Aleksandra Galus, Paulina Pospieszna

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Supporting new media in Ukraine through Polish Development Cooperation Program[1]

Abstract: After the relatively successful system transformation, some young democratic countries from Central and Eastern Europe which used to receive democratic aid in the 1980s and 90s have engaged as new donors in assisting pro-democratic changes in other post-communist countries. The donor-recipient relations between two post-communist countries can be observed on the example of the development of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. This paper deals with Polish assistance to new media in Ukraine in from 2007-2017 as a part of supporting democracy in Ukraine under the Polish Cooperation Development Program. Firstly, this work examines whether the Polish government's support of Ukrainian media as part of cooperation development will be sustained regardless of changes in the Polish government. Secondly, the paper explores whether Polish NGOs tailor their projects, financed by the Polish MFA, to the recipients' respective needs and the current situation in Ukraine. By examining Polish media assistance, the authors aim to explain the efforts of the new donor in developing media in a partner country, emphasizing the relation between the involvement of external actors and the presence of independent media which play an important role in democratization processes.

Key words: media assistance, new media, development cooperation, Ukraine, Poland

Introduction

Over the years, some donor countries have engaged in supporting political, economic and social development by providing foreign aid to their partner countries. This practice is known as development cooperation and due to its significance for international relations it has gained a lot of attention from scholars as well as from policy-makers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To support world development, donors often decide to provide not only humanitarian aid, but also to assist pro-democratic changes in countries in transition. The official

development assistance (ODA)[2] as a form of inequalities' reduction is still maintained by the majority of donors, also by those who were reported by Freedom House as facing some declines in political and civic freedoms by Freedom House in recent reports (FH, 2016; FH, 2017a; FH, 2017b). Hungary and Poland are among such countries.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is to take an attempt to examine Polish bilateral democracy assistance aimed at supporting new media development in Ukraine under the governance of the Civil Platform (2007–2015) and the Law of Justice (after 2015). Poland joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2013 but the Polish governments and NGOs have been involved in democracy assistance since early 90s and intensified their activities after joining European Union in 2004. The goal of providing support for media development, which is still under-researched type of democracy assistance, is to boost freedom of the press based on freedom of expression and freedom of information as a fundamental human rights.[3] Governmental 'Polish Aid' program is mainly realised by the third sector on the basis of their own transition experiences in order to foster democratisation in recipient countries (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). It includes also the support given to the development of all types of media in Ukraine – television, radio, press, and new media (internet outlets and social media).

The goal of this research is not only to look at concrete media projects implemented by NGOs, but to also trace if Poland as a donor tailors its support to recipient's needs, such as the emergence of armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine after Euromaidan events. What is important, by examin-

---

[2] OCD defines official development assistance (ODA) as 'flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).'

[3] The terms 'freedom of the press', 'freedom of the media' and 'media independence' will be used alternatively in this work. Freedom of information can be defined as the right to access information held by public bodies which was recognized by Resolution 59 of the UN General Assembly adopted in 1946 as well as by Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948. Freedom of information is understood as an extension of freedom of speech (referred to also as freedom of expression) as a fundamental human right (Sobczak, 2007) being a basis for freedom of the press.

ing a piece of 'Polish Aid', directed at support for new media in Ukraine, it will be possible to deliver some preliminary answers on important question whether political environment in donor country affects its democracy assistance strategy. Therefore, this paper aims to fill the existing gap in the literature on democracy assistance by linking the issues of the role of independent media in the process of democratization and the role of the external actors. In particular, this research will touch upon assessing the new media assistance of Poland, being one of the most intensively engaged in sharing own transition experiences among CEE countries.

The substantial experiences gained by Poland and other new donors during the process of system transformation are regularly used by governmental and non-governmental actors engaged in democracy assistance which might constitute a valuable lesson for especially Eastern European aid recipients sharing some common historical and social characteristics with the new donors (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). Taking under consideration recent reports showing the setback in Polish democracy, especially the decline of freedom of the press (FH, 2017a) as a result of the governance of Law and Justice party after 2015,[4] this article analyses if there are differences in media assistance provided by Poland in Ukraine before and after parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland in 2015. Two hypotheses are to be tested through the examination of primary and secondary sources, such as multiannual development cooperation programmes, annual plans, reports published by Polish MFA and NGOs:

H1: Polish government's media support to Ukraine within Poland's development cooperation has the same specific goals and thematic priorities regardless changes in the Polish government.
H2: In providing media assistance to Ukraine, Polish NGOs' tailor their projects aimed at supporting new media to current socio-political situation.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, scholarly literature on development cooperation, democracy assistance, media assistance and foreign influence will be reviewed. Then the authors will present

---

[4] According to the newest report 'Freedom of the Press 2017', mass media in Poland were rated as 'partially free' due to "government intolerance toward independent or critical reporting, excessive political interference in the affairs of public media, and restrictions on speech regarding Polish history and identity, which have collectively contributed to increased self-censorship and polarization" (FH, 2017a, pp. 23).

an empirical part describing Polish ODA strategy as an element of foreign policy since 2007 and providing examples of Polish aid projects aimed at supporting new media in Ukraine. The case study of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation sheds some light on how two post-communist countries may interact with each other as a donor and recipient countries in the field of the development of media.

Development cooperation, democracy assistance, media assistance

Over the years, a fair amount of interest was devoted to the different types of democracy assistance[5] carried out mainly by Western donors in developing countries (e.g. Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Burnell, 2000; Carothers, 1999, 2004; Diamond, 1999; Ethier, 2003; Olsen, 2000; The Commonwealth, 2016; Youngs, 2008). Specifically, the term 'donor' covers different governmental, quasi-governmental, non-profit organizations, aid agencies or individuals that advocate for the spread of democracy and devote to this purpose some resources in developing countries. The major donors examined in the literature are United States (US) and the Western European Union members, who have been consistent in supporting electoral processes, political institutions and parties, rule of law, civil society and free media in recipient countries (Carothers, 1999; Kumar, 2006; Pospieszna, 2014). The main partners in development cooperation, also referred to as aid 'recipients', were the countries going through the transformation process in CEE in the 80s and 90s, on the Balkans and in Russia (Burnell, 2000; McMahon, 2004; Mendelson, 2001; Richter, 2002; Siegel, Yancey, 1992). Also media assistance was a part of such cooperation within democracy assistance in last decades (Howard, 2003).

However, recent studies demonstrated that not only Western donors, but also young democracies from the third wave of democratization in CEE (Huntington, 1991) stimulate pro-democratic changes in neighbour-

---

[5] Despite the fact that in many works terms 'democracy promotion' and 'democracy assistance' are used interchangeably like in Youngs (2008), this paper emphasises the difference in meaning following Azpuru, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson (2008) and Pospieszna (2014). Democracy assistance is understood here as just one of the measures of promoting democracy. In contrary to wider efforts to promote democracy, including diplomatic pressure, aid conditionality or economic sanctions, democracy assistance highlights the role of partners in recipient countries in the development cooperation to establish democracy.

ing countries since they learned from their own transition experiences and were the recipients of democracy assistance themselves not that long ago (Beichelt, Hahn-Fuhr, Schimmelfenning, Worschech, 2014; Chimiak, 2016; Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, 2013; Horký-Hlucháň, Lightfoot, 2015; Jonavicius, 2008; Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007; Petrova, 2014a; Pospieszna, 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). The process of spreading ideas, institutions, policies and models across neighbouring countries through different channels is known in the literature as democracy diffusion (Brinks, Coppedge, 2006; Bunce, Wolchik, 2006). Democracy assistance is considered playing an important role in diffusion of democracy (Petrova, 2014a). New findings on the specific character of democracy assistance provided by new democracies in Europe, called emerging donors, such as Poland and other members of Visegrad Group (V4), triggered the scholarly debate on external influences on democratization. Poland in the field of supporting democracy abroad since the 90s is involved in the full spectrum of activities to promote democracy mainly in neighbouring countries which includes also the interest in providing the support for media development.

While some authors appreciated the efforts of V4 countries, including Poland, to promote democratic values, and even named them as 'democracy new champions' (Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007), others showed donors' limited funding for democracy assistance in comparison to Western support (Petrova, 2014b) or even governments' anti-democratic moves like in the cases of Hungry and Poland (FH, 2017b). Nevertheless, democracy assistance is mainly implemented in CEE region by non-state actors who tailor their international projects for partner countries independently from the government (Pospieszna, 2016a, 2016b; Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, Lightfoot, 2015). Polish funding for official development aid, including democracy assistance, has been maintained even after the victory of Law and Justice in 2015.[6] Scholars who examined the activities of new donors, such as Poland, pointed at good recognition of partners' needs as well as political and social context visible in the development cooperation (Chimiak, 2016; Kucharczyk, Lovitt, 2007; Lexmann, 2014; Petrova, 2014a; Pospieszna, 2014). Still, despite there are recent studies on postcommunist countries involvement in democracy assistance, there is a noticeable gap in the literature on particular types of democratic support of

---

[6] On the basis of Polish Aid's data available at https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Calls,for,proposals,183.html, 20.05.2017.

CEE countries to their post-communist partners, especially concerning the support given to media.

From the donors' perspective the main aim of media assistance is to embrace freedom of the press and to promote professional, independent news media in developing countries (Tsetsura, Grynko, Klyueva, 2011). As in Ukraine case, many aid recipients go through the democratisation process while cooperating with more developed donors. According to Reporters Without Borders, an international non-governmental organization focused on monitoring media freedom in the world, in practice freedom of the press is measured by the scope of media pluralism (political and economic), media independence, media transparency, the scale of censorship and the quality of legal frameworks and media infrastructure.[7] Governments, NGOs and private donors dedicate funds to improve those patterns freedom of the press to contribute to the development of media in their partner countries. Therefore, media assistance is expected to help to produce better journalism, better media organizations as well as better media systems in partner countries in order to foster democracy (Higgins, 2014) by informing society and keeping authorities accountable (Kumar, 2006, 2009) (Kumar, 2006, 2009).

The existing literature on freedom of expression and media effects does not translate directly into better understanding of the democracy assistance efforts. The importance of traditional and media, which will be described in the next section, to some extent seems to be recognized by democracy promoters and underlies many of the Western donors' programs aimed at fostering free media in developing countries. For example, US-based Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) highlights the significance of the media in bringing about the democratic change in post-communist countries (Hume, 2011). Many other EU members followed the idea to invest in raising the freedom of speech and the media pluralism in former soviet countries. Although there are some statistics of the funding for media development by major donors outside the US (Myers, 2009), works exploring aid flows as well as main characteristics of media assistance provided by countries from Central and Eastern Europe are still insufficient.

Moreover, if there was any attention paid to the matter of media assistance in Europe, scholars concentrated on the media support directed

---

[7] Based on the methodology of World Press Freedom Index developed by Reporters without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology, 20.05.2017.

mainly at the Balkan countries given to traditional media outlets (Cornell, Thielen, 2006; Karlowicz, 2003; Rhodes, 2007). Despite one report on Western donors' support to independent media in Ukraine (Tsetsura et al., 2011), little is known about in terms of receiving by Ukrainian media the external support. Therefore, by putting the emphasis on Polish governmental assistance, implemented by NGOs and aimed at fostering the development of Ukrainian online media outlets, it is believed here to deepen the understanding of the development cooperation between two bordering, post-communist states in Central Europe.

'Old' and 'new' media for democratisation

The external support for media development as one of the elements of strengthening democracy deserves to gain more attention in the scientific discourse in recent years due to the historical roles that media played in countries that went through transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes (Bohdanova, 2014; Dyczok, 2009; Jakubowicz, Sükösd, 2008; Obydenkova, 2008; Ullah, 2009; Voltmer, 2013). One of the processes, on which the media have an impact, is democratization, understood as a gradual, consisting of several stages change to democratic form of political regime (Gunther, Diamandouros, Puhle, 1995). Democratization is a part of the holistic system transformation which includes political changes as well as the transformation of society (development of civil society) and economic system (mainly the introduction of the free market). The transformation to democracy is interrelated with the liberalisation of media system and the increase of media independence (Jakubowicz, Sükösd, 2008; Sasińska-Klas, 1994; Voltmer, 2013). The role of media in democratisation should be considered in two ways, as dependent and independent variable of democratic development (Jebril, Stetka, Loveless, 2013). In practice it means that media might be treated both as a system undergoing through transformation, which includes e.g. the abolition of censorship and state monopoly, and as 'a necessary precondition of democracy' (Jebril et al., 2013, p. 10).

The studies carried out in last decades proved that mass media can play a central role in the democratic transformation, but it does not automatically mean that only media determine the success or failure of system change (Beacháin, Polese, 2010; Voltmer, 2013). Media of all types can enable the struggle emerging between democratic movements and

the authoritarian regimes in the process of democratisation (Downing, 1996). Despite the fact that mass media are considered as active participants of political communication (McNair, 1998), which is important for democratization, it has not been clearly resolved so far whether the media cause social and political changes or just follow these processes (Jebril, Stetka, Loveless, 2013). As pointed by Voltmer (Voltmer, 2013, p. 2), 'third wave' of democratization was distinguished from earlier system transitions by the 'the active involvement of the media and their strategic use by those fighting for (or against) democracy'. Taking under consideration the progressive globalisation and the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in recent two decades, not precisely defined roles of mass media in the processes of democratisation deserve further scientific reflections.

However, most researchers from the fields of political science and media studies agree that media fulfil diverse, socially important functions such as a) informing as providing information about current events and identifying power relations; b) correlating as interpreting the reality and building the social consensus; c) ensuring continuity understood as expressing the dominant values to build a community; d) entertaining as reducing social tensions, and finally e) mobilizing society to take actions in the sphere of e.g. politics (Breuer, 2012; Chyliński, Russ-Mohl, 2008; Gilboa, 2005; Jebril et al., 2013; McCombs, 2014; McQuail, 2010). The social functions of media are also described in relation to the potential of creating a platform for public discourse, educating the public or controlling authorities (Kunczik, Zipfel, 2000; McNair, 1998). It should be also noted that full spectrum of above-mentioned roles can be realized by media only in democratic environment and event then also some dysfunctional media' actions can be observed (Baran, Davis, 2007; Nierenberg, 2007).

Even if media have more or less limited possibilities of informing, educating or mobilizing society in countries in transitions, they are still involved in transformation processes which was visible on the examples of colour revolutions (Beacháin, Polese, 2010; Kudlenko, 2015; Lysenko, Desouza, 2012), Arab Spring (Arafa, 2015; Cottle, 2011; Lynch, Freelon, Aday, 2016; Robertson, 2013) or recently during Euromaidan (Bohdanova, 2014; Shveda, Park, 2016; Zaliznyak, 2014). Speaking of Post-Soviet space, some authors point the existence of independent media as one of the factors contributing to the final result of colour revolutions, in addition to e.g. strong opposition, civil society or the involvement of

foreign actors (Beacháin, Polese, 2010). Observing the systems transformations to more democratic after 2000, especially previously mentioned colour revolutions, Arab Spring and protest in Ukraine, many scholars recognised both the importance and the ambiguity of new technologies and new media (e.g. Armbrust, 2007; Cottle, 2011; Etling, Roberts, Faris, 2014; Kyriakopoulou, 2011; Lynch, 2015; Lynch et al., 2016; Olorunnisola, Martin, 2013; Onuch, 2015; Robertson, 2013; Tsetsura, 2015).

Due to the growing popularity of new media, this article focuses on the external support from Poland for the development of digital media outlets and social media in Ukraine. The term 'new media' usually covers any kind of content being available online on users' demand. Despite the confusion that the 'newness' of media causes, there is an agreement in the literature that 'new media' have several characteristics such as being digital, virtual (computer-mediated), networked and interactive (Lister, Dovey, Giddins, Grant, Kelly, 2009; Manovich, 2001). In practice, new media include online outlets of traditional press, radio and television as well as social media understood as 'a group of internet-based applications, build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0,[8] and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content' (Kaplan, Haenlein, 2010, p. 62). Social media are based on networks of people involved in creating collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia), sharing content on blogs and microblogs (e.g. Twitter) and being active on social network sites (SNS) where users create their own profiles (e.g. Facebook, Vkontakte).

The pro-democratic movements happening in past decade, such as the Egypt's 'Facebook Revolution', Iran's 'Twitter Uprising' (El-Nawawy, Khamis, 2012), Ukrainian Euromaidan (Bohdanova, 2014), delivered some proofs of the growing scale of the digital media outlets as well as social media' usage for political mobilization. Scholars from media studies as and political science highlighted both positive and negative aspects of the spread of new media in recent years (Olorunnisola, Martin, 2013; Pearce, Kendzior, 2012; Robertson, 2015; Sandoval-Almazan, Ramon Gil-Garcia, 2014). In present scholarly debate, there are both reflections and case studies proving the 'liberation technology' potential (Diamond, 2012) of new media, highlighting the role of social media, in the proc-

---

[8] The idea of Web 2.0 is based on interactivity. As a consequence of its popularity, personal websites dominating in era of Web 1.0 (before 2004) were replaced by social networks, blogs and collaborative projects where people can easily communicate with each other.

esses of democratisation, and more sceptical attitudes, treating new technologies as 'net delusion' (Morozov, 2011).

Some of the pros of new media include their contribution to empowering individuals, fostering mobilisation and independent public sphere as well as strengthening the development of civil society (Arafa, 2015; Eltantawy, Wiest, 2011; Lopes, 2014; Yesayan, 2014). On the basis of some of the recent studies it can be concluded that internet brings opportunities to pluralise the flows of information and increase the degree of freedom of speech (Bohdanova, 2014; Diamond, 2012; Howard, Hussain, 2011) not only in democratising countries but also in authoritarian regimes. Shirky (Shirky, 2009, 2011) argues that new technologies brought broader access to information resulting in the empowerment of citizens to undertake individual and collective actions. What is more, this digital media' potential for mobilisation may be important for contentious politics (Aday et al., 2010) and social movements' appearance (Bastos, Mercea, Charpentier, 2015; Lopes, 2014). Last but not least, some authors point at new media as a part of accountability mechanism which allows civil society to monitor authorities (Diamond, 2012), regarding both professional journalists publishing materials online as well as citizen journalist, taking attempts to inform their audience in new media (Doliwa, 2012; Gillmor, 2006).[9]

On the other hand, the literature proves also that the spread of new communication technologies and practices may be used by authoritarian regimes in order to extend state-surveillance and censorship, counter civil society actions and spread anti-democratic propaganda (Morozov, 2011, 2012; Pearce, Kendzior, 2012; Soldatov, Borogan, 2015). For example, the phenomenon of 'networked authoritarianism' (Pearce, Kendzior, 2012, p. 295) explains the mechanisms of using new media by non-democratic states to manipulate the information flows and to discourage citizen from using social alternative sources of news. Nonetheless, even if scholars face some difficulties in assessing the exact role of new media in democratisation, existing literature indicates the functions that journalists can fulfil during the processes of political and societal changes. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the matter of media development, including online media, started to be recognized also by international actors who

---

[9] Citizen journalism (referred also as grass-roots or participatory journalism) is understood as an alternative for traditional journalism based on the reporting news by activists led by social interest who are not professional media workers. Doliwa (2012) distinguishing many forms of citizen journalism depending on journalists' motives and media in which they are active.

take actions in the field of supporting democracy in countries in transition (Higgins, 2014; Howard, 2003; Rotham, 2015). To get better understanding of such foreign assistance, the development cooperation between Poland and Ukraine aimed at fostering new media (journalists from online media, bloggers etc.) will be analysed in the next section of this paper.

Development cooperation between Poland and Ukraine

After the collapse of communism and following fruitful European integration, young democratic countries from the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), which used to receive international aid in 80s and 90s, have become to be active in the same field as donors assisting democracy in less developed countries. Such involvement of Poland, which entered the difficult path of democracy in 1989, is a result of a will to build positive relations with neighbouring states and to share own transition experiences as well as to fulfil international commitments in terms of development cooperation. The choice of analysing Poland and Ukraine as countries cooperating within democracy assistance since early 90s us motivated by at least two reasons. Firstly, in terms of system transformation Poland and Ukraine as two post-communist countries started in similar positions. Although in recent years Poland played a role of young democracy, currently the country is experiencing the democratic backlash visible on the example of the Law and Justice government attempts to increase its influence over civil society, education system, judiciary and media. Despite those anti-democratic moves after 2015, in the perspective of last 10 years Poland seems to be consistent in providing support for democratisation in Ukraine as one of the most dynamically developing countries in the region of CEE.

All 'new democracies' in the CEE that joined EU and now are active in the field of democracy assistance are ranked by Freedom House as 'free' with high level of freedom, political rights and civil liberties (FH, 2016). However, some of new EU members, such as Poland and Hungary, experienced recently anti-democratic backlashes. A manifestation of authoritarian tendencies in the field of the media market in Poland is clearly visible on the example of increased state control over public media in Poland under the governance of Law and Justice (FH, 2017a, 2017b) which resulted in the change of media freedom rate in Poland from 'free' to 'partially free' in 2017 for the first time after

1989.[10] Media in Ukraine are rated as 'partially free' (FH, 2016, 2017a) with many areas of Ukrainian media system needed be improved and more democratic. Despite those unfavourable political conditions and attacks on media independence, Polish NGOs and journalists working in the field of media assistance might have a lot to offer in terms of sharing transition know-how in countries who still struggle with some limitations of freedom of expression. As Szent-Iványi points, new donors' 'vast body of transition experience most likely has the highest relevance for the eastern neighbours of the EU (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan)' due to partners' common historical and social backgrounds (Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 1103). Polish transition experiences include also opportunities and challenges related to the process of democratisation of media system in Poland which might be useful for Ukrainian media.

Polish democracy assistance efforts, including media assistance projects, are mainly funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and coordinated by 'Polish Aid' as a leading program for developmental cooperation as well as by Solidarity Fund as State Treasury Foundation[11]. According to governmental documents, Polish democracy assistance is based on the idea of sharing Polish transition experience and treated as an important tool of foreign policy (MFA, 2013). Poland is engaged in supporting democracy as a member of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) obligated to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) in developing, partner countries.[12] Polish democracy assistance, including

---

[10] The main imperfections of Polish media system are political dependence of public broadcast services and some of legal solutions such as defamation (FH, 2017a; Kobylińska, Makowski, Solon-Lipiński, 2012).

[11] More on 'Polish Aid': https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/About,Polish,aid,202.html, 20.05.2017 and Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/fundacja/o-fundacji/, 20.05.2017.

[12] During its transformation period, Poland received support provided by other countries, international organizations and institutions and organisations. Now as a member of the European Union as well as the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Poland is engaged in development aid as donor. OECD defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as 'those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is con-

media assistance, is realised mainly by NGOs (Chimiak, 2016; Petrova, 2014a; Pospieszna, 2014) on the basis of governmental and non-governmental financial support coming from domestic and foreign actors.[13] ODA provided by Poland in Ukraine has both bilateral and multilateral character. Taking under consideration the big number and diversity of actors involved in development cooperation provided by Poland and its sources of funding, this paper focuses only on bilateral, Polish-Ukrainian, efforts to support media. In practice, only governmental call for papers for NGOs, public administration etc. in the area of democracy assistance will be analysed to see whether a) third sector in Poland acknowledged the need to support media development in Ukraine and if yes, ten what types of projects were implemented, and b) if the strategy of Polish MFA was modified after the change of ruling party in 2015.

Polish ODA for media in Ukraine

The Development Cooperation Acts (2013) set the basic guidelines for Polish ODA. Since 2000 in governmental reports on Polish development cooperation Ukraine was listed as one of main partner countries receiving democratic support. In annual plans of development assistance, published since 2007, Ukraine has been mentioned as priority aid recipient as well as in Multiannual Development Cooperation Programmes for years 2012–2015 and 2016–2020.[14] Polish MFA highlighted in both of multiannual programmes (MFA, 2012, 2016) the need of promoting 'objective information and independent media' within actions aimed at sup-

cessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)'. Read more: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, 20.05.2017.

[13] Polish NGOs involved in democracy assistance are often the beneficiaries of financial grants coming from European Union, Visegrad Fund, US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Polish-American Freedom Foundation and other governments, international organisations, foundations and private donors.

[14] The complete list of governmental documents on Poland's development cooperation is available at Polish Aid's website: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/m/Documents,and,Publications,208.html, 20.05.2017. It includes Annual Reports (2000–2015), Multiannual Programme 2012–2015, Multiannual Programme 2016–2020, Polish aid programmes (2007–2011), Development Cooperation Plans (2012–2017), Strategy for Poland's Development Co-operation (2003), Development Co-operation Act (2011) and several additional brochures.

porting good governance. NGOs, who applied for governmental funds within Polish Aid, proposed many projects in the field of media assistance to implement the ideas expressed in the official strategies of development cooperation.[15]

Moreover, in 2014 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' was established to promote media development and self-governance. The initiative was dedicated to democracy assistance just in Ukraine and realised in order to finance two types of projects: a) supporting independent media, and b) supporting local governance.[16] 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' became one of the flagships of Polish democracy assistance initiatives based on the idea of sharing Polish transition experiences with Ukraine. None of the other aid programs so explicitly stressed the need to promote media as an important element of Ukrainian transition to democracy. 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' budget reached approximately 16 million PLN and allowed to finance eleven projects aimed at media development. Support for new media was essential in six of mentioned media assistance projects.

However, the exact data on the amount of Poland's support for traditional and new media are not available. Polish MFA has published only statistics showing bilateral and multilateral aid for recipient countries divided into grant competitions (e.g. Polish Development Assistance 2015, Polish Aid Volunteering Programme 2015, Global Education 2015, Humanitarian aid for Ukraine 2015 etc.), not into particular types of support (e.g. for media, local government, civil society etc.).[17] However, such distinction was made by OECD while measuring DAC countries' efforts in providing ODA. OECD distinguished aid dedicated to a) media and free

---

[15] The results of call for proposals (2004–2017): https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Konkursy,dotacyjne,14.html, 20.05.2017.

[16] The program budget was approximately PLN 16 million (5.5 mln CAD). Within media assistance and local democracy assistance 40 Polish-Ukrainian annual and biannual projects were financed. Precise information on particular projects' funding is unavailable. More: http://solidarityfund.pl/en/programs/poland-canada-democracy-support-program/, 20.05.2017.

[17] Statistics on Polish development cooperation in 2015: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Pomoc,w,liczbach,-,Rok,2015,2448.html, 20.05.2017. Only Zagranica Group as a platform of Polish NGOs working in the field of international development cooperation provides a database of projects, including support dedicated to media development (without the distinction between 'old' and 'new' media). However, this database lacks many implemented NGOs' initiatives and projects. More: http://zagranica.org.pl/baza/, 20.05.2017.

flow of information, b) radio/television/print media, and c) information and communication technology.[18] Data on Polish engagement in ODA goes back to 2013 when Poland joined the group of donors affiliated with DAC OECD.

Still, it is impossible to precisely distinguish the assistance given to traditional and digital media. The support for media and free flow of information might include trainings both for journalists working for 'old' and 'new' media outlets. Technical assistance for radio, TV and print media is dedicated traditional media but can be indirectly targeted at the development of their digital versions. Finally, the ODA for ICT might include the support given for new media – among other recipients. On the basis of OECD data, however incomplete, it can be concluded that Poland did invest in supporting media development in Ukraine, but regarding Polish ODA in total in Ukraine, these expenditures were not large.

Table 1

**Media Assistance: Disaggregated Polish ODA in Ukraine
(millions of US dollars)**

	2013	2014	2015	2016
Media and free flow of information	n/a	0,73	0,24	n/a
Radio/television/print media	n/a	0,063	n/a	n/a
Information and communication technology (ICT)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Total amount of ODA	12,873	18,705	28,970	n/a

Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.

The governmental assistance for new media was provided not only within 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' (2014–2016), but also to some extent in annual development cooperation grants within 'Polish Aid'. However, Polish media assistance in Ukraine was rather modest in comparison to support given to other sectors such as civil so-

---

[18] 'Media and free flow of information' (15153) includes all 'activities that support free and uncensored flow of information on public issues; activities that increase the editorial and technical skills and the integrity of the print and broadcast media, e.g. training of journalists'. 'Radio/television/print media' (22030) is understood as technical support given to 'radio and TV links, equipment; newspapers; printing and publishing'. Finally, 'information and communication technology (ICT)' covers 'computer hardware and software; internet access; IT training'. More on OECD classification of ODA: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/purposecodessectorclassification. htm, 20.05.2017.

ciety, decentralisation reform, good governance. In years 2007–2017[19] only several projects were proposed and financed by 'Polish Aid' except the support coming from Polish-Canadian initiative. Journalists working online started to receive attention only in 2012. The vast majority of the projects were realised as a result of cross-border cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian NGOs and media. One initiative in the field of media assistance was carried by the Embassy of Poland in Kiev. The table presented below shows the number of projects aimed at supporting media development (both traditional and new media) in Ukraine financed within Polish ODA.

Table 2

The number of media assistance projects implemented within 'Polish Aid'

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
0	2	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	0	0

Source: Own calculations. Excluding 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program'.

Despite the fact that in Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016–2020 Polish MFA highlighted the need of promoting 'access to reliable and objective information' and 'independent media' (MFA, 2015b, p. 13) and Ukraine remained one of priority countries, in 2016–2017 there was no media assistance projects funded within Polish Aid as a result of announced call for proposals outside ending Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program. The Polish-Canadian initiative was not continued by the Law and Justice government after 2016. Media assistance, including support for new media, supposed to be maintained also on the basis of annual Development Cooperation Plan for 2016. This document stated that through Solidarity Fund financed will be projects of Polish NGOs aimed at 'expending citizens' access to reliable and objective information by developing independent media, in particular electronic' (MFA, 2015c) – including Ukraine. However, there was no adequate notation in Development Cooperation Plan for 2017 (MFA, 2016b).[20]

---

[19] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland has not published full reports for years 2016–2017 yet. However, the results of call for paper are available: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Konkursy,2017,2583.html, 20.05.2017.

[20] According to official documents of MFA (MFA 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), the number of financed projects within Polish Aid was low but stable.

Given the fact that there have been no projects in the field of media assistance accepted to be implemented within 'Polish Aid' since the new Law and Justice government is in power, we are not able to support our assumption that Polish support for new media remains the same regardless the changes in the ruling government. Polish MFA did not publish the list of unsuccessful applications for projects, so is impossible to conclude whether there was no interest from NGOs in submitting media assistance proposals or the governmental funding priorities has changed as the result of new government ruled by Law and Justice. Considering the fact that since 2008 media assistance was continued by several Polish NGOs and that the new ruling party undertook many anti-democratic steps, including limitation of freedom of the press, the second explanation sound more likely. However, conducting further research concerning also multilateral aid and support coming from private donors would be necessary to draw more precise conclusions.

Polish media assistance in Ukraine – NGOs projects

In order to verify the second hypothesis, assuming that Polish NGOs tailor media assistance projects respectively to the needs of aid recipients and current socio-political situation in Ukraine, we embark on examining the examples of aid projects implemented by NGOs in years 2007–2017. Following media assistance projects which were aimed at empowering journalists and developing new media will allow to reveal some mechanism behind wider democracy assistance provided by Poland as new donor. In addition to ODA data, the only possible source of data regarding media assistance comes from Polish NGOs that implement project in this field. Some of the Polish NGOs' projects aimed at fostering Ukrainian new media development are financed within Polish governmental sources, but NGOs actively look also for other financial possibilities to finance their projects. Despite the difficulties in calculating the exact amount of funding for concrete projects accepted by Polish MFA as a result of announced call for proposals in years 2007–2017, in most cases revealing involved NGOs as projects' initiators as well as getting detailed information on their aims was possible. Information on specific projects – their goals, timeframe, names of NGOs responsible for the implementation, in some cases the amount of funding – were available in annual MFA reports and on the website.

It is worth mentioning that none of the projects qualified for receiving Polish media support in years 2007–2011 explicitly addressed the matter of empowering new media journalists or developing online media outlets. All of the media projects proposed at this time by Polish third sector were aimed at assisting traditional journalists, especially from local media, and strengthening media independence. Polish NGOs started to introduce initiatives to promote digital media in 2012 within 'Polish Aid'. Later, thanks to the existence of 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' six implemented projects included the support also for online media outlets and trainings in new technologies. The results of call for papers announced in 2014 and 2015, proved that both grantees and Polish MFA[21] were aware of the growing role of new media. Due to security reasons, the descriptions of three projects implemented in Ukraine in order to support media development were not revealed at the requests of NGOs. Table below presents selected projects implemented after 2012 in Ukraine within Polish ODA which concentrated to some extend on fostering new media development.

Table 3

Assistance for online media in Ukraine funded through Polish development cooperation program (examples of projects)

Year	Title of the project/Cooperating partners/Brief description
1	2
2014	**The development of analytical and informational journalism in the regional media in Donetsk (2014)**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) Association of Ukrainians in Poland (NGOs in Poland) Internews Ukraine (News agency in Ukraine)
	The scope of the training included issues related to the use of modern information technologies, optimization of content and pictures on the internet, practical work with audio-visual materials. Journalists learned how to create infographics, quizzes, and various types of video for social media, including Facebook and Snapchat. Much of the training was devoted to practical tasks.[a]
2015	**Protection and Support for Journalists of Donbass**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) Democratic Society East Foundation (TDW) (Polish NGO) Research Center of Donbass Social Perspectives OstroV (Ukrainian NGO)
	The project assumed to support journalists of ostro.org through providing knowledge on safe functioning, including cyberspace safety techniques, ability to analyse and present information for journalist covering conflict areas. The project included creation of a mobile version of ostro.org, 220 articles and 13,300 pieces of news.[b]

[21] Civic Platform governance.

1	2
2015–2016	**Investigative journalism in Ukrainian regional and local media on guard of reforms**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) Democratic Society East Foundation (TDW) (Polish NGO) Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI) from Kiev (Ukrainian NGO)
	The aim was to enhance the level of investigative journalism, increase security of regional journalists (50) and to integrate them. It assumed financial help, broader access to legal advice, trainings in data visualization instruments and data journalism. The project included the usage of new media.[c]
2015	**Media Production Centre**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) Polish Journalists Association (SDP) (Polish trade union) Telekritika (Ukrainian medium)
	The project assumed establishment of a Media Production Centre managed by independent NGO Telekritika, who deals with production and financing of materials concerning the situation in Donbass. A monthly talk-show focusing on social, economic and cultural problems was created and broadcast live by 24 local channels of the state television with its online version.[d]
2016	**The civic wave in the region of Kiev and Donbas**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) Education for Democracy Foundation (Polish NGO) Hromadske Radio (Ukrainian medium)
	The aim of the project is to support Hromadske Radio in broadcasting on ultrasonic waves in the Kyiv region and in the parts of Lugansk and Donetsk (including territories affected by war activities). The 'civic wave' will be heard live on-line, through traditional radio, and through multimedia podcasts. Over 200 programmes will be produced.[e]
2016	**Support for Crimean Tatar media**
	Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program (donor) The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Poland (Polish NGO) Ukrainian journalists
	The aim of the project is to support Crimean Tatar newspapers and journalists in 2016. Support will be used both for the continuation of printed editions as well as the development of web portals.[f]

[a] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/trening-narzedzia-multimedialne-dla-dziennikarzy/, 20.05.2017.

[b] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/ochrona-i-wsparcie-dziennikarzy-donbasu/, 20.05.2017.

[c] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/dziennikarstwo-sledcze-w-ukrainskich-mediach-regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform/, 20.05.2017.

[d] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/centrum-produkcji-medialnej/, 20.05.2017.

[e] Education for Democracy Foundation, https://fed.org.pl/obywatelska-fala-na-kijowszczyznie-i-donbasie/, 20.05.2017.

[f] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/en/programs/poland-canada-democracy-support-program/, 20.05.2017.

Source: Own compilation.

Most of the projects that started in 2012 stressed the role of new media in raising the quality of journalism. Along with the growth of internet users in Ukraine and spread of popularity of online media outlets and social media, projects' organisers naturally started to offer project including elements of digital media literacy, trainings for journalists in new tools available online, and the production of news dedicated to online media outlets. In 2014 Polish media assistance, which previously was focused on traditional press, TV and radio, evolved to more complex support which included also digital media.

The example of pioneer assistance for internet medium was 'Support for Ukrainian youth media' – a project run in 2012 by New Media Foundation from Poland and aimed at supporting independent youth media. As a result, young journalists created 54 online press outlets on media freedom available at the platform Qmam.[22] Other projects combined the elements of supporting 'old' and 'new' as in 'Regional media in Ukraine for fair and free elections' implemented by East European Democratic Centre (Poland) in cooperation with Municipal Center for Humanistic Technologies AHALAR (Ukraine) in 2014.[23] The aim of the Polish-Ukrainian initiative was to support the development of regional media in Ukraine in favour to increase the transparency of elections foster their civic functions in society. What is important, selected journalists received from Polish and Ukrainian experts technological and know how support, including trainings of online media usage.

Those two examples of projects may serve as role models of a) a project aimed directly at developing online medium and b) as an example of holistic media assistance involving both support for traditional and new media. The majority of aid initiatives, dedicated to Ukrainian media, treated assistance for digital outlets and professionals working online as a part of wider support for journalists and media. Surprisingly, none of the funded projects within bilateral cooperation in 2007–2015 provided direct support for bloggers or citizens journalists who also cover news from Ukraine or serve as watch-dogs controlling authorities just as traditional media workers. Such projects as the effort of Common Europe Foundation to establish and develop online portal Eastbook.eu which was financed jointly by Visegrad Fund and Polish Aid were rare and implemented only within multilateral aid. The projects concerned the support for online journalism

---

[22] New Media Foundation, http://www.fundacjanowemedia.org/, 20.05.2017.

[23] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/media-regionalne-na-ukrainie-dla-wolnych-i-sprawiedliwych-wyborow/, 20.05.2017.

and effective use of new media regarding emerging trends and challenges posed by digital media.[24]

In 2014 and 2015 Poland focused on media assistance in Eastern Ukraine, mostly on the aid dedicated to the journalist covering the areas of military conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The information cut off of the region of Donbas and the lack of security for journalists working in dangerous circumstances were probably the main reasons why NGOs targeted its projects to support media in Eastern part of Ukraine. Polish projects included technical support (new equipment) as well as conceptual assistance for e.g. journalists covering the armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia and for media belonging to the Tatar minority who was harassed as a result of the Annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation in 2014. Therefore, Poland by providing external funding for Ukrainian independent media got involved in information war between Ukraine and Russia.

Polish media assistance was also dedicated to journalists working for both traditional and online media in Ukraine in order to improve the transparency of public life and spread democratic values. Polish MFA as a grant-giver of NGOs' media assistance projects aimed at strengthening and building social trust in Ukraine and control mechanisms. The belief in media fulfilling the function of watch-dog and the importance of strengthening the control mechanisms underpinned such media assistance projects which was formulated in the description on project.[25] As a good example of such initiative was a project entitled 'Investigative journalism in Ukrainian regional and local media on guard of reforms' organised by Democratic Society East Foundation in years 2013–2016. Polish journalist who participated in this project as an expert explained that during the trainings the emphasis was put on using online tools for journalism and the matter of digital security.[26]

The analysis of the NGOs' projects allows us to make a conclusion that while assisting media development in Ukraine, Polish NGOs fol-

---

[24] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/eastbook-eu-usamodzielnienie-wersji-ukrainskojezycznej/, 20.05.2017.

[25] Solidarity Fund, http://solidarityfund.pl/dziennikarstwo-sledcze-w-ukrainskich-mediach-regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform/, 20.05.2017. Democratic Society East Foundation, http://www.tdw.org.pl/material,dziennikarstwo-sledcze-w-ukrainskich-mediach-regionalnych-i-lokalnych-na-strazy-reform-2015-2016,253.html, 20.05.2017.

[26] Interview with Beata Biel, specialist working for Google and Democratic Society East Foundation, 11.04.2017, Warsaw.

low the social and political developments in Ukraine and try to tailor
their projects respectively to recipients' needs and current situation in the
country. After 2013 Polish media projects started to focus on supporting
media from Eastern Europe which was motivated by severe difficulties
that journalists from this regional faced in their work. NGOs acknowl-
edged also the necessity to promote investigative journalism which sup-
posed to help Ukrainians deals with the problem of corruption. And last
but not least, Polish support since 2012 started to involve more and more
investments in new media development. Therefore, the second hypothe-
sis, expecting flexibility from media assistance provided by Polish NGOs,
has been supported.

Summary

As a result of relatively successful system transformation, Poland as
donor country started to support freedom of expression and media within
development cooperation with Ukraine in early 90s driven by the idea
of sharing own transition experiences and building good relations with
its neighbour. After joining the European Union in 2004 and becoming
a member of DAC OECD, Poland confirmed its position as young, demo-
cratic country and emerging donor in the field of democracy assistance.
Nonetheless, according to the recent reports on the freedom in the world,
like many other countries, after 2015 also Poland suffered declines in
the quality of democracy, including the governmental attacks on media
independence. Such political shifts gave impetus to ask important ques-
tion about development cooperation as part of Polish foreign policy and
international obligation.

This paper focuses on developmental assistance for new media in
years 2007–2017 provided by Poland as donor in its priority partner
country – Ukraine. The support given to Ukrainian journalists and media
outlets fits Polish democracy assistance strategy within Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA). In principle, media assistance aims to improve
freedom of speech and freedom of press, and in longer perspective to
contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Poland is involved in sup-
porting pro-democratic changes in Ukraine, including media assistance,
on the basis of development cooperation act (2013), multiannual devel-
opment cooperation programmes (2012–2015, 2016–2020) and annual
plans (2007–2017). In years 2008–2013 the support for Ukrainian media

was maintained and intensified in 2014–2016 in connection with the implementation of 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' dedicated to media assistance and local governance assistance. After the expiration of this program, no more funds were allocated by MFA in 2016–2017 to NGOs activities aimed at promoting the development of independent media.

A first bilateral Polish-Ukrainian project concerning new media assistance and financed by Polish Aid was financed in 2012. Since then, NGOs started to include digital literacy and new technologies in projects' proposals. The trainings of journalists in e.g. new online tools or direct support for establishing digital media outlets were continued until 2016. Six out of eleven media assistance projects implemented within 'Poland-Canada Democracy Support Program' responded to the need of strengthening online media and improving journalists' skills. Poland seemed also to target its media assistance regarding the needs of Ukraine as recipient of aid. Such tendency was visible on the example of shifts of beneficiaries in 2014–2015. While before the outbreak of armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia Polish support had rather nationwide character, in 2014–2015 many projects concentrated on delivering aid to journalists and media from Eastern Ukraine. The vast majority of project was addressed to professional journalists gaining experiences in working online, while there was no significant interest in empowering Ukrainian bloggers or citizen journalists.

Therefore, with confidence we can conclude, based on the analysis conducted, that the second hypothesis assuming that Poland actively takes attempt to support media respectively to socio-political situation in recipient country has been supported. Not only Polish projects focus on new media development regarding their growing popularity, but NGOs also acknowledge emerging journalists' problems, needs, and the obstacles to counting professional development due to ongoing armed conflict. However, we were not able to support our first hypothesis in which we expected that Polish governmental support for new media has been maintained regardless the changes in the ruling government. While Polish Aid financed media assistance projects in Ukraine in years 2008–2015 (Civic Platform governance), as the result of call for papers for open competition for development cooperation in 2016 and 2017, no projects in the field of media were funded. Assessing the reasons of state of art requires further research.

Last but not least, it should be emphasised that this paper examined only bilateral development cooperation between Poland and Ukraine

funded by Polish MFA and realised mainly by Polish NGOs together with their Ukrainian partners. To receive a bigger picture of media assistance efforts undertaken by diverse entities, it would be necessary to include also multilateral aid within e.g. European Union, and foreign donors providing funds for Polish initiatives such as National Endowment for Democracy (US). By examining Polish bilateral ODA aimed at supporting media, this work drew attention to the role of NGOs in shaping the practice of Polish development cooperation, being an instrument of foreign policy.

Bibliography

Aday S., Farrell H., Lynch M., Sides J., Kelly J., Zuckerman E. (2010), *Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington.

Alesina A., Dollar D. (2000), *Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?*, "Journal of Economic Growth", no. 5, pp. 33–63.

Arafa M. (2015), *Facebook to Mobilize, Twitter to Coordinate Protests, and YouTube to Tell the World: New Media, Cyberactivism, and the Arab Spring*, "Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective Volume", no. 10 (1), pp. 73–102.

Armbrust W. (2007), *New Media and Old Agendas: The Internet in the Middle East and Middle Eastern Studies*, "International Journal of Middle East Studies", no. 39 (4), pp. 531–533.

Azpuru D., Finkel S. E., Pérez-Liñán A., Seligson M. A. (2008), *Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States Been Doing?*, "Journal of Democracy", no. 19 (2), pp. 150–159.

Baran S. J., Davis D. K. (2007), *Teorie komunikowania masowego*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.

Bastos M. T., Mercea D., Charpentier A. (2015), *Tents, tweets, and events: The interplay between ongoing protests and social media*, "Journal of Communication", no. 65 (2), pp. 320–350.

Beacháin D. Ó., Polese A. (eds.) (2010), *The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics. Successes and Failures*, Routledge, London–New York.

Beichelt T., Hahn-Fuhr I., Schimmelfenning F., Worschech S. (Eds.) (2014), *Civil Society and Democracy Promotion*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke–New York.

Bohdanova T. (2014), *Unexpected revolution: the role of social media in Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising*, "European View", no. 13 (1), pp. 133–142.

Breuer A. (2012), *The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Political Protest: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution. The Social-Economic Situation of Middle East Youth*, Deutsche Nationalbibliografie, Bonn.

Brinks D., Coppedge M. (2006), *Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy*, "Comparative Political Studies", no. 39 (4), pp. 463–489.

Bunce V., Wolchik S. (2006), *International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", no. 39 (3), pp. 283–304.

Burnell P. (2000), *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization*, Frank Cass, London–Portland.

Carothers T. (1999), *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.

Carothers T. (2004), *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.

Chimiak G. (2016), *The Growth of Non-Governmental Development Organisations in Poland and Their Cooperation with Polish Aid*, IFiS PAN, Warsaw.

Chyliński M., Russ-Mohl S. (2008), *Dziennikarstwo*, Grupa Wydawnicza Polskapresse, Warsaw.

Cornell S., Thielen T. (2006), *Herzegovina Assessment of Usaid/Bosnia and Herzegovina Media Interventions*, United States Agency for International Development, Washington, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadh275.pdf.

Cottle S. (2011), *Media and the Arab Uprisings of 2011*, "Journalism", no. 12 (5), pp. 531–541.

Diamond L. (1999), *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore–London.

Diamond L. (2012), Liberation Technology, in: *Liberation technology. Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy*, eds. L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 5–17.

Doliwa U. (2012), *Dziennikarstwo obywatelskie, czyli jakie?*, "Nowe Media", no. 3, pp. 81–100.

Downing J. (1996), *Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks.

Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka E. (2013), *From a Recipient to Donor – the Case of Polish Developmental Cooperation*, "Human Organization", no. 72 (1), pp. 65–75.

Dyczok M. (2009), *Do the Media Matter? Focus on Ukraine*, in: *Media, Democracy and Freedom: the Post-Communist Experience*, eds. M. Dyczok, O. Gaman-Golutvina, Peter Lang, Bern, http://shron.chtyvo.org.ua/Marta_Dyczok/Do_the_Media_Matter7_Focus_on_Ukraine__en.pdf.

El-Nawawy M., Khamis S. (2012), *Political Activism 2.0: Comparing the Role of Social Media in Egypt's "Facebook Revolution" and Iran's "Twitter Uprising"*, "CyberOrient", no. 6 (1), http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=7439.

Eltantawy N., Wiest J. B. (2011), *Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory*, "International Journal of Communication", no. 5, pp. 1207–1224.

Ethier D. (2003), *Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives*, "Democratization", no. 10 (1), pp. 99–120.

Etling B., Roberts H., Faris R. (2014), *Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere: The Role of Blogs, Mainstream Media, and TV in Russia's Media Ecology*, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.

FH. (2016), *Freedom in the World 2016*, Freedom House.

Gilboa E. (2005), *The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations*, "Political Communication", no. 22 (1), pp. 27–44.

Gillmor D. (2006), *We the Media. Grassroots Journalism By the People, For the People*, O'Reilly Media, Sebastopol.

Gunther R., Diamandouros N. P., Puhle H.-J. (1995), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore–London.

Higgins D. (2014), *The Western Way? Democracy and the Media Assistance Model*, "Global Media Journal", no. 4 (2), pp. 1–15.

Horký-Hlucháň O., Lightfoot S. (eds.) (2015), *Development Cooperation of the "New" EU Member States: Beyond Europeanization*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Howard P. N., Hussain M. M. (2011), *The Role of Digital Media*, "Journal of Democracy", no. 22 (3), pp. 35–48.

Howard R. (2003), *International Media Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned* (No. Working Paper 19), Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" Conflict Research Unit (CRU), Hague, https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20030600_cru_working_paper_19.pdf.

Hume E. (2011), *Caught in the Middle: Central and Eastern European Journalism at a Crossroads*, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, http://ellenhume.com/wp-content/uploads/CIMA-Central_and_Eastern_Europe-Report_3.pdf.

Huntington S. P. (1991), *Democracy's Third Wave*, "Journal of Democracy", no. 2 (2), pp. 12–34.

Jakubowicz K., Sükösd M. (2008), *Finding the right place on the map: Central and Eastern European media change in a global perspective*, Intellect Books, Bristol.

Jebril N., Stetka V., Loveless M. (2013), *Media and Democratisation: What is Known about the Role of Mass Media in Transitions to Democracy*, University of Oxford, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Mediaand-Democratisation_0.pdf.

Jonavicius L. (2008), *The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, FRIDE, http://fride.org/download/wp55_central_estearn_eu_eng_mar08.pdf.

Kaplan A. M., Haenlein M. (2010), *Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media*, "Business Horizons", no. 53 (1), pp. 59–68.

Karlowicz I. (2003), *The Difficult Birth of the Fourth Estate: Media Development and Democracy Assistance in the Post-Conflict Balkans*, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002252/01/media_5_karlowicz.pdf.

Kobylińska A., Makowski G., Solon-Lipiński M. (eds.) (2012), *Mechanizmy przeciwdziałania korupcji w Polsce. Raport z monitoringu*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/filemanager/Mechanizmyprzeciwdziaaniakorupcji.PDF.

Kucharczyk J., Lovitt J. (eds.) (2007), *Democracy's New Champions. European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement*, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Praha.

Kudlenko A. (2015), *From Colour Revolutions to the Arab Spring: The Role of Civil Society in Democracy Building and Transition Processes*, "Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe", no. 23 (2–3), pp. 167–179.

Kumar K. (2006), *Promoting Independent Media: Strategies for Democracy Assistance*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.

Kumar K. (2009), *One Size Does Not Fit All. Objectives and Priority Areas for Media Assistance in Different Societies*, Center for International Media Assistance, Washington.

Kunczik M., Zipfel A. (2000), *Wprowadzenie do nauki o dziennikarstwie i komunikowaniu*, Wydawnictwo SCHOLAR, Warszawa.

Kyriakopoulou K. (2011), *Authoritarian states and internet social media: Instruments of democratisation or instruments of control?*, "Human Affairs", no. 21 (1), pp. 18–26.

Lexmann M. (2014), *Let's not talk about transition sharing, let's do it. The potential of the Central and Eastern EU Member States in accelerating democracy support and transition in EU's neighbourhood*, in: *International Conference Booklet Development and Democracy Development Ecosystems in V4: the New Role for Civil Society Organisations and Business Beyond 2015*, Pontis Foudantion, Bratislava, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/data/files/D&D_zbornik_BOOK_WEB.pdf.

Lister M., Dovey J., Giddins S., Grant I., Kelly K. (2009), *New media: a critical introduction* (Second edi), Routledge, Abingdon.

Lopes A. R. (2014), *The Impact of Social Media on Social Movements: The New Opportunity and Mobilizing Structure*, https://www.creighton.edu/fileadmin/user/CCAS/departments/PoliticalScience/Journal_of_Political_Research__JPR_/2014_JSP_papers/Lopes_JPR.pdf.

Lynch M. (2015), *How the Media Trashed the Transitions to Democracy*, "Journal of Democracy", no. 26 (4), pp. 90–99.

Lynch M., Freelon D., Aday S. (2016), *How Social Media Undermines Transitions to Democracy*, PeaceTech Lab, Washington, http://www.peacetechlab.org/blogs-bullets-iv.

Lysenko V. V., Desouza K. C. (2012), *Moldova's Internet Revolution: Analyzing the Role of Technologies in Various Phases of the Confrontation*, "Technological Forecasting and Social Change", no. 79 (2), pp. 341–361.

Manovich L. (2001), *The Language of New Media*, The MIT PRess, Massachusetts.

McCombs M. (2014), *Setting the Agenda. The Mass Media and Public Opinion*, Polity Press, Cambridge–Malden.

McConnell P. J., Becker L. B. (2002), *The Role of the Media in Democratization* (Paper presented to the Political Communication Section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research at the Barcelona Conference), http://www.grady.uga.edu/coxcenter/activities/act_2001_to_2002/materials01-02/democratizationiamcrjuly2002.pdfm.

McMahon P. (2004), *Building Civil Societies in East Central Europe: The Effect of American Non-governmental Organizations on Women's Groups*, in: *Civil Society in Democratization*, eds. P. J. Burnell, P. Calvert, Routledge, New York.

McNair B. (1998), *Wprowadzenie do komunikowania politycznego*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Nauk Humanistycznych i Dziennikarstwa, Poznań.

McQuail D. (2010), *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, SAGE Publications, London.

Mendelson S. E. (2001), *Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia*, "International Security", no. 25 (4), pp. 68–106.

Morozov E. (2011), *The Net Delusion. The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*, vol. 9, PublicAffairs, New York, http://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711004026.

Morozov E. (2012), *Whither Internet Control?*, in: *Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy*, eds. L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Myers M. (2009), *Funding for Media Development by Major Donors Outside the United States*, National Endowment for Democracy, New York, http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/CIMA-Non-US_Funding_of_Media_Development.pdf.

Nierenberg B. (2007), *Publiczne przedsiębiorstwo medialne. Determinanty, systemy, modele*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.

Obydenkova A. (2008), *Regime transition in the regions of Russia: The freedom of mass media: Transnational impact on sub-national democratization?*, "European Journal of Political Research", no. 47 (2), pp. 221–246.

Olorunnisola A. A., Martin B. L. (2013), *Influences of Media on Social Movements: Problematizing Hyperbolic Inferences about Impacts*, "Telematics and Informatics", no. 30 (3), pp. 275–288.

Olsen G. R. (2000), *Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of "Europe": Limits to International Idealism*, "Democratization", no. 7 (2), pp. 142–167.

Onuch O. (2015), *EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks*, "Problems of Post-Communism", no. 62, pp. 217–235.

Pearce K. E., Kendzior S. (2012), *Networked Authoritarianism and Social Media in Azerbaijan*, "Journal of Communication", no. 62, pp. 283–298.

Petrova T. (2014a), *From Solidarity to Geopolitics. Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Petrova T. (2014b), *Making Transitional Democracy and Human Rights Activism Work? On the Trade-Offs of Eastern EU Support for Civil Society Development Abroad*, in: *Civil Society and Democracy promotion*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke–New York, pp. 110–133.

Pospieszna P. (2014), *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave. Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.

Pospieszna P. (2016a), *Pomoc demokratyzacyjna polskich organizacji pozarządowych skierowana do Białorusi i Ukrainy: przesłanki oraz różne formy wsparcia*, "Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne", no. 3, pp. 236–266.

Pospieszna P. (2016), *Współpraca rozwojowa w zakresie promowania dobrego rządzenia i rozwoju demokracji przez kraje Grupy Wyszehradzkiej*, in: *Tożsamość i efektywność: w poszukiwaniu mechanizmów zrównoważonego rozwoju*, eds. K. Jarecka-Stępień, A. Surdej, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, pp. 89–110.

Rhodes A. (2007), *Ten Years of Media Support To the Balkans: An Assessment*, Media Task Force of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Amsterdam, http://www.medienhilfe.ch/fileadmin/media/images/dossier/mediasupport_Balkan.pdf.

Richter J. (2002), *Promoting Civil Society? Democracy Assistance and Russian Women's Organizations*, "Problems of Post-Communism", no. 49 (1), pp. 30–41.

Robertson A. (2013), *Connecting in Crisis: "Old" and "New" Media and the Arab Spring*, "The International Journal of Press/Politics", no. 18 (3), pp. 325–341.

Robertson A. (2015), *What's Going on? Making Sense of the Role of the Media in the Arab Uprisings*, "Sociology Compass", no. 9 (7), pp. 531–541, http://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12278.

Rotham P. (2015), *The Politics of Media Development. The Importance of Engaging Government and Civil Society*, Center for International Media Assistance, Washington.

Sandoval-Almazan R., Ramon Gil-Garcia J. (2014), *Towards cyberactivism 2.0? Understanding the use of social media and other information technologies for political activism and social movements*, "Government Information Quarterly", no. 31 (3), pp. 365–378.

Sasińska-Klas T. (1994), *The Transition of Mass Media in Poland: The Road to Liberalization*, "The Electronic Journal of Communication", no. 4 (1).

Shirky C. (2009), *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*, Penguin Books, London, http://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp09X420437.

Shirky C. (2011), *The Political Power of Social Media*, "Foreign Affairs", no. 90 (1), pp. 28–41.

Shveda Y., Park J. H. (2016), *Ukraine's revolution of dignity: The dynamics of Euromaidan*, "Journal of Eurasian Studies", no. 7 (1), pp. 85–91.

Siegel D., Yancey J. (1992), *The Rebirth of Civil Society: The Development of the Nonprofit Sector in East Central Europe and the Role of Western Assistance*, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, New York.

Sobczak J. (2007), *Wolność prasy. Złudzenia – oczekiwania – rzeczywistość*, in: *Media w Polsce. Pierwsza władza IV RP?*, ed. M. Sokołowski, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa, pp. 303–334.

Soldatov A., Borogan I. (2015), *The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia's Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries*, PublicAffairs, New York.

Szent-Iványi B. (2014), *The EU's Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition Experience from the New Member States*, "Europe-Asia Studies", no. 66 (7), pp. 1102–1121.

Szent-Iványi B., Lightfoot S. (2015), *Central and Eastern European transition experience: a depoliticisation of democracy aid?*, in: *Democratization in EU foreign policy: new member states as drivers of democracy promotion*, eds. B. Berti, K. Mikulova, N. Popescu, Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 37–60.

The Commonwealth (2016), *Global Youth Development Index and Report 2016*, London, http://cmydiprod.uksouth.cloudapp.azure.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/2016GlobalYouthDevelopmentIndexandReport.pdf.

Tsetsura K. (2015), *Ukrainian NGOs as Opinion Makers: How Media Organizations Communicate about Progress in New Democracy with Western Donors*, "Trípodos", no. 37, pp. 91–110.

Tsetsura K., Grynko A., Klyueva A. (2011), *The Media Map Project. Ukraine. Case Study on Donor Support to Independent Media, 1990–2010*, Internews, http://www.mediamapresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Ukraine.pdf.

Ullah M. S. (2009), *Free Media, Democracy and Democratisation: Experiences from Developing Countries*, "Journal of Global Communication", no. 2 (2), pp. 343–351.

Voltmer K. (2013), *The Media in Transitional Democracies*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Yesayan T. (2014), *Social Networking: A Guide to Strengthening Civil Society Through Social Media*, United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/SMGuide4CSO.pdf.

Youngs R. (2008), *Trends in Democracy Assistance. What has Europe Been Doing?*, "Journal of Democracy", no. 19 (2), pp. 160–169, http://fride.org/download/ART_EU_Democracy_Aid_EN_abr08.pdf.

Zaliznyak J. (2014), *The New Media of Euromaidan: Online Instruments to Defend Democracy in Ukraine*, in: *Open Europe: Cultural Dialogue Across Borders*, ed. W. Piątkowska-Stepaniak, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, Opole, pp. 179–190.

Wsparcie nowych mediów na Ukrainie w ramach polskiego programu pomocy rozwojowej

Streszczenie

W efekcie stosunkowo udanej transformacji systemowej niektóre młode, demokratyczne kraje, które jeszcze w latach 80-tych i 90-tych otrzymywały pomoc de-

mokratyzacyjną, zaangażowały się w charakterze nowych donatorów we wspieranie pro-demokratycznych przemian w mniej rozwiniętych państwach. Relacje pomiędzy post-komunistycznymi donatorami a odbiorcami pomocy można obserwować na przykładzie współpracy rozwojowej Polski i Ukrainy. Artykuł koncentruje się na kwestii polskiego wsparcia rozwojowego, udzielanego Ukrainie w latach 2007–2017 w ramach Polskiej Pomocy. Niniejsza praca ma za zadanie udzielić odpowiedzi na pytania o to czy polskie, rządowe wsparcie dla ukraińskich mediów jest kontynuowane pomimo zmiany partii rządzącej oraz czy polskie organizacje pozarządowe, które realizują pomoc rozwojową w oparciu o finansowanie Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych RP, dopasowują swoje projekty do aktualnych potrzeb beneficjentów wsparcia i aktualnej sytuacji na Ukrainie. Autorki stawiają sobie jako cel zwrócenie uwagi na związki pomiędzy zaangażowaniem państw zewnętrznych i istnieniem niezależnych mediów a procesami demokratyzacji i wysiłkami, jakie podejmowane są przez tzw. nowych donatorów w państwach partnerskich.

Słowa kluczowe: wspieranie mediów, nowe media, współpraca rozwojowa, Ukraina, Polska