
Abstract: After the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, a large group of political refugees, most of them young and often highly skilled professionals, left for the West. Most of the refugees fled to Austria. Austria immediately called on countries to help both financially and physically by resettling the refugees. Most of the refugees were very quickly resettled in other countries. These facts stand in stark contrast to contemporary resettlement practice, which is characterized by a shortage of resettlement sites and a small number of resettlement countries. The scarcity of jobs and the peculiarities of the migration policies of some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) meant that some refugees could not find a long-term place in European countries and therefore sought refuge overseas. In 1956 and 1957, Canada took in more than 37,500 Hungarian refugees. The United States was also a more common choice for refugees than the United Kingdom, for example.

Key words: 1956 revolution, Hungary, refugees, Great Britain, migration policy

In October 1956, an anti-Soviet national uprising broke out in Hungary, which was crushed by the Red Army. Approximately 1,500–2,000 Hungarians lost their lives and 180,000–200,000 left the country. A large wave of refugees, accounting for about 2% of the total population, spread around the world, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland (Miłosz,
According to a 1960 study commissioned by the United Nations, the United States received most refugees (44,110), followed by Canada (39,190), Australia (15,390), West Germany (14,400), the United Kingdom (13,670), and Switzerland (10,480). Compared with the native population of a country, Canada received the most refugees from Hungary (0.25 per cent), the United States, and Sweden (0.1%). The United Kingdom was the third country after the United States and Canada to receive the largest number of refugees.

Men (66%) and young people (70% between 15 and 39) predominated among the emigrants. It is also striking that 15% of the refugees, often orphans, were under 18. Moreover, this was a fairly well-educated community. It should be noted that in 1956, 10.6% of all engineers, 6.8% of graduates of technical universities, and 4.9% of Hungarian doctors left Hungary. This professional profile of refugees influenced their destination countries and determined expectations refugees had towards their host countries (Dövenyi, Vukovich, 1994, p. 195). Of the more than 21,000 Hungarians admitted to Britain from Austria within a few years, about 7,000 chose to emigrate further overseas, forgoing British hospitality. However, the questions still remain: why did about 30% of the refugees arriving in the British Isles choose to emigrate further? Was it the migration policy or perhaps a strong position of the trade unions, which jealously defended jobs of their compatriots?

The strongest and most important democratic émigré group was active in France, Great Britain and the United States. The refugees who arrived in 1956 and 1957 were different from the economists of Hungarian origin, Lords Nicholas Kaldor and Thomas Balogh, who were advisors to Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Before 1939 and after the war, political emigrants from Hungary also came to England.

There is no consensus on the number of Hungarian refugees who arrived in Britain. The 1959, Hungarian press reports that there were 17,000 (Menekültek Angliában..., 1959). According to Hungarian intelligence, 20,000 refugees arrived of which 15,000 remained permanently in Britain. A total of 1,913 refugees returned to the country. Similar figures were reported by other Hungarian newspapers published in the West. One of them reported (also in 1959) that 21,000 refugees arrived in the Islands and 15,000 remained permanently (Magyarok mindenütt..., 1959).

The most vulnerable returned to Hungary after a few months or years, pushed by longing and naive trust in promises of amnesty. Many of them suffered in prisons or were harassed for years. According to surviving records, after 1956, the reorganized Communist secret police were eager to recruit new spies among those young people who had returned from the West.
British migration policy after 1945

Between the wars, emigration from the British Isles and immigration from UK colonies and Europe stopped. After World War II, Britain received thousands of displaced people, including Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. By the early 1950s, the black population accounted for less than 0.5% of the total, with the largest community of about 107,000 that came from the West Indies (Thane, 2001, p. 202).

After World War II, Great Britain encouraged immigration from British Commonwealth countries. Immigration was accepted to help rebuild the country and fill labor shortages. Between 1947 and 1970, nearly half a million people left their homes in the West Indies to live in Britain. On June 22, 1948, the passenger liner Empire Windrush from Jamaica docked in Tilbury, ushering in a postwar immigration boom that would transform British society. In parallel with the influx of people between 1945 and 1962, Britain experienced a significant exodus of indigenous people seeking a better life in their former dominions (e.g., Australia and Canada) (Ramsden, 2022, p. 32).

In January 1949, the British Nationality Act of 1948 came into effect, granting all British Commonwealth of Nations (BCN) residents British citizenship and the right to enter and settle in Britain. This, coupled with the introduction of strict new immigration laws in the U.S. that restricted entry into the U.S. in 1952, encouraged West Indian immigrants to travel to Britain en masse, as they could settle in Britain indefinitely and without restriction. By 1956, more than 40,000 West Indian immigrants moved to Britain.

The Attlee government’s solution was to redefine British nationality in 1948 in such a way as to simultaneously reaffirm and change Britain’s relationship with its colonies. Until the British Nationality Act of 1948, there was no legal definition of citizenship in British law that revolved around the concept of subjectivity. Subjectivity was granted automatically to all persons born within the British Empire and Commonwealth, nominally granting recipients all the privileges of citizenship British subject status equally. One of these privileges, though it had previously existed mainly by convention, was the right to migrate to Britain. Ireland had already rejected the unilateral attribution of British subjectivity to its citizens, but the immediate impetus for reform was provided by the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946, which defined Canadian citizenship for the first time and made British subjectivity for Canadians contingent on citizenship directly granted from the British Crown. This change meant that there could be a conflict between subjectivity dependent on national definition of citizenship and a universal British version.

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From 1948 to 1962, the population of other nationalities in Britain grew from 30,000 to about 500,000. In just a dozen years, Britain changed from a white to a multicultural nation. Some people were not always quick to embrace a multicultural society, so racial problems began to escalate. In 1962, the first immigration controls were introduced under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This applied to all Commonwealth citizens except those born in Britain or holding a British passport. This act limited the number of migrants to more skilled ones to enter Britain.

The timing of the Hungarian refugees is important for a number of reasons. The 1950s was the height of the British welfare state, and its concept was further stabilized under the influence of the 1951 UN Convention, which gave political refugees essentially the same social security and welfare rights as the native population. Immigration policy was racially biased, encouraging the arrival of Europeans rather than (former) inhabitants of British colonies. It was easier for newcomers from European countries to assimilate than for those from the West Indies or South Asia (Webster, 2008, pp. 35–51). The article analyzes the British immigration policy of the mid 1950s. The policy was put to test with the reaction of the British authorities to the waves of migrants caused by the events in Hungary and the Suez crisis. To present the attitude of the British authorities towards migration issues, the article analyzes London’s policy towards migration since 1945. It also presents the attitudes of the British public towards refugees, their changes, and the treatment of refugees as a threat to the local socio-economic system (e.g., jobs).

Britain’s experience with foreign workers can be divided into three distinct stages. During the first one, within months of taking office in 1945, C. Atlee’s government sought to fill labor shortages in industries critical to its economic recovery plans by actively integrating Polish soldiers who had fought under British command into the labor market (Paul, 1997). The second phase of Britain’s early postwar experience with foreign workers began with the passage of the British Citizenship Act in 1948, a far-reaching piece of legislation that, among other things, recognized the special status of Irish citizens. This status affirmed their right to enter and leave Britain without restriction, to vote in elections, to stand for Parliament while in the country, and to participate in the labor market. The Irish were legally granted a unique status that allowed them to enter, work, settle, and even vote in Britain, even though the Republic of Ireland had left the BCN in 1947 (Solomos, 1989, p. 30). The third phase began in 1951, when the Conservative Party took power in the country; it
maintained the decolonization model previously promoted by the Labor Party. A hallmark of the Conservative Party’s thirteen-year rule was an effort to maintain Britain’s relations with the territories once controlled by the Empire. The transfer of power to the former colonial states was intended to promote their independence while maintaining ties with the BCN (Cohen, 1959, p. 90). Robert A. J. Gascoyne-Cecil, the Speaker of the House of Lords in W. Churchill’s Conservative government, emphasized that “colored” immigrants were a threat to the very fabric of British society. In his view, unless appropriate measures were taken, the influx of immigrants attracted by welfare benefits would increase and become “a fundamental problem for all of us” (Spencer, 1997, pp. 63–64). The immigration regulations in force in the United Kingdom in 1956 were set out in the Aliens Order of 1953, which imposed the requirement to possess entry and work permits issued by the Ministry of Employment. Permits were valid for one year and could be subsequently extended to four years. Under the 1953 Order, any foreigner could be refused entry at the discretion of an immigration officer (Schain, 2008, p. 168).

The influx of post-war labor migration was facilitated by the British Nationality Act of 1948, which confirmed that all citizens of BCN countries could exercise their right to work and reside in the UK without restriction. The first Nationality Acts offered a degree of independence for the former dominions and colonies, including Canada, India, and Pakistan. Consequently, the British government passed the 1948 Act, which allowed British subjects to retain their status as members of the Commonwealth. They were free to migrate, settle, and work in Britain. Thus, they held a kind of “dual citizenship” (Kurcevich, 2014, p. 359). However, the influx of migrants began spontaneously in 1948 and gained momentum in the 1950s without official sanction or formal government support. While there is some disagreement among scholars as to the extent of the British government’s “disapproval” of this phase of migration, its magnitude is indisputable: from about two thousand BCN migrants in 1953 to 42,000 in 1957 and up to 136,000 in 1961 (Layton-Henry, 1984, p. 23). Under the Citizenship Act of 1948, Britain developed a tiered citizenship system that classified foreigners according to their British ancestry and ties to the BCN. The practice of applying the above law created four groups: British subjects or BCN citizens who were granted citizenship on the basis of ius soli, which applied to all citizens of BCN states; citizens of the Republic of Ireland who were granted free entry for political reasons; descendants of British subjects who did not live in BCN states and to whom
the *ius sanguinis* principle no longer applied (Plender, 1972, pp. 16–19). Although Britain later modified its tiered system for admitting foreigners, the 1948 Act illustrates the dilemma faced by British governments in formulating entry rules that gave preferential treatment to some foreigners while excluding others.

In just a few years, the face of Britain changed from a white nation to a multicultural community. In part, Britons were proud that under the provisions of the 1948 Nationality Act and the principle of *civis Britannicus sum*, anyone, regardless of skin color, could cross Britain’s borders and settle in Britain. Since the mid-1950s, the right had been calling for careful control of the influx of refugees and migrants, as evidenced by a 1958 poll.

1956 was the peak year for immigration from the West Indies, with some 30,000 people making the journey to Britain. The general opinion in favor of restricting “colored” immigration prevailed among Conservatives, but it was also discernible among workers and in the Labour Party. Ethnic tensions became more frequent, as exemplified by the Notting Hill riots of 1958, which were sparked by white youths (Teddy boys) when black men in relationships with white women were targeted (Goodhart, 2013). As early as September 1958, The Guardian expressed concern about the economic and social consequences of the influx of both Europeans and non-Europeans into the British Isles (Solomos, 1989, p. 48). Between 1948 and 1952, between 1,000 and 2,000 people arrived in Britain, but by the 1950s (until 1957) there were between 40,000 and 42,000 migrants annually, mainly from the Caribbean. By 1961, according to the census, the number of people living in England and Wales who were born in the Caribbean was about 160,000–90,000 men and about 70,000 women (McDowell, 2013, pp. 103–108).

**Perception of the Hungarian transformation by Brits. The arrival of the refugees**

After World War II, Hungary’s new communist regime was not well regarded in Britain. In February 1951, the British Foreign Office issued

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6 The riots began as a demonstration following the murder of Jamaican Kelso Cochran.

7 The Teddy Boys or Teds were Britain’s first youth subculture. They were distinguished by their clothing and, from the mid-1950s onward, by their hostility to immigrants and refugees.
a circular establishing a “free travel zone” for Hungarian diplomats in London. It included a circle 18 miles in diameter from Corner Park, the London headquarters of the Hungarian Embassy. Any intention to leave the zone had to be reported to the British authorities (Hungarian Refugees in Scotland, 1956). The attitude of the British public towards the expectations of the Hungarian public was quite different. Assessing the views of the Hungarian refugees, Ron Ledger MP, who knew Hungary from his travels in Europe, said, “We can believe anything, but what Hungarians want now is a democratic system in a free country. I have not met anyone who wants to restore the pre-war regime. Even the staunchest opponents of communism, and there were many, emphasized that they did not want to return to the agrarian system of the past and the old type of capitalism. They explained it very clearly. At the same time, I think that of all the people we talked to, not one in ten claimed to be a committed Communist, and certainly very few of them were members of the Communist Party” (Hungary, December 19, 1956).

Under a new General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1956, the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Resolution 1129, 1956, p. 1) became responsible for coordinating aid, issuing new appeals for assistance, and assessing the needs of Hungarian refugees as accurately as possible. The Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) organized the dispatch of refugees from Austria and tried to assess their individual needs in relation to their destination countries. Within the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies dealt with Hungarian refugees in Austria, with the involvement of individual National Societies. More than 60 private organizations welcomed the newcomers from Hungary. Moreover, the host countries made considerable efforts to settle and integrate the emigrants. In 1956, Canada, France, Great Britain, West Germany, and Norway committed to accept Hungarian refugees without restrictions. It is worth not-

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8 Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) Travel arrangements were organized by the very efficient Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), which had been established to assist the millions of refugees and displaced persons left in the wake of the Second World War. At the time the ICEM was supposed to be a temporary organization, to deal with a temporary and purely European problem. Little did we know that the ICEM would have a long history and since then has become a worldwide organization, which has to handle larger problems.
ing that France, which is still often considered anti-Hungarian by Hungarian public opinion because of Trianon, maintained this willingness even in the spring of 1957.

When on 7 November, Lord John Hope, Joint Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, announced in the House of Commons that Britain was prepared to accept 2,500 Hungarian refugees, he also stated that the refugee crisis in Austria would be quickly resolved if all countries followed the British example (Gatrell, 2011, p. 5). Lord John Hope’s humanitarian statement was based on prospects of using Hungarian refugees as economic migrants. Consequently, the Home Office asked the British embassy in Vienna to provide all possible information necessary to identify and recruit refugees who could be employed in the UK in sectors facing the shortage of workers. The British delegation had traveled to Austria in early December 1956. While passing through Bavaria, members of the delegation dined in the beer hall where Hitler launched his putsch against the system of the Weimar Republic. The latter fact drew more attention of the delegation than the situation of migrants in migration camps (Refugees from Hungary, 1956, pp. 1359–1361).

Another issue was that the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Britain was not a member of the organization and it was the main organization involved in the transportation of Hungarian refugees from Austria to other countries. It was an independent organization founded in 1952 after a conference on refugees in Europe orchestrated on the initiative of the United States and Belgium. The British government officially refused to participate in the ICEM because of its annual administrative costs of £70,000. ICEM’s early successes in defining migration services and managing some migration flows, however, did not translate into sustained policy opportunities. By 1956, the overall context of migration in Europe was changing, and so were the opportunities for the ICEM. The Hungarian uprising in 1956 increased the importance of the UNHCR, which from then on began to act as the leading organization in refugee affairs (Loescher, 1993, p. 33).

In January 1957, however, the ICEM withdrew from the mission after sending 13,000 Hungarians to Britain at a cost of more than £300,000. However, the British government was reluctant to pay the organization for transportation services because the country was not a member. The Foreign Office wanted to point out to the ICEM that the British government was not in the habit of paying for the resettlement of refugees. The Foreign Office very reluctantly agreed to pay £10,000 if the ICEM asked
for a financial contribution. The Home Office stated that its refugee policy was not discriminatory, and a month after the decision to grant asylum to the refugees, it officially announced a mission to be sent to the Austrian capital to decide on granting asylum rights.

The mission consisted of more than a dozen migration officials and staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as administrative staff. The selection process was detailed and included the examination and photographing of each refugee. This meticulous process demonstrates complete control over who is admitted to the UK as a refugee. Decisions to admit refugees were made almost exclusively after considering their employment opportunities. Of those screened by the mission, 60 percent were unmarried men and women, who could work as miners, factory workers, and agricultural laborers. The British mission in Vienna carefully screened applications for asylum. Applications were rejected from undocumented migrants, Roma, non-Hungarian citizens, and homosexuals. The latter were considered non-eligible for permanent resettlement in Britain because homosexuality was illegal there in the 1950s. The same applied to those suspected of working for Hungarian intelligence. The selective approach was motivated not only by employment opportunities but also by the possibility of permanent settlement in Britain. So race and sexual orientation also played a role.\(^9\)

From the very beginning of their presence on British soil, the Hungarian refugees expressed the opinion that their goal was to move further to Canada, the United States, or Australia.\(^10\) They were even encouraged in this belief by their hosts in the camps in Austria. In an effort to ease tensions and help refugees, some refugees in Austria were misled into believing that they would transit to the New World and later to Canada or the US.

Plans to go to North America were announced in early January 1957 by Sir Arthur Rucker, head of the Hungarian Committee under the British Council for Aid to Refugees. At the beginning of the 20th century, nu-

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\(^9\) The National Archives of United Kingdom, HO 352/142, Report of the Home Office Mission in Austria at Traiskirchen, Vienna and Innsbruck, March 27, 1957

\(^10\) In mid-December 1956, The Times published a letter from an interpreter who worked in a camp that temporarily housed 850 Hungarians. It is a small sample, but what it claims is significant. As the author claimed, “the vast majority of Hungarian refugees want to cross the border to Canada, other British Commonwealth countries, and the United States.” HC Deb 19 December 1956, vol. 562, cc1317-414, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1956/dec/19/hungary.
numerous colonies of economic emigrants from Hungary were established in these countries. The refugees declared that they wanted to be as far away from the Soviet Union as possible, so fear and apprehension of the Kremlin undoubtedly influenced their attitudes. This can be considered a reasonable explanation since some of the young Hungarians involved in the armed struggle who appeared at official events in British institutions (such as the Albert Hall on November 28, 1956) wore masks on their faces to make them difficult to identify by Soviet agents working in the British Isles (*Refugess Prefer...*, 1956). In a December 1956 issue of the Daily Mirror, a photograph of 12 refugees attending a party in a Hungarian restaurant in London was awarded in the “Photo of the Year” category. The Daily Mirror, however, did not publish it for the safety of people in the photograph.

At first, any document was accepted to provide asylum. In early December, however, the British media expressed concern that there might be spies among the newcomers (*Could there be....*1956). Since June 1957, only those Hungarians who already had family in the UK were allowed, which further limited the number of immigrants. One in two adult refugees from Hungary expressed their plans to go overseas. The literature suggests that refugees from Hungary may have “come to Britain expecting far too much” than the country could offer merely a decade after the end of the war.

Although the Hungarian refugees were never interned, the Home Office was highly suspicious of them in the context of the ongoing Cold War (Cesarani, 1993, pp. 33–47). This was not a new tactic for the imperial authorities, who had approached Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria with similar suspicion during World War II, when it was feared that Nazi spies were among them. The same happened in 1956 and 1957. This time, however, Hungarian Jewish refugees were placed in separate camps organized in the larger cities, mainly to avoid the growing anti-Semitism among the refugees (Gati, 1986, pp. 100–101). Although not explicitly stated in the archival materials, raising doubts about the nature of Hungarian refugees drew attention of other departments, especially the Foreign Ministry, to the need to control Hungarian immigration.

The whereabouts of Hungarian refugees who came to Scotland from Austria were extremely interesting. It turns out that they did not consider Scotland their final destination. Most of them went to England and other BCN countries. Why did the Hungarians not stay in Scotland permanently, but left the country in less than a year? On the organizational
side, a legal framework had to be created from scratch in the UK for Hungarians coming to the country. There was a British Council for Refugee Support in London, but its authority covered only England. In order to coordinate efforts more effectively, the Scottish Coordinating Committee for Aid to Hungarian Refugees (SCCAHR) was established in Edinburgh. The SCCAHR was established on December 5, 1956. The structure was supported by various organizations throughout Scotland, including the Church of Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, the Scottish Council of Social Service, the YMCA and the Scottish Red Cross. The SCCAHR included representatives from the Scottish Home Office (AFC Clarke), the Scottish Education Department (Arbuckle) and representatives from the Scottish Labor, Health and Welfare Departments of the Scottish National Government.

Hungarians had been arriving in Scotland since the beginning of December 1956. Their number was estimated by the British authorities at 979 people. In fact, there were 981 Hungarian refugees, as two more people of Hungarian origin arrived in Scotland as part of the family reunification campaign, one from Rome and the other from Vienna. Among the refugees, single men were the largest group (396 people), followed by married couples (284 people), single women (110), and children (189). Most of them were relatively young people: 22% were under the age of 18 and 67% were between the ages of 18 and 38 (Hungarian Refugees, 1956). The arrival of the refugees created many emotional situations. For example, Erzsebet Kardos and Eric Parkes were married in early January. Parkes had been living in Australia since 1948, when he fled Hungary. He waited until 1956 for his fiancée, who after the revolution went to Austria and then to the British Isles (Hungarian Refugee Marries, 1957). Another situation occurred in January 1957, when 10 Hungarian couples from Camp Middleton in Scotland got married.

The British government found it difficult to accommodate refugees from Hungary, so the authorities earmarked a variety of sites for housing, including former military bases, hospital buildings, and abandoned buildings far from any possibility of work. According to Tony Kushner, there was no unified line of action between the Foreign Office and the Home Office. In the field of international politics, London sought to improve its ratings, which had been weakened during the Suez crisis, and it could make improvements by supporting the demands of the Hungarian revolution and welcoming refugees (Kuschner, 2006, pp. 66–67). Moreover, the authorities in charge of domestic policy were reluctant to deal with
the Hungarians. This attitude stemmed from the general anti-communist stance of the government and the police. The latter feared that, along with the refugees, agencies of the Budapest regime would establish their presence in the British Isles.

The refugees were placed in YMCA\textsuperscript{11} hostels and hotels, and the Red Cross hastily organized unguarded camps. After a few weeks, as the wave of emigration subsided, there were five refugee camps. Belmont, Bromlee, Glengoonaar, Middleton, and a Red Cross and YMCA camp. Most could hold about 250 people each. The authorities provided the newcomers with medical care, and from the first months of their stay in Britain, attempts were made to provide them with education. As the reports of the British authorities pointed out, the Hungarians were not in the best physical and mental condition (Mezey, 1960, pp. 618–627). Especially their mental condition was appalling. The people were scared and terrified. Attitudes presented by the Hungarians in the refugee camps were rather peculiar. They resulted from two factors: services offered by the British and refugee expectations from the Western world.

In late January and early February, the number of camps decreased as some refugees left for Northern Ireland. Since a significant number of Hungarian refugees left, on March 22, 1957 a decision was made that Hungarian citizens employed in the administration of the camps could be paid for their work. In late February 1957, the Glengonner camp was closed and, as a result, a significant number of camp residents were placed in hostels in Scotland.\textsuperscript{12}

A December 1957 report describing camp life included the following observations. Difficulties in communication between refugees and camp staff were partly eased by the fact that there were two people in the camp who spoke basic French and fluent German. The Christmas season brought a wave of unprecedented warmth to people who were spending Christmas away from home for the first time. Bromlee camp administrator Alastair MacPhee wrote in the report, “There were obvious signs of deterioration [in refugee morale – T.K. note]. A handful of people usually turn up for breakfast. Most only show up for lunch, unshaven and in

\textsuperscript{11} Young Men’s Christian Association.

\textsuperscript{12} With a housing shortage in Britain and a much larger than anticipated number of refugees arriving in Britain, the refugee influx had to be temporarily halted in December 1956 due to the need to locate suitable housing for them. A.D. Aranjo, Assets and Liabilities: Refugees from Hungary and Egypt in France and Britain, 1956–1960. See: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13503/1/De_Aranjo_Thesis.pdf, p. 160.
pajamas. On the one hand, they are committed to a better way of life, but on the other hand, they are unable to put it into practice. People disappear and reappear after a few days. Between the camps, they have established a kind of underground communication.”

In less than a year, from December 1956 to September 1957, most of the Hungarians who arrived in Scotland decided to emigrate further (NAS – Summary of Positions..., 1957). Most of them chose to go first to Ireland and then to Canada (436 people), while others chose to emigrate to Canada via the air bridge from the Prestwick Airport. Another group of 21 people went to various countries around the world (USA, Brazil) and finally 8 people returned to Hungary.

Both the British authorities and the local Scottish governments were unprepared for the arrival of such a large group of refugees. The problem was mainly the accommodation, since both Scotland and England at that time needed hands to work in the mines and agriculture. In May 1957, there was a debate in the Parliament about unemployment in Britain. The level of unemployment in Scotland (about 3.5–4%) was alarming, twice that of England alone, and in the capital, London, it was 1.2% (Employment, 1957).

The problem with employment for the Hungarians was an important condition for the British authorities. As reported by the British authorities, up to 90% of the new arrivals were not interested in working in Britain and expressed their desire to go to the United States and Canada. For example, at the Middleton camp, which housed 239 refugees, 69 said they wanted to go to Canada, while 101 wanted to go to the United States (NAS – Fond HH 56/63, Notes of Meeting..., 1957). There was also a relatively large group of refugees who did not find their way into the new British reality. In the long run, 1,913 people returned to Hungary from the British Isles by 1959 (Ungváry, 2013, pp. 1578–1579). While the refugees were still in Austria, it was declared that there was a possibility of further emigration. The Canadian government initially agreed to accept only 5,000 people of Hungarian descent. It agreed to increase this quota on the condition that the British would accept Hungarians who were still waiting in Austria for resettlement. Negotiations between the British and Canadian governments continued during the winter of 1956/1957. They failed to produce an immediate consensus because the Canadian authori-

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ties refused to accept Hungarian refugees during the winter when there were few job opportunities.

During parliamentary debates in the second half of December 1956, Britain realized that it would be difficult to meet the refugee expectations. As Foreign Secretary Lloyd Selwyn reported, by the end of December, Canada was the only country accepting Hungarian refugees from Britain. Canada undertook to accept at least 10,000 refugees who could be easily integrated into the Canadian economy. Ottawa was prepared to accept up to 5,000 refugees from Great Britain after April 1 of the following year – perhaps even a little earlier – a large number of whom came hoping to get to North America later (Hungary, December 19, 1956). It was thought that if the refugees had learned that they would be able to leave British soil within a few months, this would have encouraged them to learn English and take up work in anticipation of emigrating to Canada. Their taking jobs in Britain would in no way jeopardize their chances to leave for Canada in the future.

They spent 16 weeks in the UK learning English and the basics of mining. Most of the applicants were between 20 and 30 years old, and half of them claimed to be qualified. Their training was paid for by the National Mining Committee (NMC). The NMC set up a special commission, chaired by its president Ernest Jones, to persuade local mining organizations to accept the Hungarians. Ernest Jones “explained that no miner’s job was in jeopardy at the moment and that every British worker had been told many times that he would be given preference over the Hungarians if he worked in another company’s mine” (Training at 8 pound..., 1957).

From the very beginning of the Hungarians’ stay in Scotland, the British government and the local authorities tried to solve the refugee issue by presenting various options to settle in the British Isles. On November 28, 1956, the British Member of Parliament for Northern Scotland, Jo Grimond,\textsuperscript{14} sent a letter to the Ministry suggesting that there was a possibility of settling Hungarian newcomers on the Orkney and Shetland Islands. A place for their settlement was being considered there, as the Hungarian refugees could work on farms there. The idea, however, was not free from difficulties. The farms were very small (30–40 acres), and there were no other work opportunities than farming, with a great shortage of housing. Finally, the originators themselves noted that settling Hungar-

\textsuperscript{14} He was the leader of the Scottish Liberal Party for 11 years.
ians in such an area would mean nothing less than “creating a Hungarian colony, and people settled there would become animal labor” (Possible Settlement..., 1957). Settlement there would practically mean exile, as the islands would be cut off from the outside world. However, they still considered the possibility of settling refugees in a camp owned by the Admiralty at Holm on the island of Orkney. The camp included military buildings abandoned by the navy and used during the Second World War. The intention was to allocate them to Hungarians. Another proposal was to set aside a military camp at Evanton in northern Scotland (known as Camp “A”), near the village of Invergordon, for the newcomers. The site could accommodate about 100 people, so it was considered quite attractive. The weakness of the plan – which was pointed out by English politicians – was the fact that most of the refugees were educated people who lived in large cities in Hungary, and only a small proportion of them had worked in agriculture before. Collectively and individually, the Hungarians were expected that the “trust” placed in them by Britain not be abused. However, Britain faced their ingratitude when 5,000 Hungarians attempted to emigrate to Canada and failed early on to meet the requirements of the host country and did not learn English. In doing so, they distorted the image of heroic, grateful refugees. Local authorities tried to separate the problematic refugees or move them to other centers or hostels.

In early December 1956, the relocation of refugees within the United Kingdom was also discussed in the British Parliament. Conservative Baron Marcus Kimball asked the Minister of Labor if he would consider the labor needs of the country’s major agricultural areas and see if some Hungarian refugees with agricultural skills could be employed in Gainsborough, Isle of Aixholme, or Market Rasen in Lincolnshire. Conservative MP and Employment Minister Iain Macleod replied that he would be pleased if any farmer who could offer work and accommodation to Hungarians would contact their nearest local employment office. However, Iain Macleod said that of those who had already arrived, few had experience in agriculture, “because the people who came in the beginning were students, engineers, etc., and there were relatively few who were suitable for this kind of work [in agriculture – T. K. note]” (NAS – Fond HH 56/62, Hungarian Refugees..., 1956).

Refugees were housed in 128 camps, boarding schools, and miners’ hostels. Only a small fraction of these places were located in areas promising employment (e.g. hostel in Teesside). However, most of the places where Hungarians were sent were in areas isolated from the urban
world and agricultural areas, former military bases, etc. Young people were placed in university dormitories, which could accommodate up to a dozen people. The largest number of places (2,000 beds) was offered by the former RAF base in Hendesford.

**Britain’s post-1945 reality: the role of trade unions and postwar migration policies**

News about the outbreak of riots in Hungary caused serious concern among capitals of Western democracies. Britain, too, was not prepared to support the Hungarian fighters. The White House administration may have been able to respond with political support, but political circles in Paris and London knew from information provided by their own intelligence services that the Kremlin was prepared to intervene. In response to the events of late October and early November 1956, the British government announced that it did not intend to use the events in Central Europe to undermine the USSR’s position in the region (Litván, 1996, pp. 94–95). It also happened that opinion circles in Britain did not understand the changes that were taking place on the Danube and referred to the insurgents as rebels.

The answer to the question why so many refugees left the islands to continue their wandering is multifaceted. According to Hungarian diplomats working in Edinburgh, Hungarians have never been a very popular community in Britain. This may be due to the fact that the Scottish writer Robert Seaton Watson (pseudonym Scotus Viator) wrote very unflatteringly about Hungarian politics at the beginning of the 20th century. This may have caused British political circles to resent the Hungarian political class. It is also important to remember about the anti-communist hysteria in Britain, which rekindled in November 1956. The post-1920 Hungarian emigres in Austria had already been described by British observers as an internally divided group that had no idea what democracy was. Károlyi’s views were described as “a curious mixture of poor will, ambition, vanity, exaggerated sentimentalism, and nervous modernity.” After 1920, Hungarian emigrants in Vienna were said to have nothing in common with democrats because when they spoke of liberalism and democracy, they really meant socialism (Litván, 1984, p. 205).

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15 In 1956/1957, 400 students arrived in Great Britain.
At that time, the so-called “Operation Post Report” was resumed with the aim of analyzing exactly who was coming to Britain from Eastern Europe and for what purpose. This operation interrogated more than 30,000 asylum seekers in a few months, independent of the work done by the British mission in Traiskirchen, Austria, work that was perhaps done quickly and perhaps inaccurately (de Aranjo, 1956–1960, pp. 184–186). In mid-January 1957, the Hungarian authorities expelled British military attaché James Cowley from Budapest (The History of the Soviet Bloc, 2013, p. 175).

In 1945, the Labor Party had its first clear electoral victory, enabling it to govern the country in 1945–1951. Its objective was to build a new society in recognition of the contribution of all Britons to the war struggle. Trade unions benefited and the unfavorable 1927 law was repealed in 1946. Union membership rose to 9.5 million by 1950. The new government created a national health service and nationalized the coal, railroad, and shipbuilding industries. The unions were at the forefront of cooperation with the government, and as Britain’s economy grew, the number of union headquarters increased. The Conservatives, concerned about the scale of Labour’s victory in 1945, realized that they had to take active steps to be seen as friendly to ordinary working people. Successive Conservative Prime Ministers made every effort to consult with the unions on important social and political issues.

In November 1956, British trade unions were out of touch with international politics and making decisions as questionable as in the summer of 1920, when they blocked Western aid to Poland fighting the Red Army. At the end of 1956, one union headquarters demanded condemnation of the British army’s actions in Egypt and even the payment of compensation to that country. When an attempt was made to pass a resolution against the actions of the Russians against Hungary, it was defeated by the communist-unionists (Jackson, 2006, pp. 23–24).

The mining industry, including coal, became the most important branch of the national economy. As such, it was an area of conflict of interests between the Labour Government and the Trade Unions (after nationalization of mines, a body representing interests of miners was established – NCB). The goal of the government, as the direct owner of the mines, was to ensure the smooth operation of the companies, which is why a significant number of foreigners were employed immediately after the war in 1945. The group included Poles, Italians, and migrants from Central Europe. It consisted of about 8,500 people, with the government planning to employ around 30,000 miners (Edgerton, 2018, p. 97).
early 1950s, there were about 10,000 foreign miners employed in British mines, and the Trade Unions tried to block government plans to hire Italians and Hungarians. Finally, Trade Unions tried to block foreigners from accessing domestic jobs. Public attitudes towards immigrants varied. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Britain rapidly grew in wealth, partly due to the influx of cheap labor from the colonies and Central Europe. One right-wing politician even claimed that the British public was living at an unprecedented level (1957: Britons..., 2008). Britons were thus becoming a consumer society, focusing mainly on their own country’s economy with little sensitivity to the needs of other nations (Horn, 2009). However, these were the beginnings of the development and the public and Trade Unions reacted to any fluctuation in economic development. Additionally, prosperity made a large part of the population completely disinterested in politics and migration. One observer characterized public attitudes in the United Kingdom as follows: “a part of the population show imperial and racist views, some other are only interested in whether Arsenal wins the game on Saturday, and the rest are just nice to strangers (Goodhart, 2013, p. 123). The 1948 Act offered legally protected mass immigration from mostly non-European countries of the “New” Commonwealth. Contrary to popular belief, however, active recruitment from these countries was limited to a few employers; Attlee’s government considered primarily continental Europe as a source of workers to fill postwar labor shortages. In fact, the Labour government and its Conservative successor sought to discourage further immigration from the New Commonwealth by “informal” means, including pressuring governments of Jamaica and India to impose administrative barriers to potential immigrants (Spencer, 1997, p. 45).

Initially, the NCB found the Hungarians to be an attractive labor force to fill labor shortages in the mines. Trade Unions were willing to accept inexperienced miners because the newcomers were provided with three weeks of initial training and a twelve-week English language course. To select future workers, the NCB sent a delegation to Austria. In December 1956, it was publicly reported that “there was no objection in the mining industry to accept refugees.” However, the situation deteriorated rapidly in early 1957. Local agreements were difficult to reach, and many mines refused to provide jobs for Hungarians. The local NCB branches opposed the hiring of Hungarians over the fear that they would be given accommodation while some British miners had to queue for housing. They also feared that the availability of jobs would take an unfavorable turn, making
it impossible for British miners to find employment in the future. Thus, the NCB adopted an exclusionary attitude towards Hungarians (Taylor, 2003, p. 178).

From March 8 to June 14, 1957, of approximately 3,900 refugees who arrived in the United Kingdom under the Replenishment Program, only 429 were employed by the NCB (LAB 8/2580, Hungarian Refugees, 1957). By May 1957, according to a report submitted to the Parliament by Minister of Labour Iain Macleod, nearly 12,000 Hungarian refugees had found employment outside the mining industry. This figure included refugees who were temporarily employed but had since emigrated to Canada, so in May 1957 the actual number workers was somewhat lower. The National Coal Board reported that 218 Hungarians had already begun working in mines and another 115 were employed in support occupations (Hungarian Refugees..., 1957). By mid-1957, the NCB reported that some 200 trained people were available to work in the mines, but for various reasons could not be employed. Consultations were held between the NCB and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) on this issue.

Despite the difficulties, the fact that Britain was at full employment in 1956 and 1957, and that most of the refugees were young and mostly skilled men, made it easier for various agencies to find jobs for the refugees. Employment Minister Iain Macleod described them as “relatively easy to employ.” By January 22, 1957, nearly half of the refugees registered for work had found jobs, and by mid-September 1957, fewer than 200 Hungarians were unemployed.

During the Hungarian crisis, refugees from Egypt also arrived in the British Isles. However, the British government adopted a slightly different policy toward them. During a debate in Parliament on March 8, 1957, one MP stated that those arriving from Egypt – as British subjects – had a “direct claim” on the government in London, more legitimate than other refugees (Refugees, March 8, 1957). The arrival of refugees from Egypt put the British government in a difficult position, as it had to secure jobs for some 3,000 people and their families. By early January 1957, about 100 refugees arrived daily from Egypt, and it was expected that the total would be between 5,000 and 7,000 (Work Sought for Refugees..., 1957). Their integration into local society seemed easier because, as Sir Geoffrey Hutchinson, head of the National Assistance Board, noted, “nearly 70% of them spoke English and all of them additionally spoke French.”

The refugee crisis in Hungary was a chance for the British government to improve its image after the fiasco in Egypt and to show the inter-
national community that the country still meets moral and humanitarian standards. It is therefore likely that Britain’s involvement in the Suez crisis influenced the country’s friendly attitude towards Hungarian refugees. Newsreels and the press were used for this purpose. The media played an important role in helping Britain regain national and international credibility (Rawnsley, 1999).

On the British Isles, debates continued about the international context of the migration crisis. Middlesex Labour politician Maurice Orbach pointed out the need to treat all newcomers equally, according to the principle of the diversity that built Britain, since “this homogeneous nation was built in part by heterogeneous remnants we have gathered on our hospitable shores” (Hungary..., 1957). It is worth noting that the expellees arriving from Egypt were generally much older than the Hungarian refugees. A closer analysis, however, offers the impression that support for refugees from Egypt was at least vaguely regulated. Those who had been expelled from Egypt and whose property had been confiscated by the Egyptian government were advised to register their lost assets with the Foreign Office in London. However, the announcement was made in such vague language that one could conclude that the authorities were less concerned with helping their own countrymen who were in serious trouble, but with securing their political support. What motivated the British government to accept refugees from Hungary then?

However, R. Mason, representing the opposition Labor Party, was not satisfied with the successes, but condemned both the policy of the NCB and the behavior of the British miners. As a former miner, he expressed his disappointment that the miners did not want to accept Hungarian refugees. Their attitude was bad for the nation and they were also doing an injustice to the free nations of the world. So far, the NCB had recruited only 3,900 Hungarian refugees and sent them to areas struggling with the greatest shortage of housing. This caused difficulties. “I hope”, he said, “that the miners, for the sake of themselves, the industry and the country’s economy, will overcome their prejudices and take in a handful of these brave people” (Post-War Record..., 1957).

The employment of Hungarians in British workplaces was also a challenge. The main occupation envisaged by the London government for the refugees was that of a miner. The employment of Hungarians in mines was coordinated by the authorities of the NCB in London. Initially, the Trade Union authorities in various mines agreed to employ a small number of refugees. Encouraged by this development, the NCB even sent rep-
representatives to Vienna to convince refugees on the spot to choose Britain as their final decision. It was then agreed that Britain would provide jobs for four million people from Hungary.

It was also interesting that by early December some 11,000 refugees had been granted permission to enter Britain. This was a number roughly equivalent to the manpower shortage in British mines. On December 6, 1956, the British government decided to temporarily halt further arrivals. This showed that the motives of the British government were never purely humanitarian, but an important factor was to cover labor shortage. Despite shortages in the mining sector, the British government continued to recruit Hungarian refugees and allowed them to come from Austria. Perhaps the decision to resume recruiting was due to the fact that Hungary also experienced a shortage of miners after the revolution, and the lack of miners might have led to the fall of Kadar’s government. The second likely reason was the Anglo-Canadian agreement reached with British representatives on December 17, 1956, during Canadian Minister Pickersgill’s visit to Austria. Canada entered into similar agreements with other European countries to accept large groups of refugees during winter. The aim was to transfer them to Canada a few months later, at a time when the number of jobs would be growing (Memorandum..., 1956). Britain offered to take in an additional 5,000 refugees coming from Austria to be resettled in Canada in spring. Certainly, news about the agreement improved British trade union attitudes towards Hungarian refugees waiting to get jobs in mines.

British miners were not the only ones who did not want to work with refugees. Two Hungarians were hired at an aluminum foundry in Beckhenam, but they spoke so little English that communication with them was based on sign language. The Trade Union requested the factory owners to revoke the permission for Hungarians to work at the foundry. The owners, however, did not comply, partly because of refugee situation and partly because they did not agree with the union’s demands. Finally, the TU members went on strike (220 refuse..., 1957). Another surprising opposition came from the National Conference of Working Women, held in April 1957. In her address, Vera Pope of Gloucester accused the refugees of taking away jobs and housing from “our” compatriots. A resolution condemning the USSR was passed, but the conference failed to adopt a final resolution declaring full support for the needs of the Hungarian people (Hanson, 1995, p. 285).

The resentment against the Hungarians was further fueled by the behavior of young refugees. After a while, these young people confronted
reality, which was very sobering, especially for those young people with rebellious attitudes. British law allowed lower wages for those under 21, which was certainly a cause of discontent, even rebellion, among young people who experienced injustice. The press in Communist Hungary, as well as the British press, reported on the frequent violations of the law and crimes committed by young refugees. Most of them quickly learned that nothing is for free in the “golden West” (*A Daily Telegraph*, ..., 1959).

In August 1960, for example, a British court sentenced Mihály Pőczé to death for robbing pawnbrokers in Lancaster and murdering Frederick Gallagher. After three years, only 2,000 Hungarians were determined to stay in Britain. The Daily Telegraph reported that the first weeks after refugees arrived in the islands were “a period of beautiful dreams” (*A Daily Telegraph*, ..., 1959).

By June 1957, little progress had been made on the employment issue. This was because the mining union authorities declared that only a minimal number of refugees could take jobs in the mines. They cited a 1947 union law that prohibited hiring of foreigners without the approval of the Trade Union. However, if the TU authorities had already agreed to such employment, then the new worker would have to register with the union. Moreover, in the event of staff reduction, the newly hired would be the first to lose their jobs. As a result, out of 4,000 people who came to the British Isles, only 400 found jobs in the mines, 1,100 in other industries, and 2,500 waited in hostels uncertain of their status. In Scotland, for example, 75 Hungarians found employment in existing mines (most of them in the counties of West Fife (18) and West Ayr (17)) (NAS – Fond HH 56/62, *Employment of Hungarian Refugees*, 1957).

If we begin to analyze the level of employment of Hungarians on the scale of Great Britain as a whole, we find that only one in six to seven trained refugees found employment in British and Scottish mines. By the end of 1957, almost 4,200 refugees had been trained and only 731 of them were employed (Ashworth, Pegg, 1986, pp. 164–165). In other sectors of the economy there was a similar gap with Central European newcomers.

In February 1958, on behalf of the British miners’ unions, Ernest Jones announced that coal consumption had declined since the arrival of Hungarian refugees to Britain, and that there had been a reduction in the number of miners. The unions did not agree that foreigners should be

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16 In the British Isles, the death penalty was carried out for the last time in 1964.
hired instead of local workers (*Nincs hely..., 1958*). Articles appeared in the British press that showed ignorance of the realities of a Central Europe dominated by the Kremlin. After Gomulka came to power in Poland, a British journalist wondered whether political changes in Poland in late 1956 and early 1957 were not a “wiser scenario” compared to what was happening at the same time across the Danube. It was suggested that the struggling Hungarians should enter into negotiations with the Soviet aggressor and work out some modus vivendi with the Kremlin (*Kingsley, 1957, p. 161*).

John Horner, general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, resigned from the party membership. Then, during a conference of firefighters from three counties, held in Newcastle, all officials of the Fire Brigades Union affiliated with the Communist Party were called on to resign. The executive committee of the National Union of Miners passed a resolution condemning Soviet aggression in Hungary. However, after careful consideration, miners’ leader Arthur Horner decided to remain loyal to the Communist Party. He maintained that he believed communist countries should be allowed to develop in their own way without outside pressure. The Electrical Workers Union also retained its Communist leader, Frank Foulkes. However, at its annual conference in June 1957, the union itself passed resolutions supporting the Hungarian people and condemning Soviet intervention. Moreover, the Communist Club at the Oxford University was forced to disband following the resignation of its members. In an interview with the Panorama television, broadcast on December 10, 1956, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, John Gollan, stated that 590 members had surrendered their cards since the beginning of the Hungarian uprising. It was estimated that three percent of the total 34,000 members might eventually resign as a result of the events in Hungary.

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In the aftermath of 1956/1957 events, many refugees from Hungary decided to migrate further to North America. The unpreparedness of the British authorities to deal with social and migration issues added to the problem. If we compare the involvement of the Canadian government at the time, which rented additional premises for its embassy in Vienna and sent government representatives to learn about refugee problems
on the ground, we can see why most Hungarians chose Canada as their second home.

In the last month of 1959, 16,000 of the estimated 21,000 refugees remained in the British Isles. English miners did not give in to official decisions or public pressure because they felt that any concessions on the Hungarian refugee issue would weaken the position of local unions on other issues as well. Protecting their independence, position, and unity was more important than anything else. In March 1957, the miners decided that within ten days they would make a decision on the admission of Hungarian refugees. A new offer from the National Mining Committee made them think seriously. The authority offered that if the National Union of Miners accepted new workers in the mines, a shift-work allowance would be automatically included in their salaries, regardless of the new miners’ nationality. However, the miners’ delegates refused to respond immediately. They rejected the plan on the grounds that the delegates could only decide the issue in a secret ballot with the participation of all miners. Nevertheless, the British representative at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the United Nations Refugee Fund reported in January 1958 that of the 15,000 Hungarian refugees in Britain, only 600 were unemployed (Kecskés, 2010, p. 162). Summarizing, Great Britain proved incapable of taking due care of Hungarian refugees in 1956. Instead, in 1957, the country focused on refugees from Egypt and Middle East, the majority of whom already had British citizenships.

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**Węgierscy uchodźcy w Wielkiej Brytanii w kontekście polityki krajowej (1956–1957)**

**Streszczenie**


**Słowa kluczowe:** rewolucja 1956, Węgry, uchodźcy, Wielka Brytania, polityka migracyjna

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