Stranger – Other – Muslim. On the Integration of Muslim Minorities in Europe (from an Anthropological and Cultural Perspective)

Abstract: The article aims to characterize the sources of conflicts and social tensions related to the presence of the Muslim minority in Europe. To achieve this goal, I intend to utilize a transdisciplinary strategy that will enable the comparison of research results emerging from political science and sociological studies, as well as cultural studies and anthropology. This approach allows for the formulation of new diagnoses. On the one hand, it makes it possible to describe the main integration strategies regarding the Muslim minority in Europe and shows their insufficiency and ineffectiveness. On the other hand, it reminds us that migration and ethnic issues are rooted in theoretical reflection, preceding the phenomena analyzed in empirical research. It also draws attention to hidden mechanisms that determine the tendency to ethnic isolation and describes cultural processes that may contribute to remodeling the relationship between Muslim immigrants and their social environment.

Key words: Muslim minority, immigrants, Other, Strangers, integration processes

1. Research perspective

The purpose of this article is to analyze conflicts associated with the presence of Muslim minorities in Europe and to elucidate mechanisms underlying the conflicts. The research employs a desk research method founded on a transdisciplinary strategy, as advocated by scholars such as Weinberg, Mittelstrass, Kita, Kötter, and Balsiger. This approach facilitates the analysis of social conflicts from an interdisciplinary perspective. However, it eschews the creation of new interdisciplinary fusions – which would involve merging disciplines and blending competencies – in favor of conducting parallel analyses and interpretations of the same processes while preserving the cognitive independence of disciplines involved.
Transdisciplinary research stems from the understanding that not all scientific quandaries can be resolved within the confines of disciplines in which they originate. It acknowledges questions, expressed as hypotheses, that cannot be satisfactorily addressed using methods and explanations offered by a single discipline (Weinberg, 1972). Consequently, transdisciplinary approaches not only broaden the scope of research by incorporating new perspectives but also encourage a dialogue between findings from specialized disciplines and alternative interpretative frameworks that extend beyond their original contexts (Mittelstrass 2002; Mittelstrass 2005; Mittelstrass 2011; Weinberg, 1972; Nicolescu, 1996, p. 66).

Transdisciplinary studies on migration facilitate a comprehensive analysis by integrating political and sociological research with insights from cultural studies, anthropology, and philosophy. This approach helps delineate new interpretive axes and encourages fresh perspectives on familiar issues. Such studies delve into the prevalent fear of immigrants, which often mirrors historical anxieties about the presence of the “Other” or the foreign element. They extend these analyses to consider concepts such as cultural security, nationalization, and the emergence of new intolerance. Moreover, these studies highlight the critical dichotomy between “ethnicity” and “citizenship”, positioning it within the broader discourse on social structures, specifically contrasting hierarchical systems with network-based models. This nuanced examination not only broadens the theoretical landscape but also enriches the dialogue surrounding migration and its socio-cultural implications.

2. Fear of Strangers

The situation of refugees has sparked numerous debates extending beyond immediate political ramifications to broader philosophical questions. These include considerations of how the stranger, as articulated in social space (Handerek) and simultaneously as the Other (Levinas, 1998, pp. 68–70), should integrate into a multicultural society. Furthermore, should a refugee’s painful history – marked by the loss of home, language, experience of violence, and encounters with a new cultural system – warrant unconditional acceptance of their otherness (Kymlicka, 1995)? This discussion also raises the question of whether such acceptance should be confined to moral and religious dimensions or extended to legal and ethical spheres as well (Moore, 2014, pp. 325–362; Boski, 2009; Paleczny, 2007, pp. 220–229).
The recent decision by the Council of Europe’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee served as the catalyst for revisiting these questions. On June 8, 2023, the Committee introduced a principle of solidarity, requiring member states to participate in addressing potential mass crises. However, the nature of this support was left to individual countries to determine – it could involve direct participation in relocation programs, financial contributions, or logistical support. Under this new agreement, Poland agreed to accept 1,900 refugees out of a total of 30,000 migrants from Africa and Asia arriving in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. While Austria, Bulgaria, Malta, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Italy expressed reservations about the pact, only Poland and Hungary ultimately voted against the agreement.¹

The aversion to resettlement policies, of which Poland and Hungary (Duszczyk, Matuszczyk, 2016) have become the face – i.e., countries that have not had negative experience with immigrants to the extent of Western European countries – is not solely due to current migration policies. Their source is stereotypes and fears (Vertovec, 2010, pp. 83–95; Kymlicka, 2001), fueled by media propaganda (Białas, Górczyńska, Jaźwinska, Łysienia, Ostaszewska-Zuk, 2015). Even if they seem to be well known, they effectively polarize public opinion, which does not exclude researchers, experts and politicians. For a certain part of the participants in the refugee debate, they are evidence of the deepening crisis (or perhaps even twilight) of multicultural Europe. For others, on the contrary, they are a signal to rebuild its foundations. This means that even if the policy of European multiculturalism is in crisis (Mamzer, 2008; Budyta-Budzyńska, 2010; Wielecki, 2012; Wzory wielokulturowości..., 2006; The Challenge..., 1997), this is not due to the fallacy of the concept itself, but to its implementation.

Opinions on the future of multicultural Europe have crystallized into three distinct discussion streams regarding refugees. The first stream prioritizes the rights of the majority population, expressing concerns about whether the influx of immigrants might undermine native values. The second stream advocates for the “nationalization of refugees” as a corrective measure to liberal immigration policies, proposing more nation-centric approaches to refugee integration. The third stream focuses directly on

¹ See: Unijny pakt migracyjny przegłosowany w Radzie UE. Relokacja i kary za odmowę przyjęcia migrantów z Afryki i Azji – wPrawo.pl, access: 29.06.2023; Relokacja migrantów. Nieoficjalnie: Polska dostała wyjątek (businessinsider.com.pl), access: 29.06.2023.
the refugees themselves, addressing the challenges they face with integration and the resurgence of intolerance that marginalizes their status and complicates their assimilation (Górska, Rączkowiak, Gołębiewski, 2022).

3. “Cultural security,” “nationalization”, and “new intolerance”

Fears of an incoming wave of refugees have fueled a resurgence in “defense strategies” (Kitler, 2010, pp. 27–35; Tama, 2023, pp. 13–23). Concepts advocating the protection of cultural heritage from an alien invasion (Oleksiewicz, 2018; Barcik, 2008, pp. 90–91) have extended military, political, and economic paradigms (Misiuk, 2013, pp. 9–23; Buzan, 2016, pp. 18–35) into the realm of soft, symbolic values. In this context, the Other (Levinas, 1998, pp. 68–70), perceived as unpredictable, have become a symbol of irrational fear, more primordial than the political and social realities that might justify it (Nussbaum, 2018). This fear manifests in two forms: a “felt” fear, characterized by the anticipation of unpleasant, yet indistinct events, and an “implicit” fear, based on imagined rather than actual dangers (Kępinski, pp. 124–129).

Muslim immigrants have become a focal point for both types of fears, evoking a sense of alienation. Their presence is often viewed through the lens of an anachronistic social model, perceived as incompatible with the democratic standards of the Western world, which champions democracy, equality, tolerance, and respect for differences (Gellner, 1991, pp. 211–227). This perspective may stem from the fact that Muslim culture has not undergone an enlightenment similar to that in the West, which could have opened it up to the influences of other social systems, cultural practices, and philosophical doctrines (Armour, 2004). This is not to suggest that there are no experts on Aristotle or proponents of liberal values among Muslims – after all, it was Arabic translators who enabled St. Thomas Aquinas to read the works of Aristotle. However, such individuals represent a minority. The general perception remains that Muslim culture is resistant to Western values, viewing them as a manifestation of demoralization and, in some narratives, even as “the work of Satan.” This is the image of the West that emerges from the teachings of charismatic imams residing in European capitals (Cardini, 2006).

Fearful attitudes have led to both spontaneous civic responses and legal regulations. In France, Belgium, and Italy, there have been efforts
to ban the wearing of burqas and niqabs (which cover the face except for the eyes) in public places (Nussbaum, 2018, pp. 29–32). In Germany, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as Kosovo (which has a Muslim majority), there are bans on women wearing headscarves that cover their hair. In Switzerland, 58% of the electorate voted to prohibit the construction of minarets, from which muezzins call the faithful to prayer. Although opposition to minarets was largely symbolic – given that a minaret is not essential for a mosque’s operation – it symbolized a rejection of the spread of Islam and Muslim customs. As a result of the protests, only a few mosques in Switzerland have minarets. Similarly, in the United States, the construction of a mosque in Willowbrook, DuPage County near Chicago, and plans for a Muslim educational and cultural center in Naperville (less than 20 kilometers west of Willowbrook) were abandoned due to similar concerns (Nussbaum, 2018, pp. 25–34).

The second strand of thinking about immigrant centers on their nationalization based on socially negotiated “national patterns.” Patrick Weil articulated this idea, identifying the four pillars of “Frenchness” as equality before the law, a positive memory of the French Revolution, the French language, and secularism (Nussbaum, 2018, p. 15). It should be noted that France, which pursues a migration policy distinct from other European countries, has been the subject of ironic comments. As we explore the concept of a national pattern (“Frenchness”), one might envision similar “patterns” for “Germanness,” “Polishness,” “Spanishness,” “Englishness,” or “Britishness” (and perhaps even “Bavarianness,” “Silesianness,” “Kashubianness,” “Basqueness,” “Catalanness,” “Scottishness,” and “Welshness”). Critics of this concept argue that it is merely an attempt to address deficiencies of liberal immigration policies, under which newcomers were not held to any expectations and were allowed to maintain behaviors and customs far removed from liberal standards. These include practices such as female circumcision, acceptance of a patriarchal system based on violence, and adherence to religious doctrines that contravene the democratic values of the Western world. Critics of liberal immigration policy contend that it erred by assuming immigrants would naturally want to integrate. Evidence to the contrary is seen in the billions of euros spent on social, cultural, and educational programs that have failed to yield the anticipated outcomes (Marc, 2009, pp. 8–30).

We are witnessing efforts to amend immigration policies across many European countries. In Denmark, the concept of relocation has become a symbol of these changes, the spearheaded by the center-left government
of Mette Frederiksen, who took office in 2019. The plan involves eliminating urban ghettos and resettling the poorly integrated Muslim minority. This project, set to be implemented over the next decade, aims to relocate non-European foreigners to areas predominantly inhabited by Europeans. Despite facing accusations of xenophobia and racism, the Danish government has steadfastly continued the relocation initiative, which was in line with Denmark’s earlier immigration policies (Wojcicka; Erdal; Mikkelsen, pp. 1–20).

A similar issue with Muslim ghettos exists in France, primarily in cities like Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. In the 1960s, since the industry was rapidly growing, France required cheap labor and sought it from its former colonies, including Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The law on family reunification allowed not only salaried workers but also their large families, with extensive kinship networks, to migrate to France. These immigrants settled near large factories on urban outskirts, quickly establishing their own stores, mosques, and cultural and recreational centers, thus creating separate and insular communities. By the 1970s and 1980s, when industries began to decline (and some factories closed), it became apparent that the settlements were overpopulated by immigrants not integrated into French culture. Their economic and social disillusionment produced numerous conflicts (Zaborski; Tadeusiak).

Similar mechanisms leading to the isolation of Muslim minorities can be found in Germany, Scandinavia, Spain, and Italy. On one hand, this isolation results from ineffective integration programs; the mere implementation of numerous programs does not guarantee their success, as evidenced by the Swedish neighborhood of Sodertälje, where a reduction in crime coincided with the emergence of other social issues, making the community far from exemplary. On the other hand, a continued Muslim isolation promotes separatist ideas supported by some Muslim spiritual and political leaders. In the 1990s, the most well-known Muslim Brotherhood leader, Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, argued that the aim of Muslim migration to Europe was “the development of political Islam.” Al-Qardhawi’s advocacy for Muslims to form self-sufficient ghettos, intended to shield them from Western influence. It was seen as a step toward creating parallel Islamic states that maintain their autonomy and resist integration (Al-Qardhawi, 1990; Ślusarczyk).

Not all participants in the discussion about Muslim immigrants endorse fear-based arguments. Many researchers argue that the fear of Muslim terrorism is unfounded, noting that a greater threat to the people of
the Western world than al-Qaeda is Coca-Cola. For instance, in 2010, approximately 3 million people died worldwide due to obesity-related disorders, while the total number of victims from terrorist attacks up to that time was less than 8,000 (Harari, 2018, pp. 8–9; Nussbaum, 2018). Proponents of this view, who represent yet another discourse on immigrants, emphasize that most crises stem from an instrumental approach to immigrants. They also highlight that the attitude of the majority toward minorities shows democracy’s maturity and it is a test of Western social standards (Eriksen, 2013; Fenton, 2007; Posern-Zieliński, 2005).

Martha Nussbaum’s book The New Religious Intolerance became an important voice in the discussion on immigrant rights. Reflections on the “creeping return of intolerance” triggered a high-profile discussion between the author and Allain Finkielkraut. The dispute between the American philosopher and ethicist and the French essayist and philosopher, alluded to well-known anthropological and philosophical debates about the scope of cultural exchange (Fleischer, 2002; Burszta, 1998). While Nussbaum, speaking of the necessity of “mutual cultural accommodation” (adapting to the Other and the Other to us) seems closer to the idealistic attitude characteristic of scholars convinced of the importance of intercultural dialogue, Finkielkraut (who stated: “no mutual accommodation, everyone is expected to adapt to France”) criticizes Nussbaum’s position and presents a view of the limited merits of the exchange, and perhaps even of its lack of meaning (Geertz, 2003, pp. 270–325; Finkielkraut, Kuisz, 2014). In demanding a modernization of immigration policy, he seems to share the opinion of those scholars who speak of the necessity of a contract with immigrants involving mutual acceptance of cultural values and the adoption – by the newcomers – of the principles of the Western democratic order (Marc, 2009).

The value of Nussbaum’s discussion with Finkielkraut lay primarily in her exposure of the mechanisms that drive cultural fear. She demonstrated that cultural fear almost invariably leads to the dehumanization of the Other and the use of official propaganda to diminish his status. Through this process, the alien is transformed from an enemy into a scapegoat (Girard, 1987). While an enemy is regarded subjectively and engaged in combat, governed by a chivalric code (Skarzyński, 1996), a scapegoat is stripped of such distinctions and treated as an object. The scapegoat exists solely to maintain the group’s peace and must be sacrificed to achieve this end. In this dehumanized role, the Stranger becomes a unifying idea within a community, essential for affirming their identity and status.
The invalidation of the stranger has far-reaching consequences. It leads to adiaphorization, relegating him to the margins and condemning him to social indifference (Bauman, 1993). Positioned outside the systems of established values, and thus in some sense outlawed by social norms, the stranger becomes an easy target for manipulation. He can be linked to phenomena that provoke ostracism or require penalization, such as epidemiological threats or terrorism.

4. Ethnicity-citizenship

One of the main sources of conflict associated with assimilation is the tension between ethnicity and civic values. On one hand, this tension is rooted in the support for local customs, modes of celebration, religious practices, and culinary traditions. On the other hand, it appeals to a civic consciousness that prioritizes expanding intercultural cooperation and creating spaces of consolidation based on intercultural compromise. This approach involves reducing certain privileges to achieve a broader social good.

Both ethnic identity and civic consciousness are dynamic and gradable. We can identify at least two levels of each: ethnic identity can be described as strong or weak, while civic consciousness can be high or low (Castells, 2008; Paleczny, 2008). A strong ethnic consciousness is characterized by a deep attachment to symbolic capital, such as religion, language, and traditions that form the basis of cultural identity (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu, 1991). Threats to this sphere typically result in the ethnic group isolating itself from foreign influences that disrupt its status quo. In this context, the group defends itself against affluenza – a contagious state of excess and wastefulness transferred from richer to poorer societies, fueled by an increasing desire for material goods and the addictive dependence of societies on economic growth (James, 2007). A modern post-industrial (Bell, 1973) or information society (Duff, 2000; Mullan, 2000; Webster, 2000) can also pose a threat to an ethnic group. Failure to engage with its achievements can lead to an escalation of distrust and, consequently, to the self-isolation of the ethnic group (Levinas, 1998, pp. 68–70; Nikitorowicz).

The situation differs in the case of weak ethnic identity, which is characterized by a loosening of ties with the group’s value system and the exploration of new identities. Digital spaces play a crucial role in this
process by redefining categories of belonging and creating new varieties of them (Beck, 2002). A key outcome of this evolution is the emergence of the digitariat – a social class with access to information technology and the ability to process data found in cyberspace. This digitariat transforms the concept of identity towards that of *homo optionis*, a postmodern individual who is compelled to make constant choices involving all aspects of life (Beck, Beck-Gernsheim, 2001; Coleman, 1986).

Gradualism is also present in the area of civic consciousness. High civic consciousness is manifested in the capacity to expand cooperation, regardless of external circumstances related to the policies of institutions and the prevailing system of power. This form of consciousness is characterized by a willingness to seek compromise and to develop social capital (Richardson). In contrast, low civic consciousness is marked by an inability to look beyond one’s own individual benefits. This may stem from a poor understanding of social realities, ignorance, or a conscious choice to self-exclude. In the latter scenario, it often manifests as contestation.

The tensions that exist between civic awareness (low and high) and ethnic identity (strong and weak) can be depicted as follows (Woods, 2000, p. 201):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strong ethnic identity</th>
<th>high civic awareness</th>
<th>low civic awareness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neighborhood</td>
<td>ghetto (within city limits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cooperating with the city)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak ethnic identity</td>
<td>city</td>
<td>underground (under the city)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(multicultural)</td>
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The interaction between high civic consciousness and strong ethnic identity can result in initiatives to consolidate neighborhoods and small clusters within cities. While these communities are open to cooperation with the outside world, they aim to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. Educational, social, cultural, and economic projects can facilitate this balance, as they allow for the development of a compromise between maintaining independence and cooperating with the broader environment.

Weak (or waning) ethnic identity combined with high civic consciousness can lead to the development of cities as multicultural centers based on neighborhood cooperation. These cities are characterized by ethnic diversity and a willingness to expand areas of exchange. This is because the ability to interact cross-culturally is considered a paramount value, enhancing the quality of life and fostering social development. Additionally, it creates new participatory opportunities to defuse social tensions.
Low civic consciousness, combined with a strong ethnic identity, leads to the formation of ghettos whose residents are not interested in cooperating with the outside world. These ghettos strive to preserve their separateness, which is a constitutive value for them. This inclination can be seen as a reaction of anxiety fueled by affluenza, or as an expression of a belief in the superiority of one’s own ethnic cultural patterns (James, 2007).

Low civic consciousness combined with weak ethnic identity leads to the formation of zones of uncertain belonging-undergrounds, which neither belong to the city nor form distinct non-urban entities. Undergrounds are unstructured and often anarchist, differing from neighborhoods and ghettos in their indifference to ethnic groups and civil society. The product of undergrounds can include both new identities, which are also fostered by digital media, and attempts to create an alternative reality to that on the surface (Woods, 2000, pp. 201–203).

The boundaries of neighborhoods, cities, ghettos, and undergrounds can be controlled using adaptive strategies – expanding the neighborhood at the expense of the ghetto, and the city at the expense of the underground. However, administrative changes often prove ineffective because group (ethnic) affiliations result from numerous processes that are spread out over time, are based on voluntarism, and exploit the deep structures of cultural systems. This means that they are difficult to control externally (Bourdieu, 1991).

5. Networks and hierarchies

The conflict between ethnicity and citizenship does not seem resolvable through administrative measures. Instead, it appears that its resolution will be shaped by social processes occurring both within ethnic groups and in their cultural environments. These processes are largely focused on renegotiating the management of ideas and values (Song, 2017; McGhee, 2008), represented by organizations and institutions on behalf of citizens (Gudykunst, Mody, 2002; Gudykunst, 2005). Their *modus operandi* and procedures rely on hierarchical models, which means they often support the activities of the organizations and institutions themselves more than they help resolve social conflicts. Significant benefits could be derived from adopting network-based, non-hierarchical models that emphasize collective decision-making methods (Ferguson, 2018).
Networks have facilitated the exchange of goods and information since ancient times (Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti, 1995). They have enabled the growth of social capital, expressed through increased mutual trust and improved communication (Ferguson, 2018; Hanneman, Riddle, 2005), and have returned some power – previously within the purview of hierarchies – back to citizens (Wartość dla obywateli…, 2008; Rhodes, 1996). However, networks have not replaced hierarchies. Their development did not lead to the elimination of offices, uniformed services, courts, universities, churches, states, cities, and security institutions. Hierarchical systems are necessary to maintain public order (Ferguson, 2018, pp. 10–20). Networks serve as a complement to these systems, forming maps of neighborhood connections (marked by clear geographic locations), professional connections (related to transactions and the settlement of mutual obligations), religious connections (resulting from membership in religious communities), educational connections (school or university associations), and class or caste connections (bringing together representatives of specific groups and social circles).

The contemporary interdependence of hierarchy and networks is evidenced by the fact that most citizens of European (and non-European) countries function in both systems simultaneously. On the one hand, they work in hierarchical systems such as institutions, organizations, corporations, and production or service establishments, which have clearly defined competencies for specific employee groups and a clear path for career advancement. On the other hand, they engage in network relationships that satisfy their interests and personal development needs (Ferguson, 2018, pp. 21–23).

The reflection on hierarchy and networks, when applied to the analysis of ethnic tensions, reveals a paradox. Despite being based on close ties among participants, diasporas do not typically form network structures (Globalization…, 2014). This may seem surprising since one might expect these connections to foster networking. However, they are often governed by religious and social hierarchies that prevent or inhibit the development of network potential (Castells, 2013). The nature of social relations within an ethnic group is largely determined by its leaders, who maintain these hierarchical structures (Knowledge…, 2021).

This situation can be changed by new technologies – digital formats – which comprise networked exchange and significantly impact all levels of hierarchical functioning (Castells, 2012). These technologies open up new opportunities for collaboration (Jenkins, Ito, Boyd, 2016) and con-
tribute to the development of a participatory culture that engages participants in public affairs (Rancière, 2008; Multiculturalism..., 2009; Żelazny, 2004). This creates a new form of social capital (Putnam, 2008; Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti, 1995; Fukuyama; Adamczyk) referred to as “network capital” (Anklam, 1007; Hanneman, Riddle, 2005; Mikuła, Pietruszka-Ortyl, 2006, pp. 113–130). Network capital embodies similar values to social capital, such as social trust and a willingness to cooperate, but it is achieved through technologies that generate networked communication structures. Its purpose is to explore alternative methods of communication and cooperation, distinct from hierarchies, enabling a more effective exchange of ideas, opinions, experiences, and knowledge.

Network capital also leads to the formation of a new type of society – a network society (Graszewicz, Lewiński, 2010, pp. 13–21). This concept goes beyond traditional notions of the triple melting pot (“tričle cultural/religious melting pot system”) or transforming melting pot (“transmuting pot”), aiming instead to create a melting pot-net (“multicultural network melting pot”) (Zalożenia..., 1980; Gordon, 1975, pp. 84–95; Świątkiewicz, 1987). It is based on transcultural assumptions (Welsch, 1999), emphasizing the importance of what lies between cultures, as well as outside them-elements that do not belong to any single culture but represent a border area, fuzzy, of unclear classification yet of significant social importance (Mittelstrass, 2002; Mittelstrass, 2005). Understood in this way, transculturalism does not exclude or weaken any ethnic groups, nor does it aim at forcibly merging them. On the contrary, it preserves their autonomy. In this sense, transculturalism also appears to be one of those civilizational concepts that, in the long run, can reshape social relations on many levels and contribute to the development of new norms of intercultural communication.

6. Towards new paradigm?

The relevance of anthropological-cultural reflection in discussions related to the issue of immigrants, including both those who have received refugee status and those who are applying for it, is significant. Its main advantage lies in enabling the search for new communication strategies that emerge from both the potential of ethnic groups and external contexts such as civilization and technology. This approach highlights the areas of the most significant cognitive aspirations that prompt the revision of
previously established social contracts. It explores the possibilities for cross-cultural cooperation and allows for the assessment of the level of social capital. Most importantly, it facilitates observation of changes occurring within the social paradigm, directions of its modification, and the exploration of competing solutions and possible alternatives.

One of the most promising concepts in this plan seems to be the model of a trans-cultural network society, creating space for non-confrontational intercultural dialogue. Such a project, even if excessively general and in need of clarification, seems attractive because it activates local communities, leads to the creation of new forms of responsibility for the common good, enables the emergence of new leaders, and establishes a much more effective relationship between hierarchy and network.

However, the project of a trans-cultural network society requires investment in space and language. It seeks places – agoras that enable the exchange of ideas in a non-confrontational way (Derrida, 1999). This involves both the development of digital networks – acting as technological agoras – and the integration and remodeling of urban spaces, including squares, markets, and marketplaces (Ratti, Claudel, 2016; Aureli, 2011) that have lost their former functions.

It seems no less important to revise the terms in circulation. This applies both to Refugee, Stranger, and the Other, as well as to the phraseological compounds in which they appear, usually laden with a considerable load of stereotypes. Even if they have been reworked in philosophy, sociology, literary studies, and cultural anthropology, they need to be reconsidered in the context of such categories as nation, state, ethnic group, and community.

7. Conclusions

The observations and comments made in the article lead to three conclusions. The first relates to the effectiveness of integration programs. He says that even if there are some differences between them (related to the legislative, social or customary order of individual countries), the effects of these programs seem – in the vast majority – unsatisfactory both for those who developed them and for those who were to be their beneficiaries. Their basic flaw is that, with few exceptions, they do not eliminate the causes of isolation and exclusion, but attempt only to limit their effects.

The second conclusion concerns the utility of empirical studies in developing new integration programs. On the one hand, these studies are
detailed, address specific issues, and often lack incisive recommendations that could appeal to politicians and their advisors. On the other hand, when researchers do offer recommendations, they are frequently either overlooked or altered in the implementation of specific aid projects, both at the legislative and economic levels. This underscores the need to develop a new language that is both understandable and appealing to social partners, and perhaps to engage them in discussions about the scope and utility of the recommendations derived from research.

The third conclusion is that communication between scholarly discourses focused on immigration issues is insufficient to create complementary approaches that conform to the tenets of transdisciplinary research. There is a lack of broad exchange of ideas between researchers from different disciplines and sub-disciplines, who often seem to be constrained by their own beliefs and habits. Research conducted in this manner tends to become insular and fails to contribute to the development of interdisciplinary discourse or achieve broader social resonance.

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Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest scharakteryzowanie źródeł konfliktów i napięć społecznych, związanych z obecnością mniejszości muzułmańskiej w Europie. Realizacji tego celu służyć będzie przyjęcie strategii transdyscyplinarnej, umożliwiającej porównanie wyników badań powstających na gruncie studiów politologicznych i socjologicznych, z pracami kulturoznawczo-antropologicznymi. Ujęcie takie pozwala na sformułowanie nowych rozpoznań. Z jednej strony, umożliwia opisanie głównych strategii integracyjnych dotyczących mniejszości muzułmańskiej w Europie i pokazuje ich niewystarczalność oraz nieskuteczność. Z drugiej przypomina, że problematyka migracyjna i etniczna zakorzenia się w refleksji teoretycznej, poprzedzającej analizowane w badaniach empirycznych zjawiska. Zwraca ponadto uwagę na ukryte mechanizmy decydujące o skłonnościach do etnicznej izolacji, a także opisuje procesy kulturowe, które mogą przyczynić się do przemodelowania relacji między imigrantami muzułmańskimi i ich społecznym otoczeniem.

Słowa kluczowe: mniejszość muzułmańska, imigranci, Inny, Obcy, procesy integracyjne

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