National Democracy and Nazism.
The Asymmetry of Relations

Abstract: The relationship between Polish nationalism and fascism and National Socialism has been the subject of numerous publications, especially those that are part of the Polish scientific literature. There is a peculiar asymmetry embedded in this relationship. During the interwar period and nowadays, this subject has been reflected on rather on the Polish side rather than the German side. The author attempts to answer a question about reasons for this asymmetry. In the 1930s, German interest in Polish nationalism was limited. Publications dealing specifically with Eastern European issues were the only to designate more space and attention to the topic. The publications, however, almost completely ignored official NSDAP sources. The shape and evolution of the national camp in Poland focused on a few issues only and it was a domain of a few authors whose names appear in various periodicals. In Germany, a hypothetical explanation for this phenomenon is based on fundamental contradictions that divided the Polish and German forms of nationalism at the time, namely the absence of the biological-racial dimension in the Polish national ideology and its strong connection with Catholicism. The practical absence of the Polish national movement in German articles of the 1930s might be attributed to the doctrine and racist objectives of National Socialism.

Key words: National democracy, National socialism, Third Reich, National radicalism

The rise of the National Socialist movement in Germany runs parallel to the destabilisation of the democratic system in Poland. The 1920s, and especially the 1930s, witnessed a sharpening of authoritarian dictatorship and an increasingly pronounced radicalisation of Polish nationalist circles (Wapiński, 1981, Rudnicki, 1985). The so-called “young” nationalist factions gained momentum, fuelled by social and national frustrations stemming from the profound economic crisis that deeply impacted the Second Republic. It remains a subject of debate to what extent they drew inspiration from Nazi models (although the influence of Italian fascism is less contentious) and how they measured up in comparison. At
the time, much was written in magazines affiliated with the Youth Movement of the Great Poland Camp or the National Radical Camp regarding Italian and German events, with attempts made to discern patterns, draw inspiration, and heed warnings. The issue of the relationship between Polish nationalism and fascism, as well as National Socialism, became the subject of scholarly reflection in Poland (Kawalec, 1989; Musielak, 1997; Macała, 2000; Marszałek, 2001; Kotowski, 2006). However, such reflection was primarily based on Polish sources and focused mainly on the stance of Polish nationalism towards fascism and Nazism. The aim of this text is therefore to broaden the scope of comparative research on German and Polish nationalism. It is worth pondering whether the evolution of Polish nationalism also garnered interest in Germany, both in journalistic coverage and academic publications. How did supporters of the Nazi movement view their Polish ideological brethren, and how did journalists and scholars of non-Nazi provenance relate to them? What differences and similarities existed between Polish nationalist interpretations of Nazism and Nazi references to the Polish national movement? The aim of the text and research questions were pursued through the utilisation of the historical method, content analysis, and document research methodology.

**German opinions about Polish nationalism**

German analyses of Polish nationalism exhibit a discernible pattern, whether emanating from Nazi party circles or from academics and publicists constrained by regime restrictions. Several issues garnered significant interest in Germany. The Polish national camp is portrayed as the primary architect of modern Polish society and state, with particular emphasis placed on the actions and contributions of its leaders during the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference. The Polish political landscape is portrayed as a battleground where two personalities, each representing distinct visions for the territorial and systemic structure of the state, clash. Consequently, significant attention is dedicated to comparing the figures of Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski. The emergence of a new generation within the national movement in Poland after 1926 elicited numerous reactions, particularly concerning its relationship with Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.

The emergence of a nationalist orientation on Polish soil in the late 19th century was perceived by German opinion as an act of emancipa-
tion for the Polish bourgeoisie. One of the authors who frequently wrote about Polish issues, professor Erich Maschke from the University of Jena, emphatically stated: “More than anyone else, Dmowski laid the spiritual foundations of the young Polish bourgeoisie” (Maschke, 1934/5). Other German authors attributed the anti-Germanism and pro-Russianism of National Democracy precisely to its bourgeois character. According to them, Russia was perceived as a far less threatening adversary to the nascent Polish middle class compared to Germany, where this social group had attained a high level of development (Laeuen, 1938/9). The All-Polish party’s particular focus on the western borderlands was attributed to the presence of a Polish middle class predominantly formed in that region. Dmowski subsequently utilized this model of society as a blueprint for other districts in Poland (ibidem). Maschke, as previously cited, perceived the bourgeois character of the National Democracy (Endecja) as a contributing factor to its historical defeat. Maschke suggested that the First World War had undermined the identity of the Polish bourgeoisie, depriving it of its political, cultural, and spiritual independence. This loss was supplanted by an exclusively nationalistic ideology, a realization that Maschke concluded came too late for the leaders of Polish nationalism (Maschke, 1934/5).

German authors dedicated considerable attention to highlighting the democratic character of the Polish national movement. However, viewed from the specific perspective of the 1930s, they perceived this democratic nature as a sort of original sin that hindered the integration of Polish and German forms of nationalism. Ernst Sillinger, in the volkist publication Die Tat, depicted National Democracy as a movement emerging from the liberal democratic tradition of nineteenth-century France, deeply rooted in the ideals of the Revolution of 1789. Dmowski suspected that National Democracy aimed to construct a state modelled on Western European democracies. However, he also discerned a “Prussian element” within National Democracy, suggesting that this could potentially present a future opportunity of uncertain magnitude. In his estimation, only by severing its liberal democratic foundations could National Democracy evolve into a significant force akin to the role played by the NSDAP in Germany, as a catalyst for reshaping Europe (Sillinger, 1933/4). According to German authors, it was precisely the demoliberal character of Polish nationalism that purportedly accounted for the successes of its leaders in diplomatic endeavours aimed at establishing the foundations of the post-war Versailles order in Europe. It
was assumed that no one could represent the Polish cause more effectively before the tribunal of the victorious Entente than adherents of the same system of values as the Versailles areopagus.

The opinion that it was Dmowski and his political orientation that laid the diplomatic foundation for the rebirth of Poland appeared to be widely held in Germany, as articulated by numerous authors. Representative of this perspective is the opinion of Walther Recke, author of a work considered fundamental in Germany during the 1930s for its presentation of the Polish question in European politics. According to his assessment, during the First World War, the National Democrats politically dominated the Polish lands and exerted significant influence on the behaviour of Poles. This argument served as the basis through which Dmowski inspired actions favourable to the Polish cause by the governments of the Entente powers at the time (Recke, 1927, pp. 168–172). The faith in the National Socialist government of the soul was so profound among German authors that some even suggested that Russia would not have risked war with Germany in 1914 had the ground of Polish loyalty in the Congress Kingdom not been prepared in advance by the National Socialists (Fuchs, 1930, p. 27). Ellinor von Puttkamer was the most prominent advocate of the German belief in the pivotal role of Endecja in the formation of modern Polish statehood. She authored the only independent German publication on the Polish national movement during that period (Dunin Wąsowicz, 1948). Its fundamental thesis was that “Polish nationalism created the foundation upon which the reconstitution of Poland during the World War became feasible” (Puttkamer, 1944, p. 29).

The predominance of National Socialist influences in the politics of the newly established Polish state was indisputable to German authors. This was purportedly evidenced by the anti-German nature of the Polish territorial program for border delineation and essentially the entirety of its foreign policy. It was believed to be rooted in an anti-German sentiment, irrespective of which political faction held power in Poland. This sentiment was strongly reiterated by Friedrich von Oertzen, a frequent contributor on Eastern affairs to the Nazi publication “Volk Und Reich”. According to his analysis, even after Dmowski’s passing, there were no substantial alterations: “the Sanacja leadership perfectly continues his teachings” (Oertzen, 1939). The same author had previously cautioned that the Poles would not relinquish the idea of conquering East Prussia, as it was part of the territorial program of the National Democracy leader (Oertzen, 1933/34; Schmidt, 1932).
The thesis regarding the fabricated nature of the conflict between Piłsudski and Dmowski was frequently articulated in Germany during the 1930s. This notion was associated with the belief that, even after 1926, the majority of elements in Polish state policy were rooted in a national democratic framework. Maschke articulated this viewpoint most explicitly when he asserted that Piłsudski’s ideas of Polish power were derived from German ideology, stating that “Dmowski and Piłsudski are not enemies whose aims are mutually exclusive, but their works complement each other” (Maschke, 1938/9).

German authors dedicated considerable space to contrasting these two personalities. It was underscored that virtually every aspect of Polish affairs at the time was subject to dispute between the two orientations epitomized by these giants of Polish politics. In German publications, there was unanimous agreement regarding their historical roles. Piłsudski is depicted as a ‘Feuerkopf’ (Hothead) representative of the insurgent tradition of Polish political romanticism. In contrast, Dmowski is portrayed as a cool, rational politician, always prepared to confront changing realities (Recke, 1927, p. 172). One continued the Jagiellonian tradition, while the other upheld the Piast tradition (Laeuen, 1938/9). However, it was suggested that “if the Marshal wants to occupy Kiev, he must go through Königsberg,” indicating adherence to the notion of the dominance of Dmowski’s political concepts (“Ostland”, 1932). Piłsudski was portrayed as a representative of a fading era, while Dmowski was seen as better able to grasp the spirit of the times. Maschke concluded that “with political defeat was combined the triumph of the worldview that Dmowski embodies” (Maschke, 1938/9).

Poland’s ‘new nationalism’. German reactions

This “modern spirit” swept through Poland and Germany in the 1930s, reshaping the traditional form of Polish nationalism. How did German observers perceive it? Were they aware of the anti-Semitic excesses, the programmes aimed at totalizing social and political life, the fascination with the idea of chieftainship, and the distinct “biologism” of the Polish young nationalists under the banner of the ONR – the Falanga of Bolesław Piasecki, noted in Germany? Did Nazi authors perceive similarities between Polish and German forms of nationalism? Surprisingly, to a very limited extent! In the late 1930s, in “Nation und Staat”, which
frequently discussed nationality issues from a Nazi perspective, Stephan Acker published an extensive series of articles under the collective title: “Der neue Nationalismus” (the new nationalism). In these articles, he meticulously examined various nationalist movements across Europe that shared similarities with Hitlerism, providing thorough and sometimes detailed analyses. However, notably absent was any discussion of Poland (Weingaertner, 1979, p. 178). The NSDAP’s most significant theoretical publication, the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte, never mentioned Polish nationalists. Similarly, another Nazi journal, “Volk und Reich,” only briefly alluded, in passing, to Polish nationalist circles. The limited attention given to Polish nationalism was unlikely due to a lack of interest in Poland. Numerous pages were dedicated to the German national minority, with an equal amount of space devoted to Piłsudski and his political grouping. Additionally, extensive analysis was conducted on the All-Polish movement’s history, along with an examination of the sources of its anti-German sentiment. However, the official National Socialist press never addressed those aspects of Polish nationalism that could have suggested ideological affinity with Hitlerism. Until the beginning of 1939, the Third Reich pursued a rapprochement with the Second Polish Republic, attempting to draw it into its sphere of influence and utilize it in its program of eastward expansion. However, the friendly gestures of Nazi dignitaries were primarily directed towards the Sanacja circles ruling Poland. The Endecja did not seem to be a viable or worthwhile partner. This was influenced by its deep-seated anti-German sentiment and perhaps also its limited prospects of gaining power in Poland. The interest of the Third Reich’s elite in Polish national radicals would have required some element of ideological partnership, acknowledging that Poles could legitimately espouse Nazi-like ideas. However, neither the views nor the practical actions of the Nazis allowed for this.

This hypothesis appears to be supported by the fact that other publications, which are not official propaganda organs but are still influenced by Nazi ideology, dedicate considerable space to the evolution of Polish nationalism in the 1930s. Two motifs emerge prominently in these analyses: the comparison between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of Polish nationalism, and the comparison between National Democracy and Sanacja. Ernst Sillinger, previously cited, evaluated the Sanacja regime, particularly after the Marshal’s death, as lacking a deeper ideological foundation, instead solely focused on retaining power. In his view, it was precisely this lack of ideology that led the power camp to adopt slogans of national ideol-
ogy (Sillinger, 1933/4). However, he believed this to be a “resemblance without comprehension,” merely a superficial convergence. Only the nationalist camp, in his view, possessed an authentic and original ideological dimension in Poland. German authors, however, suggested that Polish nationalism was still far from mature. O. Hoetsch emphasized that the “old” National Democracy was a foreign entity within Polish society, as it emerged at the end of the nineteenth century on the basis of Western European liberalism and parliamentarism. These concepts were believed to be artificially imposed on Polish soil, which historically leaned more towards Sanacja authoritarianism. The May coup led by the ‘Eastern-born’ Piłsudski, who considered the East the most crucial direction of his policy, was seen as evidence of the disconnect between the Western European-oriented National Democracy and Polish soil (Hoetsch, 1932/33).

After the May Coup, significant changes started unfolding on the Polish political stage, leading towards the consolidation and radicalization of various factions. The nationalist camp was no exception. The formation of the Camp of Great Poland, inspired by Italian fascism, provided a platform for a younger generation of nationalists who departed from the democratic traditions of the founders of the Polish nationalism. The old ideas were replaced by a cult of action, hierarchy, a distinct conception of order, and an increasingly assertive expression of anti-Semitism (Rudnicki, 1986, p. 152). In the 1930s, the National Radical Camp, in its various iterations, emerged as the most prominent exemplar of this trend. Its program unmistakably, albeit not explicitly, echoed Nazi ideals of constructing a totalitarian state and society, where all aspects of public life would be subordinated to a single political organization. The envisioned model for their operation was the so-called Catholic State of the Polish Nation, wherein Catholicism, divorced from the evangelical values of love for one’s neighbour, was to serve as the sole state ideology (Lipski, 2015, pp. 90–107).

German reactions to these developments underscored their groundbreaking nature for the Polish political landscape. In a text titled “Das junge Polen” (“Young Poland”), “Osteuropa” asserted that until then, two orientations dominated the Polish political scene, shaped by historical traditions: positivist and romantic, epitomized by National Democracy and Sanacja. The anonymous author of Osteuropa posited that after the breakthrough of 1926, a new, third political orientation began to emerge in Poland, associated with a new generation that rejected the patterns of the past. He contended that this new orientation would likely seek to amal-
gamate the two earlier Polish political traditions, aiming to establish, akin to Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, a mass, organized, power-driven political and social movement (Osteuropa, 1934/5).

The emergence of the National Radical Camp on the Polish political stage appeared to German observers as the practical realization of the aforementioned processes. It was on this occasion, for the first and last time, that one of the official organs of the NSDAP spoke out: the “Volk und Reich”. Probably the only authoritative voice of the Nazi party at that time, it acknowledged the existence of similarities between the situation in Poland and Germany. It suggested that, although the majority of Polish youth had not yet freed themselves from the influence of Dmowski’s ‘bourgeois ideology’, groups inspired by German and Italian models were clearly gaining strength (“Volk und Reich”, 1936). A publicist from the periodical “Ostland”, which predominantly published texts advocating for the revision of Germany’s eastern borders, expressed a similar opinion, stating that the ONR’s program was not yet ideologically complete and coherent, and appeared to be nothing more than an “agitational concoction”. The suggestion was repeatedly expressed that if the complete rejection of “the harmful past of the national democratic movement” occurred, then “the political life of Poland can still be shaped normally” (“Ostland”, 1934). “Normally” here implies shaping it according to the German pattern of the time. Another revisionist journal, the Königsberg-based “Osteuropäische Lageberichte”, argued that, despite the growing power of the influence of fascist and National Socialist ideas on Polish youth, “state educational and cultural policy” had not yet been affected by them (“Osteuropäische Lageberichte”, 1935).

A text by the often-quoted Erich Maschke, published in the conservative, albeit Nazi-influenced “Die Tat” (Hecker, 1974, p. 126), became a sort of summary of the above reflections. He evaluated that the young nationalist movement, particularly innovative within the Polish context, possessed a significant social dimension. This is evident in its advocacy for a fusion of maximal empowerment of authority with elements akin to national syndicalism or even socialism, alongside state interventionism in the economy. Maschke asserts that this essentially equates to national socialism, though he notes that this realization has yet to become widely acknowledged. Particularly, the entrenched leadership of the National Socialist Party appears either oblivious to this reality or deliberately evades it. It is the youth, however, who hold “the vision of the future.” The ONR’s departure from the Endecja movement was precisely motivated by Ger-
man models. “It was National Socialism, not Italian Fascism, that served as the blueprint for Jan Mosdorf,” emphatically asserted the publicist of Die Tat (Maschke, 1934/35).

It is evident that many German authors were inclined to perceive the unfolding situation in Poland with a degree of optimism, albeit with an expectation of greater consistency from their ideological counterparts. The nationalist shift in Poland’s governing circles after Piłsudski’s passing was also met with some optimism, although its roots were primarily seen as tactical political manoeuvres.

**German criticism of Polish nationalism**

From a German perspective, not everything in Polish ‘young nationalism’ appeared to align with the Nazi ideal. Two aspects, in particular, were highlighted: the influence of Catholicism and the nature of anti-Semitism. Both aspects were challenging for Third Reich observers to reconcile. Throughout the 1930s, anti-Jewish sentiment intensified in the Second Republic, with nationalist circles exhibiting increasingly inflammatory rhetoric and political actions. This was manifested in actions such as the economic boycott, deeply troubling the Jewish community, as well as in university-related incidents surrounding “numerus clausus” policies and attempts to establish “bench ghettos”. The anti-Semitic publication ‘Weltkampf’ expressed undisguised satisfaction, stating, “One can see that the truth, which has already been noticed in Germany, has begun its march in Poland as well” (Weltkampf, 1938). He also suggested that National Democracy would not build its strength and authority in Polish society without deepening and expanding the anti-Semitic dimension of its programme. However, elsewhere, reservations were raised. With palpable disappointment, the author of “Ostland” conceded that hostility to Jews was merely a ‘ruse’ in the National Democracy’s quest for power. He saw it as a way of creating obstacles for the Sanacja government, which was thus pushed onto the defensive, especially in the face of an increasingly Jew-averse Polish society (“Ostland”, 1936).

The social dimension of Endecja’s anti-Semitism was emphasized, denying it any racial character. It was alleged that Polish nationalists were only concerned with strengthening the Polish character of towns and free professions. The final proof of the lack of anti-Semitic consistency was supposed to be the fact that those who had been baptized or came from
mixed families were not recognized as Jews. “Ostland” summed it up as follows: “until this is finally clarified the Endecja’s Jewish program will remain a theory” (“Ostland”, 1935). What was supposed to be completely embarrassing for the National Democrats was that, according to German publicists, they tolerated Jews and the “Judenbastarden” in their midst.

The deficiencies of the Polish brand of anti-Semitism were intertwined in German analysis with the Catholic character of Polish nationalism. German observers viewed the significant role of Catholicism in shaping Polish nationalism as a fundamental flaw. The alliance between National Democracy and the Roman Catholic Church was particularly repugnant to the Nazis, who regarded it as a compromising manifestation of ‘clericalism’ in their perspective. All these factors rendered it impossible to maintain a consistent line of thought and action based on racial criteria (Nation und Staat..., 1941/2).

Erich Maschke extensively analyzed this phenomenon in the cited text. He identified the fundamental dilemma of Polish young nationalists as navigating between the ethical demands of Catholicism and the growing anti-Semitism. According to Maschke, the old National Democracy opportunistically approached the Jewish issue. It was only the ONR that first articulated an anti-Semitic program clearly, yet even it hesitated to precisely define who was considered Jewish and who was not. From the perspective of the Third Reich and the Nuremberg Laws enacted at the time, this inconsistency was seen as a logical consequence of the entire historical development of the Polish state and nation. It stemmed from the moment of Christianization and was closely intertwined with the Catholic Church. Here, a fundamental and irremovable obstacle was seen to prevent the full identification of the Polish and German forms of nationalism. Erich Maschke rhetorically asked, “Can a movement that emphasizes the Catholic principles of the state and is closely linked to the Church postulate the introduction of inequality between Christians of Polish and Jewish origin?” (Maschke, 1934/35). For him, as well as for other German authors, it was precisely Catholicism that was the most difficult feature of Polish nationalism to accept. They saw the organic connection between Polishness and Catholicism as the reason why Poles would never be able to build their identity on biological, racial grounds and therefore never become, in the Nazi sense, “modern”.

German interest in Polish nationalism during the 1930s was surprisingly subdued. Only magazines and publications focusing on Eastern European affairs allocated significant space and attention to the subject.
This phenomenon is somewhat understandable and not challenging to elucidate. Indeed, the absence of coverage on these issues in the official Nazi press is notable. Polish affairs were primarily addressed by a select few individuals: Walther Recke, Ernst Sillinger, Friedrich von Oertzen, Harold Laeuen, Otto Hoetsch, and, notably, Erich Maschke. Their publications spanned various journals, reflecting differences in their embrace of Nazi ideology and the depth of their arguments. Nevertheless, none of them seemed willing, or perhaps able, to surpass the boundaries imposed by the totalitarian nature of the Third Reich, where freedom of speech and thought were severely restricted.

German analyses of Polish nationalism often underscore its bourgeois origins, which were believed to imbue it with an anti-German and pro-Russian geopolitical orientation. They also acknowledge the contributions of National Democracy during and immediately after the First World War. German authors viewed the territorial and political configuration of Polish statehood during that era as a product of the ideas and initiatives put forth by Polish nationalists. They depicted the Second Republic as a battleground between two political orientations: National Democracy and Piłsudski, embodied by the towering figures of Dmowski and Piłsudski. After the establishment of the Sanacja dictatorship in 1926, virtually no significant opposition was perceived in Poland apart from the various factions within the national camp. This dichotomy in the perception of the Polish political landscape remained a consistent feature of German analysis during that period. The emergence of “young” nationalism in the 1930s was met with approval in Germany, but the nuances of this assessment were telling. The affinity with fascism and National Socialism was cautiously emphasized, and unofficially, the shortcomings related to racism, anti-Semitism, and Catholic sentiments were frequently acknowledged.

There was little originality or depth in the German opinions of the 1930s when analyzing the formation of the Polish national camp. The only exception, perhaps, was Erich Maschke, who, despite all his limitations, approached the issues of interest in a manner somewhat less tainted by Nazi ideology and propaganda. These shortcomings had their consequences in the realm of practical politics. The Third Reich made no attempt to build links with nationalist circles in Poland, preferring instead to court the Sanacja regime that ruled Poland. It was after the death of Piłsudski, not Dmowski, that national mourning was declared in Germany. Furthermore, after September 1939, the Germans did not
seriously seek contacts with representatives of Polish nationalism. This was likely hindered by their anti-Germanism, as well as by the Nazi regime’s extensive genocidal plans for Poland and the Poles. While these factors may partially explain the limited interest in the formation of Polish nationalist circles in Germany in the 1930s, they may not provide a complete explanation.

**Endecja’s interpretations of Nazism**

The Endecja’s assessment of Nazi doctrine reflects a certain evolution of views. On one hand, there was an acceptance of certain points, such as the strengthening of the nation’s cohesiveness through the elimination of all political and ideological pluralism, as well as the removal of Jewish, Masonic, and leftist influences. Polish nationalists also admired the efficient structure of the movement, which achieved political victories in Germany. However, they also noted a fundamental contradiction between Hitlerism’s programmatic assumptions and their own principles. This was pointed out by Roman Dmowski, Wojciech Wasiutyński, Jędrzej Giertych, Stanisław Grabski, and others. Criticism of moral and religious indifference and hostility to Christianity, along with the resurgence of pagan Germanic beliefs, prevailed. In matters of foreign policy, the nationalists consistently held the position that, regardless of the political system, Germany was and would continue to be Poland’s most dangerous enemy. The profound anti-German resentment of the Polish nationalist right ensured that attempts to create a Polish variant of the National Socialist movement ended in complete failure (Grott, 2010). Hitler’s rise to power was met with some hope, but this was largely due to a pragmatic approach in assessing the international situation (Szołdra, 2005). The Endecja’s assessment of the Third Reich seemed to be based on two premises. Firstly, Hitlerism was viewed from the perspective of a certain ideological affinity, although significant doctrinal contradictions were noted. Secondly, the evaluation was heavily influenced by considerations of the international position. In this case, Hitler’s Germany was perceived as an enemy with whom no cooperation of any kind was possible. Therefore, the Third Reich was seen as a state threatening the sovereignty of the Republic (Koziełło, 2005).

The dynamic of how National Socialism is perceived within Polish nationalist circles and how Polish nationalism is viewed within Nazi cir-
cles exhibits a noticeable imbalance. While both the “old” and “young” factions of National Democracy demonstrate clear interest in developments within Germany, albeit with a greater focus on Italian fascism, the official press of the NSDAP remains completely indifferent to the evolution of Polish nationalism. Indeed, this conspicuous silence extends beyond the official press of the NSDAP to other German opinion centres as well. There, descriptions and interpretations of the Polish national right are more frequent and thorough. This imbalance appears to arise from the disparity between National Socialist doctrine and the prevailing political tactics of the Third Reich in the international arena. Indeed, the sentiment Hitler harboured for Piłsudski stands in stark contrast to the absolute lack of such sentiment towards Dmowski (Maciejewski, 2014). In Nazi ideology, there was no place for ideological kinship with those considered “Untermenschen”; however, in political practice, there was room for temporary accommodation with Poland. The tactical considerations led to the acknowledgment of the ideologically distant Piłsudski and the dismissal of the doctrinally closer Dmowski. In September 1939, the Wehrmacht honour guard stood in the Wawel crypts, not in the quarters of Warsaw’s Bródno cemetery.

Summary

The relationship between Polish nationalism and fascism, as well as National Socialism, has been extensively explored in numerous publications, especially within Polish academic literature. An interesting phenomenon arises in the examination of this topic: a noticeable asymmetry. The asymmetry in the reflection on the relationship between Polish nationalism and fascism or National Socialism is more pronounced on the Polish side, both in the interwar period and in contemporary discourse. The author of this text aims to uncover the reasons behind this phenomenon.

German interest in Polish nationalism during the 1930s was limited. Only magazines and publications focused on Eastern European affairs dedicated significant space and attention to the topic. Surprisingly, official sources of the NSDAP were largely overlooked in this context. Reflections on the form and development of the national movement in Poland were concentrated on a few key themes and were primarily the purview of a handful of authors whose names appeared consistently in various
periodicals. A potential explanation for this phenomenon might lie in Germany’s recognition of the fundamental contradictions that separated Polish and German manifestations of nationalism during that era. These included the absence in Poland of the biological-racial dimension of national ideology and its strong connection with Catholicism. The limited presence of the Polish national movement in German discourse during the 1930s may also have been influenced by the doctrinal, racist assumptions of National Socialism.

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Problem relacji między polskim nacjonalizmem a faszyzmem i narodowym socjализmem jest tematem licznych publikacji, szczególnie w polskiej literaturze naukowej. Występuje w tej kwestii zjawisko swoistej asymetrii. Zarówno w okresie międzywojennym, jak również współcześnie, jest to przedmiot refleksji raczej po stronie polskiej niż niemieckiej. Autor tekstu poszukuje odpowiedzi na pytanie o przyczyny tej asymetrii. Niemieckie zainteresowanie polskim nacjonalizmem było w latach trzydziestych niewielkie. Więcej miejsca i uwagi poświęcały mu jedynie czasopisma i wydawnictwa zajmujące się szczególnie problematyką wschodnioeuropejską. Niemal całkowicie pomijały oficjalne źródła NSDAP. Refleksja nad kształtem i ewolucją obozu narodowego w Polsce skupiona była na kilku zaledwie motywach i była dome-
nà kilku autorów, których nazwiska przewijają się przez łamy rozmaitych czasopism. Hipotetycznym wytłumaczeniem tego zjawiska może być zauważenie w Niemczech podstawowych sprzeczności, jakie dzieliły ówcześnie polską i niemiecką formę nacjonalizmu: kwestii braku w Polsce biologiczno-rasowego wymiaru ideologii narodowej oraz jej silnego powiązania z katolicyzmem. Praktyczna nieobecność polskiego ruchu narodowego w niemieckiej refeleksji lat trzydziestych mogła być zapewne spowodowana również doktryanalnymi, rasistowskimi założeniami narodowego socjalizmu.

Słowa kluczowe: narodowa demokracja, narodowy socjalizm, III Rzesza, narodowy radykalizm