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EDITED BY MARIUSZ BARANOWSKI

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FROM 'POLITICAL ECONOMY' TO 'POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY' OF THE CLIMATE CATASTROPHE: WHY THE ECONOMY NEEDS TO BE BLOWN UP TO BE BORN AGAIN?

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ABSTRACT: The conceptual approach to real social phenomena and problems, as well as factors influencing and shaping them, although theoretical in nature, has momentous practical consequences. The issue of nature, and in a narrower sense of climate, constitutes a telling and representative example of the implications of the theoretical and methodological orientation adopted to study society and its relationship with the environment and its resources. This short paper aims to highlight the consequences of the shift in research perspective from 'political economy' to 'political sociology' in the context of climate change and its challenges. The article's main argument is to outline the implications of the change of reference point for the conceptualisation and operationalisation of theoretical frameworks related to social problems and challenges, which, nota bene, are conditioned directly and indirectly by the state of the ecosystem. And the central thesis is that a fundamental reorientation towards nature and climate change within the dominant capitalist system will only be a camouflaged maintenance of the status quo (accompanied noisily by a series of technological and fiscal solutions that solve nothing).
KEYWORDS: political sociology, political economy, climate change, natural environment, social welfare, degrowth

INTRODUCTION

Political economy, a term first introduced in 1615 [2017] by mercantilist proponent Antoine de Montchrestien (Montchrétien) in his work *Traité de l'œconomie politique*, refers to "the study of how a country—the public's household—is managed or governed, taking into account both political and economic factors" (Veseth & Balaam 2020: n.p.). Neoclassical economists seem not to have fully assimilated the information that, however, "[e]conomics is a social science. It is neither a branch of mathematics nor the study of nature. It is, instead, analysis of humans by humans" (Wolf 2018: xiii). However, relations between people are both mediated by and influence nature. It would be difficult to imagine studying the processes of production, distribution, and exchange of means of satisfying individual and social needs without taking nature into account. In addition, economists, including contemporary ones, have failed or refused to recognise the increasing and irreversible costs of environmental exploitation and their secondary effects on the socio-economic system (with its attendant inequalities and injustices).

If we try to look at the current situation from a distance, we can see the absurd stubbornness of continuing with the dominant model of economic development, which completely ignores the question of the general social welfare, nature and "techno-scientifically produces risks" (Beck 1992: 19).

THE POVERTY OF ECONOMICS?

Although political economy—irrespective of the different ways it is understood by, for example, Adam Smith or Marxists—contains strongly articulated historical and social components, its primary domain of interest is economic. This fact is not altered by emphasising its sociopolitical connections, as in the following excerpt:

> Political economy, branch of social science that studies the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state, using a diverse set of tools and methods drawn largely from economics, political science, and sociology. The term political economy is derived from the Greek polis, meaning 'city' or 'state,' and oikonomos, meaning 'one who manages a household or estate.' (Veseth & Balaam 2020: n.p.)

In the context of the 'problem' of nature and climate change, and the search for alternative modes of production, visions of the economy other than capitalist ones must be developed, because "[i]t is possible, therefore, that economic theory may continue to function mainly as a surrogate ideology for the market economy, right up until the day, in some distant future, when society evolves into something so profoundly different it no longer warrants the moniker 'capitalism'" (Keen 2011: 5).

To achieve this, one needs, above all, a sociological imagination (cf. Mills 2000 [1959]) rather than an economic one (Baranowski 2011; Kassner 2021; Ziółkowski 2021). However, the latter will be crucial for building a system for meeting social needs, or social welfare, under new social conditions (Baranowski 2019). All the more reason to watch the evolution of particular heterodox economics, breaking with the approach

that "a market economy necessarily maximizes social welfare" (Keen 2011: 65). This is particularly important because the purely instrumental and commodity-like treatment of nature and the environment has gained ground under the neoliberal type of capitalism. This variety of dominant economic system fetishises economic growth, systematically privatises, commodifies and deregulates various areas of life, generating environmental devastation and marginalising the weakest social groups (cf. Abercrombie 2020; Ziółkowski, Baranowski, & Drozdowski 2020).

It can no longer be ignored in the design of economic solutions from the fact that "since 1970 (…) the number of birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians has dropped by more than half. A quarter of all species are at risk of extinction" (IPBES 2019 as cited in Hickel 2020: 26). These hard facts (based on 15,000 studies), combined with the consequences of rising global temperatures, set key planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009) that many schools of economics ignore but whose severe consequences will affect everyone.

Even what are described as progressive approaches to economics, by which I mean MMT (Modern Monetary Theory), while challenging the fiscal and monetary assumptions of mainstream economics, do not offer comprehensive solutions to the climate challenge or to reducing the commodification of nature. I am not saying that the issue of money creation and the inflation mechanism is not important at all. But they are secondary to the real challenges we face. Let us look at the statement of L. Randall Wray in Modern Money Theory, which shows a bold re-evaluation of 'professed' and taught formulas, and let us ask ourselves the role of MMT in reducing the negative impact of economies on the environment:

> Imagine how the policy discourse will be changed when our President could no longer claim that 'Uncle Sam has run out of money'; when our government can no longer refuse to create jobs, or to build better infrastructure, or to put astronauts on Mars because of lack of funds; or when pundits would no longer be allowed to raise the scary spector of striking 'bond vigilantes' who might refuse to 'lend' more to government! There may be reasons we want to leave millions of workers unemployed, or to live with unsafe bridges and highways, or to remain earth-bound, but lack of funding cannot be one of them. (Wray 2015: 8)

In perspective adopted in this article, what MMT offers is no alternative either to externalising the costs of economic growth to the environment or to undermining popularised consumption styles. And without these solutions and their underlying phenomena, such as commodification, basing the economic model on economic growth, and the predatory exploitation of nature, we will not stop the coming ecological disaster (Walker, Druckman, & Jackson 2021).

DOES 'POLITICAL' SOCIOLOGY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Politically and civically oriented sociology (more in the Burawoy's [2005] sense of public sociology) offers much more in a radical change of lifestyles, that is, behaviours, motivations, needs, and values. And it must be remembered that implementing

post-capitalist scenarios in the form of, e.g. degrowth, is not a simple task (Romano 2020; Smith, Baranowski, & Schmid 2021). It involves a complete re-evaluation of the world as we know it, from its tiniest details at the personal level (cf. Heimburg & Ness 2021), through mid-range institutional solutions (cf. O'Brien & Penna 1998), to issues of geopolitical relations (cf. Cichocki & Jabkowski 2019; Lekkai 2020; Lemańczyk & Baranowski 2021) that have never been ultimately settled.

We must not forget that sociology has historically played—and can still play—a servile role to the dominant political, economic and cultural powers. A critical view of sociology and its application should be an immanent and distinctive feature of the discipline.

One of the 'positive' sticking points in this highly complicated and challenging situation is that we simply must work out (and very quickly) concrete solutions for reducing consumption and completely changing the economic model. The other option is out of the question. The second point concerns the wisdom of the people themselves, who anticipate progressive solutions without waiting for the decisions of politicians and business people. As Christian Felber, an Austrian economist and the creator of the concept of the Economy for the Common Good (ECG), noted, "[w]herever you meet people in any country in the world, who know themselves well, they reject intuitively capitalism" (*The Mint* 2017).

Even Adam Smith, who is considered the father of economics (Norman 2018), very eloquently and unambiguously characterised 'the great proprietors' with the following words: "All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind" (Smith 2003: 525). In another passage the Scottish thinker used the term "the principal architects" (Smith 2003: 841).

Beyond these 'principal architects', however, there is an essential part of the population whose position, even within liberal and most developed economies, leaves much to be desired. The data presented in Figure 1 on relative poverty, i.e. the share of people living with less than half the median disposable income in their country, show that both the USA, UK, Australia and Canada are above the OECD average. These are countries categorised as shareholder capitalism and the residual welfare state model. But for the record, we also find Israel, Japan and Korea above the OECD average.

Even being aware of the weakness of this indicator, that "it precludes the possible existence of 'absolute' or 'primary' poverty as this is conventionally understood" (Marx & den Bosch 2008), it—and a number of other measures—cannot be ignored in stigmatising systemic socio-economic inequalities. These inequalities not only exclude a huge part of the population from full citizenship, that is, from responsibility for the fate of the community (Parenti 2010), but also deprive them of real control over the 'the masters of mankind' in environmental matters (Klitkou et al. 2017; Kopnina et al. 2021). Over four decades ago, Howard Zinn (1980: 565-566) wrote in *A Peoples's History of the United States* taht "where there was a powerful drive for profit overriding concern for human welfare, as in a capitalist system, the dangers were multiplied, and the remedies more difficult to achieve".



Figure 1. People living in relative poverty
% of population with less than half the middle income in their country, 2019 or nearest year
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database

CONCLUSION

However, let us remember 'a sociological theory of a political economy' as described by Charles Wright Mills in the following interdisciplinary way:

> As each social science advances, its interaction with the others has been intensified. The subject matter of economics is again becoming what it was in the

> beginning—the 'political economy,' which is increasingly viewed within a total social structure. An economist such as John Galbraith is as much a political scientist as Robert Dahl or David Truman; in fact his work on the current structure of American capitalism is as much a sociological theory of a political economy as Schumpeter's view of capitalism and democracy or Earl Latham's of group politics. Harold D. Lasswell or David Riesman or Gabriel Almond is as much a sociologist as a psychologist and a political scientist. (Mills 2000: 139)

In order to radically reformulate the foundations of the existing economic 'order' in the context of the climate crisis, 'a sociological theory of a political economy' must be replaced by a progressive vision of political sociology aimed at (i) redefining capitalist social relations and (ii) working out the foundations of a 'post-capitalist society', since "democracy itself is either marking time or in retreat; it is everywhere under threat" (Amin 2003: 1). This line of thinking also resounds in Tim Jackson's book *Prosperity without Growth*, particularly in the passage emphasising the social foundations of—what the British researcher calls—'prosperity', and what I prefer to refer to as 'social welfare':

> For at the end of the day prosperity goes beyond material pleasures. It transcends material concerns. It resides in the quality of our lives and in the health and happiness of our families. It is present in the strength of our relationships and our trust in the community. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the life of society. (Jackson 2009: 16)

This significant observation shifts the focus from economics to the broader field of social relations. It also takes into account the ecological barriers of our planet, so commonly ignored and disregarded. And yet—as Tim Jackson (2009: 16) continues—"[p]rosperity consists in our ability to flourish as human beings—within the ecological limits of a finite planet. The challenge for our society is to create the conditions under which this is possible. It is the most urgent task of our times".

If our task is a real transformation of the economic model towards respect for nature and a halt to climate change, the primary objective is a political sociology of change, not only in lifestyles, but above all in the ways in which decisions are made and social welfare is realised, which must necessarily be nature-based social welfare.

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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO BRAZIL?

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ABSTRACT: Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, during the 2003-2013 decade that the World Bank called "the Golden Decade of Brazil", we had simultaneously economic growth, social inclusion, environmental protection and job expansion. With no deficit and very low inflation, and all despite the turbulence of the 2008 crisis. The onslaught on inclusive policies started in 2014. Dilma was ousted through a thinly disguised coup in 2016, and ex-president Lula was jailed for the time of the 2018 election, won by Jair Bolsonaro. Since the old oligarchies and corporate interests took over, the economy is stalled, unemployment has doubled, the Amazon is being cut down, child mortality is growing. The pandemic deepened an already general economic and social crisis. This paper aims to present an overview of what went wrong, centring not on the pandemic itself but on the deeper structural change that reversed the inclusive growth model of the popular governments. This involves the economy but also technological, social and political change. The overall thesis is that inclusive development works, austerity does not.
KEYWORDS: Brazil, financialization, inequality, crisis, lawfare

> One of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy is the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness. (J. K. Galbraith)
>
> Once a policy was adopted and implemented, all subsequent activity is transformed into an effort to justify it. (Barbara Tuchman)

Personal note: The reader may find some passion in this paper. As we write, Brazil has lost more than half a million to the pandemic, millions are going hungry, while the President says it is just "a little flu" and mocks those who cry over their loved ones, mimicking a spoiled child crying. Our problem is not having this president but the system that permits such a character to reach the presidency and cause such harm. The government should manage the country's public affairs, not teach us patriotism, how we should pray, or make love. Our aim here is to understand the social and economic workings that permit the worst of us to come to the top. Objectivity in social research does not demand cold neutrality. The arguments have to be solid, but our emotions are just human. This paper is about a dumb system, not just about a dumb president.

THE POLITICS OF AUSTERITY

Austerity does not work. Capitalism, to expand, needs producers, but it also needs consumers. The central argument for the reversal of the inclusive model in Brazil was that we do not have sufficient resources to include the poor. According to different promoters of the coup, social policies and a decent minimum wage would not fit the economy, the budget or the Constitution. But the numbers are simple: Brazil produced 3.1 trillion dollars of goods and services in 2019 (GDP in Purchasing Power Parity dollars). For a population of 212 million, this amounts to a *per capita* of US$ 15 thousand a year, or US$5000 a month per four-member family. This means that Brazil produces more than enough to ensure a comfortable and dignified life for everyone if inequality is reduced. The problem is not the lack of resources but rather the absurdity in its distribution. This reasoning can be extended to world figures: the US$85 trillion global GDP is quite sufficient if reasonably distributed, for at least ensuring we get rid of hunger and other dramas that are making billions suffer. But Brazil, with a Gini of 0,52, is among the ten most unequal countries in the world. An austerity program for Brazil makes no sense: two-thirds of the population already live in deep austerity, and the wealthiest six families have more wealth than the bottom half of society.

During the Lula Government, economic growth was not only strong, but the income of the poor majority grew faster than that of the rich: everybody gained, the poor proportionately more, which reduced inequality. The poor showing up in society generated the expected reaction from the rich: the same they had with Getúlio Vargas (ousted in 1954), with João Goulart (dismissed in 1964), with Dilma Rousseff (ousted in 2016) and with Lula, who only did not get elected in 2018 because he was imprisoned, two months before the election, on fabricated corruption charges. Distribution does not

work well with the elites, neither does economic democracy.

It seems Brazil can only have democracy if it is not used. The last inclusion policies worked, but for a short time, from 2003 to 2013. Dark times and violent politics seem to be the rule, and for the oligarchy to see that what works is what they have consistently criticized is unbearable. In Brazil, with an absurd law approved in 2016 prohibiting expansion of public social investment for 20 years, inequality was written into the legal system, changing the 1988 Constitution. The recommended austerity is for the poor who are already deprived and not the rich, which is where the money is. With a stagnating market, even before the pandemic, business was working near 70% of capacity. With more poverty and stagnating demand, who is the business going to sell to?

A STUPID COUP

The World Bank called the Brazilian development experience from 2003 to 2013 *The Golden Decade*. One must be very ideologically blind to ignore the enormous progress represented by unemployment falling from 12% in 2002 to 4.8% in 2013, the creation of 18 million formal jobs, the 38 million taken out of poverty, the reduction of the Amazon rainforest destruction from 28 thousand square kilometers in 2002 to 4 thousand in 2010, the access to electricity for 15 million poor and so forth. Strong regular progress for ten years represents the sound policy, not just a temporary lucky set of events, what we in Brazil call a "chicken flight". And it is a trend we must rescue, for we have some 150 million people who still need to improve their access to individual and collective goods and services. This is a huge opportunity to stimulate economic growth, a horizon to reach. Foreign trade may help, but it is not the solution since exports represent only 10% of our GDP. We are not Asian tigers. The fundamental problems and solutions are internal.

Mental confusion naturally makes it difficult to accept evidence when you want to be convinced of the contrary. This confusion is fed and stimulated by a sophisticated form of organized rubbish we presently call a *narrative*. We were told that doing what is suitable for the people is populism and that this populism brought our budget down. The image they created and have repeated ceaselessly is that a good housewife only spends what she has. Dilma spent too much, so this housewife must go. The president being a woman was clearly used.

But the numbers are simple: what generated the deficit were not the economic and social policies of the government, but the scorching interest rates on the public and private debt, the so-called financialization. In 2021, we have 62 million adults stalled in debt, unable to pay the interest, not to speak of reducing their debt, and blacklisted by Serasa-Experian. This US-based corporation controls credit information in Brazil. They are 62 million adults in a 212 million inhabitant country, add in the children, and we are speaking of around 40% of the population. This is not a housewife spending too much; it is the banks earning far too much.

When Dilma tried to reduce interest rates in 2012 and 2013, war was declared on her by the banks, as well as the rent-earning high and upper-middle-class. Just for the

record, the interest rates she tried to reduce were 44% average for business, 88% for private persons, and 14% for government bonds, while the inflation was around 5%. This is technically usury. They were bleeding the economy at a very accelerated pace. No economy can work with this kind of interest rate. But depriving the rentiers of this enormous flow of easy money was politically unsustainable. Nothing very new for whoever read Michael Hudson's *Killing the Host* or the Roosevelt Institute studies on *The High Cost of High Finance*. High finance is running the show.

They ousted Dilma without a crime, jailed Lula without proof of guilt, and elected a sinister far-right candidate precisely because the candidate who was going to win was put in jail. The judge who had him jailed gained the post of minister of justice. In 2019, Intercept recordings published by Glenn Greenwald gave us a full picture of the conspiracy. The fact is that the judge and the prosecutor worked hand in hand against Lula and his lawyers, and when the Supreme Court thought of intervening, a general cowed it into silence. The whole setup is being exposed in the international press and was criticized by judges throughout the world. The fact is that Lula was a political prisoner. When he left his 8-year of presidency in 2010, his approval rate was 87%. In 2021, Lula was finally cleared of suspicion by the supreme court. The judge who had him jailed was put formally under suspicion himself. Lula is the favourite candidate for the 2022 presidential election.

The political dimension is obviously linked to the financial results. If the new group that organized the coup had been able to maintain the economic growth, things would probably have worked out. But they resorted to the very traditional recipe that had stalled development during the 1990 decade, with Fernando Henrique Cardoso: privatizations, high-interest rates, and environmental and social regulation reduction. In recent years, the economy suffered a -3.5% recession in 2015, -3.8% in 2016, and has been stalled ever since, with a 1.3% growth in 2019 and -4,1% in 2020. It is the eighth year they are "fixing" the economy. This is simply not working. And the more they become aware of it, the more they explain the sacrifice was not sufficient.

But the narrative keeps rooted because it is simple and gives the populace someone to blame: Dilma broke the economy. The president being a woman helps the narrative. It is a farce. Deficit during the Lula and Dilma period (2003-2013) was never significant, even including the interest rates on public debt. But for so many people, particularly when they do not understand the process, politics is centred on emotions. The financial system broke the economy but did give people someone to blame, a woman, and a stubborn and outspoken one, the ideal victim. The power of banks works today only for bankers and rent-seekers. In the line of an American quip, we can say our problem is that a minority who earns half a million a month has convinced the groups earning 50 thousand a month that our problem is the guy who makes a thousand reais a month. Narratives work.

Those who are sorry for having helped to break legality in the country are presently called 'widows' of the coup. They opened the doors to the absurdity we presently must cope with. Elementary common sense shows that what works is effective representation, in the line of the first article of our Constitution: "All power stems from the people". In this fundamental sense, the newly elected government is not legitimate.

We elected a far-right moron because the legitimate candidate who was going to win was jailed, because the big media created an anti-PT hatred movement, because they organized an industrial-scale fake news campaign, and because a criminal attempt on his life granted him a victim aura, besides saving him from what would have been a humiliating presentation of his political views on TV debates.

It is not a question of accepting or not the result of an election, but understanding that his representation is very limited: imagining we can generate sustainable development based on far-right sectarian political power makes no sense. To survive with a very narrow internal support structure, this group had to seek the support of the Trump administration and foreign corporations, and is opening the doors to predatory national and international interests in the Amazon forest, oils reserves, deregulated agro toxic agriculture and so on. Internally, its survival rests on the promotion of God and homeland and of hate against "the enemy", chosen with anticipation as guilty of the poor results of the government. Hate and violence tend to be the natural road-fellows of elitist policies. Incompetence is always on the lookout for whom to blame. Considering the weight of American policies in Latin America, the Biden election did open a new space for change, but the political mess has grown deep roots, among others changing key principles in the Constitution.

DUMB RENT-SEEKING

The profit we earn on productive investment is quite legitimate: it generates jobs, goods and services, and pays taxes. On the other hand, profit on speculative investment generates dividends and huge returns without any productive contribution. Bankers call the different papers we can invest in "financial products", and they love to call themselves "financial industry", except they do not generate products and are not industrial—pure cosmetics. Money earned from financial speculation will not put one more pair of shoes on the market. Making the difference between productive investment and financial allocation is basic. No trouble with the distinction in French, "investissements" and "allocations financières", or even in Portuguese, "investimento" and "aplicações financeiras". But the banks prefer to call everything "investment".

The British handbook on how money works, edited by Kathryn Hennessy, explains the financial snow-ball effect: financial papers yield roughly between 7% and 9% a year during the last decades. Whereas effective production of goods and services, which demands more tiring work, has been growing at an incomparably slower pace, on the order of 2% do 2.5% a year. Those who have spare money will obviously put it where it grows better. For example, the owner of 1 billion locating his money in papers paying a modest 5% a year, is earning 137 thousand dollars a day, without producing anything. And every day, a part of this rent is making the snow-ball bigger, generating non-productive ever-accelerating wealth.

The result is we will have more billionaires while the real economy is deprived of the necessary financial resources. This is capitalism shooting its own foot, slowing down economic growth and reducing its basic legitimacy. In the world financial casino, we have seen the richest 1% of the planet accumulate more wealth than the remaining

99% from crisis to crisis. When speculative investment yields more than productive effort, the process becomes systemically dysfunctional. Obvious and well explained in Thomas Piketty's (2013) studies. And nothing new for finance researchers such as Paul Dembinski and Alain Shoenenberger, who wrote in 1993, 25 years ago: "The financing of production and trade is a matter of purely marginal concern to financial markets. Instead, they are chiefly concerned with managing previously accumulated wealth. It is only a slight exaggeration to state that a society of producers is gradually making way (at least in people's imagination) for a society of interest-earners." We are entering a rentier society.

The market economy was supposed to facilitate exchange between producers and consumers while generating products, employment and income. Nowadays, the "markets", a limited group of speculators, show a surge of optimism whenever the population loses rights. It is the logic of folly. We do not have to go very far to learn something positive: China controls its financial system so that money is productively invested, the Germans rely on their local banks (*sparrkassen*), ensuring that money is invested in what the community needs, the Nordic countries have decentralized financial systems, just to mention o few. We know what works: it is when money is productively invested.

A practical example may help: a few years ago, South Korea invested public money in a large project of non-polluting public transportation. The investment generated a series of technological innovation and production initiatives, thus creating employment. Since public transportation is energetically and financially much more efficient than filling the cities with cars, the investment was paid back. Pollution was reduced both by the electric engine technology and the reduction of the use of individual transportation. Less pollution in the cities means less money spent on hospitals and other health costs. The reduction of the time lost in transportation means people are less tired and have more time for leisure and improved productivity.

The example only illustrates the obvious, which is that our resources should be invested in projects and programs that have multiplying effects in terms of stimulating the economy, protecting the environment and improving the well-being of families. So much intelligence is wasted searching for more sophisticated financial mechanisms, which could create socially and economically valuable projects. Making society wealthier is what works.

THE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL FLOW

How does this work in Brazil? The numbers are not difficult to grasp; we just have to put them together. The economy works when you put the money where it multiplies. If we take a loan to buy some kind of equipment, improving productivity. Thus, at a higher rate than the interest rates we have to pay, we can continue buying more equipment, generating more products, employment, and income. But if the cost of credit is higher than the generated income, we will drown in successive loan renegotiations, ending up working for the bank. As Zygmunt Bauman writes, bankers hate good payers. This fundamental deformation hits the main economic actors – families, businesses

and the state – which become tied to a process of permanently feeding the financial intermediaries. Herein lies the mechanism which generated our economic recession and the ensuing political chaos we are living in. But our leaders seem convinced that the solution is to put more bankers in charge of politics.

Let us get to the numbers. In Brazil, families and businesses spend 1 trillion reais a year just on interest, without reducing the debt, just rolling it over. Considering our GDP in 2019, before the pandemic, was 7.3 trillion reais, we are speaking of 14% of GDP. This surrealistic amount is simply due to the huge interest rates we pay, technically speaking constituting usury. In May 2021, for example, banking interest rates for families was on average 98.5%, when in France they are below 5% a year. Thus, the financial system drained the purchasing power of families and the investment capacity of businesses. We have government-controlled much cheaper credit lines, such as the credit automatically paid from salaries (crédito consignado), but this risk-free credit pays bankers around 28%. Overall, it is an unsustainable financial drain on the productive economy.

The flow of interest on families and legal persons generate earnings for financial intermediaries, which are in significant part invested in public debt papers. Government has to pay interest on this debt, basically to banks, institutional investors and wealthy individuals, over 300 billion reais a year, roughly equivalent to 6% of GDP, 20% of the public budget. At about 75% of GDP, our public debt is not exceptionally high, but has been paying very high interest. Thus, instead of financing infrastructure and public social policies, our taxes end up in the pockets of financial speculators, people who do not produce anything, on the contrary, extract resources that could have been productively invested (cf. Eisinger et al. 2021).

If we put together the 14% taken from families and businesses and the 6% they appropriate from our taxes, we speak of 20% of GDP. A tiny part of this returns to the real economy. In the absence of Brazilian figures, we can imagine less than the 10% Epstein and Montecino estimated for the US financial flow. This is obviously an unsustainable drain on the productive economy. But the negative impact is amplified by the tax system. While in Europe, the deformation is partly corrected through taxes on financial capital, fortunes, inheritance and high income, in Brazil, the rich pay proportionately much less than the poor, and since 1995 distributed profits and dividends have been exempted. Tax evasion for 2018 was estimated at 620 billion reais, 9% of GDP (Sinprofaz). Tax on salaries is deducted at the source, and there is no way for the poor to escape indirect taxes, so tax evasion concerns basically the rich. The process is technically supported by banks, which have specialized departments for what they call "tax optimization". The names used in finance are outstanding, such as precisely calling any financial speculation "investment".

A significant part of tax evasion relies on tax havens, with so many asset management groups located in Panama, Cayman Islands, or Delaware in the US. And we have Switzerland, which, as Jean Ziegler wrote, "*lave plus blanc*", offers superior laundering. The fact is that the stock of unproductive financial resources in tax havens was estimated at 20 trillion dollars by the Economist, more than a quarter of 2012 world GDP of 73 trillion. According to Tax Justice Network, the Brazilian participation in

this amount was around 520 billion dollars, which represented roughly 28% of GDP. Not only do they not invest, but do not pay taxes. With major US corporations using similar strategies, as the ProPublica leaks have shown, it has become mainstream (*The Economist* 2021).

What we see here is an impressive dimension of financial drains on the economy. But we also have a series of smaller drains, such as the complementary pension funds, which with assets corresponding to around 15% of Brazilian GDP could obviously be used to invest in economic and social development instead of feeding on financial speculation. It is also the case of the insurance industry, with assets also corresponding to 15% of GDP (1 trillion reais), in great part located in public debt papers. Rent-seeking is also characteristic in a diversity of sectors, such as private health schemes, communication over-pricing, big pharma patent manipulation, etc.

Our 1988 Constitution stated clearly that "the national financial system will be structured so as to promote the balanced development of the country and to serve the interests of the collectivity." Nowadays, the system is essentially used to channel money to the unproductive, whether bankers, national or international corporations, or the rich who have even managed to demonstrate on the symbolic Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, wearing national colours in support of the far-right government. The truth is that banks have created a system through which our taxes are channelled in great part to unproductive rentiers. The bankers are presently in charge of the government, drain its resources, and proclaim that the reason we are suffering is that the State is too big, taxes too high, and the poor irresponsibly favoured by social policies.

The absurdity of all this? Well, it would be incomparably more productive for all of us and quite comfortable for banks if they provided funds for the economy instead of draining it. China reached this development capacity because they channel financial resources to productive use. In our case, short term greedy attitudes consisting in playing around with financial papers, or having money grow in tax havens, generated the 2015 and 2016 recession and kept the economy stalled, even before the pandemic. How come we study in detail the productivity of every hectare in agriculture, or the productivity of each industrial worker, but never have a look at the social productivity of financial resources?

THE DUMBNESS OF INEQUALITY

Maintaining this degree of inequality is particularly absurd, but it is central in the present administration policy (*Global Multidimensional Poverty Index* 2019). After all, the wealthy groups in power defend their interests, and we seldom have anyone in powerful positions who is not rich, white, man, and concentrated on improving his already impressive advantages. The question is, of course, that from a certain level of inequality and divorce between access to wealth and productive contribution, the system tends to become dysfunctional. Merit should play a role, even for the happy few. They threw the economy into recession, unemployment and political chaos. Who is this working for?

Does it work for the rich? Raising families in absurd closed condominiums, or in

mansions where they have to cope with in-house security teams, protect themselves in armoured vehicles, hiding their fortunes in tax havens, managing tax evasion schemes, and finding comfort and relaxing in developed countries – civilization at last – all this has little in common with a society where you breathe freely. Innumerous international comparative studies on quality of life perception show a radical quality of life improvement is when a poor person has access to a decent income but practically does not improve when a millionaire gets more millions. Not even for them does this system work. If we are to improve our overall feeling of happiness, there is no doubt that inclusion policies work better for everyone. When more money flows to the bottom of the social pyramid, we generate more happiness and more economic activity. Reducing inequality has strong impacts in ethical terms, as well as political and economic ones.

In ethical terms, it is difficult to find words that would be strong enough. In no civilized society could a person have no access to basic health services, a child or an adult have no food, families without shelter or spending years in refugee camps. Multidimensional poverty now hits 1.3 billion people, of which 663 million children and 428 million under ten years of age. (UNDP/OPHI) Is this poverty their fault? Lack of initiative? We must stop the "bullshit"; the rich, not the poor, created this absurdity. Almost a billion people and growing are going hungry, while we produce more than one kilo of grain per person per day, and a third of the food we produce is lost by mismanagement.

All these irresponsibly rich drain our resources for ostensive consumerism or financial speculation instead of helping to implement policies that work for the whole of society. These corporations generate social, economic and environmental tragedies, navigate proclaiming values no primate would accept (*greed is good*), and whose ethics consist in grabbing a more significant piece, no matter the suffering, damn the planet. What we have here is impressive intelligence in getting to the means and stunning idiocy in defining the ends. Should we build taller walls to contain the poor, organize more cocoons for the rich, develop more violent and constraining repression systems? The poor do not deserve their poverty, neither the rich deserve their wealth.

This inequality is evidently also dysfunctional in social and political terms. From a certain level of inequality, there is no room for social solidarity or democratic conviviality. Violence tends to contaminate all domains. In the US, people buy more guns. In Brazil, the army invades favelas, and the police kill an average of 16 persons a day. Well, we have no death penalty in Brazil. Europeans do not know what more to invent to protect themselves from migrants fleeing the colonies Europe had so violently exploited. We are not speaking of perfect equality here, but of a little less obscene scenario, where every person could be valued as a human being and have opportunities to thrive and contribute. Reality is straightforward here: when people are placed in desperate situations, they react desperately. There is a limit to good behaviour by millions who find all the doors closed. We have the resources, we have the technology, we know what has to be done, and it costs very little. The 2030 Agenda is here for everyone to see. Is it an exaggeration to speak of ignorance? We find ourselves institutionally helpless.

And inequality is particularly dumb from the economic point of view. We all know

how the New Deal worked in the US, how the Welfare State brought prosperity to so many presently rich countries; we have all the data on the South Korean miracle, of the impressive rhythm of development in China, of the Golden Decade 2003-2013 in Brazil. All these experiences have in common the expansion of purchasing power of the population in general, access to universal free public social policies, all of which stimulates production and employment. Productive entrepreneurs do not need Chicago Boys economic ideology, they need people with purchasing power for their products and cheap credit to invest. Brazil has neither.

The mechanism has been well known since almost a century ago, with Kalecki and Keynes. But it is basically common sense. Investing in the population's well-being stimulates demand, generating more production and ensuring more jobs that create more demand. Family consumption and business production generate more taxes which puts back into government whatever was spent to stimulate the inclusion programs. And a population with access to social policies, with more health and education, is simply more productive, besides being more satisfied with life. Here we do not need ideology and hatred or scapegoats, but a simple look at the experiences that have worked and are working today in many places. What works in economics is when the economy is directly oriented according to the priorities of family wellbeing. Inequality, in economic terms, only maintains a narrow space of activity and low social productivity.

Let us put a conditionality in this reasoning. I worked for seven years in Africa in impoverished countries. Just spreading money will not work if you do not have the corresponding productive capacity. In these conditions, you have to balance productive investment and consumption support. But in the case of Brazil, where businesses are working with 70% of capacity, distribution does not generate inflation, as was clearly seen in the 2003-2013 distributive phase. And the poor have a simple consumption profile, goods and services which can easily be expanded. What inflation we have in Brazil does not result from excessive demand but from traders' speculation. What works for productive companies is people with money to buy what they produce, and cheap credit to finance investment. In Brazil, they have neither.

Maintaining and reproducing inequality, when it disorganizes our societies in ethical, political and economic terms, is profoundly dumb. As we are doing throughout the world, increasing inequality, but particularly in the US and Brazil, is in the sphere of pathology. All the positive examples we have, from Canada to South Korea, in Germany and Nordic Countries, and of course in China, are based on expanding internal market and social policies instead of generating privilege for the few. The promotion of the Global Green New Deal, the first steps towards ESGs (Environment, Social and Governance) are no more than the first steps, but point to a growing consciousness of the slow-motion catastrophe we are heading to.

THE STATE, BUSINESS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

At the centre of our challenges is the necessity of redefining our institutions to implement policies that make sense. *New Rules for the 21st Century*, the Roosevelt Institute

called it. *Change the Rules* is the title of a *New Economics Foundation* report. The debate over politics has mainly been centred on the war between those who want to privatize and those who have a more active government. The reality is that we presently are too complex societies for this kind of simplifications to work. Effective policies are based on a reasonably balanced intervention of the state, business, and civil society where they work. Corporations without public interest restrictions turn to the mafia, the state without public control tends to become authoritarian, while public interest without civil society organizations strong enough to face both corporations and the condition tends to be over-run. There is no political Santa Claus.

But it is not complicated. The overall objective is sustainable development, balancing economic, social and environmental interests. Nowadays, the 17 goals and 169 objectives of the 2030 Agenda clearly describe where we should be headed: ensuring decent life for all without screwing the next generations. And we know what works: it consists in orienting the complete economic cycle towards the well-being of families. This, after all, is what we mean when we speak of economic and socially sustainable development. It certainly depends on our direct income, the pocket money we earn, which allows us to pay our bills. Ensuring a reasonable income for all consumers will, in turn generate demand, stimulating productive activities. Both direct consumer activity and business production generate taxes for the public dimension of development.

The government will in turn, be able to use these resources to what has been called indirect salary, which allows us to have access to collective consumer goods and services such as health, education, culture, security, a clean river, parks in the city, energy and transportation infrastructures and the like. Access to collective consumption is fundamental. It is much cheaper and much more efficient to have free public universal access to health services, such as in Canada than facing the dominantly privatized American out-of-pocket system. The numbers are glaring: American costs 10,400 dollars a year on health services, while the Canadian system, costing 4,400 dollars per capita, presents much better final results. Not to speak of the reduction of anxiety when you live in a country where you know you will not be unable to pay a doctor for your kid (cf. Abernathy et al. 2019).

Public, universal and free access to some basic social services is simply more efficient and hugely important for reducing people's stress, one of our chief social scourges. It is ridiculous to call public social investment "expenditures" when we are speaking of the most efficient way of ensuring access to essential public consumption services. Strangely we put names on things, and the papers bankers push us to purchase are called "financial products" and "investments". At the same time, health and education are classified as "costs" or "expenditures" when they constitute very efficient investments in human capital.

The dumb attitude here consists in maintaining an ideological war between pro- or anti-state attitudes, when it is natural that individual consumption goods be managed in the private sector, social policies and infrastructures in the public realm, and vigorous civil society organizations insure the trade-off and coordination between both areas. Democracy limited to a vote every few years is fake democracy. Instead of stupid

macho declarations against the "nanny-state" and other idiocies, we need common sense and a good look at countries where things are working.

AN INFORMED SOCIETY

We learned from Jung that thinking is a laborious activity, so people would rather have opinions. We obviously have a right to our thoughts, not to our facts, but it seems not to matter very much. What is impressive is that we have so uninformed a society when we are awash in means of communication, at home, in the street, in any waiting room, in our pocket. In good part, if we must choose between facts that reach our brain and the opinions which get our guts, we clearly prefer to be in peace with our guts. We rationally select the facts or deform them to justify what we want to believe. Demagogues worldwide, nowadays organized in the consensus-building industry Noam Chomsky has presented so well, have learned that mobilizing people through hate is much more efficient than explaining complex reality. When presenting a culprit, hate generates a powerful popular catharsis, an immense excitement of belonging to a punitive gang: KKK and the black, Hitler and the Jews, Palestinians in Israel, China in the US (Fidel and Hussein are gone), immigrants in Europe. In Brazil, we have even reinvented communism to justify Lula's hate and the poor in general.

Kurt Anderson (2017) writes that the United States suffered a mutation that transformed the country into a *Fantasyland*: "Among the one billion websites, believers in anything and everything can find thousands of fellow fantasists, who share their beliefs, with collages of facts and "facts" to back them up. Before the internet, crackpots were mostly isolated and surely had a harder time remaining convinced of their alternate realities. Now their devoutly believed opinions are all over the airwaves and the Web, just like actual news. Now all fantasies look real."

Political demagogues with their hate speech or flattering patriotism, corporations that convince us we are more important if we pay 300 dollars for a Montblanc fountain pen (it writes), Think Tanks that are mushrooming everywhere – from the giants financed by the Koch brothers to our modest Millenium imitation in Brazil – oil and coal giants funding fake science to convince us that climate change is fake science, all these points not only to the fact that we are very fragile in terms of how we use reason, but that we have a gigantic planetary opinion building industry to make a profit on it. Noam Chomsky spreads the vaccine against this deformation.

From 2013 on, the Globo communications empire orchestrated an impressive anti-corruption theatre, a show every night featuring the last *corrupto*, suggesting the hidden links to Lula. A fake news industry, managed by marketing corporations, created the deep political polarization we presently know to have been very similar to what was organized for Brexit or Trump. The Brazilian *novelas* became politics. Instead of information, we now have 'narratives' and huge manipulation industry.

Our brain becomes an instrument to invent reasons to believe in what has no rational basis whatsoever. In a context of huge information overload, having such an uninformed society points to the particularly dumb way we organize access to knowledge. We have made a technological information revolution and use it to create fake

reality.

THE TECHNOLOGY PARADOX

It is impressive that we have to worry about the advance in technology. After all, being able to do more with less effort should make us glad. We improve social productivity. But the explosive technological change we are living in demands innovative forms of regulation and social organization. In the grab-all world, we curiously call neoliberalism, the new technologies lead us to transform climate, destroying our forests, drastically reducing biodiversity – all on unprecedented scales, precisely because of the power of technologies. The expanded creativity new technologies permit become dangerous when we have such difficulty in coping with systemic change. Wating for the markets to solve the structural challenges will not work. The research by Wallace-Wells, *The Uninhabitable Earth,* helps in understanding how deep this goes.

And we also have an impressive difficulty in looking at the long term. It is remarkable that the 2008 crisis seems like yesterday, while 2030, an equal distance in years, seems lost in the future. Not to speak of distant 2050 or mythical 2100. And yet, my newly born grand-child Leonardo will be 31 in 2050, and in 2100 will have the professor's age who is writing these lines. The future is right ahead and coming fast. We are living a slow-motion catastrophe, reading our future in scientific research papers as in the last pages of *One Hundred Years of Solitude*.

It is obviously a question of radically improved governance. Why should we worry so much about technological unemployment when improved productivity means we could work less and dedicate more time of our lives to culture, leisure and conviviality? We can better organize our working schedules, let the economy expand in areas that will allow us to enjoy our lives better, and ensure universal basic income so that no one is reduced to a desperate situation in the transition. But most of all, we must generate regulation and governance capabilities so that we do not destroy our planet. The Brazilian government has opened a free-for-all policy concerning the destruction of the Amazon forest, even producing an impressive propaganda documentary on how we must claim the right to exploit our resources. And our minister of foreign affairs attributed the climate challenge to a "Marxist conspiracy". Fortunately, he did get kicked out, and governments changed, but there is a mismatch between the amplitude of necessary measures and the shallowness of governance reach (Belluzzo& Bastos 2016).

In other words, looking at the expanding technological capacity, we have to ensure it is used for economically sound, but also socially just and environmentally sustainable development. The free-for-all battlefield we generously call 'markets', inherited from the XXº century, but with XXIº century technologies, is a disaster. Using so much technology and knowledge to deepen the environmental, social and economic crisis, frankly, is systemic folly.

COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION

We know collaboration works. But instead, we wage war among all of us, between social groups, religions, countries, corporations, neighbours. In a great measure, obviously, it belongs to our nature. Chimpanzees are different from bonobos, and so are we. Reading *Our Inner Ape* by Frans de Waal (2005) is inspiring. But the essential thing is that we can see, in so many examples throughout the world, that it is also a matter of institutions. It was not in the nature of the German to kill people in concentration camps, nor is it the case with American frontier guards tearing children apart from their mothers. And we can see how societies much more centred on collaboration, like Canada or the Nordic countries, are prospering not only in terms of quality of life but also of economic productivity. And persons forget, when they look at the impressive rhythm of transformation in China, Vietnam or other "tigers", at what point this is anchored in their collaborative traditions built on the rice planting culture, where the water resources must be shared, where transplanting is a collective culture, with chanting and all.

What is essential in this short life of ours is not only the result but also the process. Transforming life into hell and then showing increased productivity leads us to think, after all, what is it we want? Life is the walk itself, and turning the path less thorny can be more important than getting there faster. People are rediscovering the common good through access to knowledge, a protected environment, infrastructures that generate a more comfortable life, as well as harmonious links between the different types of activities. With world urbanization, many cities are taking over through local governance, seeking more balanced development, organizing collaboration between the various economic and social stakeholders. With evolution towards a knowledge society, we are discovering the obvious, that ideas can be freely shared without additional costs, in the framework of the zero-marginal cost society so well described by Jeremy Rifkin (2014). With planetary connectivity, we have a new immense sphere of collaboration opening, something Hazel Henderson has shown so well in her *Building a Win-Win World*.

It is high time we get a little more civilized. A simple verse by a Pernambuco famous poet is full of wisdom: "Where at are we all rushing to, why so much greed if nobody came here to stay?" Frankly, all those super executives, whether politicians, entrepreneurs or religious leaders, get us tired. We prefer the peace of everyday life, the pleasure of social exchanges, the joys of conviviality. And we have all the science and wealth necessary to ensure well-being for all without so much ideology of individual success. It is good to succeed, of course, but not by only rushing through life, pushing people around, creating human and environmental dramas, even killing people as is happening in so many regions. When the rules become flexible and the laws adjustable to the strongest, we all become anxious or insecure. And fear generates hate. Is this necessary? Until when will we accept the stupidity of selling more arms to more people in the name of making them feel safe, a Trump policy also promoted in Brazil? Of sending the army to favelas instead of facing the absurdity of their existence? Is it demanding too much from intelligence to understand that it is more productive to act

upon the causes than the consequences?

LAW AS A VECTOR OF INJUSTICE

Legality is fundamental. The set of laws defines the rules of the game in society. And equality in the face of the law is essential, allowing us to feel secure in our lives. A central problem, of course, is the question of who makes the laws. In the really-existing society, laws are made by men and not coincidentally white and rich. And, as could be expected, they tend to privilege men, white and rich. There was a time it was legal for a person to buy another person as a slave. Lincoln, as president, managed to change this law through a series of legally questionable initiatives. It has been commented that a profoundly ethical person attained the most outstanding humanitarian progress in the United States through some dishonest means. In Brazil, the habit of legislating in one's own interest leads us to chaos, eroding the legitimacy of law and even the judiciary system.

Our recent legal transformations are very significant. We can say the Constitution of 1988, the way it was negotiated, was legitimate. But within this legal framework, deeper power structures have transformed it into a Frankenstein. Follow the process. The new Constitution was enacted in 1988, after years of military dictatorship, reaching a certain level of civilized governance. But in 1995, congress approved a law that opened the gates to rent on public debt: as of July 1996, banks would be able to invest our money in public debt bonds, paying an astounding 25%, already with low inflation. Regular earnings on public debt are usually in the 0.5% to 2% a year bracket. It was called the Selic rate and was, as it continues to be, a present to bankers. This is a legal form of taking over public money. Well, the law is the same for everybody, so the poor, if they had money, could also profit from the opportunity. The fortunes thus earned by the wealthy were also exempted from taxes: in a Christmas present on the 26th of December 1995, distributed profits and dividends would not pay taxes. The bank employees pay their taxes already deducted from their salaries, but the millions going into bankers' pockets are exempt. This is one more Brazilian originality. And it is in the law.

There is more. In 1997 government sanctioned a law authorizing legal persons to finance political candidates. With this corporate funding of elections, public administration became a prisoner to the major clusters of economic power, such as the agri-business, leading banks, etc. It took 18 years, at the end of 2015, for the Supreme Court, guardian of our constitution, to notice that the first article, which states that 'all power stems from the people', not the corporations, had been violated. But these 18 years were sufficient to profoundly change the political landscape. In 2003 Congress elected with corporate money eliminated article 192º from the Constitution, and interest rates, which had been limited to 12% plus inflation, were now free to reach usury level. Financial regulation ceased to exist.

Lula was perfectly aware of the power balance in the country and read, in June 2002, what was called a Letter to Brazilians, which could easily have been called a letter to bankers: he would not mess with their interests. In fact, with the elimination of Article

192º that had drawn up the legal framework of the national financial system, he would anyway have the little legal capacity to regulate private banking activity. Despite the economy bleeding with the excessive interest rates, impressive results were attained, as we have seen.

But in 2012, with more than 50 million adults unable to pay their debts, businesses facing reduced demand and high-interest rates, and government hampered by the public debt drain, Dilma decided to reduce the financial drain, mainly using public banks and the official public debt rate, by lowering interest rates. This drastically reduced the vast financial profits made by banks, institutional investors and the higher-middle-class. She did not have the strength to face the political backlash. We know what followed: boycott, street movements, and the coup. Formally Dilma was ousted in 2016, but in fact, from mid-2013 on, there is no government, just chaos. Guido Mantega, the competent finance minister of Dilma before the impeachment process, clearly shows how both internal and international financial interests brought the distributive system down.

Vice-president Temer, who actively supported the coup, became President and changed the Constitution so that social policies would freeze for 20 years, and raised the interest rates on the public debt again. In mid-2021, as we write this paper, public debt service has exploded, while in the private sector, 62 million adults are unable to pay their debts. Average personal credit interest rates in June 2021 are 74.72% in commerce, 288.35 for credit card revolving credit, 132.91% for overdraft, 48.33% for personal bank credit. Inflation is roughly 5%.

Moral of this sport: speaking of legality became a make-belief exercise. In a small book in 2015, *Os Estranhos Caminhos do nosso Dinheiro,* the strange paths our money follows, we describe how large-scale corruption creates its own legality. A corporation paying a politician to vote for a particular law is a case of corruption. But between 1997 and 2015, paying a politician to get elected, thus having his votes in the corporation's pocket for four years, was declared legal, much as the system created in the US in 2010. You only are forbidden to purchase a politician in retail operations. In the US, they say, "we have the best congress money can buy".

We do have a basic legal framework, what remains of the 1988 Constitution. And a guardian to make it respected, the Supreme Court. But by abandoning legality and supporting the coup, giving an appearance of "legal process" to right-wing putschists, the judiciary facilitated a radical shift to the right. It opened the way to the dramas we presently face, with radical reduction of democratic space. Can anyone trust our politicized judiciary system? They managed a profound demoralization, and the loss of confidence in justice represents a massive loss of institutional capacity in the country. We are facing the absurdity of the judiciary demoralizing justice. The costs for the country are immense and much more than only financial (Warren 2016).

* * *

We are back to the fundamental problem, our impressive difficulty in governing ourselves with a minimum of good sense. For so many people, political options continue

being defined much more by our guts than by brains, with hatred having more space than solidarity and compassion. In fact, the aggressiveness of groups and social classes that, for some reason, have become powerful seems to be a permanent part of our history, with systematic use of extreme forms of discrimination and violence. Any motive will do, whether skin color, gender, sexual option, religion, income difference, and frequently even age. At times the length of your hair, a beard, or a veil is sufficient to feed the latent beast within us. And when bestiality can find a collective expression and dresses up in moral superiority, it becomes powerful.

Nowadays, the communication system leads to our consciousness being invaded by the most absurd narratives, but usually favourable to dominant groups. Invading our intimacy is presently made possible on the individual level. The control of what we see and interpret allows algorithms to manage public opinion on an industrial scale, as documented in *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism* by Shoshana Zuboff (2019). Complex financial systems make us lose control over economic activities, generating excessive inequality in favour of unproductive rentiers. Giant corporations distribute their power over the planet, a power no one voted for and not limited by any global governance. And we are rushing, in historical terms, towards the destruction of life on the planet. *The Uninhabitable Earth*, by David Wallace-Wells, presents as we have seen an excellent overview of these bleak perspectives.

We do have strategic visions, and they are reasonably obvious: rescuing the public dimension of the state, taxing unproductive capital and more generally adapting our tax system to the new economic realities, generating transparency on financial flows, some kind of basic universal income, reduction of working hours according to productivity gains, rescuing the role of cities as fundamental units of bottom-up public governance, and obviously creating a minimum of international governance in the face of the global chaos, as well as democratizing media so that we can have an informed society. Is this viable? The question is not of viability, but of understanding, first, the essentially political dimension of our challenges, the centrality of the question of power. And we must understand that it is a question of time, for with climate change, destruction of biodiversity, the deepening gap between rich and poor, worldwide contamination of water and other growing challenges, we are just using a universal political "mañana", probably until a planetary catastrophe generates the necessary political will. It will probably demand more than Covid-19.

The erosion of what little democracy we had in Brazil can be seen as a burlesque tragedy. We brought down policies that were working; we tore down a Constitution which was protecting us from absurdities. We elected a weak far-right demagogue with very limited political support and who can only survive by letting the oligarchy and international interests free to promote destructive policies. The man in charge of the economy, Paulo Guedes, is co-founder of BTG Pactual bank, which has 38 affiliates in the Cayman Islands, Bermudas, Panama, Delaware and other tax havens. Tax havens are used essentially for financial speculation, tax evasion and money laundering. Is this what we need? How come such a guy becomes minister of the economy?

We do have a kind of deep conscience in Brazil, a mass of common sense in the heads of millions, that would allow us to get back on a constructive road. But we are

so stiffly divided into left and right. This is comfortable for the right, in that grabbing more resources for the already rich and destroying the environment can be presented as a legitimate political option, an appearance of legitimacy, a question of "opinions". In fact, the great divide is between those who seek a democratic and sustainable society and those who try to grab more, in the short term, no matter what happens to society and nature. It is not a question of right and left. It is a question of elementary human decency. How long will we tolerate having 850 million going hungry in a world awash in food? And watching on TV as a band of "idiots" in Wall Street justifies anything, chanting "Greed is Good"?

Paulo Freire once declared he wanted "a less evil society". It seems childish. But our challenges are immense, and we, as teachers, communicators or social organizers, or simple citizens, must face the task of explaining the obvious: a society that works has to be a society that works for everyone. Dumbness should be confronted, or faced, with what works, and that is a society organized for the common good.

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THE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR AS A BARRIER TO SOCIAL INCLUSION ERASMUS+ PROJECT PARTICIPANTS' PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT: The paper is the result of collaboration between seven European universities and covers health, social pedagogy, and special education programs, aimed at the removal of barriers to social inclusion and social participation facing children and young adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). The collaboration received funding from the Erasmus+ Intensive Program with the aim of developing a common curriculum on social inclusion for children and young adults with IDD. Identifying variables that support inclusion for individuals with IDD who engage in challenging behavior is critically important and this paper is built on reviewing social and educational policies from 5 European countries in order to do so. The paper re-

veals loopholes and paradoxes in policy that hinder social inclusion when addressing challenging behavior. The greatest challenges identified by the researchers are the gaps in training for different professions and the lack of overarching legislation for these professions. Another issue identified is government tolerance of a lack of clear competencies and codes of conduct amongst unregulated service providers.
KEYWORDS: developmental disabilities, ethics, collaboration, international comparative studies, policy

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we aim to focus on challenging behavior as a barrier for social inclusion of children and young people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). However, as a result of the critical reflection, we ascertain that it is coercive practice in response to challenging behavior that may be responsible for hindering inclusion. We discuss relevant national legislation from contributing European countries and specific professional approaches to challenging behavior from a practitioner's perspective. We discuss professional perspectives that our team represents and therefore social educators (Norway), special pedagogues (Poland, Romania, Sweden) and learning disability nurses (UK) are at the focus, as they are positioned at the center of our professional experience. Coincidently, we unveil controversial paradoxes, entangled in the interplay between national legislation on social inclusion and human rights, and the use of legal coercion in professional practice. Therefore, the overall aim of our article is to highlight the gaps and grey areas in policy and practice that addresses challenging behavior that may create barriers to the social inclusion of people with IDD in the five European countries we explore (Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Poland, and Romania[1]).

Although enhancing social inclusion is one of the important aims in professional practice, it is inhibited by problem behavior. Problem behavior may sometimes lead to use of coercion (physical force, the use of power or restraint against a person's will). The legal use of force and coercion as a measure to reduce the negative consequences of problem behavior creates a barrier to social inclusion and carries a stigma. Is there an alternative to the use of legal coercion, especially when the use of coercion is prolonged? In Norway, legal decisions on the use of force and constraints (Health and Care Service Act 2011) are valid up to 12 months, but there are no limitations on how many times a person with IDD may experience the lawful use of enforcement measures. As a result, if a decision to use force is extended, a person may spend their entire life under such conditions. This is an extremely difficult issue to resolve if the aim is

[1] Participating universities: Oslo Metropolitan University from Norway, The Maria Grzegorzewska University from Poland, The University of Oradea from Romania, The University of Hertfordshire from England, Stockholm University from Sweden, Edinburgh Napier University from Scotland and The Queens University of Belfast from Northern Ireland.

indeed social inclusion. In this paper we analyze country-specific policies related to the different professions involved and investigate how social inclusion principles and the use of legally justified force are balanced. When a vulnerable group in society displays challenging behavior, the response should come from highly trained professionals, as there is a difference between stopping the person using peaceful measures and coercion, which would be stopping the person using physical force (e.g. pinning them down to the floor). Competent practitioners are trained to use the right procedures at the right moment.

Health, social, and educational professionals have a politically agreed mandate from society to provide services to the vulnerable, a mandate mirrored in the ethical guidelines developed by each profession. One purpose of these guidelines is to give society confidence that teachers, nurses etc. are able to deliver what's expected from them (Grimen 2008). Broadly speaking, the purpose of ethical guidelines is to direct each profession so that it contributes to delivering of the mandate given to the profession by the society. Issues related to self-determination, avoiding intrusive measures, and quality of life are central to these ethical guidelines (FO 2019). However, many professionals experience, often on a daily basis, that the use of force, constraints and other intrusive measures applied against the will of an individual (all of which constitute coercion), are observed in secure services. This may be viewed as exercising power entrusted in professionals by society (mandate for professions of trust), but also erects a mental barrier between staff and the service users (cf. Goffman 1978). In our view, it also undermines trust of service users towards staff, enhances negative stereotypes and stereotypical responses to difficult situations, and it may stigmatize both staff and service users in the eyes of wider society. Thus, a tension between the need for intrusive measures on the one side and self-determination on the other side easily occurs. In this tension ethical issues and legal demands related to social inclusion and quality of life exist, which each profession and professionals need to securely solved and met. Moreover, appropriate training on how to resolve difficult situations where challenging behavior occurs is key to supporting the sustainable social inclusion of persons with IDD and reducing the need for use of coercion. In a systematic review of staff training on challenging behavior for individuals with intellectual disability, Cox, Dude and Temple (2014), identified positive behavior support, active support, appropriate communication training and using alternative and augmentative communication as relevant areas for professional training, which yield positive outcomes in mitigating challenging behavior. Due to the international and multilingual context of this paper we enclose a table with the glossary of terms we use and how they should be understood.

Term	Definition
IDD – Intellectual and developmental disability	Severe, chronic condition with mental and/or physical impairments that affect self-care, independence, mobility, ability to express oneself and to learn, often described as SEN (special educational needs) or SEDN (special educational needs and disabilities)
Coercion	Use of physical force, restrains, application of medication or preventive and punitive measures against one's will.
Special pedagogue	Special pedagogue is a university-trained specialist able to support the holistic development and learning of persons with SEDN (In Romania also a psychopedagogue)
Social educator/social pedagogue	In some countries, social pedagogues support individuals with SEDN in their independence and inclusion within the community. In other countries, they build theoretical frameworks and community-based solutions for social work to be delivered (cf. Odrowaz-Coates & Szostakowska 2021)
Social inclusion	Social participation, which means equality of access to all spheres of social life, social interactions of vulnerable people and people within wider society that is frequent and meaningful.

Table 1. Terminology
Source: own elaboration.

CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR

The term "challenging behavior" was originally introduced by The Association for People with Severe Handicaps in North America and is often related to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). Other terms are also used among practitioners to label such behavior, such as "aberrant behavior", "dysfunctional behavior", "maladaptive behavior" and "problem behavior". However, the term "challenging behavior" is the preferred term among experts within the field because it brings fewer negative connotations and is not associated with any deviating psychological factors (Emerson 2001). Emerson (1995; as cited in Emerson 2001) defines challenging behavior as:

> [...] culturally abnormal behavior(s) of such intensity, frequency or duration that the physical safety of the person or others is likely to be placed in serious jeopardy or behavior which is likely to seriously limit the use of, or result in the person being denied access to, ordinary facilities. (p. 3).

Different studies confirm the prevalence of challenging behavior in people with IDD and describe it as high, but the reported prevalence between them varies (Simó-Pinatella et al. 2019; Grung et al. 2021). Some possible explanations for this diversity are variations in the operationalization of challenging behavior, characteristics of the samples, and variation in measurement methodology. For instance, in a systematic

review based on 20 prevalence studies of challenging behavior in children and young people with IDD, Simó-Pinatella et al. (2019) found an overall prevalence rate ranging from 48% to 60% in children diagnosed with intellectual disabilities. In children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) Simó-Pinatella et al. found an overall prevalence rate of challenging behavior at about 90%. The latter is not a surprise as some types of stereotypical behavior, which can include challenging behavior, are a diagnostic criterion in ASD (World Health Organization 2020).

In a prevalence study conducted with a Norwegian sample, Holden and Gitlsen (2006) found challenging behaviors in 11.1% (N = 91) of 904 participants with IDD. The most common forms of challenging behavior were attacking other people (6.4%, N= 53), self-injurious behavior (4.4%, N = 36) and destructive behavior (2.3%, N=19. 7.1% (N = 59). Participants also displayed other difficult, disruptive or "socially unacceptable behavior'. Furthermore, Holden and Gitlesen (2006) found that challenging behavior occurred more often in males than in females and that challenging behaviors were more common in people under the age of 40. They also found that the prevalence of challenging behavior increased with the severity of intellectual disabilities. Similar to Simó-Pinatella (2019), Holden and Gitlesen (2006) found that challenging behavior was more prevalent in people with ASD and even more so in people living in municipal care homes (community-based care homes supported by the state or the local authority within the community, to support independent living, grow in popularity in Norway, Sweden, UK and in the past 5 years also in Poland). Holden and Gitlsen (2006) also found that there was a correlation between impaired communication skills and an increased likelihood of challenging behavior. This may be due to frustration experienced by individuals unable to express their needs.

SOCIAL INCLUSION

Literature and research on social inclusion has been criticized for lack of a coherent definition of the concept (Bigby 2012). For example, in a thematic analysis of key contributors to social inclusion, Filia et al. (2018) referred to 17 different definitions of social inclusion. However, for the purpose of this paper social inclusion is understood as "social participation between vulnerable people and people within wider society that is frequent and meaningful, such as frequent and meaningful social interactions and relationships between children with IDD and their peers without disabilities" (Grung et al. 2021: 1).

Social exclusion, the opposite of social inclusion, has severe negative effects on the individual and their cognitive processes (cf. Ask et al. 2019; Syrjämäki & Hietanen 2019), his or her close relations (family) and on the society (cf. Twenge et al. 2001; Baumeister et al. 2002; Bernstein 2016). For such an individual, social exclusion has negative effects on all aspects of their life, from their perceived quality of life to biological parameters such as higher blood glucose, due to negative behavioral patterns pertaining to health (Floyd et al. 2016). In this context, it is worth noting that social inclusion/exclusion are the most important determinants of health and wellbeing (Wilkinson & Marmot 1998). For close relatives, the experience that their loved ones

are socially excluded can be a very stressful situation whilst for society, social exclusion is associated with a significant economic burden (Parodi & Sciulli 2012). Social inclusion is a proven method to reduce these burdens (Boushey et al. 2007, as cited in Filia et al. 2018). For example, social inclusion policies such as minimum wages, tax-reduction for low-income earners, flexible employment and work measures improving labor market participation, do not only increase individual income and well-being but importantly, also boost economic growth. Therefore, social inclusion has major positive effects on health, wellbeing, and quality of life for people with IDD (Floyd et al. 2016). To define social inclusion, one may look at it from a multitude of perspectives, for instance an educational perspective (e.g. access to education with neurotypical peers), or from a civil/human rights perspective (e.g., access to the community, supported living and the ability to enter employment). Different pieces of legislation support each of these types of inclusion.

COERCION AS A BARRIER FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION

As described by Emerson (2001) in his definition of challenging behavior, one of the consequences of such behavior is that it is "[…] likely to seriously limit the use of, or result in the person being denied access to, ordinary facilities" (p. 3). Thus, challenging behavior is by definition a risk factor for social exclusion (cf. Bigby 2012; Holden & Gitlesen 2006). Typical examples of challenging behavior displayed by people with IDD are aggressive behaviors towards others (physical- and verbal aggression), self-injurious behavior (i.e. face hitting, biting own arms), a higher frequency of stereotyped behavior (i.e. hand flapping, stereotyped vocalization), severe hygiene challenges (i.e. encopresis, enuresis), and pica (i.e. eating inedible things) (cf. Emerson 2001; Holden & Gitlesen 2006). Such behavior may be a danger to the individual and to other people, may inhibit important training and can hinder that person's opportunity for meaningful social interaction with others (i.e. social inclusion) (Holden & Gitlesen 2006). Despite declarations and treaties related to human rights (United Nations, 2006) and national legislation and policies (Grung et al. 2021), many children and young adults with IDD continue to experience social exclusion (Bartolo et al. 2016). The use of coercion may be part of the issue. Social inclusion is built on the principle of overcoming existing differences and distinctions for overall social benefit. In situations when a representative of one group holds power to use coercive force over another, this principle is undermined, drawing a clear demarcation line between the service providers and the service users (cf. Goffman 1971). How can this aid inclusion? Regarding the issue of inclusion, Hem et al. (2014: 7; 2018) found that perceived coercion is related to a more negative patient-therapist relationship, building a barrier to social inclusion. On the other hand, the safety of the person displaying challenging behavior and the personnel concerned is equally important.

There is a general expectation in societies that professionals who provide services to people with IDD, either within education or health and social services, have the formal competence to do so and a strong ethical grounding (Grimen 2008). However, a Swedish study (Sjöstrand et al. 2015) showed that the law is subject to a broad range

of interpretations in the hands of professionals, who, using implicit over explicit coercion, manipulate patients' autonomy, through using power in negotiations, bargaining and the use of blackmail. Another study from Sweden, concerning ethical arguments for use of coercion in the treatment of children and adolescents with IDD, focused on two main considerations: protection and treatment requirements (Pelto-Piri at al. 2016). These were most often judged and justified on the authority of facility staff and the decision of carers within the closest family (Pelto-Piri at al. 2016). The ethics of compulsory treatment was analyzed in the context of human rights by Stevens (2012), who concluded that the use of coercion may be appropriate, based on professional judgment. However, his study referred to drug abusing offenders and not people with IDD. In a recently published study, Ellingsen et al. (2020) found that as many as 33.2% of the service providers within municipal health and social services directed at people with IDD in Norway, did not have any relevant formal training. Furthermore, they found that 38.6% had relevant educational training at a lower level (high school), and that only 28.2% had the relevant higher education. Of those, 10.7% had training as social educators. They also found that the number of part-time positions was high and that more than 50% of staff with no relevant formal training and education worked less than ten hours per week. Still, in these ten hours, a challenging behavior may occur and a lack of training may lead to an abuse of power.

A central purpose within the training provided by the Norwegian social educator program is to ensure that the candidate has "competence related to disabilities and the social conditions that create disability, [and] competence related to complex needs and developmental disabilities" (Kunnskapsdepartementet 2019; § 2, the authors' translation). The social educator program is the only program with higher-education training that explicitly focuses on the needs of people with IDD. However, disabilities in general are not the sole responsibility of social educator training. As part of the focus on disabilities in general, and specific to the needs of people with IDD, social inclusion is a central topic in the social educator curriculum. It cuts across as a lite motif through all the subjects in the curriculum. In addition, since challenging behavior is relatively prevalent within people with IDD (cf. Holden & Gitlesen 2006; Simó-Pinatella et al. 2019), legislation relevant to the use of force and coercion is focused on during social educator training (Kunnskapsdepartmenet 2019).

As described earlier, there is legislation on the use of force and coercion that explicitly applies to people with IDD in Norway. The professional code for social educators states that even if the conditions for the legal use of coercion and force are present, it may not be ethically responsible to do so (FO 2019). Hem et al. (2014) focused on the consequences for staff health, resulting from the burden of making decisions about the use of coercive force, which they classed as: formal, informal and perceived coercion. All of these cases carried an emotional burden for the user of coercive force. The question as to how to provide what is in the best interest of the 'patient' and the service provider remains open. Bach & Kerzner (2010), Danzer & Rieger (2016), Norvoll, Hem & Pedersen (2017) tried to present a user-focused approach as more beneficial and less harmful for all the social agents involved, but did not discuss the implications for social inclusion per se. They centered around 'will and preferences', as well as 'best

interests', but found that these matters could be very subjective and related to the values held by the individuals involved. Therefore, the values of the service users and the professional code of ethics should be considered. Values that may or may not have been tailored by professional ethics and codes of conduct (cf. Bach & Kerzner 2010). This also applies to the possible harmful or positive outcomes of decisions regarding the use of force.

LEGISLATION AND POLICIES IN FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

This section contains brief summaries of the relevant legislation of each of the above-mentioned countries regarding health, special education and social services aimed at children and young adults with IDD and challenging behavior. It is important to be aware that this is not a systematic review, but a purpose driven overview of key points where human rights and policy interact, sometimes in conflicting ways.

NORWAY

In Norway both policy and practice are based on rights, starting with the *Right to special education*. Pupils who do not have, or cannot receive a satisfactory outcome from ordinary education are entitled to special education (Opplæringslova 1998). Furthermore, the Act on *Right to services and treatment* (Pasient- og brukerrettighetsloven 1999) dedicated to patients' and users' rights gives children and young adults (and others with Norwegian citizenship), the right to necessary treatment from specialist health care services (such as hospitals and ambulatory health services provided by the hospitals) and the necessary healthcare services from the local municipality (Pasient- og brukerrettighetsloven 1999). The term 'necessary' should in this context be understood as the right to appropriate and secure services based on a specific assessment of the need for such services (adequate, appropriate, relevant, right competence, at the right time, at the right place etc; Helsedirektoratet 2015). While the Specialist healthcare services primarily focus on the treatment of challenging behavior, the health and care services from the local municipalities, which also provides housing and respite services if necessary, focus primarily on care and the facilitation of everyday activities. However, the facilitation of everyday activities may contain elements of treatment. Cooperation between the two levels of health care services is a legal obligation, which will be described later. *The right to contribution, to information and to consent,* influenced the Act on patients' and users' rights, which gives children and young adults with IDD the right to contribute to all stages of the services/treatment provision. In practical terms, the contribution means being included in the decision making about themselves and their treatment. Depending on the age of the child and their cognitive abilities, legal representatives (most often parents) may contribute along with the child. Information about the services and treatment is crucial for both the fulfillment of the right to contribution and the right to consent. If the young adult is over 16, the main rule is that it's that person who consents to the healthcare services, independent of the diagnosis. However, this is modified by the persons' cognitive abilities, and in some cas-

es, consent is given by their legal representatives (Pasient- og brukerrettighetsloven 1999). The legislation on the right to consent is complex and in this paragraph, only a short outline has been given. The rights to contribute, to be given information and to consent, applies to all kinds of treatment and care services, including the treatment of challenging behavior. The *right to an individual plan and coordinator,* gives patients and users who are in need of long term and coordinated healthcare services, the legal right to an individual plan (IP) and a coordinator (pasient- og brukerrettighetsloven 1999). An IP is a collaboration plan between different health and social services and a mechanism that facilitates contribution from the patient or user for whom the services are provided. An IP is coordinated by a coordinator, someone who is a professional, frequently in contact with the patient and the user, and his/her legal representatives and close relatives. There are also some instances where coercion may be used.

LEGISLATION ON THE USE OF COERCION IN NORWAY

Today there are four different acts on the use of coercion and all may apply to people with IDD:

(i) patients that lack the ability to consent and who actively refuse healthcare measures (Pasient- og brukerrettighetsloven 1999); Chapter 4 a)

(ii) coercive measures against drug addicts (Helse- og omsorgstjenesteloven 2011); Chapter 10) (iii) establishment and termination of compulsory mental health care (Psykisk helsevernloven 1999; Chapter 3), and

(iv) the use of coercion and force against certain persons (Helse- og omsorgstjenesteloven 2011; Chapter 9).

However, work is ongoing in Norway to renew the legislation on the use of coercion. A likely outcome of this work is that the four acts will be replaced by one act on the use of coercion (NOU 2019: 14). The use of coercive measures against people with IDD are mostly regulated by Chapter 9 in the Health- and Care Service Act (Helse- og omsorgstjenesteloven 2011). This act applies to people with IDD of all ages during delivery of services from the local municipality. The purpose is to prevent persons with IDD from exposing themselves or others to significant harm and to prevent and limit the use of coercion. Central in this act is the fact that the use of coercion is the last resort, and measures not involving coercion must be evaluated and documented as being ineffective prior to the use of coercion. For example, if a non-coercive measure, such as differential reinforcement of other behavior (DRO) or differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (DRA) (Cooper, Heron & Heward 2007), is documented as ineffective, then the act allows for more restrictive measures involving the use of force and/or coercion (e.g. locks on a refrigerator to prevent overeating, physical restraint to prevent self-injurious behavior etc.). This act does not include forced treatment of challenging behavior or forced use of medication, only measures inhibiting or preventing the challenging behavior. Exposure therapy would be an example of treatment. However, the act emphasizes non-coercive measures and proactive strategies,

which have similarities with the treatment of challenging behavior.

POLAND

The Polish Constitution prohibits discrimination on any grounds. Article 72 of the Polish Constitution guarantees the right to protection against violence and cruelty. Moreover, the Charter of Rights for Persons with Disabilities (1997) guarantees equal access to all spheres of life. These acts become problematic when confronted with challenging behavior or social maladjustment characteristics of some mental disorders and some disability spectrums. In most cases, instances of challenging behavior that may require coercive force translate to referrals to a special school or special medical facility. Since the 1920s, Maria Grzegorzewska (1964), a Polish pioneer in special education, advocated specialist education for children and youths displaying challenging behavior. She was the first in Poland to demand professional training for special educators, to aid social inclusion for people with SEN (Special Educational Needs). Maladjusted behavior may pose a threat to the safety of self and the public, enhancing the systemic and practical disproportionality in relations of power and helplessness that compromise the above-mentioned guarantees. According to paragraph 18 of the Healthcare Act 1994, supplemented by the Regulation of the Minister of Health 21 December 2018 on the use of direct coercion against a person with mental disorders, force may be used against the will of the person with a minimum discomfort to that person. The use of direct coercion initially should not exceed 4 hours but can be consecutively extended to 6 hours each time it is required for the safety and well-being of the person and their environment. It should cause the least trauma possible and can consist of:

– holding: temporary, short-term immobilization of a person with the use of physical force

– compulsory use of drugs: immediate or prescribed as part of the treatment plan, the introduction of drugs into the body of the person, without the person's consent

– immobilization: overpowering a person with the use of belts, handles, sheets or straitjackets

– isolation: placing a person alone in a closed and appropriately adapted room.

The above legislation pertains only to specialist facilities and to persons that commit an attack against their own or other person's life or health, against the public safety, violently destroy or damage objects in their own environment, seriously prevent the functioning of a psychiatric institution or an organizational unit of social assistance. Although the legislation means to be a protective measure, it creates a moral dilemma for human rights and the rights of patients. Moreover, the recent COVID-19 pandemic reinvigorated the legislation, updating the Act of December 5, 2008 on preventing and combating infections and infectious diseases in humans, with the introduction of

the article 36, dated 1 September 2020, which allows the use of force against a person who does not undergo compulsory vaccination, sanitary and epidemiological tests, sanitary procedures, quarantine or isolation of compulsory hospitalization, and who is suspected or diagnosed with a particularly dangerous and highly contagious disease thereby posing a direct threat to the health or life of other people. In such instances, direct coercion may consist of holding, immobilizing or forcibly administering drugs. Therefore, the regulations of the Ministry of Health and the legislation on social inclusion (cf. Grung et al. 2021) remain in contradiction to each other.

ROMANIA

Given the fact that inclusive policies do not have a long tradition in Romania, the institutional culture regarding the management of problematic behaviors is constantly being strengthened. Following a somewhat denialist policy in this regard during the communist period, the challenges of tackling aggressive, adversarial or deeply maladaptive behavior were extreme. In addition to institutional change, there is also a need for extensive campaigns to change public perception of inclusion and problematic behaviors in children with intellectual and developmental disabilities.

Article 50 of the Romanian constitution, added in 2003, expressly provides for complex social protection and equal access to services for people with disabilities (ROU Const., art.50) and has paved the way for legislative and institutional modernization.

The national strategy for the inclusion of children with disabilities, launched in 2005, finalized the concrete strategies and procedures for organizing inclusive education, educational, social and health services for children with intellectual and developmental disabilities (Gherguț 2005). More and more inclusive schools have been established and the number of special schools decreased, being maintained strictly for children with severe and profound disabilities. Also, clear regulations have been developed regarding the training of specialists, in this case psycho-pedagogues, to safeguard the educational and therapeutic process for children with disabilities. Inclusive policies have increasingly focused on student-centered education, and institutions such as the School Inspectorate and the County Center for Resources and Educational Assistance, along with the Child Protection Directorate, have developed individual plans and allocated as many resources as possible to maximize educational and social inclusion. However, specialists often have difficulty managing problematic situations. Many schools have special spaces designed to relax and calm children who exhibit aggressive behaviors, and psycho-pedagogues are trained to manage and prevent critical situations generated by these behaviors. Medication is used only in critical situations and cannot be imposed institutionally. Parental/guardian consent is required in this regard and this also involves family counselling. The process of including children with intellectual and developmental disabilities in mainstream education is often accompanied by extensive adjustment problems, both on the part of the student and of peers and teachers. In this sense, the special training of teachers in mainstream education is insisted upon in order that they acquire the skills to manage these situations.

The Social Assistance Act of 2011 (ROU 2011: 292) provides assistance measures

for children with intellectual and developmental disabilities, and regulates the support offered to both children and families. In most cases however, this institutional support is insufficient, especially in cases of problematic behaviors. In this sense, the niche of private services and those provided by NGOs is constantly growing and the demand for services from families is also growing.

UNITED KINGDOM

Following a media **exposé** of the treatment of hospitalized patients with learning disabilities and/or autism in the UK, the Transforming Care agenda (NHS England 2015) moved the government's focus to the reduction of hospital beds within Learning Disabilities and Mental Health services. This includes those hospitals belonging to the private and voluntary sectors, as well as the Local Authority and NHS provisions. With fewer beds available and processes in place to ensure that admissions that still do take place are far shorter with an immediate emphasis upon safe discharge, consequentially community learning disability and mental health services are increasingly managing problematic behaviors within the community. Although there has been a reduction of hospitalization it is felt that there has been an increase in the use of psychotropic medication which continues to be heavily relied upon to decrease agitation and anxiety, despite the additional scrutiny applied to such prescribing and the 'Stopping over medication of people with a learning disability, autism or both' (STOMP) campaign led by NHS England (NHS England 2016).

The Care Quality Commission (2017) describes a significant variation between services, and how frequently staff use restrictive practices and physical restraint to de-escalate problematic behavior. Services in the UK are committed to ensuring that the least restrictive practice is observed always, and several important national documents recommend this: e.g. the MIND Report, 'Restraint in Crisis' (2013); Restraint and Restrictive Intervention (DoH 2017); the revised Mental Health Act Code of Practice (2015).

SWEDEN

In Sweden, there is strong legislative protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. In 2008 the Swedish government ratified, the *UN Convention of the Rights for Persons with Disabilities* and its *Optional Protocol* which safeguards the equal access and participation for persons with disabilities. The rights to equal treatment for persons with disabilities is protected by the Swedish Constitution. Chapter 1, article 2 clearly states that all public institutions shall promote the opportunity for all to participation and equality in society and combat the discrimination of persons on the grounds of disability amongst others. Moreover, the anti-discrimination law from 2008 prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all aspects of everyday life (SFS 2008: 567). Though persons with intellectual disability and challenging behavior are not explicitly mentioned in the laws, they are implicitly covered under the heading of disability.

The Swedish system emphasizes a rights-based approach where persons with disa-

bilities are given the right to access and participate in social welfare services such as education, health care, employment, etc.

Most treatments, rehabilitation and provisions of support to persons with intellectual disabilities and/or challenging behavior are provided with the consent of the individual concerned as prescribed in the *Health Care Act* (SFS 1982: 763) and the *Social Services Act* (SFS 2001: 453). However, there may be instances where the need for care and protection of persons may outweigh personal autonomy and involuntary or coercive care be provided. As stated in the Swedish Compulsory Mental Care Act, coercive care may only be used in certain conditions such as if the individual is suffering from a serious mental disturbance, has an absolute need of in-patient psychiatric care due to his/her mental state and general personal circumstances, and objects to such care (Peltro-Piri et al. 2016: 2).

Despite this strict legislation regarding coercion, a Swedish study demonstrates the widespread use of physical restraint in group homes for persons with intellectual disability, especially of persons exhibiting challenging behavior (Lundström et al. 2011). This study identified chair belts as the most commonly used method of physical restraint.

Regarding education, it is estimated that about 1% of students in the compulsory school system have an intellectual disability (Klang et al. 2019). According to the Swedish Education act (2010), children with intellectual disability in Sweden have the right to be included in the regular education system and support provided to them in their ordinary groups. These students may also be provided support in small groups within the regular education system or attend special schools outside of the regular school system. Students, who due to an intellectual disability are at risk of not meeting the national curriculum standard, may be provided an adapted curriculum (Klang et al. 2019). According to Wilder and Klang (2017), the adapted curriculum can be delivered in both regular and special educational settings. However, a majority of students with IDD in Sweden are provided education in special educational settings outside of the regular education system (Klang et al. 2019). The teaching profession in Sweden is regulated by a specific ethical code of conduct (https://rm.coe.int/vol-4-codes-of-conduct-for-teachers-in-europe-a-background-study/168074cc72). The same applies to medical staff and these have their own code of conduct.

PROFESSION SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

Professionals working with children and young people with IDD have an ethical responsibility (i.e. professional ethics) and legal obligation (human rights and national legislation) to treat/reduce challenging behavior in order to, among other things, facilitate social inclusion (Grimen 2008; Grung et al. 2021; United Nations 2006).

THE SOCIAL EDUCATOR – NORWAY

Broadly speaking, the social educator's mandate is to be an 'inclusion agent' – people

with different kinds of disabilities should experience meaningful lives and positive relationships with other people. Central for the social educator in meeting this mandate is the GAP-model, where the 'GAP' is used as a metaphor for the relationship between an individual's abilities to master their environment and the mastery of the environment over the individual (NOU 2001: 22). The gap is referring to the "space" that occurs when the skills required to manage the environment in a socially acceptable way are lacking. This relational model, which combines the biological and the social perspective on disabilities, allows the social educator to work on both sides of the gap, to increase the individual's abilities to master and to reduce the environments' demands for mastery. On the individual's side, the social educator uses their competency and skills in training of language skills (oral, sign or another alternative language), training of social skills, [behavioral] treatment of self-injurious, aggressive and other kinds of challenging behaviors, and supporting leisure activities and meaningful contact with other significant persons and more. On the ' environment's' side, the social educator uses their competency and skills in structuring the environment (e.g. day plans), removes unnecessary demands, removes physical barriers in the individual's surroundings, trains other professionals in how to meet the needs of children and young adults with IDD (and all others with disabilities), and more. All the measures described here may, alone or in combination, be important measures in limiting the 'gap', and thus reducing problem behavior and increasing the likelihood of experiencing social inclusion. Challenging behavior can, from this perspective, be understood as the individual's response to 'non-standard conditions' in combination with the lack of necessary skills (i.e. a person with IDD and language difficulties self-injures, and the self-injurious behavior is reinforced by attention. The self-injurious behavior may have a mand function (Skinner 1957). It should be mentioned that social educator programs at some universities and university colleges emphasize behavior analysis, while other programs have a more eclectic approach (combining psychological perspectives). However, the relation perspective, as reflected in the GAP-model, is central in all training of social educators independent of psychological perspective (Grung 2016).

THE SPECIAL PEDAGOGUE – POLAND

The Ministry of Education (Act 1578 of 9.08.2017) regulated the profession of special pedagogue as dedicated to the care, upbringing, and education of children with disabilities, socially maladjusted or at risk of social maladjustment. A special pedagogue is university trained through a 5-year specialist MA program to conduct educational activities in cooperation with other teachers and specialists. They sometimes lead or sometimes participate in lessons and activities run by other teachers and specialists in order to provide support and assistance during integration and group activities. A special pedagogue helps with the choice of materials, forms and methods of teaching the children and youth with disabilities, maladjustment and at risk of maladjustment. They conduct classes adjusted to specific individual developmental needs and psychophysical abilities, including revalidation classes, rehabilitation and socio-therapeutic

classes. In cooperation with a team of psychologists and pedagogues, the special pedagogue prepares: Individual Multidisciplinary Assessment of the Student's Functioning Level, together with the Individual Educational and Therapeutic Program and its evaluation. Moreover, he/she coordinates the implementation of the recommendations outlined in the special educational needs referral, cooperates with other specialists, external clinics, NGOs and special education institutions as well as the parents. General schools, as well as integrational schools and specialist schools, employ special pedagogues as children with IDD are entitled to study in all these facilities depending on the severity of their disability and the decision made by their parents. In the general and integrational schools, a special pedagogue's therapeutic influence is often supported by school counselors, who are either university trained psychologists or social pedagogues. All these professionals are classed as highly trusted, are highly trained and bound by the professional ethical codes of conduct.

THE PSYCHOPEDAGOGUE – ROMANIA

In Romania, the primary role in the inclusion of children with disabilities is played by the psychopedagogue, who can specialize in several areas (Roșan 2015). After university training of at least 3 years and obtaining a license in Special Psychopedagogy, the psychopedagogue may choose the following paths:

a. Teaching psychopedagogue. Mainly responsible for adapted teaching activities for children with intellectual and developmental disabilities. He/she works in Inclusive Education Centers or special schools with small groups of children with severe or moderate disabilities and focuses on the transmission of adapted educational content and the training of basic skills.

b. Recovery psychopedagogue. Specialized in individual or group activities aimed at recovering the intellectual, psychomotor and emotional abilities of a child, and the prevention of problematic behaviors. He/she coordinates the individualized intervention plan that aims to focus on the needs and particularities of each child.

c. Psychopedagogue / support teacher. Accompanies children with mild and moderate disabilities included in mainstream education and is responsible for curricular adaptation and ensuring the behavioral and educational adaptation of the child in a mainstream school.

d. Psychopedagogue / itinerant teacher. Travels to the homes of children who encounter major difficulties in travelling to school for a certain period.

The psychopedagogue must adhere to professional ethical conduct and in practice may use implicit (indirect) force, but should rather rely on help from other professionals better equipped to solicit explicit coercive force. In the Romanian context, professionals who work in the state educational system use a general ethical guideline established by the Ministry of Education and Research derived from the National Ed-

ucation Law 1/2011 and the professionals in the private and the NGO area are subordinate to the Romanian College of Psychologists and the ethical guidelines stated in the 213/2004 Law for the practice of psychology and the procedures derived from it. Therefore, there is a division between state operated and private (NGO) scopes of service provision regarding the ethical guidelines, but they seem to be relatively coherent on ethical aspects.

THE LEARNING DISABILITY NURSE – THE UK PERSPECTIVE

Key policy documents (Department of Health 2012; NHS England 2015) demonstrate the clear sets of values learning disability nurses aspire to in the UK, with inclusion and person-centered approaches being central to all practices. Similar to that said of social educators, learning disability nurses are agents of inclusion and are often seen as the doorway to equitable health services for a group of people who have historically been vulnerable to inequalities in both health and social care in the UK.

There is currently no single therapeutic approach or service model in the UK that can help at all times to support individuals whose behavior is perceived to be problematic and evidence, particularly around effective services, is poor and/or limited. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2015, 2018) guidelines recommend Positive Behavior Support (PBS) interventions for adults with intellectual disabilities who exhibit such difficult behaviors. PBS is an understanding of the behavior of an individual. It is based on an assessment of the social and physical environment in which the behavior happens, includes the views of the individual and everyone involved and uses this understanding to develop support that improves the quality of life for the person and others who are involved with them (BILD 2016). The introduction of PBS into government legislation in 2014 indicates a significant shift from simply managing the physical elements of the problematic behaviors and concentrating far more intensely upon the causes and means of addressing the elements of a person's life that it impacts. Nevertheless, the use of coercion is still a recourse when deemed necessary.

THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR/PEDAGOGUE AND SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHER – SWEDEN

In Sweden, the special educator/pedagogue and the special education teacher are the key actors who are responsible for the organization and provision of special education at school level. The role of these two professionals is distinctive within the school system. The special pedagogue is primarily responsible for the development of special education at the whole school level, with the goal of achieving inclusion in the school for all. Special educators work at an organizational level to support the development of special educational support that is inclusive with the aim that fewer students in need of special educational support receive this support in separated settings (Berhanu 2014). The special education teacher provides special educational support directly to students individually or in small groups, within their ordinary study group or outside of it. The special education teacher is expected to understand school difficulties at the

individual level and provide personalized support to the student (Berhanu 2014). The special education teachers have a variety of different specializations including, intellectual disability, language, reading and writing difficulties, mathematics difficulties, visual impairments and hearing impairments. Both special education pedagogues and special education teachers are highly qualified professionals in Sweden, their study programs are at post-graduate level, spanning a period of one and a half years of full-time studies. Moreover, to qualify for admission into these programs, candidates must have completed the teacher education program and worked for approximately three years (Special pedagogue program SU 2020). These professionals therefore come with experience as regular classroom teachers and with a better understanding of the challenges classroom teachers may experience working with people with IDD. The work of these professionals at school level is not only to strengthen the development and organization of special educational support at the individual, group and school at large, but to do this in a way that is responsive to the requirements of a school for all.

DISCUSSION

Professions of social trust receive a politically defined mandate to work with vulnerable groups in society. Their overall aim is to foster social inclusion. However, the emphasis on social inclusion may be undermined by loopholes in the support and care systems, in particular by the negative effects of using coercion, which is likely to have a stigmatizing effect and counteracts inclusion efforts. Emerson (2001) describes that some methods of control, inhibit participation and thus, inclusion. For example, people with IDD and challenging behavior are more likely to receive medication. However, the side effects of medication, such as sedation and extrapyramidal syndromes, may inhibit inclusion. Further, control measures involving physical restraints may be socially stigmatizing and such measures often inhibits participation (Emerson 2001). In Poland and in Romania, only graduates of higher education may work in the educational system and therefore also in the special education system. The same applies to medical and therapeutic roles in the Polish and Romanian national health services. In the majority of cases, when private care and NGOs are involved, the professionals come from the same higher education institutions. In Sweden, professionals are expected to adhere to codes of conduct and ethical guidelines that governs their specific professions. For the teacher profession which includes special educators and special education teachers, there are specific codes of conduct and ethical guidelines that have been developed by the teachers' unions. Professional ethics for teachers aim to support the teacher in performing their work in an ethical, professional approach and describes the common values a teacher has and should have (Lärarnas Yrkesetiska Råd 2014) In cases where trained professionals work with persons with IDD, the ethical aspects are standardized (teachers, special educators) but elsewhere, where care may include many other untrained persons (e.g. Ellingsen et al. 2020), the ethical codes may not be of a similar standard or may not be available. Untrained professionals may refer to persons supporting persons with IDD without formal training such as personal assistants. Each profession has their own professional guidelines or code of conduct

and since different professionals may work with persons with IDD, these codes may differ, as for example for teachers and nurses. In the UK, there are several untrained and unqualified support workers, who work within the field of special education and therapy, especially within the private sector. Nurses and special educators adhere to ethical codes of conduct and are also subject to professional codes of conduct, but many unqualified care-staff are unregulated and do not adhere to a specific code of conduct (Richards 2020). Similar issues were reported in Norway.

This leads to a question: What weight should we put on the value of social inclusion when coercive measures are being assessed? In Norway and other countries there are many staff who lack formal relevant competence. When we know the negative effects of social exclusion (for the persons themselves, their relatives and for the society) why is it accepted that so many lack relevant competence in the services for people with IDD? Relevant competences include, in our view, knowledge about social inclusion, the needs of persons with IDD (e.g. adapted communication), knowledge on how to de-escalate self-harm and violent behavior, awareness of legislation and ethical guidelines. Without relevant competences, formal words written on paper bring little to making social inclusion a reality for people with IDD. A gap may be observed between values that form the basis for legislation related to social inclusion and the need for relevant competences in the services. As described, the employment of a relatively large proportion of people without formally relevant competence increases this gap (Ellingsen et al. 2020). Knowing the negative effects that social exclusion has on a person, we believe that a relevant formal competence is necessary to achieve the goals of social inclusion. So why is the lack of formal competence accepted in these services? Is it simply cost and availability of appropriately trained staff? Relevant competences rely on knowledge of social inclusion and processes that facilitate it, the needs of people with IDD supported by relevant legislation and professional ethics. It is only through relevant education that such skills and knowledge can be learned and understood, and professional ethics are exclusively aimed at individual professions.

CONCLUSION

Although legislation varies from country to country, specialist training and available support seem to follow the same direction, based on human rights principles: the right to life and health, respect, dignity, and access. Practical solutions shared by specialists prove to be universal, despite professional definitions and linguistic intricacies. Unfortunately, the grey area for inclusion related to the use of physical force remains controversial and unresolved, revealing the limitations and the helplessness of the system when confronted with challenging behavior. We believe that the situation in many cases may be caused by lack of funding for standardized provision of highly trained staff bound by ethical codes and equipped with additional training. We see long-term benefits from raising awareness of how to address challenging behavior in empathetic and humane manners across services. Although there is a difference between IDD and mental illness, the response to challenging behavior appears to be the same when it comes to the use of coercion, including implicit and explicit

forms, constraints, forceful handling and administration of drugs against the patient's will. Despite advancements in European policy for the rights of people with disabilities (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, CRPD), the response to challenging behavior remains insufficiently explored and addressed. This article aims to provoke debate on the gaps between the principles of social inclusion offered by the legislation and the ability to use coercive force that undermines them. Based on our findings we urge stakeholders to invest time and effort in developing alternative strategies for handling challenging behavior and to enhance staff training, so that the awareness of available tools and benefits of using them becomes a norm, not only an aspiration. We also recommend sharing of best practice and raising awareness of tools and techniques available to specialists instead of coercive force.

We conclude with some difficult questions that seem to remain unresolved. How can we incorporate a common code of ethics and practice for professionals working with individuals with IDD? Is it possible to foster social inclusion whilst maintaining the possible use of coercion in cases of IDD? How can a person with IDD trust professionals that use coercion as a method of providing safety, protection, and treatment? What are the alternatives?

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CULTURAL JUSTICE, BASIC INCOME AND THE CAPABILITY APPROACH

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we elaborate a theory of an evolutionary political economy capable of accommodating the issue of cultural justice by taking seriously the redistribution–recognition dilemma, a normative analysis of which has been put forth by Nancy Fraser. While accepting Fraser's articulation of the dilemma, we resist her concluding that Sen's capability approach is insensitive to cultural justice or the recognition of difference. There is no automatic guarantee, yet an intermediate theory of recognition or cultural justice could in theory be brought to bear on what is, after all, 'a framework'. We argue that Fraser's analysis is well suited to be such an intermediate theory, and propose a theoretical device for an evolutional perspective on redistribution and recognition. We concentrate on identifying the stage of the market process at which policy intervenes to remedy redistribution, and the stage of the communication process at which policy intervenes to remedy recognition. Interventions at the entrance stages of both processes are relatively effective and one possibility for such an intervention is to propose Basic Income, which would make it not inconsistent with the capability approach, even though this approach neither directly suggests such a policy not excludes others.
KEYWORDS: Amartya Sen, Basic Income, Evolutionary political economy, Nancy Fraser, Recognition

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I try to make an argument for the kinds of social policies that more effectively facilitate cultural justice. I limit this argument to normative deliberation, specifically to Nancy Fraser's and Amartya Sen's work.

I begin by giving the definitional outlines of cultural justice as the term has been used rather vaguely. I then go on to explore how normative theories have been thought to treat such cultural justice, relying primarily on Nancy Fraser's framework. I build on her insights regarding evolutional political economy, recognition and redistribution — the argument being that the Basic Income proposal is one of those social policies that facilitate recognition and the deconstruction of difference. I resist Fraser's critique of Sen, and show how Sen's work about identity is compatible with Fraser's (and my) framework.

2. DEMAND FOR THE RECOGNITION OF CULTURAL IDENTITIES

The term culture on its own is used to mean the customs and beliefs, the art, way of life and social organisation of a particular group — not exclusively construed as an ethnic or national group. In the literature on the development or theories of justice, however, culture is sometimes equated with ethnicity.[1] Whenever the term "multiculturalism" is used, for example, that tendency becomes more apparent. Although this use of the term culture may have many merits, in this paper, I choose to broaden the definitional scope: in my usage, a particular group could certainly be an ethnic group, but it could just as well be a group formed along other demarcations (gender, disability, sexuality and so on).

I am guided in this use of the term by several academic traditions. First, recent discussions on culture in philosophy have brought the term "recognition" to the fore. This term, which I shall shortly explain, connotes broader usage. Second, social theory after the linguistic turn has focused on "social construction". This "constructionist" view, open to the broader definition of culture [2] contrasts with the "essentialist" view of culture held by those who consider culture to be solid, given and non-problematic. Third, cultural studies have changed the tradition of the academic left that exclusively focuses on material substructure, and have focused on the superstructure instead — an influence palpably felt in the rise of subaltern studies and post-colonialist literatures, where the term "cultural" is meant again in a broader sense[3].

Let us return to the term 'recognition'. The revival of this Hegelian term in modern political philosophy owes much to Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, and Nancy Fraser. Honneth's *The Struggle for Recognition* (Honneth 1992) reconceptualises the term in order to articulate the struggle for emancipation of disadvantaged groups (Honneth 2000).

While the groups mentioned by Honneth are proletarian at large, Taylor connects

[1] For example, Mani(2002), Kelly(2002). See Woolcock, Rao and Alkire(2002) for a critical survey of development economics.

[2] See Butler (1990) for an example of this analysis concerning gender identity.

[3] Stuart Hall is a representative example of the authors of the studies I mention here.

the term directly to the struggle over identity and difference, or to multiculturalism.

> A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition… [T]he demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today's politics, on behalf of minority or "subaltern" groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of multiculturalism (Taylor 1992: 25).

Fraser clarifies this concept by contrasting it to redistribution, both in philosophy and in social science. Philosophically, the theory of recognition is supposed to rectify the shortcoming that the theory of redistribution (i.e. theories of distributive justice) cannot take recognition seriously, in Fraser's framework. Theorists of distributive justice would be, for example, Karl Marx, John Ralwls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen. Fraser insists that they cannot treat cultural justice properly. The dispute over whether her conclusion is plausible or not is not one I would wish to enter here. However, I shall return to this issue in Sen's case in a later section. In social science, traditionally, social struggles are understood in terms of struggle against economic inequality or exploitation. It is still an effective proposition, but not one that can cover properly current social struggles, which are struggles also against cultural misrecognition (Fraser 1997).

3. THE REDISTRIBUTION-RECOGNITION DILEMMA AND BEYOND

Fraser's claim, however, is not that the theory of recognition should replace the theory of redistribution in philosophy, nor that the politics of recognition should replace the politics of redistribution in social science (or in the real world). Fraser acknowledges how recognition and redistribution are deeply "intertwined" (Fraser 1997: 15). Her purposeful distinction between recognition and redistribution is meant to identify and analyse a dilemma experienced in current social struggles, while also pointing to ways in which we could go beyond this dilemma.

The name she gives to the dilemma is "the redistribution-recognition dilemma" (Fraser 1997: 13) and it happens as follows. The simultaneous pursuit of redistribution and recognition can create a contradictory situation. To win equal distribution of resources, oppressed and disadvantaged minority groups are often forced to claim that they are "the same" as the majority. For example, in order to obtain equal qualification for entrance examinations to universities in Japan, high schools privately run by ethnic minority groups must insist that their educational system is the same as that of public schools strictly adhering to the guidelines of the ministry of Education, Culture, and Science. Likewise, to obtain equal opportunities for work, women have to claim they are as capable of working as men. This kind of situation will contradict the demand for the recognition of difference.

Even when recognition of difference is pursued with view to equal redistribution, there will be cases where the majority remains the same, while the minority is unilaterally rated as inferior. This type of recognition, first, may end up justifying the inequality of distribution. Second, even if redistribution actually takes place, it will

come with stigma attached. This form of recognition runs the risk of giving relief as an outcome, but without questioning the social cause of creating a disadvantaged minority. In this case, the politics of recognition reproduces and perpetuates the dominant norm that creates disadvantaged minorities in the first place. Such results are not what the claim of recognition set out to accomplish.

As far as issues of gender are concerned, the dilemma maps over onto the tension between "equality feminism" and "difference feminism." Similar dilemmas exist in all the problems that separate relatively marginalised and stigmatised minorities from the normalised or privileged majority, not only with respect to gender, but also with regard to other issues such as disability and sexuality.

Then, how could we avoid or go beyond such a dilemma? Fraser distinguishes transformative remedies from affirmative remedies and advocates the former in both redistribution and recognition. For redistribution, the affirmative remedy is represented by "the liberal welfare state", which does "surface reallocations of existing goods to existing groups; supports group differentiation; can generate misrecognition." The alternative, transformative remedy for malredistribution is represented by "socialism", which can be a "deep restructuring of relations of production; blurs group differentiation; can help remedy some forms of misrecognition (Fraser 1997: 27)." For recognition, the affirmative remedy is represented by "mainstream multiculturalism", which does "surface reallocations of respect to existing identities of existing groups; supports group differentiations." Fraser's term for the alternative, transformative remedy for misrecognition is "deconstruction," which could be a "deep restructuring of relations of recognition; [destabalising] group differentiation (Fraser 1997: 27)." The distinction she makes with regard to recognition corresponds to the distinction between *essentialism* and *constructionism* in social theory and cultural studies.

4. EVOLUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR RECOGNITION AND REDISTRIBUTION

I tried to connect Fraser's proposal as summarised above in Evolutional Political Economy or Social Economics (Yamamori 2000). Allow me to explain it briefly here. Fraser's solution is to make the boundary fluid. It urges us to focus not on static outcomes, but on dynamic processes of redistribution and recognition. Figure 1 represents these dynamic processes.

My first proposition is to consider the "market" as the space of redistribution. Now, imagine the market as a game where goods are exchanged, as Neoclassical Economists think, though the real market is not so simple. We can locate three stages at which to intervene in the redistribution process: the entrance (opportunity), the game, and the exit (outcome). The usual intervention-justifying norm is that of "national minimum" or "social citizenship." It does not logically define where the intervention should occur, but existing interventions based on this norm tend to the exit stage. If this game (market) itself were sacred and absolute, it would be unjust to intervene in its processes at any stage. And indeed, libertarians like Robert Nozick might make such a contention (Nozick 1974). Characteristic of this game is that were some players to

lose the game or be unable to enter it for lack of marketable goods or a labour force to sell, then they must not only drop out of the game but also must die. It is for this reason that Friedrich von Hayek justified minimum intervention at the exit in order to preclude a player's demise. Taking this game more seriously, however, it is unfair if the conditions of the players at the entrance are unequal, because the inequality at entrance would entail inequality at exit. Therefore, ensuring equality at the entrance is important. The norms of "equal opportunity" and the normative theories of Rawls and Sen embody this idea.



Figure 1. Three Stages of Redistribution and Recognition
Source: Yamamori (2000: 238).

My second proposition is to examine "communication" as the space of recognition. Imagine "communication" as a game where identity is mutually recognised, following Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1981), although real communication is not so simple. The influential normative arguments in justification of "recognition" are "multiculturalism," "difference feminism" and the theories of Taylor and Carol Gilligan (Taylor 1992; Gilligan 1981). In these essentialist arguments, the game is considered as given and unproblematic. The focus is on "recognition" only at the exit stage. These arguments share a common problem with the predominant paradigm of ignoring "recognition." They do not even think that the game exists, and hold in common a characteristic of not paying attention to the game. The identity at the exit, regrettably, is not always supportive and unproblematic, because usually the conditions at the entrance are unequal. Some players have more discursive resources, including the advantage of social norms, than others. Inequality at the entrance will have a considerable effect on inequality at the exit. "Constructionism", as noted above, acknowledges this factor.

In both redistribution and recognition, interventions at the exit tend to a fixity of the boundaries. Social assistance is an intervention at the exit of the market. In contrast to the policy of intervention at the entrance such as "Basic Income", which I will discuss in the next section, this social policy draws a line separating "independent" citizens from "dependent" welfare recipients, leading to a reinforcement of boundaries. Another example is affirmative action, a policy of intervention at both market entrance and communication exit. While this policy has a lot of positive effects on

redistribution, it too, tends to fix boundaries in terms of recognition.

From what has been said above, I conclude that intervention at the entrance or in the game itself is indispensable in overcoming boundaries. This is not to deny the importance of intervening at the exit. The normative theories of Rawls and Sen justify intervention at the entrance, but do not intervene in the game itself. As we intervene in the market and communication games, we must realise that the game is neither a natural nor an unchangeable institution.

5. BASIC INCOME

In this section, I argue for Basic Income in line with Fraser's solution (described in Section 3) and in accordance with the Evolutionary Political Economy of Recognition and Redistribution (described in Section 4). Basic Income is an unconditional guaranteed income for all. Philippe van Parijs defines it as "an income paid by a government, at a uniform level and at regular intervals, to each adult member of society." It is paid "irrespective of whether the person is rich or poor, lives alone or with others, is willing to work or not." The membership referenced here extends to "not only citizens, but to all permanent residents (van Parijs 2001: 5). There are three reasons why Basic Income (BI) is called "basic". First, it is a basic platform which "[a]ny other income — whether in cash or in kind, from working or saving, from the market or the state — can lawfully be added to (van Parijs 2001: 6)." Second, it helps to satisfy people's "basic needs."[4] Third, it is an entitlement derived from "basic human rights."

How is BI assessed in terms of my argument in this paper? As regards the redistribution aspect, i.e. in the game of the market, BI is obviously an intervention at the entrance. The "socialism" which Fraser recommends as a transformative remedy is an intervention in the game itself. As I explained earlier, both interventions at the entrance and in the game itself (as compared to interventions at the exit) tend to help make the boundary fluid. So even though Fraser made no mention of it, BI is also one such alternative transformative remedy.

As regards the recognition aspect, I would like us to pay attention to several features of BI that distinguish it from the traditional welfare state system. First, BI would be paid, not only to citizens, but also to permanent residents. It would be paid irrespective of whether they are poor or rich, have the will to work or not. All of these would help blur the boundaries on a number of points (national identity, class identity, the identity of welfare dependency). Second, BI would be paid not on the basis

[4] See Baker(1992). Demand for Basic Income in the Claimants Union movement in the U.K. was based on this strong connection (Jordan 1973, Yamamori 2003a). However, I have to note that van Parijs explicitly denies this connection between Basic Income and basic needs (2001: 6). This denial is relevant to his justification of BI in terms of his Real Libertarianism (van Parijs 1995). While I have been strongly influenced by his works, and I think his justification is powerful and effective in the context of the dominance of Neo-Liberalism, I am not sure when he said BI is "a material foundation on which a life can firmly rest (2001: 5-6)," how far removed and unconnected to basic needs this level of "material foundation" could be.

[5] Robeyns (2000) calls attention to the fact that BI could be gender sensitive only in conjunction with other policy packages which facilitate gender equality.

of households, but on an individual basis. This holds some potential for changing the (dis)balance of gender relations within households, although this is not automatically guaranteed.[5] Third, in the strong version of BI (perhaps in the version of van Parijs), social policies intended to compensate for past discrimination against a particular group, such as affirmative action or positive discrimination, might diminish. While those social policies are a compensation both for a maldistribution and a misrecognition at the exit of the games, market and communication, BI is an intervention at the entrance of both games. Therefore, Basic Income is a good candidate that can go beyond the redistribution-recognition dilemma.

6. SEN ON IDENTITY

Let us go back to the question of whether Fraser's negative conclusion about distributive theories is justified or not. In the case of Sen, it is controversial, not only because "Sen treats a 'sense of self' as relevant to the capability to function (Fraser 1997: 33)," but also because his concept of capability itself is detached from emphasis on resources distribution, in contrast to Rawls' "social primary goods" or Dworkin's "resources". Indeed, Ingrid Robeyns (2003) strongly argues against Fraser. While Robeyns admits that Fraser's intention to introduce recognition matters in the field of theory of justice, she criticises Fraser for oversimplifying theories of distributive justice, and for getting it wrong as far as Sen's approach is concerned. Robeyns also concludes that Fraser's suggestion for an alternative (not the transformative remedy that I mention in this paper, but Participatory Parity) is "included in the capability approach, whereas the capability approach also points to some normative considerations of (mis-)recognition (Robeyns 2003: 550)." I agree with Robeyns on the first claim; the validity of the second I will not discuss here, however, what I would like to bring forth is the clarity of her characterisation of the capability approach as "framework". She argues the capability approach is "an evaluative framework, not a fully specified theory." (Robeyns 2001: 3) Therefore, it is "open" to diverse interpretations, so if we want further specifications of the approach, we need additional "explanatory theories (Robeyns 2004: 1)." I would like to argue that Fraser's theory (and my argument for evolutional political economy for recognition and redistribution) can be such an explanatory theory for when we want to make the capability approach difference-sensitive.

The capability approach could be difference-sensitive for several reasons. First, it shifts the informational basis from who (what person) possesses (goods) to what a person can do or be (capabilities) (Sen 1980, 1992). The focus moves to diversity derived from the different ways in which a person converts goods to capabilities. Second, contrary to utilitarianism, the capability approach is associated with disaggregated measure, not with sum-ranking (Sen 1982, 1992). It could zero in on the situation of minority groups. However, this sensitivity is only a possibility, so we need an explanatory theory. Furthermore, the capability approach itself does not suggest directly what kind of social policy would facilitate just recognition. So again — the need for an additional theory or explanation. But on what basis can we count Fraser's theory as one such? I would like to argue that Sen's work on need and identity points in a con-

structionist direction[5], and that is also the direction taken by Fraser.

Fraser's analytical distinction between redistribution and recognition could be rephrased as a distinction between need distribution and need interpretation (Fraser 1989). Sen's capability approach primarily concerns need distribution, but there are some aspects of need interpretation. He places emphasis on the necessity for *self-evaluation* (Sen 1987: 32) of capability and functionings. Self-evaluation is different from utility, and "self-evaluation is quintessentially an evaluative exercise, which none of the interpretations of utility in itself is. The issue of paternalism, when it does arise, must relate to the rejection of the person's self-evaluation (rather than of utility) (Sen 1987: 32)." In his capability approach, the extent to which one's self-evaluation of one's capability compromises prevailing perceptions of capability as social standards is by no means immediately apparent. It should, therefore, not be assumed that the debate over need-interpretation has thus far taken an entirely appropriate direction within the capability approach. Sen does, however, recognise that the process of need interpretation itself takes place within a rather separate dimension from the narrow focus on need-distribution. Outside of the context of the capability approach, Sen notes:

> The totality of the human predicament would be an undiscriminating basis for the social analysis of needs. There are many things that we might have good reason to value if they were feasible, maybe even immortality; yet we do not see them as needs. Our conception of needs relates to our analysis of the nature of deprivations, and also to our understanding of what can be done about them. Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing political responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves (Sen 1994: 36).

Sen has criticised the dichotomisation of need and freedom (e.g. political rights, democracy). The strength of this claim lies first of all in the fact that it identifies the importance of an often-overlooked relevance: the relevance of freedom to respond to need fulfilment. I would like to pay attention to the relevance of freedom to define needs, in the context of this paper. This freedom and political rights that Sen points to could be interpreted as a freedom or right to participation in the public sphere (and the game of communication — to use the terminology of Section 4). One could also say that this stance gives careful consideration to the concept of need as a social standard as well as respects the social construction of needs, thereby suggesting that need must take shape within processes of the public sphere. Furthermore, however, he asserts that the formalised rights and freedom to the public sphere have severe limitations. "It is important to acknowledge, however, the special difficulty of making a democracy take adequate notice of some types of deprivation, particularly the needs of minorities (Sen 1994: 36)."

Sen doesn't respond directly to this difficulty, but does appear to hint at one specific direction in his treatment of identity (Sen 1985, 1998, 2001). He is wary of consid-

[6] I already argued this elsewhere (Yamamori 2003b), so the following argument was there in a slightly different version.

ering a single identity as a stable or solid entity. First, "[w]e all have many identities (Sen 1985: 348)." Second, identity is not discovered, but rather, it is chosen by reason (Sen 1998). Third, he distinguishes the "epistemic" use of identity from the "ethical" use of it, and only advocates the former (Sen 2001). In addition, the social norms that are the result of the social construction of need are not the primary point of theoretical departure. This approach to identity (summed up as "plural identity," "identity choice," "beyond identity" in Sen, 2001) overlaps with Fraser's and mine, although the terminology is different. In my terminology, Sen is not only aware of the recognition aspect, but is also aware that the consequence (exit) of the game of communication is sometimes negative and that we can resist it. This concern of Sen's becomes clear in the following statement: "[t]he prevailing perceptions of "normality" and "appropriateness" are quite central (Sen 1999: 116) " to some sort of question like gender inequality.

All of these arguments suggest a constructionist direction. I called this tendency in Sen "constructive universalism (Yamamori 2003b)". Although it might be epistemologically different from Fraser's "deconstructionist" approach, it could still enable us to connect these two theories to each other in order to evaluate social policies from a normative perspective.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Allow me briefly summarise the discussion above, in a slightly different order. The capability approach developed by Sen can be sensitive to cultural justice or the recognition of difference. Being just a "framework", it could theoretically be associated with an intermediate theory of recognition or cultural justice, but at the same time, there is not automatic guarantee. I argue that Fraser's analysis is suitable for such an intermediate theory, and propose a theoretical device for an evolutional perspective of redistribution and recognition. The focus is on choosing the stage of the market process at which policy intervenes to remedy redistribution, and on choosing the stage of the communication process at which policy intervenes to remedy recognition. Interventions at the entrance stages of both processes are relatively effective and a Basic Income (BI) proposal is one possibility for such an intervention.

Thus we could conclude that the BI proposal is not inconsistent with the capability approach, even though this approach neither directly suggests such a policy not excludes other policies.

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It has now been twenty years since I first tackled the topic of the paper and it is to my great surprise and pleasure to have recently discovered new readers. I would like to thank especially Dr. Mariusz Baranowski, the editor of *Society Register*, on whose kind invitation my work is being published here. I would also like to thank Dr. Beatrice Sasha Kobow for including the paper in the reading list for her graduate philosophy seminar at the University of Salzburg in 2020, and for inviting me there. I am grateful for her students' thoughtful questions and comments.

While I have tried in the intervening years to continually engage with the central problematics of the paper – developing a theory of an evolutionary political economy that can accommodate the issue of cultural justice, my individual works since then have not taken on the topic as a whole, but have rather developed specific points addressed in the paper. The relationship between Amartya Sen's ethical universalism and non-essential ontology on identity was explored in Yamamori 2006. The concept of need in Sen was discussed in Yamamori (2018, 2019), while the same concept in economics at large was explored in Yamamori (2017, 2020). Yamamori 2017 also tried to examine how colonialist discourse influenced the formation of the concept of need in economics, which indirectly relates to cultural justice. On Basic Income, I contrasted Nancy Fraser's work with findings from an oral history of the British working-class women's movement which had demanded Basic Income in the long 1970s (Yamamori 2014). The definitional issue of Basic Income pointed to in footnote 5 in this paper is revisited in Yamamori 2021.

When Dr. Baranowski offered me this opportunity, I thought immediately of the chance to review and incorporate all the literature to date, but soon realised what a daunting task this would be in the given time constraints. Thus the paper here is almost identical with the original in 2004, albeit in an edited new guise, for which thanks are due to Dr. Rositza Alexandrova.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Toru Yamamori is a professor at the Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. He has been working at the intersection of heterodox economics, history and philosophy of economics, and oral history. His theoretical research on the concept of need in economics has been recognised with the award of the 2017 K. W. Kapp Prize from the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy. His oral historical research on the intersectionality between women's liberation movements and claimants unions movement in the long 1970s Britain won the 2014 Basic Income Studies Best Essay prize.

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DEGROWTH, STEADY STATE AND CIRCULAR ECONOMIES: ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

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ABSTRACT: Criticisms of the neoclassical economic framework and perpetual growth in GDP terms are not a new phenomenon, although recent years have seen increasing interest in alternative and ecological discourses including degrowth, steady state and circular economics. Although these may initially appear as distinctly different discourses, they are highly compatible and comparable, sharing similar, often nearly identical principles and policy proposals. A more collaborative, joined-up approach aimed at integrating alternative discourses is required in order to build a coherent, credible, well-supported alternative, as there is more uniting than dividing these critical voices, particularly in the face of mainstream political and economic debates that are shaped by neoclassical economics.
KEYWORDS: degrowth, steady state economy, circular economy, economic growth; environmental sustainability; social equity

INTRODUCTION

Governed by neoclassical economics, the economies of modern-day Western democracies are designed to pursue economic growth as a means of increasing economic and social welfare, nationally as well as at the level of households and individuals. Short- and long-term threats posed by climate change, exacerbated by high levels of carbon-intense economic activity, as well as poverty and inequality in both

developed and developing nations are increasingly bringing into question the fitness for purpose of economic growth in truly achieving social equity in an environmentally sustainable manner. Though still largely marginalized from mainstream political and economic debates, alternative discourses to growth, stemming predominately from the field of ecological economics, are becoming increasingly prominent. Two particularly notable such discourses are those of degrowth and the steady state economy (SSE). A third but less well-established discourse is that of the circular economy, one that, strictly speaking, does not fall into the realm of ecological economics, but can be adapted and integrated.

Though the conceptions of alternative discourses are not entirely new, both degrowth and steady state economics have seen rapid expansion in research interest as well as media and public attention over the last five to ten years. The fact that the first and second international conference on economic degrowth were held in 2008 and 2010 respectively, with a third and larger iteration to be held in September 2012, as well as the first conference on the steady state economy being held in 2010, the 2010 foundation of the Post Growth Institute as well as other organisations critical of economic growth, all serve as a testament to their increasing prominence. This paper aims to unpack the alternative discourses of the circular economy, degrowth and steady state economics, by analysing the theoretical underpinnings as well the practical implications of each.

Throughout this analysis, the ways in which each discourse is envisaged to function both in theory and in practice are considered. However, it should be noted that it is uncertain what they would actually look like in practice. These alternative discourses have not necessarily been tried and tested, at least at large scale. While certain policies are proposed, they cannot necessarily be guaranteed to work to the letter. This is best demonstrated by neoclassical economics; theory is very different from practice. There is no guarantee that this wouldn't also hold true for ecological economics. Of course the articulation of policies is important, not least for purposes of encouraging debate and demonstrating that alternatives are possible, at least in theory.

Throughout this paper, the circular economy is understood as a system that is designed to be restorative and regenerative; restoration replaces the 'end-of-life' concept for products, energy systems are shifted towards renewable technologies, toxic chemicals that impair reuse are eliminated and waste is eliminated to the greatest extent possible through improved materials, products and systems design (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2012). Degrowth is defined as a socially sustainable and equitable reduction (and stabilisation) in society's throughput, where throughput denotes the materials and energy a society extracts, processes, transports and distributes, to consume and return back to the environment as waste (Kallis 2011). A steady state economy is one that undergoes neither growth nor recession, resulting in a constant rate of throughput (Czech and Daly 2004). Much like the degrowth scenario, it too is environmentally sustainable and socially equitable.

The brief definitions for these alternative discourses may not seem conflicting or mutually exclusive. Indeed, degrowth, the steady state as well as the circular economy, albeit to a lesser extent, share certain principles and goals. As noted by Spash (1999),

there is a certain level of consensus regarding the key features of any new paradigm, such as the recognition of ecological limits and ecosystem constraints, concerns for equitable, fair and effective economic systems as well as intergenerational justice. Although from an external perspective there may appear to be three distinct schools of thought, in actual fact the lines are blurred; the principles are shared, the visions overlap – in short the discourses are converging. Nonetheless, certain distinct differences do remain, but further collaboration for a more integrated message is required in order to achieve maximum possible credibility and influence public and political spheres.

The methodology employed is a literature review of mainly academic journal articles presenting and debating alternative discourses to economic growth. A text analysis of key publications and resources from relevant conferences is also carried out. Section two provides some brief, additional background information. Sections three, four and five successively discuss the circular economy, degrowth and steady state discourses. Each contains a subsection on the features and principles of the discourse as well as considerations and observations. Section three on the circular economy contains a subsection on potential benefits; specific policy proposals were not available or presented in the same manner as for the degrowth and steady state discourses, which both, as part of this analysis, contain a subsection on proposed policies. Due to certain restrictions including time and length, limitations were placed on the extent to which a detailed policy analysis for the steady state and degrowth discourses can be undertaken, not least due to the sheer volume of literature that exists for each. A brief round up of how the three narratives can be combined is provided in section six. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.

BACKGROUND

The most basic rationale behind degrowth, steady state and circular economy discourses is essentially the same, i.e. that human societies must operate within the ecological limits of the planet, and that this is something the dominant economic paradigm and industrial model fails to guarantee.

Although the circular economy approach does not oppose economic growth, degrowth and the steady state do, and for very similar reasons. Despite increasing levels of wealth in developed countries, subjective well-being stagnates after certain income levels (Jackson 2011). Despite increasing technological efficiency, negative environmental impacts, including rising carbon emissions and resource depletion, are not eliminated (ibid). Economic growth and the pursuit of an endlessly increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not addressing key social and environmental concerns, yet even in the wake of the ongoing financial crisis, return to growth is the paramount policy objective of nearly every developed nation. It is therefore argued that GDP should not be as prominent as it currently is; indicators of human and social welfare as well as reported levels of life satisfaction should instead take centre stage.

Fundamentally, it is argued that a new industrial model (in the case of the circular economy) and more broadly, a new macroeconomic model (in the case of degrowth

and steady state economics) is required; one that will be ecologically sustainable and socially equitable.

THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY

Features and principles

The principles behind a circular economy are not novel; concepts of operating within finite natural resources by extending the product-life of goods to reduce resource depletion and therefore waste were put forward by Walter R. Stahel in his 1982 Mitchell Prize Winning Paper, *The Product-Life Factor*. The Ellen MacArthur Foundation, or EMF (2012) recently revived circularity concepts, investigating circular economy business models across the European Union in order to identify success stories, determine the factors that lead to success, obtain an insight into which sectors and products possess the greatest potential for circularity and investigate the wider potential economic effects of such an industrial model.

As described previously, a circular economy is based on changing the linear 'take, make and dispose' model through restoration and regeneration of industrial products, with the aim of preventing material leakage and disposal (EMF 2012). It is based on the key principle of designing-out waste, such that products are designed and optimised for multiple life cycles of disassembly and reuse, employing renewable energy systems to power the circular cycle, thus decreasing non-renewable resource depletion and building resilience against external shocks, such as oil shortages (ibid). The designing-out of waste is differentiated from current disposal and recycling methods, as large amounts of energy and labour are lost in such processes (ibid). The inherent nature of the circular industrial process will entail a rethinking of ownership, whereby products are not owned by individuals but rather leased by manufacturers who re-collect and re-process the raw materials at the end of each lifecycle (EMF 2011). Re-thinking of ownership is also an issue raised by the degrowth and SSE discourses, though in a broader sense and from a different perspective, as briefly described in Table A1.1 (van Griethuysen 2010; Jackson 2011).

Benefits

The circular economy is increasingly moving from theory to practice, as case studies do exist where the concepts are being implemented for certain products and within certain business models (EMF 2012). Circularity presents the possibility of decoupling revenues from material input, leading to material savings and reduction of supply (EMF 2012), and can therefore be appealing for companies. As recollection of products is necessary, companies will have to increase the rate at which they recuperate components; currently few industries reach a collection rate of even 25% (ibid). After analysis of options for various types of resource intense products it was concluded that the circular economy could deliver a range of benefits, including (EMF 2012):

(i) Reduction of 50% in mobile phone remanufacturing costs.

(ii) Accessibility of high-end washing machines for most households, if leased instead of sold, also contributing to savings in resource use and reduced CO_2 emissions.

(iii) Potential savings of $1.1 billion for the UK on landfill costs by keeping organic food waste out of landfills.

The concept was found to be economically viable and scalable for a range of products, beyond those investigated by the study (EMF 2012). In addition to the benefits listed above, it is argued that economies, companies and consumers and users all stand to win from a circular economy, as illustrated in Table 1 (EMF 2012).

Tab. 1 Benefits from a circular economy for key stakeholders

How economies win	**How companies win**	**How consumers and users win**
Substantial net material savings	Reduced material bills and warranty risks	Reduced pre-mature obsolescence (due to build-to-last or reusable products, which can also reduce ownership costs)
Mitigation of volatility and supply risks	Improved customer interaction and loyalty	Increased choice and convenience
Potential employment benefits	Less product complexity and more manageable lifecycles	Potential for the accrual of secondary benefits, if products deliver more than their basic function
Reduced externalities		
Long-term economic resilience		

Source: Ellen Macarthur Foundation, Towards the Circular Economy: Economic and business rationale for an accelerated transition 2012.

As mentioned, one of the benefits of the circular model is that some firms and companies are already adopting it, as it is promoted in the context of further economic growth. However, large-scale implementation requires buy-in from more or most of the major companies that form economies and infrastructure in order to reach a fully circular economy (EMF 2012). The prospect of a full-scale circular economy is also gaining academic and political momentum; as a nation that is not rich in environmental or natural resources and therefore interested in material recovery as well as cost of energy China is a prime example of this (Pin and Hutao 2007).

Considerations and observations

Following the key concepts and potential benefits offered by a circular economy the EMF report concludes by outlining a basic vision for 'mainstreaming the circular economy', i.e. making it the rule, not the exception (EMF 2012: 12):

> The mainstreaming phase will involve organizing reverse-cycle markets, rethinking taxation, igniting innovation and entrepreneurship, stepping up education, and issuing a more suitable set of environmental guidelines and rules – especially with regards to properly accounting for externalities. […] Such a transition offers new prospects to economies in search of sources of growth and employment. […] Its inception will likely follow a 'creative destruction' pattern and create winners and losers.

Although not elaborated in detail, some of the key aspects that must be considered in moving ahead with a circular economy are therefore proposed, including taxation, innovation, education and so on. The second and third sentences however, namely explicit reference to economic growth and creative destruction, are of particular interest and relevance to the current analysis.

Focusing specifically on the industrial model, the discourse is not critical of the status quo regarding the prevailing economic policy of economic growth, explicitly suggesting compatibility with and operation within the neoclassical economic framework. Furthermore, Jackson (2011), from an SSE perspective, denounces the concept of 'creative destruction' as it accompanies economic growth. The circular economy is therefore, strictly speaking, not an 'alternative discourse to economic growth', but rather an 'alternative growth' discourse. Furthermore, it is far less developed than the concepts of degrowth and steady state economy (a simple Google search or search for academic literature is enough to validate this); further elaboration is therefore required. As such, ample consideration is not given to a number of key aspects including population, employment, international trade, the role of various institutions, the ways of 'measuring progress' and so on, all of which take greater prominence in the degrowth and SSE discourse (although, since envisaged to operate in the present economic framework, perhaps as detailed an analysis for a circular economy is not required, but would nonetheless prove useful). Although resource depletion and limits to natural resources are recognised, and the idea behind circularity is precisely one of limiting depletion and throughput as in a degrowth or steady state economy (Pin and Hutao 2007), the notion of scale is also not adequately dealt with. This can be a problem for example, under a scenario where population is growing and although the circular model limits resource consumption *at a given point in time*, the level of consumption may have to change due to changes in population.

The unprecedented levels of technological efficiency improvements and decreased intensity of economic activity required for growth to be sustainable are clearly laid out and deemed unattainable by Jackson (2011). A 130-fold reduction in carbon intensity (assuming economic growth continued as it did until 2007, with income equalizing around the world) would be required by 2050 to remain within safe CO_2 emissions limits (Jackson 2011: 123-133). The possibility of changing the 'engine of growth', as proposed by some, is analysed, examining the notion of 'green growth'. It is concluded that green alternatives would still take a toll on natural resources, not least due to the rebound effect, whereby the positive impact of green goods and services is cancelled out by increases in production and consumption; such alternatives are therefore seen

as "unrealistic and self-contradictory" (ibid). However, the circular economy does not constitute one of the alternative 'engines of growth' considered by Jackson. It should therefore be noted that the implications of a circular economy on resource depletion, throughput and efficiency improvements in a scenario akin to what Jackson (2011) proposes, are unclear. If implemented large-scale, a circular economy has the potential to fundamentally change the economic intensity. Further investigation into the exact implications and effects would provide interesting and useful research.

At first glance, circularity may appear at odds with the ecological economic discourses of degrowth or SSE, but this need not necessarily be the case. Notions of circularity, or decreased throughput combined with increased product durability and regeneration are conveyed through both the degrowth and SSE literature (Daly 2008, Second International Degrowth Conference 2010). Although the Ellen MacArthur Foundation's circular discourse analysed here belongs to the neoclassical economic approach, its fundamental aspects and principles can and should be adapted and integrated into the ecological approaches.

DEGROWTH

Features and principles

Broadly speaking, sustainable degrowth entails "an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term" (Schneider et al. 2010: 511). With the primary objective of achieving well-being, ecological sustainability and social equity, sustainable degrowth does not specifically aim to reduce GDP, though this will decline due to reduced large-scale, resource-intensive economic activities that currently constitute a big portion of GDP (Schneider et al. 2010).

Sustainable degrowth is differentiated from unplanned degrowth (or recession) within a growth economy, as degrowth is a voluntary, smoothly planned and equitable transition to a state of lower production and consumption (Kallis 2011; Schneider et al. 2010). The voluntary and democratic nature is paramount; it cannot be imposed externally as an imperative (Schneider et al. 2010). However, the chances of people being involuntarily forced into degrowth lifestyle changes are constantly increasing due to looming ecological limits including peak oil and gas, exacerbated by the financial crisis (Davey 2008). There is a narrow 'sustainability window' for a successful and smooth transition; policies promoting low rates of economic growth and increased investment in renewable energy will expand it (D'Alessandro et al. 2010).

The degrowth community is diverse, consisting of scholars from various philosophical backgrounds and intellectual sources (Schneider et al. 2010). This is important in understanding that while there is not necessarily a single, dominant consensus view amongst degrowth proponents regarding necessary measures for a transition, there exists at least some level of agreement extending beyond principles, translating into policy suggestions, albeit often basic and not fully developed ones. This is evidenced by the documents and resources emerging from the first and second international degrowth conferences, some of which will be discussed in greater detail.

Proposed policies

A list of key policies put forward at the Second International Degrowth Conference (2010) is available in Table A1.1, Annex 1. The Table also contains a list of steady state policies arising from the SSE Conference (2010). Though extensive, Table A1.1 is not exhaustive; many other policy proposals exist in both the degrowth and SSE literature. However, in order to provide an overview as well as comparison of the types of policy interventions these discourses advance within the time and length restrictions, some main points arising from the conferences for each are discussed.

Employment. One of the key policies is the reduction of working hours and the working week in order to place greater emphasis on leisure and other activities. Providing more opportunities for part-time work will also enable work opportunities to be divided more equally amongst the labour force. Tax reform should focus on taxing resources as opposed to labour (Second International Degrowth Conference 2010).

Basic income. Providing all citizens with a basic income (BI) is regarded as a means to decreasing social inequity while contributing to the degrowth process (Mylondo 2008). The reason it contributes to degrowth is twofold. Firstly, granting all citizens a BI eliminates the need to work, and secondly, to be funded, it requires increasing taxes on other incomes, diminishing the profit generated from work, something regarded as a positive and welcome outcome within the degrowth context (ibid).

Waste reduction. Products should be designed to be more eco-friendly, with a cradle-to-cradle (as opposed to cradle-to-grave) lifecycle to encourage reuse and avoid resource depletion; goods should be treated and disposed as locally as possible in order to minimise waste production. The 'cradle-to-cradle' approach is essentially the industrial model proposed by the circular economy, thus a 'circular' approach is indeed consistent with and can be embedded into a degrowth economy.

Measuring progress. Progress towards sustainable degrowth should be measured. Though not explicitly referred to in the workshop outcomes of the conference, the Proceedings document from the First International Degrowth Conference contains a contribution on 'The indicators of tomorrow' (Du Crest 2008). Three structural indicators are proposed, as shown in Table 2. The indicators are based on "the state of the planet at a given point in time, from the triptych of sustainable development" (ibid: 93), driven by relationships between:

(i) social and economic;

(ii) environmental and social;

(iii) environmental and economic.

Note here, it is not depending on the *state of* (but rather the *relationships between*) those three cornerstones (Du Crest 2008).

Tab. 2. Proposed indicators for measuring progress towards sustainable degrowth

Relationships	**Indicators**	**Dimension**
Social/economic	Time spent on non-business activities/ time spent on remunerated work	Time
Social/environment	Area taken up in catering to human needs/ areas set aside for other species	Space
Environment/economic	Ecological footprint: equivalent space used by man for his needs and to absorb his waste products	Space/time

Source: Du Crest (2008: 94).

With regards to governance and transition, degrowth scholars are often more critical of capitalism as a viable system for a degrowth or zero-growth economy, sometimes preferring socialist alternatives (Schriefl et al. 2008). Steady state discourse is more welcoming of the possibility for a zero-growth economy to function within a capitalist society; Jackson (2011) emphasizes the fact that a steady state regime will be different to one of growth and whether or not it results in capitalism is not important. Lawn provides a detailed account and explanation suggesting not only that steady-state capitalism is feasible, but also that this would be the best means of reaching true sustainability (Lawn 2011).

Considerations and observations

As is evidenced from Table A1.1, degrowth and steady state discourses are becoming increasingly complementary to each other, something acknowledged and emphasized by both the degrowth as well as steady state schools of thought. As noted by Schneider et al. (2010: 512), "[In sustainable degrowth], the adjective 'sustainable' does not imply that degrowth should be sustained indefinitely (which would be absurd) but rather that the process of transition and the end-state should be sustainable in the sense of being environmentally and socially beneficial". Kallis (2011) also suggests the reduction and eventual stabilisation of throughput, implying a steady state economy. The notion of a steady state following an initial period of degrowth is increasingly the vision of degrowth proponents. The final conference declaration from the First International Degrowth Conference specifically states, "Once right-sizing has been achieved through the process of degrowth, the aim should be to maintain a 'steady state economy' with a relatively stable, mildly fluctuating level of consumption," (First International Degrowth Conference 2008: 318) whereby right-sizing signifies remaining within the Earth's ecological limits. The second iteration of the international degrowth conference went a step further in suggesting a closer collaboration between the steady state and degrowth schools of thought, through uniting macroeconomic modeling (Second International Degrowth Conference 2010).

THE STEADY STATE ECONOMY

Features and principles

Notions of the steady state, originally appearing even before the industrial revolution (Smith 1776), have evolved over time and currently appear to be the most clearly, concretely and extensively developed alternative discourse to economic growth, both in terms of volume of academic literature (though increasingly rivaled by the degrowth discourse) and in terms of suggested policy proposals (Czech and Daly 2004; Victor 2007; O'Neill et al. 2010; Jackson 2011: 171-186). Herman Daly, one of the most prominent SSE proponents, has recently advocated a quasi steady state economy that is "neither static nor eternal – it is a system in dynamic equilibrium within its containing, sustaining and entropic biosphere" (Daly 2007: 117).

The underlying principles of SSE are, to a great extent, much the same to those of degrowth. It is not surprising then that the two discourses are increasingly converging, often even to the extent of offering identical transition policies. Nonetheless, areas of disagreement or disparity do exist both on the level of principles and that of policy, owing also to the fact that neither SSE or degrowth are a narrow, homogeneous community of scholars with an absolutely and clearly defined agenda. Overall however, progressively more sets the two discourses together rather than apart, and this is something that should be taken advantage of.

Policy proposals

Table A1.1 lists some of the policies outlined by steady state proponents. There is no policy included in the categories of pensions, infrastructure and housing. Policy considerations do in fact exist for these categories, at least the former two, within the SSE literature (Czech and Daly 2004; Jackson 2011: 171-186), however they did not form part of the recommendations of the Steady State Conference (O'Neill et al. 2010). For the purposes of this analysis and for reasons of clarity and comparability between the degrowth and steady state conference recommendations they are therefore not included.

It should be highlighted once again however that proposals for SSE appear to be more developed than for the circular economy and degrowth discourses. One of the most recent, accessible, extensive and seminal contributions to the field offers a wealth of recommendations, broadly under the three key headings of: establishing the ecological limits, fixing the economic model and changing the social logic (Jackson 2011). Jackson (2011) even goes as far as laying the foundations for the development of a new, ecological macroeconomic model, stressing that the need for its development is one of the biggest, if not *the* biggest priority in building credibility and steering such concepts from the fringes into mainstream political and economic debates.

Employment. As with the degrowth proposals, SSE recommends reduced working hours and a more equitable distribution of the available work. However, a further aspect (not articulated in the degrowth literature) is that government should act as an 'employer of last resort' by providing a Job Guarantee, an idea

put forward by Mitchell and Muysken (2008). The Guarantee would provide minimum wage jobs to all unemployed people, primarily for the production of goods and services with public goods characteristics, thus enhancing the average skill level of the workforce (Mitchell and Muysken 2008; Lawn 2011).

Basic income. A citizen's income as well as a maximum pay differential, whereby the highest paid employee in an organisation earns no more than a certain multiple of the lowest paid employee, are proposed.

Waste reduction. Caps for use of natural resources, based on available scientific evidence regarding the Earth's carrying capacity, are proposed. Moreover, Daly (2008) suggests that goods should be produced to be more durable and longer-lived, proposing that a method of leasing products from firms to customers could achieve this. Once again the core principles of the circular economy are integral to and presented from a steady state perspective.

Measuring progress. A new set of indicators consisting of three headline indicators, as displayed in Table 3, are put forward. The potential headline indicator for the environment, i.e. the ecological footprint, is also the chosen indicator for measuring the relationships between environmental and economic structures in Du Crest's (2008) methodology shown in Table 2.

Table 3. Proposed indicators for measuring progress towards in a steady state economy

Indicator Group	Potential Headline Indicator	Description of Potential Headline Indicator
Environment	Ecological footprint	Biologically productive area necessary to generate the resources consumed by a nation, and absorb the wastes produced
Economic system	Area taken up in catering to Income inequality	Size of the gap between society's richest and poorest citizens
Human well-being	Happy life years	Combination of life expectancy (an objective measure) and life satisfaction (a subjective measure)

Source: O'Neill et al. 2010: 14.

Considerations and observations

Once again the various common and overlapping policy goals make it evident that steady state and degrowth discourses are increasingly complementary. Degrowth is explicitly referred to in certain SSE literature. The report from the 2010 Steady State Economy Conference states, "the UK and other wealthy countries must stabilise, if

not *degrow*, their economies in order to provide the ecological space needed for poorer nations to grow" (O'Neill et al. 2010). O'Neill et al. (2010) also claim that financial and other resources should be directed at developing countries to assist them in developing "in less materialistic ways." On the other hand, Serge Latouche, a staunch degrowth proponent, advocates that degrowth must apply to developed and developing countries in order to avoid "rushing up the blind alley of growth economics" (Latouche 2004). Furthermore, Latouche (2004) suggests that the aim for the Global South should not be development but rather disentanglement, whereby the obstacles that prevent a different pathway and method of development are removed. While undoubtedly different, the O'Neill et al. (2010) and Latouche (2004) approaches are not necessarily in complete contradiction with each other. While the latter denounces growth altogether and prioritises disentanglement over traditional, Western growth-based development, the former advocates a less materialistic development, i.e. non-traditional development. Once again there appears to be increasing scope for further dialogue and collaboration between the steady state and degrowth camps.

DEGROWTH, STEADY STATE OR CIRCULAR?

This analysis has proved that the three discourses of degrowth, SSE and the circular economy are not worlds apart. Though the most comprehensive vision of a circular economy is envisaged to work within a growing economy, both the circular and steady state schools of though have embraced and integrated its basic principles. Incorporating the key aspects of both a steady state economy and degrowth, Kershner (2010) clearly indicates that the latter is merely a transition to the former. "Economic degrowth in the [global] North provides a path for approximating the goal of a globally equitable steady state economy by allowing some more economic growth in the South" (Kerschner 2010: 549). This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1. Balancing an equitable quasi steady-state world economy
Source: Kerschner (2010: 548)

The triangle in Figure 1 is the stock-throughput and represents a quasi SSE with strong social, environmental and economic sustainability, but will most likely have to shrink over time (Kerschner 2010), if global throughput is to be limited. Kerschner (2010) suggests that defining the actual size of the triangle, even for a short period of time, is highly problematic if not entirely impossible, and therefore argues that the steady state is rather an 'unattainable goal' which should nonetheless be strived towards in the long-term.

Bringing the three discourses together, one could suggest a degrowth transition into a steady state economy (or as close to it as possible), one that also integrates the notion of circularity in its model of production.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper provided an overview of three increasingly prominent discourses, each of which would fundamentally change the ways in which our economies work. The theoretical background as well as practical policy measures required to successfully transition were presented for the steady state, circular economy, and degrowth.

The current economic paradigm of continued growth – operating within the framework of neoclassical economics – is not proving ecologically sustainable or socially equitable. Alternative discourses are becoming increasingly prominent. Ranging from the circular economy, which is envisaged to operate within the neoclassical framework, to a proposed degrowth transition into a steady state, based on ecological macroeconomics, the case is being made. From an outsider's perspective these may appear to be three distinctly different discourses, however they are not mutually exclusive but rather highly compatible and complementary to each other. Though Circularity may strictly not belong to ecological economics it is increasingly gaining the attention of governments and businesses, even being adopted by some firms for business planning purposes, something that both the SSE and degrowth have failed to succeed in to date. Though ideological and other differences are likely to persist given the diverse backgrounds of SSE, circular and degrowth proponents, a more collaborative, joined-up approach that is aimed at integrating these alternative discourses to as great an extent as possible will build a strong, credible and well-supported alternative. After all there is more that unites than separates these discourses – from principles to policy interventions – especially when compared to the rather ubiquitous neoclassical economic view of the world.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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ANNEX 1

Policies advocated for by the degrowth and steady state economy discourses, as presented at relevant conferences, are presented in Table A1.1 below.

Policy	Degrowth Discourse	Steady State Discourse
Employment	Reduced working week and working hours, with more time for leisure and other activities. Encouraging work-sharing and part-time work, legislation that supports co-housing, tax reform with a focus on taxing resources, not labour.	Instead of using technological progress to produce more goods and services (as we tend to do today) we should use it to increase leisure time by gradually shortening the paid working day, week, year, and career. - The gradual reduction of working time would help keep unemployment low by distributing available work more equally. Government to act as an 'employer of last resort' and guarantee jobs for all the unemployed (as it guarantees primary education and healthcare).
Population	Full reproductive rights that take into account environmental and social consequences for humans and other species. Opposition to government drives and incentives in certain countries to increase population; the declining rate of population growth and peak population are welcome.	In the UK, government should develop and adopt a non-coercive stabilisation policy: - Aim to balance immigration & emigration - Aim to incentivize family sizes of two or fewer children Globally, UK to support policies that provide education, access to birth control and equal rights for women everywhere.
International trade & cooperation	Global trade must be democratized and focused on social and environmental sustainability: there should be a new, democratic trade organization that shifts away from "free trade" and growth as the fundamental basis.	Democratisation of international organizations (UN, WB, WTO) to represent interests of the majority of the people on the planet. Technology transfer from wealthier to poorer nations. Goods and services to be produced locally, where practical Capital controls and minimum residency time for foreign investment to prevent capital flight.
Changing consumer behaviour	Use a bottom up as well as top down approach to limit advertising. From community child protection against advertising, to banning advertising in public spaces.	Shift towards 'mass behaviour of enoughness' (sufficiency): - Recruiting influential individuals as agents of change. - Supporting organizations that challenge or contradict consumerism. - Promoting the benefits of non-materialistic lifestyles. - Creating infrastructure to encourage the emergence of new forms of corporate and civic entities. - Overcoming resistance from large corporations and the state.. - Tapping into some of the core human motivations such as collectivism (individualism, power, status, achievement are only some of the human motivations).

Tax reform	*See employment policy*	Ecological tax reform: cap-auction-trade systems for natural resource usage/depletion (note this is different to Pigouvian or simple pollution and resource depletion taxes!).
Monetary system	An alternative monetary system should be established. Governments need to allow the use of alternative (e.g. local) currencies. There should be an international research network for alternative monetary systems, to share information and best practices. Many questions still exist with regards to alternative currencies, e.g. what is their potential to transform the international monetary system? How is demand for them increased? Should the powers of private banking to create money be removed?	To prevent inflation, government taxation and expenditure should be linked to the system of money creation. Communities should be encouraged to create their own currencies to support local economic activity. The UK to promote and participate in a global negotiation to create a neutral international currency to replace the reserve currencies in use today.
Waste reduction	Minimisation of waste production by ensuring production, treatment and disposal of goods as locally as possible. Legal instruments to reduce waste should also be employed. Additionally, ensuring eco-design and cradle to cradle product lifecycles to encouraging reuse and avoid depletion of natural resources.	Caps for resource use, based on available scientific evidence regarding ecological limits - Caps should be top-down, starting from global level all the way down to local communities (but managing resources within caps should be done at local level) Will require a system to measure material throughput of the economy as well as the social and environmental consequences of that throughput.
Pensions	Transition to a secure pensions system via a progressive taxation system focused on income (100% taxation above maximum income) as well as green taxation for increased pension funding	*N/A*
Ownership & private property	Restriction of private property, to halt the commodification of nature and returning to a democratic management of natural resources.	Transition to a new economic order would require us to re-envision fundamental economic concepts such as investment, productivity, and ownership.
Limiting inequality	A basic income for all is desirable.	Progressive taxation and generous social programmes: - Citizen's income (i.e. basic income) - Maximum pay differential (i.e. maximum wage)
Infrastructure	Certain infrastructures should be limited or abandoned altogether. Nuclear incinerators, high speed trains and large-scale dams should be abandoned. Highways, airports and long distance transportation infrastructure should be limited. Certain existing infrastructure should be transformed: smaller, more compact cities, converting car based infrastructure to walking and cycling infrastructure.	*N/A*

Business & production	Limit the size of company for maintaining the rationality of satisfaction of local needs. Change institutions to abolish the profit dividends and profits of distant shareholders that don't take part in the activity. The social economy would be driven by people directly engaged on the labour force of economic and social activities and not only as inventors.	Firms should aim for the 'right-size profits'. - I.e. large enough to maintain financial viability without causing environmental damage. - Firms to be given information on a) total ecological impact and b) ecological allowance. Alternative forms of business – shift towards cooperatives, foundations and community interest companies (e.g. that have primary goals that are socially beneficial, with profit as a secondary motive). - Such organizational forms are not as preoccupied with growth as profit-maximising shareholder corporations. - Governments should encourage such businesses by making them easier to set up or switch to and by taking away excess profits from shareholder companies.
Housing	Occupy empty housing and encourage shared (communal) housing. Encourage architectural research into alternative housing such as collaborative design of reused/empty buildings into cohousing with residents, material reuse, etc… Impose a large tax on unoccupied housing as well as state purchases of houses that would be repossessed, to turn them into public cohousing.	*N/A*
Local food production / agroecology	Focus on local food production. Agroecology should be prioritised over other forms of agriculture; policies currently financing industrial agriculture should stop in order to provide funding for agroecological alternatives. Urban and rural localized food farming must be encouraged.	*See international trade & cooperation policy*
Fostering democracy	Foster "deep democracy". Create spaces for enhanced participation in politics and decision-making (e.g. citizen juries); de-commercialise and de-commodify politics.	Democratization of institutions where inequality originates, especially in the work place. Promote employee ownership, cooperatives, etc…

Engaging politicians, the public and the media	Allow room for different pedagogies in order to promote creativity and diversity. Promote cooperation early on in the process of education development, e.g. by involving the community in the formation of curricula. Education oriented around self-determination: - Raise political and critical awareness in order to evolve collectively and in harmony. Reexamine the methods of evaluation and standard setting, and promote inter-generational knowledge sharing and informal education.	New forums should be identified (or created) to engage decision makers and opinion influencers in an active debate about the problems of growth and potential economic solutions. Need a more rigorous modeling and elaboration of how an SSE would work in practice, and how ecological limits can be reflected and respected in policy. Collaboration and agreement amongst leading business schools and economics departments to include compulsory coverage within degree courses, of the different views concerning sustainability and the limits to growth. Need a more public and accessible image and name that resonates with the general public
Measuring progress	Progress towards sustainable degrowth should be measured. Environmental and social indicators, qualitative and quantitative aspects, as well as objective and subjective indicators should be used.	New system of indicators that separates ends (goals) from means (methods of achieving those goals) - The set of indicators should include 3 groups, each with a 'headline' indicator: Environment, Economic system, Human well-being

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BRIDGING TOGETHER AUTHORITARIAN RIGHT-WING POLITICS AND NEOLIBERAL URBAN POLITICS: ISTANBUL'S BID FOR 2020 SUMMER OLYMPICS

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ABSTRACT: This study aims to analyse the political impact of sports mega-events through urban lenses. Sports mega-events often come along with drastic transformations in the built environment of the city where they are held. Contemporary urban impact of the sports mega-events, with the increased role rested by local and/or national governments on the private sector in the organization, is highly interconnected with the neoliberal measures of selling out the urban space, undertaken for hosting the event. In terms of the hosts, there is an increasing shift towards the countries where right-wing authoritarian parties are in power. I argue that the promises of these governments guaranteeing more swift urban transformations to meet the infrastructure requirements of hosting these events cause this shift and in turn, right-wing authoritarian governments use these events as platforms for disseminating their ideologies. This research aims to trace this trend, based on the example of İstanbul's failed bid to host the 2020 Summer Olympics and the neoliberal urban policies in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). By using the city master plan presented during the bidding process and the statements made by AKP officials, I aim to demonstrate how hosting international sports events in Turkey is undertaken as part of a neoliberal urban policy and how this is incorporated into a wider conservative-Islamist political project by the AKP.
KEYWORDS: sports mega-events; urban entrepreneurialism; neoliberal urbanism; Istanbul; Olympic bids

INTRODUCTION

Sports mega-events are one of the most significant phenomena that extend national and/or regional boundaries in the sense that they generate a significant amount of public interest and economic revenue. For this reason, hosting mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup attract local and national governments into filing bids. Sports mega-events lead to significant spatial changes in the cities where they are held, through urban development projects which are undertaken for meeting the requirements to host the event. Moreover, local and national governments increasingly utilize sports mega-events to transform cities in a manner that prioritizes attracting private investment. This way, hosting sports mega-events are harnessed into a "broader urban agenda" (Hiller 1999). While this enhances the role of the private sector in the organization of sports mega-events, local and national governments seek political gains out of hosting these events as well. Governments also use hosting sports mega-events as a way of disseminating dominant ideologies and influencing opinions held by -domestic or foreign- people and/or other governments (Black 2007). This research aims to look into the intersection of the economic and political aspects of hosting sports mega-events.

Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments, Turkey has witnessed a surge in the number of international sports events being held on its soil, which brought about significant changes in numerous policy areas. Although these changes are related to every element intrinsic to sports mega-events such as athlete participation and media coverage, the most significant impact of the rising interest in hosting these events was on the urban landscape and the built environment of the cities where competitions are held. Numerous stadiums have been built in different cities, which are part of a wider boom in construction projects under the AKP. The new stadium projects are undertaken by private businesses that have close ties to the ruling party, as well as the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), the government housing agency, which eventually obtained great power over the commodification of the urban space (McManus 2018:76). These newly built stadiums and sports venues made up an important part of the candidature files of the international sports events to which cities in Turkey put forward bids for hosting. A further aspect of the increased interest towards hosting international sports events and the ensuing urban transformation under the AKP government is the ideological dimension, which refers to the AKP using these events as a way of showcasing a novel, conservative-Islamist national identity. Urban development projects which are undertaken on the premises of hosting international sports events constitute a very important part in order to achieve this. Therefore, in this study, I aim to analyse the relationship between urban development projects and national identity formation in Turkey during the AKP era, within the scope of hosting international sports events.

For the purpose of this research, I examine the candidature of İstanbul for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics. İstanbul's bid to host the 2020 Summer Olympics, albeit a failed one, was the biggest project of sports event hosting during the AKP era. İstanbul, by the merit of being the last capital city of the Ottoman Empire, holds a dis-

tinctive place in the conservative-Islamist political mindset in Turkey, which makes a proposal to host the Olympic Games in the city a relevant subject matter for tracing the Islamist conception of a novel national identity in Turkey under the rule of the AKP. Furthermore, İstanbul is a significant city to observe the impact of the construction boom in Turkey under the AKP which transformed the urban spaces drastically. Lauermann (2016) contends that the failed Olympic bids play an integral role in shaping urban agendas. Furthermore, albeit a failed one, the 2020 Summer Olympics was the biggest bid for hosting an international sports event in Turkey during the AKP era, particularly in terms of urban planning. In this sense, I aim to locate İstanbul's failed bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics in the AKP's Islamist ideology and the urban construction boom in Turkey.

In this research, I dominantly rely on the candidature file of İstanbul presented to the IOC. The urban development projects outlined in the bidbook are combined with the statements made by the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other AKP officials. In order to properly discuss these findings, I firstly begin with outlining the relationship between neoliberal urban planning and the Olympic Games, then, I move on to the conception of the city of İstanbul in the Turkish conservative-Islamist political mindset and how this is associated with the AKP's understanding of a novel national identity. Following this, I discuss how İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics can be located at the intersection of these. My main argument is that right-wing authoritarian governments increasingly bid for hosting international sports events by promising swift urban transformation projects through neoliberal measures and use the events as a way of demonstrating a novel identity for their country in line with their ideologies. This research contributes to the existing literature on the urban impact of sports mega-events by combining economic and political dimensions at a time when more and more right-wing authoritarian regimes are hosting these events.

URBAN POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND THE OLYMPICS IN NEOLIBERAL ERA

International sports events such as the Olympic Games have always come to carry significant spatial transformations. The venues where the competitions are held and the housing to accommodate delegations and other visitors as well as commercial areas are integrated into Master Plans of cities where the events are held. In the case of the Olympics, the scope of the urban transformation has changed from the first modern Olympics in 1896 to this day. Chalkley and Essex (1999) describe four phases in terms of analysing the urban impact of the Olympic Games over host cities. In the first phase which lasted from 1896 to 1904, the Olympics were small scale and had very little impact on the urban landscape of the host cities and the determination of host cities in this phase was largely symbolic. In the second phase from 1908 to 1932, which was interrupted by the First World War, the Olympics grew larger, making it a necessity to build new facilities to meet the demands of hosting the event. This phase involved the construction of sporting sites for the very purpose of organizing Olympic sports competitions. In the third phase from 1936 to 1956, sporting facilities

gained more importance as "flag-ship symbols" of host cities, despite their relatively modest influence over the urban space. The period between 1960 and 1996, marked the fourth phase which was the most politically turbulent era of Olympic history, in Cold War conditions. Hosting the Olympic Games grew larger in terms of impact over urban space in this phase. With the neoliberal transformation, the world started to go through in this period, the money revolving around the organization of the Olympic Games vastly grew. The role of the private sector increased while that of the public sector changed. This way the profit-making aspect of the Olympics came to the forefront of the organization and this led to the private companies taking over the process of staging the Games, with the enabling of the public sector.

Building on this four-step analysis, it is possible to speak about a fifth phase in the urban impact of hosting the Olympic Games as well. This fifth phase is characterized by the enhanced role of the urban neoliberal measures in the organizing of the Olympic Games and its influence over the urban space. Jessop (2002) contends that a neoliberal city encourages an economic and social restructuring driven by market interests. Neoliberalism as an economic project, in this sense, prioritizes the "liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions" across borders in a globalizing economic market. As a political project, neoliberalism foresees a retreat from state intervention of welfare systems and transforming it into one that gives way to a deregulated market structure. Furthermore, Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2009) hold that neoliberal programs are always accompanied by political-institutional contexts that facilitate the implementation of a deregulated market structure. At the urban level, this applies to urban and national governments actively engaging in promoting the urban space for attracting investments and acting as business partners.

A useful concept to understand the urban context of neoliberalism within the framework of hosting mega-events is *urban entrepreneurialism*, which refers to a form of urban governance that aims to sell-out the city in order to obtain an advantageous position in a structure of inter-urban competition (Harvey 1989; Leitner and Garner 1993; Swyngedouw 1992). Entrepreneurialism refers to a form of development of urban space directly related to productivity and investment and represents a shift from prioritizing providing public services to its population to incentivizing businesses to attract investment. Public-private partnerships are inherent to urban entrepreneurialism, as local governments allocate a significant amount of resources to attract external sources of investment. In the context of the Olympics, in order to better understand the scope of public-private partnerships, Giulianotti et al. (2015) propose the concept of 'New Right two-step'. The New Right two-step involves an initial public expenditure on sports venues, infrastructure developments and other urban projects. What follows is a neo-liberal process where sponsor corporations and construction companies enjoy a financial boom. The urban impact of this transformation becomes visible with the privatization of urban space which is reorganized in a manner that makes the built environment more appealing to the transnational capital flow and wealthier tourists as well as possible residents. Sports-related urban renewal projects often end up in a series of urban gentrifications ranging from housing to commercial areas and stadiums. In this sense, the urban transformation projects undertaken for

hosting international sports events that last several weeks have longer enduring impacts on the cities where they are held. Boykoff (2016:157-160) calls this as 'celebration capitalism' denoting that a state of exception created for temporary time spans (namely, the duration of the event) takes permanent effect and it is mostly characterized by public-private partnerships in which most of the expenses are made by the public sector whereas the sponsorship and investment deal direct most of the revenues towards the corporations. As Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) contend, the estimations about the benefits of hosting such events rarely live up to the promise. Under these circumstances, one of the most important factors that make bidding for hosting international sports events is the expected political outcomes.

The neoliberal transformation of urban space has political and cultural/ideological dimensions as well. A growing body of research forms a link between the neoliberal economy and the rise of authoritarian politics (Brown 2003; Bruff 2014). Accordingly, Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2009) argue that neoliberalism exists in a 'parasitical relation' with different state and social formations including neoconservatism and authoritarianism, which refers to 'national projects of institutional restructuring' accompanying the neoliberal transformation. In the context of international sports events, the urban transformation projects that are implemented for hosting can be used to transmit a certain message about the host which is directed at the international community and the domestic population alike. As Black (2007) underlines, a narrative that outlines why the candidate city is suitable for hosting the Olympic Games is inevitably integral to the bidding process, due to the cosmopolitan self-image of the international sports events. The post-Second World War trend of awarding the Olympics to the cities in former Axis Powers such as 1960 Roma, 1964 Tokyo and 1972 Munich is significant in terms of transmitting a message of change and restoring these countries' places in the international community. Furthermore, hosting international sports events is framed as a noble endeavour of universalism in order to mobilize public enthusiasm and mass support for the bidding process. However, the scope of the political aspect of hosting international sports events reaches far beyond these political narratives.

Numerous researches underline the political dimension of hosting sports mega-events in a wide range of terms including nationalist politics, media coverage and international relations (Tomlinson & Young 2006; Grix & Lee 2013; Vincent et. al. 2018). International sports events, such as the Olympic Games have always been an important stage for displaying and consolidating nationhood. The competitive element in these events makes it easier for the perceived national group to imagine nationhood and rally around the national identity. In this sense, sports mega-events have always been instrumental for nationalist politics. According to Allison & Monnington (2002), national pride can be derived from sports in two ways, which are being recognized by taking part in sports events or displaying power through hosting the events or winning honours in them. There are a number of contemporary studies which demonstrate and conceptualize how hosting these events serves to the purpose of signalling nationhood. For instance, Skey (2006) proposes the concept of 'ecstatic nationalism' in order to explain the impact of special events that take place over

limited periods of time. Ecstatic nationalism denotes the performative outbursts of nationalist aspirations during special events. Such events as the Olympic Games, give way to different articulations regarding discourses of nationhood and hosting these events hinder daily life to the extent that the narrative revolving around the national identity and its perceptions become more visible than before, during the period when the event is held.

However, differing from Skey's analysis which focuses on discourses and narratives around national identity through media coverage or other overt displays of nationalism, this study focuses on the relationship between international sports events and national identity through the lenses of the built environment. This makes it easier to observe the enduring outcomes of the spatial transformation related to the event and to trace the relationship between neoliberal urban transformation and nationalist politics. In the case of İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics, these are presumed outcomes as the bid eventually failed. Lauermann (2016) holds that temporary projects of hosting temporary one-off events have durable impacts on the urban space and therefore bidding for organizing these events allow implementing long-term development plans hence, the temporariness become one of the required elements of 'durable neoliberalisation'. Moreover, unsuccessful bids contribute to and shape the long-term urban agendas to an extent that cannot be overlooked. This is a result of the financial and political guarantees required for filing a bid, which brings together political and corporate actors in public-private partnerships. Furthermore, bids, successful or not, help the governments put forward an identity of their country on an international platform. For these reasons, researches on unsuccessful bids are relevant to examine the economic and political impacts of hosting international sports events.

Sports mega-event hosting is increasingly utilized by authoritarian regimes as platform for legitimizing their policies both domestically and internationally and disseminating dominant ideas and views. These regimes take advantage of the increasing expenses of the Games and related increasing reluctance to host them through excessive financial investments and mega construction projects and with the promise of swift decision-making, by the help of suppression of opposition in authoritarian rules. Awarding of 2014 Winter Olympics to Sochi in Russia despite the global outcry due to the anti-LGBTI+ laws in Russia and Sochi being the site of Circassian genocide in the 19th century can be an example of this (Boykoff 2016:200-201). Another example can be Qatar, which hosted the World Athletics Championships in 2019 and is set to host the FIFA Men's World Cup in 2022. As mega stadium constructions are underway in Qatar, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (2019) decry the exploitation of workers, most of them migrants, working in unsafe and precarious conditions. AKP's policies of hosting international sports events in Turkey can be evaluated in this category as well, as a way of drawing sports events through promises of vast financial investments and using them as platforms of implementing and transmitting political views, as well as seeking legitimacy in the international arena. In order to analyse İstanbul's bid to host the 2020 Summer Olympics, it would be accurate to first contextualize the bidding process by reflecting on the construction boom in Turkey

under the AKP governments, the conception of İstanbul in the conservative-Islamist political mindset and the impact of these over sports.

TRACING THE POLITICS OF TURKEY'S CONSTRUCTION BOOM IN ISTANBUL

Political action takes place in a space which almost all the time carries a symbolic value. Spaces are created and invented therefore it is important to examine the meanings they carry for the actors that operate within them (Edelman 1967:95-96; Lefebvre 1991). İstanbul constitutes an important place as a result of its symbolically loaded geographical location, as a site for contestation of inherent opposites such as East and West, local and global (Keyder, 2000:17). Moreover, as the last capital of the Ottoman Empire, İstanbul is the main place for the conservative-Islamist politics represented by the AKP which spatially characterizes the narrative of a novel national identity (Tokdoğan 2018:168). As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who went on to be the chair of the AKP, former Prime Minister and the President of Turkey, first came under the political spotlight at a national scale as the mayor of İstanbul, the city holds a distinct place in the AKP's political mindset. Furthermore, this provides a useful starting point for tracing the expansion of the construction sector in Turkey under the tenure of the AKP governments.

Particularly following the global economic crisis in 2008, the construction sector in Turkey witnessed an immense growth. One of the central roles in this growth belongs to the Mass Housing Development Administration (TOKİ). TOKİ was founded in the 1980s in order to provide loans to small contractors and people who wanted to buy a house, however through a series of legal amendments during the first years of the AKP government between 2002 and 2008, it was surrounded by immense authorities ranging from authorizing the privatizations of public lands to executing urban transformation projects (Balaban 2016:27). Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism was handed immense authorities as well, in order to realize public-private partnerships for mega urban projects such as a third bridge over the Bosphorus Strait or the third airport in İstanbul. The construction of these mega projects is often undertaken by pro-government conglomerates whose business portfolio extend to many fields including the media, through acquisitions of pro-government media groups (McManus 2018:77). In this sense, it can be inferred that the commodification of urban space is used as a driving force to initiate production and consumption in a number of other areas. Furthermore, for the conservative-Islamist politics in Turkey, construction and altering the urban space have long come to be seen as the most explicit way of establishing hegemony and generating consent (Çavuşoğlu & Strutz 2014; Yeşilbağ 2016). This puts a particular emphasis on the grandeur of the urban development projects both in physical and symbolic terms (Bora 2016:13). İstanbul, as the last capital of the Ottoman Empire, has been a crucial site in terms of the relationship between urban space and establishing political consent for the conservative-Islamist ideology in Turkey.

The image of İstanbul is a crucial crossing point between conservative Islamism and nationalism in Turkey. İstanbul, according to Bora (2000:62), represents both the

Ottoman hegemony and the rule of Islamic law in the Islamist political mindset. In other words, İstanbul represents the geographical hub of the conservative-nationalist political agenda, by references to its history as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, hence the final place where the Caliphate resided. Combined with the constant references to the multicultural demography of the city, particularly through the substantial non-Muslim population in the past, this discourse produces and reproduces the Ottoman imagination of Islamist politics underlining the unequal cohabitation as proof of the Ottoman hegemony and the jurisdiction of Islamic rule. This leads to a neo-Ottoman nostalgia towards İstanbul in the political mindset of the AKP, pointing towards a lively 'promise of return' to the city's past status in the Ottoman era, which is later transferred to Ankara as one of the earliest moves of the Republican period (Tokdoğan 2018:169). A link can be traced between the symbolic loss of power experienced by İstanbul and the concept of a revanchist city, which implies a political strategy that stems from resentment, and is enabled for the reestablishment of an idealized golden age and a supposedly lost old order (Smith 1996). In the case of İstanbul, a motive of nostalgia is manifested as labelling the city as the site for the embodiment of a novel national identity by the AKP. The steps taken in this direction can explicitly be exemplified with the conversion of the Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque, restoring its status during the Ottoman era.[1] This can be traced back to the days when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President of Turkey and the leader of the AKP became the mayor of İstanbul in 1994.

During the local election campaign of 1994, while most of the other parties' candidates focused on İstanbul as a 'global city', Erdoğan's mayoral campaign focused on the shanty towns and their residents (Bora 2000:67). While votes from these regions of the city became influential in the election of Erdoğan, they also provided crucial public spaces for the mobilization of conservative-Islamist ideology. After the election, the networks in these regions of İstanbul were translated into 'welfare systems' involving Islamist organizations and Welfare Party's municipalities, which were officialized and integrated to central state structure after 2002, when the AKP first became government (Batuman 2019:95). Başakşehir region of İstanbul is emblematic of the urban transformation policies of Islamist politics in the sense that it corresponds to the emergence of an urban, middle-class conservative base, through the construction of gated communities. Başakşehir was a project realized by the KİPTAŞ, a housing company run by the municipality and the role of KİPTAŞ was extended to the TOKİ (Mass Housing Administration), the public housing agency, at a country-wide scale after the AKP came to power in 2002 (Çavdar 2016). When the AKP came to power in 2002, the urban policies did not remain limited to housing and gradually expanded to include constructions and transformations of public spaces. Large scale urban development projects transform the built environment in a way that leads to new forms of socialization. One of these mega-projects undertaken by public-private partnerships is the construction of a massive mosque to the Çamlıca hill overlooking

[1] Hurriyet Daily News. 10 July 2020. "Hagia Sophia converted into mosque as Erdoğan signs decree." Retrieved 25 July, 2020 (https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hagia-sophia-converted-into-mosque-as-erdogan-signs-decree-156455).

İstanbul. Çamlıca mosque, which in Erdoğan's words "can be seen from everywhere in the city" is designed in a neo-Ottoman style and its geographical domination over İstanbul's skyline is an example of the ideological designing of urban space through mega projects (Batuman 2019:58). These construction projects do not only reflect the image of a return to the Ottoman heritage and the reclaiming of urban space in the former capital of the Empire, but they also serve to the imagining of a novel social organization. Mosques, as places where people gather, socialize and partake in a collective ritual, are ideal places for communicating political messages and rallying people around those messages. Stadiums and other sports venues have the potential to serve to similar ends, which makes them relevant as subjects of analysis.

Although references to the Ottoman past are very common in the politics of Turkey, its adoption by the AKP deserves particular attention as it is integrated as part of the imagining of a novel national identity. In the case of the adoption of Ottoman references by the conservative-Islamist politics in Turkey, restoration of this part of the past carries the aim of making the Ottoman a formative part of the national identity (Tokdoğan 2018: 84). Therefore, a specific focus on this policy is required to better comprehend the contested nature of nationhood in Turkey under the rule of the AKP governments. Moreover, İstanbul emerges as the spatial epicentre of this reimagining of the national identity and restoring its image as the historic capital of the Ottoman Empire plays a critical role along the way (Tokdoğan 2018: 90). In this sense, it is important to analyse the formation and imagining of a novel national identity through a spatial transformation that creates collectivities.

CONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL HEGEMONY AND SPORTS IN ISTANBUL

From 2007 to 2015, Turkey has built more stadiums than any other UEFA member country, including Russia which was set to host the FIFA World Cup in 2018. A significant number of the eighteen new grounds of this period were built in conservative-nationalist hubs like Konya, Trabzon and Sakarya. Most of these cities were not in need of stadiums big as the ones that are built, such as Konya, where the newly built stadium's capacity of 42.000 was solely chosen as a reference to the city's plate number, 42. A common theme for these cities where new stadiums are built is that the former grounds had been built at the city centre as part of the Republican project up until the 1950s, and the replacements are moved to the outskirts. Therefore, these gentrified stadiums appeal more to those who have the time and money to spare to make the long journey to the venues (McManus 2018:75-76). New football grounds were built in İstanbul as well, one belonging to the football club of Başakşehir, the aforementioned site of urban transformation in İstanbul, leading to the formation of a conservative middle class. The construction of the stadium was undertaken by Kalyon group, a conglomerate with close ties to the AKP that owns a large pro-government media group and undertakes other mega construction projects such as the new airport of İstanbul.[2]

However, hosting sports mega-events is a different agenda for İstanbul's urban

[2] BirGün. 24 July 2020. "Yeşil Sahalarda Yeşil Sermaye: BAŞAKŞEHİR A.Ş." Retrieved 25 July, 2020 (https://www.birgun.net/haber/yesil-sahalarda-yesil-sermaye-basaksehir-a-s-309464).

politics. İstanbul, in fact, enjoyed the position of being an international power hub extensively, and showcasing through mega-events have come to be an important part of it. Its geographical as well as a symbolic political value of being in the middle of the continents of Europe and Asia, became Turkey's main poster at the international stage, despite losing its capital status with the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. In 1936, Henri Prost, a French urbanist was invited to Turkey to draw up a master plan for an Olympics and World's Fair to be held in İstanbul (Bilsel & Zelef 2011). However, aspirations for hosting the Olympic Games in Turkey are far more related to the global neoliberal trend. Despite Prost's master plan never came into effect due to the Second World War, at the same periodical time with the rise in entrepreneurialism trend in urban governance discussed above, hosting the Olympics came back in the political agenda in Turkey in the 1980s. A municipal action programme was put together to host the Games in 1988 (Bilsel and Zelef 2011). İstanbul's first bid to host Olympic Games came with legislation enacted in the parliament called Law on Olympic Games to be Organized in the City of İstanbul (Turkish Law, No: 3796), in 1992. Although all five of İstanbul's Olympic bids failed, the willingness for hosting the Games had important impacts in terms of urban development. For instance, with the purpose of hosting the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, Ataturk Olympic Stadium in İstanbul was inaugurated, which is perhaps the only stadium with the word 'Olympic' in its name to never host the Olympic Games. However, Turkey hosted numerous sports events during the period of the AKP governments, including those in İstanbul such as the famous UEFA Men's Champions League Final in 2005, several group round matches and final round matches of FIBA World Championships for Women in 2014 and the knock-out phase of Eurobasket 2017.

Hosting these events are also critical to evaluate the contested nature of the national identity within the context of sports, in terms of the AKP's political project of imagining a novel image of Turkey and how it interacts with the opposition. For instance, the Islamic Solidarity Games of 2021 set to take place in İstanbul[3] was moved to the conservative power hub of Konya,[4] where nationalist-Islamist politics have historically held a stronghold. This came right after the election of an opposition candidate as the mayor of İstanbul in the municipal elections of 2019. This demonstrates the role that hosting international sports events plays in the policy of the AKP, as the party relies on the financial ties revolving around the municipal administrations for the organizing of the event. While all these served to the establishment of an increasingly privatized urban economic regime and the instituting of a novel identity of 'New Turkey', branded by the AKP, through a conservative-Islamist political view, candidacy for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics was the biggest project of them all.

[3] Hürriyet. 06 April 2017. "İslami Dayanışma Oyunları 2021 yılında İstanbul'da düzenlenecek." Retrieved 11 June, 2020 (https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/sporarena/islami-dayanisma-oyunlari-2021-yilinda-istanbulda-duzenlenecek-40418879).

[4] Yeni Şafak. 20 December 2019. "5. İslami Dayanışma Oyunları 2021'de Konya'da." Retrieved 11 June, 2020 (https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/5islami-dayanisma-oyunlari-2021de-konyada-3518862).

ISTANBUL'S BID FOR HOSTING THE 2020 SUMMER OLYMPICS

Istanbul filed its candidature to host the Summer Olympics five times and the final bid was for the 2020 Summer Olympics. İstanbul's bidding process to host the 2020 Summer Olympics began in 2011 and ended with the vote in September 2013. İstanbul made it to the second round of voting, while no candidate city won half of the votes required to win the Games in the first round and Madrid was eliminated in the first round with a run-off vote against İstanbul. In the second round of voting, Tokyo gathered 60 votes against İstanbul's 36 and won the race to host the XXXII. Olympic Games.[5] The candidacy was a major government project as the category of 'Government and public support' received the highest points (8/9)[6] from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the bidding process was launched by the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on 13 August 2011.[7] Calling the prospect of hosting the Olympics in İstanbul a "*belated rendez-vous*", Erdoğan stated that, "İstanbul is not only a city that brings together three continents for centuries, but it is also a monumental capital where different civilizations, faiths and cultures live together fraternally". The main motto of the candidacy was 'Bridge Together', and relatedly most visible cultural references made while making the case for the hosting bid of İstanbul for the 2020 Summer Olympics were those that entail the city's heritage from the Ottoman era and the geographical positioning of the Bosphorus strait between Europe and Asia. As Erdoğan stated in the launch of the bidding campaign, "(…) one of the most remarkable chapters of Olympic history will be written in this city [İstanbul] of unique beauty, bringing together three continents". Erdoğan made remarks about the ongoing financial crisis as well, citing growth rates as a solidifying factor for İstanbul's bid. This is no surprise, as Turkey's emergence with higher growth rates following the 2008 financial crisis is mostly a result of the enlargement of the construction sector with foreign debt (Yeşilbağ 2016).

İstanbul's candidacy for hosting the Games demonstrates a clear example of neoliberal urban politics and public-private partnership. Seven grand corporations, including Digiturk, Doğuş Holding, Koç Holding, Sabancı Holding, Turkcell, Turkish Airlines and Ulker have signed a sponsorship contract with Turkey's National Olympic Committee for its bid to host the 2020 Summer Olympics,[8] while Turkey's public housing agency TOKİ (Public Housing Development Administration) in its presentation to IOC's Evaluation Committee, outlined plans for the construction of a new urban settlement which would cover an area of 420 km^2, which is more than 1/12 of the entire city.[9] The overall cost of construction projects outlined by TOKİ was estimated

[5] BBC. 07 September 2013. "Olympics 2020: Tokyo wins race to host Games." Retrieved 10 June, 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/24002795).

[6] International Olympic Committee (2012) *Games Of The XXXII Olympiad 2020 Working Group Report.* IOC report. 05 April Lausanne: IOC, p. 26.

[7] Habertürk. 13 August 2011. "2020 Olimpiyatları'na adayız!" Retrieved 09 June, 2020 (https://www.haberturk.com/spor/olimpiyat/haber/658653-2020-olimpiyatlarina-adayiz).

[8] Hürriyet. 21 January 2013. "2020 Olimpiyatları için dev ortaklık." Retrieved 09 June, 2019 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/2020-olimpiyatlari-icin-dev-ortaklik-22408288).

[9] BBC Türkçe. 03 April 2013. "İstanbul 2020: Belki şehre olimpiyat gelir." Retrieved 09 June, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/turkce/spor/2013/04/130403_cuneyt_olimpiyat).

approximately as $25 million.[10]

İstanbul's bid shows characteristics of creating a state of exception as the government support behind the candidacy relies mostly on the administrative capacity of preparing legal and executive frameworks for the organizational adjustments rapidly. During the launch of the candidacy, Erdoğan promised the enactment of a new law for İstanbul, "*[Our government] will make the necessary authorizations, through a special law, in order to immediately actualize the investments needed for the organization*".[11] Furthermore, tax exemptions and other legislative changes were also promised.[12] A further example of the state of exception through the government's hand in the case of a potential Olympic Games in Turkey was in fact experienced in 2013, prior to the vote to determine the host city of 2020 Summer Olympics, when Turkey hosted the XVII. Mediterranean Games. The 2013 Mediterranean Games were initially awarded to the combined bid of Greek cities, Volos and Larisa, however they were stripped of hosting rights due to the financial crisis in Greece and Turkey's southern city of Mersin won an online vote in 2011 to host the Games.[13] The seventeenth Mediterranean Games were held in June 2013, right in the middle of one of the largest protests to ever take place in Turkey, which started in İstanbul as the city witnessed the biggest urban social movement in its recent history, against the demolishment of Gezi Park. Although the protests were hardly mentioned by government officials or the IOC in the remaining three months of the bidding process, the Mediterranean Games hosted by Mersin during the summer of 2013 witnessed the ruling AKP's provincial branches purchasing and distributing tickets to their members *en masse*, for the opening ceremony, instead of regular sales,[14] in an attempt to suppress any potential anti-government protest that might erupt in the stands during the ceremony.

İstanbul's Olympic Games Master plan is comprised of four zones of sites and venues that include seven clusters. Three of the four zones are located at the European side of the city, except for the Bosphorus Zone. Out of the 37 (3 of them are football stadia to be built in Ankara, Antalya and Bursa), structures listed in these seven clusters (including stand-alone venues), only 11 were presently available at the time of the bidding process. In this sense, it would not be far-fetched to argue that such a potential Olympic urban design of İstanbul would rely on the eerily growing construction sector. There are also several promises in the candidature file that do not quite match reality and one of them is regarding transportation. While the bid promised that "100% of athletes will be within 35 minutes of competition venues and the average athlete trip is 12 minutes",[15] it would be a difficult task for the already struggling transportation

[10] Hürriyet. 25 March 2013. "2020 için TOKİ'ye inanılmaz bütçe." Retrieved 05 June, 2019 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/2020-icin-tokiye-inanilmaz-butce-22892697).

[11] 2020 Olimpiyatlarına Adayız!

[12] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. I, pp. 83, 93.

[13] CNN Türk. 23 February 2011. "2013 Akdeniz Oyunları Mersin'de." Retrieved 09 June, 2020 (https://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/02/23/2013.akdeniz.oyunlari.mersinde/607937.0/index.html).

[14] Hürriyet. 20 June 2013. "Akdeniz Oyunları'nda 'bilet krizi'." Retrieved 09 June, 2020 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/akdeniz-oyunlarinda-bilet-krizi-23549027).

[15] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 23.

structure, which received one of the lowest points (5/7)[16] from the IOC, with the city's estimated population of 16 million, and the Olympic visitors. Almost entire operations regarding the construction and maintenance of the venues are rested on TOKİ's Game Directorate[17], which "benefits from a direct reporting relationship to the Prime Ministry and a high degree of autonomy to deliver its mandate".[18] Furthermore, TOKİ is surrounded by expanded authorities of land acquisition and expropriation[19] which lead some international watchdogs to voice concerns of forced displacement.[20] All in all, these reflect the extensive role allocated to TOKİ in terms of urban design during the era of the AKP governments. This is a clear example of urban entrepreneurialism in AKP-era Turkey, as in a joint letter co-signed by five officials including the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the then-mayor of İstanbul Kadir Topbaş, "the entrepreneurial spirit of new Turkey"[21] is mentioned. Moreover, TOKİ promised 18 new stadium constructions in 16 different cities during the bidding process.[22] These demonstrate the neoliberal processes that are at play in the planned transformation of the built environment during İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics.

According to Batuman (2019:28), the constructions oversaw by TOKİ also lead to the attribution of an Islamic character to the urban spaces and this can be observed in İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Olympics as well. For instance, despite the fact that all opening and closing ceremonies of the Summer Olympics are held in Olympic Stadiums of the cities where the Games are held, in İstanbul's bid, a temporary venue called the Bosphorus Stadium was planned to be built near the historic Haydarpaşa Train Station to host the ceremonies and several other events. This 70,000-seat stadium would cost more than $474,000[23] and was planned to be dismantled after the Games end. Placed beside the Bosphorus strait between the continents of Europe and Asia, a significant aspect of this stadium is that, if realized, it would have a clear vision of the Topkapı Palace, the main court of the ruling dynasty of the Ottoman Empire in İstanbul for nearly 400 years. Although the Topkapı Palace is historically a significant part of the city's landscape, the fact that the opening and closing ceremonies are not held in Atatürk Olympic Stadium, which was specifically built for the purpose of hosting the Olympics implies a wider political symbolism.

The most visible cultural references in the hosting bid of İstanbul for the 2020 Summer Olympics are those that entail the city's heritage from the Ottoman era and the geographical positioning of the Bosphorus strait between Europe and Asia. In the presentation before the 125th IOC Session in Buenos Aires, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan states that İstanbul's bid brings together past, present and future, as

[16] 2020 Working Group Report, p. 22.
[17] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 37
[18] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 53.
[19] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 57.
[20] Bianet. 21 August 2013. "'Zorla Tahliyeler Olimpiyatın Kirli Yüzü'." Retrieved 10 June, 2020 (https://bianet.org/biamag/toplum/149305-zorla-tahliyeler-olimpiyatin-kirli-yuzu).
[21] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. I, p. 11.
[22] Yeni Şafak. 11 August, 2013. "16 ile 18 stadyum daha." Retrieved 14 June 2021 (https://www.yenisafak.com/politika/16-ile-18-stadyum-daha!-552794).
[23] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 39.

well as claiming that awarding the Games to a Muslim country would send a message to the broader region.[24] A further indication to this can be traced in the candidacy file of İstanbul, which defines it as, "A vibrant mega-city spanning two continents, more than three civilisations and eight millennia, (…) the world's capital of creativity, diversity and inclusiveness."[25] Other examples of the references for the Islamic religious character include the promotional candidate video which begins with the image of a man praying before a mosque.[26] In the same video, mosque minarets are a recurring image while the only reference to multicultural demography is the image of mosaics in the Hagia Sophia. Furthermore, according to the candidature file, the aspiration to host the Olympic Games was set to deliver "national pride outcomes for the nation which would last for generations."[27] There are constant references to the prospect of hosting the Olympics in a 'secular Muslim society'. In the section on the motivation for hosting the Games, while stating that "İstanbul 2020 offers an opportunity for the first ever secular Muslim democracy to host the Games and the first ever city to stage the event on two continents simultaneously"[28], the state's relationship with religious identity is listed ahead of its geographical significance with regards to the Bosphorus strait. Although these may be analysed as a way of attracting international voters to opt for İstanbul as the host of the 2020 Summer Olympics, the statements in the pro-government media on the candidacy provide a clearer picture of such emphases. For instance, in a pro-government newspaper, *Star,* a columnist contended that the reason why İstanbul lost the vote is Islamophobia.[29] This indicates an imagination of a novel identity which is based on religion, as İstanbul's bid for hosting the Games is associated with a Muslim-self and choosing Tokyo over is labelled as a form of enmity. In other words, opposition to the candidacy, which is equated with the novel identity and opposition to it is understood as a threat. This perception is a threat is perhaps best manifested by another pro-government newspaper, *Türkiye*, which labels an online petition following the Gezi Park protests, against İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics as treason.[30] This way, it is possible to trace both faces of national identity formation, external and internal. Externally this process is defined by identifying the opponents of İstanbul's bid as Islamophobes whereas internally they are labelled as traitors, which manifests the instrumentalization of the bidding process for a wider political purpose. In this sense, İstanbul's failed bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics is the concretization of a more comprehensive political pro-

[24] Olympic. 2013. "Presentation by Istanbul, Turkey." Retrieved 10 June, 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7dV17zqJ6k&t=21s).

[25] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. I, p. İ.

[26] Olympic. 2013. *2020* "Olympics - Istanbul, Tokyo and Madrid Promotional Candidate Videos." Retrieved 10 June, 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HI3ErDjr4BY).

[27] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. II, p. 11.

[28] İstanbul 2020 bid book, Vol. I, p. 21.

[29] Star. 09 September 2013. "Ezikliğin son noktası: Ooh İstanbul kaybetti." Retrieved 14 June 2021 (https://www.star.com.tr/yazar/ezikligin-son-noktasi-ooh-istanbul-kaybetti-yazi-787558/?fbclid=IwAR3c_Nle-mBIFxJruCJ2xcoNmQB_jBM1whWAE8anh2eYu1C2RHPffXff-xk).

[30] Türkiye. 14 June 2013. "İşte Gezi mektubu, her satırı ihanet." Retrieved 14 June, 2021 (https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/45141.aspx).

ject of combining neoliberal politics with the promotion of an Islamist reimagining of national identity.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I argue that hosting international sports events constitute an important element of the AKP's urban politics that reflect the neoliberal turn the urban governments took with urban entrepreneurialism and public-private partnerships. Furthermore, I argue that the international sports events held in Turkey during the tenure of the AKP governments serve to a wider political project, which is reflecting the Islamist political ideology through signifiers and references such as those to the Ottoman past. İstanbul is an ideal case study to demonstrate this in the sense that it used to be the capital of the Ottoman Empire, as well as an important hub for the neoliberal urban activities of right-wing governments at local and national levels, through enabling enlarged construction sectors. Hosting the Olympic Games is one of the biggest projects in this regard and that is the reason I chose İstanbul's bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics as a topic of research.

Conducting analysis on an event that did not take place is difficult, however, İstanbul's candidacy for the 2020 Olympic Games provides sufficient data for analysis as it made it to the final round of the bidding process. This way, although failed, İstanbul's bid presents an example of neoliberal urban practices combined with the promotion of conservative political agendas. The reason there is lacking discussion on opposition towards the project of hosting the Olympic Games is that there is not a thorough public debate on the topic. In other words, the Olympics do not make it to the higher ranks of public agenda, except for the three-week period they are held in. In this sense, a sheer indifference[31] towards the potential of hosting the Olympics Games can be observed and the limited debate surrounding it can be categorized as an island of agreement in favour, among social classes of different political affiliations. However, international sports events are an integral part of the policy of establishing and propagating a novel national identity for the AKP. Taking advantage of the neoliberal processes that are at play in the transformation of the urban environment, the construction sector in Turkey immensely grew during this period and consequently took a central role in the increasing number of bids for hosting international sports events. While İstanbul's bid for hosting the 2020 Summer Olympics is a failed one, it requires attention due to the frame it draws for the aforementioned policy and the city's key position as the formative space of the reimagining of national identity by the conservative-Islamist politics in Turkey.

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[31] A study by Çoknaz et al. (2010) demonstrate that nearly %46 of physical education and sports students at higher education level do not know which city filed its candidacy for hosting the Olympics.

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MAGDA LEJZEROWICZ[1]

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In the book *Anxiety and Lucidity: Reflections on Culture in Times of Unrest,* Leszek Koczanowicz reflects upon the phenomena of fear and anxiety in essential areas of life, both for the individual and the community. He adopts an interdisciplinary perspective so characteristic of an insightful researcher of culture. Fear and anxiety, as he argues, are intrinsic to modernity – the inability to get rid of them is typical of modern man. Koczanowicz puts his thoughts on paper in a demanding fashion, which does not, however, obscure the pleasure of reading these well-written and intelligent texts. The author's knowledge is vast, which transpires in the reviewed publication.

The Covid-19 lockdown has led to a crisis in many, if not all, areas of social life. Lebenswelt – the lifeworld – has ceased to be familiar, with the standard social order seriously disturbed. Koczanowicz's book, although written before the pandemic, as one of the very few, is the most up-to-date in pandemic times. The category of fear, used as a narrative dominant in this collection of essays, enables tracing, along with the author, the phenomenon of fear in modern culture.

When reading Koczanowicz's book, it is worth asking yourself the following questions: Is it possible to return to the pre-pandemic world? Is a world without fear possible at all? What will the world emerging from the crisis look like? Are we able to imagine it? What will man be after the pandemic?

In the first essay, *Angor animi: Or, on the culture of anxiety,* Koczanowicz uses the medical context to problematize the perception of anxiety. Angor animi – i.e. fear in

the face of imminent death, is transferred by Koczanowicz into the areas of community, the lifeworld and social relations, thus combining them into the culture of fear.

Also, this essay alludes to Boltanski, who characterizes modern reality as distinctively ambivalent. This ambivalence is a source of anxiety that has never been equally intense and widespread (p. 13). On the one hand, man experiences the unpredictability of the everyday world. Still, on the other, he looks to the future with the hope that the relevant institutions will maintain the existing order, although… *the world as we knew it has come to an end, while the future is the beast in the jungle* (Koczanowicz 2020: 14). Striving to understand the everyday world or one's own circumstances in the ambivalence of this reality poses a challenge for modern hamartia – hamartia, which millions of people share. Both fear and uncertainty feature in the question: Is the world of everyday life the only reality? Is there some depth beneath the surface, or should one abandon the search for the hidden causes of the actions taken? For few, the answer could reside in the words of Wittgenstein from *Philosophical Investigations*: "Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I do" (Wittgenstein 2010: §217: ccv).

Hamartia as alienation or hamartia as a virtue? Searching for answers together with the author, we discover the phenomenon of being out of place (*Identity as a nuisance. Two genealogies of modern hamartia*). The experience of being out of place, misinterpretation of one's here and now or inaccurate recognition of the circumstances constitute the experience of many people today, which is in stark contrast to the category of hamartia in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Are we able to discover our own identity through hamartia as alienation or as a virtue? Can a person be in their own place? Autonomy, as well as perpetration and freedom, are key features of the subject nowadays. However, does the subject really possess them? Can the subject really hold the authorship of their own life? Does the subject not give up autonomy in many areas simultaneously, or does he allow others to decide whether he does not live entangled in social norms instead of being the causative person? Joining Koczanowicz in exploring the examples from Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Durkheim or Rousseau, we discover that the individual, instead of living their own lives, lives the lives of others. By living others' views and judgements, they remain alien to themselves.

Taking the role of the Other and being an external observer may be interpreted as a virtue. This approach to hamartia is pointed out by Koczanowicz, who quotes examples from the works by Kant, Smith, James, Mead or Rorty. According to Richard Rorty, being deprived of one's own place is the basis for the lack of a specific view of the world and thus lack of exclusion of those who have a different worldview. The place where Rorty's ironist operates is the sphere of private life. Her world is her own private world as she does not impose her reality and principles on others. Others possess a different reality and a dissimilar world. However, is the existence of a society of ironists possible?

Koczanowicz creates a unique narrative about communication by analyzing the content of a postcard. The postcard's message is challenging to grasp and becomes an emblem of the paradoxes of language and communication. Taken out of context, the meaning of the content of the postcard may be undermined. Tearing out of mem-

ory and lack of reference to a specific situation enables rereading the content, thus creating a new chain of connections between past events. These considerations have led me to reflect on whether and if so, to what extent the ambivalence of communication influences the perception of fear or increases the amount of fear in the everyday world? (*A gladioli postcard. Memory and communication*).

The memories of childhood in a spectral world is an essay in which Koczanowicz combines the philosophical discourse on Otherness and Strangeness. The encounters with the Other in the illusory world proved significant for the author. What is it like to grow up with the Other, besides the Stranger? Is it possible to communicate with the Stranger? One may attempt to share this experience with Koczanowicz. The author, himself brought up in a city of displaced people, tells the story of appropriating a place that is not his own, adapting and at the same time rejecting someone else's history and life. We live next to the Other, beside the Strangers, the Different, at times even together with the Other, the Stranger, the Different, and sometimes we ourselves are classified as Other, Stranger or Different. However, certain groups remain excluded from this multiplicity of cultures and worlds. What can be considered puzzling is the limited multiculturalism, i.e. multiculturalism excluding Strangers, and the diversity excluding the Diverse. Being simultaneously Different and Strange makes us present and absent from the community.

The author draws attention to the state of uncertainty in which the settlers of a multicultural city had to function. Today, this state of uncertainty accompanies all Others and Strangers: migrants, the elderly, people with disabilities, minorities, people of different skin colour or people who define themselves as LGBTQIA. Politics seems to play a special game with the migration crisis as well as economic, social and demographic crises. It controls the layers of fear present under the layer of social order, taking advantage of the uncertainty and fear of social groups. This approach has resulted in the exclusion of Others from many communities. Do pedagogy or sociology have an answer to this state of affairs? Sadly, no. They, in fact, contribute to perpetuating the culture of fear.

Post-communism and culture wars are essays that tackle the coexistence of culturally and politically different communities and two nations with disparate values and goals. Are any of them genuine? Will any of them usurp hegemony?

Are we able to abandon the vision of the uniqueness of the Polish nation and join an honest discussion about our country's standing in European or global culture? Wolff (1994) and Janowski (2008) point to the lack of uniqueness of Poland. This country is neither particularly persecuted nor chosen, a country that, in fact, does not stand out from other Eastern Europe countries in any way. Are we able to use the emancipatory character of the postcolonial theory for Polish history, free ourselves from myths imposed by the colonizers and our own national myths, overcome cultural limitations, free ourselves from fears of domination and loss of identity? However, recalling the discursive concept of Laclau and Mouffe's politics, will referring to Polish history and its uniqueness, with the idea of the nation as an *empty signifier*, not provide a *hegemonic advantage* in the political struggle? At the end of the text, Koczanowicz points to a doubt regarding the unauthorized assumption of continuity of culture that exceeds

economic, political and social transformations. The essay concludes that the liberal arts must be confronted with the illusion of the continuity of culture.

To what extent do social media transform relationships with Others? Is there a shared virtual reality? Does the world of social media create a different reality for each user? These are the questions that Koczanowicz asks the reader in his essay *The anxiety of intimacy: or, on telling the truth in the age of the Internet*. The internet technological revolution has created a tool for making parrhesia, thus escaping the fear of intimacy. A user of a Facebook account or other social networks is faced with the dilemma of what information to disclose and what to omit. The fear of intimacy can be associated with identity, with reconciling self with social identity. In the concept of stigmatization, Goffman draws attention to the tension that accompanies individuals who ignore certain information about themselves and hide certain features that could discredit them (Goffman 1986). Likewise, the Facebook or Twitter user decides what to reveal and what to conceal. It is also worth remembering the difference between the identity Koczanowicz drawing on Rousseau's *Confessions*, the social identity revealed by *I* according to Goffman's concept, and the identity revealed on the Facebook profile. Identity in social media is just a profile that a person can manage and even decide to have a few of them. There is also a significant difference between real and virtual identity management. The fluid boundaries of intimacy in the Internet age allow for complete isolation as well as emotional exhibitionism. On the one hand, people possess a desperate need to be present, which may be achieved through new technologies; on the other hand, *the internet never forgets,* and some events that are shared now may prove unfavorable in the future. We do not know what world will emerge from the web or to what extent new technologies will change the trajectories of interpersonal relationships. Will a human or a bot emerge from the network? To conclude, it is worth paying attention to this essay, which seems so crucial for contemporary people, especially as it is not common for cultural critics to focus on this area of culture.

Koczanowicz points out the ambiguity of the term politics in his essay *The anxiety of politics*. Whatever understanding of politics we have, it is one of the fundamental features of human existence. The inability to conceptualize it creates a source of fear. Koczanowicz states "(...) what we cannot name is particularly disturbing and, even, terrifying to us. Unable to give politics "a local habitation and a name," we still need to talk about it because politics is impossible to ignore as one of the fundamental properties of human existence" (p. 93). The author recalls the concepts of Wittgenstein, Fondane, Habermas, Laclau and Mouffe, Boltanski, Levinas or Ricoeur, offering examples of different kinds of understanding of politics. What I found remarkable was Kocznowicz's perceptions of politics as seduction through the art of enhancing reality. Is it still art, or is it ideology? Another interpretation of politics is the struggle for hegemony or imposing the interpretation of *empty signifiers* (Laclau & Mouffe 2007).

In his reflections on modernity in the essay *Anxieties of Community,* Koczanowicz traces the phenomenon of fear in this area of human activity. He refers to the vision of man proposed by the two characteristic circles of thought – enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, particularly the understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community. He illustrates the examples that reflect the diversity of

community perception in the works by Kant, Burke, Herder, Nietzsche, Sternhell, up to the contemporary visions of Taylor and Nancy's community. Koczanowicz also alludes to the poets' understanding of community despite not always postulating political ideas. The poet resonates with the community's voice and can transform it or give it a form (p. 129). The author points to the importance of distinguishing communities based on experience, oftentimes on the experience of a crisis or a state of emergency, or communities based on dialogue.

In the essay *Please, don't be angry, happiness, that I take you as my due: happiness in the age of democratization*, Kochanowicz critically analyzes selected concepts of happiness present in contemporary liberal arts and social sciences. He draws on, among others, Foucault's concept of happiness, which is linked to the state as one of its major responsibilities. Fortunately, the authors of pragmatic concepts of the body draw attention to the role of the body in the development of abilities (Dewey 2008; Shusterman 2012). Happiness as a product or happiness as harmony? – this is a dilemma that Koczanowicz leaves the reader with.

The fear of old age is yet another area explored by Koczanowicz in the essay *Mortal generations: on two phenomenologies of ageing* – Cicero and Améry. What is the ageing process? Does an older adult themselves reflect on their own old age, or do they still perceive themselves as the subject? Or are they merely terrified of old age and death? How does individual experience interact with social determinants in this process? How does a person act in their old age? Koczanowicz strives to address these questions by analyzing the phenomenology of old age by Cicero and Amery.

Amery's thought fits with the contemporary observations of sociologists and educators holding that old age leads to alienation and self-alienation, exclusion and self-exclusion, and stigmatization and self-stigma. At death's door, a senior person is absent from social consciousness (Lejzerowicz 2019; 2020). The ageing process is a social phenomenon and existential experience, hence the need for an interdisciplinary approach offered by ageing studies. Describing the existential experience of ageing requires objectifying the individual experience by appointing a narrator. The *impartial* observer, the Other is a figure which appears in Cicero, Amery and Koczanowicz. Koczanowicz writes about his own experiences and reflections related to age, using the figure of K. K. poses the following questions: can philosophy be a consolation, especially in the last stage of life? Or is there only despair without hope left? Which perspective should one take, Cicero's or Amery's? Which is more grounded? Koczanowicz ends his narrative with a sentence from a poem by Szymborska: *I prefer not to ask how much longer and when* (1998: 215).

Predicting the future is another area of anxiety analyzed in the essay *The anxiety of clairvoyance: terminal lucidity and the end of culture*. The current world is ending, with schemes of action and typical procedures no longer effective. Is terminal lucidity a lucidity before a fall or before another crisis? The possibility of clairvoyance is, in a sense, the same as terminal illumination. Who can read the signs of the times, who can be a prophet or a clairvoyant: the spirits of Marx, the angel of Benjamin, the philosopher of Hegel? These figures of modernity reflect the era's problems – the period of decline, the era of transit, perhaps leading to emancipation. At the same time, they

correspond to the feeling of the end of history. Koczanowicz concludes the essay with a radical proposal to take up the challenge to face the fear of the time we live in (p. 175). The radical nature of the challenge is reinforced by the fact that no clairvoyant will predict the outcome. "(…) The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk" (Hegel 2008: 23).

Koczanowicz's considerations fit into the contemporary discourse of researchers of culture, politics, philosophy and sociology as he describes many of the issues raised: autonomy, subjectivity, identity, the randomness of human existence, time, transience, communication, democracy as a project of enlightenment in a manner which creates space for discussion. The author's perspective is remarkable and constitutes an innovative approach to contemporary literature. He guides the reader along the paths of fear, reinterpreting the problems in his earlier works: *Community and Emancipation. A dispute over a post-conventional society* (2005); *Politics of Time: Dynamics of Identity in Post-Communist Poland* (2008); *Modern anxiety. Essays on Democracy and Its Adversaries* (2011); *Politics of Dialogue: Non-Consensual Democracy and Critical Community* (2015).

The book *Anxiety and Lucidity* is an exciting springboard for a discussion on the future of democracy. It is worth recommending, especially today in times of ubiquitous fear, of the multitude of catastrophes that accompany man, existing in a shaky reality in which they seek rules yet ends up with randomness or exceptions.

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