krouwel 1999).
The paper aims to point out the Italian situation and the main characteristics of the gay social movement in Italy as key factors of the social change. More specifically, the paper is aimed at recounting the political process and the symbolic and cultural factors that led the Italian homosexual social movement to impose itself on the social scene as a reality with its own specific identity. The paper's last section analyses the so-called "Italian rainbow cities", urban contexts where the LGBT community is highly concentrated and in which it is so active as to stimulate, in cooperation with the local urban administrations, capacity-building processes oriented to the construction and consolidation of LGBT people's rights and social inclusion.
KEYWORDS: Italy, homosexual movement, rainbow cities, Mayors, LGBT

INTRODUCTION

Homosexuality is an emotional interest and/or sexual orientation or behavior between people of the same sex or gender (Harrold 1999; Grueter & Stoinski 2016). The propagation of homosexuality in humans is difficult to determine accurately, although in many ancient cultures homosexual relationships were highly prevalent (Hekma 2006). Throughout history, some aspects of homosexuality have been admired or condemned, according to the various specific societies' sexual norms. In some of these, same-sex behaviours and attitudes have been generally accepted, even honoured (Hutte 1978). In other times and places they have been considered reprobate and illegal, prohibited and punished by law (Levine 1979).

Since the mid-twentieth century, homosexuality has gradually been disregarded as a crime or disease and decriminalized in nearly all progressive nations (Bernstein 2005). However, nowadays the legal status of homosexual relations varies widely from one country to another but jurisdictions which consider certain homosexual behaviors as crimes and punish them with severe penalties, including death, still remain (ILGA 2019)[1].

Urban contexts have played a central role in fighting heterosexism and homophobic pressures of a still very heteronormative society, with different results context by context (Weinberg 1983; Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999). Sexual identities sociologists have conceptualised cities, as Kath Weston notes, as an "escape from the isolation of the countryside and the surveillance of small-town life in contrast to the freedom and anonymity of the urban landscape" (1998: 274). These scholars have started to problematise the "gay imaginary" in which gay men and lesbian women conceive urban areas as synonymous of homosexual spaces and, consequently, leave rural areas in favour of urban areas. This imaginary was initially described by Weston as gay men and lesbian women of the 1970s started to flock from towns to the larger cities of the U.S. in search of a place to live out their homosexual identity.

More specifically, urban sociology spent time to recognise that sexuality is as foundational to the making of social and spatial orders as the categories of gender, class, or race. Initial insights into the place of sexuality in the city were hence restricted to consideration of the distributions of "zones of vice" and studies of "deviant phenomena" (Reckless 1962; Symanski 1974). However, those physical boundaries that urban sociology would define as "deviant spaces", became epicenters of an international countercultural identity movement that gave definition to the "gay self" and challenged broader heterosexual assumptions surrounding sex, gender, sexual orientation, and sexual identity (Lauria and Knopp 1985; Epstein 1987).

The increased visibility of lesbian and gay life in a range of Western cities in the

[1] Homosexuality is illegal and punishable by prison sentences and fines in 72 countries. The crime of sodomy is condemned with the death penalty in 5 Islamic nations (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen). The lack of tolerance towards the homosexual community is not a prerogative only of Asia and Africa. In America, in fact, there are (still) 11 countries that criminalize homosexuality, 9 in Oceania, and in Europe, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus provides for up to five years in prison for the crime of sodomy.

1970s and 1980s (San Francisco, New York, Amsterdam or London) saw pioneering studies emerge, highlighting the importance of gay neighborhoods ("gay ghettos" or "lavender ghettos") in the social, economic and political life of those whose lives fell outside the heterosexual "standards" (Weinberg and Williams 1974; Castells and Murphy 1982). For example, Humphreys (1972) has labeled as "gay ghettos" the neighborhoods connoted by marked tolerance of homosexuality and a clustering of gay residences and facilities. These urban areas are distinguished in their cities by the social practices of their users and inhabitants, the specificities of their economic activity, or their contribute to creativity or social integration. These territories have been characterized not only by the coexistence of diverse lifestyles, trajectories and identities, but were also used to conceptualize gay people as a legitimate minority group, having a certain "quasi-ethnic" status, and deserving the same protections against discrimination that are claimed by other groups in society. The "politics of identity" have settled nearby a notion of "gayness" as a not arbitrary social difference. Sociologist Manuel Castells' (1983) essential study on San Francisco documented many of these factors in rich ethnographic detail. He hypothesised that homosexual people moved into urban spaces because cultural change allowed for sexual "experimentation". Other scholars have since hooked upon Castells' analysis, describing further social dimensions related to mass urban migration into cities (Jackson 1989; Armstrong 2002; Brown and Knopp 2003). In contrast to the Castells ethnography, which states that the visibility of homosexual people and the spatial consequences are primordial in the process of resistance, Knopp and Brown, for instance, state that daily survival strategies can be every bit as meaningful and important in people's lives as revolutionary social change. They specifically look at the way in which queer subjectivities are constructed in small and non-metropolitan areas. The evidence from these researchers strongly suggests that upward, sideward, and multi-scalar flows of people and ideas may be just as important in the shaping of cultures and politics both in large and small metropolitan or non-metropolitan areas as simple downward flows. During recent decades, there has been a growing concern about the decline of "gay neighborhoods" analysis. This is in part due to a greater mainstream acceptance of certain gay and lesbian identities and lifestyles: on one hand, gay neighborhoods are no longer considered as a significant part of identity formation, self-affirmation and mutual support among sexual minorities (Gorman-Murray and Waitt 2009; Monaco 2019), on the other, decline of gay ghettos is an outcome of the domination of tourism and urban marketing strategies over these spaces (Alderson 2016; Corbisiero 2016). By the mid-1990s, as neoliberal policies drove an entrepreneurial and competitive urban regime, the need to market and promote the city as a "gay-friendly" place and an attractive destination to live in became paramount (Harvey 1989; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009). For some scholars (Floyd 2009) living in urban contexts has prevented the impact of the neoliberal lifestyle and has produced 'homonormativity' effects. Further salient factors characterised gay and lesbian migration into cities. Bailey (1998) has noted that gay and lesbian people were driven into the city by the desire for local political power and a general sense of safety and anonymity.

Recent urban studies have become arguably more important in the last twenty

years by considering the broader ways that urbanization shapes sexual practices, new homosexual identities and spaces of resilience (Browne, Lim & Brown 2007; Doan 2010; Hubbard 2011).

A part of these studies have taken up the project of analysing gay and lesbian lives beyond metropolitan centres by focusing on rural areas (Gorman-Murray, Pini and Bryant 2012; Gorman-Murray, Waitt and Gibson 2012) and, more recently, on smaller or "ordinary" cities (Browne 2007; Muller Myrdahl 2013). By contrast, the safety of gay ghettos within cities has been brought into question (Myslik 1996) and rural areas have also been advanced as sites of sexual liberation (Kramer 1995). In tandem, metronormativity has become a central queer critique of lesbian and gay studies, exemplified by works such as Herring's (2010) examination of the history of American queer anti-urban movements or Tongson's (2011) relocations of queer life to the landscapes of new suburbia, both of which demonstrate the limitations involved in constructing the urban as the authentic space of all gay liberation movements.

The focus of the paper is to point out the Italian situation and the main characteristics of the homosexual movement in Italy as key factors for the social change. More specifically, the paper is devoted to describing in detail the history of the Italian homosexual social movement and some of the most interesting effects that have been achieved at local and national level from a normative and social perspective. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyse the "Italian rainbow cities" patterns which configure a not homogeneous geography for gay and lesbians rights as a result of political and normative weakness. This focus puts emphasis on geography and socio-political patterns instead of sexuality. In doing so, it also downplays the connection between sexuality and urbanity, thereby contributing both to the growing literature within sociologies of sexualities and urban LGBT studies.

The first section is aimed at recounting the political process and the symbolic and cultural factors that led the Italian homosexual social movement to impose itself on the social scene as a reality with its own specific identity, although some of its inner niches are sometimes in conflict with each other. Despite some internal differences, the glorification and celebration of Gay Pride, and the frequent use of symbols (such as the rainbow flag) and non-verbal language, have given visibility to the requests of the Italian homosexual community, legitimizing its identity.

The second section of the paper is dedicated to the long Italian public discussion and to the various parliamentary proposals that have been made in Italy in the wake of the social movement and that only in recent years have resulted in some significant changes.

The paper's last section analyses the so-called "Italian rainbow cities" (Corbisiero 2013; Corbisiero & Monaco 2017). These are urban contexts where the LGBT community is highly concentrated and in which it is so active as to stimulate, in cooperation with the local urban administrations, capacity-building processes oriented to the construction and consolidation of LGBT people's rights and social inclusion.

The rainbow cities appear to be founded on a *milieu* of economic, political, cultural, social and urban dimensions whose main objective is to ensure a full citizenship to LGBT people. Quoting Marshall (1976) the right of citizenship is a status given to

those who are full members of a community; all the people who possess this status are equal with respect to rights and duties.

THE ITALIAN HOMOSEXUAL MOVEMENT: URBAN HIERARCHIES?

The Henri Lefebvre framework about the "right to the city" (1968) offers a series of perspectives regarding the political potential of the urban experience and helps us to understand how space as a social and historical set of processes is understood, constructed, lived, and perceived (Lavinas Picq and Thiel 2015).

Lefebvre's concern with the alienating impact of the modern city emphasised an increasing disconnection between urban inhabitants and their abilities to participate in the production of spaces that highlight the processual nature of capitalist social space (Harvey 2000).

While the citizens' involvement in the right of the city has gradually come to be seen as one of the crucial factors of democratic urban development (Purcell 2003), it remains unclear which of many LGBT initiatives should be included in the use of spaces (including services and infrastructure) and how to compromise between their often conflicting goals.

Many urban initiatives emerge in order to protect a certain space or place, like in the case of heritage protection groups, but also cultural or social centers, squats and so on.

The 1969 Stonewall Riots, for instance, mark the beginning of the modern "LGBT right to the city" and show that transformative events can have multiple enduring effects on the history of an urban movement. The riots certainly served as a catalyst for widespread mobilization (D'Emilio 1983). When they turned their attention to the cause of "gay liberation" they brought the tactical repertoires and collective action frames they had acquired in those other urban movements with them. These included adopting the concepts of "coming out" and "Gay Pride" as a way of creating visibility, disrupting heteronormative cultural codes, and generating a new socio-political identity, and the creation of "safe" spaces for political–consciousness raising. In Italy the scholars pay attention to the various political strategies and values that the movements adopt and the State–city-community relationships. Although a ranking of metropolitan areas by their all above gay and lesbian concentration finds low statical values even in Italy's most attractive cities as Naples, Rome or Milan, Italy was crossed by a wide network of associations which played an important role in shaping LGBT urban social movements and political activism (Curati 2013). Over time the level of diversity and complexity of this network increased, and its composition was dynamically changing with the transition of some organizations from the area of civil society to the field of public services or party politics and the emergence of new allies. The analysis of the multitude of speeches, projects, experiences and militant practices lived by the Italian LGBT movement suggests more than a path of slow and progressive evolution of the construction of a collective identity. Italian LGBT movement has lived a discontinuous overlapping of "political moments" (Prearo 2015: 17) that emphasise the breaks and the discontinuities between national, local politics and movement. The

Italian LGBT reality is still characterized by a multitude of political divisions and by a huge variety of collective actions that take place exclusively in urban contexts.

The US Stonewall riots caused, also in Italy, the birth of revolutionary groups, social movements, and sexual liberation collectives in various cities of the country, especially the largest ones, such as Rome, Turin and Bologna. While recognising the importance of these and other socio-cultural factors, the Italian political-structural environment in which LGBT organizations have historically existed has had a profound effect on the nature of organizations as well as their changing ability to influence Italian political outcomes. To use the language of social movement theorists, the political opportunity structure in Italy has not always been particularly favourable to LGBT movement organizations. In the spring of 1971 the association F.U.O.R.I (Fronte Unitario Omosessuale Rivoluzionario Italiano) was founded and through its own magazine "Fuori" started a critical debate on the homosexual condition in Italy (Rossi Barilli 1999).

Italian homosexual social movement's issues were considered interesting by the "Radical Party", who shared its same liberal and non-violent revolutionary attitude. Nevertheless, a negative policy legacy, the somewhat closed nature of the Italian political system and the lack of culture about civil and human rights came together to create comparatively adverse opportunity structures for LGBT organizations.

During the eighties, the Italian homosexual social movement reorganised its activities through the creation of "Arcigay", a cultural and recreational homosexual association of the Italian Communist Party (Pezzana 1996).[2]

At that specific historical time, in the wake of the feminist movements that had started in the previous decade, the Italian lesbians gradually abandoned the gay collectives, because they no longer felt fully represented by the logic and dynamics of male homosexuals. This process has enabled a cleavage mechanism within the homosexual social movement which quickly led to the establishment of associations made up of lesbian women only or trans* women only.

In 1982 in Bologna the first group of homosexual urban culture (its first name was "Collectivo frocialista"; it later became "Circle 28 June") was officially recognised by the City Council of Bologna. This event represents an important moment in the history of the Italian LGBT movement, because the institutional recognition of the homosexual movement by a local government legitimated its right to enjoy an institutional endorsement.

The new millennium brought additional progress toward the homosexual Italian movement's main goals of curbing homophobia as well as the ruling heterosexism. The main focus of the homosexual social movement's claims became the legal recognition of civil rights, above all same-sex unions, also requested by a strategy of continuous pressure on national policies in collaboration with other institutions such as media, political parties and universities. And not least a further goal was strengthening anti-discrimination laws.

[2] The first Arcigay association was born in Palermo, after the civic mobilization caused by the homophobic murder of two young gays. That crime generated a fast spreading of territorial gay, lesbians and trans movements and organizations.

In some urban areas, the Italian homosexual social movement achieved interesting results: in Rome, for example, the administration delegated the management of home services dedicated to HIV-positive people and AIDS patients to the LGBT associations. A decade later, Rome became the Gay capital, hosting the World Pride in the Jubilee year 2000 (Sanna & Bersacchi 2000; Barbagli & Colombo 2001). In this sense, the cities started a phase of reaching political participation aimed at a constant claim of civil rights (D'Albergo & Moini 2007). This kind of inclination has attracted more and more homosexual people to metropolitan areas.

The homosexual social movement generated a proliferation of associations and informal groups. This phenomenon on one hand has been a strong point for the whole LGBT community, which has established itself on the Italian social scene through a plurality of voices, expressions of diversified needs. On the other hand, the power disparity among the various associations and the involved actors generated some internal conflicts, often making the dialogue difficult among them, especially with the more subversive components such as queer and transgender people. These frictions were created around the power of "Arcigay" and its network abilities. In the process of restructuring the civil rights, "Arcigay" consultancy became increasingly formalised, giving rise to partnerships in which the local administration capitalised on the resources present in its area, recognising, in fact, the role of this organization as a broker between the social needs and the territories.

This division between institutionalization tendencies, carried out by "Arcigay", and movementist policies has been continually re-discussed and the birth, in the last ten years, of other associations such as "Famiglie Arcobaleno" (association of families with LGBT parents) and "Anddos" (association of gay clubs) exacerbated the conflict questioning the ability of militant communities to mobilise and produce social changes.

THE ITALIAN LGBT CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE POLITICAL AGENDA

LGBT human and civil rights advocacy is often described in monolithic terms. In politics and popular media, references to a "gay agenda" or a "gay rights movement" are ubiquitous. In early 2000's the increasing focus on human and civil rights led the Italian homosexual movements – not without difficulties – to insert the question of the equality of homosexual people's rights to the center of the political agenda. Thanks to a relentless and constant action of pressure by the homosexual movement and other actors of the Italian civil society, in recent decades "the homosexual issue" has attracted the attention of the Parliament and has fully entered the public debate. The discussion of Italian politics on the issue of LGBT rights and claims represents a break with a past of intolerance and exclusion.

Empirically, however, public policies in favor of homosexual people have been few and limited. During over twenty years, the Italian Parliament has never been able to pass a single law in favor of homosexual equality. Historically, Italian politics has faced for the first time the issues related to the rights of homosexual people only between 1988 and 1996, when a weak debate started about the legalization of same-

sex unions (without marriage) through a proposal of law for each of the legislatures of that period. Proposals would continue to come one after another until 2016, when Renzi's government passed the law "Regulation and discipline of civil unions between same-sex people".

Despite this partial result, not only is it still not possible in Italy for same-sex partners to marry, but homoparental families are not yet legally recognised. Two same-sex partners can register their civil partnership, but even if the couple is legally recognised, this does not apply to parental rights: the "non-biological parent" or "social parent" cannot recognise their partner's child as their own.

So, at present, Italian law does not protect the children living in these families, leaving it to the judges to grant a special adoption, when this is considered in the interest of the child, to registered couples who request it.[3] The judge's discretional decision to secure a relational-affective relationship with the non-biological children (with consequent waste of time and money) increases even more the distance with the "traditional" families (Gargiulo 2008; Romeo 2011). Thus, the current civil union law creates a sharp division between families with heterosexual parents and the rainbow ones, with the risk that the homoparental families can be labeled as "dysfunctional", because they do not follow the (hetero)sexual standards (Rinaldi 2012).

Unlike other Countries, a law that condemns discrimination based on homophobia and transphobia is also missing in Italy. So, this kind of behaviours is not considered as a criminal offense.

In summary, from a legal point of view, Italy still seems far from granting homosexual people a full citizenship. The regulatory deficiency has a number of consequences connected with one another. First of all, the institutional homonegativity generates phenomena of minority stress in homosexual people (Meyer 2003). As it is known in the literature, hostile and stigmatising contexts put individuals who belong to a discriminated minority in a continuous stress condition (Herek 2004). Secondly, the Italian legal deficit implies a necessary intervention by the courts, called to respond to instances of recognition of homosexual people's rights in an anti-discrimination function. Last but not least, these deficiencies have the effect to give more strength to the homosexual movement and, more in general, to the whole LGBT community (Pichierri 2014; Pini 2011).

The renewed title V of the Italian Constitution, that through the subsidiarity principle gives local authorities the opportunity to re-build and re-orient the legal system, has moved the homosexual social movement's claims to the local political level, too.

So, mainly in larger cities, thanks to the collaboration of some gender-sensitive Mayors, there is an institutional civic culture oriented toward integration and social inclusion through local welfare policies and cultural actions (Monaco, Urciuoli & Zaccaria 2015).

[3] Article 44 paragraph 1 of Law no. 184 of 1983 and subsequent amendment.

THE BUMPY ROAD FOR LGBT RIGHTS IN ITALY: THE ROLE OF RAINBOW CITIES

During the nineties of the last century homosexual social movements, in response to an inconclusive action by the national government, began to pressure local governments in various Italian cities demanding more social justice, at least locally. Within the framework defined by law, the local authorities have regulated the citizens' lives in view of the concrete (or sometimes symbolic) implementation on their own territory of a system of practices and inclusion services aimed at the homosexual population.

As a consequence, since that time, an unprecedented alliance between social movement and political apparatus has also given birth to collectives such as Cods (Homosexual Coordination of Democrats) or Gayleft of the Democratic Party. In this scenario, the less proactive national policy has agreed to delegate territorial policies to intervene. Local administrations proved to be less ideological and more pragmatic. The reasons why the homosexual Italian movement has chosen to address local administrations to face the regulatory gap are various: local politicians are more accessible, closer to local associations, they have good communication skills and a good degree of collaboration with the media system.

The engagement with the local administrations has been a good strategy that the Italian homosexual urban movements used to achieve their goals. Just in the context of this close collaboration some possible regulatory solutions around the right to the city concept found space.

So, while the Parliament left the various drafts (about civil unions, protection by discrimination and homophobia, health issues, etc.) to remain in the drawers of politics, associations tried the strategy to press the local political level. It was a strategy that was already attempted in some other European areas.

Regional governments have first adopted a series of innovative standards in terms of protection of LGBT people's rights, such as the recognition of forms of cohabitation different from marriage, as well as specific forms of contrast to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The regions of Tuscany, Liguria, Apulia, Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Piedmont, Umbria, Campania and Sicily issued regulations such as access to local services, contrast to discrimination, homophobia and transphobia, and the promotion of gender equality and policies concerning job placement.

The role of the homosexual social movement seems crucial in the constitution of the Italian "Rainbow Cities" (Corbisiero and Monaco 2017), places that not only have welcoming gay-friendly spaces, but that are also actively engaged at the local level to promote well-being, full inclusion and equality for LGBT citizens. On one hand these cities are engaged in the symbolic question of recognition, namely LGBT citizens' need for recognition of their identity, which was denied and disparaged by widespread prejudice. When administrations are assigned the role of guarantors of an area which respects diversity and minorities, what is called for is cultural action to combat prejudice. Along with the increasing importance of security policies on a local level, there is a growing focus on the need to guarantee the security of LGBT citizens as potential victims of homophobic and transphobic violence.

At present some Mayors have become the main sponsors of the Italian LGBT community and the local Governments have been the center of rainbow initiatives. This liaison became a reality because it simultaneously met two needs: on one hand, the LGBT population's needs, which required resources, visibility and recognition, on the other hand, the Mayors' needs, who aimed at legitimacy and popular support (Musi 2004).[4]

It was a very important accomplishment: thanks to the work of the LGBT movement, a traditionally national political issue was directed to and managed by a specific local system. The innovative and proactive nature of the so-called "rainbow Mayors" resulted in the institution of a pressure instrument on Parliament.

The Mayors, with their relative autonomy, and thanks to the direct support of citizens and LGBT associations, became ambassadors of a new debate aimed at achieving the objectives of equality at a national level[5]. In fact, the initiatives implemented on a local level have stimulated national parliamentary discussion. Waiting for a valid legislation involving the whole territory, some Italian Municipalities have therefore found valid alternatives and effective solutions to guarantee city rights to LGBT citizens.

As a recent research on Italian cities' degree of inclusion has highlighted (Corbisiero & Monaco 2017), "rainbow cities" in Italy are distributed throughout the territory (see Fig. 1).

The research, conducted as one of the activities of the "Osservatorio LGBT", research center of the University of Naples Federico II, classified some of the main Italian cities according to their level of openness. To give each Italian city a score, researchers built a statistical index from 0 (no inclusiveness) to 100 (maximum inclusiveness degree), starting from a set of variables, with different weights. The construction of the index provided for an accurate selection of indicators synthesised through the ACP method. More specifically, researchers considered forms, tools, performances and outcomes of services and policies implemented by local administrations for the social inclusion of LGBT people.[6]

[4] On July 7th, 1997, the Mayor of Pisa, Piero Floriani, created the municipal register of civil unions, guaranteeing the registered couples (whether same-sex or different-sex) to benefit from a series of services and policies reserved for residents in the Pisa urban territory. In the following years, many other Mayors followed his example.

[5] In 2005, the Democratic Party discussed the issue of same-sex unions in Parliament on a proposal by the first openly gay M.P. (Franco Grillini), supported by many Democrats' leaders of that time. During Prodi's government, the bill on Di.Co. (Rights and duties of persons permanently living together) proposed by members of the Left Democrats and the Radicals was presented. None of the Parliamentary proposals was passed because of the strong influence of the Catholic and conservative forces. In particular, these insisted on eliminating the possibility of adopting the partner's child from the Law 20 May 2016, n. 76. (Cirinnà 2017).

[6] See Corbisiero and Monaco 2017 for the complete research.

Figure 1. Ranking of Italian rainbow cities



Source: Corbisiero & Monaco 2017

The majority of Italian rainbow cities is in the Northern part of the country. The city of Turin in 2001 was the first to adopt a service for monitoring and fighting discriminations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In 2006, the same municipal administration became promoter and leader of the RE.A.DY, a network of public administrations that choose to adopt good practices with respect to issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity (Gusmano & Lorenzetti 2014).

In Milan, the important role of the homosexual movement, together with the role played by a social and commercial network, allowed the construction of permanent institutional and private services: the gay self-help line, the rainbow library and other consulting services. The Milan homosexual community has encouraged an ongoing

strategic partnership with the city administration, supporting the creation of regional networks, partnerships and alliances.

In Southern Italy the main rainbow city is Naples, which lived over time a series of socio-political changes. Since the "Grand Gay Tour" times, the capital city of Campania is considered to be a capital of tolerance. In Naples, the rainbow community has gradually conquered different areas of the city: squares (such as Piazza dei Martiri formerly and Piazza Bellini later), as well as many streets. The Mayors that have managed the city from the nineties until now have all paid homosexual issues a great attention. They have sponsored events, initiatives, Gay Pride parades. In 2008, the Municipality has established the "LGBT table", where administration and associations sit and evaluate together the most appropriate strategies to be put forward.

Farther south, the city of Palermo has also distinguished itself for being one of the first to establish the municipal registry for marriages contracted out of the country. In order to protect the fundamental rights of the person, the city government has promoted the largest Gay parade in southern Europe, the "Palermo Pride" in 2013 and promotes each year the "Sicily Queer Film Fest".

Virtuous actions developed by regions and rainbow cities are designed to serve at least three purposes: from a political point of view, these actions ensure the recognition of rights, policies to fight discrimination and promote the differences; from a socio-cultural point of view, these actions are useful to give visibility and to listen to the needs of the LGBT population in order to stimulate a change in mentality and fight homophobia; from the standpoint of daily life, these actions are important to establish specific community services such as the social and healthcare assistance or legal and psychological counseling.

The Italian local governments are the most fit for understanding the problems of the LGBT population thanks to the presence of a new generation of seamless experts and specialists in various fields of equal opportunities policies.

CONCLUSIONS

At the dawn of the third millennium, the issue of homosexual people's rights has become one of the pillars of the global discourse about equality (Richardson 2005). From this point of view, during the last decade the European Union has implemented policies, guidelines and strategies to contrast any discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, founding this work on the principle that all European citizens have equal value and equal dignity. Although EU law does not compel member States to recognise relationships or marriages between same-sex people, several countries in Europe have adopted same-sex marriage or civil forms similar to the legal recognition of the marriage institution (Colley 2007). Not without problems, as seen in the Italian case.

Through the right to "full citizenship" a sense of collective belonging (Parsons 1976; Durkheim 1970) and individual guarantees is acquired (Weber 1924), that qualifies people as members of a "community". As such, the citizen becomes the subject of specific rights and duties. Typically this is the granting by the State of "political and

civil rights" (freedom of speech, thought, association, property, voters) and "social rights" (electorate, right to work, right to strike, access to subsidies, pensions, social services, health, education…). Each citizen must comply with the laws of the State and all the social conventions. However, in heteronormative societies, homosexual people are not always able to live a condition of full citizenship, having to negotiate their participation in social life on the basis of rights they are only partially granted (Lauria & Knopp 1985; Soysal 1994).

The proactive role of the Italian homosexual social movement between the end of last century and the beginning of the present one has shown that Marshall's hypothesis of the close connection between the rights of citizenship and the enjoyment of the human rights is not always real, and for homosexual people this phenomenon is still more visible (Phelan 2001).

In Italy, the antidote to stigma, intolerance and prejudice based on heterosexism was the search for practices and principles of social inclusion, regardless of the laws in force at national level. Civil rights, those of individual freedom and equality before the law, have thus emerged thanks to the development of the urban homosexual movements.

Seen from this critical angle, it is clear that the process of freedom from homophobia and, more in general, discrimination against sexual minorities in the Italian society is accompanied by subsidiary and territorialized policies (D'Amico 2014). Under the European pressure from the center (government) to local (municipal), the principle of LGBT citizens' equality appears more and more complex, since it must take into account political, legal, and cultural identities, not always equally oriented to the implementation of practices of social justice (Plummer 2003). In this sense, the triangulation made up of "Mayors – local movements – cities" appears to be virtuous and winning, since it has acquired the traits of otherness and autonomy from the national context. Political inertia and the lack of Italian legislation isolated and forced the rainbow cities to find their own solutions in the field of citizenship rights, generating public policy devices and a number of services and good practices at the local level that are much more effective even than those of other European countries where homosexual people are safeguarded by national government initiatives.

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INVENTING URBANITY: URBAN MOVEMENTS IN POLAND

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ABSTRACT: The article discusses the process of formation and transformation of urban movements in Poland. Conclusions are based on the data collected during the research project "Urban Social Movements in Poland" supported by the National Science Centre. For the requirements of the project was adopted a method of qualitative research using the techniques of in-depth narrative interviews, participant observations and secondary data analysis. The author conducted 30 in-depth interviews with leaders of urban movements from sixteen cities. The article describes the process of structuralization and the creation of identity of the Polish urban movement and their role on the local political stage, stressing, in particular, their significant role as a creators of a new discourse in Polish cities.
KEYWORDS: urban movements, Poland, city, urbanity, urban polices, discourse

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The article consists of five sections and a summary. In the first part the author describes research objectives and methodology. The second part is dedicated to the analysis of the initial phase of development of Polish urban movements after the accession of Poland to the E.U. In the next, the author describes the process of structuralization and the creation of identity of the Polish urban movement. The fourth section describes the process of mobilization of urban movements in Poland. In the last part, the author discusses the role of Polish urban movements on the local political stage, stressing, in particular, their significant role as a creators of a new discourse in Polish

cities. Finally, in summary, the author describes some problems which Polish urban movements will have to face in a new context.

The article discusses the process of the rise and development of urban movements in Poland. The conclusions presented in the article are based on the results of a research grant Miniatura 1 017/01/X/HS6/01204 "Miejskie ruchy społeczne w Polsce" (Urban Social Movements in Poland) was supported by the Polish National Science Center[1]. Field research was conducted in 2017-2018 in sixteen Polish cities: Białystok, Bytom, Gdańsk, Gdynia, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Lublin, Łódź, Katowice, Kraków, Mielec, Poznań, Sopot, Toruń, Wrocław, Warszawa, Zielona Góra. The choice of these cities was determined by two main factors. Firstly, in these cities urban movements have the longest and the richest tradition, which allows the analysis of them during a long term perspective, and treating them not only as spontaneous grassroots mobilization but as *structured* social movements. Secondly, choice of different sized cities, fulfilling different functions, gives a wider perspective and allows the perception of specific features of Polish urban movements.

The fieldwork was collected over 30 in-depth interviews with leaders of particular organizations. An important addition to the empirical material, which is based on in-depth interviews, was also participant observation focusing on processes of formation of urban movements in Poland during the last decade. The choice of qualitative methods, (in-depth interviews and participant observation), results from the very nature of the research problem. An important advantage of in-depth interviews is the possibility of a holistic approach, which stems from the fact that the research is carried out in its "natural environment". Unlike surveys, in-depth interviews are less structured and thus they enable the customization of the specific content to the particular context of the study, in the case of this study, the possibility of modification of a particular content while keeping the general scheme of the interview, enables researchers to grasp the specificity of different cities. The in-depth interview included questions related to the following issues: (1) the origin of particular urban social movements, (2) their structure and goals, (3) common frame and self-identification, (4) evaluation of local urban policies and the role of local urban movements in (re)creating such policies, (5) evaluation of local public debate on urban issues .and the role of mass-media in such debates (6) the future of urban social movements in particular cities as well as at the national level. However, it should be stressed that a qualitative method have some limitations. The information collected during in-depth interviews are often marked by the respondents' biographical experiences, including their worldview, available knowledge and ability to process it. Therefore, in my study I am using various research techniques: participant observation as well as analysis of secondary data documents, it is possible to examine interviews critically. By applying various research techniques, I was able to triangulate the results as a control of the research material.

URBAN MOVEMENTS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Urban movements have become an important power in contemporary cities. The

[1] A detailed analysis of the results of this project was conducted in Kubicki (2019).

growing importance of urban movements has resulted in increased interest both in various academic disciplines as well as in journalism, which has resulted in a significant number of publications on this topic. Paradoxically, such interest has contributed to blurring this term, so that many different activities in the city space are defined in terms of "urban movements". In fact, the city space has always been a scene for collective behavior and mobilization of social movements. From ancient times to the present day we can identify a long list of protests, rebellions, revolutions etc., which took place in cities, but they have not been defined as urban movements. This was because the term "urban movement" was introduced into sociological language relatively recently, just at the beginning of 1970s. The first time this term was used was by Manuel Castells in his "The Urban Question" (1977)[2] and was developed this concept in his other book "The City and the Grassroots" (1983). For him, urban social movements developed around three major themes: (1) demands focused on collective consumption, (2) defense of cultural identity associated with and organized around a specific territory (3) political mobilization in relationship to the state, particularly emphasizing the role of local government (Castells 1983). Even when the term "urban social movements"[3] was introduced to academic language, it didn't mean that the matter of urban movements become more clearer. From that time, in response to the consequences of the urban crises, globalization and ascendant neoliberal polices, a new wave of urban activism has been emerging. A lot of analysis of such activisms have stressed the different structural aspects, features and goals. Therefore, in sociological literature on urban movements we can find various definitions of urban movements stressing various aspects and features. It has happened for at least three reasons. Firstly, because of the fact that, as pointed out by Anna Domaradzka; "urban mobilization takes many forms, including traditional civil society organization (grassroots neighborhood organization, housing association, local interest groups), as well as protest initiatives (against profit-oriented urban polices or commercialization of public resources) or political movements for environmental and social justice" (Domaradzka 2018: 607). Secondly, as a consequence of every changing of social, cultural, economic and political conditions, therefore, as described it Magit Mayer, every decade, since 1970s, the specificity, structure and goals of urban social movements have been changing. (Mayer 2011). Thirdly, and probably the most important in this context, is the fact, that theory of urban movements developed in relative isolation from social movement theorizing generally. Despite some positive aspects of this, Chris Pickvance identified three negative results of such isolation. Firstly, it meant being cut off from general social movement theory. This was highly significant, since from the 1970s this theorizing was undergoing an explosive growth. Secondly, isolation led to some empirical lacunae. For example, the process of mobilization was neglected in early writing on urban movements. Thirdly, a separation was established between studies of voluntary associations and their interaction with authorities, and studies of urban movements. The final point about the "separate development" of writing on urban movements was

[2] Original publication in French, 1972.

[3] In the article I use the abbreviated form "urban movements".

that it was partly influenced by the rise of interest in "new social movements". More usually urban movements have been categorized as an old social movement like the labour movement, because of the allegedly material character of their demands. To study them was therefore to study a residue of diminishing interest. This view contributed to the lack of interest in urban movements among writers on social movements generally (Pickvance 2003: 104-106).

These arguments indicate that in order to analyze urban movements we should create an operational model which takes into account the complexity of the context in which they develop and act. Therefore, I have based my research, on urban movements in Poland, on three main assumptions. Firstly, I understand urban movements according to the definition of Hans Pruijt, who defined them as: "Urban movements are social movements through which citizens attempt to achieve some control over their urban environment. The urban environment comprises the built environment, the social fabric of the city, and the local political process" (Pruijt 2007: 1). Secondly, the structure, goals and strategy of Polish urban movements were formed by the specificity of the transformation of Polish structure at the beginning of the 21st century, driven by accession to the EU (2004) and coming to power a new generation (new bourgeoisies) at the beginning of 21st century. Thirdly, they are a part of the new social movements according to Claus Offe definition (Offe 1985) and their activity and frame of reference are determined by: (1) Spatial turn (Foucault 1986; Soja 1996), determining the intellectual discourse of the contemporary urban question. (2) A significant shift in the subjectivity of the city as a frame of reference which determined collective identity and behavior (Glaeser 2012, Barber 2013). (3) Consequence of neoliberal polices and urban crises (Mayer 2011, Harvey 2012, Florida 2017).

THE ORIGIN: INVENTING URBANITY

Polish urban movements, for many reasons, have been developing much later then their Western counterparts. According to my respondents, the origin of Polish urban movements is dated around 2007-2008[4]. This date also indicates the beginning of new waves of Western urban movements which have been mobilized as a reaction to the financial crises of 2007-2008. In the Polish case however, urban activism has different roots. This is a consequence of the specifically Polish urban question. In order to clarify this situation, it is necessary to shed some light on the specifically Polish context.[5]

The process of formation of a Polish national identity within an ethnic model in which Polishness was almost exclusively described from the perspective of noble culture and peasant folklore, and the idea of the city was presented in terms of foreign values threatening the homogeneous ethnic culture. The notion of the city and urbanity as a foreign, outside national entity is one of the most durable stereotypes functioning in Polish culture. While over past centuries Western Europe was experiencing a period of dynamic development of cities and urbanity, in Poland, however a whole

[4] Some grassroots organizations which had transformed into urban social movement set up a few years earlier.

[5] A detailed analysis of this process was conducted in Kubicki (2016a).

set of unfavorable circumstances, along with the ongoing historical processes, caused Poland to experience this process only marginally. With the lack of its own sovereign state throughout the whole 19th century, enormous damage in the physical tissue and socio-cultural aspect taken during the Second World War, the anti-bourgeoisie politics of the Polish Republic of People and process of ruralisation of cities – all of these factors had an influence on the exclusion of urbanity from the national public discourse. At the end of 1980s Polish sociologist Jan Turowski described the Polish urban question as: "a country of accelerated industrialisation and delayed urbanisation" (Turowski 1988: 200-201). Moreover, Polish cities were among the most culturally diverse cities in Europe up until World War II, inhabited by people of different nationalities and religions. As a consequence of World War II (the Holocaust, displacements etc.) the multiculturalism of Polish cities was completely destroyed. Additionally, the multicultural heritage of cities, especially those with German and Jewish heritage, was perceived as foreign and dangerous to Polish monocultural identity, and thus eradicated from national public discourse after World War II. As a result of the factors described above, the new inhabitants (post-war migrants) of cities for a long time sought legitimation for their social and cultural identities mostly in the idea of the nation and family ties, rather than in the cities where they lived. Consequently, in Polish society, but especially in the cities, there has accrued a so-called sociological vacuum. (Nowak 1979). In such a vacuum, the only levels of identification were 'family' in a narrow sense and the 'nation', understood as an imagined symbolic community; the 'city', meanwhile, remained an alien, or at best an indifferent space. Therefore, just at the beginning of the 21st century, the Polish urban question was described by Ewa Rewers in this way: "in this respect, Polish cities are deficient, their urban character is unrecognised, and the consciousness of the city overlooked" (Rewers 2010: 14). All these factors strongly influence the specific character of Polish urban movements which, at the beginning of their process of formation, put attention on different issues than their Western counterparts. Polish urban movements predominated by well-educated urban middle class were focused mostly on cultural issues, such as: identity and heritage of the city, esthetic of the city, spatial planning. Therefore, the first stage of their formation could be described as a process of "inventing urbanity" (Kubicki 2016a) rather than in terms of an idea of "the right to the city" a common frame of global urban movements.

Polish urban movements have been developing in an evolutionary way. There was no one single milestone which could initiate mass mobilization, as in case of many social movements. There were rather a set of structural changes and opportunities since the beginning of new millennium. Therefore, it is difficult to indicate concrete dates of the first stage of formation Polish urban movements, but for the purposes of this research project I suggest that it was 2007-2014.

One of the most significant outcomes of research data was the fact that in each city, activists are firmly convinced that they are a pioneers of urban activism in their cities. A typical answer to the question about the legacy of urban activism in a particular city was like this: *No, we're self-taught in this field.* (...). *We learned from each other, from our own experiences*. (RM11). *We, as activists, had to invent everything, all the procedures, all*

the know-how (RM10). *To be honest, I don't remember there being any organization that would be treated the city and urbanity in such a holistic way.* (RM22). In fact, in Polish cities in 1980s and 1990s acted social movements which could be defined as proto-urban social movements. These organizations were especially connected with anarchist movements (Żuk 2001, Pomieciński 2016, Pluciński 2016) and environmental movements (Gliński 1996). Some sociologist stressed that in these processes we should seek the genesis of contemporary Polish urban movements (Nowak 2015, Pluciński 2015, Wróbel 2011.) In practice institutional memory of such activism has been completely erased. Contemporary activists are absolutely convinced that they have nothing in common with social movements form 1980s and 1990s. For example Kraków is the city where in 1980s and 1990s the environmental movements had the strongest tradition (Gliński 1996: 296). But contemporary activists who are focusing on the main problem of this city's – air pollution, when being asked if they draw on experiences, knowledge from of such previous movements, answered: *No. I don't think so, because we didn't have anything to draw from either.* (…). *KAS* (Krakow Smog Alert) *was the first organization to take up the subject* (air pollution). (RM06).

This belief, that urban activity in Poland has a pioneering character is also consequence of the fact, that local grassroots activities for long time were just "invisible". It was because they did not fit into an intellectual framework describing civic activity in the Polish pattern of culture which was predominated by "grand narratives". Moreover, Polish urban middle class were widely described as a beneficiary of the transformation and, in fact, for long time they also self-identified themselves in this way. Therefore, they were not interested in social mobilization, protesting, developing social movements, and it was a time of "social non-movement" (Nowak 2006: 110). The consequence of this situation was that: "the appearance of urban social movements on the stage of civic activism surprised sociologists in Poland". (Pluciński 2015: 412–413). Polish urban movements have appeared as a new phenomenon both for sociologists and journalists who wish to describe them, as well as for their own activists themselves: *We, as activists, had to invent everything, all the procedures, all the know-how* (RM10). Therefore, respondents asked about a sense of common identity of Polish urban movements answered, that it is: *a generational experience* (RM11). In sociology the term of generation is defined as: "a group of people who have experienced the same important historical events, who have experienced the same situations, who have reacted to the same situations" (Sztompka 2005: 154). In the case of Polish urban movements "the same experiences" which have linked people and organizations together, could be describe as the process of "inviting urbanity". A cited respondent's sentence depicted this process: *And so it began in Gdańsk, we slowly began to discover the tools of participation and set up such a group of people from the cultural circles and architects, and we did such activities as were also done in other cities at that time, such as walks, historical-architectural walks, or reading the city through literature, through art, well, there was a lot of it in our country, which really fuelled such a trend for urban activism.* (RM01) Each generation requires new narrations to legitimize new identities. In this particular case, the Polish urban movements, inventing urbanity and using it to legitimize their new identities. The crucial role in this process was fulfilled by a

new social category in Polish cities, the so called "new bourgeoisies". The rise of the new bourgeoisies has been observed since the very beginning of 21st century. This social category is defined as 30-40 years old, children and grandchildren of peasant migrants who have grown up in cities and have started building their identity in relation to urbanity and the urban culture. Research on the new bourgeoisies indicates that they are crucial to the process of redefining the role of urbanity and the urban culture in Poland (Kubicki 2011, Galent and Kubicki 2010). Moreover, a new urban economy, based on production of symbols and knowledge, makes the urban cultures attractive for them and are loaded with more positive values. Also, the process of integration within the EU created new opportunities for urban activities. One of the key principles of the EU – free movements of goods, services, capital and labour, stimulates diffusion of urban patterns of culture, good practices etc. This aspect was often stressed by respondents during interviews, when they were asked: 'why have you decided to engage in urban movements?', they often answered: *first of all, the ERASMUS programme, because thanks to that we could travel around and see how other cities look, you could see how the public space looks* (RM16). *I had the opportunity to travel a lot in European cities, I saw a better world and I asked myself why could this not be in ours cities.* (RM20). The process of inventing urbanity has opened new opportunities for the new bourgeoisies. Engagement in urban activity was also correlated with the sense of self-fulfilment, while other ways of self-realization were already blocked by older generations: *Warsaw in 2007 was in a specific period, it was a "white town" and it was intertwined with discussions about public space and I, at that time 23 years old, could join to this and become a leader. It was enough to take up the topic half a year earlier to frame the rules of the game.* (RM16). The generational dimension of Polish urban movements determined that they are predominated by people of the similar age of 30-40 years: *Statistics of our Facebook fanpage show that the average age of people who are engaged are 30-35 years old.* (RM06), *Mainly it is people about 35 years old* (RM13). Also other researchers indicated that grassroots local activism in Poland are predominated by this cohort. Marek Nowak investigated volunteer organizations in Poland, and stressed that they consist of the similar cohort, namely 31-49 years old (Nowak 2015: 286). However, Dominika Polańska analyzed activists in informal initiatives that were formed in various Polish cities and focus on some specific urban issues in their activity, indicated that the average age of activists was 33 years (Polańska 2018: 3–4).

In the time when urban movements have been forming in Poland's cities, there have taken place some very important processes: during the years 2007–2011, eleven Polish cities were involved in the competition for the title of the European Capital of Culture 2016. This competition brought crucial changes in many spheres of city life, played an important role in the process of shaping local identities and strengthened social capital and could be described as the "European Capital of Culture effect."[6] The most important consequence of the "ECOC effect" has been the fact that the competition triggered intensive public discussions about urbanity and urban culture in Poland.

[6] A detailed analysis of ECOC effect was presented in the book: Kubicki, Paweł. and Bożena, Gierat-Bieroń and Joanna Orzechowska Wacławska. 2020, *The European Capital of Culture 2016 effect: how the ECOC competition changed Polish cities,* Berlin: Peter Lang.

Therefore, for many activists the "ECOC effect" was perceived as the milestone in the process of inventing urbanity: *It could be said that such a stirring of social movements, which was triggered thanks to the European Capital of Culture competition, could have a feature of a "levée en masse" of various groups and organizations, especially connected with culture policies in the city.* (RM09). *It was (ECOC) such a kick that if I have to indicate the date of a new era of* Łódź*, it was from that moment, for sure.* (RM11).

The processes described determined the context in which Polish urban movements have been forming in the first decade of 21st century. Therefore, despite the fact, that urban activism in Poland is diverse (Domaradzka 2017, Domaradzka and Wijkström 2016, Kowalewski 2013, 2016, Kubicki 2013, 2016b, 2017, Pluciński 2015, 2018, Pluciński and Nowak 2017, Polańska 2016, 2018, Piotrowski and Polańska 2016), in the first stage Polish urban movements has been predominated by the new bourgeoisies and their requirements and interests. As Pluciński pointed out, in Poland: "Ideas created by these three visionaries Jane Jacobs, Jan Gehl, Leon Krier were points of reference for many urban movements and initiatives. (Pluciński 2018: 12). But the context is changing and in the same way is transforming the character and goals of Polish urban movements.

EMOTION: SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

The processes described above have created a specific urban frame of reference. Thanks to this, urban activism found a fertile soil for their development. But it could not have been an engine for development of social movements. As Castells suggests, social movements are based on emotions, their creation does not begin with the creation of a programme or a political strategy. According to him, for social movements the crucial point is spinning off emotion into action (Castells 2012). Anger and frustration are the emotions which most often stimulate mass mobilization and social movements. Also, in the particular case of Polish urban movements, the crucial mechanism which has transformed grassroots activity into urban movements was the rising anger and frustration at neoliberal urban polices. In my opinion a good illustration of such a process is a respondent's answer to the question about motivations involved in urban movements: *I've always been interested in the city, in 2003-2008 I was frustrated by neoliberal governments, and in 2009 I decided to get involved, to get beyond the monitor.* (RM12). Respondents indicates that the most common reason for involvement in urban activities was the chaos in spatial planning. The "spatial chaos" has become a catalyzer of mass mobilization, at least, for three reasons. First of all, after accession, thanks to EU funds, as well private capital, Polish cities have become a huge "construction site", what was a consequence of their deep infrastructural backwardness. But, this construction boom coincided with a lack of urban policies, the deregulation of spatial planning, and the dominance of neoliberal ideology. Moreover, in the first years of this construction boom there were not a public, civic control of spatial planning in Polish cities, and this sentence could be a good example of the problem: *we went (to the City Hall) for the consultation of the local plan with the authorities – announced according to the law - and the officials are completely lost because someone had actually arrived.*

They had to organize for us a room, because people completely did not use such participatory tools even that was introduced in 1997, and that was 2007. (RM01). The overlap between these three factors has led to the spatial chaos: *These are the consequences of transformation and accession to the EU, the consequences of this wild capitalism: investments, developers, shopping centres, office buildings and hotels etc., all at the cost of something* (RM13). The cost of such "development" of Polish cities was the devastation of green areas, neighborhood identity etc. Respondents indicated that the problems with special planning issues were the main reason for social mobilization and the setting up of local, grassroots organizations which, over time, have transformed into urban movements. Paradoxically, it also influences the specific structure of Polish urban movements which were, in the early stages, dominated by middle-class professionals (architects, urbanist, sociologist etc.) from big cities where the construction boom had the greatest impact on the local environment: *There are some dozens of organizations in the Urban Movements Congress, they are mostly associated with the middle class, intelligentsia, with the academic character of big cities.* (RM13)

STRUCTURALIZATION AND IDENTITY

As Pluciński pointed out: "The urban initiatives and movements that started emerging in 2007–2008 in Poland's largest cities were at first isolated and unaware of the larger context. They were, however, quick to develop their own counter discourse, praxis and strategies as well as (re)construct local public spheres while facing the long tradition of non-urbanity, non-participation and the challenges of neoliberal urbanism" (Pluciński 2018: 660). In fact, in the first decade of 21st century in Polish cities there emerged many of the grassroots organizations which had more in common with NIMBY groups or debating clubs than with urban social movements. The situation has changed thanks to the inherent processes of integration. These processes took place on two levels. On the one hand, it was the formalization of the local urban activities, establishing official structures, mostly by setting up legal associations. On the other hand, it was the nationwide networking - establishing cooperation between the urban movements from dozens of cities.

When it comes to formalization on a local level, respondents indicated two main reasons which determined this process. First of all, it was about ensuring greater cohesion and integration, especially in the case of these organizations which decided to stand for local election: *I think, and I suspect that most people in the association agree with me, that it is important to have an official association. This is a good example of the history of formalization: it was said from the beginning that it is important (registration of association), but everyone postponed it until later and at the moment of the first crisis in 2014, when three ours city councilman jumped ship, or were expelled - it was no longer important - then we realized that we need a formal procedures for members and therefore it was a quick submission of documents to The National Court Register and registration at the beginning of 2015.* (RM18). Moreover, respondents indicated that official structures increased the importance of urban activity especially in the context of their relations with local authorities and the media: *Often it (the association) is used as a "windbreak-*

er", because there are just few people hiding behind this association, but officially it is an association and so it gives it a higher status. (RM08). The process of formalization was also a response to the specific nature of Polish urban movements. Everyday practice of these urban movements are not a spontaneous protest or 'happening' but it consists in disputes with local authorities and/or developers on formal and legal grounds, entering into consultations, pursuing litigations, etc. For these reasons they need to have an official structure registered at the *National Court Register: I am absolutely sure, that without an official structure, many of the things we have done so far could not have been done. (…) We were involved in two judicial proceedings at the Provincial Administrative Court, also in relations with the City Council, and we can be a participant in administrative proceedings, initiate administrative proceedings when it is necessary (…)they can't get rid of us so easily then, we are able to exercise the law.* (RM05). However, the most common model of urban movement structure has a hybrid character. Such a model consists of a small number of "core" – people who are official members of an association and dozens of those who engage themselves occasionally in direct action. Such a model enhances efficiency and creativity, as well gives legitimization in the local community, as a representation of "ordinary people" and not as just only as NGO experts.

The most important aspect of structuralization has been the development to the nationwide level. The crucial role in this process has been the establishment of the Urban Movements Congress. UMC was established as an informal structure in June 2011 in Poznań during the first[7] meeting of urban movements from all country. UMC has become the milestone for urban activism in Poland for many reasons. Firstly, because, and thanks to UMC, the term "urban movement" was introduced into Polish public discourse[8], which has allowed Polish urban movements to create their own identity*: It seems to me that we have been using this term: "urban movements" since that meeting (UMC), we worked it out there, and we dared to use it there.* (RM01). Secondly, during the congress activists worked out the Urban Theses[9], which become a common frame joining urban movements in Poland. The Urban Theses based on the crucial values of Polish urban movements: (1) Sustainable development in the spirit of the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (2007) – long-lasting, protectiveness towards space, nature and other resources, and oriented towards the quality of life. (2) Participatory urban democracy, combining the will of the majority with the protection of human and minority rights. (3). Social solidarity – ensuring equal opportunities, just social relations and the support of the urban community for all those in need of such support[10]. The Urban Theses became both common ideology (so-called "city-view"), as well as a specific code creating *esprit de corps* of Polish urban movements:

[7] In fact, in 2009 in Łódź and Lublin, took place meetings in which were gathered grassroots organizations interested in urban issues, but no one has ever defined their activities in the term of "urban movements."

[8] There is a common conviction, both with researchers as well activists, that the term "urban movement" describing urban grassroots activism in Poland was the first time used in this time.

[9] In Poznań 2001 was the working out of 9 Theses, next, at IV UMC in Gorzów Wielkopolski in 2015 it has been extended to 15 Theses. More about it: https://kongresruchowmiejskich.pl/urban-theses/

[10] https://kongresruchowmiejskich.pl/tezy-miejskie-spis (27.06.20).

For us, these Theses are, I would not like to call them the Bible, but they are such a code, if you want to be among us, you have to accept it. (RM15). Thirdly, regular congressional meetings: Poznań (2011), Łódź (2012), Białystok (2013), Gorzów Wielkopolski (2015) cities of Silesian Region (2017) Ostróda and Iława (2019), have become a kind of ritual which integrates activists and builds identity of urban movements. Integration within the UMC also allowed for the creation of a communication and networking structure. UMC, as I mentioned before, was established as an informal structure, but since 2017 it exists as a legal union of associations. Today the union consists of 44 organizations[11] from all around the country. Respondents evaluating the role of UMC stressed two important features. Firstly, UMC fulfills the role of urban think-tank which produces and shares knowledge and good practices, gets legal and expert support for each organization and stimulates networking: *We have an opportunity to networking, exchange ideas, experiences, from the perspective of different cities, access to expert knowledge: architectural, jurisprudential* (RM24). Secondly, especially in smaller cities, membership in UMC *increases the prestige* of urban activism: *such awareness that we are associated in such a larger network is very positive for me personally, because I remember those times when we were perceived here as such local activists from a garbage cans or pavements, and now we are not, because we are creating a network of more than 30 urban movements from all country.* (RM15).

Such integration within UMC framework has allowed various and often different organizations to create a common identity of Polish urban movements despite their diversity. Such identity could be described according to the Pluciński's definition of Polish urban movements. The author writes that they: "share some characteristics in spite of their diversity: (1) they consider themselves urban, (2) they are locally based and territorially defined, and (3) they mobilize around the three major goals: collective consumption (or public infrastructure), cultural identity and political self-management' (Pluciński 2018: 7).

URBAN MOVEMENTS AT THE POLITICAL STAGE: THE POWER OF DISCOURSE

The process of developing of urban movements and crystalizing their identity resulted in the situation that they began to play a significant role on the political stage. In 2010, the first Polish urban movements "My Poznaniacy" (We, the Inhabitants of Poznań) stood for election to the city council in Poznań. They received quite a good result – over (9%), but in accordance with the electoral system - the D'Hondt method - they did not get any seats in the city council. The situation significantly changed during the next election in 2014, when urban movements created an electoral coalition of 9 organizations for all the country. In some cities they received very good results, in Gorzów Wielkopolski and Poznań[12] were elected to the to the position of mayor, and it was widely described in Polish media as a great success of urban movements. In the same year, two other events showed the growing power of urban movements. In Kraków, the

[11] State of affairs on the day: 27.06.2020.

[12] In fact, Jacek Jaśkowiak who was elected as the mayor of Poznań was an official candidate of the Civic Platform, but he, as a former member of local urban movement, had their support.

local urban movement "Kraków przeciw Igrzyskom" (Kraków Against Games) led to a local referendum on the Winter Olympics in 2022. Despite an intensive and very expensive advertising campaign made by the authorities, the 2022 Winter Olympics was rejected by a majority (69,72%) of the voters, with a high (by Polish standards) turnout (35,96%). In Warsaw, however, the urban movement "Miasto Jest Nasze" (The City is Ours) published the "Map of Reprivatisation" which showed connections between politicians, businessman, real estate companies, and lawyers who were involved in the chaotic and dubious processes of real estate reprivatisation in Warsaw. The map has had broad publicity and had significant impact on political reality in the capital of Poland.

Thanks to these reasons and the electoral success in 2014, urban movements began to be perceived as an important player on the local political scene. Therefore, in the next election in 2018 they were often presented as a third power on the cities' political stage. However, despite the fact of mass mobilization and their relatively good publicity, the general result of this election was well below expectations. The main reason of this situation was a specific political context which predominated Polish reality during that time. Even though it was a local election, the character was determined by a nationwide political conflict - a deep polarization between two politics blocks: democratic and pro-European "Civic Coalition" versus populist and nationalistic "The United Right." Therefore, a local election was in fact a plebiscite between two dichotomic forces, and there was no space for a third political power. But even in such an adverse context, in many cities urban movements received some seats in city and/or district council.

Polish urban movements have come to power not through the politics institutions, but thanks to the creation of a new discourse, a new narrative. It occurred because of two main reasons. On the one hand, it was a consequence of the specific nature of the new social movements (Offe 1985, Melucci 1980) – with whom Polish urban movements have much in common. The new social movements are dominated by a well-educated middle class having high resources of cultural capital and thanks to this, having supremacy on the discourse level. On the other hand, it was a consequence of the way in which Polish urban movements have been described. In the first part of the article, I discussed – referring to Pickvance – problems with a weakness of theory of urban social movements as a result of isolation theory of urban social from social movement theorizing generally. However, such a theoretical weakness has also positive results for perceiving urban movements in public discourse. For Pickvance, the first of such a positive feature was the focus of urban movement writing on effectiveness. The very definition of urban social movement referred to a level of effect, not to a type of organization. The effects involved could be urban (improvements in public services) or political (changes in power relations). A second was the interest in political power. A third was the concentration on the political context in which urban movements developed. This recognized that urban movements were not spontaneous responses to objective inequalities or deprivations but formed more easily under certain social and political conditions than others (Pickvance 2003: 104-106). Classical theories of social movements put attention on the processes of mobilization and verbalized collective

activity in the city space: rebels, protests, happenings etc.. Therefore, they are often presented in public discourse as a movement of protest or outrage and not as creators of a new narrations. But, in the time, when the production and control of information is one of the main attributes of power, in analyses of a social movements we should pay attention rather on this aspect, and not only on analyses of the type of organization or collective actions. It is especially important in the particular example of Polish urban movements, because the main effect of their activity, is not an ability for mass mobilization and significant protests in the city space, but efficiency in realization of their demands - thanks to the ability to creating a dominant interpretive discourse. Such discourse according to Alain Tourain: comprises a set of representations and ideas that constitute a mediating authority responsible above all for constructing an image of the whole of an individual's social life and experience, where at the intermediary level – that of ideological discourse – intellectual choices take place and conditions of communication are forged that impose the rules of the game, and afford some and not others the privilege of being listened to. (Touraine 2009). Such a privilege of being listened to (according to urban policies) has becoming the privilege of urban movements: *In my opinion, the media and politicians, have begun to speak the language of urban movements, I don't know if it was only before the elections or on a permanent basis*. (RM22). *Our presence in the media has made us more professional, as partners to politicians and not as cranks*. (RM18). Urban activists are recruited mostly from well-educated middle class, professionals: urbanists, academics, artists, journalists: *We try to interest the media about our activity, because urban movements from all over Poland are attracting such people…: specialists, journalists, artists, these are people who are very conscious of the media, social media and can create such a message*. (RM22). Therefore, they have an over-representative influence on a dominant interpretive discourse and they are, above all else, the generators of new meanings, symbolic systems and values, which are the foundations of socio-cultural changes in Polish cities. The power of Polish urban movements lies not in their numbers of seats in the city council, but in their ability to create a public discourse and impose their narrative on others.

SUMMARY

Polish urban movements has been developing over the last decade. During this time they have gone through various stages of development, from spontaneous and atomized local grassroots organizations to nationwide social movements with well-defined identity and structure. They have become significant social players in Polish cities, having the ability to create and impose their own narration about the city and urbanity. They have taken also co-responsibility for the development of urban policies, both on political stage as well as at expert level. However, they will have to face some problems which will determined their future development. According to the research data, two main issues have been identified. First of all is a problem of "stealing narration". During interviews all respondents indicated that local authorities have took over their narration, the language of urban movements. It was because of this, that in Polish cities the period of huge public infrastructural investments has finished. There-

fore, local authorities, in order to legitimized their power, have been looking for a new narration related to issues about the quality of life and sustainable development than spectacular investments as previously was the case. Paradoxically, success of urban movements – introducing their demands and ideas into the public discourse, has put them in an uncomfortable position. They are losing their most important advantage - the language of story of the better city. Today, the same language is spoken by authorities and urban movements will have difficulty in the future to distinguish themselves from them.

Secondly, in the case of almost every organization, respondents stressed that they have a serious problem with the recruitment of new members, especially from the younger generation than the cohort of 30-40 years old. This problem is determined by two factors. On the one hand, this is the consequence of the generation identity of Polish urban movements. Generation identity creates strong social bonds between people who have participated in the generation's events, and who have experienced the same situations. However, it also creates symbolic boundaries which exclude others who have not had such common experiences. On the other hand, the problem of recruitment is also connected to issues of language. The language of Polish urban movements used to be revolutionary a decade ago, nowadays, this is the language of the mainstream. Therefore, it could not mobilize a younger generation who wants "the change". Moreover, over the last few years in Polish cities there has emerged many of the new and more revolutionary political forces which recruit their members or/and supporters mostly from the younger generation. On the left side there are a new left political parties (Razem and Wiosna), and also very popular with the younger generations are women's movements, as well as youth environment movements such as Extinction Rebellion or Global Climate Strike. On the right, however, there are nationalistic and populist movements which are growing in power, as well as backlash movements protesting against progressive policies in cities, especially in the context of sustainable transport polices.

Despite these problems, Polish urban movements still have dynamism, and new organizations are still joining the UMC. However, the new context in which they find themselves will undoubtedly require a new urban agenda for urban movements.

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‘MEETING OF WATERS?’ RECONSTRUCTING THE LANDSCAPE OF THE POLISH RIGHT TO THE CITY ACTIVISM

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ABSTRACT: For over a decade, the explosion of various forms of urban activism has been observed: so-called urban social movements or the right to the city (RTTC) movements actively participate in the realm of non-institutional politics. This trend has been observed both worldwide and in Europe, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland is also a clear example of this tendency. The paper presented aims to achieve two goals. First of all, it is based on desk research and offers a broad literature overview, indicating the main directions and results in urban activism research in Poland of the last ten years. Recalling and discussing the broadest possible body of literature, with particular emphasis on Polish-language references, should be useful for international readers and researchers. Secondly, the paper attempts to synthesize these current research results, including the authors own research results, identifying the complexity of the field of urban activism. As a result, it points to various entities using the RTTC slogan in their social struggles, consequently identifying two main types of RTTC activism: radical and middle-class petit-bourgeois movements.
KEYWORDS: urban social movements, the right to the city, middle-class-based / petit bourgeois activism, radical activism, anarchist activism, tenants’ activism

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of the *meeting of waters* is well-known as one of Brazil’s natural wonders. Near Manaus, Brazil the streams of two rivers converge: the dark water of

Rio Negro and the pale sandy-colored water of the Amazon River. Differences in the rivers' physical characteristics cause the two rivers to flow together side by side, without mixing, for several kilometres. This phenomenon seems to be an apt metaphor for trends in urban activism in contemporary Poland, as urban social movements (hereinafter: USM) can similarly be distinguished based on differing characteristics. At the same time, as the author points out, the multiplicity of various backgrounds of civic engagements and different institutional forms it takes can be reduced to two key currents: the radical and reformist, i.e., new petit bourgeois urban movements.

The article thus pursues two aims: (1) to offer a comprehensive overview of existing – to a large extent Polish – literature, thus constituting a form of *desk research*, while at the same time referencing the principal directions and conclusions of studies of urban activism in Poland during a period approximately corresponding to the past decade (ca. 2010-2020). The body of literature referenced here, with a particular focus on studies published in Polish, can be useful for international readers and researchers interested in both urban activism, as well as social movements in general; (2) it offers an attempt at the synthesis of the conclusions of current studies, illustrating the complexity of the field of urban activism while attempting simultaneously to reduce said complexity. In this regard, the article follows the direction undertaken two decades ago by Margit Mayer: to streamline and simultaneously reveal the principal trends of activism by showing the richness of urban civic society. Mayer suggested that two types of self-organization emerged on the urban scenes of the contentious politics at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries: (1) "radical, 'autonomous' protest movements and marginalized protest of the new poor people's movements" and (2) "middle-class-based, quality-of-life-oriented movements focused on protecting their home environments" (Mayer 2000: 138-139; 145).

THE PREMISES AND LIMITS OF ANALYSIS

The article's primary thesis states that two principal trends exist in contemporary Polish urban activism. As highlighted previously, the article refers to the results of existing studies, including the author's own research results, then synthesizes them. Due to the synthetic character of the material, many detailed arguments are invoked here in an equally synthetic way, though always in a manner consistent with the elementary principles of academic analysis, referring the reader to primary sources and studies on the issues in question. References to two policy papers cited in the text (*Tezy dla kierunku* 2010, *Tezy miejskie*) and the surrounding discussion are an example of this type of approach.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Although the article is not primarily theoretically oriented, it is also not 'transparent' or utterly atheoretical. The background to the discussion proposed in the paper is a particular perspective within the field of critical urban theory: the concept of the right to the city (hereinafter: RTTC). Drawing on Engels' and Marx' intellectual heritage

(Merrifield 2002), the concept of RTTC was originated by the French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (2000), and then developed by his students and contemporary followers.

In Lefebvre's view, the right to the city is defined as a universal call for the radical transformation of urban, implicitly capitalist, reality. As a French thinker put it: "the right to the city is like a cry and demand (…). The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life" (Lefebvre 2000: 158).

The openness of the idea of RTTC is, however, burdened with a considerable degree of ambiguity. This is, moreover, thanks to Lefebvre himself, who while constructing the RTTC category, on the one hand, openly referred to the activist perspective of social movements, using his experience and connections with the Situationist International, which Castells then developed sociologically proposing the concept of "urban social movements" (Castells); on the other hand, Lefebvre proclaimed the need to create modern urban studies, with the normative intention of going beyond capitalist social relations, which, in turn, was most effectively developed by critical human geographers such as David Harvey (2012) and others.

The ambiguity of the RTTC category mentioned here, which is for some of Lefebvre's followers one of its most vital advantages (Purcell 2002; Marcuse 2009; McCann 2002) – for example, allowing David Harvey to treat the RTTC concept as an empty signifier (Harvey 2012: XV) – was also subjected to critiques, both from the activist (de Souza 2010) and academic perspectives. Some academic critics refer to the argument that the concept of RTTC is rather an ideological slogan than a scientific, analytical category (Gottdiener, Hohle, & King 2019: 385). They offer, therefore, a narrowing understanding of what the right to the city is. Other critics, in turn, point out that for years too much emphasis has been placed on the category of RTTC, which has led to other conditions of urban mobilisation being ignored. They, therefore, offer a perspective beyond the RTTC (Uitermark, Nicholls, & Loopmans 2012).

The article, in turn, adopts a broad understanding of the RTTC concept – treating it as a kind of umbrella concept combining the activist perspective that provides a framework for social mobilization and political action, as well as ontological and epistemological, knowledge-based approach (Pluciński 2020b). Nevertheless, in its core, analytical part, the article focuses primarily on urban activism, indicating which social forces use RTTC categories and how they understand them. This follows David Harvey's observation as "everything depends on who gets to fill" the RTTC category "with meaning" (Harvey 2012: XV).

FROM URBAN BOOM TO THE NEW URBAN QUESTION

Cities and urbanity around the world, and by extension, within Poland, have been particularly popular topics for well over a decade. The reasons for this are, of course, complex, though one fact is significant: in 2007, the *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs* (UN DESA) announced that over 50% of the global population lives in cities. Despite doubts as to the UN's demographic criteria (Brenner 2013: 101-102),

the horizon of our experience is no longer a predictor of an "urban society" (Madden 2012), but the reality of an "urban explosion" and planetary urbanization (Brenner 2014).

The apparent results of such intense and unprecedented urbanization are tensions and crises. These tensions were pointed out roughly five decades ago by Henri Lefebvre, for example, in his *The Urban Revolution* (2003), with a multitude of continuators in tow. These include both more sociologically oriented researchers such as Manuel Castells (1977) or Mark Gottdiener (2010), as well as human geographers (Harvey 2003; 2012; Purcell 2002). Aside from internal differences between disciplines and positions, these researchers are in agreement as to the inherent relationship between capitalism and its crises, and cities (Brenner & Theodore 2002).

Contemporary urban crises are thus a derivative of neoliberalization[1] (Brenner & Theodore 2005; Harvey 2007; Juskowiak 2015; Szmytkowska & Sagan 2012; Sagan 2016). This neoliberalization resulted in the acceleration of specific processes, which shared in common advanced commodification as well as striving toward successive mitigation of collective consumption (Castells 1977; Forrest 1991). One of the main features of neoliberalisation process has been the dismantling of the welfare state, which for several decades has effectively reduced systemic tensions through interventions and provision of „housing, socio-cultural facilities, public transport and so on, i.e. the whole sector which the economists call 'collective goods' and which are characterized (in terms of liberal economics) by the fact that they do not meet the price of the market" (Castells 1978: 18). In other words, the intervention of the state, "in order to take charge of the sectors and services which are less profitable (from the point of view of capital) but necessary for the functioning of economic activity and/or the appeasement of social conflicts", as Castells put it (1978: 18), was defined as unnecessary.

Consequently, interest in cities as spaces for just and egalitarian living was consistently reduced. The result of all of these processes is the birth of the new urban question (Merrifield 2016; Baranowski 2016). Merrifield, one of the principal protagonists of the abovementioned perspective, in constructing his urban narrative, was not only a co-creator of a sociologically-supported *urban theory*, oriented both towards

[1] On the one hand, the neoliberalization process is universal, but on the other hand, it has taken on different forms in different regions of the world, due to local, sociohistorical conditions. While in the countries of Western Europe there was a welfare state to dismantle, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe it did not even exist. Neoliberalization was therefore, in a sense, more efficient here (Hardy 2009), and certainly it was introduced in a 'time compressed' manner. As stated by Kerstin Jacobsson: 'while processes of privatization have of course taken place in the West as well, these adjustments in the urban patterns have been taking place much more gradually. Moreover, urban development in the West has been more strongly guided by public planning and the negative effects mitigated by public policies. The post-socialist countries, on the other hand, moved from central planning to a haphazard and chaotic urban development following a permissive laissez faire during the first 15 years of economic transformation' (Jacobsson 2016: 11). The specificity of urban struggles against neoliberalisation, their significance for the birth of a new urban question and the structural conditions for the birth of urban movements in a certain, Polish context, are discussed in this issue in more detail by Marek Nowak (2020).

the descriptive (how it is), and the normative (how it should be), but also advocates open engagement with urban reality. This post-Lefebvreian perspective is currently experiencing its second life as a reference point for the most recent wave of activism under the umbrella term of USM. These volunteer pursuits focus on crises (as poorly solved urban problems), yet are anchored in set normative visions, whose endpoint is the 'dream city' (Pluciński 2018).

URBAN CRISES IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND

The universal processes referenced here, are of course mirrored on the national and local levels. The reality of post-transformation urbanization in Poland is a model example of capitalist remodernization. The shift from real socialism to actually existing capitalism (Brenner & Theodore 2002) is a process, through which, partially as a result of time compression (Jacobsson 2016: 13), cities became arenas for numerous conflicts (Sagan 2000; 2016), that comprised sensitive urban crises. They can be characterized as follows:

(1) urban modernization in Poland – just as the process of transformation itself – was imitative but at the same time on a wholly different scale. Showy projects (Gądecki & Kubicki 2014: 145; Rek-Woźniak 2017), predicated on the belief in the ability to reproduce the Bilbao effect, a phenomenon whereby cultural investments and spectacular architecture are supposed to spark developmental impulse for cities (Plaza 2000), became the symbols of progress. In times of a public finance deficit, this resulted in a policy of cuts in spending on mass consumption;

(2) in turn, there was a radical withdrawal by the public sector from active participation in housing policy, which was intentionally left to the free market (Tsenkova & Polanska 2014), or the pursuit of land rent by developer capital (Domaradzka 2019). Housing became commodified (Kostka & Czarnota 2017; Polanska 2010; Stephens, Lux, & Sunega 2015) and financialized (Aalberg 2016), which led to a massive divestment of communal housing stock by city government, as property restitution (Kusiak 2019), and such pathological phenomena as "unrestrained reprivatization" (Ciszewsk & Nowak 2016; Śpiewak 2017; Siemieniako 2017) and "tenement cleansing" or the widespread implementation of "social containers" (Czarnota & Piotrowski 2018). Gentrification also began to increase (Pobłocki 2014a).

(3) The radical commodification of urban space and the pursuit of land rent also intensified spatial conflicts (Mergler 2008; Mergler 2011) as well as spatial disorder. The neophyte cult of the free market, in its exploitation of the oversights of the era of real socialism in this aspect, resulted in the rejection of spatial planning and of the institutional and social oversight of urban space (Kusiak 2018).

(4) Suburbanization also increased (Kajdanek 2012). The relatively low purchasing power of urban dwellers along with the rising prices of land and housing in

city centres – a result of, among other causes, Europeanisation of the real estate market – pushed some real estate buyers outside the cities and popularised the "suburban perspective", turning cities into transit zones between urban workplaces and suburban residences.

(5) Consequently, transportation slowly became an issue (Filar 2012) – primarily as an effect of suburbanization and policies of limiting expenditures on public transport. This bolstered the tendency to transform the transport needs of residents into private trouble (Krysiński, Uss-Lik, & Szczepańska 2020).

(6) At the same time, ecological crises become more apparent. Tensions surrounding urban ecologies in general (Mergler 2008), whose departure points were numerous locational conflicts and the related clearing of urban green spaces, served today as an exclusive departure point for crises of a more complex composition related to air quality (Grzechnik 2018), access to water or energy-related problems and climate change.

(7) The final element of these crises – one that plays out primarily in the symbolic domain, but mirroring nevertheless the "hard" processes referenced here – is the urbanization of consciousness, constituting to some extent an element of, as Paweł Kubicki put it, the "invented urbanity" (2016). At stake in this process is the redefinition and construction of a new urban identity built on a relatively strong and well-nurtured legacy of an agrarian and to some extent "non-urban" society (Jedlicki 1991). This is, to a certain extent, a continuation of the processes of urbanization of identity through the proletarization of the peasantry that settled in the cities (Pobłocki 2011).

These crises are intersectional in nature, mutually determining one another and creating complex networks of connections. For example, the housing crisis that pushed residents into the suburbs (while in turn pauperizing other segments of the population), generates increased commuter traffic, transforming the city into transit zones and strengthening local policies that privilege individual automotive transport, often at the cost of urban greenery, at the same time generating additional ecological problems – such as those related to energy consumption and air quality. This chain of connections is, of course, a simplified one. The complexity of these crises is mirrored in the complexity of conflicts fought over the city itself, in correlation with Castells' classic hypothesis, who openly wrote that: "the plurality of contradictions occur through the agents being in contradictionary places within the same (...) urban system" (Castells 1977: 270-271).

THE COMPLEX LANDSCAPE OF URBAN ACTIVISM

The above catalog of post-transformation urban crises allows for initial identification of the complexity of the field of conflicting interests. Their cause was the ineffectiveness or – according to social opinion – an unacceptable trajectory of particular urban policy. Ryszard Grobelny, the long-time president of Poznań and a symbol of unilat-

eral transformation with a neoliberal bent, upon losing power after 16 years of office, quipped anecdotally during a subsequent interview about the urban social movements that contested his policies: "I created them myself" (Bojarski & Lipoński 2014). In a manner similar to Grobelny, the presidents of Łodź, Gdańsk or Warsaw also created their local "critics". The result of the gradual appearance of more and more new conflicts, reactions and protests (Urbański 2002; Mergler 2008; Pobłocki & Mergler 2010) was the progressive crystallization of the wide spectrum of social forces that constituted the resistance against neoliberal urbanism, thus defining the field upon which "conflicts over the city" were conducted. Necessarily, various propositions to describe said field began to appear. Studies that eventually appeared on the topic defined the following actors:

(1) (neo)anarchist movements, which were also closely tied to squatter movements. Organisationally, they are comprised primarily of urban divisions of the Anarchist Federation (though not exclusively), among which the most active groups are those in Warsaw, Poznań, Kraków and the Tri-Cities; primarily limited to large urban centres;

(2) tenants' movements. While these movements are a country-wide phenomenon in Poland, they tend to primarily operate in larger urban centres. However, they are also active – with various levels of success – in smaller cities. The most recognizable entities are Wielkopolskie Stowarzyszenie Lokatorów [Greater Poland Tenants' Association], Warszawskie Stowarzyszenie Lokatorów [Warsaw Tenants' Association] or the Warsaw-based Komitet Obrony Lokatorów [Tenant Defence Committee] (Polanska & Piotrowski 2015);

(3) workers' movements, which at first glance are peripheral from the perspective of urban problems. They do openly define the question of labour as a crucial urban problem, directly tied to issues related to spatial order and the housing question (Urbański 2011b). They are often closely tied to (neo)anarchist and tenants' movements;

(4) so-called petit-bourgeois movements, occasionally defined as new petite bourgeoisie movements (Kubicki 2011) or "middle-class urban movements" (Mayer 2000). Structurally and in terms of discourse, they are the strongest and equated by certain researchers with the entirety of the phenomenon of urban movements;

(5) local and grassroots initiatives. These are quite numerous but less institutionalized. They tend to most often emerge around auxiliary councils, schools, playgrounds and neighbourhood communities (Pokrzywa, Prokopczuk, & Tarkowska 2017);

(6) third-sector organizations active in the field of city policy and urban issues (Lewenstein, Gójska, & Zielińska 2020). They tend to be institutionalized and formalized. They are, at the same time, as diverse in their ideological backgrounds,

social base or even practices and operational strategies as the third sector itself. At one extreme are associations with a low level of institutionalization, while at the other, entities that are at significant risk of *quango*ization (Drozdowski 2011);

(7) activists operating as individual agents of change.

It should also be noted that political parties and local administrative bodies are also active in the field of urban problems (Pluciński 2014b; Kowalewski 2016). Aside from the normal responsibilities of political parties, particularly parliamentary ones as the "forces of authority" responsible for urban policies, the problem of "logics of interception"—sometimes realised by parties and local administrations in the field of urban conflicts—will be briefly addressed below.

They took the form of colonization through "programme borrowing": attempts to appropriate the labels of urban movements[2] or open recruitment of notable activists into party ranks. Of course, this essentially pertains only to petit-bourgeois USMs. Two relatively young, left-leaning and progressive parties were particularly active in this area: Partia Zielonych [The Greens][3] and Razem [Left Together][4]. The latter is an intriguing case—initially clearly appealing to grassroots activism and the social movement tradition, with an emphasis on a horizontal organizational structure. Liberal parties were also "poaching" in the field of urban activism, parties such as Nowoczesna [Modern][5] (which in 2015, during the 8th parliamentary term, brought two female MPs with previous ties to urban movements into the Polish Parliament) as well as Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform][6], who at the turn of 2014/2015 attempted unsuccessfully to court urban movements.

Beyond the parties themselves, local authorities also practiced "interception logic", employing prominent activists in appropriate specialist departments dealing with urbanism, transport, and revitalisation. This occurred most often in Warsaw, Łódź, Poznań and Kraków, and is a complex issue. To reduce it to two mutually exclusive themes, it is worth considering that on one hand the capacity for the "neutralization" of activists as critics of local city policy through employment, and on the other, the

[2] During a local election campaign in Lublin in 2018, there was a controversy concerning the use of the urban movement label by right-wing and liberal-conservative groups tied to the Kukiz ''15 political movement and the "Wolność [Freedom]" party. This caused a conflict with activists previously operating under the name "Lubelski Ruch Miejski" [Lublin Urban Movement); Cf. T. Maciuszczak, *Lublin: Kto jest ruchem miejskim, a kto nie* [Lublin: Who Constitutes an Urban Movement, and Who Does Not]. Retrieved May 10, 2020 (https://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/wybory-2018/kto-jest-ruchem-miejskim-a-kto-nie,n,1000225571.html).

[3] Partia Zieloni [The Greens] – a Polish political party with a progressive, pro-ecological platform, and an emphasis on social justice and sustainable progress.

[4] Lewica Razem (Razem) [Left Together] – a leftist political party with a social-democratic stance, close to that of democratic socialism.

[5] Nowoczesna [Modern] – a Polish centrist/liberal party, with a strong emphasis on free-market ideology.

[6] Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform] - a political party with a primarily liberal-conservative stance, with some consideration of Christian democratic values.

activists' own belief in working more effectively from inside the administration (this happened in Poznań, where an urban activist named Maciej Wudarski became the vice president of the city, whose responsibilities included overseeing transport between from 2014 to 2018).

THE DISCUSSION AROUND THE ONTOLOGY OF URBAN MOVEMENTS

The proposal for a description of the field of urban conflicts outlined above, inclusive in its intent, was discussed by, among others: Anna Domaradzka (2018), Joanna Erbel (2014), Maciej Kowalewski (2013, 2016), Przemysław Pluciński (2014a; 2014b) and Marek Nowak (Pluciński & Nowak 2017), Kacper Pobłocki (2012), Tomasz Sowada and Jacek Kotus (2015, 2019), Joanna Grzechnik (2019), Grzegorz Piotrowski and Mats Lunsted (2016), Piotr Żuk (2018) and finally Barbara Lewenstein (2020). Though it is not the only viewpoint present in the discussion surrounding urban movements in Poland, other proposals have been of a restrictive nature.

Marta Żakowska, an activist and editor of "Miasto" [The City]—an important magazine to the fraction of petit-bourgeois USMs that are likely to work with local governments—outlined, in turn, five types of urban movements: redistributive, social (focused on helping to create local identities), civic (interested in participation and decentralization), ecological, and gender (Żakowska 2013: 17). This view, though adept in its reconstruction of a significant part of the urban activism space, marginalizes the importance of movements of neo-anarchist origin. Assuming that in the author's view, there is indeed space for neo-anarchist, squatters', and tenants' movements, they would in all probability constitute a fraction of redistributive movements, which is not an entirely accurate depiction of their identity.

Another activist, Lech Mergler, places neo-anarchist movements distinctly outside the sphere of USM, in writing that they are not: "an agreement between non-mainstream political movements, such as anarchists, feminists, alterglobalists, greens (…)" (Mergler 2014: 90); a perspective similar to that of other researchers: Karol Kurnicki (2014), Paweł Kubicki (2016a, 2016b), Joanna Kusiak and Wojciech Kacperski (2013), Jan Śpiewak (2015, 2016), Katarzyna Łuczak (2013, 2015), and also to some extent Tomasz Sowada nad Jacek Kotus (2015, 2019). There was also a lively discussion on the topic during a panel entitled "Social Self-organization in the City: Unity in Plurality?" at the last nationwide conference held by the Polish Sociology Association. Restrictive approaches, however, are nothing new here. These tendencies, which highlight petit-bourgeois actors primarily, could also be observed for many years in other countries (Lowe 1986).

This restrictive view was already contested two decades ago by Margit Mayer. Mayer wrote: "the current urban social movements are far more fragmented and play a more contradictory role, not just because there is little overlap or resonance between different and more distinct movements (…). At the same time, the incorporation of many of these groups into the established political process has created new problems of complex governance: the new forms of regulation, which increasingly involve tripartite negotiation frameworks, have to be broad and flexible enough to process the

complex antagonisms" (2000: 149-150). Others unequivocally identified tenants' and squatters' movements as right to the city movements (Ciszewski 2014; Polanska & Piotrowski 2015).

TOWARDS THE MEETING OF WATERS

The urban crises discussed here and the multiplicity of actors on the urban scene overlap in part, with the tendency to develop a certain "functional differentiation". It, therefore, leads to a "complexity reduction" of the field of urban activism. Consequently, we can identify two principal currents of RTTC activism: radical urban movements, and middle-class-based movements of the new petite bourgeoisie. That both types of movements can be labelled as urban movements is lent legitimacy by the fact that – as revealed by previous studies – both cite RTTC as their underlying ideology, even if each fills it with a different meaning. It can thus be assumed that both types of USMs are affected by the same global factors that generate "matters to attend to" in local and urban structures. The processes of the urbanization of capital and the pursuit of land rent whose beneficiary is global capital transforming cities into growth machines affected not only the most vulnerable but also undermined the prerogatives of the nascent post-transformation middle class. Nevertheless, the reaction of both currents to this "capitalist steamroller" were quite different.

These differences became apparent quite quickly; over a decade ago. They were expressly articulated during two crucial moments for each of the primary USM fractions: the nature of the so-called city theses, which each grouping presented, as well as the ideological confrontation that came to pass during the 1st Urban Movements Congress (hereinafter: UMC; Kongres Ruchów Miejskich)[7]. One of the main accepted reference points in the analysis of USMs in Poland are the so-called *Urban theses* ["Tezy miejskie"]: initially ratified as "9 Urban Theses" at the 1st UMC in Poznań in 2011, then expanded to "15 Urban Theses" in the course of deliberation at the 4th UMC in Gorzów Wielkopolski in 2015. Meanwhile, anarchist circles in Poznań prepared a prepared a political manifesto similar in nature as early as the beginning of 2010. This manifesto, entitled *Theses for the Development for the City of Poznań* ["Tezy dla kierunku rozwoju miasta Poznania"] tends to be omitted in analyses of urban movements, despite presenting the most complete picture of the contemporary tendency towards urbanising anarchism[8]. Though these anarchist theses at times tackle the same problems as those

[7] The UMC can be understood in two ways. In its primary understanding, it was the first congress of activists from the entire country, which took place in Poznań in June, 2011. Congresses, thus understood, have taken place five times since then. In its secondary understanding, the UMC is an organization of the most important urban movements in Poland, called into being after the first meeting in Poznań. In time, it was formalized into a country-wide association, still in the form of a network, but no longer ephemeral, and centred around the so-called 'urban theses'.

[8] It is worth noting a significant difference here: as much as the UMCs' urban theses were conceived from the start as a universalizing factor for the multiplicity of local experiences (intended to give a consistent frame of interpretation to the multitude of social organizations active in the cities and hitherto unaware of one another), the anarchist theses cited here were not utilized in such a manner. The opportunity presented by ideological programming was better used by new petit bourgeois USMs, and

from the UMC a year and a half later (Pobłocki 2014b; Pluciński 2020a), these are issues surrounding housing, labour, the city as an object of communal ownership or radical democracy that they place at the forefront (Baranowski 2011). Defining these as strictly *urban* issues, they are unequivocally cast as anti-capitalist. The UMS Urban Theses are, in this regard, decidedly reformist.

This exact tension was palpable during the 1st UMC in Poznań in 2011. Also present were delegates from anarchist movements, who were active in the proceedings, including the plenary session that closed the congress, during which the UMC Urban Theses were ratified (Pobłocki 2014b). Their reception of this event, however, was to be ambivalent at best. Ultimately, it led to discord between the new petit bourgeois and radical perspectives. This is very clearly seen in Jarosław Urbański's assessment, who ascertained that:

> "I do not want to (...) say that the problems and conflicts around spatial issues or spatial planning are not important. That said, any abuses on these grounds are merely the consequence of the omnipotence of certain social groups, whose roots can be found in the structures of ownership in the city (and not in "bad law" which is merely a reflection of said structures). There was little discussion of ownership—especially private ownership—at the congress. The capitalist domination of urban space arises not only, and today not even primarily, from political relationships, but economic ones. We can observe how the interests of developers often infringe upon those of local communities at the level of real-estate development planning, yet it is with great difficulty that many admit that these same interests generate conflicts at the tenant or employee level" (Urbański 2011a).

The above diagnosis thus reinforces a genetic, materialistic reading of the RTTC concept, which—when confronted with an entirely different set of priorities on the part of the new petite bourgeoisie—resulted in what can be termed a centrist political/ideological framing of new petit-bourgeois movements.

A closer examination of the two primary types of USMs is presented below, alongside the following differentiation criteria: (1) interpretations of the idea of RTTC and the identification of key urban issues; (2) the social base; (3) organizational forms; (4) tactics.

Radical urban movements are movements with anarchist origins, socially-oriented, and strongly tied to tenants' and squatters' movements and initiatives through personal alliances, well as, to some extent, the labour question. It is important to note here their radicalism[9], which should in no way be equated with revolutionary tendencies. Described elsewhere as "radical reformism" (Pluciński 2020a), this is the most accurate assessment thus far, considering that radical urban movements remain essentially non-violent. The appearance of movements that originated from anarchist

neglected by representatives of radical movements. It is fraught with consequences, although a detailed analysis of the problem presented here requires its own treatment.

[9] This is important due to, for example, numerous backlash reactions to social movements–urban movements included– with a clear leftist and/or anarchist provenance.

is the result of clear urbanization of anarchism, a process set in motion primarily as a result of the progressive erosion of the alterglobalist movement[10].

Adherents of radical UMCs accept the RTTC ideology as a frame for their activities, infusing it with materialistic sensibilities. At the same time, they remain true to Henri Lefebvre's goals, referring to its anti-capitalist elements and mechanisms of class organization against capitalist urbanization. An important element of this interpretation is the position taken on the issue of the first two crises identified in the article: a critique of the unilateral, exclusionary monologue of capitalist remodernization as such, as well as the placement of the issue of housing in the centre, thus arranging urban issues in a manner akin to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, with the right to housing and decent living conditions deemed the most important. Additionally, it important to seek potential for decommodification (present, for example, in the slogan "a city is not a company") or the demands of "radical democracy"—itself as horizontally structured and participatory as possible.

The social base of radical USMs is narrow, and so they are not mass movements. The class/socio-economic aspect of the base is significant here—in spite of a lack of studies that would allow for precise categorization of USM participants and sympathizers along class lines, the consensus among researchers is that they can be considered poor people's movements (Mayer 2000; Pluciński 2020a). A real problem the movement must contend with is the "lack of widespread acceptance of anarchist practice and theory in society" (Sinewali 2009: 114). Relatively speaking, the most effective mobilization occurs around the issues of labour and tenancy, though even here there are caveats: though the anarchist movement is effective in animating labour and tenants' movements, it's difficult to speak of a reciprocal effect of anarchist activism working in the opposite direction. The anarchist movement thus plays an avant-garde role – raising awareness as an agent of change (Pluciński 2020a). A real problem for the base of radical movements is also a high degree of fluctuation in participants. The great majority of those active in the movement, aside from its intellectuals or opinion leaders, are short-term and issue-focused participants. They enter the movement primarily, sometimes even exclusively, in order to solve individual problems, only to leave the movement immediately after a resolution is achieved—be it positive, or negative. In this sense, these movements, especially those of tenants, become a kind of "registry office", which allows for the enabling of freeloading strategies.

The movement is structured in a horizontal manner, on the basis of voluntary participation and engagement. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out adopted formal and legal frames—particularly in the case of renters' and labour initiatives. Associationalism serves to strengthen the movements' ability to mobilize to some extent, though is itself treated as a tool. Consequently, these movements are much more closely aligned with the vision of radical democracy.

The movements are also no stranger to cognitive and autodidactic practices: discussion of existing literature, activist conferences, workshops and seminars or publishing

[10] The historical presence of the urban perspective in Polish anarchism should also be pointed out (por. Pluciński 2016; Pluciński 2020a; Pluciński 2020c).

activity, permeated by academic and activist analyses, as well as the organization of grassroots research processes (Kostka & Czarnora 2017; Pluciński 2020b).

In spite of radical USMs' constant identification as protest movements, their ongoing pragmatization becomes increasingly clear. One author described this tendency as "constructive anarchism" (Głaz 2017). A "legalistic shift" can be observed, or a turn towards, as Habermas might say, systemic media of control such as law or expertise, which took place, for example, in the case of the struggles against an attempt to use containers as a form of social housing. New forms of social pressure are also being used, making use of online tools (mail bombs, for example) and new media, particularly social media and channels. Some of these actions were unorthodox; a trip through local poverty ghettos in February 2012 organized by neo-anarchists (Błoszyk 2012) or the Tri-Cities' "march of empty pots"[11] are two noteworthy examples. In spite of the fact the tactics employed by radical movements are becoming increasingly legalistic, direct actions, such as blockades of evictions, remain in use as secondary forms of protest in their repertoire.

New petit-bourgeois urban movements are movements whose social base is comprised of progressively-inclined factions of the middle class, as discussed by Claus Offe in his classic paper *New social movements: challenging the boundaries of institutional politics* (1985). These middle-class factions, as Offe pointed out, while forming social movements, do not always act in their own objective class interest, at times even acting in opposition.

The petit-bourgeois current of urban activism is comprised of a myriad of third sector organizations—ones both poorly institutionalized as well as those practically quangoized— informal movements, individual activists, grassroots initiatives, and single-issue movements. Their reading of RTTC ideology, however, assumes a deradicalized nature, transforming it into an overtly reformist political tool. Thus, selective civic engagement becomes viable that does not delegitimize—even in discourse—the capitalist foundations of social order. Some members of new petit bourgeois USMs openly distanced themselves from the Marxist origins of the RTTC idea, treating it—and here, in the interest of fairness, the context of the strength of discursive anti-communism in the post-transformational Polish public sphere must be pointed out—as heavy ballast.

RTTC in accordance with new petit-bourgeois values primarily deals with crises arising from commodification of space, suburbanization, the problem of transportation, and urban ecologies, as well as becoming an active part of the narration around urban identities. The RTTC idea thus became an ideological basis for all of these essential progressive struggles that ultimately revolved around quality of life: attempts at spatial order, the protection of green spaces, participatory budgets, or sustainable transport. In essence, all of these problems can be interpreted as anti-capitalist struggles, which new bourgeois USMs, however, avoid. In doing so, they transform the RTTC idea into an ideology of the progressively-inclined middle class (Czarnota 2014). The

[11] March of empty pots [pol. Marsz pustych garnków] was a protest against sudden rent increases, during which the participants banged on empty pots as a metaphor for poverty.

socio-demographic profile of activists is a characteristic one, demonstrating fluidity over the last decade and slightly beyond (Kubicki 2016b). Initially, these were "older people, with an average age over 50—owners of small businesses, houses, apartments and apartment buildings, representatives of technical, trade and economic intelligentsia", decidedly outside the "stereotype of the urban activist, generally thought to be ecologists, cyclists, rebellious young hipsters, etc." (Mergler 2018). There was an inter- and in-class conflict of interest lurking here: between these representatives of the newly-created middle and upper classes who were the beneficiaries and stakeholders of global capital installed primarily in urban or suburban Poland, and representatives of the lower or so-called old middle class, in situations when "a large, commercial business entity defeated a small, personal, local one. Resistance was possible only by working together" (Mergler 2018). In time, the new petite bourgeoisie attracted activists roughly a generation younger, with a stronger emphasis on the presentation of public concerns in terms of the common good.

Neither did new petit bourgeois USMs become mass movements. The vision of urban democracy that they shared is decidedly closer to representational democracy—their representatives, after all, take part in local elections—than to radical democracy (Purcell 2008). They also accept much more commonly occurring types of organizations, in order to, among other things, be a party to administrative legal proceedings (Pobłocki & Mergler 2010). Some movements and initiatives also volunteer in the Kongres Ruchów Miejskich [Urban Movement Congress]—a relatively powerful, country-wide organization that functions as a federation—with which the entirety of the phenomenon of new petit bourgeois activism should not identify with.

Furthermore, it is the new petit bourgeois USMs which, among the social movements currently active in Poland, are the ones most profoundly professionalizing, with a particular emphasis on expertise and the cognitive aspects of their activism. For years, they have maintained dynamic institutional and personal relationships with academia. The ranks of urban activists comprise representatives of the humanities (sociologists, lawyers), as well as those of the technical professions (urban planners, architects, transport specialists), which activates learning processes *in their* praxis and often leads to the co-production of knowledge (Skórzyńska 2017; Pluciński 2020b).

These movements' tactics are openly legalistic: their activities rely on knowledge and expertise, skilful use of their relationships with academia, the social processes of learning, participation in administrative proceedings concerning local spatial management plans, engagement in auxiliary councils, the "long march through institutions" through deliberately "entering the system" as public servants or through participation in city council elections (Pluciński 2014a), or, less often, political lobbying. It is paradoxical, though naturally only in part, that the urban space itself is used relatively rarely in this manner, serving most often as a backdrop for occasional single actions, such as happenings.

CONCLUSIONS

The article presented the problem of internal differentiation within the field of urban

activism in contemporary Poland. It defined the crucial actors on the urban activism scene on the basis of a review of literature tackling the new urban question in Poland, and the overview of urban crises. Next, using Margit Mayer's intuitions, a synthesis was performed, and the two currents of urban activism defined: the radical and the new petit bourgeois.

As discussed in the article, the two currents have a different understanding of the RTTC ideology, filling its empty signifier with their own meanings. They constitute two distinct currents of urban activism, being at the same time – what is indicated by the title metaphor used in the article – as respectively the dark- and sandy-colored water of the Amazon River.

If both these currents of Polish USMs were to be considered answers to specific urban crises, these currents should not be considered in competition with one another. They are two different responses to the same process of neoliberalization of cities that rather transforms them into spaces for profit and not for the people. In other words: both types of USMs deal with different, related challenges. Though the factions examined here entered into conflicts with one another, they were also capable of forming *ad hoc* alliances. They can thus be seen not so much as rivals, but instead engaged in a unique activist and cognitive division of labour, where the stakes are a city organized as well as possible.

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RIGHT TO THE MAP? COUNTER-MAPPING PRACTICES OF SMOG ALERTS AND URBAN GREENERY MOVEMENTS IN POLAND

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ABSTRACT: Data production is becoming an emerging trend in critical urban activism. Precise and reliable public information, including spatial and environmental information, serves individual and collective 'right to the city' beliefs. One of the common strategies adopted by contemporary urban movements to ensure the accuracy and inclusiveness of urban data production processes are various forms of counter-mapping, which we introduce in this paper as a perspective aimed in critical evaluation of urban environmental conditions in Polish cities. By process tracing of smog alerts and urban greenery movements we investigate the main strategies of using such tools and their effects for both particular social actors, and general urban environmental policy. We argue that the core idea of citizen-driven collection of geographical data is strongly supported by its other features – social involvement and collective production of visualizations illustrating the scale and dynamics of particular environmental problems. In this sense, counter-mapping is aimed rather at repoliticizing urban environmental data in order to critically evaluate existing urban policy, than just to ensure greater citizen involvement in environmental decision-making.
KEYWORDS: counter-mapping, social movements, right to the city, air pollution, urban greenery

INTRODUCTION

Maps are the basic tool of urban policy and the 'lens through which we see the city' (Dovey and Ristic 2017). Since the 1960s however, there have been critical voices challenging the so called 'power of maps' as top-down, or even oppressive, tools which underrate lay knowledge, dynamics of space, and the conflictual character of mapmaking (see Harley 1989, Rattray et al. 2015). This trend in geography flourished in various alternative socio-spatial ideas and research agendas such as critical geography (Crampton 2008) and neogeography (Turner 2006). Based on this critique, new tools and applications to collect and visualize geospatial data appeared, called citizen-driven geographic information (Lampoltshammer and Scholz 2017), Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI, Connors et al. 2012), participatory ways of using geographic information systems (GIS), or broadly, 'counter-maps'. Despite many names and some differences between those concepts, the idea is similar and can be defined as greater inclusion in mapmaking of 'non-professionals', particularly 'those outside or on the margins of large, powerful institutions such as corporations or governments' (Dalton and Stallmann 2018:95). The general aim of such initiatives is to 'add' to official maps additional, sometimes underrated, information in order to challenge (and ideally change) a dominant perception of mapped territory: 'make qualitative knowledge of places and spatial perceptions visible, for inclusion in or contestation of policy processes, thus supporting social mobilization' (Pfeffer et al. 2015). Those mapping activities are fundamentally critical to what 'the power of maps' represents by including citizen science similar to 'statactivism' (Bruno et al. 2014) or data activism (Renzi and Langlois 2015) as well as lay knowledge expertise (Harris and Hazen 2006) in state or urban decision-making.

Related literature and empirical examples pointed to several purposes/strategies of using such an approach by social actors. For instance, Elwood et al. (2012) explored a) mapping aimed at generating new geospatial data (as 'geoinformation'), b) shared geospatial data in professional and social networks (a 'geosocial' function of mapmaking), and c) visualized 'user-contributed information' (function of 'geovisualization'). Also, Crampton (2001) pointed out similar elements differentiating 'traditional' and 'new' ways of thinking about maps and the mapmaking process on the continuum from communication to visualization. He used the concept of 'cartography cubed' (MacEachren and Fraser Taylor 1994) to discuss an observed turn on three interrelated dimensions: from private to public, from low interactivity to high interactivity, and from revealing knowns to exploring unknowns. He concluded: 'Traditional cartography has emphasized public use, low interactivity, and revealing knowns, while visualization emphasizes private use, high interactivity, and exploring unknowns' (Crampton 2001: 244). As a result, the recent landscape of geographical data provision and usage gained the form of 'an assemblage of practices' (Elwood et al. 2012) which can involve various types of social actors (both formal and informal) with diverse knowledge of geographical information (lay, professional, expert in other disciplines) and differing motivations and degrees of being 'counter' or 'critical' towards dominant mapmaking.

Thus, for the purpose of this article, counter-mapping has similar but not the same

assumptions as various forms of ‘participatory’ GIS (see Elwood 2006, Dalton and Stallmann 2018), mainly introduced by public authorities at national or local level. Under the label of participatory GIS we understood efforts often aimed in engaging a variety of stakeholders in spatial decision-making which is already designed by actors who are in charge of such processes. Thus, they are critically focused on how to successfully incorporate varying opinions of individuals into the spatial decision-making process (Jankowski and Nyerges 2001; Simao, Densham, and Haklay 2009), and serve the role of collaborative tools to develop spatial consensus (Nyerges et al. 2006; Nikšič et al. 2017).

Instead, spontaneous counter-mapping activities (e.g. parish/sentiment/mental maps or ad hoc mapping) are unasked by any other actors but grew out of grassroots needs, anger, and interest. This critical mindset is reflected in several terms for counter-mapping in cities, such as ‘autonomous cartography’ (Dalton and Mason-Deese 2012), or ‘guerrilla cartography’ (Cowart and Powell 2019), and ‘power mapping’ (Maharawal and McElroy 2018). Firstly, indigenous movements were using such counter-mapping as a contestation activity against official land-use plans to extract natural resources (Peluso 1995, Kidd 2019). Then, along with the increasing availability of data collection tools (e.g. social media, map-based portals, smartphones, drones), various forms of counter-mapping has emerged in cities and has been adopted by urban movements as a tool to critically analyze urban space. They proved to meet perfectly the ‘right to the city’ approach. Here we are following Domaradzka’s (2018: 612) interpretation of the famous Lefebvre and Harvey slogan which interestingly combines individual and collective aspects of this right as ‘the individual liberty to access urban resources (including space, services, and infrastructure) and the ability to exercise collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization’. Counter-mapping can directly support both postulates through ‘delineating the non-neutrality of urban environments’ (Rattray 2015: 135) or ‘establishing the ground truth of maps’ (Taylor 2013: 9) by complementing or negating the accuracy of official ones, all motivated by involved individuals. Moreover, through its alternative approach to spatial data collection and visualization of them, counter-maps question dominating official maps and power relations behind their creation. Thanks to that, counter-mapping approaches can make visible ‘the landscapes, lives, and sites of resistance and dispossession elided in capitalist, colonial, and liberal topographies’ (Maharawal and McElroy 2018: 381).

Similarly, from their very beginning Polish urban movements used various forms of citizen-driven collection of geographical data – as an information exchange platform or a channel to publicize ‘right to the city’ issues. They applied maps as serving both a precise analytical tool made of ’objective’ layers or interactive matrix with subjective knots, paths, edges, and landmarks. Among already proposed counter-mapping activities, there were maps of spatial barriers (in Polish: mapy barier), reprivatization claims (in Polish: mapy roszczeń), or maps of craft workshops (in Polish: mapy rzemieślników) to name just a few examples. Maps used in this context served various roles from producing additional data, through ensuring greater citizen involvement in spatial decision-making to a symbolic and technical tool for critical analysis of urban policy. Using this perspective, we would like to explore why and how, despite the

increasing popularity of using various Public Participation GIS (PP GIS) approaches among local governments (Bąkowska et al. 2016), supported by the work of research units (in Poland especially Adam Mickiewicz University research activities, see Jankowski (ed.) et al. 2018) and NGOs, spontaneous and bottom-up counter-maps are used in contemporary urban environmental politics.

Our hypothesis is that such forms of counter-mapping particularly fit in ongoing criticism about the state of urban democracy which is considered a high priority in the literature associated with critical urban theory. Scholars from this movement assert that contemporary social struggles, debates, and antagonisms are often covered by various forms of 'scientization' (Habermas 1970) or post-politics in which 'political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance' (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014: 6). Urban environmental governance is already accused of being 'post-political' (Tahvilzadeh et al. 2017, Rosol et al. 2017) and related to 'roll out environmentalism' committing to 'stronger investment (...) in the management of environmental issues and to a more entrepreneurial way of tackling those issues' (Béal 2012: 406). In this context, urban movements are seen as those which conquer an existing system (Castells 1983; Habermas 1987). For instance, Offe (1985: 820) claims that the core of social movements' efforts is to 're-politicize' various social issues (bringing them back into political reality) using novel methods from traditional public and institutionalized politics. The aim of such efforts is to change the dominant political paradigm in a way 'to reconstitute a civil society that is no longer dependent upon (...) regulation, control, and intervention'.

It is still in question to what extent urban movements are the equivalents of such new social movements (Pickvance 2003; Jacobssen 2015; Kowalewski 2016), but for the purposes of this article, it is sufficient that all of them can be defined as social actors with a critical attitude towards urban policy. Therefore in place of the definition of urban movements, we rely on their three characteristics, proposed by Castells (1983: 328), that should appear in given collective actions jointly and clearly in opposition to the dominant logic of capitalism, technologization and statism: 1) perceive themselves as urban or civic in relation to the city; 2) their activities are local and spatially defined; and 3) mobilize around three main goals: collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-government. The inclusive nature of the above features also appears in other definitions of urban movements and indicates their diversity in terms of a) topics discussed (e.g. quality of public space, housing, natural conditions, social participation), b) a degree of formalization (informal groups, associations, election committees) and c) the nature of the actions undertaken (one-off, cyclical, continuous). Nevertheless, grassroots counter mapping seems to share exactly the same idea of empowering citizens through new tools and unconventional solutions outside traditional urban politics (so despite public administration efforts of more participatory ways of doing such politics).

Taking into consideration the history of counter-mapping and its roots in critical evaluation of urban politics, environmental issues should be among the popular subjects of such activities. Indeed, human geography studies have already recognized

and analyzed the phenomenon of maps for conservation (Harris and Hazen 2006, Kidd 2019). Also, the flourishing literature of science and technology studies covers the transformative power of new ICT-based devices (sensors, automatic measures, drones) in our understanding of environmental issues (Gabrys 2016). However, both scientific inquiries are mostly focused on nature preservation areas located outside cities or in general environmental problems, ignoring their location. Very few studies analyzed the urban environmental condition through counter-mapping (Connors et al. 2012, Syngellakis et al. 2018). Yet, even those studies, to a lesser extent, explore the perspective of counter-mapping as strategies of urban environmental movements in order to support their critical standpoint towards urban politics. The aim of this paper is to fulfil this gap by investigating the main strategies of using such tools and their effects for both particular social actors and general urban environmental policy, taking smog alerts and urban greenery movements as an example. By tracking their usage of social mapping in reaction to official environmental data, we want to explore the possibilities and limitations of such tools for the purposes of environmental urban social movements.

METHODOLOGY

In this study we applied qualitative data analysis with different research strategies for the cases of urban greenery and air quality movements. Our analytical unit was a mapping strategy of the selected urban environmental movement, on the basis of the review of the broader informational context. For smog alarms, the main source was a database content package of 18,575 Facebook posts published by 89 smog alerts between 2014 and 2018 extracted by the Netvizz application (Rieder 2013). Even though Facebook withdrew this application in September 2019, we found this content appropriate for analysis because of its nationwide coverage (Frankowski 2020). In the case of urban greenery movements, we used a database of 215 Google alerts from the years 2014–2018 containing around 700 Polish-language internet news items tagged as ‘urban greenery’ (Polish: ‘zieleń w mieście’). As chosen by the internet search engine from all available internet sources, news in this database could be treated as randomly selected.

On the basis of the imported database analysis, we carefully tracked the activity of both smog alerts and urban greenery movements for various examples of counter-mapping, understood as mentioned above, as grassroots counter-mapping aimed at conquering dominant urban environmental politics. Our inventory is obviously biased in favor of the activities widely promoted in traditional and social media. However, taking into consideration the specific (geo)social features of counter-mapping, promoting citizen-driven data collection should be a necessary characteristic of the activities which we are looking for. The second limitation of our analysis was tracking just two types out of many urban environmental movements (concerning sustainable transportation, animal and wildlife issues, water, etc.).

Still, we think that an inventory of mapping the experiences of air quality and urban greenery issues as a form of ‘process tracing’ (Bennett and Checkel 2014) is a

convenient research strategy. According to the typology of Polish urban movements (Nowak and Pluciński 2017), we situated smog alerts and urban greenery initiatives at the intersection of middle-income class movements and local actions. Thus, their experiences should be representative of other urban movements of similar origin. Moreover, air pollution and the state of urban greenery have common characteristics in being almost 'invisible' to the 'layperson' if not detected by technical means (metrics, sensors) and scientific deliverables (Irwin and Michael 2003; Sandberg et al 2015; Gabrys 2016). Thus, the state and the strength of social trust in the knowledge system 'delivering' those threats directly influences its effectiveness. On the other hand, the highly scientific realm of environmental debates, including urban air quality and urban greenery, can have a 'backlash effect' in decreasing public engagement because it marginalizes other ways of understanding environmental problems, e.g. through local consequences and alternative solutions for societal and economic development (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2018). Thus, issues of urban greenery and air pollution are indicated in the analysis as particularly driven by the question of public engagement in data collection and 'strengthening the voice' of science by social actors, e.g. social movements and protest groups, which are both crucial and challenge the achievements in recent environmental governance.

The analysis will present several strategies of using counter-maps by two chosen groups of urban environmental movements in reaction to official environmental data. For smog alerts they proved to be a bottom-up reuse of public data and open sensing maps, while for urban greenery movements they were mental maps of valuable greenery and map-based inventories of threatened greenery. The results will look for characteristics in the two analyzed types of urban movements and then describe if and how they are similar in relation to analyzed factors of enhancing public debate on environmental issues and challenging official representations of environmental problems. We hope that our inventory and the typology of strategies we have created from them can supplement and further develop the number of existing in-depth studies of particular mapping initiatives. Through the inventory associated with chosen examples, we tried to grasp the evolution of those participatory mapping efforts and discuss their role and further potential in urban environmental movements in Poland.

COUNTER-MAPPING PRACTICES OF SMOG ALERTS AND URBAN GREENERY MOVEMENTS

The last decade brought a revival of grassroots movements to Polish environmental governance (Szulecka and Szulecki 2017). Urban conditions proved to be particularly prone to environmental problems as they brought issues of health, well-being, and a renascent community spirit into public debate on power relations and economic priorities. Characteristically, appearance of both analyzed examples of such urban environmental revival, smog alerts, and urban greenery movements, directly depended on 'spatiality' of environmental problems. Discussion of public air quality would not have been possible without the introduction of a nationwide air pollution monitoring scheme (2001) as an implementation of the EU 96/62 Directive (Bogucka et al. 2004).

Similarly, urban greenery movements resulted to some extent from the introduction of participatory mechanisms to spatial procedures (e.g. Environmental Impact Assessment, EIA in 2008, public consultations) and development of geoportals enabling online map browsing (e.g. geoportal.gov in 2008). The emergence of both examples demonstrated that an issue of what is 'known' and 'unknown' in terms of environmental problems would determine their actions.

In terms of air pollution, starting from Cracow in 2012, more than 100 grassroots movements grew up in most Polish large and middle-sized towns. Their first and foremost aim was to publicize the existence of an air pollution problem and its main sources, low quality solid fuel burning and intensive car traffic, in order to upgrade this theme to the policy mainstream (Frankowski 2020). From its very beginning, this public discussion circled around two scientific- and technology-based controversies on delimitation of alarming pollution levels and on appropriate density of measuring points around the country. Similarly, rising awareness of benefits to the ecosystem from urban greenery led to heated local opposition against tree logging[1] which gained intensity due to the rapid development of infrastructure and investment pressure after the political transformation and then after Poland's accession to the EU (Putkowska-Smoter 2020). The often informal and local character of those actions makes it impossible to accurately assess the scale of this phenomenon, however, general scientific observations on urban environmental protection would indicate a steady trend in the occurrence of conflicts over urban nature in Polish cities (Mergler, Wudarski, Pobłocki 2013; Pawłowska 2012; Siemieński and Bida-Wawryniuk 2016). Among diagnosed threats to urban greenery in Poland were its poor condition due to past neglect, insufficient funds, or strong investment pressure (NIK 2015), and management deficiencies, especially insufficiency in data collection about urban greenery (Kronenberg 2012; strategic planning document of Cracow 2015 and Warsaw 2017). Moreover, national reports on climate change highlight the vulnerability of Polish cities and their ecosystems to negative climate effects such as urban heat islands or extreme weather events (Polish National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate 2020; The 2030 National Environmental Policy) which requires more dynamic, detailed, and real-time monitoring of urban greenery. However, in 2014 only two the biggest cities – Cracow and Warsaw – had already undergone comprehensive tree inventories while several other cities had done a partial inventory of particular green spaces (e.g. in regenerated areas). Despite several efforts of NGOs to support public entities in collecting data through PP GIS (see Sendzimir Foundation 2014 and Jankowski et al. 2018), available urban greenery maps were still missing in many cities over the period under analysis. Lack of public data significantly limited the possibilities for social actors to monitor and protect the state of urban greenery. Therefore, next to 'conservative' arguments against tree logging, struggles around urban greenery were often driven by the postulate of wider public participation in environmental decision-making by providing data

[1] For instance, in the capital city of Warsaw alone, at least 18 such protests occurred in 2010–2018 (Putkowska-Smoter 2020). Also, considering its importance, fighting for urban nature was listed among one of main postulates of Urban Theses (2015) formed by the Congress of Polish Urban Movements which serves as a source of recognized issues raised during local environmental debates all over the country.

on urban trees and planned felling.

Both the urban movements analyzed transformed over time from individual and loosely connected local initiatives, through formalized local associations (e.g. Krakow Smog Alert - Krakowski Alarm Smogowy or Ochocianie Association - Stowarzyszenie Ochocianie in Warsaw) to collective and cooperative bodies (Polish Smog Alarm and branch of National Congress of Urban Movements). They also diversified their approaches, which included both involvement in public consultations and participatory actions coordinated by local and national authorities, as well as practices outside collaboration such as petitions, protests, and informational campaigns. Mapping activities proved to be particularly important initiatives in the maturing of those movements, addressing recognized challenges, mobilizing people around environmental problems and visualizing alternative solutions. Below we present an inventory of such activities grouped into four illustrative strategies of bottom-up citizen participatory mapping concerning air pollution and urban greenery which – we think – support this thesis.

BOTTOM-UP REUSE OF PUBLIC DATA

Even though specialized smog alerts took over the central position in public discussion, a fight for clean air remained the main postulate for traditional Polish urban movements. One of the most powerful antismog social movement initiatives was the 'Warsaw Map of Dirty Stoves' made by Miasto Jest Nasze (The City is Ours) – a Warsaw-based urban movement, also the initiator of Warsaw Smog Alert. The organization mapped the location of 1,934 municipal apartments heated by low-quality solid fuel stoves [GW: Czarna Walentynka 2018]. Data were collected through public information requests directed to the municipal housing management agency in 2017. Every selected location provided data about the address and number of municipal apartments using low-quality coal stoves for heating. Moreover, the authors placed on this map all nearby kindergarten locations in order to strengthen the issue of the consequences of the problem created by this source of air pollution.

The map was established to accelerate coal stove replacement by the City Office. Using public data as 'weapon' as well as the basis of powerful and professional visualization resonated in national and local media. On the same day, a local government representative promised to replace all municipal stoves by the end of 2019 (Portal Samorządowy 2018). In the meantime, activists monitored the progress of intervention (Kopeć, Chełmiński, Korzeniowska 2019) and repeated public information requests, then pointing out insufficient momentum and low data quality in some districts (Chełmiński 28.10.2019). Interestingly, after the election in 2018 one of the map creators became a director for sustainable development, including for green areas and air pollution management, responsible also for removing stoves from municipal buildings. During winter 2019/20, the president of Warsaw, under pressure from urban movements, decided to phase out coal heating not only in municipal offices, but also to prohibit individual solid fuel stoves until the end of 2023.

The example of the 'Warsaw Map of Dirty Stoves' shows that urban movements

assumed that City Office should be a 'model' institution which ought to set standards and solve the smog problem, beginning within their own housing resources. They used public information in this neglected urban policy area and then prepared a precise and visually attractive map, which is also evidence of their technological capacity. However, identifying individual buildings on the map with their precise addresses may stigmatize less affluent citizens. Even though there are some smog alert initiatives which combine the map with addresses and even the emission evidence such as photography, the other alerts recognized that such practices may antagonize the local community and it is their duty to protect vulnerable people (Skawiński Smog Alert, Facebook post, 4.10.2017).

Screen: 'Warsaw Map of Dirty Stoves'



Authors: Environmental Committee of Miasto jest Nasze Movement (Komisja ds. ochrony środowiska Ruchu Miasto Jest Nasze). Source of the map: https://miastojestnasze.org/smog/.

CITIZEN SENSING

While the 'Warsaw Map of Dirty Stoves' nuanced the reasons for air pollution, citizen sensing pays attention to the harmful consequences of smog. Official air pollution maps were based on public system monitoring. Because of a relatively small public air measurement station network, smog alerts often consisted of insufficient numbers and locations of such devices. To produce valid environmental information, they encouraged local authorities to buy such devices, comparing with a neighboring city as a benchmark (e.g. Sulechów to Zielona Góra, Racibórz to Wodzisław Śląski, Gniezno to Poznań). In case of local authority resistance to investment in air measurement stations, smog alerts practiced borrowing dust meters, mobilizing money for information boards and sensors within participatory budgets, harvesting money through private company CSR, and encouraging people in locating their own air measurement

stations.

Insufficient sensor density ought to mobilize citizens to acquire better knowledge of health issues and being ‘energy citizens’ (Devine-Wright 2007). This approach also resonates with the different, broader expectations regarding urban inhabitants - as prosumers, microdevelopers, and co-producers, especially in the areas beyond the official regulations (Frąckowiak 2016). However, as far as borrowing dust meters and buying smog stations through participatory budgets were popular in the early smog alert activity, nowadays the cost of air pollution sensors has fallen significantly and people decided to establish private air measurement stations. Such devices enabled production of real-time data and sent to the commercial and non-commercial general air pollution map providers such as AirMonitor or OpenSenseMap. OpenSensing Movements can be read as an ‘energy citizenship’ issue: taking personal responsibility for the selected land area and delivering evidence about its conditions. However, it can be read also as a threat of public duty privatization or outsourcing. The rapid development of this movement may affect the measurement quality negatively: some information can be biased, dispersed, incomparable, or disclosed. Moreover, commercial companies try to use that citizen engagement, sometimes offering the ‘sensor ambassador’ position. In those cases, such grassroots ideas may be used intentionally and monetized by a dynamic and increasing market of ‘smart-city’ technologies and providers.

RESTORE TREE ON THE MAP

One of the challenges recognized by urban greenery movements was a specific ‘invisibility’ of urban trees in public decision-making. In many conflicting cases, urban trees entered a public debate only when they were going to be cut. On such occasions, trees were presented mainly as obstacles colliding with planned investments, and sick, damaged, or life-threatening. This was the reason why large parts of inventoried counter-mapping activities were aimed at ‘restoring’ the value of urban trees on the maps. Thus, we recognized several examples similar to traditional ‘parish maps’ (Wood 2005) in which tree mapping activities served the role of local guided tours among particularly interesting or important elements of urban nature. Those actions were often recalling individual memories and sentiment in order to (re)create ‘green’ mental maps of close surroundings.

For instance, green areas and particular trees appeared on several ‘sentimental maps’ collected under grassroots urban projects, e.g. in Poznań (in 2018 by Malta Festival Poznań) or in Lublin (in 2018 by Lubelska Grupa Badawcza). Trees are important witnesses to local history which now are subject to rapid development. As stated in this quotation from one of the stamps on sentimental maps prepared in Lublin: ‘*Oak, which grows between the lanes of Monte Cassino Heroes Street, is the only remnant of the farm that once existed here in the past. This tree was chosen by the jury and internet users as the Treasury of Space Culture. The oak is also proof that you can plan the city development in such a way to save nature*’[2]. Along with this trend, in several cities lo-

[2] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z44E3Ds6r0dAeuvfUYS6vx_OOS_l1MTe/view

cal activists developed various maps of environmentally valuable trees. In Warsaw in 2015, the artistic collective RośnijWAW organized several walking tours with citizens of Warsaw to identify interesting green areas and then collected all the points on the printed map. The walks were very popular, they were held in cooperation with other urban environmental activists and they were associated with a contest and educational campaign about urban gardening (called 'Warszawa w kwiatach i zieleni'). In Cracow, inspired by a local environmental NGO, citizens mapped 'Dokąd tupta jeż' (English: where the hedgehogs trot) places where meeting hedgehogs is possible. As a result, 200 places were reported. The idea of this sympathetic action was to pay attention to the need of protecting urban flora and fauna, thus it was followed by recreating more favorable conditions in reported places (planting trees, shrubs, and grassland) for hedgehogs and other urban animals. Similarly, two other environmental NGOs – Fundacja Ekorozwoju and Klub Gaja created maps of valuable trees reported by citizens under their community educational actions – Święto Drzewa and Aleje dla Natury. Several tourist maps with interesting specimens of trees and descriptions of their history were created as a result.

All those activities gained significant social recognition, through traditional and social media, as easy to explore, spontaneously expand, and possible to replicate in other locations. They also often referred to urban nature as highly valuable (from many angles) but underestimated the often invisible elements of urban spaces. In this context, counter-mapping served a role of a symbolic act aimed at restoring ('adding') nature within the urban environment and in highlighting its potential to bring people together (as in community-driven mappings via social media and walking tours around city).

Screenshot of map-based mobile applications: 'Trees with the atmosphere' (PL 'Drzewa z klimatem')



Authors: Klub Gaja. Source of the map: http://swietodrzewa.pl/?page_id=5907

Redrawing boundaries of social control

The second group of the existing usage of social mapping were inventories of threatened greenery and bottom-up notifications about illegal felling or inappropriate care of newly planted trees. This trend may have resulted from popular expectation of evidence-based environmental governance which led to critical evaluation of available sources and databases about urban nature. As already stated above, Polish local administrative units are often criticized for having partial, outdated, and incomparable datasets of urban greenery which limit their capacities to strategically govern such resources. This problem raises particular attention because of increasing recognition of environmental challenges, such as the above-mentioned air pollution or climate changes, showing up in the form of heavy rainfall and urban heat islands.

Thus, social mapping proved to be useful in order to supplement environmental debate with 'green numbers' and updates about the state of urban greenery. In several locations (e.g. Poznań, Warsaw, Łódź), urban activists started bottom-up tree inventories aimed in fulfilling diagnosed gaps in local environmental data. Providing additional data was often followed by more advanced social and educational goals. For instance, a description of an informal group from Łódź called 'social tree caretakers' (Polish: społeczni opiekunowie drzew) involved in such bottom-up voluntary tree inventory recording also contained goals of 'drawing attention to the problem of lack of care for trees' and 'conducting educational activities about the importance of trees'[3]. In Opole and Wrocław, requests and expectations on adding or restoring urban greenery were collected through social media and then visualized as maps of 'green needs'. Once again, such collections were driven by aims beyond adding information. For instance, in Wrocław several individual initiatives involved in urban greenery mapping (e.g. Fundacja EkoRozwoju, AkcjaMiasto, Zieleń Wrocławska and MiastoDrzew) cooperated with each other in lobbying for urban greenery development at the city level. Finally, there were also some attempts to map inappropriate states of urban greenery. For instance, in Ursynów (district of Warsaw), local citizens created a map of newly planted trees which suffered from drying out. Inspired by this mapping, local and social media debated how to recognize trees in poor condition, and more widely the problem of urban drought as a result of climate change.

Despite the fact that all the above examples just relied on lay citizen data, they proved to be useful and inspiring for local governments. For instance, in the analyzed period several cities prepared professional GIS-based tree inventories and urban greenery maps. Moreover, the cities of Warsaw, Cracow, Łódź, Poznań, and Wrocław began sharing data on urban greenery on interactive maps. However, local low-tech solutions proved to be particularly useful once again for several months in 2017. Then, the law named after the incumbent Minister of the Environment – Jan Szyszko as 'lex Szyszko' – allowed the cutting of trees on private land virtually without legal arrangements or environmental permits. The massive effects of this unexpected relaxation of regulations showed that local governments have limited ability to monitor and protect trees on private land. In response, we reported at least 20 cities which benefited from 'lex Szyszko felling' maps hosted by local media websites or Google Maps, which

[3] https://spoleczniezaangazowani.pl/projekty/spoleczni-opiekunowie-drzew/

monitored the state of trees in urban private areas and reported on ongoing felling in order to help local governors in controlling them. In most of the cases, those maps were the only public tools covering information and pictures of trees that disappeared.

Screenshot of map-based website on tree logging (example from Cracow)

Authors: Internet users coordinated by local Radio Kraków. Source of the map: https://www.radiokrakow.pl/wiadomosci/aktualnosci/gdzie-zniknely-nasze-drzewa-tworzymy-mape-wycinek-w-malopolsce-interaktywna-mapa/

This group of examples illustrates that simple, citizen-based maps of urban greenery still have potential in supporting environmental debate with up-to-date local information and unique social context. Above all, the maps serve as a message to local governments about the expected level of availability (being transparent, public, interactive, online) and accuracy (covering particular trees and their dynamic status) of environmental data. In a metaphorical sense, using the recognized spatial procedure of mapping in the form of a monitoring tool can 'add' social control as an additional 'layer' to rather managerial, professionalized, and top-down environmental governance.

DISCUSSION

In both examples we could observe how various counter-mapping activities were mainly planned to challenge official representations of environmental problems and to reconfigure relations between actors in the environmental debate. By using mapping tools, smog alerts undermined official top-to-bottom environmental policy by promoting citizenship data requests and citizen sensing on the basis of their own data, collected in real time. They also were pressing local governments to choose a commit-

ted and comprehensive approach to air quality problems. Similarly, the maps prepared by urban greenery movements pointed to several inadequacies and deficiencies in official urban data on trees. Again, the citizens and their knowledge of the local context were promoted as a valid source of complementary information in the multi-layered and complex urban greenery dynamics. The following table outlines those results.

Table 1. Main functions of counter-mapping tools in analyzed examples

Strategy	Examples of counter-mapping	Public data sources in reference	Alternative data sources	Functions of contra-mapping tool in reference to official data
Challenging official representations of environmental problems	*Bottom-up reuse of public data*	Municipal housing data (available on request)	Reconfigured and spatialized municipal housing data combined with other layers (such as kindergartens)	Visualization of the condition of local administration resources to get attention and effectively mobilize people around the air pollution problem from municipal housing.
	Restore tree on the map	Public urban greenery and spatial data	Mental images (sentiments, experiences)	Promoting of and giving importance to urban nature features 'invisible' from official data point of view in order to mobilize people around urban greenery protection.
Reconfiguring relations between actors of environmental debate	*Citizen sensing*	National air pollution measuring system	Sensor measurement	Fulfilling the public sector shortcomings through enlarging official air pollution measuring system by private resources.
	Redrawing boundaries of social control	No data or limited data available	Local knowledge (observations, pictures)	Monitoring and filling up local administration efforts in taking care about urban nature by including local knowledge and everyday experiences of citizens.

Source: own elaboration

Despite all the above-mentioned similarities between smog alerts and urban greenery movements, there are also some separating characteristics in using citizen-driven mapping activities in reference to official data. We observed that smog alert activities have a more direct and questioning character towards official data than urban greenery ones, unlike urban greenery mapping activities which were more into promoting alternative layers of geospatial information concentrated on social relations and local need. Using the Elwood et al. (2012) division, we could say that smog alert mapping was oriented towards geoinformation, while urban greenery mapping is towards geosocial and geovisualizing. This may be due to differences in the preconditions and nature of the environmental problems raised. First of all, availability of official data on air quality enabled critical analysis by social actors and open discussion about alternatives. Insufficiency of urban greenery data differently directed mapping activities into local needs-related and ad hoc data collections. The perceived 'hazardousness' of air

pollution led to towards more confrontational measures in this area. The shared positive image of urban trees and a ‘conservationist’ approach makes the debate around this issue tend toward sharing experiences and ‘make them visible’ approaches, closer to traditional ‘parish maps’. Those findings might be a useful suggestion for further studies and practitioners to take into account the advancement of public data as well as the nature of reality being mapped while crafting an appropriate mapping tool.

However, as already pointed out in the relevant literature, growing popularity and availability of mapping tools rises ethical questions. We found this aspect of counter-mapping rather underrated in tracked activities, although it is particularly relevant in the case of so called ‘shaming and blaming’ types of mapping initiatives. They should address their postulates rather to the people in power than to a neighborhood which sometimes lacks complex knowledge about energy usage or urban gardening conditions and possibilities. Neglecting such limitations while preparing maps with addresses could stigmatize less affluent people and, in consequence, weaken social ties in local communities. Secondly, the high-tech, still costly, and health-related character of air pollution measurements encourages involvement of private entities which can have commercial interests, e.g. in sale or promotion of their own measurement systems. If those particular interests try to (in reality or by the interpretation of other actors) cover social and public areas, urban movement activities associated with such entities may lose their legitimacy to act on behalf of local citizens. This threat can be relevant to urban greenery movements as well as if they decided to use commercial greenery inventory systems.

Our results are also relevant to the introductory discussion about counter-mapping meeting the needs of environmental urban social movements. Undoubtedly in both cases, choosing mapping tools was a strategic decision. They proved to be simple, dynamic, easy to promote, involving, and rich in symbolic meanings. In such a way map-based tools confirm that they can fit several characteristic features of urban environmental movements. For instance, dynamic and collectively filled-up maps mirror informal and ‘network-based’ structures of environmental movements (Castells 1996). As open for almost all to contribute, they can both arouse interest and encourage the commitment of citizens. Thus, we agree with Rocio et al. (2013) that maps can be particularly effective as a first step in undertaking grassroots and participatory community action.

However, we see some limitations in this mobilization and educational potential. Almost all the above-mentioned maps, except the Warsaw Map of Dirty Stoves, were limited in moderation or data checking and were enriched by direct proposals for further ‘real world’ actions. Lack of control over data flow can reduce the reliability of the data collected and thus, usefulness as an alternative source of urban knowledge. Also, cutting ‘real world’ actions out of the map can contribute to digital exclusion and lead to limiting the involvement of residents to negatively evaluated ‘slacktivism’ when online actions (in the form of clicks/likes/shares/comments, etc.) are not translated into any ‘real’ environmental actions or attitudes (Christensen 2012).

On the other hand, the richness of maps in metaphors and symbolic meanings (e.g. adding to the maps what is ‘invisible’, overcoming official maps/data, providing new

knowledge out of the 'collective' mind etc.) can only strengthen the value-creation strategies of environmental movements. Using that potential, urban actors can influence local authorities more effectively by referring to values such as public health, urban solidarity, or environmental injustice. Obviously, the technical quality of data obtained by social mapping is insufficient to be directly incorporated to official datasets. However, there are several examples that maps, as visualizations and dynamic illustrations of environmental problems, encouraged local authorities to actively look for new or more accurate solutions, at least at a declarative level.

Going beyond the fact that counter-maps can be easily used and misused by urban environmental movements, we can also conclude that such tools in the broader sense bring new technologies as solutions to urban environmental problems. In both the analyzed cases the core idea of conquering the dominant geospatial system (mainly through collecting valuable alternative datasets) were strongly supported by other features of citizen-driven geospatial mapping – social tightening, educational goals, and collective production of 'visualizations' aimed at illustrating the scale and dynamics of particular environmental problems. Moreover, instead of resolving environmental problems, adding more data resulted in complication of the overall picture and multiplication of the views and interests towards those particular problems. This supports general findings from recent literature that usage of GIS-based tools could significantly differ depending on actors' objectives (Sieber 2006). It may also suggest that various forms of maps (official, participatory GIS, counter-mapping) are not mutually exclusive and in contrast to the idea of overcoming spatial conflicts by more inclusive and participatory mapmaking, various forms of counter maps can still function in parallel at different stages of the environmental debates.

Finally, even if counter-mapping was relatively effective in challenging power relations over environmental knowledge and decision-making, there is still little evidence of its success in overcoming or eventually changing those relations. Thus, we agree with Grabkowska et al. (2015) that similar to many other technologically advanced ICT solutions, maps should be treated mainly as a tool rather than as a solution to urban environmental problems and struggles over their solutions. More generally, we would agree with warnings of McCormick (2007) that critical engagement of social movements with official research and data can be benefiting for those actors to gain the necessary credibility but it would not be enough to impact politics, which is influenced also (or mainly) by factors other than research evidence, such as power relations and economic priorities. On the other hand, by using the 'power of maps' as alternative and challenging ways of collecting and exploring official data, urban environmental movements introduce themselves to the next level of critical urban politics which is focused on data production. We treat it as a sign that despite ongoing debates and hopes related to political concepts such as smart city and urban sustainable development, possible tools of contestation are probably an inherent part of every single (current and forthcoming) urban managerial practice.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this paper was to explore the evolution of counter-mapping efforts of environmental urban social movements and discuss the role and further potential of such practices for critical urban politics. We argue that urban environmental movements used the social potential and visualization of geospatial data to challenge official representations of environmental problems and thereby change the power relations between actors involved in urban governance. In these two separated strategies, maps – as a contestation tool – play different, specific functions: not only filling public sector failures and knowledge deficiencies, but also promoting, explaining, and mobilizing society around the visible and invisible common good. Counter-mapping remains a boosting and attracting device, but it also requires complementary activities to be both an effective and engaging tool. In times of a growing 'sharing economy', voluntary data activism, opening public datasets, and increasing the technological capacity of social movements, the role of maps will probably grow, and urban environmental movements will be more engaged and in a better position to reclaim the 'right to the city' through repoliticizing urban environmental data.

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RIGHT TO THE CITY AND RIGHT TO THE NON-CITY: NEO-EXTRACTIVISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT: This text aims to propose a reflection on the phenomenon of so-called *touristification* within the geographical area of Southern Europe concerning two points: how the processes of production of space that go under this name can be placed inside of the framework of the neo-extractive processes and how social movements against tourism may eventually resonate with the perspective of political ecology.
The hypothesis is that this typology of accumulation processes responds to a certain colonial rationality of capitalist exploitation within a specific area of the Global North – Southern Europe – starting from the global economic crisis of 2008, which I assume as a historical period characterized by specific forms of production of space (Lefebvre 1974) and specific social movements – the anti-tourism movements and the environmental struggles.
KEYWORDS: touristification, Southern Europe, Political ecology, right to the city, extractivism

ABOUT EXTRACTIVISM AND NEO-EXTRACTIVISM IN THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

One of the theoretical categories on which my analysis will be based is that of 'ex-

tractivism': in particular, on the idea that the forms of action of capitalistic-colonial rationality on the value of territory and the production of space are specifically continuous and contemporary forms of original accumulation.

This concept, which refers in the first place to those economies that are based on the predatory withdrawal of the natural resources of the territories, has recently met, starting from the South American debate (Gago 2015; Zibechi 2016), an extension of its field of application to the domains of finance and urban economics (Gago & Mezzadra 2015; Mezzadra & Neilson 2013, 2015), up to being interpreted "as part of the process of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2010), characteristic of the period of domination of financial capital." (Zibechi 2016)

The concept of extractivism, in this sense, refers, in the way I intend to use it, to that category of analysis of the so-called 'accumulation for dispossession' that David Harvey used to describe the economic scenario of the global financial crisis. In Harvey's theory, these forms of extraction indicate a new phase – or rather a sort of 'return' – capitalist exploitation: no longer – and not only – capitalism as a power relation that insists on a biopolitical dimension – that is, of the reproduction of life valued by capital; but also capitalism as a purely extractive mechanism, which is placed 'outside of life itself' and no longer needs to encourage its reproduction.

In this sense, Harvey interprets the massive process of impoverishment of the US middle class, in particular the way in which this process originated and has strongly impacted the urban dimension since the financial crisis was immediately manifested as a real estate crisis in that part of the world.

Assuming this perspective of analysis, however, I would like to specify its limits and scope better. The theme of extractivism as a category of analysis of a specific mechanic of the functioning of capitalist power does not assume, from my point of view, the role of a periodizing caesura that characterizes in the absolute a 'new' phase of global exploitation.

First, we must always consider that we are not faced with a paradigm shift, since mining practices continue to be flanked by a "productive" dimension of power- in the Foucaultian meaning: they are simply applied on different groups subjected to such an exploitation regime. Furthermore, as pointed out by Miguel Mellino (2014), by discussing Harvey's text so far quoted, even if we assume that we consider this extractive dimension of Capitalism as an innovation, in reality it is a novelty only within the space of the global North.

From the point of view of a postcolonial Marxist critique, in fact, Mellino underlines how the continuity of practices of accumulation and dispossession, or extractivism – on human and natural resources – completely characterizes the history of capitalism in the colonial space: that is, capitalism has, from its origins, a *necropolitical* (Mbembe 2003) tendency to accumulate value by extracting it from living labor and from the territory, even at the cost of the destruction of life and nature, when these resources are in abundance.

What I would like to emphasize is that the category of extractivism, which lends itself well to the analysis of certain capitalist enhancement processes that have occurred – always following Harvey – within the capitalist paradigm of the global eco-

nomic crisis, must always be read within a kind of cognitive decentralization, as a category of postcolonial capitalism.

In a rather comparable analysis perspective, Sandro Mezzadra (Mezzadra 2008) makes precise reference to the processes of original accumulation as phenomena not only 'of antiquarian interest', but, on the contrary, constantly present and re-proposed in different phases of capitalist development. In particular, Mezzadra traces exactly a colonial genealogy of these phenomena: in the global North, capitalist development was associated with different phases of productive organization that constituted a sort of necessary evolution of the more appropriately extractive phase – specifically, the 'liberation' of *living labor* which turned into *wage labor* as a pivot point for advanced capitalism coming out of the accumulation phase; in the colonies, on the contrary, these different exploitation regimes had always been coexistent with pure extractivism mechanisms – both in labor regimes and in relation to natural resources (Visentin 2013).

My initial interpretative hypothesis is that the global economic crisis has represented a specific moment of particular intensification of the use of this form of colonial rationality of the capitalist organization even within the global North: capitalism, even in the Global North, is it is restructured through the application of techniques learned and developed previously only in the colonial space.

In other words, with the rapid impoverishment of the middle classes in specific areas of Europe and the United States, the authoritarian tendency towards government techniques in the same areas has affected both subjects and places. In the first case, in the form of restrictions on social rights and welfare. In the second case, through the privatization of the territories, the 'sale' of the places and the affirmation of new urban paradigms (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer 2012).

WHICH SOUTH? *ABYSSAL LINES* WITHIN EUROPE

What I would like to try to add is that the reproduction of extraction practices within the global North is not at all uniform and that specifically the exercise of what I have so far called colonial capitalist rationality unfolds through space producing – or reproducing – South in the global North. In other words, using a concept coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the application of this neo-extractivism – that is, this mixture of colonial extractivism and biopolitical government techniques – traces and 're-traces' abyssal lines (Sousa Santos 2007) in the global North.

The metaphor of the abyssal line, due to its close connection with the theme of space production, seems to be particularly effective for introducing and qualifying the area on which I would like to apply my analysis. In fact, the abyssal line marks North and South not only as geographical definitions, but mainly as relations of power – and emancipation – inscribed in space, or even, in the production of the same.

The 'South' demarcated by the abyssal line, therefore, is produced as absence and otherness, as a territory defined by the hegemonic categories coined on the other side of the line.

Within this framework, my analysis focuses on a specific 'relational south' within

the global north, defined by a complex network of abyssal lines: Southern Europe.

This specific area of the continent is historically surrounded by a combination of representations and discourses – in a model that we could define as 'Orientalist' (Said 1978) – on one's own otherness compared to the rest of the continent that we can trace back at least to the nineteenth century; on the other hand, the representation plan is intertwined with an economic imbalance between the two areas of the continent which, at least throughout the 20th century, has made Southern Europe a relatively low-cost migrant labor pool for the most 'developed' capitalist areas of central and northern Europe.

This deliberately rather vague framing of the question of Southern Europe is necessary to understand a point: the abyssal lines that are drawn by specific modes of articulation of power on which we want to dwell are not invented or created by a precise choice of global capitalism; on the contrary, what perhaps should be emphasized in general in the metaphor of the abyssal line is how it functions, very often, by stratification and interlacing, rather than as a break.

I mean, with this, that the production of a South inherent in the metaphor of the abyssal line works particularly well in the case of the re-production of a space on the basis of multiple levels of production of the alterity of this place; levels that are placed both in the plane of discourses and cultural representations and in that of economic power relations.

My analysis focuses on a specific articulation of the North-South relationship within Europe - that is, that which, during the global economic crisis, focused on the different distribution of debt, creating an economic dichotomy and a specific apparatus of representations that have identified Southern European countries as PIGS; or, in other words, a combination of economic subordination and discourses that represented these places and the populations that inhabit them as anthropologically guilty and materially in debt: this process and its colonial framework were perfectly defined as the 'calibanization' of Southern Europe in the financial crisis discourse (Ervedosa 2017).

Both aspects of this reproduction of the South draw on an extensive archive of ethnographic representations and economic relations which, as we mentioned earlier, constituted the founding basis capable of reversing them. At the same time, this joint of abyssal lines has, in my opinion, permitted a specific application of that neo extractivism of the colonial matrix that we have described so far, and which has been applied to the transformations of the European labor market as to the production of space.

How the typology of colonial rationality that we tried to describe in the first paragraph – i.e., an intensification of the mechanics of capitalist exploitation that intertwines extractivism and biopolitics in the global north as a result of the economic crisis - interacts with the re-production of this specific South?

What spaces are produced and which battles for places are at stake in these power relations exercised in space?

To develop this articulation between space production and neo-extractivism in contemporary Southern Europe, I would like to try to dialogue two areas of political

reflection and academic research that focus on the processes of 'predatory sampling of the natural resources of the territories': urban studies on 'turistification' and political ecology.

Both of these approaches have the characteristic of being not only corresponding to research groups and schools of interpretation, but they are strictly resonant and particularly stimulated by recent social movements – as we shall see, in both cases, particularly located in southern Europe.

HOW SOUTHERN EUROPE BECAME *TURISTIFICATED*

Urban planning studies on tourism, or rather on the way in which the tourist economy impacts and changes the urban fabric, have become widespread in Europe in recent years.

The aspect on which I would like to dwell in this paragraph is how the phenomenon of the so-called *turistification* can be inscribed within the neo-extractive paradigm of which we have spoken and how it acts – with a colonial rationality – in the dynamics of reproduction of South to the within the European area.

The first point is to identify how the typology of phenomena in question is inscribed in the relationship between economic and urban, or in the articulation between contemporary capitalism - and its class dimensions - and the production of space.

The use of the term 'turistification' is based on the notion of 'gentrification' – which already contained exactly the problem of spatial and urban articulation of economic reasoning - and specifies its use.

The two concepts designate two processes of urban extractivism (Salerno 2018) with similar characteristics, but they are not at all superimposable. Both are processes related to the commodification of the urban, however, the so-called gentrification can constitute only one aspect or part of the process of turistification; on the other hand, gentrification can be strongly driven by tourism transformation processes, but it is not necessarily dependent on it.

In both cases we are faced with a population substitution; in both, in addition, the so-called rental gap is at the center of this replacement: that is, an economic differential between the potential level of income of a given area of the territory and the level that is currently achieved through the use of the same territory.

This rent gap becomes much more valuable when the area under examination has suffered a collapse in its real estate and commercial value, as this attracts capital investment in view of a particularly large profit margin.

This, however, occurs in ways that can be very different, and that in the case of turistification have their own characteristics.

First, gentrification normally determines 'the replacement, within a given area, of less well-off social classes with more affluent ones, whose common characteristic lies however, in the stability of the settlement' (Salerno 2018). The intervention of tourism, instead, produces a replacement of a resident population with an 'intermittent', which resides in the territory for relatively short periods. This causes a replacement 'of the residential area in itself with new forms of crossing places' (Salerno 2018), or

in other words, a significant variation of the centrality of use value of the territory in favor of the exchange value.

Moreover, although at the bottom of both extractive forms there is a tendency to expel and displace a specific population - belonging to a lower social class or to a more vulnerable social group than those of the following population – the case of turistification does not concern only and exclusively the housing issue, since this phenomenon also impacts trade strongly.

Once the 'rent differential' of a territory has attracted the investment of capital, in fact, this transformation creates a chain effect on the type of services and commercial establishments that develop in that particular area. In the case of tourism, the presence of accommodation facilities for this nonresident population – b&b, hotels, airbnb – produces the growth of commercial establishments aimed at new customers, to the detriment of the commercial offer for 'settled' inhabitants. The latter will always be less ideal tenants and able to compete to remain in that particular area, once the commercial offer has attracted more tourists.

A further difference to be clarified lies in the relationship between transformation and conservation of space. The processes of gentrification, in fact, are characterized by a transformation of the use of the territory that can also foresee the destruction of what was there before – as an urban example, in conjunction with a massive displacement of the population, a whole neighborhood can be razed and rebuilt.

On the contrary, in the processes of touristification there is the need to preserve the territory, immobilize it in an image that is usable and equal to itself to 'sell' it in a new guise; this concerns both the 'natural' and the anthropized landscape – in the urban case, once again, these processes are defined as 'patrimonialisation' and 'museification' of the historic city centers (Salerno 2018).

This reconstruction of how turistification is exercised as a form of neo-extractivism – based on the definition of this mechanism and its novelty points described in the first paragraph – is necessary to register these processes within an effective colonial rationality of the production of space. Several texts of studies on tourism are recently focusing on highlighting the usefulness of this category of analysis.

Already in a 1989 text, in fact, Crick defined tourist economies as intrinsically connoted by a 'colonial' character, meaning, in his case, this description as that of a type of economy that makes conspicuous consumption of 'accumulated' resources in the time his distinctive trait (Crick 1989).

The recent text by Salerno (2018) also comes to the same conclusion, in which the 'colonial' character of tourist economies is evidenced by a detailed analysis of five aspects of the articulation of this dynamic that I try to briefly summarize: the economic dependence produced on the territory in question, due to the concentration of the flows of capital in a monoculture; the intensive exploitation of resources that tend to run out – in this case, the territory itself; the 'impoverished development', or rather concentration instead the redistribution of wealth; the disintegration of the social fabric on which this is exercised economic reason; finally, the tendential increase in authoritarianism in land management. The colonial rationality that characterizes the turistification, in short, is characterized as a way of organizing the economy of a place

in function of an external market.

The extractive paradigm of a colonial matrix that marks the return of new forms of 'accumulation for dispossession' and that defines the tourist economies that we have described so far interacts with that process of re-production of the South that occurred around the abyssal lines which cross Europe. This dynamic is a non-linear interaction, but I would like to propose some starting points from which to try to investigate it.

First of all, the overall intensification of the phenomena of economic transformation and urban planning due to tourism is not at all analyzable as a uniform event nor does it correspond in univocal way to a simple quantitative increase of tourism in Southern Europe.

What can rather be observed in European space is a mutation in the direction and especially in the flows of tourism itself, which produced, in a differentiated manner, the presence of a new social actor in the articulation of the city space – i.e. Lisbon – or one simple intensification of an already validated presence – i.e. Venice.

In particular, due to the impoverishment of the European middle class, tourist flows have undergone a major change that has significantly reduced the spread of holidays and travel outside the continent, in favor of domestic tourism.

In this process, Southern Europe presented some optimal characteristics to become a destination attractiveness of new domestic tourism; in the first place the coexistence of landscape resources in the non-urban spaces – the optimal sea and climate which make the Mediterranean 'the new tropics' – and historical-cultural in urban ones – the cities of art; secondly, the relatively low cost in areas with 'new' tourist potential, comparing with the cost of Northern Europe or of the 'exotic' tourist locations outside Europe.

Furthermore, I would like to suggest that the way in which the economic crisis is articulated as a real estate crisis has greatly favored the development of these processes.

In countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, the massive impoverishment of the middle class has occurred, translated also in the inflation of mortgages, which caused that many residents lost their homes or, more simply, they became not very competitive actors on rental market, based on the mechanism of greater attractiveness of short-term rents than we have tried to describe previously. What I would like to argue is that the economic crisis has largely favored, in Southern Europe, the production of the 'rental gap' that we have just now seen to be at the base of the processes of urban extractivism, favoring, in fact, the change of the connotation of the use of certain areas, both in favor of new populations and of the new offer commercial aimed at them.[1]

As a last element, I would like to add that the tendential increase in unemployment rates in the aforesaid regions and in particular in the poorer areas, had a strong weight on the process of "impoverishment of the social fabric" mentioned above. In fact, according to Salerno, this process generates "a passive civil society whose main expectation of wealth is determined by rents, thus reducing social creativity ". Indeed, in the social breakdown produced by the employment crisis, tourism was identified as

[1] A paradigmatic case would be that of the AirBnb phenomenon. (see Gainsforth & Sarah 2019)

the only possible source of employment and income for the native populations.

The 'impoverished development' typical of the colonial brand of the tourist economy has been translated into a real statement without alternatives: the development of tourism as a vehicle for one possible economic and social salvation – completely individual and competitive – has become the only one possibility of alternative work to emigration from the territory, although at the cost of 'exhaustion' of the territory itself. This contradiction between development and territory is, in my opinion, at the base of the phenomenon of turistification, and constitutes the problematic node, critically highlighted from birth and ever greater spread in the South of Europe of social movements against the *turistification*.

Social movements arose in opposition to tourism, as well as providing a sort of mapping of the urban transformations in progress, have constituted a real new generation of urban social movements in areas of tendential deactivation of political activism.

As emphasized by Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse, Margit Mayer (2013, intro), the effects of global economic recession are dramatically intensifying the contradictions on which urban social movements are called to confront, putting them to immediately elaborate claims concerning the unsustainability and the tendency to destroy the 'neoliberal forms of urbanization':

> Equally important is the question of how this crisis has provoked or constrained alternative visions of urban life that point beyond capitalism as a structuring principle of political-economic and spatial organization.
>
> Capitalist cities are not only sites for capital accumulation strategies; they are also arenas in which the conflicts and contradictions associated with historically and geographically specific accumulation strategies are expressed and fought out. (Brenner, Marcuse, & Mayer 2013)

Although with enormous peculiar differences in the processes that have invested every single territory, many cities in Southern Europe have, in recent years, seen the emergence of social movements opposed to the turistification. These movements have particular roots in Spain, which, among the countries of Southern Europe, was also the one most characterized by the spread of radical movements organized on the theme of the housing, following the estate crisis – in particular, the Plataformas Afectados de la Hipoteca (PAH): these networks of activism and mutualism, in the Spanish case, were the first direct activators of movements against tourism, through the convocation of demonstrations and assemblies that connect more claims on the collective use of urban space.

These metropolitan social movements carry forward the overall claim of 'Right to the city', that is not only to the house, but also to the possibility of participating in the processes of urban space production: Among the themes claimed, in the Spanish case, there are the application of the Ley de Dependencia [*Law for the autonomy of people in situations of dependence, approved by the Zapatero government in 2006 - ndt*], the right to a worthy job, the right to a public transport system that does not marginalize parts of the city.

Following a series of international meetings proposed by the Spanish realities in the last two years, in April 2018 the founding Manifesto of the SET network commenced – Southern Europe against turistification.[2] A network of cities[3] and grassroots experiences, with a fort rooting in the Iberian peninsula, which aims to address the effects of the extension of urban tourism industry.

In the nine points of common reflection among all the cities that are listed in the manifesto, we find the problem of the increase in rents and the consequent precariousness of the right to housing; the transformation of the shops for the tourist offer to the detriment of the local population; the limitation of access to public space for the inhabitants, as streets and squares are always more congested; the saturation of public transport; the economic 'monoculture' which creates dependence of the territory on tourism; the precariousness of the working conditions of the population employed in the tourism industry; the pollution and the high consumption of environmental resources exhaustible; the constant increase in the construction of invasive infrastructures for the territory; Lastly, the 'trivialization of the territory', with the tendency of transforming places into 'thematic parks' for the use and consumption of tourists.

As can be seen from this short list, the claims of these anti-tourism movements are very varied and invest the subject of the rights of local populations in very different aspects a take part in the choices concerning the production of space.

The problem of extractivism, also declined in the political sense of the tendency to shift power to decide on the territories in the hands of economic actors outside the territories themselves, is part of the municipality reflection of these movements. The organizational form of the network of rebel cities can be defined, in the words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, a form of "connection between South and South" (Santos 2007), or alliances between movements and subjects that are found to be "on the other side of the abyssal line" without these relations being mediated by the intermediation of the North.

MAPPING CONFLICTS FOR SPACE: WHERE DOES THE RIGHT TO THE CITY END?

Finally, I would like to add a critical element with respect to the picture I tried to trace so far, and which frames tourism in Southern Europe and the social movements that it is opposed to in the interpretative framework of extractivism and its colonial rationality.

As I tried to reconstruct, extractivism – also based on the recent South American readings of this phenomenon (Gago & Mezzadra 2015) – also implies a strong exploitative dimension mass of natural resources (Gorz 2003).

If this dimension is very present in the debate on extractivism and if, at the same time, all the definitions of the phenomenon of *turistification* undoubtedly include the problem of exploitation of the non-urban or non-metropolitan territory, however, we

[2] The founding cities of the network are: Venice, Valencia, Seville, Palma, Pamplona, Lisbon, Malta, Malaga, Madrid, Girona, Donostia / San Sebastian, Canary Islands, Camp de Terragona, Barcelona.

[3] The manifesto is available in Italian, Spanish and Portuguese at: https://youtu.be/nnDoK6vz7sM

must find that, in fact, studies on the tourism remain strongly marked inside the frame of the studies of urban planning as well as social movements against touristification remain, fundamentally, metropolitan movements.

The 'non-city' – I will try briefly below to explain why I use this phrase – seems to be the great absent in this picture, although it is space of accumulation processes very violent and, in the case study we examined, that is Southern Europe, very much evidently a field for the exercise of massive tourist processes. From the province of Almeria in Spain to the Greek Islands, from the Algarve in Portugal to large areas of Southern Italy – the Salento, in the south of Puglia, for example – the non-metropolitan territories have been the subject of a very strong tourist transformation, especially as relatively less rich areas than the rest of the countries in which they are located and therefore excellent candidates for becoming tourist destinations not too much expensive, based on the phenomenon I tried to describe in the previous paragraph.

My intention is not to repeat a traditional theoretical divide between city/nature or, alternatively, city/countryside – as two contradictory aspects of capitalist and capitalization processes of space production, because the two terms are clearly relational and interconnected.

A large literature of urban studies has highlighted the importance of this relationship in the process definition of urban and non-urban space until the definition of *Nature Metropolis is* coined (Cronan 1991) to underline the fundamental role of the relationship with the surrounding space in the birth and structuring of the city.

At the base of this approach it seems to me that we can trace the concept of *urban society*, which Lefebvre coins in 1970 to "give name to the *post-industrial* society, that is the one that is born from industrialization"(Lefebvre 1970). This new society that arises "From the complete urbanization of the world" is not just the extension in space of what already was intended as a city; instead, it is a process in which "the non-city and the anti-cities will be conquered by the city, penetrate it, make it explode, and consequently extend immeasurably, resulting in the urbanization of society, in the urban fabric that covers the remains of the city before the industry "(Lefebvre 1970). In other words, the characteristics of urban society, or post-industrial, predominate as much on the countryside as on the city itself, to the point that the classical opposition between the two concepts of space no longer makes sense in the continuum of the urban fabric[4].

However, previously, Lefebvre had questioned the contradiction city/countryside in partially different terms, and which provide other interesting ideas for our analysis. In *Right to the city* (Lefebvre 1968), the problem of the relationship between nature and culture is posed in terms of that between city and country; this articulation is identified in three terms: rurality, urban production, centrality. The relationship between these aspects, according to Lefebvre, varies with the variation of production relations; although he undoubtedly recognizes the centrality of the urban in the

[4] It is in this context that the analyzes of Negri and Hardt are situated around the theme of the *metropolis*, according to which the state current "the metropolis is for the multitude what the factory was for the working class," as "space of the common, of life in common, of the sharing of resources, of exchange goods and ideas" (Negri and Hardt 2010).

capitalist production relationship, from the high side the confusion that the borders between countryside and city generate still attracts his attention. The city-country contradiction, according to Lefebvre should not be overcome in a "generalized confusion in which the country is lost inside the city and the city absorbs the campaign by losing it". In reverse, urban life itself contemplates "special mediations between city, countryside and nature. So is the village, whose relationship with the city, historically and currently, is far from being completely known."

What I would like to suggest with this reconstruction is that the question of the centrality of the urban in the processes of capitalist accumulation and social reproduction – set by Lefebvre and variously developed in the subsequent literature – has decisively oriented the debate on turistification and its extractive role. Without questioning the importance of the metropolis in the current configuration of capitalist power and in the possibilities of autonomous organization of the social movements, it remains to ask: what becomes of what *is not* city?

While fully assuming the deconstruction of the Manichean binarism city-countryside or city-nature, it still seems important what told by Lefebvre about the contradictory nature of this relationship, and especially about the galaxy of other forms of space occupation that are produced in the mediation between these two principal: the village, the *rururban*.

Forms of accumulation for dispossession and extraction of territories that are directly or indirectly connected with the tourist economy occur, within the 'South' of which we are occupying, even in non-metropolitan areas – that is, not within cities, but in those spaces of mediation between city and nature in which the urban assumes many other different forms of diffusion on the territory.

What I would like to suggest in this text is that these phenomena – and the social movements that are to it associated – tend not to be so frequently connected to the analysis of turistification because they are more often considered the prerogative of a different analytical approach and of one different tradition of political thought: they are considered as "environmental conflicts" and studied with the categories of political ecology.

Political ecologist Martinez-Alier has coined the expression "ecology of the poor" (Martinez-Alier 2002) exactly to define the field of study of political ecology as the one concerning communities and territories fighting against extractivism, instead of a certain ecological 'Bourgeois' sensitivity founded on the idea of the defense of nature and perfectly non-contradictory with the so-called *green capitalism*. Most of his studies on extractivism have been based of research in Latin America, within the same debate from which it also derives the setting of tourism studies we have talked about so far.

However, at a later stage of his research, Martinez-Alier took part in a project of mapping of environmental conflicts in which he dealt with the European territory.

I refer here to the project 'Atlas of Environmental Justice' of 'Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade.'[5] This project aims to create a platform digital

[5] The Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (www.ejolt.org) is a global research

mapping of global 'conflicts for environmental justice and ecological distribution", with many main thematic areas – nuclear, mining extractive, waste business, justice climatic conditions are some examples.

The work coordinated by Martinez-Alier on Europe has highlighted a new category of environmental conflicts that had not previously been foreseen, or that of connected conflicts to tourism. This category has been added to the map search filters, giving rise, in the case of the European continent, to the result we can see in Fig.1[6]: the environmental conflicts against tourism facilities cover the maritime cost of Mediterranean Europe.

Figure 1. Environmental justice atlas



CONCLUSION

What I would like to highlight is the way in which the issue of touristification and that of environmental conflicts in the South of Europe encounter a space of strong coexistence and partial overlap within a dynamic of capitalist development of the territory that in both cases we can define extractive and responsive to a colonial rationality.

However, the two literatures intersect relatively little, being the question of tour-

project bringing science and society together to catalogue and analyze ecological distribution conflicts and confront environmental injustice. The primary objectives of EJOLT is to compile and make available an Atlas of Environmental Justice (https://ejatlas.org/). The Atlas of Environmental Justice is a practical and intuitive online platform that allows searching and filtering across 100 fields, as well as browsing by commodity, company, and type of conflict. The intellectual propriety of the maps and of all the images is of PROYECTO EJATLAS, INSTITUTO DE CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGÍA AMBIENTAL (ICTA), UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA (UAB).

[6] The present image (Fig.1) is reproduced here without any commercial purpose and the intellectual propriety is not, in any case, to be considered transmitted to any other entity or subject, according with the conditions of access and utilization of the site (https://ejatlas.org/legal, Retrieved December 15, 2019).

ism still very closely linked to the space of the city – and the right to the city – while that of the environmental conflicts are typical of the non-metropolitan space.

It seems useful here to refer to what is written by Wendy Wolford and Sara Keene, by the way of the difficulty of applying political ecology to the study of the so-called 'social movements.'

What is claimed by the two authors is that there is a substantial disconnect between what is considered as 'environmental conflict' and what, instead, falls within the definition of 'social movemen.' This stems from a number of historical reasons, including the fact that the articulation between environmental conflicts and class has not always been linear.

Political ecology, however, interprets environmental conflicts exactly from the point of view of a community fighting for the territories, not a moral attitude to environmental conservation carried out by those who have the material conditions to be able to afford it.

This could be a useful perspective to re-read many of the contemporary phenomena of touristification, especially in the Southern Europe area? My hypothesis is that this kind of perspective could help us to force the foundational contradiction of touristification, or that between consumption of the territory – as an exhaustible asset – and 'conservation' of the same in a re-proposition equal to itself of a simple performance that has nothing to do with the territory as living tissue.

This, however, would imply a rethinking of the centrality of the urban space in relation to the tourist phenomenon and a different attention to urban spaces of another type; this passage, perhaps, implies a de-colonization of the categories and disciplines with which the question has so far been addressed.

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TEACHING ENGLISH AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE: A CASE STUDY FROM POLAND

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ABSTRACT: This article presents a detailed history of the development of a particular immersion program to teach English to young Polish students. The program draws support from two organizations, the Kościuszko Foundation and the Polish Scouting Organization. Kościuszko Foundation is dedicated to strengthening the ties between the United States and Poland as well as to increase knowledge of Poland's history and culture in the United States. The cooperation of these two organizations developed an experience of immersion in language and cultural exchange. Both the teachers and the students in this program benefited from the opportunity to engage in a number of different types of language activities and cultural events through a summer camp experience. This program is, of course, unique, but the elements of context, culture and immersion could be used in other programs to develop English skills and knowledge in the context American culture.

KEYWORDS: Teaching English; immersion language, language program history, Polish-United States exchange

INTRODUCTON

This article describes a program that teaches English as a foreign language in the context of United States cultural practices and historical events set in a summer scout camp for Polish elementary school children. Since the early 1990's the Kosciuszko Foundation (KF) has organized and staffed 144 English Language American Culture and Arts Enriched Camps throughout Poland. More than 15,000 Polish students, approximately 2,500 American volunteer teachers and assisting students and a comparable number of Polish educators and student counselors have benefitted from participation in this program. The focus of this paper is the program located in Załęcze Wielkie, established by the Kościuszko Foundation. A unique element of the Załęcze Wielkie program, is the cooperation with the Polish Scouting Organization (ZHP). Kosciuszko Foundation supports a number of camp programs that teach STEM, but the Zalecze Wielkie camp is the only one that cooperates with ZHP. The presented model was developed by an American non-profit organization (KF), volunteers and Polish public organizations; however, we argue the model may be more widely generalized and reproduced. While this model has been described as a language teaching tool, the authors highlight the interdisciplinary aspects, involving volunteer teachers and social workers, may increase children's skills and openness to opportunities of globalized work (Devereux 2008). The Teaching English in Poland Program of the Kościuszko Foundation is a unique program developed by responding to needs with available resources. We present the history of this endeavor to acknowledge the work of the Kościuszko Foundation as well as to inform future educators and innovators.

TEACHING ENGLISH IN POLAND AFTER 1989

After the Second World War, the education program in Poland was introduced under the influence of the Soviet Union. The main second language taught in Poland was Russian and was mandatory in all Polish schools. Although some schools also offered a third language, usually English, German, French, or Spanish, it was rare for schools to offer a third language option. After 1989, when as a result of the Solidarity movement Poland regained freedom to self-govern, new education programs provided flexibility for schools to select programs and texts in the language of their choice. The role of Russian as a second language decreased in favor of English; language choice became a symbol of the new direction of a country moving toward "freedom, democracy and wealth" (Komorowska 2014). However, there was a pronounced shortage of teachers able to teach English as a second language. The first response to this situation was to educate a significant number of teachers in a relatively short time. Many teachers of other specialties (especially teachers of Russian) were encouraged to learn new skills and become teachers of English as an international language.

Poland's new open attitude to the West after 1989 allowed people to develop their life goals in a more globalized world and for this reason knowledge of English became important. Poles began to travel to the West looking for work, others learned new careers and experienced a world that, for years, was out of reach. Knowledge of English became crucial for people to meet their new life goals and people quickly recognized its significance in everyday life (Kasztalska 2014). Just after 1989 there were 18,000 Russian teachers in Poland, more than ten times the number of English teachers. Twenty years later, in 2009/2010, ninety percent of students in the school system were already studying English. Only 7.2 % studied Russian language (data from Komorowska 2014). In 2010-2011 there were 3,414 teachers of English and 3,580 teachers of Russian in Poland. (Zarebska 2010/2011).

DEVELOPING NEW MODELS OF TEACHING ENGLISH

One of the concerns of teaching an international language is the message transmitted during that process. In the case of Russian, it was clear that the teaching of this language had also been a venue for Soviet propaganda. Political and social messages that would have been difficult to deliver in other classes were presented naturally under the cover of teaching Russian. Russian language instruction was the most effective way for students to learn about the literature and art of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. Similarly, people often have asked if teaching English as a international language can be a form of cultural imperialism, a way to present Western culture as superior to others (Odrowąż-Coates 2017). It would be difficult to teach a language without also engaging in discussions about the culture in which the language operates and often these discussions – either overtly or covertly- include social and political opinions.

In the years 1945-1989, when the Soviet Union had significant influence on the content and methods of teaching in Polish schools, the educational needs of certain groups of Polish citizens were not met. Among those needs was the knowledge of the English language. Those with professional or personal interests in learning English, had few options and many of these options were expensive. English classes were offered, for example, by the Methodist Church or language camps were offered by British Council (Swick 1991; Hayes 2014). Participation in any activities to learn English, including private lessons offered by skillful teachers, was desirable and prestigious, but typically carried a high cost. Knowledge of English provided many benefits for those Polish residents who learned it. For example, they could have contacts with people visiting from Western countries, listen to and understand radio broadcasts and read literary sources not available to the general public. A knowledge of English allowed young people to listen to and understand modern music, which gained enormous interest beginning in the 1960's and continues even today. In Poland's rebellious culture towards Soviet propaganda, the motivation to learn English was very high, but there were many barriers to realizing the goal of understanding and speaking English.

There are many models of language education concerning the most effective way to engage students in the process of learning (Dörnyei 1998; Guerrero 2015). The tra-

ditional model of teaching a foreign language at school is whole class instruction offered by a teacher from the same community as the students. Often, English language texts are available in Polish so instruction and communication between students and a teacher is based on translation of words using the same communication structure as in other classes. Less traditional models of language instruction are related to understanding the motivation to learn a language. Gardner and Lambert (1972) described two different approaches in the process of learning language: an integrative orientation that encompasses a language, its culture, and its community and instrumental orientation that is related to practical goals of learning. Further, research in language acquisition addresses the cognitive processes and the learning context in the class. The last sphere of research concerns a specific learner's motivations which change over the time of learning and understanding the benefits of acquiring new linguistic skills (Guerrero 2015). The traditional model of learning English as an international language in schools, by rote memorization and grammar study, does not offer an integrative component of motivation and attention to a student's practical goals for learning (Kasztalska 2014).

There are several theoretical approaches to characterize the best practices in teaching a language (Brown 2000; Richards and Renandya 2002) and evaluations to support the best practices (Hillocks, 2009). In general, it is difficult to evaluate a process that is multidimensional and time dependent. Motivation to learn a foreign language changes with age and with the understanding of the benefits that knowledge of English offers. The most informative are empirical data gathered in different countries and cultures that develop their own practices and process evaluations of teaching English as a second language (Giota 1995; Nikolov 1999; McKay 2003; Guerrero 2015).

After 1989, with the beginning of political and economic transformation, people in Poland quickly understood that knowledge of English will help them to achieve their personal and career goals. Many teachers had to make a decision to abandon their previous discipline, like teaching Russian, and learn how to teach English. It is obvious that in a short transition period many teachers did not develop desirable teaching skills. Both students and teachers became learners. Instrumental motivation was clear but integrative orientation was more difficult to achieve. Parents of school age children were looking for the best learning environment for them. Many people who had experiences living in English speaking countries offered private classes. Parents who could afford sending their children abroad use this resource to better prepare their children for the new, more competitive word. Again, the need to learn English had a barrier of high financial cost. People were looking for better and more accessible models of teaching English as an international language.

In 1991, the Polish National Commission for UNESCO and the Polish Ministry of National Education invited the Kościuszko Foundation to cooperate in meeting the growing English language needs of Polish youth that emerged after the fall of communism. The Kościuszko Foundation responded with the development of the Teaching English in Poland program (TEIP), an innovative approach providing Polish students (upper elementary through high school) with interactive English language immersion experiences and practice in conversational English within an American cultural con-

text at summer camps throughout Poland. It also incorporated principles of democracy, entrepreneurship, business etiquette and volunteerism to provide Polish students with the basic tools needed to ease the transition after 1989 to national independence and to prepare them for participation in international arenas. From its inception the program was also intended to give American teacher and student volunteers the opportunity to become acquainted with the people, history, language, culture and educational system of Poland.

The role of the Polish Ministry of National Education (MEN) was to fund the boarding school campuses and educational centers designated as camp sites, to compensate the Polish staffs required to work with the students and Americans, and to cover the costs related to the operation of the camps. Polish camp Directors would also receive funds to provide the American participants with a small stipend, classroom and extra-curricular facilities, room and board, experiences in Polish culture and life, complimentary excursions to local places of historical and cultural interest and an end-of-program tour. The primary responsibilities of the Kościuszko Foundation were to recruit, select, and organize the volunteer American staff for each camp, arrange group flights to Poland, provide a program and curriculum guide and arrange for accident-medical insurance for its American participants.

DETAILED HISTORY OF THE TEACHING ENGLISH IN POLAND PROGRAM

The Western New York Chapter of the Kościuszko Foundation recruited ten American teachers to implement the 1991 pilot program at a boarding school in Bydgoszcz. One hundred Polish students enrolled in the program that summer. Due to its success, the Kościuszko Foundation expanded the camp offerings the next year. In 1992, Christine B. Kuskowski, Kościuszko Foundation member and Colorado and New York State educator and curriculum specialist, authored and presented the first official Teaching English in Poland program and Curriculum Guide as a volunteer in preparation for leading an American staff and implementing the TEIP program for high school students in Łomża. The guide was also to be used by an American staff from the Western N.Y. Chapter for launching the program at a camp in Ustka. This guide was afterwards revised annually to accommodate the needs of American volunteers and Polish students and to keep in step with changing times and venues.

As the program grew in popularity, Kościuszko Foundation President Joseph E. Gore, Esq. appointed Mrs. Kuskowski as Program Director in 1993. Under Mrs. Kuskowski's vision and leadership, the program expanded rapidly reaching a record high of nine camps per year in the period 1995-1997. As the English language became a popular foreign language in Polish schools, parents clamored to send their children to the camps. At that time, it was presumed that the program would only serve Polish high school students. As studying the English language became a popular option in Polish schools, the TEIP program grew in demand and was opened to upper elementary and junior high school students. The curriculum and model for the upper elementary group was developed by Dr. Mary Kay Pieski in 1997 and was implemented at the Warsaw camp. For the first time, American youth were partnered with Polish students

and served as peer tutors. The curriculum focused on assisting the students in refining their English language conversational skills, on motivating them to develop self-confidence while applying those skills, and on preparing them to engage in international endeavors.

From 1998-2009, the number of camps ranged from four to seven each year. In 2009, the Polish Ministry of National Education withdrew its financial support from all summer foreign language camps. At this critical juncture, the Kościuszko Foundation decided to continue the program by accepting the invitation of two administrators, who were able to find independent support to organize camps at their sites in 2009 and 2010. These two locations were Załęcze Wielkie and Tczew. In 2009, through the initiative of Assistant Director Mary Kay Pieski, the Foundation introduced the Arts Enriched English Language Camp for students thirteen to fifteen years of age at the Polish Scouts Organization's (ZHP) educational, environmental, and recreational center, "Nadwarciański Gród", located in Załęcze Wielkie. The traditional TEIP language and American culture program was also conducted simultaneously at that site for upper elementary school students.

Offering an English language camp enriched by the study of the arts represented a truly novel approach for Polish students to learn American culture. Students at this camp attended a total of six different classes taught daily in English. The classes included dance, music, art, storytelling, and drama. Students were accepted into the program regardless of their previous exposure to the arts. The camp provided the opportunity for students to learn how to play banjo, guitar, clarinet, ukulele, dulcimer, and Orff instruments as well as learn choral singing and technology-assisted music composition. The Delta Kappa Gamma Educational Foundation awarded grants, which funded the purchase of these musical instruments. The camp concluded with an Arts Expo for parents, friends, and community members during which the students showcased their work. This innovative camp model was presented at several state, national, and international music education and humanities conferences. In 2010, the Arts Enriched English Language Camp at the ZHP site was expanded to accommodate students twelve through eighteen years of age. The NIDA Foundation of Poland (Nidzicka Fundacja Rozwoju) supported the program by funding the participation of sixty students. The Arts-Enriched English Language and American Culture camp at Załęcze Wielkie was the only TEIP camp offered in 2011.

In 2012, Christine Kuskowski became Director Emerita and Dr. Mary Kay Pieski, assumed leadership of the program with Dr. Teresa Wojcik serving as Assistant Director. The traditional English Language and American Culture camp model (not focused on the arts) returned that year with a new camp at Barlewiczki. From 2012 to 2018, the TEIP program witnessed continued growth with the addition of several new camps: Pinczow, Minsk Mazowiecki, Krakow, Krynica-Zdroj, Siennica, Otwock, and Załęcze Wielkie. In 2013, the Arts-Enriched camp model expanded to a new camp in Otwock. In the 2010s, the Teaching English in Poland program grew to a record seven camps in 2016. In the fall of 2018, the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the Kościuszko Foundation decided that it was best for the Fundacja Kościuszkowska Polska to administer the TEIP program under the auspices of the Kościuszko Foundation.

Dr. Grazyna Czetwertynska was named the new Director of TEIP.

From the inception, the Teaching English in Poland program was more than its name; it was conceptualized as a reciprocal learning experience for both its Polish and American participants, with each side acquiring knowledge and appreciation of the other's language, culture, and heritage. The Polish students had the unique opportunity to attend lessons taught by native speakers of the English language. The Polish teachers and teaching assistants also benefited from their participation in the camps. For example, they witnessed how American teachers interact with students and use active pedagogical approaches such as role-play and cooperative learning. They also were able to practice their English language skills and expand their knowledge of American culture through conversations with the American staff.

Volunteering as a teacher or teaching assistant at a TEIP camp gave the American volunteers the opportunity to have an international teaching experience. Living and teaching in Poland allowed the American participants to learn firsthand about the Polish culture, language, and cuisine. During the camp, the Polish students and staff shared aspects of Polish culture with the Americans during a special event designated as "Polish Day." Students made presentations about Polish history, cuisine, and music as a way to share their culture with the American volunteers. At the conclusion of the camp, the American volunteers typically attended a three-day excursion during which they visited sites of cultural and historical significance to Poland.

RECRUITING THE TEACHING TEAM

The Kościuszko Foundation recruits teachers in the United States as volunteers. Teacher participants in the program provide their own travel expenses and organizational fees. Room and board in the Załęcze camp are provided by the Polish Scouting Organization. At the end of the volunteers' stay, they are offered a trip to sites of Polish cultural interest consisting of a few days in Kraków and Zakopane and the opportunity to see world history sites such as Auschwitz.

There are two different groups of Americans recruited to participate in the Załęcze camp, both groups are educators: teachers and teaching assistants. Both groups are recruited through various methods including advertisements through local Polish organizations, posts to various teacher groups (e.g. emails to world language teacher groups), social media promotions, informational tables at local cultural events (such as the Cleveland Dyngus Day celebration), and informational flyers sent to schools with an interest in international mindedness such as International Baccalaureate Schools. Additionally, teaching assistants are also recruited through presentations at universities with teacher preparation programs. To help to properly screen all applicants, two letters of recommendation are required as well as several short answer questions where applicants explain their motivation for participating in the program as well as lessons they would be willing to teach. Often American Staff Leaders will also conduct phone interviews and reference checks to gain further insight into a candidate's abilities.

When recruiting teachers, educators from all disciplines are desirable as the aim of

the program is to build conceptual understanding and language competence in variety of situations. With this in mind, the program happily accepts a range of educators from college professors to high school art teachers to private music teachers. In the past two years teachers of physical education, science, health, history, math, architecture, and even military science have all shared their content knowledge in English with students. This variety of instructors also adds a variety of content for students who may return to the program year after year. It guarantees that the content will not stagnate and that returning students (and Polish staff) will be exposed to a wide variety of concepts, content, and methods of instruction.

Previous experience working with English language learners is not a requirement to participate in the program as the American Staff leader provides instruction in best practices for teaching English language learners. Participants are provided with a curriculum guide updated yearly by the program's directors. The American Staff Leader also leads virtual meetings where she reviews best teaching practices for English language learners and reviews the language goals of the camp – to help students in the development of their oral language skills, vocabulary, and listening comprehension through meaningful interaction with native speakers. Before camp, teachers and teaching assistants are also provided with training on administering the pre- assessment instrument (The IPT Oral test) and information on what the implications of different levels of IPT achievement will mean for instruction and grouping.

An interesting note on the teaching staff is that at least one quarter to one half of the teaching staff usually have some Polish background. Despite this background, however, few of them may understand or even speak any amount of Polish, so before camp the American Staff Leader also covers the facets of English that are uniquely challenging to speakers of Polish and Slavic languages. The American Staff Leader also describes common cultural differences between Americans and Poles to preempt any cultural misunderstandings. Staff members are provided with a guide from the TEIP Program called "News You Can Use" which attempts to cover the basics of functioning in Poland as well as a brief foray into Polish cultural expectations and norms.

In the months before camp, teachers are asked to begin planning their lessons and it is suggested that they co-plan with their teaching assistant for maximum effectiveness and content knowledge on the part of both instructors. This planning is done virtually as teachers and teaching assistants typically live thousands of miles apart. The staff leader's role is much like that of a traditional administrator in American public schools--to provide instructional leadership and guidance. The staff leader reviews the lesson plans and provides suggestions for instruction and modification, also checking to ensure that teacher's lessons do not repeat content.

Upon arrival at camp, the American Staff Leader continues the traditional educational administrator role by performing classroom observations to provide feedback and if necessary suggestions for change. The staff leader also acts as a liaison between the Polish and American staffs, relaying feedback from the Polish staff in areas where they see the need for change.

VALUES AND CULTURE AS PART OF LEARNING A LANGUAGE

The Kościuszko Foundation was created by Polish immigrants and by Americans of Polish heritage, those who have an interest in furthering cooperation and education about both the United States and Poland. The Curriculum Guide for the Teaching English in Poland program (2018) straightforwardly addresses concerns regarding potential imperialistic messages (Odrowaz-Coates 2017) that might be communicated through the teaching of English as a language:

> It is not the intentions of the program to Americanize students or to proselytize political or religious concepts and views. Respect for the culture, traditions, and educational standards of Poland must be maintained. Familiarizing the students with American culture should enable them to converse comfortably and intelligently on a variety of American topics. (p. 16)

However, the program does offer plenty of opportunities for socialization into American culture. The theme of the camp changes from year to year but content is molded to reflect the theme. When one of the authors of this paper was in Załęcze, each day of the camp was dedicated to a different famous person, holiday, or event in American history and culture. Children read Edgar Allan Poe and learned about Martin Luther King. They came to understand the importance of the Fourth of July to Americans and how much fun Americans have on Halloween, dressing up in costumes and eating candy. As Polish students are often exposed almost exclusively to British English and culture, it is the goal of the American staff to show the Polish students what the staff considers to be unique and important to them about American culture.

The other source of values and a specific culture represented in the learning English in Poland camp in Załęcze is the scouting tradition associated with the Polish Scouting Organization (ZHP). The place where the camp is organized is a well-known scouting center for both educational opportunities and summer vacations. All of the Polish teachers are scouting leaders, and the entire camp organization is dictated by scouting traditions. Grażyna Truszkowska, one of the camp's teachers, noted, "The values of Kościuszko, such as patriotism, service to others, and tolerance, are also the values of scouting." The values of the Polish Scouting Organization (ZHP) and of the Kościuszko Foundation are essentially the same. It is worth noting that ZHP in years after the Second World War tried to change its core catholic values of education into a more humanistic approach (Kaszkur 2007). As the result of World War II experiences, scouting leaders tried to educate youth in what Ambrosewicz-Jacobs (2016) called a transnational justice set of values. Interestingly, Grażyna Truszkowska cited Janusz Korczak's famous statement: "There are no children, just people". It shows that the main values at the camp are respect and autonomy of students. Camp staff use play and team work as a learning practice. Each team establishes its own rules and priorities. Staff cooperate with parents. Often families work with the camp staff for a few years sending their children each year for this camp.

TEACHING LANGUAGE IN A SCOUT CAMP

It is well recognized that learning depends on the environment (Acker & Miller 2005). In this case the environment consists of a few buildings in the forest along the river Warta. The forest is the most natural setting for scouting. Many games, songs, and scouting skills relate to the forest. Nature is also a favorite environment for the experiential learning process. Each day of the camp is divided into three different parts: classes in the morning hours, fun and sport in the afternoon, and free time in the evening. American staff is encouraged to use whatever venue is most suitable to their classes and often class activities take place outside. The afternoon activities are always held outside. The structure for outdoor activities is made according to scouting rules, with leaders and teams knowing exactly how to work with each other (Mislia et al. 2016; Radzki 2016; Rajamanikam 2016)

Each age group of children has its own scouting leader, and the American staff teachers are assigned to them. The assigned staff is responsible for creating a group culture with the full participation of students. The curriculum of class is age appropriate and depends on the knowledge of English evaluated at the beginning of the camp. To further try and build a sense of belonging and community each group creates its own unique slogan and a badge in English related to American culture. The scouting routines help to create a relationship between the students and teachers based on working together and diminishing any barriers that may come from the intersection of the American and Polish cultures. This structure for participation in the daily life of the camp and in the learning process follows the recommended teaching practice by Grossman et al. (2009) and is consistent with recommended learning processes in social work (Bergart & Clements 2015).

Both teachers and students appreciate when all the activities of daily life are connected to the curriculum through informal and formal learning processes. There is no break from learning; all communication has to be conducted in English as the American teaching staff does not speak Polish – even those who do know Polish do not reveal this to the students. In the atmosphere of learning about each other, teachers help students to discover their interests and talents. Later during the concluding program at the camp, students will present their achievements to the whole camp community.

The strong incentive in the learning process at this camp is novelty. Each member of the teaching staff is truly a foreigner. Additionally each year for at least one or two American staff members the visit to Załęcze will be their first time outside the United States or at least off of the North American continent. They come from a different culture and have different reactions to common things present at the camp. They also represent different professions such as teachers and social workers. The best example to illustrate cultural exchange involves food. During the program, there were different dishes that were liked by Polish students and staff. However, these dishes were met with clear distrust by Americans. For example, warm milk for cereal was universally rejected by the American staff and when the Americans served Kraft Macaroni and Cheese to the Polish students, its unnaturally vibrant yellow color was also met with much skepticism and distrust. One food, pizza, was loved by all. Pizza became a sort of

balm for homesickness among the American staff and there were special trips outside the camp to bring pizza. Polish students loved not only the taste of pizza, but also the ritual of "ordering out" and receiving pizza delivery. Another interesting example of informal learning concerns electronic media. Polish students love exchanging "friendship" on Facebook with American students who work as teaching assistants. This allows them to learn more about each other's lifestyle, travel, music and other interests, which can be discussed later. The practice of using Facebook in learning a language in Poland has been evaluated by Polok and Harężak (2018) with positive outcomes. The use of social media in learning a foreign language was also described by Mondahl & Razmerita (2014).

This unique learning environment reflects well the discussion among researchers concerning best practices for use in teaching foreign languages (Grossman et al. 2008). Załęcze and the TEIP's instructional program in general are focused on Krashen's hypothesis of acquisition-learning and also on his input hypothesis (Krashen 1988). Thanks to assessments they perform before camp, teachers are aware of their students' abilities and levels and are able to provide appropriate, comprehensible input. Additionally by providing somewhat authentic American classroom contexts of a STEAM (science, technology, engineering, art and math) class or a physical education class, it is hoped that the student will through communication with the teacher and teaching assistant more naturally acquire the English language. This model of teaching the English outside language classrooms is also known as CLIL – Content and Language Integrated Learning (Renau Renau 2016). The teaching method applied in Załęcze is also a good example of a practice in which teachers, through authentic contact with native Polish speakers also learn about the many dimensions of their students' experiences in daily life and culture.

Since teachers are coming from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds than the students, there is no room for negative consequences of professional routine. Teachers need to learn about students through on-going communication inside and outside the classroom. The practicality of the program taught (the content, the English language) facilitates the students' motivation to participate in the learning process. Educators model communication, demonstrate how to ask questions, set and honor professional boundaries and define behavioral structures. The teachers gather information about the students by participating with them in a range of activities inside and outside of the classroom. They can then evaluate the effectiveness, integrity, and complexity of their work during the daily staff meetings according to Grossman et al. (2008).

STUDENTS

Approximately a hundred students attend the camp. The students are ten to thirteen years old and possess different levels of English knowledge and ability. Most of the students are recruited through advertising for the camp in schools and community centers. About twenty students are recruited from low income families whose participation is funded by The Nidzica Development Foundation "NIDA". American social

work volunteers are especially interested in this group of students. It is interesting to note that children from this group are fully integrated with the rest of the children; it is difficult to differentiate them from the other children during daily activities. Low-income families do not have to have characteristics of multi-problem families. Although some children from this group may come from families where one parent lives abroad (Farkas & Romaniuk 2017), they usually are well prepared to live and cooperate with peers in the camp. It is frequently assumed that poverty is linked with behavioral and cognitive deficits among lower income children, but the observation of this group of children contradicts this belief. Children from low-income families were independent and well behaved. They knew how to dress depending on the weather or the special event for the day. They took care of their siblings and other peers from the same group. It seems that low-income families who care to send their children for additional learning also prepare their children well to live in society. The program provides a step up for children of lower income families to form friendships and to participate in preparation to thrive in a global economy through language development skills. Their participation is very important as there is some concern that teaching English can be a source of social and economic exclusion (Odrowąż-Coates 2017). Parents are aware that the English language and socialization to Western culture will help their children in higher education, future employment, and social status (Kasztalska 2014). For these reasons many families invest in teaching their children English as a second language in private schools, training camps, and study abroad programs. Extracurricular technical activities and language classes can increase the wage premium up to 10% (Bedyk & Liwioski 2016). Students who completed at least one semester of learning abroad increase their wage premium up to 28% after graduation (Liwiński 2016). Low-income families cannot afford such additional spending on their children's long-term goals. Social and economic exclusion may start early.

CHALLENGES IN INSTRUCTION

One of the biggest challenges faced by American teachers and teaching assistants is communicating content in a total immersion situation. Often the American staff leader provides suggestions on how to give the students comprehensible input that matches Krashen's qualifications of being challenging but still comprehensible. The students are ability grouped when they arrive but as teachers often don't have experience working with ELLs (English Language Learners), guidance must be given on the characteristics of each group (i.e. what can be expected of an emerging learner versus an expanding learner according to World-Class Instructional Design and Assessment standards). For ease of communication, each group of Polish students is accompanied by a Polish staff member who serves as both translator and disciplinarian. Polish staff members are mostly certified teachers and university students.

Discipline is another challenge for American staff members. Because of the delicate nature of intercultural interactions, the Polish staff is asked to handle all student discipline matters as they see fit. This can take some adjustment as many American educators are used to being in charge of student behavior in their own classrooms.

Additionally, American educators must learn on the fly standards and expectations for student behavior and interaction in Polish classrooms while at the same time trying to teach students American standards and expectations. While this arrangement does not lead to much conflict, it can lead to confusing situations for both parties involved.

CONCLUSIONS

This detailed account of the working of the Teaching English in Poland program illustrates an immersion opportunity to learn English in the context of cultural beliefs and historical events. The program, offered as part of a summer camping experience, is a novel approach to providing English instruction to young Polish students in the informal environment of a scout camp. The inter-organizational cooperation is crucial to the program and has evolved over the years of its operation. Another aspect of this program is the opportunity for students from families of differing incomes to develop skills that will increase social capital and abilities to participate in the global economy. This program is unique to Poland, but the elements of the immersion ideas and administrative alliances can be replicated for different settings and different languages.

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Mary Kay Pieski , Ph.D. is a recently retired music teacher and served as the orchestra director for the Kent City Public School System. She received an undergraduate degree in Music Education from Marywood University in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Dr. Pieski holds a Master of Music Education Degree in Piano Pedagogy and a Ph.D. in Cultural Foundations of Education from Kent State University. Dr. Pieski has been actively involved in programs that teach English, American Culture and the Arts to children all across Poland for over 25 years. This led her to co-found Eagle-Orzeł Educational and Cultural Exchange, Inc with Dr. Teresa Wojcik, which continues to connect Americans and Poles through

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Postscript

Significant changes in the administration of the TEIP program have taken place since the time of the writing of this article. Dr. Mary Kay Pieski and Dr. Teresa G. Wojcik no longer serve as the Director and Assistant Director of the program, respectively. They are no longer affiliated with the Kosciuszko Foundation.

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ELSEVIER'S SLAVES: THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?

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Captivity—it is putting the form in place of the goal.
C. K. Norwid [translation]

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the mechanisms of subordinating the system of science and higher education to the needs of boosting capital in the conditions of a new business model characteristic of neoliberal capitalism. The author uses as a theoretical framework of critical studies of science and higher education systems developed in Poland by Krystian Szadkowski based on political economy (Simon Marginson and Gigi Roggero). The weakness of the recently implemented reform of Polish education, the essence of which is making the status of 'scientist' dependent on publication in high-ranking journals belonging to publishing corporations' oligopoly, is that the natural and technical disciplines have been places on an equal evaluation footing with social sciences and humanities. This practice impoverishes the educational and critical functions of humanities, impoverishes the research questions, impoverishes the research methodology, and consequently, their cognitive values. The assessment of the quality of a social researcher's work, to be reliable, should include several other components—the presence of an "invisible university" in international networks (e.g. measured by selected citation indicators), but also problematization and interpretative innovation, as well as an original contribution to the achievements of the discipline. Monographs mainly document this. Qualitative expert assessment is required for evaluation. Therefore, the publication of monographs in reputable Polish and foreign publishing houses should become a showcase of the Polish social researcher, rather than contributing journal papers. In the paper, the author synthesizes his var-

ious analyses of contemporary capitalism and the role that science and the research and development sector play in accumulating capital.
KEYWORDS: knowledge, capital accumulation, turbocapitalism, humanities, parametric evaluation, expert assessment

1. THERE IS NO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION WITHOUT INNOVATION

We are dealing with a wave of four processes (mechanisms) regarding the functioning of modern capitalism. The first is globalization, or the processes of free movement of capital, resulting in production and value chains that encircle virtually the entire globe. The carriers of these processes are transnational companies that have created oligopoly networks in profitable branches of the economy. They follow the logic of profit, especially of maximizing the company's stock market value and reducing the time of capital circulation. Moreover, offshore zones and tax havens were created in their interest, as well as a space for speculation in the raw materials sector (food, oil, precious metals, minerals). They are complemented by speculation in the assets of enterprises (shares, loans), also on the periphery (India, Russia), or by land speculation like in Poland and Ukraine. Globalization took this form as a result of the state's implementation of neoliberal doctrine. Labor arbitration arose, and as a result of deregulation of the financial sector and manipulation of the tax system, considerable disparities in the distribution of income and assets appeared.

The second mechanism is the financialization of the economy and capital accumulation. This is not just a gargantuan expansion of the financial sector. It is also the financial form in which food, inventions, office space appear on the market, and finally the enterprises themselves. Even pensions are involved in the speculation spree.

The third is the progress of technology, the fourth industrial revolution or the second life of machines, this time perhaps controlled by artificial intelligence, not as before—by human beings. This raises uncertainty about the future of capitalism. Optimists are tempted by the vision of active civilization, while pessimists are afraid of a world where people are crammed in the suburbs of large cities without any chance of employment.

The fourth mechanism is the rise of excessive public and private debt, which makes it easier for the financial sector to control the state's economic policy, making slaves out of employees struggling with debt.

These mechanisms are complemented by cultural hegemony—control over ideological apparatuses and means of reproducing ideas and behavioral patterns. Here, the domination of the neoliberal doctrine and the system of institutions that sustain it is complete (bank economists, entrepreneurship studies, behavior control through consumer and mortgage debts, etc.).

In the current phase of the development of the capitalist market economy, the sources of capital accumulation are inventions, product and organizational innovations, the first draft of which is created at universities as a result of academic work. They can be implemented using raw materials, energy, and labour available in the

entire economic space of the world. There is no need to invest in fixed assets, also due to the high variability of products. Corporations prefer to control the market of scientific and technical knowledge in order to receive benefits from intellectual property. Modern-day Fords do not build factories. Today, the production line encircles the globe, the conveyor belt has been replaced by a container, and only the role of the distribution system is ever more significant (see Amazon). Władysław Szymański defines the contemporary economy of incomplete globalization (i.e. economic, not a political one) as "a system based on transnational entrepreneurship networks" (Szymański 2011: 212). Large companies (shell corporations) dominate the globalized economy. Management staff and departments responsible for research and development are located in the headquarters that merely coordinate the global network of suppliers and subcontractors of designed products. A production chain is created, whose first link is located on the Chinese coast, now also in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Central Europe. This applies to products that are admittedly marvels of technology like the iPhone, but their assembly, from parts manufactured separately, is done faster and faster by the skilful hands of trained residents of the province. Factories, or rather assembly plants in which gadgets for information society are created, are owned by local producers, and their margin is small. Establishment of such production and service chains requires computers, telecommunications networks, modern logistics, in particular, containerization of transport and broadening access to, a qualified, and at the same time cheaper, the labour force was needed.

Patents and intellectual property rights are essential in the new business model, and so a pioneer must have two advantages—ample funds and excellent research potential. Business and state expenses for research and development have increased. They range from basic research (discoveries), their technological selection, patents, prototypes, to implementation and production. Expenses for this sphere currently reach 2-3.5% of GDP, with 1/3 of research employees working at universities and 2/3 at enterprises. This leads to an explosion of patents in the field of ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, environmental protection, especially in the field of renewable energy. About 200,000 patents are registered each year, of which 1/4 is in the US, followed by Japan (over 20%), Germany, and Korea (nearly 10% each). Higher education provides about 20-30% of patents, and business—70-80%; in Poland quite the opposite.

For example, giants of the ICT industry buy patents from individual companies. These patents relate to wireless connectivity, encryption, touch and voice control, photo processing, etc. Individual companies may own up to several thousand patents. Therefore, the production of patents or at least their possession, prototype design, implementation of production, and promotion of a new product has become a new specialization for large companies. The competitive advantage is then ensured by the size of the potential sales market. The larger the market, the faster the depreciation of expenses and net profit. Thanks to a large market, the scale of production is increasing, and it is important because the costs of implementing technical progress are high. In this situation, market dominance is a way to increase efficiency and competitive advantage—the more customers, the greater the innovation rent and research profitability. That is why powerful global companies are standing in the field of increas-

ing productivity. Oligopolies are created, such as the American GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) or Chinese BATX (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi). In this context, the power of intellectual property of patents is coupled with financial resources, also due to tax optimization. The revenues of the 500 largest mega corporations are approaching 40% of the global GDP. Therefore, they are close to gaining a controlling stake over the global economy, and consequently over the states and universities that are financed by them, and over the future of civilization.[1]

An entrepreneur as an innovator is the organizer and coordinator (orchestrator) of the production and distribution network. This way, next to the market and the state, the network becomes a method of coordinating the global economy. Shell corporations are "real machines for spinning the economic surplus on the global market" (Szymański 2011: 270). A leading company has large liquidity reserves thanks to the innovation rate, high turnover, high margins, market position, and it also has easy access to bank loans and acquires a large part of the surplus generated in the economy. In the product price of such a company, as much as 75% are intangible assets—fees for research, patent, design, marketing strategy, advertising, law firm costs, consulting, public relations, etc. Therefore, the state cannot be unreliable in the protection of intellectual property. This is the essence of a knowledge-based economy. Due to market dominance, the company buys start-ups, merges and takes over competitors. The value of mergers and acquisitions in the world exceeded 4.38 trillion dollars before the financial crisis of 2008. The concentration of capital currently relies on the control and coordination of production as well as trade in high-tech goods (with a few exceptions from the mining or defense industries). Characteristics of capitalism confirm its relevance as a multi-level structure in which the "permanent investment game" takes place (F. Braudel). At the lower level, there are mainly family poverty-businesses in agricultural production, services, construction. The upper level, however, covers spatially extended production and exchange chains, created by large corporations implementing innovative products based on the achievements of natural and technical sciences (Klementewicz 2019: 60-69).

The "game" could go on endlessly if humanity had several planets at its disposal. Economic growth and technological progress have degraded the natural environment (air, ocean, soil pollution), food (antibiotics, chemicals), and climate (carbon dioxide emissions). An outstanding environmental economist Herman Daly laughed at the functional model built on faith in the power of science and technology. Together, they would solve the problem of resource depletion. According to this model, an increase in raw material prices would stimulate the development of new technologies that would, in turn, reduce mining costs.

Consequently, as lower-quality ore, usually a more abundant one, is exploited, prices fall and production increases, and this is called a mining pyramid model. Firstly, technology itself also has its financial and energy costs. Secondly, the increase in the costs of extracting fossil fuels determines all other factors linked to each other. Al-

[1] Milan Babic, Eelke Heemskerk, Jan Fichtner, Who is more powerful – states or corporations?, July 10, 2018 4.14pm, https://theconversation.com/who-is-more-powerful-states-or corporations- 99616

ready at the threshold of industrialization, the co-creator of neoclassical economics and methodologist William S. Jevons noticed: "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption" (Smil 2016: 234). Hence, the paradox derived from his name—cheaper energy, less expensive raw materials, and a reduction in labor costs ultimately lead to a decrease in the product price. The effect of this "progress" is the increase in consumption of a given good or service. As a result, according to the calculations by Vaclav Smil, an outstanding Canadian scholar of Czech origin, the average domestic consumption of per-person contributions to production increased at least four times during the 20th century. The contributions referred to include concrete in houses, metals and plastics in machines, aluminium and plastics in aircraft, and heavy metals, rare earth elements, lithium in electronics, magnets, and batteries. We seem to be slowly entering a new era. It will be a mild agony of economic growth and the search for technological solutions for zero-emission energy. The era in which science and its achievements will again become a common good. Therefore, according to Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski, science should not follow economic trends, but overtake them, preparing societies for institutional changes and a new development strategy (Kozyr-Kowalski 2005: 52).

2. THE BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF THE EXPLOITATION OF ACADEMIC WORK: GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY AND CORPORATE UNIVERSITIES

Since innovations are the backbone of an effective business, it is not surprising that corporations finance 70% of research and development work. Some corporations benefit from the circulation of knowledge, its dissemination, as well as from the selection of most creative researchers for American universities (brain drain). These, in turn, are corporations selling knowledge to students, hence the role of rankings to highlight the place of the university in the hierarchy of prestige and "research and teaching power." There are around 100 million students to intercept, and not only the university's global ranking, but also the model of "scientific excellence" of the modern researcher is utilized to do it. This formula prefers competition for status between researchers as well as between enterprising universities. This competition, like any other competition on the market or quasi-market, leads to the concentration of prestige and scientific achievements in the centre, and thus in the USA. Scientific excellence understood in this way is intended to ensure, in Marx's language, the subsidization of research work to capital in public higher education sector. Its essence is plundering the public sector, where research results and education based on them have so far been a common good (Szadkowski 2015: 145-174).

The global emergence of university rankings in 2003 was the beginning of subordinating scientific work to corporations. To this end, research (corporate) universities were created, integrated into the market society, which, from the mid-nineteenth century, had become, according to Karl Polanyi, only an addition to the economy. The university transmits in the form of papers, and thus indirectly, to corporations the products of research work arising from public funds—research reports, results of experiments, etc.—every year, the database contains 2.5 million papers. It gets trans-

ferred for further processing in the corporations' research and development departments or to start-ups in science parks created by government agencies, cities or local governments. There, the papers are transformed, as in life sciences, into new technologies, therapies, medicines, gadgets of the ICT industry. Oligopoly consisted of 5-6 publishing corporations plays the role of an "intermediary." In the social sciences and the humanities, these include Reed-Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Sage, Thompson Francis, and Springer. In total, they have an over-60% share in the publication of papers in these fields. Reuters Thompson and Elsevier additionally prepare information on citation in the form of appropriate indexes, e.g. Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) published in the Web of Science database. Their income and profitability exceed the income of industrial corporations; only investment funds have better achievements. Their profit margins rarely fall below 20%; they even reach 40%, e.g. Reed-Elsevier's profit increased from 13 to 25% in the years 2010-2015. To make this possible, American universities' expenditure on their journals grew four times faster than the inflation in 1986-2004 (see Szadkowski 2015a: 150).

Complex research systems are used to direct research to the needs of industry and capital circulation (investments), e.g. in Germany the network of 82 Planck Institutes whose domain is basic research, and the network of 60 Fraunhofer technology centres which are financed half by business and half by state budget (Theil 2012: 25-27). Thanks to this, the whole community assumes the risk of making wrong decisions as to the direction of research and financing of basic research. As always, corporations preponderate—they can socialize the costs of market position by hybridizing what is public and what is private at both global and national levels. The neoliberal Leviathan facilitated the change and was justified by bank economists in the form of neoliberal doctrine and public choice theory. At the core of this theory is the assumption of *homo oeconomicus* (i.e. the specific goal of maximizing utility, especially self-benefit), methodological individualism, and a fierce fight against a "malfunctioning state," bureaucracy "typing winners." In this way, the bureaucracy dares to support the market's harsh verdicts. Although it operates a price mechanism, it is mainly to distribute profits between enterprises. Besides, the economic efficiency criterion imposed on the administration paved the way for new public management. It turned out to be an attempt to commodify another sphere of social life, which was the public services sector. The neoliberal Leviathan first introduced management at universities in accordance with the ideal of evaluation and supervising the state in terms of transparency, accountability, and efficiency. In a word, value for money, hence the large role of social engineering auditing and academic work measurement practices. National bureaucracies governing science and higher education aim to direct researchers and universities to create knowledge that can be commodified or privatized, although at the upper levels of ideas and innovation. The time of academic work has been accelerated—increasing productivity in an even shorter time. The neoliberal Leviathan thus supports its own entrepreneurs in international competition (Korea and China, now also the German government). The new efficiency formula is contracting services, financing them, and finally settling accounts. American universities first provided the models of "good practices" in managing the research and education sector. In a "mother-society," the

state with the industrial-financial-academic conglomerate remains in a successful symbiosis. For instance, MIT is such a hybrid. The implementation of "good practices" was taken care of by the World Bank, OECD, and the European Commission. They define evaluation procedures, comparisons, and benchmarks. Proper implementation of the ideal is done by international bibliometrics experts, as well as specialists in public policy. They resemble imperial eunuchs—judging researchers worthy of financial favors on behalf of principals. They are not able to assess the cognitive values of "evaluated" works themselves; they resemble someone who wishes to evaluate a book without knowing its content. Instead, they leave the main problem of every science aside, which is, after all, a true cognitive practice, i.e., the problem of cognitive values of the knowledge it provides, i.e. its reliable insight into reality.

The process of subjecting science to business has taken the form of a "triple helix model of mutual relations" (L. Leydesdorff, H. Etzkowitz) between the neoliberal Leviathan, corporate university, and industry:

government bureaucracy ==> university ==> knowledge-based economy.

An important link is the relationship between the university and industry. It consists of business incubators, science parks, clusters, research and development departments of corporations.

For example, health protection has become a new field of technological progress based on the achievements of natural science and capital accumulation. First, a significant part of the GDP is allocated to the health sector (from 4.5% in Poland to 17.5% in the USA).[2] Second, it is an amenity that people do not save on—they want to remain young and healthy, and they want to be fit. New opportunities have brought the discoveries of the human genome and various DNA manipulation techniques. The new sensation is the CRISPR technique, which uses the rotation mechanism of bacteria against viruses. To defend against them, the bacterium incorporates a viral DNA fragment into its genetic code. Moreover, this path is used to precisely modify the genetic code of flora, fauna, and people. Therefore, large pharmaceutical companies (Roche, AstraZeneca, Pfitzer), investment funds, and state agencies direct huge funds to biotechnology, personalized medicine, genomics, cryonics or the digitization of healthcare. Application creators from Silicon Valley are trying to buy immortality or at least longevity. They invest millions of dollars in start-ups looking for a panacea drug for cell ageing, arthralgia, poor eyesight, and Alzheimer's disease, just to avoid natural therapy—exercise and a proper diet. Business clusters like Cambridge UK, which consists of 500 companies, employs 15,000 specialists educated at corporate universities, are created. The cluster generates revenues reaching 5 billion dollars. New companies and start-ups are made up of giants of the financial sector: JPMorgan Chase, Berkshire Hathaway. Most significantly, Jeff Bezos's Amazon took over PillPack for 1 billion dollars. This start-up has created a full online pharmacy (from prescription to drug delivery to the patient). Therefore, pharmacies will soon disappear, just like bookstores and small shops. Also, Polish medical schools and hospitals will get something out of

[2] World Health Organization, Public Spending on Health: A Closer Look at Global Trends, 2018, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/276728/WHO-HIS-HGF-HF-WorkingPaper-18.3-eng.pdf

fashion for bio investment. The government appoints the Medical Research Agency, and clinics receive orders from western giants for clinical trials of late drug implementation and new therapies (Lorezi, Bererebi 2019: 83-92).

In conclusion, the implemented system of evaluating achievements of the humanities is a form of exploitation of scientists, albeit with the enthusiastic support of a narrower circle of beneficiaries and naive zealots. Researchers give away intellectual, copyright, and publishing rights to corporations for free. What is more, researchers and universities often have to pay extra for this turnover. This is a state of affairs utterly incomparable to the situation of artists—admittedly always addicted to and kept by public patronage on a short leash, but nevertheless entitled by definition to royalty. Also important is the fact that the publishing regime imposed by administrative coercion forces researchers where to publish and, appearances to the contrary, what to publish ("what will sell well and what not—in grants and publications"). Therefore, we are dealing here with systemic violation of the autonomy of cognitive processes, of the freedom of science, and of the service of the quality of civil society.

Poland, as a belated newcomer for several centuries, has joined the parade / process of "scientific excellence" and global competitiveness. The state added reform-deformation of higher education and science, at least in the field of the humanities to transform the economy and pensions in accordance with the Washington, DC rules. Hence, a Polish scientist should draw problems for analysis, cognitive styles, and scientific criteria from this reform. However, the results of research exported to the world may have a secondary impact on the center in the form of valuable case studies for comparative research, and even enrich theoretical instruments. It has been done by several Polish humanists (L. Fleck, T. Kotarbiński, F. Znaniecki).

3. NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES: FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

There is no doubt that internationalization is a condition of cognitive progress in natural and technical sciences. The "scientific excellence" of natural sciences is indeed closely related to internationalization. According to the latest news, "international visibility of research results," "global circulation of knowledge production," and imitation of the American system of grants and corporate universities are present on the "international scientific production" quasi-market. This is where the problem of the specificity of socio-humanistic sciences appears vis-à-vis the natural and applied sciences. Do they have practical (ideological) or theoretical functions that answer the question, how is it now? In the first case, the criterion of their usefulness would be efficiency, in the second—the truth. The practical functions of socio-humanities are also social engineering techniques and technologies of such organization of social life in various dimensions to provide it with the necessary stability and the ability to survive and develop.

Well, science as a type of social practice, as a form of social awareness, and as a genre of knowledge has two basic aspects—content and scope. The first one covers the substantive content of the accumulated knowledge (theorems), the second—the

research area and problem coverage. In general, according to historical epistemology developed by Jerzy Kmita from the Polish Poznan school, the main function of science is to provide prognostic premises, and therefore directives that allow researchers to predict the consequences of undertaken activities, i.e. they determine the effectiveness of human actions against nature and possibly in the social world.

The gathering of practical knowledge takes place in the following order:

nature => scientific knowledge => productive practice => rationality (Kmita 1980).

According to the thesis of historical epistemology, scientific knowledge, and thus the social practice that leads to its creation, are functionally subordinated to the other spheres of social life. Scientific and research activity is determined by non-cognitive factors of historical-pragmatic nature in accordance with the heteronomous model of science development. These will arise in the form of demand for innovation from the economy in the form of technical bottlenecks, orders for the military complex, growing empirical anomalies, inconsistencies in the theoretical apparatus, as well as ideologies, social systems, politics, and the worldview of the current era. They demand better explanations, corrected statements with greater predictive power in a word, of cognitive progress. Thus, science is autonomous in terms of content while becoming increasingly dependent on external factors in terms of scope.

In the field of technical progress, industrial civilization continues to make further qualitative leaps. In the economy, the level of efficiency is determined by scientific derivative technologies that reduce energy and material consumption, facilitating the manipulation of atoms and molecules (nanotechnologies, robotics, teleinformatics, artificial intelligence, optoelectronics, biotechnologies using genomics discoveries, biomedicine, brain-machine interface, material engineering such as carbon nanotubes for computer chips, 3D printing, Internet of things).

In Poland, appearances to the contrary, the current reform of higher education and science is not opening the Polish economy and science to the global market. According to the latest EU ranking, the Polish economy occupies the 25th place in terms of innovation. Whether the lack of innovation is the result of the weakness of Polish science or rather of the structural weaknesses of the Polish economy—of that child of the neoliberal transformation. After three decades of another Polish modernization, there are still no global corporations absorbing innovations. According to the Central Statistical Office of Poland, in 2016-2018 only 26% of industrial enterprises and 21% of service companies were innovatively active. This is the result of deindustrialization and replacement of factories with assembly plants of ready-made parts, as well as the dominance of over 2 million micro-enterprises in the economy. And they are not innovative. In addition, there is a lack of an own arms industry, which has a steering role towards the science and research sector (like the Pentagon in the USA). Currently, the Polish state supports the innovation of other societies by sending scientific discoveries there, at least in its initial form. There is also a lack of laboratory base and a financially rich network of research institutes, as in Germany or the USA.

Meanwhile, in Poland, employment in the research and development sector has decreased by 100,000 employees. So, it is easy to be wise after the event—neither

the neoliberal transformation has shifted the Polish economy to the center, nor the neoliberal pension reform guaranteed their recipients a "vacation under the coconut trees," nor will another neoliberal reform, the reform of science, lead the University of Warsaw to become a competitor of the American Ivy League. Not with these funds, not this laboratory base, not this network for intercepting research results financed from public funds in peripheral countries. However, the requirements cannot exceed the possibilities, but they must be adapted to them.

The humanities are in a different situation because they are more influenced by consciousness and ideational factors, in other words, parts / elements of Popper's Second and Third World. In terms of content, social sciences are less autonomous and sovereign. They contain various "images of the world"—ideological, scientific, and philosophical systems, and images of the world, which are generated by the common consciousness of individual social groups. Thus, the humanities study symbolic culture, preserved in sign systems on the one hand, and on the other, their conscious incarnations—attitudes, stereotypes, memorial sites, historical consciousness, and symbolic imaginarium, etc. All these spheres co-shape human behavior. The regularities that occur between social structures, between the institutional environment and behavior, are used to control people according to the Foucauldian knowledge-power duality principle. It is used, for example, by the government in motivating employees as a "human resource," as well as in advertising, in commercial and political marketing. However, this knowledge is a cognitive deficit.

The main reason for this state of affairs is the lack of connection between the "discoveries" of human sciences (including the impact of ideological or religious discourses) and production technologies, new products, ways of taming and using the powers of nature, etc. The ways of doing so are provided by natural and technical sciences. Consequently, social sciences do not affect the rationality of people in the basic, and thus economic sphere of social life. The business utility of social sciences is of lesser importance. The social sciences' knowledge allows, possibly, to expand the ranks of consumers by shaping the hierarchy of needs, especially symbolic consumption, thanks to which it becomes easier to overcome the barrier of realization of the mass of goods produced; they also allow shaping employees' behavior, especially as voters or consolidating loyalty to the prevailing social order through cultural hegemony. From this point of view, research areas that use models, indicate behavioral conditions, and indicate how to make a profit—neoclassical economics, social choice theory, business psychology and advertising, social policy, electoral sociology, etc. will always be preferred. These disciplines will remain at corporate universities. But they do not contribute much to understanding the complexities of the human psyche and the world that shapes it. Generalizing the characteristics of Florian Znaniecki, the humanities strive to inductively describe the activities of people and the structure of the social systems in which they live, by explaining their causes and functions through the interpretation of meaning.

The functions of social disciplines now boil down, as they did before, to the question of how to serve the gods of this world? And they can be understood as classes, states, national communities, humanity. The rationality of learning about the humanities

and the resulting narratives are dialectical. On the one hand, they represent in the hidden (ideological and political) form particular interests of classes and social states, corporations, nations, on the other they strive for legitimacy borrowed from applied sciences. This fact best explains creative freedom, which is gradually institutionalized in the form of scientific disciplines, essay writing or journalism. A considerable space of public discourse is created, in which individual scientific and philosophical paradigms serve as a "shield and sword" for the rationality of people. And at the same time they are functional towards the interests of classes and large social groups, often even contrary to the ideas, also a common sense of these groups. So, many paradigms contain "areas of vision and blindness," hence the multitude of methodological rules for each paradigm.

I wonder what type of discoveries the reform supporters expect from internationalized humanities. Have there been any significant "discoveries" since the masters of the "art of suspicion"—Marx, Nietzsche or Freud? Well, one can possibly supplement the list with trackers of signs of violence in social life (M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, T. Adorno, L. Althusser). What is more, one can even argue, like Geoffrey Ingham, that "some of those who could qualify on this list have only contributed to the misappropriation and obfuscation of the intellectual heritage of Smith, Marx, Weber, Schumpeter, and Keynes" [translation] (Ingham 2011: 9).

The actual problem of choosing a set of research tools and techniques is to combine two research tasks. First, it consists in the reconstruction of the cultural (semiotic) layer of social reality. It is a sphere of social phenomena and processes, which also include conscious, ideological ("scientific" and simple) ideas about them, also known as the symbolic universe. It is rooted in the history of individual life and work communities—cultural heritage, historical experiences, and systemic specificity. The results of these reconstructions are presented in an appropriate narrative form. Secondly, it involves the reconstruction of the existence outside of the consciousness network of relationships between people, called communities. They determine the possible alternatives for action, as well as its necessity. We reach the unconscious world only indirectly. A thought-out theoretical structure is used for this, which must be encapsulated in indicators of observable phenomena. The researcher serves various socio-demographic and economic data, information from surveys etc. But their cognitive values depend on the theoretical concept that gives them meaning.

A social researcher, therefore, without a laboratory and the possibility of conducting macro-social experiments, works with their head. The success of their work depends on subjective general and factual knowledge, as well as modelling skills—hence the role of the name and a sense of autonomy. That is why authors of contributing papers do not belong to the humanities. Yet, the authors of great analyses and syntheses, such as F. Braudel, M. Foucault, W. Kula, and Th. Pikkety, K. Polanyi, J. Topolski and I. Wallerstein do. It took the latter to write his 1500-page *opus magnum* several years. Nearly 1,700-page work of the English political historian Samuel E. Finer is so valuable for a political scientist; and in the work one can find unique data for studying the function of the state in history (Finer 1997). The imitation of natural science produces an unexpected effect, which is the contradiction between the utilitarian pro-

gramming and selection of publications in the field of applied sciences and the forced reproduction of secondary, sometimes even empty words of "universal" humanities. This threatens with marginalization and even elimination from the international circulation of reflective humanities, seemingly impractical and even useless.

Interesting in this context is the question of where the great humanists come from. All theoretical concepts organizing contemporary research are essentially museums of social thought. The road to greatness leads through diligence and unwavering faith in the validity of ideas, theories, and concepts that are original in the creator's eyes. They must constantly repeat their idea in subsequent books, as well as find its apostles (Hartman 2016). Can writing papers to journals instead of writing monographs help to take a significant position in a linguistically and partially culturally foreign world? The negative answer to the above question leads to the practical conclusion that, above all, the access of outstanding Polish monographs to the global market should be supported. This was the case with the work of Ludwik Fleck, *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*, which only after translating into English won a well-deserved place in the sociology of science. Another example is the 5-volume set of books edited by Przemysław Urbańczyk, entitled *The Past Societies. Polish Lands from the First Evidence of Human Presence to the Early Middle Ages* published by the Polish Institute of Advanced Studies PIASt, financed by the National Humanities Development Program.

Contemporary capitalism without borders has faced challenges whose diagnosis and suggestions for overcoming them should now be completed by catalogs of humanists' research questions. Let me indicate the most important:

ecological crisis and depletion of raw materials, ecological costs of consumerism; energy transformation, change of lifestyle to limit consumerism as a life orientation of contemporaries;

scientific and technical access, reindustrialization, especially robotization, artificial intelligence (the world without a job, its precarization, the problem of basic income);

aging of the population and the problem of safe old age and the related increase in expenditure on the pension fund and health care;

the explosion of inequalities within national societies and disparities between regions of the world (populist movements, waves of immigrants, the problem of unnecessary people of the Global South);

financial crises: financialization of economies, dominance of the financial sector over states (public debt mechanism, invisible parliament of "investors").

Therefore, social sciences not only provide valuable information about man as a social being and the communities he creates. Science—when it comes to the humanities and knowledge about society—is not only measurements, observations, and experiences, not only calculations, but also reflection, theory, focusing on what is problematic or controversial in interpretation. It is universities, not international journals,

that have been a place of pluralistic debate on national strategy, defining the reasons for the state, interpretation of tradition, diagnosis of opportunities and threats in the face of existing development trends of the economy, quality of community ties, examination of human relations with the environment, evolution towards a multi-polar global system, ways of arranging relationships with a neighbor.

In addition, researchers at public universities carry a burden of service towards those who maintain universities through taxes. The minister only administers public funds; they cannot be only a business supporter. In the Polish regressive tax system, these are mainly employee classes. In addition to social and planetary rationality, the social researcher should consciously take into account the emancipation interests of those marginalized, weak, and pushed to the side of public debate. Nevertheless, they can achieve practical goals only because they provide knowledge that is characterized by cognitive values, i.e. it is a reliable insight into the studied reality.

William A. Williams, an American reflective historian and political scientist, indicates four criteria of a reliable social researcher. First, they must get to the bottom of things. This leads to the disclosure of deeply hidden determinants of social life—its economy, political struggle and "game," masked contradictions, and ideological opium. Secondly, they must provide an explanation of the ever-changing institutional matrix of society—new trends and barriers to development. Thirdly, they must present an alternative hierarchy of values than those socially shared, because it is responsible for current causes of stagnation and creates development barriers. Finally, they must show the path of a structural change in the current order, both strategic goals and tactical alternatives to action (Tilman 1974; Williams 2009). As Tony Judt said, a social researcher is to be more of a whistle-blower than a "priest of truths." Paradoxically, capitalism for survival needs not only the "Magic Flute" of scientists naturalizing the System, but also the "Occam's Razor" of researchers critical of their boring theories, hypostases, and recommendations. Otherwise, their uncontrollable tendency to accumulate capital causes havoc in the ecosystem, they cause suffering, affects people's lives and collectivities, ultimately structural crises. As a result of neoliberal turmoil, the science center has just found its place in the backyard of shareholder capitalism, with its guidelines for the privatization of public services, the codification of education and knowledge. And it is a fact, because it reveals the macro-social sources of the evolution of the academic field in the light of the sociology of science and the style of Barry Barnes and David Bloor's strong program of the Edinburgh School. The dynamics was driven by the innovations necessary to multiply capital in the neoliberal business model.

The university cannot install a specific production line of researchers. It will then cease to be a forge of intellectuals with an inquisitive and critical attitude towards social reality. It would then become a culture of "productive" clones according to the criteria of parameters, grades, and grants. The social researcher is not a "puppet" in the hands of the disposer of public funds, a politically correct service provider. From this point of view, Humanities 2.0 can be interpreted as a conscious limitation of the number of researchers and non-natural faculties (i.e. of little use to business or administration) at Polish universities. The results of social research are useful to corpo-

rations for the effectiveness of the cultural industry, controlling consumer behavior and its variation—electoral, forming attitudes towards the System. For administration, for example, the information provided by demographers and social politicians in connection with assessing the effectiveness of public services is valuable. In a word, the taxpayer and the consumer are what counts, not the citizen. Therefore, functions towards the community of life and work related to showing its developmental tendencies, visions of a better organization of society to improve the quality of life or remove the deficiencies of liberal democracy will be eliminated. An interesting contribution to assessing the effectiveness of a reform-deformation of the Polish humanities is the insignificant influence of American (and thus global) citations champions, especially the winners of the Nobel Prize in the field of Economics.

In this country, only six media groups under shareholders' control decide on the content of 90% of what people watch, read, and listen to. The losers in the rat race are wrong—around 30 million uninsured, a few poor jobs may not be enough to live a month without social support.[3] Low unionization and employee protection—short leave, low unemployment benefits, no maternity leave, large pay gap. Hence, one of the highest Gini coefficients, close to 0.5, which means a large diversity of income and assets. Higher education is costly from the lowest levels in the education system. No wonder that 14 times more sons and daughters can afford it whose parents are among the 20% richest citizens than the children of the poorest 20%. And, as a consequence, only 6% of people born in this group manage to break through to the elite—as it is shown in the Brookings Institution research (Zalewski 2019). Therefore, the wealthy class rules. Almost 1% of the population, mainly young African Americans, is also detained in privatized prisons, doing half-free work for a business friend of the prison owner. Privatization includes more and more public services—pensions, intelligence, security services, forest services, water supply systems, garbage disposal, and public transport. That is why the American writer Paul Theroux, traveling in the Deep South, writes that "in terms of power and splendor, America is unmatched in the world, but in terms of neglect it is no different from the world" (Theroux 2017: 533/534). Even the Deep South is no different from the Third World, which the author often emphasizes. One of the reasons for this is the belief that everyone who tries enough will realize the "American dream" of material success ("from rags to riches"). Not surprisingly, according to the Pew Research Center, 41% of Americans believe that the second coming of Jesus "probably" or "with certainty" will take place by 2050.

The economy is dominated by shareholders and speculators, hence the inflated financial sector and capital market. Profit will forgive you anything—even using 15 million liters of water for one unconventional fracturing operation to squeeze gas out of the shale. Even if the society consumes a quarter of the world's energy, "the American way of life is non-negotiable," as President George Bush once said in Rio de

[3] In 2017, 8.8% of people, or 28.5 million, did not have health insurance at any point during the year as measured by the CPS ASEC. The uninsured rate and number of uninsured in 2017 were not statistically different from those in 2016 (8.8 percent or 28.1 million); Edward R. Berchick, Emily Hood, and Jessica C. Barnett, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2017, September 12, 2018, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-264.html

Janeiro. Restricting the free market in the name of climate change would be a crime against the noblest part of humanity. Meanwhile, EU countries have reduced energy consumption by 2%, greenhouse gas emissions by 22% in 1990-2016, and at the same time increased their GDP by 54%. According to the Center on Poverty and Inequality at Stanford University, the president of a corporation earned 24 times more than their production worker in 1965. Currently, it is 185 times more. That is why the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. According to Angus Deaton, 46.2 million Americans lived in poverty in 2011, while in 1959, it was only 6.7 million (Deaton 2016: 201). In 2015, Americans at the bottom of the social ladder lived at the level of 36% of the official poverty line, which for a family of four constituted an income of 16.5 dollars daily. No wonder that 14% of Americans need food stamps, or about 40 million US residents are supported by food coupons. Half of the employees do not have sufficient income to pay their pension contributions, and two-thirds under 40 do not have any savings for retirement. Meanwhile, the top 10% of the American society had 47% of the total income at their disposal in 2011, with an average of 255,000 dollars per person, while the poorest 20% accounted for 17% of the total income (Deaton 2016: 224). In 2015, the top 20% has an average income 8.3 times greater than 20% of the poorest (4.4 times higher in Germany, only 3.7 times in Denmark).[4]

The country also has its own tax havens in its territory, in which low-income gains and rents disappear. Frustrations are best treated with a multi-shot pistol, which can be purchased at a "Jesus loves you—buy&sell weapons" type of store. The choice of representatives is determined by packets of shares, not by a ballot.

The meaning of these facts is unequivocal—scientific excellence is one thing, and the quality of a society in which science arises is another. They have little in common. Science is used to position the university so that it can attract students from all over the world, not to improve an anarcho-capitalist society.

4. POLITICAL SCIENCE: WHAT CAN BE EXPLAINED AND WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD

Bibliometrists believe that if a thought is not expressed in English and published in an Anglo-Saxon high-ranking journal, it has no cognitive value; it does not matter if it is innovative, true, or initiates a public and scientific debate on some hitherto unnoticed problem. This was the case with publications that opened the eyes of Polish society to the medium development trap. The works are valorized by anonymous, free-working reviewers who fill out the review forms. Bibliometrists themselves do not bother to get to know the "evaluated" achievements. Some even prefer, most easily, to x-ray the biographies, or even the personalities of the researchers evaluated.

Bibliometry, especially in the spirit of Scopus, rewards descriptions or, at most, exploration of details and epiphenomena, e.g. electoral behavior. On the other hand, it is difficult to parameterize the effects of ambitious explanatory (theoretical) reflection, and even more so to investigate and determine hermeneutics, understanding sociolo-

[4] The World Bank, Nearly Half the World Lives on Less than $5.50 a Day, October 17, 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/17/nearly-half-the-world-lives-on-lessthan-550-a-day

gy or humanistic political science. This happens, among others, due to disproportions in the communication circuit. A philosopher or theoretician, with the exception of a "scientific celebrity," a currently trendy author, has no chance of winning or even participating in the auction for the number of citations.

The problem arises as to the role of universalization of science, its global circulation and production in the cognitive progress of the humanities. Important questions will arise in this situation—who and for what purpose uses the knowledge gathered by academia? Should it legitimize the existing social order, or rather look for the reasons for its unreliability? This second task is undertaken by critical sciences, without deceiving the recipient that ultramodern research techniques ensure ideological neutrality. They continue the critical and skeptical Enlightenment attitude. Research tasks may concern:

a) own national community (local level);

b) the European community (regional level) or

c) the universal community of life and work (universal level).

What really determines the status and "excellence" of the discipline is the scientific knowledge in the form of theorems and theories collected and systematized by its representatives. The question arises whether the scope and content of the achievements of American political science can only be a model and an oracle for the world due to the position of the country? Without a detailed substantive analysis of the achievements, this question cannot be answered. For example, for someone who is interested in the phenomenon of revolution, they will reach for the work of Theda Stockpol, but not instead of the eminent Polish historian and political scientist Jan Baszkiewicz. "Internationalization" is hampered by the basic fact of human existence. Namely, we are always dealing with a "socioeconomic man institutionally rooted" (Morawski 2001: 34). At the same time, this institutional environment has a historical shape. Therefore, even economists who prefer everyday models (Rodrik 2019), with their analyses of the current state of the national or global economy, are trying to create the basis "for economic and social policy, in which reference to values, norms, and other criteria of social assessment is inevitable" (Wilkin 2005: 13).

In addition, there are aspects of life in political science, which can be studied using statistical techniques (electoral behavior, attitude, analysis of political content, analysis of decision dilemmas). Political scientists studying this aspect are more likely to "internationalize" due to the dominance of the empirical model of social research (in economics, psychology, demography, and partly sociology).

On the other hand, researchers of political history, political systems, political thought, and international relations are in a worse situation. Here, the research and studies have a local and national scope, they are addressed to decision-makers and civil society, because they contain valuable diagnoses, practical suggestions, and launch public debates. In a word, they perform important educational and critical functions from the point of view of the national community. The task of the researcher here is to create a specific map of the global system to indicate the place of their

own national community in the international division of labor and power. It is only on this basis that they can be tempted to reflect on the national strategy or policy of government agencies. Usually, practical reflection based on diagnoses and forecasts ends with postulates, expert opinions, program recommendations, close to visions of better organization of political life. The common wisdom of a politician here is not in the theoretical approach, because it is not true that work and wisdom are getting the nations richer, or that if someone has visions, they should see a doctor. Therefore, it must be assessed separately, both participation in shaping the global good of shared knowledge (participation in the achievements of the "invisible" global university) and participation in the shaping of the national common good—knowledge of political life in a specific country and at a specific time. However, as Jan Hartman writes, "everything in political science eventually returns to the fundamental, and thus philosophical issues" (Hartman 2017: 20). Moreover, "there is no national history, especially modern history, detached from social one" (Mencwel 2019: 21). In this respect, the various subdisciplines of political science have unequal opportunities for international visibility. Let us briefly review their set of research tools and techniques (Klementewicz 2017).

Political history. The works of this subdiscipline use historical sources, official documents, and widely use the procedure of understanding and causal explanation. The political history researchers describe, usually in the form of monographs, often even biographies, the course and effects of a politician's rule or synthesize a specific process. Historical studies are interpreted in these works—they determine the facts, interpret them, and then determine the historical rank or at least embed it in some system of assessments. The set of research tools is universal here, but the circle of interested representatives is rather at national level. At most, thanks to international circulation, the political history studies can be used by other researchers for comparative research. A more systematic approach may take the form of empirical-historical theory of a given type of state or individual process, e.g. the twilight of the significance of the state in the global system, as at present the US. The border between historiography and political science is movable in such a way that the *terminus a quo* of facts directly interesting to the political scientist sometimes goes deep into the past. For example, the peripheral nature of the Polish economy, the type of patriotism characteristic of Poles, a distinctive social ethos, with a lack of civil courage in public life—must be associated with the processes that originated in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. These were in order: refeudalization of Eastern Europe and its place in the division of labor in Europe at the time, nobles' democracy, folklore mentality of the folk classes, nobles' intelligence in the role of the "tribune of the people."

Political systems. This, in turn, is knowledge about the organizational structure of the state apparatus, the party system, and legal and cultural norms. Studies on political systems contain the rules of legal dogmatics. In the work on political systems, the thematic axis is the reconstruction of applicable constitutional and possibly administrative law. In the light of relevant sources of law, these norms determine the competences of state authorities, ways of fighting for the control of the center of political decision by citizens' organizations, as well as the scope of their freedom and civil

rights. Although the effectiveness of legal regulations based on various empirical data is assessed, these works contain a key element that does not appear in other types of narrative of a political scientist. It is the axiological discourse and the rules of legal dogmatics. Important components of political system studies are:

political justifications of the sources of the legal system, legal and political ideologies, factors determining the content of legal norms, in particular *de lege ferenda* postulates;

legal inference rules, conflict of law rules of the legal system, systematization of legal norms; linguistic and non-language interpretative directives of norms from legal provisions (like *ratio legis*), legal inferences.

Dogmatic and legal reflections, problems of interpretation of norms, legal arguments and conclusions assessing the effectiveness of regulations and *de lege ferenda* postulates—they are all of analytical nature. They only occasionally refer to the results of empirical research. The set of research tools is also universal here, although it must take into account the specificity of legal systems. Needless to say, work on a state's political system is primarily relevant to its citizens.

Political ideology. These are forms of culture (awareness) of people participating in politics. So, these will be ideologies, declared party program options, public opinion, national, historical, and class consciousness, stereotypes, myths widespread in a given society. This is where the representative method together with the questionnaire technique and statistics is widely used. Nowadays, studies are being prepared in the form of empirical research reports. There is room here for an explanation of what the source of the idiographic nature of political science is. Mass processes, as important as they are for demographers, sociologists or economists, are, however, a large but secondary area of a political scientist's interests. An inseparable element of political reality are the actions of specific individuals and groups—political leaders in the system of authorities, and in political parties and movements, especially the opposition, trade union activists, freedom and urban movements, representatives of pressure groups, and social authorities. They play the main role on the political scene, which today has shrunk to the size of a television screen. A researcher, wishing to describe the game and fight in the public sphere or assess the role of leaders (biography), must use the historian's set of research tools. Historiographic competence includes, among others, the ability to criticize external and internal sources, mastering the procedures for establishing facts, but also the ability to use non-source knowledge. This is followed by the prominent role of the humanistic interpretation and the procedure of understanding. Therefore, it is counterproductive, even thoughtless, to call political scientists to practice behavioralism as the American rankings' champions do. The leading, most cited authors most often are mainly researchers of electoral behavior, political culture and, in addition, native society. They usually have authored textbooks on surveys and statistics.

Political thought. Analytical work on the history of political thought and current ideological and political options occupy a separate area. Rules for interpreting texts

dominate in these works. Their description is dealt with in philosophical and literary hermeneutics. These studies are sometimes about recreating the system of concepts or worldview of the era, the social group represented by the researched author. Then, an explanation of the origins of ideology functions in the historical drama of group conflicts and their rationalization. The authors of these studies join existing interpretative traditions and propose their interpretations. In this way, one can also analyze the ideology of film or belles-lettres. Polish political science has many authors whose substantive level and writing form are a real ornament of all polish humanities (J. Baszkiewicz, F. Ryszka, G. Seidler, M. Waldenberg).

Philosophy of politics. It deals with the values and norms of political life. At this level, disputes are taking place between supporters of classical liberalism and libertarianism and the advocates of social liberalism, as well as the solidarity and collectivism. It comes here, among others, for establishing—on the basis of ethical and axiological arguments—a catalog of primary goods, analyzing the links between social justice and economic efficiency, or indicating acceptable state actions in the field of redistribution of goods and provision of public services, especially social insurance. For decades, this has been a dispute over a minimal state versus a welfare state. Polish political philosophers in this field provide studies and interpretations in line with the rules in force in "global" science.

Sociotechnics. Its subjects are measures and methods of political action. Several subdisciplines examine the social engineering of governance and influence in a more or less systematic way—political marketing, research on mass communication, sociology of law, research on the language of politics, public discourse, manipulation techniques, the role of non-violent techniques, etc.

Social policy—the state and the economy. Researchers are interested in the issues of economic and non-economic efficiency of public administration activities. The researchers are interested in the role of the state in the economy. That is why several specific policies are attracting their attention. We are talking here especially about monetary, tax, income, business, and development policies, and in particular about social policy. The researcher of the latter makes extensive use of sociography, reports, and diagnostic tests using the representative method.

International relations. The subject of interest of this subdiscipline are the international conditions of the political life of a given society and the process of development and consolidation of the global system, the process of creation of supranational communities, general civilization, duration and evolution of the human population divided into races, nations, and political communities. They were in respectively mini-systems, agricultural empires, nation-states forming a hierarchical whole. Quantitative methods also appear here, especially to measure the power of states.

Political theory. Political science has already been attempted to be illustrated by the use of neoclassical economics in the form of public choice theory. For example, Duncan Black, one of the representatives of the Rochester School, argued that the use of neoclassical economics tools for collective decision mechanisms would lay the foundations for a pure science of politics. Well, it was supposed to work like never before, it turned out as always—everything is to blame for an "inefficient state," espe-

cially when betting on the winners of the game, which should always be market-based and absolutely competitive. It may surprise some, but Polish political science has a theory of its field. This is the result of systematizing efforts initiated by professor Artur Bodnar. Systematic general knowledge about politics consists of several laws of science. They include, in order—the functions of the state, the role of the economy in the face of the political sphere and the role of the state in the economy, the ideological foundations of power, the social entity of public authority, the autonomy of the professional apparatus of power, and the sources of the dynamics of political life (Klementewicz 2017).The multi-faceted political phenomena discussed above lead to specialized strategies for their description and explanation. But since research tools are targeted at specific areas of the political world, they cannot cover the entire research field. Therefore, they have specific cognitive and heuristic values, but at the same time they must be supplemented with other research perspectives (Ollman 2015). The broad pluralistic panorama of modern political science is created by orientations referring to logical empiricism (behavioral approach), institutional and historical approach referring to Marxism, critical school and structural functionalism as well as approaches referring directly to hermeneutics, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, as well as the to naturalistic rhetoric—biopolitics. There are still battles of moderate scientism with the humanities and interpretationism.

However, there is no doubt that a full explanation of an important phenomenon or social process becomes possible only after including knowledge about a man in the broad system of research. And this narrow specialization makes it impossible. That is why "the more limited the subject of research—more and more often a really limited one—the more worthless books and papers can be produced. Even doubtful whether they increase knowledge. It seems that at best they constitute a set of information—facts and their narrow translations" (Czapnik 2012: 80). In this situation, an important challenge for the contemporary researcher is to overcome the division into disciplines. It is only the integral analysis that is carried out over the nineteenth-century discipline divisions that provides the tools of understanding and criticism. To this end, it should combine "issues, research methods, and strategies specific to such sciences as history, political sciences, economics, sociology, anthropology and oriental studies" (Gdula & Nijakowski 2014: 12). Thomas Piketty writes that "one should act pragmatically, mobilize the methods and approaches of historians, sociologists, and political scientists as well as of economists" [translation] (Piketty 2014: 49). A chance arises then for an integral analysis of social processes. In this analysis, various determinants of phenomena—ecological, economic, political, and cultural-consciousness (ideological) ones can be included in the explanatory procedure. Thanks to the integral approach, social sciences better reflect the syndromic nature of social phenomena, including politics. Historical and institutional analyses develop in contradiction to the concept of an abstract, universal economy of free competition, full of information and effective markets, i.e. the dominant trend of neoclassical and neo-institutional economics. Therefore, paradoxically, it is not the cumulative results of studies on the attitudes and behavior of behavioralists and political psychologists that are the most important—as if it resulted from new criteria for evaluating scientific achievements.

5. HOW TO EVALUATE A HUMANIST: BOTH THE POINTS AND THE EXPERTISE

"Not everything that counts can be counted,
and not everything that can be counted counts." A. Einstein

It is very doubtful whether the correct answer to the needs of knowledge integration necessary to understand the current phase of the development of capitalism is the suggested Anglicization of the humanities. It consists in the fact that the Anglo-Saxon center determines the set of problems to study. The language of analysis provides fashionable approaches, and the patterns of good work, i.e. research methodology, reflect the practices of natural sciences. From this universe comes both the preference for papers in major journals and the emphasis on international research teams. To this must be added a grant system. It was originally created so that the entrepreneurial state could support the industry in innovative technology and products (Mazzucato 2016). The Archives of Natural Sciences are research reports describing new findings, but journal articles tend to be secondary literature in the humanities (Suber 2014; Eve 2014). Others, like talented popularizers such as Richard Dawkins and Jared Diamond, synthesize them for the benefit of a wider audience. Here is the weakest link in the projects of Polish science and higher education system reforms (Kwiek 2016). They remind us of the former fascination with the neoliberal transformation of the economy and the introduction of capital pensions.

Following the exact sciences, the fact that the works of scholars and intellectuals in the field of social sciences retain the character of the individual craftsmanship, with its uniqueness and individual characteristics, is ignored. The social researcher is a small producer because they provide their work in the scheme T => P => T`. However, their work is close to art. It requires "creative passion, imagination and sensitivity, the strength of expression, aesthetic values of communication" (Sztompka 2012: 8).

Gilded but empty papers. Can writing papers for journals instead of monographs help to take a significant position in a linguistically and partially culturally foreign world? Only for members of the Polish society the process of modernizing the country, the emergence of a modern nation, and "own" cultural history extended over centuries are engaging. For other recipients, these are only exciting contributions to universal history. On the other hand, the work of Thomas Piketty *Capital in the 21st Century,* on increasing income disparities between 1% of the richest and the rest of humanity has a universal reach. The negative answer to the above question leads to the practical conclusion that, above all, the access of outstanding Polish monographs to the global market should be supported. In addition, he emphasizes the improvement of research conditions so that "expertise" and additional meaningless work will not close a researcher's household budget But what is the role of social sciences in this "responsible development" in a situation where those disciplines that are responsible for educating critical attitudes and developing political awareness of citizens are marginalized; in a situation where at the same time there is a degradation of diplomas, non-instrumental knowledge, not directly subordinated to the needs of business and a corporate career. The economization of the existence of the workforce owner serves the needs of

business, especially when it covers most areas of their life, with family life, sometimes spare time as well. The ideal here is the entrepreneur, whose dynamism is ensured by egocentrism, greed, and consumerism.

On the other hand, as in every discipline, cognitive values and legitimacy of political science is "a derivative of the factual commitment to update in actual scientific research" (Tuchańska 2012: 278). But, unfortunately, neither cognition nor experience can bring certainty of cognition, since it is machined by our minds, nor empirical data, since they do not clearly determine theoretical choices, and even more the unchanging logical-methodological principles.

The status of a researcher should depend in appropriate proportions on the number of points for internationalization of the academic achievements. This, in turn, should be correlated with their expert assessment of "excellence" and cognitive value. Otherwise, the popular essay by Francis Fukuyama about "the end of history" should be valued higher because of the stunning citation index than the lectures of Michel Foucault contained in the books. But the French philosopher is fortunately the leader of influence in the humanities, and in addition he does not owe it to his papers.

Additionally, other forms of participation in the scientific life of the research community should be assessed—not only papers and monographs, but also reviews, polemics, participation in important debates or conferences. Just like it happens in promotion processes. The ideal would be a "compromise balance" between international and national, theoretical and empirical, research and application achievements.

Qualitative assessment should include—the originality of the researcher in the field of systematization of general knowledge, creating new research problems, overcoming the methodological difficulties of the discipline or practical values in the form of expertise, diagnoses, and forecasts regarding the solution of development barriers to the country. And so:

> does their work facilitate the integration of knowledge accumulated by various disciplines and subdisciplines of the humanities, in order to comprehensively explain and understand politics, as well as game and fight in the public sphere? Social phenomena are weaves of various factors and conditions, ranging from ecological, demographic, and economic to political or cultural ones;
>
> do they indicate how to combine various procedures in the research process to show how the selection of a specific alternative for the unit's operation depended on the subject's knowledge of these conditions and professed value systems? It is a fact that structures (natural, economic, institutions, organizational forms, legal regimes, dominant ideas, and ideologies) do not determine human actions, they only limit or facilitate them; they contain the "burden of history; "How does the researcher solve the problem of holism in their own work, and thus distinguishing the social whole, of which the studied phenomenon is part; is he / she able to move from the level of the local community to regional, national and even for some processes to the whole ecumene?
>
> Does the researcher have any idea how to capture historical dynamics, the weave

of continuity / change in spiritual culture, institutional order, national strategy? Qualitatively new forms of social life are emerging in the history of human societies. They change the current determinants of social processes. This fact means that the laws of social sciences, together with the terms used in them, must take into account the developmental aspect of the social world. Their generality consists in taking into account structural differences occurring between all previous types of social phenomena (generality in the historical sense, not in another sense);

Does the practical knowledge provided by the researcher inspire the activities of, e.g. social associations to thus contribute to improving the quality of life of the general public? Contrary to the apparent impression of secondary nature and lack of originality (Warczok & Zarycki 2016), Polish political scientists are developing new and proprietary strategies to solve the indicated research difficulties. Only this achievement must be known first, and then one can proceed to its evaluation, subject to criteria appropriate for the humanities. In particular, reaching the modern "heart of darkness," which is the power of corporations in the global system, requires taking into account three levels of analysis of the social system and at the same time a "three-level model of analysis of the basis of power." The first step is the reconstruction of the explicit level, the second hidden, and the third is the extraction of the deeply hidden, even latent level (Kaczmarek 2003: 136; Ilkowski 2017). At the first level, we have a constitutional order with the ideology of liberal democracy that legitimizes it. Civil society is "marching to its defense." At the second level, there are sources of power, i.e. some historical aspects of classes and social states that find in a given social order the fulfillment of their basic material interests and the concept of a good life. At this level, the oligarchy, the money, and property elite occupy various interchangeable positions in the social system—corporate and bank presidencies, positions in the administration. The deeply hidden dimension, which the author calls in Hegelian premises, is turbocapitalism—the ruthless exploitation of work, nature, and human life for the capital accumulation, ultimately huge excess liquidity that needs to be utilized and recycled in the global system. The system creates functional contradictions that result in various conflicts and antagonisms—inter-class, international, between the economy, and the natural environment. Moreover, in general, they determine the developmental drift in which capitalism without borders is found. In this way, the theoretical foundations of critical political science are codified. The codification is a Polish contribution to universal political science, and it also uses the Polish achievements of socioeconomic structuralism (Tittenbrun 2011). The achievements of Polish political scientists in the field of political theory include the development of the integral explanation procedure (Karwat 2018; Pierzchalski 2016). It solves the structure-action dilemma to facilitate understanding of politics. Its logical foundations were developed by Leszek Nowak (1980), Jerzy Kmita (1973) and Jerzy Topolski (1990), and so it has a native origin. This procedure combines causal, genetic, functional (to reconstruct the conditions of

action) with a humanistic interpretation of the action taken. By referring to the knowledge that the acting subject had about the conditions in which they found himself, as well as on the basis of the professed system of values—it becomes possible to understand why they chose this alternative and not another.

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THE RIGHT TO INCLUSIVE EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT: A child is a member of a vulnerable group in societies. Children's rights are equal for all children and they cannot be denied, because they are a birthright. However, throughout the world, children with disabilities and their families constantly experience a barrier in regard to the enjoyment of their basic human rights and to their inclusion in society. The situation began to change only when requirements to include disabled children in the education system were introduced in legislation. Following the example of other countries worldwide, the Republic of North Macedonia introduced inclusion of children with disabilities in the mainstream educational process. Hence, the main aim of our paper is to represent the actual situation in Macedonian schools regarding the problem of educational inclusion of students with disabilities in the regular school system. The research methods are based on document studies and case studies about changes in social and educational policies for students with disabilities and special educational needs who are included in primary and secondary education. At the same time we shall present some guidelines for teachers who work with these children and future directions for a proper inclusion system in the Republic of North Macedonia, because every child has a fundamental right to education and must be given the opportunity to achieve and reach an acceptable level of learning. In this frame, school societies try to support full participation of students with disabilities in areas of their lives on equal terms, conditions, social justice and

basic human rights.
KEYWORDS: disabled children, special educational needs, human right, inclusion, challenges

INTRODUCTION

"Inclusion and participation are essential to human dignity
and to the enjoyment and exercise of human rights."
(Salamanka Framework for Action, 1994)

Human rights are rights or powers that belong to each person, they are universal moral rights that are to be distributed among all human beings. Every human has their rights, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), and children need special and increased protection, care, safety, understanding and love in order to develop in a healthy way. Children have special rights, because of their vulnerability, such as the right to protection from exploitation and abuse, the right to be carried for and have a home, and the right to have a say in decisions which affect them.

In this regard, historically many children with disabilities were not visible. They lived in large institutions, away from their families and communities. Now, most children with disabilities live at home, with their families, in communities across the country. However, this change has not resulted in children with disabilities becoming full and active members of the community. Throughout the world, children with disabilities and their families constantly experience a barrier in regard to the enjoyment of their basic human rights and to their inclusion in society (Raby 2008). Their abilities are overlooked, their capacities are overlooked, their capacities are underestimated and their needs are given low priority. The barriers they face are more frequently a result of the environment which they live rather than a result of their impairment. At the same time, the needs of parents who care for children with disabilities have also been excluded. Children with disabilities and their parents are not fully included in all aspects of the society and do not enjoy full citizenship (Valentine 2001). It means that children and families are able to participate with choice. It means that individual children are involved in activities and social structures in a way that is meaningful to their own experience. Real inclusion starts from the experiences of the child and challenges the society to provide a meaningful place for these children (Freiler 2002; Nussbaum 2007).

THE MEANING OF THE TERM DISABILITY

Children with disabilities are not a homogenous group. They may identify themselves more expressly with other aspects of their overall identify such as their gender, economic status, ethnicity or a combination. The belonging to one or several of these groupings significantly increases their vulnerability and dedication to addressing the

right to educational needs in order to consider such multiple vulnerabilities (Singhal 2004; Nessner 1990).

A disability, of course, can be understood very differently, across different communities and cultures. Article 1 of the CPRD (The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) describes these persons as "those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others" (United Nations Committee on the Rights of Person with Disabilities 2016). This approach is consistent with the World Health Organization's (WHO's) International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, known more commonly as ICF, which conceptualizes a person's level of functioning as a dynamic interaction between her or his health conditions, environmental and personal factors (International classification of functioning, disability and health:ICF 2001).

As stated by Loreman and Deppeler (2001:16) "Inclusion means full inclusion of children with diverse abilities in all aspects of life and schooling that other children are able to access and enjoy. It involves regular schools and classrooms genuinely adapting and changing to meet the needs of all children, as well as celebrating and valuing differences."

The enjoyment of human rights by children with disabilities can be fully realized only in an inclusive society, that is, a society in which there are no barriers to a child's full participation, and in which all children's abilities, skills and potentials are given full expression. Ensuring that children with disabilities receive good quality education in an inclusive environment should be a priority of all countries. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities recognizes the right of all children with disabilities both to be included in the general education system and to receive the individual support they require (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006).

Disability affects physical health, social relationships of people, life in the context of family, friends and neighbors or the level of independence. The consequences of a disability can have an impact at personal, interpersonal, family and social levels. In fact, a disability affects the different facets of life of a person and this life is often complicated by negative forces, such as ignorance, prejudice, negativism and insensitivity (Pijl, Frostad, and Flem 2008).

CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

Special educational needs (SENs) refer to the special educational arrangements which are in place for people with disabilities (Citizens Information Board 2012). Griffin and Shelvin (2007) assert that any child may have special needs, and that not all special needs are related to education. Therefore, not all children with special needs will require special educational support.

Research and practice in special education show that children have special educational needs if they have a learning difficulty which calls for special provision to be made for them. Some children may have special educational needs for a relatively

short time, they often have special educational needs directly through their education. So SENs means, in relation to a person, a restriction in the capacity of the person to participate in and benefit from education on account of an enduring physical, sensory, mental health or learning disability, or any other condition which results in a person learning differently from a person without that condition (Smith 2010).

Michailidis and Wilhelm (2009) indicate that the majority of children with special educational needs take part in mainstream education. The UK and other countries have based theirrecent policies on the assumption that up to one in five children may have a special educational need at some pointduring their education (Bines and Lei 2011:420). Stakes and Hornby (2000:8) identify eight different types of special educational needs, including: learning difficulties, visual difficulties, physical difficulties, developmental difficulties such as autism spectrum disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or intellectual disability, speech and language difficulties and emotional or behavioral difficulties.

Most children with SENs will have an appropriate provision made for them by their school while working with their parents. All professionals and parents realize that students with disabilities are human beings with a wide range of assets and limitations. There have, traditionally, been three broad approaches to the education of children with special educational needs: segregation, in which children are classified according to their impairment and allocated a school designed to respond to that particular impairment; integration, where children with disabilities are placed in the mainstream system, often in special classes, as long as they can accommodate its demands and fit in with its environment; and inclusion, wherethere is a recognized need to transform the culture, policies and practices in schools to accommodate the differing needs of individual students and an obligation to remove the barriers that impede those possibilities (Punch 2006). All children, including children with special educational needs, not only that they should have access to schooling within their own communities, but that should also be provided with appropriate learning opportunities to achieve their potential.

INCLUSION AND INCLUSIVE EDUCATION: DEFINITION AND DISCOURSE

Education for all (EFA) which represents an international commitment to ensure every child and adult receives basic education of good quality is focused on a human rights perspective and on the generally held belief that education is central to individual well-being and national development. So far, EFA has not paid sufficient attention to some marginalized groups of children, in particular those seen as having “special educational needs”or “disabilities” (Miles and Singel 2009).

In response to the perceived failures of EFA to date, a growing focus has been placed on inclusion as the key strategy for promoting the right to education, including the one for children with disabilities. Therefore, inclusion can be understood as a commitment to creating schools which respect and value diversity, and aim to promote democratic principles and a set of value and beliefs related to equality and social justice, so that all children can participate in teaching and learning (Minion 2011). Inclusion

in education is not a marginal issue, rather it is central to the achievement of high quality education for all children and the development of more inclusive education (UNESCO 2005).

The term "inclusion" however, moves the focus from the child to the school – it conveys the school's duty to welcome pupils with special educational needs, and the pupil's right to full participation in school life and all aspects of education (Ainscow 2013). Cumming and Wong (2010:4) understand that inclusion implies"the rights of children with disabilities to access, participate and be equally included, alongside their peers in shared education and care settings, as well as having access to a broader community." They suggest that inclusion provides children with disabilities with more challenging learning settings and a chance to watch, learn and interact with more competitive peers. Also they found that the benefits of inclusion are most commonly identified in the domain of social competence, play and peer engagement.The key principles of inclusion refer to the following fundamental concepts:

– Valuing diversity;

– The right to be respected;

– The dignity of the human being;

– Individual needs understood as individual requests;

– Planning;

– Collective responsibility;

– Development of professional relations and culture;

– Professional development and equal opportunities.

Inclusive education represents a continuous process of improving the school, aimed at expropriating existing resources (especially human resources), as a perspective, and as it has been done to present day. This perspective is much closer to the ideal school of the future, which strives to offer services as a response to a variety of educational demands expressed by different children, without becoming an exclusivist environment (Barnett et al. 2003).

Inclusive education is a human right issue. Inclusive education means changes and adoption of a mainstream education system in the whole society in order to meet the special needs of children with disabilities.

Inclusive education primarily pertains to the practice of enabling children with a developmental problem to exercise their right to education along with all other children and to attend a neighborhood school that theywould normally attend if they did not have developmental problems. Literature suggests that students with special needs who have been educated in regular classes have better academic and social achievements than comparable students in non-inclusive settings (Gordon 2013).

Inclusive education should play a key role to ensure individual development and

social inclusion, enabling children and youth with disabilities to attain the highest possible degree of autonomy and independence. Within this frame, school societies try to support full participation of children with disabilities in all areas of their lives on equal terms and conditions (Jha 2002).

THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES TO INCLUSIVE EDUCATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

The tendency in most European Union countries is to develop policies that promote inclusion as an important process in democratic societies, which gives equal opportunities to everyone and maximum flexibility in meeting the specific and social need of the individuals. Having in mind that inclusion is a developing and a dynamic process, the developmental level of inclusion in the member states varies. Same as many other southeast Balkan countries, the Republic of North Macedonia has been facing a challenge to steer the national policies towards creating societies that are structurally based on the principle of equal rights to all, according to which people have equal rights and opportunities, individual differences and respects and they lead towards building an inclusive society. The general intention of Macedonian institutions is to build an inclusive society in terms of abilities, ethnicity and socio – economic inclusion. According to the Constitution of the Republic of North Macedonia, all children have the right to education. In the Constitution, in terms of economic, social and cultural rights governing the right to education it is indicated that"Everyone has the right to education. Education is accessible to everyone under equal conditions"(Human Rights and Education Country Guide 2016). The education of children and adolescents with disabilities is an integral part of the unique educational system in our country. The state is committed to the inclusion of all people in all areas of life regardless of the type and degree of the disability. This tendency implies inclusion at all educational levels.

The actual conceptual placement of the education for students with special needs is regulated with the Law on Primary Education (2008) and the Law on Secondary Education (1995).

In addition in the relevant laws, in 2010 the Government has adopted the national strategy for standardization of the rights of persons with disabilities, which is based on a thorough comprehension and analysis of the need for the Government to adopt adequate decisions for protection, education, rehabilitation, training and employment of disabled persons (National Council of Disability Organizations of Macedonia 2011). The Strategy foresees realization of seven specific measures related to educational needs and requirements of children with disabilities:

– Development of programs for inclusion of children with special needs in the educational system, including pre–school education;

– Application and improvement of the existing legislative provisions that define the field of discrimination in the educational process at all levels of education;

– Individual work with the children by engaging special educators in regular

schools in addition to special education schools;

– Guidance of the SEN pupils according to their needs and preferences;

– Development of motivational programs for the parents throughout the education of their children, which will contribute to raise awareness about the inclusive approach in the education;

– Provision of training for the teaching staff, school directors and professional associates in the school for support and implementation of the inclusive education.

The realization of these measures and activities is a responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science and the Municipalities as the local educational authorities. The right to education for persons with disabilities is defined in Article 24 of the Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities which our country ratified in 2011.

INCLUSIVE EDUCATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA: PAST EXPERIENCE AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Today inclusive education is considered an aspect of the quality of the education system. For that reason, the European Union and UNESCO in most of their recommendations provided guidance to ensure that a sociopolitical issue is well-addressed. Although inclusive education is most commonly associated with children with developmental disabilities, it, in fact, concerns all socially marginalized groups of children (ethnic minorities, children from culturally deprived backgrounds, children of displaced persons and refugees, children from disadvantaged socio–economic conditions, etc.).

In order to adequately promote the idea of inclusive education, a great number of foreign humanitarian organizations (i.e. UNESCO, UNICEF, Save the Children UK…), in the last 20 years, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science of Macedonia, have organized numerous educational and training programs for teachers, professionals and parents of children with disabilities with a main goal to find solutions and ways to satisfy the child's needs (Ministry of Education and Science 2002).

One early project in the field of inclusive education was the "Modernization of the Education of Persons with Disabilities"in the Republic of Macedonia which was carried out in the period from 1996 to 1998. The project resulted in some changes in the Law on Primary and Secondary Education. The norms and standards regulate the education of teachers with special educational needs (OECD 2006:152).

In the period from 2000 to 2005, the Ministry of Education and Science implemented a project titled "Inclusion of children with special needs in regular schools." In 2005, five years after the project, there were 73 primary schools and 13 kindergartens where children with special needs were included. The project began by offering seminars for teachers and professionals (psychologists, pedagogues or special educators) from mainstream schools. As a result of this project, special methods and forms of work and inclusion in the educational process, as well as other forms of individual and

group work have been proposed (OECD 2006:153).

UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Science also implemented several pilot projects for inclusive education in preschool institutions from 2010/11 to 2016/17 and from 2011/12 to 2017/18 in several elementary schools in the Republic of Macedonia (UNICEF 2017). During these pilot projects two priorities were identified in order to achievea significant change towards inclusive education for children with special needs: (a) to change teacher's attitudes; (b) to change attitudes of parents and the community by increasing their involvement and support.

It is true that inclusion cannottake placewithout a systematic approach. Even in ideal circumstances, when the school is a"friendly" environment for a child with special educational needs, interventions from the system, networking and link are still needed. Hence,the reformed schools in the Republic of North Macedonia open the door for inclusion of children with special needs in regular education. The Macedonian education system aims to include all children with special needs in regular schools or kindergarten groups. Hence, inclusive education is introducedin certain elementary schoolsthroughout the country. There is an observable progression of the number of students with special educational needs that attend inclusive schools in the regular educational system. The number has increased from 471 students in 2014/15 to 1451 students in 2017/18 (Ministry of Education and Science, Bureau of Education Development 2018:64).

In kindergartens, teachers are the primary helpers of the children; professional counselors with appropriate training may also assist when available. Teachers engage in regular activities with the children, trying to respect the principle of an individual approach, so that children with developmental difficulties are offered activities appropriate for their capacities. Individual work is carried out on the basis of the individual program which is constantly monitored in terms of the need to introduce changes. Children with developmental difficulties need to play and socialize with other children. By means of play, pre–school settings can help children learn about themselves and about the others (Ruijs and Thea 2009).

In elementary schools, from grade 1 to grade 6, teachers also work directly with the children and later the children are expected to continue their education in regular further grades, on the basis of their level of achievement, with or without individual programs and further assistance. Of course, teachers do not receive pre-established individual programs for work with particular children and must create such programs by themselves, in order to define target attainments for the child. The process is based on experience and intuition. Furthermore, school pedagogues, psychologists and speech therapists advise and educate students and parents, and assist teachers with instructions or provide some assistance in classes.Other difficulties arise in the transition from class to subject teaching after the sixth grade. Class teachers may be more tolerant towards children with special needs while in subject teaching, each teacher will spend less time with a specific student and therefore, will be less able to follow through with additional assistance (Ainscow 2005). Sometimes school experts can provide support, but many have not been trained in this field yet.

Secondary education as well as primary education are mandatory. According to

Article 39, paragraph 1 of the Law onAdultEducation, in secondary schools students with special educational needs are educated according to adequate curriculums for students with special needs, but also with programs for the appropriate vacations in vocational training (Law on Adult Education 2015:16). One important opportunityto increase training of academic staff can be notices in the new Law on Primary and Secondary Education, which obliges educators to attend in service training on a regular basis, providing an excellent occasion to include new approaches in the primary and secondary education system. Increased training would later enable teachers to accomplish inclusive education in the future.

In addition, inclusion unavoidably was an integral part of the development of the Education Strategy 2018-2025 in the context of lifelong learning and the Action Plan, which had be adopted by the Ministry of Education and Science and the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia (Ministry of Education and Science 2018). At the same time, according to the Macedonian education system it was planned for the students with special educational needs to be included in mainstream school, while the new special schools should be built in the vicinity of regular schools, in order to ensure contact and interaction and promote inclusion where possible.

None of these difficulties is insurmountable, however, if considered together, they present a series of big challenges to be met in the development of inclusive education in the Republic of North Macedonia.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is a part of project called "Inclusive education and support of children with developmental disabilities" implemented by the expert team of the Association of Citizens for Psychological, Defectology and Speech Therapy "Center Savant" Skopje with the support of the Municipality of the "City of Skopje." The main goal of this study was to explore the reality of inclusive education of students with disabilitiesin mainstream secondary schools in Skopje, from the perspectives of secondary school teachers, students without disabilities and parents of children with disabilities. As an outcome of the completed project activities in 2019, significant effects were concluded which created the base for exploration of possibilities to extend the network with new project schools. To that end, in order to determine the attitudes, knowledge and experience of teachers, peers and parents, in the first four project schools in regard to the inclusive practice, a research was carried out in the period from September to December, 2019. A total number of 246 respondents were included in the research, of which: 40 parents, 89 teachers and professionals from secondary schools and 117 students from the first to fourth year of secondary education within the same schools.

For the purpose of this study, a qualitative research design was chosen. In fact, a qualitative approach was adopted since it provides the best support aimedat gaining greater understanding of inclusive education, from the perspectives and experiences of those involved, namely teachers, peers and parents of children with disabilities. A combination of sampling techniques was used for this study. Convenience sampling was used as the researchers selected four local schools together with the represen-

tative from the Department for Education from the City of Skopje. Purposive technique was also employed since the researchers wanted to gain insights from teachers who were in mainstream secondary schools and had experience in working with children with special needs within their mainstream class groups. The study also required insights from parents who had a child with special educational needs and who was attending a mainstream school setting. The third group were the students without disabilities who learned together with their peers who had some kind of developmental difficulties (e.g. autistic spectrum disorder, Down syndrome, learning difficulties, cerebral palsy).

In order to invite candidates to take part in the study, contact was established initially with the principle or the vice principal of the school. By using a network sampling technique, they were asked to convey the information and the invitation to participate tothe members of the teaching staff, peers and parents of students with special educational needs attending the school. The parents were contacted by the school principals and teachers. Confidentiality and anonymity of children, family and school was reiterated to all participants at this point. The contact with participants was held at the school premises during school hours. At the same time, we respect the participant's right to anonymity, confidentiality and privacy, and give participants clear information about the study. The researchers communicated openly and honesty with all participants in this study. All information – written and recorded – was stored securely, whereby access was available only to the researchers. Contact details for the researchers were also included, for any further questions.

The research included three modules of work.

Module 1. Workshops with students without disabilities

The main purpose of these workshops was to educate students on accepting and supporting their peers with some form of disabilities, but at the same time to teach them how to reduce their prejudice towards their peers. During the workshops, different forms of activities involving the students were organized: role plays, discussions, films and competitions. For example, students from 16 to 18 years of age, from secondary school, spent 5 days undertaking photography activities with a camera. Students with disabilities were paired with their non–disabled peers. Together they shared the photos and discussed. This type of activity provided them the opportunity to learn or develop their skills, but above all, it contributed to breaking down barriers between children with and without disabilities. The results demonstrated how positive attitudes and friendships can grow within a short time by using a very simple, but a powerful tool – a camera. The research has very effectively promoted a message that all children can and must be educated together.

Module 2. Work with parents

The work with parents wasfocused on training, support, knowledge, communication skills and legal advice. After this activity,the parents acquire a positive experience of

the abilities of their child and develop a partnership which provides support and encouragement to parents in their effort to do as much as possible for their children. We found that the parents were very satisfied with their children's experience of mainstream education, for example:

We always considered the other children as well…..so we had to learn how to adjust over the years and think about what was best, not just what we wanted for her, but what was best for everybody. I really wanted my girl to go to a mainstream school. I think we all have the idea of the school we would like our kids to attend.

(Parent of an autistic child)

Also the participants identified social learning and social awareness as positive aspects of inclusive education settings. It is not only children with disabilities who have a social benefit, this applies forall children at school.

Since he started school he has been spending more time with his peers than with his family. So they are his educators; they are his everything; they are his world, and he is not the onlychild with a disability in the school, so he himself would be helping them.

(Parent of a child with cerebral palsy)

Regarding the inclusive processes, the views of the parents are divided, depending on their personal experiences, the degree of disability their child has and whether the society has accepted their child or not. Still, some parents are not satisfied with the inclusive education and they believe that there is not any real inclusion in the country and that it all depends on the parents and their means.

Module 3. Training and support for teachers

No single change in the educational process can take part into practice without the teacher, because the teacher is and remains to be the key factor in the implementation of the educational process. Teachers are the ones who can understand every change. According to this, the researchers organize trainings for teachers, psychologists and officials about inclusive education issues. Participants were invited to share their views and experiences on various themes related to inclusion in education. During these activities teachers same as the parents, should share the same view of what the term inclusive means, they express positive attitudes concerning the acceptance of children with special educational needs in regular school by their schoolmates and positive attitudes concerning the need of additional assistance by a special needs assistant as a specialized person within the framework of inclusive practice. Also the largest number of teachers were determined to design an individual educational program (IEP) as one of the forms for additional necessary assistance. From the discussion on children's social interaction, an emphasis on the caring nature exhibited by secondary school students towards pupils with special educational needs became evident.

He would be verywell looked after in the class and they would include him as much as possible…But for him, you know, whether he would considerany of them as his 'real'

friends, Ido not know if he would. But yet he really enjoys being with them…

(Teacher of a student with Down syndrome)

Although teacher training courses have more recently incorporated modules on inclusion in education and students can avail of placement practice inspecial needs settings, we found that teachers feel it is not enough to prepare them for the needs of all children attending mainstream education. The results indicated that 60% of the teachers from the secondary schools had no training or experience in working with students with special educational needs, but 90% of them believed that every teacher would receive training in order to work better with these children.

Teachers need confirming education (training, access to literature, workshops, instruments). This helps them overcome negative, individual medical model–based perceptions and attitudes. Thus, they need to acquire skills for supporting students and establishing collaboration with parents. In this regard, training content related to human rights, the social model of inclusion, defining inclusive education, the twin – track approach, learning styles and individual planning really help (Kane et al. 2003). The school inclusion team uses this training content adapted to our context.

The participation in this inclusive education project encouraged us to reconsider school challenges in our country. Our participation in the last training module was a new stimulus to focus on the current inclusive processes and the school's future potential. According to this, we should share this case study as good a practice for creating conditions that enable students with disabilities to enroll and successfully progress in an inclusive school.

CASE STUDY: A 16-YEAR-OLD GIRL WITH DOWN SYNDROME

The student Lilly had intellectual impairments. The girl had developed during her first year of life, but problems emerged (when she was at the age of 17 months). The parents noticed an attention deficit, she did not respond to her name and had speech difficulties. During her early childhood, the girl received speech therapy three times a week and worked individually with a special educator. Her parents followed her progress, because at the age of 7 the little girl could count to 10, she knew relations, colors, shapes and letters. The speech therapist and the special educator together decided that she had abilities, needs and potentials to be in educational settings together with her peers in a local mainstream primary school. Here her teachers helped and encouraged her to play with other children. An education inclusion team together with teacher and parents made an individual educational plan (IEP). An IEP was developed, which specified learning goals for Lilly that matched her abilities and identified needs. The following instructional methods/strategies have been used with Lilly:

– Individualized approach;

– Working in pairs and a small group;

– Play, observation, showing images, applications, objects, toys, illustrative

method, dialogue, practical work;

– Development of individual instructional booklets for educational purpose;

– Use of teaching aids, educational software, practical didactical tools.

Apart from having a good achievement level according to her abilities and the educational goals set out in IEP, Lilly was included in all activities of the school community (school performances, exhibitions, after–school activities, etc.).

Now Lilly is in first grade of secondary school and she still needs support, because the new environment and greater mobility in the classroom still upset her, but her new teachers helped and encouraged her to feel better between her new peers. In fact the teachers were a part of Module 3 and they explained us their plan of Lilly's future education. The new action plan of the school inclusion team would be made for her. This includes organizing meetings to exchange views and experiences among teachers who teach those students, providing individual support, understanding her socioemotional status, because she is in period of adolescence and taking action for improvement, etc. The monitoring of the implementation of the IEPs shows that she is mostly achieving her goals, although if her parents were more fully engaged in the process, the results could be even better. Lilly has an opportunity to finalize the requirements of inclusive education. She hopes to go to college and study art.

Up until now, her inclusion in mainstream school has been extremely positive. Lilly is happy. Her parents are happy. The school team is happy.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Inclusive education as the single special route leads to an inclusive society. All children at some point need special attention and support, so that they can more easily overcome daily challenges, or perhaps specific storms they are facing and going through.

Every child is special, talented and prone to success in some field. Every child needs to play, learn and socialize with the children. Every child has a right to participate in a regular kindergarten or school according to their pace (Freeman 2000; Subramanian 2003). This is especially important to children with disabilities, because school settings can help them learn more about themselves, the others and the world. The world is a big place with lots of opportunities!

Every child has a fundamental right to education and must be given the opportunity to achieve an acceptable level of training (De Valenzueala et al. 2006). Every child has unique characteristics, interests, abilities and learning needs, so an educational system should be designed and an educational program should be implemented in order to take into account the wide diversity of these characteristics and needs.

On the basis of our findings and lessons learned from all of the training modules on inclusive education, and the inclusion story of Lilly, we would give the following recommendations:

– To accept inclusion as an obligation;

– To enable higher level of participation of students with developmental disabilities in creating educational programs, as well as during the enrolment in the first grade of secondary school;

– To implement active teaching strategies by teachers as the base for the inclusive approach;

– To create a warm environment with complete respect for everyone, so that all children are equally valuated and encouraged;

– To involve children with special educational needs in all varieties of activities, depending on the abilities the child has;

– To balance the rights of children with special needs and interests, with the goals and interests of their parents;

– To achieve better social integration and socialization by supporting development of the sense of security, satisfaction and self-esteem;

– The need to invest in the development of measures and services for increasing the quality level of involvement of children with developmental disabilities in the community.

Finally, continuous inclusive process across the whole school, through connecting and networking activities based on the principle: "you can teach and you can learn".

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