

Katarzyna ZALAS-KAMIŃSKA

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University of Wrocław

ORCID: 0000-0003-2605-1036

Humanitarian Aid for Ukraine as a Pivotal Element in the Polish Aid Programme and an Opportunity to Amplify the Role of Development Cooperation in the Polish Foreign Policy

Abstract: Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing humanitarian crisis made 2022 a landmark year in terms of humanitarian aid to Ukraine and resulted in a huge wave of support, not only financial. Poland became known as a "humanitarian superpower," and the attitude of Poles was assessed as unprecedented in terms of solidarity. The events in Ukraine significantly affected the Polish development cooperation system (Polish Aid), causing not only a more than 200 percent increase in ODA and the proportion of its distribution, but increasing the involvement of Polish actors. The answer to the question of how much the situation is likely to translate into an increase in the share of humanitarian aid, which is part of development cooperation, in Polish foreign policy depends on Poland's further strategy of providing humanitarian aid and skillfully combining it with social potential.

Key words: humanitarian aid, aid for Ukraine, development cooperation, Polish Aid, Polish Foreign Policy

Introduction. Humanitarian aid – development cooperation – foreign policy

The analysis of development cooperation as a tool of state foreign policy primarily focuses on its underlying motives (Lancaster, 2006, pp. 1–64; Bagiński, 2009, p. 25). It represents a distinct sphere of state activity: a form of foreign social assistance characterized by a partnership between a highly developed and affluent donor and a less developed and economically disadvantaged recipient, yielding tangible benefits for both parties (Stępień, 2010, p. 114; Kugiel, 2013; Overton, Murray, 2021, p. 5). In addition to the objectives and interests of the donor on the one hand, and the needs and capacities of the recipient on the other, both par-

ties should be bound by a shared global responsibility to tackle challenges of the modern world (Pauselli, 2020, pp. 34–46).

Poland, transitioning seamlessly from the role of foreign aid recipient to that of provider, has been recognised as an ‘emerging donor’ (Paterek, 2013, p. 208; Smolaga, 2011, p. 383). In its foreign policy, Poland aims to establish itself as a stable and trustworthy state (Bieleń, 2010), capable of sharing its wealth with others and committed to contributing to the implementation of sustainable development goals (Szent-Iványi, Tétényi, 2013, pp. 819–831; Zalas-Kamińska, 2019, pp. 78–96).

While Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 marked a significant milestone for the development of the Polish development cooperation system, Polish Aid (Official Development Assistance, or ODA) initially held a rather marginal significance in the Polish foreign policy.¹ The dynamics and complexity of international development issues, along with the aim of establishing Poland’s position as a responsible actor engaged in addressing global challenges, gradually shifted this state of affairs, despite the initially low level of ODA² (Sobotka, 2012, p. 45; Paterek, 2013, pp. 208–209). As early as 2008, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski asserted that development assistance was a tool of Polish foreign policy (Szostakiewicz, 2008). Moreover, emphasis was placed on strengthening Poland’s international standing as “a nation with notable accomplishments capable of effectively sharing its successes” (MSZ, 2018, p. 4). It was deemed necessary to enhance Poland’s role in this realm of state activity, recognizing the pivotal role of development cooperation in fostering global prosperity and stability (MSZ, 2012, p. 22; MSZ, 2016, pp. 2–4). In recent years, there has been a significant emphasis on the importance of development cooperation in Poland’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to security issues. The overarching aim of such state activity is to contribute to a more

¹ The terms “development cooperation” and “Polish Aid” refer to the entirety of the Polish government’s activities directed towards developing countries or transition countries. Additionally, these activities are sometimes referred to as “development assistance.” This interchangeable usage stems from the period before the terminology was standardized in the Development Cooperation Act of 2011, during which the terms were not consistently distinguished.

² Official Development Assistance (ODA) refers to assistance directed to or for the benefit of a specific group of recipient countries by donor countries. Low expenditure on this form of foreign government activity was cited as one of the reasons why development cooperation was not widely regarded as a significant element of Polish foreign policy. Additionally, the relatively high dispersion of aid contributed to the low effectiveness of foreign policy objectives.

sustainable world for both present and future generations. Furthermore, engagement in development activities is seen as a reflection of the solidarity and humanitarianism inherent in Polish values. (*Solidarność dla Rozwoju. 2021–2030*, 2021, p. 5).

Humanitarian aid, alongside development assistance and global education, has been recognized as integral components of the Polish development cooperation system (Act, 2011).³ It is defined as “providing assistance, care, and protection to populations affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other humanitarian crises caused by nature or man” (MSZ, 2012, pp. 8–9).

In the initial phase of the Polish development cooperation system, humanitarian aid constituted a small fraction of its efforts. However, between 2016 and 2018, there was a notable surge in Polish involvement in humanitarian action, reaching its peak in 2017. This increase in spending was driven by the country’s response to the challenges posed by heightened migration, notably in the response to the Syrian crisis.⁴ In 2017, as much as 86% of humanitarian aid was allocated to support Syrian refugees.⁵ This was in line with Poland’s policy of providing ‘assistance on the ground’ (for instance, in 2016, the government adopted ‘Humanitarian Package in the Middle East’). “An integral component of Polish development cooperation is humanitarian aid, which Poland primarily directs to countries in the Middle East and Ukraine, regions geographically distant but profoundly affected by armed conflicts due to the current global political situation. A key priority of Polish foreign policy is to assist refugees

³ According to the Act, the provision of humanitarian aid falls under the purview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Act delineates the forms of humanitarian aid and the entities responsible for its implementation. Additionally, it introduces the possibility for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to commission such activities without the need for open competition.

⁴ Among the countries to which Poland directed humanitarian action were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Cameroon, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan.

⁵ The majority of Polish humanitarian aid was provided as a contribution to the EU’s *Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT)*. It is worth noting that Poland’s total expenditure on humanitarian aid exceeded PLN 173 million, which accounted for 21% of bilateral development assistance. In 2019, humanitarian aid spending accounted for over 8% of bilateral aid. Moreover, out of the total PLN 71 million almost 40 million (i.e. more than 55%) was allocated to the FRiT. In 2020, Poland designated PLN 39 million for the same purpose (total humanitarian aid channelled bilaterally was approximately PLN 74 million), whereas in 2021, it was PLN 23.5 million (total bilateral humanitarian aid was PLN 90 million).

as close as possible to their homelands”, – emphasised Joanna Wronecka, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Coordinator for Development Cooperation (MSZ, 2017). At the close of 2017, a Humanitarian Aid Department was established within the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, with Beata Kempa assuming the role of Minister for Humanitarian Aid. However, the department was dissolved in 2020. A pivotal period marked by significant changes for humanitarian aid was the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, this was reflected in the competitive procedure titled ‘Humanitarian and Development Aid in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic’. As part of its efforts, Poland provided support to countries, including Ukraine, involved in the ongoing development cooperation in their fight against the pandemic. The increase in the volume of humanitarian aid in 2020 and 2021 was primarily driven by the global response to the pandemic, e.g. the redistribution of surplus vaccines among developing countries. In 2020, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to counteract COVID-19 and humanitarian aid amounted to PLN 74.51 million. Moreover, in 2021, the cost of supporting refugees in Poland increased by half compared to the previous year before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (Zalas-Kamińska, 2022a, p. 8).

The incorporation of this form of assistance into ODA was controversial as ODA was believed to align more closely with migration policy rather than development policy. As per the OECD’s interpretation, certain associated costs may indeed be eligible (Szeniawska, 2022, pp. 13–14). These scenarios fitted into humanitarian assistance objectives, such as aiding refugees from recipient countries even if they were located on the territory of another, potentially highly developed country. Additionally, it alleviated the burden on countries experiencing humanitarian crises or countries in a state of war, as the aid covered the refugee support cost. This option was used, among other things, by Poland to help refugees from Ukraine in 2022.

Ukraine as a priority country for Polish Aid

While Ukraine has been a priority country for Polish Aid since 2005. In 2017, the country received most significant bilateral support,⁶ and the

⁶ In 2017, Ukraine related ODA amounted to around PLN 230 million, whereas in 2019, it was around PLN 309 million (4% of total ODA in 2017 and more than 10% of ODA in 2019). Moreover, 2021 ODA increased to exceed PLN 325 million.

cooperation with it played a pivotal role in the Polish foreign policy primarily for geopolitical reasons. Development cooperation was thus regarded as a complement to the pre-existing multilateral political partnership between the states, acknowledging that Polish Aid could bolster the partner's socio-economic and political reforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, p. 3).

The ODA for Ukraine primarily focused on facilitating country's successful transformation and alignment with the European Union (MSZ, 2013, pp. 6–7, 13–14; Kaca, 2011; Pospieszna, 2014). As a result, numerous projects focused on democracy assistance in its broadest sense, encompassing political, social, and economic reforms. This assistance promoted decentralization, professionalization of civil service, public finance, and crisis management. Support was also extended to education and scholarships, which constituted a significant component of the aid provided⁷ (Petrova, Pospieszna, 2021).

Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine within the Polish Aid has continued since the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014. Initially, the program provided support to those affected by the Kiev Maidan, offering treatment and rehabilitation in Poland for individuals injured during the protests. As needs grew, the assistance was extended to cover the eastern regions of Ukraine. Early on, it was recognized that addressing the likely challenges of humanitarian aid in Ukraine would be essential in the upcoming years (MSZ, 2014, p. 4). Humanitarian support was provided through both multilateral and bilateral channels. Contributions came from multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support those impacted by the conflict, and

⁷ Scholarships and educational expenses represent a significant and hotly debated aspect of Polish bilateral aid. Some members of the non-governmental community argue that Poland lacks a coherent scholarship policy strategy and question the extent to which the education of students in Poland contributes to development in their home countries. Moreover, including such costs in aid is inconsistent with OECD recommendations. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that educational and scholarship initiatives help build "the socio-economic capacity of partner countries". This discussion holds significant importance, as Ukraine represents one of the largest minorities in Poland, with associated support factored into Polish Aid. Between 2016 and 2019, approximately 84% of Polish support to Ukraine was directed towards supporting Ukrainian students and researchers. This allocation was viewed negatively by two-thirds of the surveyed beneficiaries (MSZ, 2018, p. 32; *Concord...*, 2019, pp. 8–10; Świdrowska, 2022, pp. 24–25).

the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) for operations in Ukraine. Additional support was provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for initiatives aimed at promoting entrepreneurship among conflict-affected populations in Ukraine. Furthermore, activities were carried out through direct bilateral channels with Polish entities, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1

Examples of Polish humanitarian aid to Ukraine in 2014–2021

Project	Operator
1	2
Accommodation for internally displaced people (IDP) from conflict regions in Ukraine and winter preparation	Caritas Poland
Winter preparation of IDPs from Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv regions	
Humanitarian aid in the form of subsistence and accommodation for people affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine	
Provision of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people from Zaporizhia Region, Ukraine	
Operation of four medical-social centres in eastern Ukraine	
Direct material and psychological assistance to the population living in the demarcation zone in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas controlled by the Ukrainian government	
Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in Ukraine.	Polish Centre for International Aid
Help for internally displaced people in Ukraine to prepare for winter conditions	
Securing a 'roof over one's head' and psychological support for internally displaced persons in Ukraine	
Provide humanitarian and social assistance to internally displaced families and community members living in the Zaporizhia Region	Polish Humanitarian Action
Providing humanitarian assistance and social care to internally displaced people and community members in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Region)	
Humanitarian assistance to displaced people from the Kharkiv Region, Ukraine	Polish Red Cross
Improving access to medical care for internally displaced people in the Dnipropetrovsk Region	
Together with Ukraine. Humanitarian assistance to prepare internally displaced persons for winter	European Meeting Centre – Nowy Staw Foundation
Together with Ukraine. Humanitarian aid	Foundation for Spiritual Culture of the Borderland

1	2
Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people in Ukraine	Polish Medical Mission Association
Family and therapeutic camps for children – victims of activities war and armed conflict in eastern Ukraine	Catholic Intelligentsia Club
Humanitarian assistance to refugees from the eastern regions of Ukraine	Foundation of the Union of Polish Knights of Malta, Malta Medical Service, Malta Aid
Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and host communities in the Kharkiv consular region	Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kiev
Improving access to health care in conflict-affected areas in the Lugansk region	
Transport of humanitarian aid	MFA, State Fire Dept.

Source: Own compilation based on data from MFA annual reports.

The involvement of Polish actors from the onset of the crisis in Ukraine escalated significantly in 2022, entering a crucial phase characterized by increased financial and social support.

Social support – Poles involved as humanitarian aid capital

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, over 7 million people fled the country. More than half of these refugees sought refuge in Poland, with nearly 1.5 million individuals becoming permanent residents (*Ukraine refugee situation, 2022*). Furthermore, the UNHCR estimates that over half of Ukraine’s population, approximately 24 million people, will require humanitarian assistance in the near future.

The Polish public responded immediately; stories of their support for Ukrainians at the Polish border and later in many Polish cities gained global attention. Poles provided food, clothing, blankets, and cleaning supplies to those at the Polish-Ukrainian border. Numerous individuals arrived independently or in groups of family and friends, along with representatives from various businesses, associations, and foundations, offering transportation and housing to refugees. Advertisements on the internet solicited support, with Poles providing food and accommodation, assisting with legal formalities related to staying in Poland, and organising collections of material and financial aid.

A survey by the GfK Polonia Household Panel revealed that 80% of Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees (*Polacy*

ochoczo..., 2022). Additionally, more than three months into the conflict, over 47% of Poles reported personal involvement in aiding refugees, according to Interia.pl in 2022. Data from the Central Statistical Office (CSO) further indicates that from February to June 2022, approximately 70% of Polish households had provided assistance to Ukrainians (*Oto ilu Polaków*, 2022).

The public aid campaign became so widespread in Poland that it was rare to find any institution or organisation that did not participate. When asked why they were so eager to help, many Poles described their actions as a natural human response. This widespread compassionate effort was recognized and leveraged by the Polish government, especially during the image crisis concerning the treatment of refugees and migrants at the Polish-Belarusian border. Polish President Andrzej Duda emphasised, “The tragic days and hours of trial united Poles and Ukrainians. Everyone worked to help Ukraine. Poles rose to the occasion and behaved as they should towards their neighbours in need,” thanking Poles for their dedication alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski (PAP, 2023a). Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki added: “This solidarity will be remembered for generations” (Polskieradio24.pl, 2022a).

The Polish assistance to Ukrainians received unprecedented international acclaim. American writer J. Daniel Sawyer praised Poland’s efforts on Twitter: “Poland has once again presented itself be one of the most fundamentally decent cultures in Europe. They have their flaws, but since the Middle Ages, this has been profound feature at the heart of Polish culture.” Moreover, U.S. President Joe Biden expressed gratitude during his visit to Warsaw in February 2023, stating, “I would like to thank Poland and the Polish people for helping Ukraine; what you have done has been truly remarkable” (*Joe Biden do Polaków...*, 2023). US Ambassador to Poland Mark Brzezinski added: “Poland is seen as a humanitarian superpower” (PAP, 2023b).

Financial support under ODA

The crisis in Ukraine has profoundly influenced development cooperation, prompting a shift in priorities of Polish humanitarian aid. Previously planned activities were adapted by reallocating funds and incorporating initiatives to support Ukrainian refugees as part of Polish Aid (MSZ, 2022).

According to preliminary estimates, in 2022, Poland allocated 0.51% of its Gross National Income (GNI) to Official Development Assistance (ODA), marking an increase attributed primarily to the support provided to refugees from Ukraine. Of this, USD 226 million (7% of ODA) was earmarked for direct assistance to Ukraine, while USD 2,181 million (65% of ODA) was allocated for the maintenance of refugees on the Polish territory. Additionally, after almost 20 years, the proportions between bilateral and multilateral aid have shifted, with the former accounting for 75% and the latter 25% (GOV, 2023).

Thus, among the DAC countries, Poland emerged as the donor with the largest increase in ODA in the year under review, marking a staggering 256% rise. This nearly threefold surge also propelled Poland beyond the commitment to achieve 0.33% of GNI as outlined in the Agenda 2030. The substantial increase in Polish aid, exceeding two hundred percent, marked a pivotal moment in the country's development cooperation system. Despite numerous declarations, the level of aid had previously remained relatively low (see footnote 4).

It is important to note that the data does not include other financial contributions directed towards Ukrainian citizens, which are considerable but difficult to quantify. According to various sources, private aid from Polish citizens alone is estimated to be between 9 to 10 billion zlotys (*Wojna udowodniła...*, 2022).

In addition to private contributions, Polish non-governmental organizations played a significant role by organizing humanitarian aid convoys, collecting donations for those affected, and providing assistance to refugees within Poland (polskieradio24.pl, 2022). While these efforts are difficult to quantify, they exemplify the solidarity and humanitarian spirit of the Polish people.

Potential for the future

According to the Minister for Development Cooperation, Paweł Jabłoński, Poland has gained valuable experience in providing assistance during challenging circumstances. He stated, "This recognition helps to shape Poland's image as a nation that is always prepared to offer support in times of crisis." (MSZ, 2019, p. 5). Undoubtedly, Poland's humanitarian assistance strategy (*Solidarność dla rozwoju...*, 2021, pp. 24–25) will be instrumental in sustaining this image. Moreover, additional insights

are provided by the OECD review of Polish Aid. The OECD has stated that Poland's strengths included its capacity to stimulate more integrated approach, underlying the necessity to enhance coordination in Poland's development, humanitarian, and peacekeeping efforts (*OECD...*, 2023, pp. 10–11).

According to the current annual plan, Poland will continue its humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and extend support to countries facing a humanitarian crisis due to mass migration from Ukraine. Additionally, the Polish government aims to support nations that rely on grain imports from Ukraine to mitigate risks to global food security. If humanitarian aid, particularly support to Ukraine, is to enhance the role of development cooperation in Polish foreign policy, it is vital to assess both the humanitarian capacity Poland has developed so far and the future prospects of development cooperation amidst global instability and unpredictability.

Firstly, the aforementioned initiatives will demand the ability to make swift decisions and foster effective international cooperation, including donor coordination. In this regard, Poland has emerged as a central hub for humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Poland's support for Ukraine has acted as a 'defibrillator,' profoundly influencing the course of the conflict (*Ambasador RP w Kijowie...*, 2022).

Secondly, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, and catastrophes will require not only increased financial support as a facet of development cooperation but also a surge in human resources. The demand for highly skilled specialists, such as humanitarian workers, medical rescuers, and search and rescue teams, is expected to escalate significantly. In this regard, Poland already possesses significant resources, demonstrated by organizations such as the Polish Humanitarian Action Foundation, Caritas Poland, the Polish Medical Mission Association, and the Polish Center for International Aid. These entities have been actively engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and maintain enduring partnerships with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement development cooperation initiatives.

Thirdly, in addition to high-level specialization, involving non-governmental actors and Polish citizens aligns with the vision of transferring Polish expertise through local partners (MSZ, 2019, p. 4), thereby embodying the spirit of Polish solidarity and humanitarianism (Chimiak, 2016, pp. 193–246). While Polish engagement has historically prioritized promoting the democratization agenda (Monkos, 2021), international exigencies, including the necessity to address diverse crises, have amplified

humanitarian aid endeavours. This has brought to the forefront the social potential of Poles, garnering attention not only from the Polish government but also internationally. The observed shift in the balance between bilateral and multilateral channels in 2022, following nearly two decades of the Polish Aid programme, may offer strategic advantages for Poland's foreign policy. Nonetheless, ensuring the ongoing willingness of Poles to support Ukraine will remain crucial.

Additionally, it appears important to enhance the relationship between development and humanitarian projects and actors responsible for implementing these initiatives (Zalas-Kamińska, 2022, p. 8). Prominent examples from Poland-Ukraine relations include projects such as the development of the voluntary medical rescue system, bolstering the personnel capabilities of the State Border Service of Ukraine, and enhancing the effectiveness of Ukrainian emergency services in responding to crisis situations. The expertise acquired through aid projects has proven invaluable during the increased service demand during hostilities. The 2023 Development Cooperation Plan underscores the importance of not only continuing humanitarian aid to Ukraine but also prioritising the country's reconstruction efforts and supporting its institutions and society (MFA, 2023, p. 4).

Support for Ukraine enjoys robust backing from the Polish society, at least for the present. A 2022 social survey reveals that 71% of Poles believe that Poland should support Ukraine during the war. For the majority of respondents (56%), it is evident that such support enhances Poland's security. Slightly fewer respondents (44%) argue that aiding Ukraine is a moral obligation for Poles to assist their neighbour. Interestingly, more than half of the respondents are of the opinion that helping the Ukrainians will benefit Poland in the long term and they are willing to allocate additional resources for this purpose (*Raport z badania opinii...*, 2022, pp. 36–39). The comprehensive Polish diplomatic efforts regarding Russian aggression against Ukraine's civilian population, along with the unity in the internal Polish political narrative from the onset of the war, have bolstered this message. Together, they signify potential for the advancement of Poland's public diplomacy, particularly with the return of Radosław Sikorski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the 2023 parliamentary elections. Sikorski, who was a proponent of Poland's democratisation agenda in development cooperation years ago, brings his experience and perspective to the table.

The findings from a survey conducted among Ukrainian beneficiaries of Polish development cooperation between 2016 and 2019 offer valuable

insights. Particularly pertinent to the current discussion are the recommendations for enhancing specific areas within Polish development cooperation with Ukraine. These recommendations encompass aspects related to humanitarian aid, such as supporting internally displaced persons from Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, as well as bolstering emergency services (Świdrowska, 2022, pp. 23–39). In this area, humanitarian actions on the part of Poland are already in line with the expectations and needs of the Ukrainian society.

Undoubtedly, the world is grappling with a rising number of crises, ranging from man-made conflicts to the repercussions of climate change, including natural disasters and catastrophes. Unfortunately, vulnerable countries bear the brunt of these challenges. Consequently, there is a pressing need to increase humanitarian aid. For Poland, justifying this increase aligns with the core objectives of development cooperation, including enhancing security, fostering a more sustainable world, and integrating the solidarity and humanitarianism of the Polish people. Moreover, this underscores the eastern focus of Polish aid, which remains a crucial component of the Polish foreign policy, serving its interests and concerns about security (Paterrek, 2013, p. 227). The results of the ongoing debate on changes in the management system of Polish development cooperation, including the growing role of the Foundation for International Solidarity, are significant (Kugiel, 2023). Strengthening Ukraine also entails the weakening of the Russian Federation, a goal that is not only integral to Poland's development cooperation but also aligns with its broader activity in the international arena (Zięba, Pawłuszko, 2016, p. 27). This aspect is likely to be crucial.

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Konceptualizacja: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

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Authors contributions

Conceptualization: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

Formal analysis: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

Methodology: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

Writing – original draft, review and editing: Katarzyna Zalas-Kamińska

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**Pomoc humanitarna dla Ukrainy jako punkt zwrotny w programie
Polska Pomoc i szansa na zwiększenie udziału współpracy rozwojowej
w polskiej polityce zagranicznej**

Streszczenie

Agresja Rosji na Ukrainę i wynikający z niej kryzys humanitarny sprawiły, że rok 2022 był przełomowy pod względem pomocy humanitarnej dla Ukrainy i spowodował ogromną falę wsparcia, nie tylko finansowego. Polska zyskała miano "supermo-

carstwa humanitarnego”, a postawa Polaków była oceniana jako bezprecedensowa pod względem solidarności. Wydarzenia w Ukrainie znacząco wpłynęły na system polskiej współpracy rozwojowej (Polską Pomoc), powodując nie tylko ponad dwustuprocentowy wzrost ODA i proporcje w jej dystrybucji, ale zwiększając zaangażowanie polskich podmiotów. Odpowiedź na pytanie o to, na ile sytuacja ma szansę przełożyć się na zwiększenie udziału pomocy humanitarnej, będącej częścią współpracy rozwojowej, w polskiej polityce zagranicznej, zależy od dalszej strategii udzielania przez Polskę pomocy humanitarnej i umiejętnego połączenia jej z potencjałem społecznym.

Słowa kluczowe: współpraca rozwojowa, pomoc humanitarna, polska polityka zagraniczna, wojna w Ukrainie, solidarność Polaków